Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Eighth sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Peter Dowd, Clive Efford, Sir Roger Gale, Carolyn Harris, † Esther McVey

† Abbott, Jack (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)

† Atkinson, Lewis (Sunderland Central) (Lab)

† Campbell, Juliet (Broxtowe) (Lab)

† Charalambous, Bambos (Southgate and Wood Green) (Lab)

† Francis, Daniel (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)

† Gordon, Tom (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)

† Green, Sarah (Chesham and Amersham) (LD)

† Hopkins, Rachel (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)

† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)

† Kinnock, Stephen (Minister for Care)

† Kruger, Danny (East Wiltshire) (Con)

† Leadbeater, Kim (Spen Valley) (Lab)

† Malthouse, Kit (North West Hampshire) (Con)

† Olney, Sarah (Richmond Park) (LD)

† Opher, Dr Simon (Stroud) (Lab)

† Paul, Rebecca (Reigate) (Con)

† Richards, Jake (Rother Valley) (Lab)

† Sackman, Sarah (Minister of State, Ministry of Justice)

† Saville Roberts, Liz (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)

† Shah, Naz (Bradford West) (Lab)

† Shastri-Hurst, Dr Neil (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)

† Tidball, Dr Marie (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)

† Woodcock, Sean (Banbury) (Lab)

Lynn Gardner, Lucinda Maer, Jonathan Whiffing, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

[Esther McVey in the Chair]

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

09:25:00

Will everyone ensure that all electronic devices are switched off or to silent mode? We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and on the parliamentary website. It shows how the clauses, schedules and selected amendments have been grouped together for debate. I remind the Committee that a Member who has put their name to the lead amendment in a group is called first or, in the case of a stand part debate, the Member in charge, Kim Leadbeater, will be called to speak first. Other Members are then free to indicate that they wish to speak in the debate by bobbing. At the end of the debate on a group of amendments and new clauses and schedules, I shall call the Member who moved the lead amendment or new clause again. Before they sit down, they will need to indicate whether they wish to withdraw the amendment or the new clause, or to seek a decision. If any Member wishes to press any other amendment—including any of the grouped new clauses and schedules—to a vote, they need to let me know. I shall use my discretion to decide whether to allow a separate stand part debate on individual clauses and schedules following the debate on relevant amendments. I hope that explanation is helpful. If any Member wishes to make a declaration of interest, they can do so now.

On a point of order, Ms McVey. Yesterday, members of the Committee received notification that, in the last week, we have received a further 242 pieces of written evidence and 159 pieces of correspondence. Last week, I had read every word of the original 110 pieces of written evidence and 56 pieces of correspondence, as well as studying all the amendments and tabling amendments of my own. As I said, however, more than 400 pieces of evidence and correspondence have been uploaded during the past week, with no deadline by which further such evidence needs to be submitted. Given the large number of evidence submissions every day, Members may well struggle to keep abreast of it and be able to say that they have read every piece of correspondence before the tweaking of the Bill. I find it difficult to believe that any member of the Committee has been able to read all the evidence submitted since last Tuesday. For instance, the written evidence submitted by the chief executive of my local hospice, which she blind-copied me into on 20 January, was available for members of this Committee to read on 7 February, 17 days after she submitted it. That suggests that, as well as Members struggling to keep up, the Clerks are struggling to keep up. Given the sheer volume of evidence, we will not be able to consider it fully before line-by-line scrutiny. I therefore seek your advice, Ms McVey, on how we can reasonably expected to begin line-by-line scrutiny when in the last week we have been presented with more than 400 documents, in addition to new amendments.

I thank the Member for making that point of order. It is normal practice for evidence to come in, and for it to be submitted as it comes in. However, due to the large amount of evidence and its substance, and to the importance of the Bill and this line-by-line scrutiny, I will seek the advice of the Clerk and will come back to him.

Further to that point of order, Ms McVey. My concern is about written evidence that has been submitted but not yet read—I have certainly not been through the last batch of evidence that we have had. How do we proceed when, for example, we might have gone through clauses 1 and 2, or even up to clause 4 or 5, and we receive evidence related to those clauses? We will have already discussed them in Committee. We have been told we will only get five hours on Report, while on Second Reading more than 100 MPs, including me, were unable to speak. The evidence could inform amendments. I am struggling to understand how this will be workable. I would value your advice.

I am pleased that people feel they are free to make those points. It is for the Committee to decide how fast to move through the Bill.

Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. I also assume that we are expecting more written evidence to come through. We Committee members are here for the whole day. I hear you say, Ms McVey, that this is normal practice, but considering the importance of the Bill, I assume there will be a lot more written evidence by the end of today. It would be good to consider how Committee members are able to go through that written evidence before we come back here tomorrow morning.

As I expressed before, it is for the Committee to decide. Should Members feel they have not had enough time, it is for the Committee to raise a point on that. Should people wish to have an adjourn, they could move that and the Committee would vote on it.

Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. I am grateful for your guidance, and I acknowledge your point that normal process is being followed in this Committee. Nevertheless, further to the points made by hon. Members, last night we heard through the media that a very substantial change to the Bill will be introduced. We have not yet seen those amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Spen Valley, but we look forward to doing so. This goes to the same point: we are being asked to start line-by-line scrutiny today of a Bill with a huge amount of evidence that we have not yet been able to digest. Furthermore, substantial changes to the Bill that we voted on at Second Reading are being tabled. I appreciate that the process allows amendments to be tabled at any time through the course of the Bill as long as the clause is still ahead. Nevertheless, I value your guidance on whether it might be appropriate to seek an Adjournment so that we can consider the additional evidence, but also allow the hon. Member for Spen Valley to table her amendments, which change the whole scope of the Bill as voted on at Second Reading.

I thank the hon. Member for his point of order. As I said, the Committee would have to move and vote on an Adjournment. These are significant points of concern and alteration for the Bill, but that is for the Committee to decide.

Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. My point of concern is similar to the one just raised, and is about the fact that on Second Reading a key plank of this proposed Bill was about the role of the High Court judges. We are aware of an amendment coming via the promoter of the Bill, my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, to remove that completely and replace it with something else. I suggest that a lot of the evidence that we have seen, including the new stuff that has been mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, is based on the expectation of there being a High Court judge in that role; not on there being a new amendment. I suggest that we are missing vital perspectives on the way that any new amendment, and the Bill going forward, would work in the light of that. That is my concern.

It is important that everybody has got their point on the record, and that they have said and raised their concerns.

Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. First of all, it is worth saying that the amendments tabled by the Bill’s promoter, the hon. Member for Spen Valley, are in response to evidence that has been heard by this Committee—oral and written. Certainly the Bill Committees that I have been on have had repeated information coming in as the Bill has evolved. That is an actual process. It is worth also pointing out to Members that the Bill Committee is not the end of the process, and written evidence that will arrive throughout will be pertinent on Report, when the whole House will have that information available. Then members of the Committee can lead the debate and reflect on information or written evidence that has emerged even after Committee stage, once the completed Bill from that process is seen. It is perfectly possible for this to evolve as we get to Report and Third Reading in the light of evidence that arrives. That is the normal process through which all legislation goes.

Thank you. I call Kim Leadbeater.

Further to those points of order, Ms McVey. I take on board people’s comments. There’s no two ways about it; this is a considerable amount of work for members of the Bill Committee to undertake. As has been alluded to, there are a wide range of amendments being proposed. The job of the Committee is to take evidence, look at those amendments, discuss and debate them, and then vote accordingly. That is the process that we are all here to undertake.

Thank you. Let us start. Clause 1 Assisted dying

I beg to move amendment 178, in clause 1, page 1, line 3, after “person” insert “in England or Wales”. This amendment provides that only persons in England or Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 179, in clause 1, page 1, line 13, after “provided” insert “in England or Wales”. This amendment limits the assistance that may be provided in accordance with the Bill to assistance in England or Wales. Amendment 180, in clause 1, page 1, line 20, at end insert— “(3) The steps to be taken under sections 5, 7, 8 and 13 must be taken— (a) when the terminally ill person is in England or Wales, and (b) in the case of the steps under sections 7 and 8, by persons in England or Wales.” This amendment provides that steps under clauses 5, 7, 8 and 13 must be taken by and in respect of persons in England or Wales. Amendment 182, in clause 4, page 2, line 21, after “person” insert “in England or Wales”. This amendment limits subsection (3) to cases where the person is in England or Wales. Amendment 193, in clause 7, page 4, line 8, at end insert— “(ca) is in England and Wales,”. This amendment, which is consequential on Amendment 178, provides that the coordinating doctor must ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person who made the first declaration is in England and Wales.

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms McVey, in this very important stage in the consideration and detailed scrutiny of the Bill. We are discussing assisted dying for terminally ill adults who have a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and who have not been subjected to coercion or pressure from anybody else to do so. These are very serious matters and deserve serious consideration, which is why I was determined that this Bill should have an unprecedented level of scrutiny. We have heard from a range of over 50 witnesses with differing views on the Bill and have received written evidence from many, many more. I am grateful to everyone who has contributed in such a thoughtful and constructive way. It has been widely remarked—and I wholeheartedly agree—that the Second Reading debate on 29 November last year, when the House approved the principle of the Bill by a majority of 55, showed Parliament at its best. I hope and believe that this Committee, as it goes through the Bill line by line, will do so in the same considered, respectful and measured manner.

I completely endorse that last point made by the hon. Lady. Does she remember how many Members on Second Reading—including, I think, herself—made reference to the judicial stage of the process and specifically to the High Court judge? Over 60 colleagues have stated on the record that they voted for the Bill on Second Reading because of that safeguard. Does she acknowledge that point?

I do acknowledge that point—absolutely, as I have acknowledged, the role of a High Court judge is really important in this process. That role will remain with the amendment I have tabled. It will also take account of the very clear evidence we received during the oral evidence sessions from psychiatrists, social workers and other professionals who feel that they have an important role to play in this process. Indeed, I heard the hon. Gentleman say he agreed with that on the radio this morning. It is very important that we hear from those experts. There is no point in having witnesses if we do not listen to what they have to say.

