Crime and Policing Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Sir Roger Gale, Mark Pritchard, Emma Lewell, † Dr Rosena Allin-Khan

† Barros-Curtis, Mr Alex (Cardiff West) (Lab)

† Bishop, Matt (Forest of Dean) (Lab)

† Burton-Sampson, David (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)

† Cross, Harriet (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)

† Davies-Jones, Alex (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice)

† Johnson, Dame Diana (Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention)

† Jones, Louise (North East Derbyshire) (Lab)

† Mather, Keir (Selby) (Lab)

† Phillips, Jess (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)

† Platt, Jo (Leigh and Atherton) (Lab/Co-op)

† Rankin, Jack (Windsor) (Con)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

Sabine, Anna (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)

† Sullivan, Dr Lauren (Gravesham) (Lab)

† Taylor, David (Hemel Hempstead) (Lab)

† Taylor, Luke (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)

† Vickers, Matt (Stockton West) (Con)

Robert Cope, Claire Cozens, Adam Evans, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

[Dr Rosena Allin-Khan in the Chair]

Crime and Policing Bill

09:25:00

We continue line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill. According to the programme order agreed at the start of Committee stage, the Committee must conclude today at 5 pm.

On a point of order, Dr Allin-Khan. I want to clarify remarks that I made during the previous Committee sitting, in response to a point raised by the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam, about officer numbers in the Metropolitan police. I stated that the Government anticipated that, under the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime budget for 2025-26, there will be a reduction of around 1,000 police officers and police community support officers in the Metropolitan police. There has been some confusion about the anticipated reduction in police officers, PCSOs and staff at the Met, which has been very unhelpful in getting a clear picture. The final MOPAC budget report states that the Met police is expecting a reduction of 1,419 full-time equivalent officers, PCSOs and staff—it includes staff—as opposed to the 1,700 figure that was previously reported. As I said in my remarks at the end of last week, I am obviously concerned about reductions, and the Government have done everything they can to minimise the number of officers, staff and PCSOs who will lose their roles. I hope that clarification is helpful to the Committee.

Thank you. Before we begin line-by-line scrutiny, I have a few preliminary reminders for the Committee. Please switch electronic devices to silent. No food or drinks are permitted during sittings of the Committee, except the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk or pass their written speaking notes to the Hansard colleague in the room. Members are reminded to bob and catch my eye if they wish to speak in a debate. New Clause 42 Report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders “(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. (2) That report must include— (a) the organisations which will be responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders; (b) what level of counterterrorism and de-radicalisation training and expertise they have; and (c) what additional resources they will require to effectively administer the provisions, prohibitions and requirements of youth diversion orders. (3) Within one month of the publication of this report, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a plan assessing the— (a) training, (b) financing, and (c) guidance, available to the organisations identified in the report under subsection (1) to bring their training, expertise and funding to the requisite level identified in that report. (4) The Secretary of State must commission a report from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to assess whether the levels of funding, training and expertise proposed in the plan under subsection (3) are sufficient. This report will be laid before Parliament with the plan under subsection (3).”—(Matt Vickers.) This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders and a plan and independent report on the funding, training and expertise they need. Brought up, and read the First time. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

46|0|3|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 43

Travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation

“(1) A person commits an offence if they travel outside of the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation.

(2) For the purposes of this section, ‘support’ includes—

(a) becoming a member of a proscribed organisation, or an affiliated group of a proscribed organisation;

(b) working for any entity, either voluntarily or for financial gain, run by a proscribed organisation;

(c) attending political, religious or social gatherings in support of a proscribed organisation;

(d) meeting with members of a proscribed organisation;

(e) creating content, both online and offline, to raise support for a proscribed organisation; or

(f) travelling to territory controlled by a proscribed organisation without an exemption.

(3) This section does not apply to—

(a) accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations;

(b) accredited media outlets and journalists;

(c) diplomats and other governmental officials travelling in an official capacity; or

(d) independent journalists and content creators reporting on a proscribed organisation, or in a territory with a proscribed organisation present.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable—

(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to a fine (or both), or

(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment of a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).”—(Matt Vickers.)

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

47|0|4|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 44

Individual preparation for mass casualty attack

“(1) A person commits an offence, if, with the intention of—

(a) killing two or more people, or

(b) attempting to kill two or more people,

they engage in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to their intention.

(2) A person found guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.” —(Matt Vickers.)

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

48|0|4|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 46

Seizure of vehicles by police: mopeds used for commercial purposes

“(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 59, after subsection (3) insert—