Order. I remind Members that they should keep to the amendments being debated.

Thank you, Ms McVey. I hope and believe that the Committee will take the same considered, respectful approach that we have taken previously. We have been asked by the House to look at where the Bill can be improved and to amend it, so that Parliament can be presented with a piece of legislation that is robust and workable in order to meet the objectives it is designed to achieve. Most—if not all—the amendments tabled in my name, have been drafted with the help of parliamentary counsel and officials in both the Department of Health and Social Care and the Ministry of Justice. The Government are committed to making the Bill workable and operable, while maintaining a position of neutrality. I am grateful for the tremendous hard work that has gone into this to make a well-drafted Bill even better. I know the Ministers on the Committee, although remaining neutral, will be here to explain, where necessary, why some drafting amendments were needed to meet their duty to the statute book. There is an old adage that says too many cooks spoil the broth. That may not exactly be parliamentary language, but we will have to bear it in mind as we go along. Over 300 amendments have been tabled—most of them with the intention of improving and strengthening the Bill. I thank all MPs, whether members of the Committee or not, for the time and effort they have put in. We have a responsibility to maintain the integrity and coherence of the Bill as a whole, so it is evident that we will not be able to accept all amendments. Indeed, we may find ourselves rejecting amendments that sound entirely reasonable in themselves and that undoubtedly come from a good place, but that are perhaps better addressed elsewhere in the drafting. Others might have unintended consequences or create a degree of ambiguity or uncertainty that could undermine the legal authority of the legislation. That might be very good for the pockets of lawyers, but it does not make for good law.

Order. I remind the Member that although a brief introduction is acceptable, we should be talking to the amendments in this group.

Absolutely, Ms McVey—thank you for allowing me to make some introductory comments. Amendments 178 to 180, 182 and 193 simply clarify that only persons in England and Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Act, and only medical practitioners in England and Wales can carry out the required roles at each stage of the process. Hopefully, this is a nice straightforward one to get us started.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley for her introductory comments. The Government will continue to remain neutral on the Bill and do not hold a position on assisted dying. I want to make it clear that I, along with the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green, are speaking in Committee not as Members of Parliament, but as Government Ministers responsible for ensuring that the Bill, if passed, is effective, legally robust and workable. To that end, we have been working closely with the hon. Member for Spen Valley and, where changes have been mutually agreed on by herself and the Government, we will offer a technical, factual explanation for the amendments. Therefore, I will not be offering up a Government view on the merits of any proposed changes put forward by other Members, but I will make brief remarks on an amendment’s legal and practical impact to assist Members in undertaking line-by-line scrutiny.

May I ask how what the Minister has just said interacts with voting? He set out clearly his involvement in the Committee, so how does that impact any votes that he will take part in during it?

I am on the Committee as a Member of Parliament and I vote as such. When I speak on the Committee, I speak as a Government Minister in order to provide factual and technical explanations. As the Bill is a matter of conscience, I will be voting with my conscience on all the amendments as they come forward. The amendments that we are now debating have been tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley in consultation with the Government. They relate to the location of the person seeking assistance under the Bill and are designed to ensure that the service can only be accessed by an individual present in England and Wales, with a view to preventing medical tourism. I will take the amendments in turn. Amendments 178 and 193 would ensure that only a terminally ill person in England or Wales may be provided with assistance in accordance with the Bill. Further to that, a requirement is placed on the co-ordinating doctor to ascertain whether, in their opinion, the person who made the first declaration is in England and Wales as part of their first assessment. Amendment 179 would limit the assistance that may be provided in accordance with the Bill to assistance in England or Wales only. Amendment 180 would require the steps taken under clauses 5, 7, 8 and 13 that relate to both declarations and both doctors’ assessments to be taken by persons in England or Wales. Amendment 182 would limit the provision of clause 4(3), where a person indicates to a registered medical practitioner their wish to seek assistance to end their own life, to cases where the person is physically present in England or Wales. It would prevent people who are outside of England or Wales from accessing assistance in accordance with the Act—for example, by online consultations from abroad. As I said earlier, the Government will continue to remain neutral on the substantive policy questions relevant to how the law in this area could be changed. That is, as I have made clear, a matter for the Committee and for Parliament as a whole. However, I hope that these observations are helpful to Members in considering the Bill and the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley. Amendment 178 agreed to.

I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 1, page 1, line 4, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”. This replaces the concept of capacity based on the Mental Capacity Act and replaces it with a new concept of ability which is defined in NC1.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 36, in clause 7, page 4, line 7, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1. Amendment 37, in clause 8, page 4, line 34, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1. Amendment 38, in clause 9, page 6, line 27, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1. Amendment 202, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “capacity”. This amendment corrects a typographical error. Amendment 39, in clause 9, page 6, line 31, leave out “capability” and insert “ability”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1. Amendment 40, in clause 12, page 8, line 2, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1. Amendment 41, in clause 13, page 9, line 31, leave out “capacity” and insert “ability”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1. Amendment 42, in clause 18, page 12, line 23, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1. Amendment 43, in clause 30, page 18, line 16, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1. Amendment 44, in clause 40, page 23, line 26, leave out from “capacity” and insert “ability”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 34 and NC1. New clause 1—Ability to make decision— “The person is to be considered as having the ability to make a decision to request assistance to end their life if they can fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State under affirmative resolution.” This new clause defines the concept of ability which is intended to replace the concept of capacity. This new clause is intended to replace clause 3. Amendment 45, to schedule 2, page 26, line 36, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability to make a decision”. Amendment 46, to schedule 3, page 28, line 1, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability to make a decision”. Amendment 47, to schedule 5, page 30, line 14, leave out “capacity” and insert “the ability to make a decision”.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. I thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley for her opening remarks. I am grateful to be called so early in proceedings, because I believe this is one of the really important issues before us. It is about whether or not somebody “has the capacity to make a decision to end their own life” as is stated in clause 1(1)(a). I believe that the word “capacity” in this context is potentially difficult to define. I note that in clause 3, all reference to mental capacity is assumed to refer to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but I do not believe that that is sufficient for the purposes of the Bill. We heard plenty of voices to support my point of view during the oral evidence, so I want to reflect on that. I think there are four separate concerns about using the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to judge capacity. The Royal College of Psychiatrists submitted its original written evidence in January, which we have all had sight of, and it said: “Under the Bill as introduced, a person with a co-occurring mental disorder that is impacting their wish to end their own life would not necessarily be deemed ineligible; only those whose mental disorder was deemed to impair their capacity to make a decision to end their own life would be excluded.” That means that an individual could have a terminal illness and also separately have a mental illness, such as depression; that would affect their ability to make a decision as to whether that terminal illness was sufficient for them to ask for assistance with dying.

09:45:00

Under the Mental Capacity Act, someone must be completely unable

“to understand the information relevant to the decision…to retain that information…to use or weigh that information as part of the process of the making the decision, or…to communicate his decision.”

If they are only partially able to do so, they will still be considered to have capacity under the Mental Capacity Act, so it is not a safeguard to protect a terminally ill person who happens to be suicidal due to depression. That is not just a hypothetical issue; in a 2015 Court of Protection case, a woman with a personality disorder refused lifesaving dialysis treatment, and the doctors felt that her personality disorder affected her decision, but the court held that she none the less had the capacity to make that decision, even though it would result in her death. Under the Bill, a patient in the same position could opt for assisted dying and the Mental Capacity Act would not protect them. I am not sure that is acceptable to Members of this House when they are considering the Bill.

New clause 1 would replace the notion of capacity with a test of ability. The definition is based on the functional test in section 3 of the Mental Capacity Act, but would require that the person was able to

“fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information”

The addition of “fully” means that, in the case of impaired ability, the person would not be considered to pass the test. This means that a terminally ill patient with a co-occurring mental health condition that affects their judgment would not be eligible for assisted dying

During oral evidence, the hon. Member for Spen Valley said that the intended beneficiaries of the law

“would not describe themselves as suicidal.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 165, Q211.]

However, as drafted, the Bill offers little protection to a terminally ill person who happens to be suicidal. In my view, it should protect them, and I strongly suspect that is something that the vast majority of colleagues who supported the Bill on Second Reading think is already in the Bill. The Mental Capacity Act also includes the presumption of capacity, which is really important, and it says:

“A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity.”

It must therefore be proven that somebody lacks capacity.

The Mental Capacity Act is written to enable people to carry out day-to-day scenarios, such as buying a coffee or doing their banking, so that they are not challenged in every transaction in their life. It is therefore a very low bar to be deemed to have capacity. Does the hon. Member believe that it was written for this kind of scenario?

That is an absolutely relevant point. The Mental Capacity Act was not drafted in anticipation of it ever being used for this kind of scenario. Therefore, it is really incumbent upon us to weigh very carefully whether the Mental Capacity Act is the right way of assessing people’s ability to make this decision. As I was saying, it includes the presumption of capacity, and for a decision to end one’s life, an assumption of capacity to make that decision is a low bar, and we have lots of evidence.

I am interested in that point about the Mental Capacity Act not having been written with the Bill in mind. That is absolutely true for the minds of its framers and the Parliament that passed it at the time. It is worth noting, however, that we can see from the accounts and records of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, which became Dignity in Dying a few years later, that it was lobbying at the time covertly—or behind the scenes—for the Mental Capacity Act to be framed in exactly that way. The Voluntary Euthanasia Society was very conscious that, when the time came to pass the law for assisted suicide, it would be very helpful to have a capacity Act on the statute book that had this very low bar. The society was delighted when the Act was passed in the way that it was, and it boasted at the time of the influence it had had on the Act.

That is a very interesting intervention. I cannot comment on that because I have no knowledge of how the Mental Capacity Act was drafted or the evidence that was taken.

I do believe that the Mental Capacity Act enables people to make very serious decisions, such as stopping cancer treatment, so I would absolutely dispute the hon. Lady’s interpretation of it.

The hon. Gentleman puts his finger on the exact point: it allows people to make a decision about whether or not they want to continue treatment; it has not been used in this way before, and it was not intended to be used for that purpose. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point: he was trying to say that to stop treatment is akin to making a proactive decision to end one’s life, but I would argue that it is not, and that is why the Mental Capacity Act is unsuitable for this purpose. It was interesting to reflect on the oral and written evidence we received on this issue. Professor Sir Chris Whitty, the chief medical officer, stated in his oral evidence: “Issues…around mental capacity…are dealt with every day…every doctor and nurse above a certain level of seniority should be able to do that normally. It may require some slight adjustment.” He acknowledged that “the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30, Q13.] However, the Royal College of Psychiatrists said that “an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding.”

During the oral evidence, we heard from three sets of psychiatrists who all cast doubt on the suitability of the Mental Capacity Act for decisions such as assisted dying. Is the hon. Lady’ s amendment an attempt to alleviate those doubts and put that right in the Bill?

Yes, that is exactly what I am aiming to do. The hon. Member makes an excellent point. There is a wide variety of views on this, but in actual fact, much as I do not wish to question Professor Sir Chris Whitty, and I acknowledge his seniority as the chief medical officer, he was very much the outlier on this. Everybody else who gave evidence on the sufficiency of the Mental Capacity Act to determine someone’s capability to make this decision for themselves cast doubt on the idea that the Mental Capacity Act was the right way of doing it.

That is not quite accurate. I think we did have other witnesses who absolutely said that they had confidence in the Mental Capacity Act, and I will speak about them in this debate.

I look forward to the hon. Lady’s further comments, but as I said, the psychiatrists were very clear that they did not believe that this was a sufficient safeguard, and we should acknowledge that. I was unable to put my question to Alex Ruck Keene KC during the oral evidence session, but he kindly agreed to give further evidence in writing in response to a letter I sent to him later that day. That exchange of letters has been published as written evidence. It was his position that, in actual fact, Professor Sir Chris Whitty misinterpreted the Mental Capacity Act when he gave evidence. There is no such requirement in the Mental Capacity Act that states that the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have. Mr Ruck Keene’s view is that that was the common law prior to the Mental Capacity Act coming into force, whereas in actual fact the Mental Capacity Act does not require that the more serious the decision, the more capacity someone needs to be judged to have.

I am sympathetic to the problem the hon. Lady has identified of people who have a terminal illness as well as other mental health conditions. Instead of rewriting the Mental Capacity Act for this new context, would it not be better to secure safeguards through clause 9, through which further assessments are potentially going to be mandated, if the amendment from the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) is agreed to, for those cases where there is doubt as to capacity? That would add a further safeguard rather than rewriting the established Mental Capacity Act and case law.

I have no intention of rewriting the Mental Capacity Act. It should stand exactly as it is and be used for the purpose for which it is intended. That is not the intention behind my amendment, which merely proposes that we should assess people’s ability to make the decision and not just their capacity. Many of those who provided evidence demonstrated that merely testing somebody’s capacity to make a decision is insufficient in this case.

We also heard evidence that if we make this more complicated and introduce more terms into the Bill, then there will be less safeguarding for patients. That is why we are all here: we are trying to make this Bill safe for patients seeking assisted dying. Changing it from the Mental Capacity Act will make it less safe.

I heard Sir Chris Whitty in particular say that it would be preferable to have a more straightforward Bill that did not have too many bureaucratic hurdles for people to overcome. That was why he was keen for the Mental Capacity Act to be retained. However, I tabled the amendment precisely because, when people are thinking about whether assisted dying is an appropriate decision for them, I do not think that it is safe for them to be judged merely on the basis of their capacity. It is by no means my intention to increase bureaucracy; I am merely proposing that the Act is not sufficient in this case.

Three psychiatrists gave evidence to the Committee in person: Professor Allan House, Dr Annabel Price, of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, and Professor Gareth Owen. All expressed doubts about the use of the Mental Capacity Act to assess whether a person was in a fit state of mind to undertake assisted dying. Does the hon. Lady agree that we should place great weight on the opinion of psychiatrists when assessing whether the Act should be used to assess applicants for assisted dying? It is a horse before the cart scenario, because the Act was not made for this context; when it was passed, we were not talking about the ability to choose to die.

I agree exactly with the hon. Lady’s point. The Act was not designed for this purpose, and it is essential that we carefully scrutinise whether it should be used in this way.

Will the hon. Lady give way?

Order. I remind hon. Members that interventions are just interventions; there will also be speeches.

I welcome the hon. Member’s attempt to improve safeguarding in the Bill, which I agree is currently not at the right level. Does she agree that the Mental Capacity Act assumes in the first instance that, if there is no evidence to the contrary, a person has capacity, and that whether a person lacks capacity must be decided on the balance of probabilities? Unwise decision making does not indicate a lack of capacity, and supported decision making is considered to be acceptable. We need all to be clear that that is what the Act says.

The hon. Member is absolutely right. That would be another weakness of the Mental Capacity Act being used in this context: if someone is judged to have capacity, they are free to make an unwise decision, yet there is nothing in the Bill to provide a safeguard against people who might have capacity and make an unwise decision because their thinking has been obscured by mental illness, depression or something else.

I have a few questions for the hon. Member. Who does she propose will decide whether a decision by someone who has capacity is wise or unwise? Does she also propose changing the law around patients’ refusing life-saving treatment? Should that be handled under the Mental Capacity Act, as it is at the moment?

I am grateful to the hon. Member for his intervention, but I am not proposing to change any legislation other than the Bill before us. All the other legislation to which he refers should remain precisely as it is, and for the purpose for which it was intended. He asks who is to say whether someone is making a wise or unwise decision; that is the job of the people who are instructed to provide assessments under the Mental Capacity Act. As was clear from my response to the hon. Member for Reigate, if someone has been assessed as having capacity, there must not be any further interference in their decision-making process, even if there are distinct concerns that that person may be deciding to end their life not purely because of their terminal illness but because they are suffering from depression. There is no other mechanism in the Bill to enable that further safeguard.

I use the Mental Capacity Act almost every week in my work. As Chris Whitty said, in the majority of cases, whether someone has capacity is clear and indisputable. For a narrow proportion of people, it is more difficult to decide. The Bill takes account of that by using a panel to decide on those difficult cases of capacity. I would insist that most cases are very straightforward.

I have to ask the hon. Gentleman to clarify that. When he says he uses a panel, is he referring to the new amendment that has been proposed? I have not seen it yet and cannot comment on it, and have no idea if it will be adopted.

10:00:00

If we are not sure about capacity, we must refer to psychiatry, so that a specialist organisation can make a more detailed assessment. However, most people do not fit into that category. Most people clearly have not got capacity or have got capacity, so this is a very narrow cohort.

If I may say so, the hon. Gentleman’s intervention precisely illustrates what other hon. Members were raising as points of order earlier. How can we properly scrutinise the legislation when new amendments are being tabled at the last minute that potentially change the entire nature of the legislation that we are attempting to scrutinise? It is very difficult then to speak about the amendments that have already been tabled.

Further to that point, the hon. Lady responded to the hon. Member for Stroud, who suggested that a doctor must refer to a psychiatrist in the event of concern over capacity. There is no such obligation in the Bill. There is the opportunity to do so—the second doctor may do so, if they choose—but there is no such obligation. That is something that we could definitely improve. The hon. Member for Stroud, who is a GP, says that it is always obvious to him when there are issues about capacity. I assume he might think the same about coercion. I wonder if the hon. Lady is aware that one in six older people are subject to abuse—elder abuse. Does she think that the hon. Member for Stroud always spots the one in six of his older patients who are subject to abuse?

Order. I remind everybody to stay within the scope of what we are talking about, which is capacity.

On that note, I will probably not respond to the hon. Gentleman’s comments about coercion, but I will pick up on what the hon. Member for Stroud said about using the Mental Capacity Act every week. I think that probably makes him unusual among MPs, if not GPs. I personally have no experience of using the Mental Capacity Act, which is precisely what gives rise to my anxiety. We in this room need to properly understand what the Mental Capacity Act means, yet most of us do not have the experience that he has in applying it. However, we are all collectively responsible for ensuring that the legislation is framed properly. I can only go on the oral and written evidence that we have received, and I am paying serious attention to all those who have said that they do not think that the Mental Capacity Act is sufficient. I lack the direct experience that the hon. Member for Stroud has of those matters, and that is the best that I can do.

We are discussing the balance of autonomy against considerations such as capacity and coercion. The Mental Capacity Act 2005 has been in existence for 20 years, so it has the advantage of being familiar. Would the hon. Lady agree that if we were to bring in clinical views from different professions, such as from doctors, social workers and psychiatrists, we would have different definitions in place, which would address some of the concerns about different applications?

That is an extremely wise observation. I regret enormously that there was not more opportunity, before the legislation was drafted, to have those discussions between experts, advisers and others who really know what the Mental Capacity Act means and whether it is sufficient for this purpose. The best that we can do now is reflect on the evidence that we have received. In many ways, that is what I am hoping to address with my amendment: to redefine “capacity” as “ability”, to transfer the responsibility for defining how ability should be assessed under the Act to the Secretary of State for further analysis and consultation, and then for that to be laid out properly. When assessing people’s ability to make the decision, we want to take into account their ability to understand, retain, use and weigh information, and to communicate the decision. That will still be at the heart of an assessment of whether an individual is making the decision for the right reasons. A whole range of things might affect a person’s ability to make the decision. I have mentioned many times mental disorders such as depression, which is more common in people nearing the end of their life. Delirium, which is common in people with advanced illnesses, needs to be assessed. There is the complexity of people who have a physical terminal illness alongside a mental disorder; I think particularly of people suffering from an eating disorder, which is primarily a mental health condition but clearly has physical health implications. If the mental health condition is not treated or is resistant to treatment, the physical manifestation of the eating disorder can quickly become a terminal illness. That is a really important point that we need to reflect on. The feelings of hopelessness that may come alongside a diagnosis of terminal illness may affect a person’s ability to weigh information. Anxiety can amplify their fears of future suffering, and types and doses of medication can affect capacity. All sorts of people can suffer vulnerabilities from external factors such as the lack of realistic alternatives like palliative care services; overt or implicit coercion; personal losses including bereavement; poor housing; financial hardship; and loneliness and social isolation. Understanding and responding to those vulnerabilities is at the centre of suicide prevention, but absent from the Bill. We have to remember that the Bill would apply to people who are said to be within months of death but may not be, to those who may die within months but otherwise have a very good quality of life, and to people whose trajectories to death vary greatly. In his written evidence, Professor Allan House states that “careful inquiry is justified because a statement about wanting to end one’s life cannot be simply taken as the result of a straightforward rational decision to choose one type of end of life care over others. Simply checking mental capacity and asking about coercion is not adequate.”