‘(3A) For the purpose of this section, a moped driven by an individual with a provisional license is to be regarded by a constable as “likely to cause, alarm, distress or annoyance to members of the public” if the individual in question is using their vehicle for commercial activities.’”—(Matt Vickers.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dr Allin-Khan. This new clause was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Rebecca Paul) in an effort to raise a subject that affects many of her residents. She says that dangerous delivery drivers have become an increasingly common sight on the roads of Reigate, Banstead and Redhill. She has spoken with constituents who have reported near misses, actual collisions and a growing sense that people and property are being put at risk by these individuals, who simply do not have the skills to operate their vehicles safely. My hon. Friend believes that the new clause would both address this problem and protect the rights of regular moped users. In a world with an increasing number of home delivery transactions being undertaken, there are more and more delivery drivers on our streets. Many are not properly qualified to drive, but they are working potentially long shifts, having to find addresses in areas that are alien to them. The fact that they are doing so using a licence that exists to allow people to learn to drive poses real challenges for road safety. The new clause would amend section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002, which grants police powers to seize vehicles being used in a manner that causes “alarm, distress, or annoyance”. Proposed new subsection (3A) would deem mopeds being used for commercial purposes by riders with only provisional licences as likely to fall into that category, effectively lowering the threshold for police action in such cases. The use of mopeds for delivery services—for example, food and parcel deliveries—has expanded rapidly. However, a concerning number of riders continue to operate on provisional licences, often without any training or supervision, putting both the riders and the public at risk. By allowing the police to treat such behaviour as likely to cause alarm or distress, the new clause would ensure faster and more decisive action to remove unsafe vehicles from our roads. It would allow police to actively deal with individuals on mopeds abusing the lack of legislation. If the Minister does not support the new clause, I would welcome her views on how the issue can be tackled.

I am grateful to the shadow Minister for setting out the case for the new clause on behalf of his hon. Friend the Member for Reigate. As he explained, it concerns the important issue of mopeds being used for commercial purposes by riders with provisional licences. I assure the Committee that any kind of antisocial behaviour is unacceptable, and that is why the Government are undertaking an ambitious programme of work to tackle it. The antisocial use of vehicles such as e-scooters and off-road bikes causes havoc in local communities, as we all know from our constituency postbags. We are making it easier for the police to seize such vehicles from offenders and dispose of them. Clause 8, which we have already debated, strengthens the law so that vehicles being used to commit antisocial behaviour can be seized immediately by police without the need first to provide a warning. Furthermore, the Department for Transport, together with the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency, is considering plans to review existing requirements for motorcycle training, testing and licensing, taking account of recent proposals by the motorcycle industry. As we have heard, it is currently legal for moped riders with provisional licences to work as delivery drivers. The new clause would therefore create an ambiguity in the law, which could result in confusion for the moped riders, as well as for employers and the police, because it is legal to drive on a provisional licence for these purposes but they could have their moped seized. There is also no clear definition of “commercial activities”. That could extend to a range of scenarios and cover people such as food and grocery delivery riders, couriers, parking enforcement officers, medical laboratory technicians, blood bank workers and so on. The new clause could therefore result in such sectors operating with diminished capability. The new clause may also have the unintended consequence of an increase in the use of modified electrically assisted pedal cycles that do not comply with current EAPC regulations for use on public roads, or the illegal use of off-road bikes on public roads for the same commercial purposes. The shadow Minister asked what more we could do on this issue. I highlight the work of Transport for London, which launched a road safety charter for meal and grocery delivery companies in September 2023 to identify ways to reduce death and serious injury among riders and raise road safety standards. The charter was developed in collaboration with the then five largest meal and grocery delivery companies and consists of 10 road safety principles that aim to keep food delivery motorcycle couriers and other road users safe. TfL is evaluating the impact of the charter’s implementation over the past 18 months and will share its findings with the Government in due course. On that basis, I ask the shadow Minister to withdraw new clause 46.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion. Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 47 National statutory inquiry into grooming gangs “(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of the passing of this Act, set up a statutory inquiry into grooming gangs. (2) An inquiry established under subsection (1) must seek to— (a) identify common patterns of behaviour and offending between grooming gangs; (b) identify the type, extent and volume of crimes committed by grooming gangs; (c) identify the number of victims of crimes committed by grooming gangs; (d) identify the ethnicity of members of grooming gangs; (e) identify any failings, by action, omission or deliberate suppression, by— (i) police, (ii) local authorities, (iii) prosecutors, (iv) charities, (v) political parties, (vi) local and national government, (vii) healthcare providers and health services, or (viii) other agencies or bodies, in the committal of crimes by grooming (f) identify such national safeguarding actions as may be required to minimise the risk of further such offending occurring in future; (g) identify good practice in protecting children. (3) The inquiry may do anything it considers is calculated to facilitate, or is incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of its functions and the achievement of the requirements of subsection (2). (4) An inquiry established under this section must publish a report within two years of the launch of the inquiry. (5) For the purposes of this section— ‘gang’ means a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims; ‘grooming’ means— (a) activity carried out with the primary intention of committing sexual offences against the victim; (b) activity that is carried out, or predominantly carried out, in person; (c) activity that includes the provision of illicit substances and/or alcohol either as part of the grooming or concurrent with the commission of the sexual offence.” —(Matt Vickers.) This new clause would set up a national statutory inquiry into grooming gangs. Brought up, and read the First time. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

49|0|4|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 48

Annual statement on ethnicity of members of grooming gangs

“The Secretary of State must make an annual statement to the House of Commons on the ethnicity of convicted members of grooming gangs.”—(Matt Vickers.)