I understand the concerns my hon. Friend is raising about assessing mental capacity. Does she acknowledge that throughout this process mental capacity will be assessed not once but multiple times? What does she say to that?

I say to that what I have been saying throughout: a test of mental capacity is not sufficient for this Bill. For example, the Royal College of Psychiatrists states that the Mental Capacity Act “is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill. Extensive consideration needs to be given to what an assessment of mental capacity should consist of” for decisions relating to assisted dying or assisted suicide— “and, indeed, whether a determination through such an assessment can be reliably arrived at in this novel context.” I believe that what the Royal College of Psychiatrists means by “novel context” is that no legislation of this type has been framed before and we do not have any precedent to guide us in terms of what an appropriate determination of capacity might be.

I apologise to the hon. Lady for my continued interruptions, but I want to put across some important points. In our medical system, the Mental Capacity Act is currently used to test capacity in cases of withdrawing life support. Does the hon. Lady not agree that that is on the same level as assisted dying?

I have a suspicion that the hon. Gentleman may have made that point already in one of his many interventions. Withdrawing treatment is not the same as someone making an informed wish to have their death assisted. That is why we need to be very careful about considering whether the Mental Capacity Act is appropriate for that kind of decision. That Act is being used in a way it was not designed for. To use this definition of “capacity” is to accept the premise that this is just like any other treatment option and not qualitatively different, and fails to recognise the complexity and gravity of the decision. The Bill also fails to consider that there may be a risk of assessor bias—that sometimes it may well be that a doctor who makes an assessment may well have their own views about the suitability of assisted dying as an option for that particular patient. They may be in favour of it, or they may be against it. If that were to sway them towards making an assessment against capacity, that could have lots of serious implications for the patient. I have proposed amendment 34 because I think it is the best way forward at this stage, given the variety of evidence we have had and the real difficulty for us in this room of making an appropriate determination of the extent to which the Mental Capacity Act’s use may be modified for this purpose, or of coming up with something entirely new. I think the best way forward is to give the power to the Government—to the Secretary of State—to define the term “ability” in relation to this legislation at a later date.

With respect to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, I do not support her amendments, which seek to replace the references in the Bill to the Mental Capacity Act with the concept of “ability”. First, medical practitioners already know, regularly use and well understand the Mental Capacity Act 2005. As a result, as Professor Chris Whitty said in evidence, where practitioners conduct such an assessment of an individual separately, they are usually in agreement in their decisions about the outcome in relation to that individual. That was also mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud. Secondly, the term “ability”, unlike mental capacity, is not an existing concept in law that we can draw upon in the context of complex medical decision making about consent to medical treatment. I therefore do not accept that it is a low bar.

Will the hon. Lady give way?

No, I will make some progress. To replace the established concept of mental capacity with “ability” would create more problems than it seeks to solve, and is not underpinned by a clear statutory basis. Furthermore, the language the hon. Lady uses in her new clause 1 only echoes the wording of the second leg of the two-stage test in the MCA, in its language of fully understanding, using and weighing the relevant information. It does not, however, have the scaffolding and clarity of the five principles set out in the Mental Capacity Act, and it is a pale imitation of the second stage of the test of capacity, which is already in section 3 of the MCA. Thirdly, the use and application of the Mental Capacity Act has been applied and litigated upon in our court system over the last 20 years, further nuancing its application in complex medical decision making and explicating, for example, the five principles in the MCA and the subsequent two-stage test for capacity. Contrary to what colleagues on the Opposition Benches have said already, it is used in cases where treatment is withdrawn. It is important to understand that in those circumstances, such withdrawal is not seen as an omission; it is seen as a deliberate act. It is therefore analogous to the usage in the Bill as proposed. Fourthly, I have deep concerns that the use of the term “ability” and the concept expounded in new clause 1 imports an ableist approach, which I do not welcome, as someone who has worked in disability rights and policy for more than a decade and a half. To return to my first argument, about the familiarity and usage of the Mental Capacity Act by medical practitioners, clinicians and the wider social care profession for two decades, many family members will be familiar with the term and used to using it as part of the wider care of people with learning disabilities, autism and mental health problems. The boundaries of those who are familiar with the concept go well beyond the walls of only medical practitioners. In oral evidence, chief medical officer Professor Chris Whitty stated that the Mental Capacity Act “is used up and down the country by doctors and nurses every day; they know it and they understand it. Although…it is a large piece of legislation, it is one that people have worked through in practice multiple times. If you ask six or seven doctors, ‘Does this person have capacity?’, in almost all cases you will get six or seven identical answers, because people are used to using it.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 33, Q7.] To unleash the tiger of an unknown and untested concept of ability into a Bill that would benefit better from the well understood, measured and principled approach of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 does not best serve the patients that I know the hon. Member for Richmond Park seeks so carefully to protect. It is therefore worth laying out the paradigm that underpins the MCA and the principles it legislates for, and why it is so important to retain this at the heart of the Bill. The presumption of capacity in the Mental Capacity Act exists because it is considered a fundamental principle of respecting individual autonomy, meaning that every adult is assumed to have the ability to make their own decisions unless there is clear evidence proving otherwise. This protects against unnecessary interference in people’s lives and ensures that they are treated with dignity and respect, even if they may have a disability or medical condition that could potentially impact their decision-making abilities. I want also to reflect on the robust language in clause 2(3), which states: “For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not to be considered to be terminally ill by reason only of the person having one or both of— (a) a mental disorder, within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983; (b) a disability, within the meaning of section 6 of the Equality Act 2010.” That provision, the tightly drawn limit on the need for the person’s terminal illness to leave them with only six months to live, and the third stage of the test—using the Mental Capacity Act to understand their decision making—mean that we have a strong set of safeguards.

10:15:00

Will the hon. Lady give way?

I will give way to the hon. Member for Richmond Park, who asked first.

The hon. Lady has moved on considerably from the point that I was going to make, so I took it that she was not going to take interventions. Although I would have liked the opportunity to respond to some of her points, I have kept my counsel. Since she has now given way, I want to make something of a point of order. The hon. Lady mentioned that she thought my use of the word “ability” was ableist, and I want to put on the record that I had absolutely no intention of it being interpreted in that way. I meant no offence, and I hope that the word would not have been considered in such a light. If that caused any offence, I apologise. I hope that the general meaning of the word “ability” is well understood in this context.

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making that statement. That is not the assumption. As I will say later, the term “ableism” is very much grounded in a deficit model of disability, which assumes that somebody is not capable of doing something themselves—for instance, making important decisions—whereas the Mental Capacity Act starts from a different perspective: it presumes that the person will have the ability to do something until proven otherwise. That is why I feel that the concept of ability does not align well with what is needed in understanding and providing autonomy to people making very difficult decisions at the end of their lives.

The hon. Lady accurately quoted clause 2(3) about a person not being considered to be terminally ill “by reason only” of having a mental disorder or a disability. That word “only” is very important, as she acknowledged. Does she recognise that that explicitly allows for somebody whose judgment might be impaired by a mental disorder still to be eligible for an assisted death, because they would still be judged to have capacity under the terms of the Mental Capacity Act? That term “only” is in fact not a safeguard; it is an access to an assisted death for somebody with impaired judgment.

I appreciate the hon. Member’s intervention, but I do not agree. Taken together, the parameters around the six-month limit, clause 2(3) and the requirement for a mental capacity test cumulatively create a safeguard in the Bill. Importantly, the MCA’s two-stage capacity test is already underpinned by robust safeguards, which address exactly the issue the hon. Gentleman raised. Stage one asks whether there is a disturbance or impairment in the person’s brain or mind, and stage two asks whether the disturbance or impairment is severe enough that the person cannot make a specific decision. That two-stage test already deals with the issue he raised. The references to the Mental Capacity Act in the relevant clauses of the Bill ensure, crucially, that we import that test too. Elements of the language in the new concept of ability proposed by the hon. Member for Richmond Park appear to attempt to echo the second stage of the Mental Capacity Act test, as just described. That has four elements: understanding information about the decision to be made, retaining that information in the mind, using or weighing that information as part of the decision-making process, and communicating the decision by talking, using sign language or any other means. It is important to say that those core elements are built on the scaffolding of the five principles of the MCA, working in a progressive way. Opposition Members talked about the unwise decision, but the principles in the Mental Capacity Act work collectively and cumulatively together. That is only one step, then, which is followed by the fact that decisions must be taken in the person’s best interest, and there is well-worn and well-trodden understanding of how we ascertain that. It is important that those things all work together. The issue is already addressed under the MCA; if we do away with the MCA, we lose not only the scaffolding of the five principles, but the important safeguards of the two-stage test.

My hon. Friend made reference to that already being done, but where is the evidence that the capacity stage she talked about is actually happening? We had evidence from the Royal College of Psychiatrists and, as she said, Professor Chris Whitty. Where is the evidence that it is being done well, as things stand?

I do not have a list of the case law in front of me—I am sure it will be possible for that to be found for my hon. Friend—but it is done regularly. The Mental Capacity Act is used regularly in decisions about the withdrawal of life-support treatment. That is the case, and she is welcome to search for the case law.