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

50|0|4|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 49

Publication of sex offender’s ethnicity data

“(1) The Secretary of State for the Home Office must publish—

(a) quarterly; and

(b) yearly;

datasets containing all national data pertaining to the ethnicity of sex offenders.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a “sex offender” is anyone convicted of—

(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child),

(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child),

(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13),

(d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child 25 sex offences),

(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence),

(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust),

(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or

(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children),

(i) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent),

(j) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder),

(k) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or

(l) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism),

(m) an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.”—(Matt Vickers.)

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

51|0|4|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 50

Removal of parental responsibility for individuals convicted of sexual offences against children

“(1) The Children Act 1989 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 2 (parental responsibility for children) insert—

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a person (“P”) has been found guilty of a serious sexual offence involving or relating to a child or children; and

(b) P had parental responsibility for a child or children at the time at which the offence was committed.

(2) P ceases to have parental responsibility for a child or all children—

(a) till the child, or children, turns 18, or

(b) until an application by P to the family court to reinstate parental responsibility has been approved.’” —(Matt Vickers.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. New clause 50 would amend the Children Act 1989 by inserting a new section 2A to suspend parental responsibility for any individual convicted of serious sexual offences involving or relating to children. It is not in a child’s best interests for a person who has committed a serious sexual offence against a child to retain any legal rights over them, whether that child was the direct victim or not. The new clause would put child safety above all else, by ensuring that there is no ambiguity about the offender’s legal standing as a parent. Although the courts do have the power to strip parental responsibility when it is in the best interest of a child, families and former partners of perpetrators are currently required to instigate and fund proceedings to secure these orders to protect their children. The costs for these types of proceedings can run into tens of thousands of pounds. However, under the new rule, the automatic suspension would make proceedings simpler. The new clause would send a powerful message that those who commit serious sexual offences against children forfeit the rights of parenthood. Parenthood comes with responsibilities, chief among them being the duty to protect. Breaching that duty in the most serious and damaging way should have equally serious consequences under the law. There is wide public and cross-party support for measures that prioritise the protection of children over the rights of offenders. The new clause would ensure that the law reflected both moral clarity and practical necessity, putting children first and ensuring that legal rights are not abused by convicted predators. It would introduce a long overdue legal safeguard for vulnerable children by ensuring that no individual convicted of a serious child sex offence continued to exercise legal power as a parent while in prison, unless and until a court independently decided that it was safe and appropriate for them to do so. It would strengthen the child protection framework and put survivors’ welfare and dignity at the centre of family law.

New clause 50 seeks the automatic removal of parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of a serious sexual offence against a child. To begin with, I wish to be clear that child sexual abuse is an abhorrent crime that leaves a lasting impact on victims and their families, and those affected have my deepest sympathies. The shadow Minister’s motivation in tabling the amendment is laudable—protecting children and vulnerable adults is a top priority for this Government—but there are several compelling reasons why we cannot support it.

09:45:00

First, the new clause does not define which offences would be in scope. Without that clear definition, what is considered “serious” is left open to interpretation, which could lead to disparity in the protections offered to child victims and their families. Similarly, it is not clear what is meant by a crime

“involving or relating to a child or children”.

Again, there is a range of interpretations for that wording, meaning yet more chance of the measure being inconsistently applied and offering uneven protections for children.

Furthermore, the measure appears to confuse several concepts in the existing law around parental responsibility. It uses phrases such as “removal”, “suspension” and “terminate” interchangeably. In practice, there are distinctions between restricting or removing a person’s parental responsibility and suspending it. This would place the provision in opposition to the wider law on parental responsibility, which has its roots in both legislation and extensive case law. The measure leaves open to interpretation precisely which of these approaches should be taken in each individual case, which reinforces the potential for variable application.

In short, the new clause contains some clear problems that undermine its good intentions. However, I reassure the Committee that we do intend to legislate to protect the children of child sex offenders. Members may be aware that, in the King’s Speech, we made a commitment to protect the public from sex offenders, including by restricting the parental responsibility of child sex offenders. I am pleased to confirm that the Government have included a measure to that effect in the Victims and Courts Bill, which was introduced to the House last Wednesday.

That measure will provide for the automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility of offenders sentenced to four or more years’ imprisonment for serious child sexual abuse offences against a child for which they hold parental responsibility. The exercise of the offender’s parental responsibility will be restricted to the point that they cannot take any meaningful action in relation to any of their children. Our measure, which is driven by the same motivations as the shadow Minister’s, will provide workable protections for the children of those convicted of serious child sexual offences and will be fairly applied in all circumstances.

The shadow Minister’s new clause has a worthy aim; all of us have a huge amount of sympathy for the children who are in these awful situations, and we all want to do everything we can to protect them from harm, including that caused by parents who, despite being the people who should keep them safe, are the perpetrators of serious child sexual abuse offences. However, given the problems that I have mentioned, and given the measure that the Government have included in the Victims and Courts Bill, I urge him to withdraw the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

52|0|5|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 51

Amendment of Possession of extreme pornographic images

“(1) Section 63 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (possession of extreme pornographic images) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (7) after paragraph (a) insert—

‘(aa) an act which affects a person’s ability to breath and constitutes battery of that person.’”—(Matt Vickers.)