The hon. Lady talks about the four tests and parts of the Mental Capacity Act; the point I was making was that we want to retain elements of the Act, although using it in its entirety is problematic in this context. The four functional tests about whether someone is capable of making a decision absolutely should be retained—as she said, that is well tested, it works well and people understand in a court of law exactly how to apply it—but some of the other elements of the Mental Capacity Act are problematic. That is why I seek to redraft “capacity” to “ability”—I accept that that might be a problematic word, but I hope the hon. Lady will take on board my earlier comments—and that is what is important. The hon. Lady is saying we should not take out those bits of the Mental Capacity Act that are valuable and important, and I agree.

I am pleased to hear the hon. Lady’s agreement. As someone who has worked in this space for a long time, I say that if she does not want to have the impact in law of putting in place a concept that would be ableist and take a deficit model of disability, we need those five principles that are already embedded in the Mental Capacity Act. We also need the stringent two-stage test, the second stage of which has the four elements that I set out. Only then can we be certain that we are approaching the paradigm of this complex and important decision making as one where we understand the autonomy and best interests of groups of people we all wish to best protect.

Will my hon. Friend give way?

I will make some progress. The concept set out by the hon. Member for Richmond Park is the bare bones of what is needed in the complex decision making required across various stages of the Bill. In such decision making, the MCA has a wide and well-used toolkit to determine capacity. That leads to my third point. The Mental Capacity Act has been applied and litigated in our court system over the past 20 years. The chief medical officer, Professor Sir Chris Whitty, said in his evidence that the Act “has the advantage of being tested in the courts. That has gone as far as the Supreme Court, and the various ambiguities that were inevitably in the legislation have been clarified by senior judges. Therefore, to practitioners like me, it feels like a piece of robust and predictable legislation.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 33, Q7.] He continued later: “If there were no Mental Capacity Act, there would be an argument, which has been used for a long time, that the Bill would have to define what was meant with a fair degree of clarity.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 36, Q14.] I do not see sufficient clarity in the hon. Lady’s concept as set out in the amendment. At a later evidence session, Yogi Amin, a solicitor and partner at Irwin Mitchell, augmented Sir Chris Whitty’s argument by saying: “I wholly recommend and support the idea…to defer to the Mental Capacity Act for capacity assessments. I have been working in this area for over 20 years, before and after the Mental Capacity Act came in, and I have done cases all the way up to the Supreme Court, as well as day-to-day different cases around the country. It is well understood how capacity assessments are done, and it is ingrained into the practice of practitioners generally and of legal practitioners in the courts.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 140, Q176.] He continued: “It is a well settled and understood approach to the law, and producing a new one would throw up a whole new conundrum, where people would be questioning how to approach it, etc. It is not broken—it works well.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 141, Q177.] Finally, for further clarity, I will vote against the amendment because of the ableist assumption in both language and concept. Ableist language assumes that disabled people are inferior to non-disabled people and perpetuates deficit discourses about such groups. I believe that this does not take the approach that we see in the paradigm of the Mental Capacity Act, which puts disabled people’s choices, autonomy and control over their choices at the heart of this legislation.

I thank the hon. Member for Richmond Park for tabling the amendments. Fundamentally, I do not agree with them, but I am grateful for her good intentions. I understand the concerns that she has raised, and she makes an eloquent argument, but I fundamentally disagree. In my view, the amendments would only lead to abandoning the well-established principles codified within the Mental Capacity Act. They would introduce a degree of woolliness and legal uncertainty by introducing of a new term that is, as yet, undefined. That would make the operability of the Bill so much harder and would move us away from the Mental Capacity Act, which has a heritage of some 20 years and is already well established in the use of advance directives around organ transplantation, the withdrawal of treatment and the decision to undergo major operations that can have life-changing or life-limiting consequences.

My hon. Friend says that the term “ability” is not yet defined, but it is set out quite clearly in new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park. It simply says: “The person is to be considered as having the ability to make a decision to request assistance to end their life if they can fully understand, use and weigh the relevant information”. It uses the language of the Mental Capacity Act on understanding and weighing information. The key distinction is that it does not allow for impaired judgment; it requires somebody fully to understand the information in front of them. It is very straightforward, and I do not think that it would be difficult to apply. Does my hon. Friend recognise that the terms are pretty clearly laid out?

My hon. Friend makes incisive points clearly and concisely, as always, but I cannot agree. This is a short clause that is dealing with a hugely complicated issue that is presently codified within the Mental Capacity Act, which runs to some 183 pages. I do not think that it is as simple as saying that the new clause deals with the issue. There is also the two-stage test, which determines both the functional ability to make the decision and whether that decision is impaired in any way. It would be an oversimplification to suggest that the provision as drafted would deal with those issues in a satisfactory way that would provide confidence not only—although most importantly—to those who are making a decision around an assisted death, but to the medical practitioners who are part of the process and the courts, which will have to grapple with the issues that will inevitably arise from a new definition.

The Royal College of Psychiatrists highlights that a person’s capacity can change and is decision-specific. It therefore says that the Mental Capacity Act is not suitable for the Bill. What is the hon. Member’s response?

The hon. Member is absolutely right that capacity can change. It is an evolving piece: someone’s capacity at one point in time will not necessarily be the same as their capacity on a future or a previous date. However, the whole purpose of the Bill is to put a series of mechanisms in place that assess capacity to ensure a robust decision-making process. I should also mention that the Mental Capacity Act allows the capability of individuals to make an advance directive. Where they have capacity at a point in time to make a decision for a future date, capacity can be inferred at that future date for that decision. That is acknowledged within the 2005 Act.

10:30:00

I have to confess that I am a little confused by the evidence to which my hon. Friend refers. Can he confirm that it is perfectly possible for me to be diagnosed with a terminal disease and make an advance directive, which may apply in three months’ time, that in those circumstances I would decline treatment and would wish to die at that point? The Mental Capacity Act is used to assess me in making that advance directive, having had my terminal diagnosis. If it is good for that decision, I struggle to understand why it would not be good for a similar decision to end my life in similar circumstances.

As always, my right hon. Friend makes a very good point. The Mental Capacity Act allows for advance directives on a whole variety of choices, including withdrawal of treatment, decisions on care or financial elements, and decisions on having treatment as opposed to not having treatment. It creates that ability and it is deemed robust enough for those purposes. It must therefore follow that it is robust enough for the purposes of the Bill.

I just want to probe the hon. Member on the capacity to make a future directive. Is he saying that, under the terms of the Bill as drafted and its reference to the Mental Capacity Act, it would be possible to say, “I may not be eligible now—I may not even be suffering from a terminal illness—but at some future point, because I have capacity today to make this decision, I should like to choose assisted dying”? Would that decision then be honoured at that future date, without any further intervention or assessment?

The hon. Member makes an interesting point, which I had already considered; in fact, I have tabled a new clause that would address it. It is not grouped with the amendments now before the Committee, but I will touch on it, if I may. There is an argument that, if an individual with an advance directive has gone through the two-stage test in the Bill and then loses capacity, the advance directive should hold weight. My new clause 6 would deal with that point. Sections 27 to 29 of the Mental Capacity Act deal with exclusions from advance directives, including issues around voting rights, marriage rights and Mental Health Act implications. There may be a mechanism, for example, to exclude an advance directive that deals with assisted death, either through the Bill or through an amendment to the Mental Capacity Act. But I do not disagree with the hon. Lady; she raises an interesting point.

Is my hon. Friend suggesting—I think his new clause makes it clear, and I think my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire is making the same point—that it is inappropriate for an advance directive to authorise an assisted death? The Mental Capacity Act authorises somebody to decline treatment at a future point, so my hon. Friend is acknowledging that there is a difference between the principle of declining treatment and the principle of requesting an assisted death. Given his new clause, I do not imagine that my hon. Friend thinks that we should have advance directives that authorise an assisted death. If he acknowledges that, he must recognise that there is a distinction between declining treatment and requesting an assisted death.

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. I have concerns about public confidence in the Bill without that additional safeguard, as this is such a consequential decision, but of course any advance directive would be predicated on having gone through those two stages first before capacity is lost. I feel that on this occasion additional tightening is necessary so that the public can be confident that a robust process has been gone through. The MCA is a tried and tested piece of legislation used by practitioners up and down the country. The hon. Member for Stroud uses it every day in his practice; I have to say that I did not, but I was not consenting patients for surgery every day. Every time I did so, however, I had those conversations. Capacity lies on a spectrum: if I am doing major abdominal surgery, the level of capacity required to make a decision will be much greater than if I am removing a small bump or lump on an arm. As well as having been tried and tested by medical practitioners, the MCA has been tested in the courts, as the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said. It has been right up to the highest court in this land, it has been robustly tested and it has been found to be good legislation. The risk we now face is that it will be replaced not only with a new legal concept, but with an entirely different process for assessing capacity in this setting. Although there may be good intentions to improve the system, that will only add to the folly of it and overcomplicate the issue.

I am sorry that it has taken me a while to find the relevant provision of the Bill. The discussion on the advance directive is a really interesting one, and I am glad that we are having it. Is the hon. Member reassured that clause 18(4) is very clear that on the day that assistance is provided to a patient, a doctor has to assess once again their capacity to make the decision to end their own life, check again that there is a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and indeed check everything again on the day, including capacity? I believe that that will negate the issue around the advance directive.

The hon. Member makes a reasonable point. I agree with her on many issues, but on this issue I have some reservations. Clause 18(4) says: “The coordinating doctor must be satisfied, at the time the approved substance is provided, that the person to whom it is provided…has capacity…has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life”. Of course, under the wording of section 26(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, that decision can be made at an earlier time and deemed to have currency, once capacity has been lost, for its enactment at a later date. I think that there could be a minor tightening of the wording or reassurances from Government to address that, but it is an important point to raise and air.

Order. Before we proceed any further, I remind hon. Members that we are discussing capacity and ability.

I am just trying to understand what the hon. Member is communicating. Under the Bill, if somebody has anorexia, diabetes or kidney failure and has the capacity to make that decision because they meet the criteria for the capacity to refuse treatment, will that mean that they can decide to sign up to this option?

The Bill is very clear in determining that it is for those who have a progressive illness, disease or medical condition that cannot be reversed by treatment. On my reading of the Bill, it excludes that category of individuals who choose not to engage with treatment that in ordinary circumstances would prevent the progression or deterioration of their condition. I therefore do not see it as analogous with the hon. Member’s scenario of someone who could have a long life expectancy if they had taken their treatment, but who chooses not to. That is not captured within the Bill, in my interpretation.

I am struggling with this, because it is clear from the evidence from our witnesses that that is the case where somebody has anorexia, for example, and they make that choice. As has been referred to plenty of times in the context of the Bill, the Mental Capacity Act has been used, and is sufficiently used, for people to withdraw treatment. Personally, I think that that is a pretty false equivalence, because when a person’s life support machine is turned off, the decision is made not by the person receiving lifesaving treatment, but by their loved ones. According to what we have heard this morning, if someone has the mental capacity to use the MCA to withdraw treatment for a condition, that will lead to a diagnosis of terminal illness. It could kill someone. If I refused to take insulin, and I was diabetic, I would have the mental capacity to say, “Actually, I’m not going to take this treatment, so can I make a decision?” I am just trying to check the hon. Gentleman’s understanding.

With the greatest respect to the hon. Member, I think that she is conflating two issues. Someone can stop treatment under the MCA; over time, that will lead progressively to death, with some conditions—she gave the example of being a diabetic without insulin—but that would not be a terminal illness in reference to this Bill. The Bill is very clear that it is about an inevitable and progressive illness, disease, or medical condition that cannot be reversed by treatment. Diabetes, treated with insulin, is not a progressive condition that becomes a terminal diagnosis; it is terminal only by virtue of somebody refusing treatment, which therefore would not be captured within the Bill.

I would like to understand why my hon. Friend thinks that diabetes could ever be considered reversible. It can be treated and managed, but surely we cannot turn back time.

My hon. Friend makes a valid point—the Committee can see that I was an orthopaedic surgeon, not an endocrinologist. It is not necessarily a progressive condition; it is a condition that can be managed and maintained. It does not fall within the wording of the Bill. We are not talking about a condition that is inevitably progressive, and for which there is no treatment option available to pause, reverse or prevent its progression. We are talking about a relatively limited group of conditions that will inevitably lead to death when someone, for want of a less blunt phrase, has reached the end of the road in terms of their therapeutic treatment options.

I give way to the hon. Member for Richmond Park.

I am conscious that the hon. Member for Ipswich sought to intervene before me, but may I press the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley slightly on his point? When I asked Professor Sir Chris Whitty during oral evidence whether there could ever be a defined list of conditions that he would define as terminal, he was very clear that there could not be. Someone may suffer from a range of conditions. Most people who develop cancer survive, so cancer is a terminal illness, but not for everybody. The question of what is and is not a terminal illness is quite contested; it is not clearcut. As the hon. Member for Bradford West says, it is quite possible that diabetes could be a terminal illness if someone refuses treatment for it. I am not entirely clear why the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley is saying that it is clear from the legislation what is and is not a terminal illness. As we heard in oral evidence, it is not clear.

Order. I remind Members that the Committee will discuss terminal illnesses, and extending the list relating to terminal illnesses, under a later clause. Let us remain in scope this morning and continue the debate on the amendments before the Committee.

I will keep my answer very brief by saying that I will return to hon. Lady’s point when we come to the clause on terminal illness, when perhaps I can elucidate, improve and work on my responses in a way that is conducive to understanding.

I look forward to it.

I am aware that the hon. Member for Ipswich is waiting to intervene.

I am grateful to the hon. Member; he has given way a number of times, and I am sure he wants to make some progress. To return to the scope of the debate—I am sure you will be delighted to hear that, Ms McVey—part of the rationale cited for making this change from “capacity” to “ability” is depression, and given what we are talking about, there is a very real possibility that someone will become depressed after diagnosis. In the hon. Member’s experience, are patients with a clinical diagnosis of depression currently deemed capable under the Mental Capacity Act of making potentially life-changing decisions about treatment or whatever it might be? Are there any scenarios in which he would offer or remove certain treatment because of their depressed state? What I am getting at is that there are a huge number of scales and considerations to factor in with depression, but does the Act allow us to look at those when it comes to depression?

10:45:00

The hon. Member is right: there is a huge spectrum of patients when dealing with these complex issues, and it would be absolute nonsense to arbitrarily say that anybody with depression is unable to make an informed decision on any issue. There are individuals who have mild depression—indeed, I suspect that most people with a terminal diagnosis would have some form of depression or reactive disorder, whether formally diagnosed or not, because of their circumstances. That does not mean that they are unable to make a rational, informed decision; we have to look at each patient individually. The Act is a tried and tested piece of legislation that doctors up and down the country use every day. Doctors over the road in St Tommy’s will be using it at this very moment, and they are adept at knowing and sensing when they need to escalate, whether by getting the opinion of a psychologist or a psychiatrist, because they have concerns about underlying issues. The Act is a robust piece of legislation, and we should be using it to enhance this Bill, not introducing further complexity, which will only put us into a quagmire of uncertainty.

My hon. Friend does not want uncertainty, so perhaps he could answer this question very directly: would he be content to see somebody who is depressed, and indeed suicidal, successfully apply for an assisted death?

My hon. Friend puts it with his usual candour. He asked a straight question, so I will give him a straight answer: I think there is a difference between somebody who is depressed and somebody who is depressed and suicidal. I have no personal moral objections if someone who has a terminal illness, who suffers from depression and who has capacity as set out through the two-stage test in the Mental Capacity Act, ultimately wishes to end their life because of their terminal diagnosis. If they are doing it because they are suicidal as a consequence of their depression, that is a different and distinct issue. We are talking about individuals who want to end their life because of their terminal diagnosis, not because of their mental disorder.

I keep making the point that clause 9 adds a different element to this process. It says that, when undertaking the assessment, one of the two doctors “may, if they have doubt as to…capacity…refer the person for assessment” of their capacity by a psychiatrist. Does that reassure the hon. Member that there is a further layer of safeguards in this area?

That is one of the additional safeguards in the Bill. This Bill has more in-built safeguards than any similar piece of legislation across the world. I think the hon. Gentleman makes a valid point: when a doctor has concerns about somebody’s mental state, they can escalate the case and seek further, specialist opinion.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

I will make some progress, if I may, because I think I have indulged your patience for far too long, Ms McVey. I am cautious about introducing this new test. I may not have persuaded everyone, but I have set out my reasons. We risk making the system overcomplicated. We would move away from the well-established mechanism under the Mental Capacity Act and into tiger country, with untried and untested systems that the courts have not considered, which will inevitably lead to challenge. There is no need to do that, because we already have robust mechanisms in place and doing so will merely lead to ambiguity and potential complications. This is not me reaching this conclusion in isolation. Of course, there will always be voices on different sides of the debate, and we can frame the evidence we have heard to favour one set of arguments over another. However, I am significantly persuaded by the chief medical officer, given his wide experience as not just a clinician but a public policymaker. In his evidence to the Committee on 28 January, he said: “It is not clear to me what problem people are trying to solve by doing that,” —he means moving away from the Mental Capacity Act— “given that the Mental Capacity Act clearly makes the point that the more severe the decision, the greater the degree of capacity that has to be assumed before people can actually take that decision.” ––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 37, Q14.] It is that foundation that we are building on, and it is central to how these things operate in practice. Although I understand the position of the hon. Member for Richmond Park, and I have a degree of sympathy with those who support the amendments, I invite them to reflect, in the time we have left for this debate, on whether the amendments achieve their stated aim. Do they make the Bill better or do they make it more complicated and convoluted? I say that they make it more convoluted and that, despite the best of intentions, they should not be supported.

My hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge knows I am an ally on many of these issues, but I will humbly disagree with her on some matters. I am not a lawyer or a doctor, but like many people here I speak from lived experience. I speak as the parent of a learning-disabled child, so I see the kinds of decisions that have to be made day to day, and the kinds of arguments and conversations that have to be had with people who presume that my child has more or less capacity than she has. Believe me, that is a constant, daily battle for me and my wife. My daughter has 12 words and a severe sight impairment, which makes it very difficult for her to make some of her decisions, as well as other complexities—predominantly her cerebral palsy, which caused a brain injury at birth. Therefore, in my own way, although I am not a lawyer or a doctor, I have become a bit of an expert on some of the capacity issues that people encounter day by day. This morning, as I do most mornings, I read to her the three choices for her breakfast. I give her a bit of time to think about them and then I repeat them. We get yes or no to those three choices, and that is the choice she makes. Because of her severe sight impairment, when I put those three options in front of her, I have to lift them up in front of my face so that she can see them; if I put them much lower down, she would not be able to see them and make a choice. She would be able to make the choice through pointing if it was within a certain range. I have doctors calling my wife and me all the time, asking to have a conversation with my daughter, despite their having read the notes saying that she is an 11-year-old with 12 words and a severe sight impairment. I therefore query—I will refer to some of the oral evidence in a moment—how well some aspects of the Mental Capacity Act are currently being carried out. Equally, I deal with people who suggest that she has a greater level of capacity than she does. I accept—I have had this conversation with the hon. Member for Spen Valley on a number of occasions—that this legislation would not be applicable to my daughter. However, we heard in evidence from Mencap that the vast majority of people with learning disabilities in this country are not in the same position. They are living their day-to-day lives, living in supported accommodation and making the kinds of decision we have discussed in this debate, such as buying coffee and going to the bank. As a result of my 20 years as a councillor, and in the last 11 years since our children were born, I have become involved with a number of local disability charities, and I know the decisions that people make when their child is at that transition age. They are trying to understand the complexity of taking a power of attorney for a child, as well as other decision-making issues. I spend a lot of time with parents who do not put those measures in place, because they do not understand the complexity in terms of age. We could therefore have a young adult relying on doctors who do not know them and on a judge—I have not seen an amendment on that issue, so I am still talking about a judge—to make a decision about capacity.