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

53|0|4|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 52

Child Murder Sentencing Guidelines

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 21, paragraph 2(2) omit (b) and (ba) and insert—

‘(zb) the murder of a child’.”—(Matt Vickers.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause seeks to amend the Sentencing Act 2020 to ensure that the starting point for sentencing anyone convicted of the murder of a child is a whole life order. Specifically, it would amend schedule 21 to insert the murder of a child as a stand-alone aggravating factor warranting the highest penalty available under the law. The murder of a child is one of the most heinous and incomprehensible crimes in our society. It represents a total breach of the duty of care and protection that adults owe to children, the most vulnerable members of our communities. Unlike many other forms of homicide, the murder of a child is rarely spontaneous and often involves an abuse of trust, authority or access. These are crimes that permanently scar the moral fabric of society and must be treated with the utmost severity in our justice system. Under the current law, a whole life order for child murder is applied only in cases involving additional aggravating factors, such as abduction, sexual abuse or premeditated sadism. This creates an unjust distinction that can result in disparities in sentencing. A child’s life is not made more or less valuable by the specific nature of the crime. The act of taking a child’s life should, in itself, warrant the strongest possible sentence. The new clause would eliminate ambiguity and bring clarity and consistency to sentencing practice, ensuring that the most severe punishment is applied to the most serious offence. By making the starting point for child murder a whole life order, Parliament would send a powerful and unambiguous message that the deliberate killing of a child will never be met with any leniency. That would not only strengthen public confidence in the justice system, but serve as a deterrent to those who might commit such unforgivable acts. It would reinforce the principle that the protection of children is paramount, and that their murder is an attack on the very core of civilised society. The new clause would recognise the unique horror of child murder and ensure that our sentencing laws reflect that reality. By adopting the measure, we would show victims’ families that their suffering is acknowledged, and uphold the principle that the life of every child must be fiercely protected in both law and practice.

The new clause seeks to make the starting punishment for child murder a whole life order. I thank the shadow Minister for his commitment to tackling crimes involving children and reiterate the offer made at the last sitting by the Safeguarding Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley, that if he seriously wishes to address these crimes and all the others we have debated throughout the Committee’s sittings, we stand willing to work with any Member across the House to make that a reality. As yet, no acceptance of that offer has come forward. I share the desire, as many do, to ensure that those responsible for these terrible crimes are punished properly. The murder of the most vulnerable in our society causes extreme grief and devastation for loved ones who are left behind. Those affected have my deepest sympathies. It may be helpful if I set out in what circumstances the murderer of a child would currently receive a whole life order. Everyone convicted of the murder of a child will receive a life sentence. That means they will only be released, after serving their minimum term, if the Parole Board is satisfied that their detention is no longer necessary for the protection of the public. Even if released—and I say “if”—the offender will remain on licence for the rest of their life, subject to recall to prison if they breach the conditions of their licence. When a life sentence is imposed, the court must determine the minimum period to be served in custody for the purposes of punishment and deterrence. When sentencing adult offenders, the starting points are 15, 25 or 30 years, or a whole life order. Judges must then consider relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and adjust the minimum term accordingly. Whole life orders are the most severe form of punishment that the courts can impose. These sentences have no tariffs and no possibility of Parole Board release. As such, they are reserved for the most heinous cases of murder. As of 31 December 2024, there are 69 offenders serving whole life orders in our prisons. There are certain instances of child murder that are regarded as so heinous that they are normally subject to a whole life order starting point. Currently, a whole life order will normally be the appropriate starting point for the murder of a child if it involved the abduction of the child, sexual or sadistic motivation, or a substantial degree of premeditation or planning. Some instances of child murder may also fall within other circumstances where a whole life order is normally the appropriate starting point. Those additional circumstances apply to murders involving victims of any age—for example, a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause, or a murder committed by someone already convicted of murder. The court may also impose a whole life order for murders where it considers that the seriousness of the offence is exceptionally high, even if it does not fall within one of the categories of case specified as normally warranting a whole life order starting point. There are several reasons why we cannot support the new clause. It is important to recognise that cases involving the murder of a child can be incredibly complex and it is therefore right that we do not introduce legislation that treats them all the same. Given their severity, whole life orders must be reserved for the most serious cases, and it is right that in other cases judges retain broader discretion to impose the appropriate minimum term in accordance with the statutory framework. However, the Government recognise that there are serious concerns regarding homicide law and sentencing, which do need addressing. The Lord Chancellor recently announced a Law Commission review of homicide law and sentencing. The review will consider the law relating to homicide offences, including full and partial defences to those offences, and the existing sentencing framework for murder, as set out in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020. Any changes to schedule 21, including to whole life orders, will therefore be considered in the context of the Law Commission’s review. The Law Commission planned to begin its work on the review earlier this year, and we understand that it will publish a timeline of that work shortly. It would not be right to anticipate the recommendations of the commission by introducing legislation on murder sentencing prior to the publication of its review. Instead, its findings should be considered independently and in their totality. I thank the shadow Minister again for his commitment to punishing offenders that commit crimes against children. However, as I hope I have made clear, crimes against children are complex and need all due consideration in sentencing by the independent judiciary. I therefore urge him to withdraw his new clause. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

54|0|5|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 54

Financial gain from child sexual exploitation and abuse

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 70 insert—

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offence; or

(b) the offence is aggravated by financial gain; and

(c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed.