I do not particularly have a question to ask my hon. Friend, but I want to pay tribute to him for engaging so positively with the scrutiny of the Bill and for the very personal experience he has shared with the Committee. I reassure him that I will do everything I can to work with him, as I have so far through this process, because his fears are real, and I hear them. We have a job to do through the Bill to solve the problems that exist for people who are dying, but we do not want to create other problems. I am happy to continue to work with him to ensure that we address as much of that as we can through the Committee.

I thank the Member in charge for her comments. That is the conversation we had when she invited me to join the Committee, and we will continue to have conversations as amendments come forward. My concern is about some aspects of the Mental Capacity Act, which was not written for these scenarios, and the hon. Member for Richmond Park talked in particular about the statutory principles in it. I am not an expert on these issues, and my hon. Friend the Member for Stroud behind me is more of an expert on some of them. However, there is no obligation in the code of practice under the Act to consult carers involved in a person’s life. The code says: “if it is practical and appropriate to do so, consult other people for their views about the person’s best interests”. Therefore, given the way the Act and the code of practice are worded, there is no obligation in the scenarios I am discussing. There is another issue I was going to raise before I took that intervention. Mencap does considerable hard work. At my local branch, there are many people whose parents are in their 70s and 80s and have cared for their child all their life. I am not being rude, but their child, who is in their 40s or 50s, does feel like a burden to their parents. They know the obligation their parents have to care for them for their whole life. I ask Members to consider what the Mental Capacity Act says: those adults are at a level of capacity to make decisions, but they have been supported in those decisions all their lives and do not—

We have spoken a lot today about further safeguards and provisions, beyond the Mental Capacity Act. However, I note that my hon. Friend has tabled amendment 339, which states that if a “person has a learning disability or is autistic” they “must be provided with accessible information and given sufficient time to consider it” and that, additionally, there must be a “supporter” or “advocate” with them. If that amendment was passed, would that satisfy some of my hon. Friend’s concerns about the Act?

I am hearing that that amendment will need some rewording, but it would address some of my concerns. I am working with Mencap, and further amendments will be tabled to later clauses of the Bill. I understand that one of our colleagues has also tabled amendments, which I welcome. However, I would still have concerns about the interpretation—and there are different interpretations—of the current code of practice when it comes to the involvement of carers and loved ones. Those concerns brought me to the place I came to on Second Reading. I did not seek to be the person standing here; indeed, a year ago, not only did I not believe that I would be a Member of Parliament, but I did not believe that I would be on this side of this argument. It is this particular point that has driven me to this position. I will talk a little about evidence. The Law Society has a neutral position on the Bill, but it has said that, before the provisions become law, a comprehensive consultation should be undertaken to allow resident experts to share views on the appropriate definition of capacity for the purposes of the Bill. That is the position of the Law Society.

11:00:00

Other hon. Members have referred to the oral evidence. Sir Chris Whitty said that “some slight adjustment” might be required in terms of training, so even he is saying that the Mental Capacity Act does not cope with this scenario. If we are going to have this debate, let us hear the oral evidence on the matter.

Dr Rachel Clarke told us:

“The elephant in the room with all of this is the capacity assessments. I would suggest that anybody who pretends that those assessments are easy and routinely done well in the NHS has not got enough experience of observing that happening. I teach capacity assessments to doctors and medical students, and it is often the case that they are very poorly conducted. The doctor often does not understand the criteria for assessing capacity.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 71, Q85.]

Dr Sarah Cox said:

“I and my colleagues have concerns about the safeguards in the Bill. It is not just the capacity assessment”.––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 73, Q90.]

Professor House, when referring to

“the presence of diagnosable mental disorder”,

said that

“the top of the list of importance is depression, which is well known, particularly in the elderly, not to be that easy.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 162-63, Q205.]

Baroness Falkner said:

“For example, you have just been discussing capacity, and capacity is a very serious consideration in our concern.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 178, Q232.]

Dr Hussain said:

“I really liked what you said yesterday; we need gold standard training. The thought yesterday about what happens with capacity made me think straight away about cases in the last few months where we, as a palliative care team, thought that someone had capacity, and the other team did not.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 194, Q254.]

My hon. Friend cites some interesting observations from the oral evidence, and I welcome his doing so. I draw his attention to my amendments 186 and 198, which look at the training. This is something I feel passionately about. If the Bill were to pass, having gold standard training would be vital, as I said during that sitting. I will do whatever I can to embed that in the Bill, and I will certainly consider what that will look like in the instances that we are discussing.

I welcome that commitment and look forward to that discussion in due course. Dr Hussain went on to say: “Ultimately, I do not think the Mental Capacity Act and safeguarding training are fit for purpose.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 199, Q260.] Professor Owen said: “That conveys questionable confidence in the consent processes, of which mental capacity is part, in relation to the decision to end one’s life. It is significant evidence about the confidence that is out there among experienced practitioners.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 228, Q290.] Dr Price said: “I…refer back to Professor Gareth Owen’s oral submission, thinking about the purpose that the Mental Capacity Act was drawn up for and the fact that decisions about the ending of life were not one of the originally designed functions of it. We would need to think carefully about how that would then translate into a decision that was specifically about the capacity to end one’s life.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 268, Q349.]

I note the point about training, and of course we would all welcome the strongest possible training. As the hon. Gentleman implies, nobody has yet used the Mental Capacity Act to assess somebody for an assisted death; it would be completely uncharted territory for the whole system, including anybody providing training. How does he imagine that training might be designed to allow for the Mental Capacity Act to be applied in this case, when it would be completely novel?

As I say, I am not an expert on this matter from a legal or medical background, but those are the concerns that have driven me to the place that I am in. Dan Scorer, from Mencap—as my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley knows, I was adamant that Mencap would give evidence to us—said: “building on the previous question about the adequacy of the Mental Capacity Act, there is a question about the adequacy of training, awareness and compliance with that Act now.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 269, Q350.] He clearly cited what many people know occurred during covid, with “do not resuscitate” orders and decisions being made on people’s behalf. That is what has driven me to this place, and that is why I will support the amendment. I also have further amendments on this issue later on down the line. I completely understand what my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley said about training in relation to these decisions and scenarios. At the end of life, people should have autonomy and choice, but if that comes at the price of one person, in a borderline capacity decision that is made on their behalf, it will be one death too many.

It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford, and I pay tribute to his powerful speech. I wish more people on our side of the debate and on the Committee had medical backgrounds, but I am glad that we have someone who has such direct personal experience of supporting people with learning disabilities. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for everything he said and I entirely agree with it. I want to speak in support of new clause 1, tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park, to replace the use of the Mental Capacity Act with a new ability test. This goes to the heart of the Bill: it is absolutely crucial. Clause 3, which her new clause would replace, is in a sense the essence of the Bill. It is the shortest clause, but perhaps the most important one, because it determines the means by which somebody will be assessed to be capable of making this decision. It is a very important protection—and, at its simplest, this is a very confusing and complicated area. I will no doubt confuse myself in the course of my speech, but I have a simple observation to make, which the hon. Lady also made very well. We are dealing with the issue of impaired judgment; currently, under the Mental Capacity Act, it will be possible, through the terms of this Bill, for somebody whose judgment is impaired by virtue of a mental disability or mental illness to successfully apply for an assisted death. I do not think that is what the public want and I do not think it is what the House of Commons voted for. I think it is a misunderstanding of the principle of the Bill, which did win support on Second Reading. The simple fact is that somebody’s judgment can be impaired under the Mental Capacity Act, but they could still have capacity. We have repeatedly heard points made about how the Mental Capacity Act applies in the normal conduct of life for disabled people—for people with mental disabilities. For instance, people can be anorexic, depressed or suicidal, and of course they can still consent to all sorts of decisions that affect their life, including medical treatments. A person can consent to have surgery on a broken leg while depressed; there is no difficulty whatever with that and of course that is appropriate. That is rightly the basis on which we currently judge capacity. New clause 1 would build on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act. It would add to the principles of autonomy and of people being able to understand, use and weigh the relevant information. As I said in an intervention, the key point is that using this new test of ability would ensure that the person was fully able to do those things—fully able to understand, use and weigh the relevant information. In the case of impaired ability, they would not be considered to pass the test. We hear a lot that this is the toughest Bill in the world, with the highest safeguards. It is worth pointing out that in Oregon, which this Bill is largely inspired by, there is an impaired judgment test. There is a capacity test similar to that in the Mental Capacity Act, but people are also required to demonstrate that there is no impaired judgment, and that is exactly what the hon. Lady is seeking to achieve. Her new clause would build on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act with these key principles about understanding information, but would ensure that it was a full understanding, with no impairment. It would strengthen the Bill without complicating it. In fact, it would significantly simplify it, because at the moment—this is the substantial issue with the application of the Mental Capacity Act—a huge complication is involved when we go into the forest of the MCA and try to apply it in these terms. When we try to navigate our way through the MCA in pursuit of an assisted dying application, there is a whole series of complications. I will cite some of the evidence that we received. The Royal College of Psychiatrists, which we heard from, stated in its written evidence: “It is the RCPsych’s view that the MCA is not sufficient for the purposes of this Bill.” We also had evidence from King’s College London’s Complex Life and Death Decisions group, which is a group of world-leading professionals working on issues relating to the end of life. They say that use of the MCA for assisted suicide would be “an entirely novel test”. I note that the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge—and I think my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley—made the point that an “ability” test would be a novel term. I acknowledge that the term “ability” is not currently set out or recognised in law in the same way that capacity is, but as I said, it is clearly defined in new clause 1, as tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park. Of course it is going to be novel—we are talking about something that is entirely novel. Assisted suicide is a new measure that is being introduced, so of course we have to have a new measure by which we define who is appropriate.