(2) The court—

(a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by financial gain from a specified child sex offence or child sexual abuse material as an aggravating factor; and

(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.

(3) An offence is “aggravated by financial gain from a specified child sex offence or child sexual abuse material as an aggravating factor” if—

(a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender financially profiting from a child sexual offence; or

(b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender financially profiting from a child sex offence, and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that the said person was financially profiting from said child sex offence.

(4) In this section “specified child sex offence” means—

(a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7); or

(b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence.

(5) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child);

(b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child);

(c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13);

(d) an offence under any of sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child sex offences);

(e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence);

(f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust);

(g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences); or

(h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children).

(6) An offence is within this subsection if it is—

(a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent);

(b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder);

(c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences); or

(d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism), and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18.

(7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18.

(8) For the purposes of this section “financially profiting” means receiving money, goods, or any other form of payment.’”—(Matt Vickers.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would introduce a new aggravating factor into sentencing decisions for child sexual abuse offences under the Sentencing Act 2020. It would establish that where an individual has financially profited, directly or indirectly, from the exploitation or abuse of a child, that financial gain must be treated as a serious aggravating factor. It would also require the court to state that publicly when passing sentence.

10:00:00

The sexual exploitation of children is among the most reprehensible offences in our society—a betrayal of innocence, safety and human dignity. When such abuse is monetised, the moral gravity of the offence is even more severe. Turning child abuse into a source of financial gain elevates the exploitation to an industrial scale. It transforms the victim into a commodity and incentivises further harm. The new clause would ensure that courts recognise and respond firmly to that added layer of depravity.

Unfortunately, technological advancements and global criminal networks have enabled an alarming increase in the commercial exploitation of children. Offenders now profit through various means, including the sale of abuse material online, the livestreaming of abuse for paying viewers, and the trafficking of children for sexual purposes. In some cases, even possession or circulation of indecent images may serve broader financial interests. The new clause would ensure that the law keeps pace with the evolving methods of abuse and exploitation.

Sentencing must reflect not just the harm caused to the victim but the motives of the offender. Financial gain reflects cold, calculated and deliberate exploitation. It suggests repeat offending, involvement in networks and disregard for long-term consequences. By making financial profit a statutory aggravating factor, the new clause would help judges to deliver sentences that match the exceptional seriousness of these crimes.

The new clause would align sentencing practice with the lived reality of modern child sexual exploitation. It would make it clear that child abuse must never be a source of profit, and that those who attempt to benefit from such vile acts will face significantly enhanced punishment. In doing so, it would strengthen justice, deter future harm and place victims’ suffering at the heart of the legal response.

I understand that the purpose of the new clause is to create a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing for any individual who has financially benefited from the creation, distribution, possession or publication of any specified child sexual abuse offence. While I wholeheartedly agree with the spirit of the proposed measure, I must inform the shadow Minister that Sentencing Council guidelines already provide for courts to lengthen sentences where an offender has financially benefited from a sexual offence committed against a child. Sentencing guidelines are developed by the independent Sentencing Council for England and Wales. All sentencing courts must follow any sentencing guidelines that are relevant to the offender’s case, unless it is in the interests of justice not to do so. The overarching sentencing guidelines include “Commission of the offence for financial gain” and “High level of profit from the offence” as aggravating factors that courts can apply to any relevant offence. The sentencing guidelines for sexual offences also include “Commercial exploitation and/or motivation” as a high culpability factor, increasing the starting point that the courts apply when deciding on a sentence. The new clause risks introducing confusion in the application of existing provisions. Furthermore, by specifying the offences to which the factor applies, it could inadvertently narrow the range of cases in which financial gain is considered an aggravating factor. For those reasons, I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw the new clause. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

55|0|5|9|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 55

Annual statement on employment status of sexual offenders

“(1) The Secretary of State must publish an annual report on the employment status of convicted sexual offenders at the time of their offence.

(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), “Sexual offenders” means any person found guilty of an offence stipulated in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.”—(Matt Vickers.)

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

56|0|4|9|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 57

Prohibition on sexual relationships between first cousins

“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 27 (family relationships), subsection (2)(a) after ‘uncle,’ insert ‘first cousin,’.

(3) In section 64 (sex with an adult relative: penetration), subsection (2) after ‘niece’ insert ‘or first cousin.’

(4) In subsection 64(3) at end insert—

(c) ‘first cousin’ means the child of a parent’s sibling.

(5) This section does not affect the continued sexual relationships between first cousins that had begun before the Crime and Policing Act 2025 received Royal Assent.”—(Matt Vickers.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The Opposition believe that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 falls short in not addressing sexual relationships between first cousins. New clause 57 would abolish this loophole by explicitly prohibiting sexual relationships between first cousins, bringing these relations in line with prohibitions on other familial relationships. New evidence published by the BBC in February 2025, drawn from new data from the Born in Bradford study conducted by researchers at Bradford University, highlights the key health and social issues caused by consanguineous marriage between first cousins, which new clause 57 seeks to address. A child of first cousins is twice as likely to inherit a recessive health disorder such as cystic fibrosis or sickle cell disease. Indeed, in the private Member’s Bill introduced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Holden), data was presented that showed the higher risk of birth defects, increased infant mortality rates and more heart, brain and kidney problems due to recessive disorders among children born to cousin parents. The medical evidence shows that health conditions and genetic disorders are compounded by cousin marriage, particularly when the practice persists through generations in a family or wider community. There may potentially be thousands of such marriages each year. Some may argue that this is a minor issue, but if it involves an act that we regard as deeply damaging to the potential health of a child, it cannot be ignored. To do so would be deeply irresponsible.

Again, I thank the hon. Member for the new clause, which would extend existing offences relating to sexual activity between certain family members to first cousins. The Sexual Offences Act 2003 currently makes it a criminal offence for a person aged 16 or over to sexually penetrate an adult family member where they are related as a parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, sister, half-brother, half-sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece. The rationale for the offence in relation to sexual relations between family members generally is the fundamental breach of trust involved in particular family members engaging in sexual activity with other family members. It is also important to acknowledge that criminal offences help to ensure that patterns of abuse established in childhood are not allowed to continue into adulthood. If the intention of the new clause, as the shadow Minister stated, is to prevent marriage between first cousins, this Bill is the wrong vehicle for that. The Marriage Act 1949 deals with prohibited degrees of relationship for marriage. It is therefore the case that under this new clause, although sexual penetration between first cousins would become a criminal offence in certain circumstances, first cousins would still be legally able to marry. Marriage will always be one of our most important institutions, and we must, and are, considering any recommendations to change wedding law carefully, including in relation to cousin marriage. I acknowledge that the new clause does not seek to criminalise continued sexual relations between first cousins where the sexual relationship started before the Bill is passed. However, the practical reality is that many first cousins would be permitted to continue having sex, while for others it would become criminal behaviour. The new clause also seeks to make it a specific criminal offence for a person to sexually touch a child who is their first cousin, or to incite a child who is their first cousin to engage in sexual activity, where the child is under 18 and the perpetrator does not reasonably believe that they are 18 or over. Regardless of the new clause, it is already an offence for anyone, of any age, to engage in sexual activity with children under the age of 16, even if that child purports to give their consent. These are serious sexual offences, and they are treated as such across the criminal justice system. We consider the existing protections for children under 16 to be sufficient. Therefore, for the reasons I have set out, I ask the hon. Member for Stockton West to withdraw the new clause. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

57|0|3|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 58

Amendment of the Police Act 1996

“(1) Section 39A of the Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (7) insert—

‘(8) The Secretary of State may require that the College of Policing revises the whole or any part of a code of practice issued under this section or any other guidance or standards for policing the College of Policing may issue.

(9) The Secretary of State may require that the National Police Chiefs’ Council revises the whole or any part of policy, strategic plan, action plan, or any other document intended direct policing practices.’” —(Matt Vickers.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. This new clause would empower the Secretary of State to require revisions to any code of practice, policy, guidance or strategic document issued by the College of Policing or the National Police Chiefs’ Council. It would ensure that policing standards and practices remain aligned with the Government’s democratically accountable vision for public safety and law enforcement. The College of Policing and the NPCC play critical roles in setting the professional standards and operational frameworks that govern police conduct across England and Wales. However, those bodies are not directly accountable to the public. The new clause would ensure that, when necessary—particularly in response to changing threats, public concerns or parliamentary direction—the Secretary of State has the power to intervene and ensure that the frameworks reflect the national interest and the expectations of the British people. Policing in the UK rightly enjoys operational independence, but that is not the same as independence from oversight. When public confidence in policing is strained, whether due to failings in standards, inconsistency in approach or a lack of responsiveness to major public concerns, the Government must be able to act. The new clause would provide a clear, proportionate mechanism for ministerial oversight of the non-statutory frameworks that underpin much of modern policing policy. From rising levels of serious violence to emerging threats such as online abuse or disruptive protests, the nature of crime and disorder is changing rapidly. The Government must be able to ensure that national policing guidance adapts accordingly. Whether it is guidance on stop and search, digital investigation, safeguarding or public order, it is vital that these documents are kept under review and reflect current priorities. The new clause would enable timely updates when needed, without undermining police independence in operational decisions. With the sentencing guidelines legislation, we have seen the need for the Government to intervene to prevent unhelpful practices that fly in the face of equality, as well as public opinion. The shadow Home Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), has rightly highlighted that everyone must be treated equally before the law. Given the important role that these bodies play, we welcome the added accountability that would come from allowing Ministers to intervene if necessary. Would the Minister not be grateful for the ability to take action if such a situation were to arise? The new clause would not erode police independence; it would reinforce public accountability. It would ensure that when Parliament or the Secretary of State identifies a critical issue in how police standards are set or enforced, they have the tools to respond. In doing so, it would help maintain confidence in the police, strengthen the integrity of the policing profession and ensure that national guidance reflects the values and priorities of the society it serves.