I am reading the text of new clause 1, and it is remarkably similar to the text of section 3(1) of the Mental Capacity Act, which says, “For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable— to understand the information relevant to the decision, to retain that information, to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision”. It is not a novel concept—that wording is virtually the same as in new clause 1. I do not see why we need to have the new clause or the new definition, as it is already present in the Mental Capacity Act.

The hon. Gentleman’s intervention helps me to explain my point more clearly, which is that the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Richmond Park builds on the terms of the Mental Capacity Act. It recognises the value of the terms, which have been well established in case law through the MCA—the ability to understand, use and weigh the relevant information. The key difference is the word “fully”. The case law around the MCA allows for somebody to be deemed capacitous even though their judgment might be impaired. What is proposed in the new clause is the closing of that lacuna, so that it would not be possible for someone to get an assisted death if their judgment was impaired. That is the key difference. It is also important to exclude the MCA because of the thicket of complications that it would entail. We have heard about the importance of simplification. A much simpler and better way to do the entirely novel thing that we are proposing, which is to authorise assisted suicide by the state, is to have a new definition.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

The hon. Lady does not like my terminology.

I do struggle with that terminology. This is not assisted suicide by the state. The state is not involved. It is the person making an autonomous decision based on their choice at the end of life. I will say on the record that the term “suicide” is not accurate for the cases we are talking about. The people we are dealing with are not suicidal. They very much want to live; they do not want to die, but they are dying. It is important that we have that on the record.

I think it is totally valid for us to have this argument about terminology periodically. I will repeat the point that we have made before, which is that we are actually amending the Suicide Act 1961—or rather, we are disapplying that Act—in the process set out in the hon. Lady’s Bill. There is no getting away from the fact that we are talking about assisting suicide. I am afraid that I will continue to use the term, and I hope the hon. Lady will forgive me for that. I am arguing that the MCA is a complicating factor in the process that is being proposed for the Bill; it makes things much more difficult and complicated. The point has already been made—the hon. Member for Richmond Park put it very well—that, in the case for the MCA, a lot of weight is being put on the evidence from Sir Chris Whitty, suggesting that the MCA works very well. I point out that Sir Chris made a significant mistake in his evidence, when he said that “the more serious the decision, the greater the level of capacity that someone needs to have.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 30, Q3.] There is no such requirement in the Mental Capacity Act. Of course, we would hope that doctors would take a serious decision more seriously than a trivial one, but there is no such requirement. I cite Alex Ruck Keene KC, who wrote to the hon. Member for Richmond Park after his evidence session; with the greatest of respect to Chris Whitty, the fact that he got that wrong does not inspire confidence in his comments that the Mental Capacity Act is well understood by doctors throughout the country. I very much echo that. We have had so much evidence on how the Mental Capacity Act does not work well in practice that I think it was regrettable for the chief medical to have made the Panglossian observation that every doctor interprets it in exactly the same way and it works perfectly everywhere. The Mental Capacity Act does not detect coercion. We will discuss coercion more in subsequent debates, but that Act is certainly not the safeguard against it. Professor House made some comments to us about Down’s syndrome and about diagnostic overshadowing. That is a very important concept. I am afraid to say that it is frequently the case, regarding people with severe disabilities, that capacity—or, indeed, incapacity—is not correctly observed because the medical professional will not see beyond the more presenting of their conditions. Observing capacity in someone who does have disabilities is often mistaken; it is harder than it is regarding other people.

11:15:00

On the subject of Down’s syndrome, I refer members of the Committee, if they have not read it, to the very powerful piece by Dominic Lawson in the newspapers this weekend about his daughter, who has Down’s syndrome, and the struggles that she and her family have with accessing equitable treatment and fairness in the system. As the hon. Member for Bexleyheath and Crayford said, there are profound problems in the way that we currently deal with people—particularly young people—with learning disabilities.

I will quickly observe the point made by witnesses about what is called fluctuating capacity, which is inherent in certain conditions, particularly dementia. The point about a decision for an assisted death is that, once someone has made it, they cannot unmake it. By the way, that is a key distinction between requesting an assisted death and declining treatment: one can always go back on a decision to decline treatment, but not on a decision to have an assisted death. Capacity fluctuates, particularly with dementia.

Can I clarify what the hon. Member is proposing by introducing a separate test for people accessing assisted dying? Say an individual is on a respirator at the end of their life. Under what the hon. Member is proposing, if they said, “Please turn this respirator off; I want to die”, he thinks that it is appropriate for capacity to be assessed under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but somehow he thinks that that person should have a different legal test if they said, “I want to take a drug to end my life,” knowing full well that they would have exactly the same result.

The simple answer is yes, I do. I think it is a causatively different decision. In fact, this whole Bill entails causative differences between those decisions. I will come to that point more in a moment. Professor Owen made an important point to us regarding capacity. He said: “You might be talking about a kind of cognitive impairment that has not reached the threshold for a diagnosis of dementia; you might be talking about a kind of mood problem or an anxiety problem that is sub-clinical; or you might be talking about a level of intelligence that is not clinically a learning disability.” He talked about “pressure within a family, let us say, which is often not malign in its intentions, but it exists.” and about situations “where there is an impairment and also an interpersonal pressure”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 30 January 2025; c. 234, Q297.] Although we are not talking at this point explicitly about coercion and family pressure, the issues around capacity and coercion are nevertheless intertwined, and it is often very difficult for doctors to determine what is really going on. Again, the challenges around capacity are intense. The point has been made by hon. Members that under clause 9(3)(b), if the second doctor in the process is in doubt about capacity, they “may” refer the person to a psychiatrist, but the clause in fact refers to “a registered medical practitioner” who “has experience of” the assessment of capacity—so not a psychiatrist, but just someone who has experience, whatever that means, of the assessment of capacity. It is not totally obvious what that means. Amendment 365 has been tabled overnight by the hon. Member for Bath (Wera Hobhouse) which would mean that both the first and second doctor, and indeed the court, if we are allowed to have a court process, “must”—not “may”— refer the person to a psychiatrist. That is not just if they are concerned about capacity, by the way. The court, or whoever it is, must conclude that there is no “impairment of judgment arising from a mental disorder or other condition”. I very much welcome that amendment and I hope that we will pass that in due course.

On that point about clause 9(3)(b), as I think was mentioned earlier, an amendment has been tabled by the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper)—an amendment that I would support and I hope the Committee will—that would indeed turn the “may” to a “must”, so that there has to be a referral to a psychiatrist if there is any doubt from either of those doctors.

That is excellent news. For the first time so far in the course of this debate, we have a strengthening of the Bill from the hon. Member. That is great news—we can chalk that up as a victory, and as good sense breaking out. I am grateful for that. Let’s see what more we can achieve. The point that I want to make is that we are in the foothills of understanding the effects of depression, cognitive impairment and social pressure on the decision to end life. That is a point made strongly by a series of witnesses to us in both oral and written evidence: we are still very much in the early stages of understanding how capacity interacts with mental illness, disability and coercion. Then, into the mists of vagueness, we are proposing to insert this single clunking, clumsy question: “Is there evidence of incapacity?” I strongly suggest that the abuse of the Mental Capacity Act that we are seeing here is not a way of simplifying the process of ensuring that there are a small number of strong safeguards; it is a great complication of the process and introduces more complexity, as we see from the many additional things that clinicians should consider. That is in direct contradiction to the principle of the Mental Capacity Act, which simply asks the question: “Is there capacity?” The point has been made that there is more to the Mental Capacity Act than simply the question of capacity. There are concepts of best interests and supporting decision making. As the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge suggested, it is a cumulative process. The Mental Capacity Act entails not only the question of capacity but the consideration of best interests and whether we are supporting the decision making of an individual. I am not sure how those terms apply in a situation of assisted dying. It is not similar or comparable to the sorts of decisions that the MCA is intended to apply to.

This touches on some of the evidence given by Mr Ruck Keene, particularly around the best interests decision. From my reading of this legislation, it is very clear that there is no possibility for someone to make a decision on behalf of or in the best interests of anyone else. As the hon. Member for Solihull West and Shirley mentioned earlier, there are a number of exclusions in the Mental Capacity Act. For example, someone is not able to make a best interests decision on someone getting married or adopting. Does the hon. Member agree that in order to have a guarantee, without any doubt, on the best interests point, an amendment could be included to clarify that nothing in the MCA would allow a best interests decision under this legislation?

That is absolutely right. I do not think best interests can apply in this case. That is why the Mental Capacity Act is being abused. As the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge said, it is supposed to be cumulative. We are supposed to consider all aspects of the Mental Capacity Act, and best interests should be part of a consideration—but how on earth does one make a best interests decision about somebody deciding to commit suicide? The hon. Gentleman is right that best interests are excluded in the Bill, so the Mental Capacity Act is not being used, except for this most basic, low-level bar to cross, which is the capacity decision.

For clarity, I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central on what would strengthen the Bill. The exceptions only apply where the right and proper Mental Capacity Act process has been gone through and the person doing that assessment has arrived at the point that that person does not have capacity. It is only in that very narrow set of circumstances where they have determined that the person before them does not have capacity to make the decision at hand that they then go to the second look at whether making such a decision would be in the individual’s best interest. The specific exclusions listed in the MCA only apply in that stage. What my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central is suggesting is that we table an amendment that would add to the list of specific exclusions; that would further strengthen the two stages. First, there would be the full Mental Capacity Act tests that may determine that the person does not have capacity. Such an amendment would give us belt and braces in circumstances where the person does not have capacity. Under the Bill currently, the person would fall out of scope and not be able to seek assistance if it had been determined that they did not have capacity. A belt-and-braces approach would make sure that there is no circumstance in which it could be determined by a medical practitioner or any other that it was in their best interests to follow this course of action. Under the Bill as currently drafted, those people who have not got capacity as a result of the Mental Capacity Act would not be able to have access to the provisions in the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central suggests that we augment that even further so that there can be no doubt that, where it has been determined that the person does not have capacity, following the Mental Capacity Act, we should also add a very clear exception—

Order.

11:25:00