10:15:00

I am grateful to the hon. Member for setting out the rationale for his new clause, and I will refer to a number of related issues. New clause 58 would give the Home Secretary the power to amend or withdraw any code of practice, or related guidance documents, from the College of Policing and/or the National Police Chiefs’ Council. As the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament and the public for policing, it is important that she works with policing bodies to ensure consistent standards and practice across England and Wales. The issuing of guidance is just one part of achieving that aim. The hon. Member referred to the ability of Ministers to take action. It is worth noting that there are existing provisions for the Home Secretary to approve the issuing and revision of codes of practice published by the College of Policing. Such guidance is rightly categorised as statutory and covers a wide range of issues—from armed policing through to the requirement for ethical policing—that are relevant to ensuring that the public are safe and that communities have confidence that officers are held to the highest standards. Although the new clause would go further and provide the Home Secretary with powers to amend any guidance issued by the College of Policing and the NPCC, we should not forget—in fact, the shadow Minister referred to this—that policing is operationally independent of Government. That is a vital principle in our democratic society, and it is fundamental to our model of policing by consent. Having said that, I note that the Home Secretary and I have very productive relationships with police leaders. We work hand in hand with police leaders to develop policy and guidance with the ultimate shared aim of keeping the public safe. I remind the Committee that the Government will publish a White Paper on police reform later this year. The Home Secretary has signalled her intention to work more closely with police leaders to drive improvements and to ensure that policing is set up to succeed. We will set out our plans for strengthening how the policing system works to tackle a range of issues, from the future workforce to tackling fast-changing crime. I encourage all hon. Members to engage with that work when the consultation on the White Paper opens. As the hon. Member for Stockton West said, the new clause was inspired by recent issues such as the update to the police race action plan. The plan was jointly developed by the NPCC and the College of Policing, and it commits to zero tolerance of racism in policing, on which I am sure we all agree. It is worth reflecting that the plan was originally published under the previous Conservative Government. I support the plan’s aims, and I completely reject the notion that it encourages preferential treatment for some groups over others. Of course, police officers should be conscious of the history of race relations in their local area—for example, by working with community leaders and key stakeholders from different communities on issues such as stop and search. Having said that, the police are required to apply the law equally, regardless of ethnicity. I think this new clause is misguided. In any event, given the levers available to the Home Secretary in relation to statutory police guidance, and given the wider work on police reform, the new clause is unnecessary. For those reasons, I invite the hon. Member to withdraw it. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

58|0|3|9|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 59

The retention by the police of non-crime perception records

“(1) Non-crime hate incidents as a special category of incident to be recognised by police authorities are abolished. Reporting, recording and investigation of such incidents should occur only in the limited circumstances provided for in this section.

(2) For the purposes of Article 6(1) of the UK GDPR, section 35 of the Data Protection Act 2018 (“the Act”) and Article 8 of the Law Enforcement Directive, the processing of relevant data by a police authority is unlawful.

(3) In this section, “relevant data” means personal data relating to the conduct or alleged of a data subject which is unlikely to constitute criminal conduct and which has been perceived by another person to be motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility or prejudice towards one or more persons who have or who are or have been perceived to have one or more relevant characteristics and with that hostility or prejudice arising due to that or the perception of those protected characteristics.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3), the following are relevant characteristics—

(a) race,

(b) religion,

(c) sexual orientation,

(d) disability,

(e) transgender identity.

(5) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the processing of relevant data—

(a) pursuant to an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution,

(b) for the purposes of the internal administrative functions of the police authority.

(6) Subsection (2) does not apply in respect of the retention of a record (a “non-crime perception record”) of relevant data where a police officer (the “certifying officer”) of the rank of inspector or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.

(7) Where a certifying officer certifies the retention of a non-crime perception record pursuant to subsection (6)—

(a) the certifying officer must include in the record a description of the future criminal conduct they have in mind and the reasons they believe that the retention of the record may assist in its detection or prevention,

(b) the relevant data which may be retained as part of the record may be no more than the certifying officer believes is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct,

(c) a copy of the record must be expeditiously provided to the data subject unless an officer of the of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that—

(i) the provision of the record to the data subject may interfere in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct, or

(ii) the officer is satisfied that that it is not reasonably practicable to provide a copy of the record to the data subject.

(8) If the data subject objects to the retention of the non-crime perception record, subsection (6) does not apply unless a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above certifies that in their opinion the retention of the non-crime perception record is likely materially to assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct which may occur in the future.

(9) No police authority or police officer can be held under any circumstances to be under any duty to undertake the retention of any relevant data.

(10) After subsection 113B(3) of the Police Act 1997 insert—

“(3A) An enhanced criminal record certificate must not give the details of a relevant matter to the extent that doing so would result in the disclosure of relevant data as defined in section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.”

(11) For subsection 39A(3) of the Police Act 1996 substitute—

“(3) No part of any Code of Practice issued by the College of Policing may be in a form which could be issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 60 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”

(12) Section 60 the 2022 Act is to be amended as follows—

(a) the cross heading to be changed to “Non-crime perception records”,

(b) the section heading to be changed to “Code of practice relating to non-crime perception records”,

(c) in subsection (1) leave out from “by” to the end of the subsection and insert “of relevant data”,

(d) omit subsection (2),

(e) in subsection (3)(a), leave out “personal data relating to a hate incident” and insert “relevant data”,

(f) in subsections (3)(b), (c), (d) and (e), for “such personal data” substitute “relevant data”,

(g) in subsection (4)(a), for “personal data” substitute “relevant data”,

(h) in subsection (4)(b), leave out “personal data relating to the alleged perpetrator of a hate incident” and insert “relevant data relating to the alleged perpetrator”,

(i) in subsection (7), at end, insert “relevant data” has the meaning given by section (The retention by the police of non-crime perception records) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025”.

(13) Any code of practice previously issued under section 60 of the 2022 Act is deemed to be withdrawn.

(14) Within three months of the commencement of each calendar year, each police authority which is retaining non-crime perception records must—

(a) undertake a review of the relevant data by an independent person to ensure that any retention of such records is in compliance with the provisions of this section.

(b) publish a report in respect of the review prepared by the independent person including setting—

(i) the total number of non-crime perception records retained by the police authority;

(ii) the total number of data subject to which those records relate; and

(iii) the equivalent numbers of those records added in the previous year.

(15) In this section—

(a) “a police authority” means—

(i) a person specified or described in paragraphs 5 to 17 of Schedule 7 of the Act,

(ii) a person acting under the authority of such a person,

(b) the terms “data subject”, “processing” and “the UK GDPR” have the same meanings as under section 3 of the Act,

(c) “the Law Enforcement Directive” means the Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament,

(d) “the 2022 Act” means the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022.”—(Matt Vickers.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 52, in clause 135, page 146, line 4, at end insert— “(3A) Section [The retention by the police of non-crime perception records] comes into force at the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.” This amendment would add a commencement provision in relation to NC59.

New clause 59 would abolish non-crime hate incidents as a distinct form of police record. Police authorities would no longer be permitted to report, record or investigate such incidents unless specific exceptions apply. This marks a significant departure from previous practice, where incidents not amounting to criminal conduct could still be logged if perceived as motivated by hostility related to protected characteristics. The new clause would establish that the processing of relevant data by police authorities is unlawful under key UK data protection laws. “Relevant data” is defined as personal data relating to a person’s conduct that is unlikely to constitute criminal conduct but has been perceived by someone else as motivated by hostility or prejudice. There is an exception to allow for relevant data to be processed where it is required for an ongoing criminal investigation or prosecution. Other forms of retention would have to meet stringent conditions. A police officer of the rank of inspector or above could authorise the retention of relevant data where they believe it is likely to assist materially in preventing or detecting future criminal conduct. By abolishing the category of non-crime hate incidents, the new clause would address widespread concerns about the chilling effect such records can have on free speech. Under the previous system, individuals could be recorded by the police simply for expressing controversial or unpopular opinions, even when no law had been broken. The new clause would ensure that lawful speech is no longer subject to disproportionate scrutiny or police record. Nationally there are 13,200 non-crime hate incidents recorded per annum, according to Policy Exchange, which reasonably concludes that over 60,000 police hours each year are spent on NCHIs. Given the challenges facing the police, it is essential that they are able to focus on what matters most: tackling crime.

New clause 59 seeks to abolish non-crime hate incidents and to make the processing of personal data in relation to such incidents unlawful. It also seeks to introduce a new type of incident, known as a non-crime perception record, to ensure that data that may assist in the detection or prevention of criminal conduct can still be collected. It may be helpful for the Committee to know that, in 2023, the previous Government introduced the statutory non-crime hate incidents code of practice on the recording and retention of personal data for police forces in England and Wales, and that the College of Policing updated its operational guidance on hate crime for the police in 2023 to ensure it aligned with the code. The College of Policing also publishes operational guidance, known as authorised professional practice, for numerous crime types and police business areas. Members should be in no doubt that this Government’s top priority for policing is delivering on our safer streets mission, including through essential reforms to rebuild neighbourhood policing, restore public confidence and deliver our commitment to halve knife crime and violence against women and girls, as well as reducing antisocial behaviour. Against that backdrop, the Home Secretary has been clear that a consistent and common-sense approach must be taken to non-crime hate incidents. Accordingly, she has already agreed that the National Police Chiefs’ Council, supported by the College of Policing, will conduct a review on the recording’s use and effectiveness. The review will cover when the police should record information that does not reach the criminal threshold but where it is still deemed necessary to monitor community tensions and keep the public safe. It will also consider the fundamental right of freedom of expression and recent court rulings in this area. The Government will work closely with the NPCC and the College of Policing as we develop our findings and any proposals. I hope the hon. Member for Stockton West agrees that it would be premature to make decisions on the future of non-crime hate incidents before the review concludes later this year. I therefore invite him to withdraw his new clause. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

59|0|3|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 60

Threshold for intentional harassment, alarm or distress

“(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows—

(2) In sections 4A(1)(a) and (b) leave out ‘or insulting.’” —(Matt Vickers.)

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause seeks to amend section 4A(1)(a) and (b) of the Public Order Act 1986 by removing the word “insulting”. Its effect would be to raise the threshold for the offence of intentional harassment, alarm or distress, ensuring that only behaviour that is threatening or abusive is captured under that offence. Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of British democracy. Although it is vital to protect people from genuinely threatening or abusive behaviour, the inclusion of the term “insulting” in criminal legislation casts too wide a net. Insults, however unpleasant, are part of everyday life and public discourse; they should not, on their own, lead to criminal charges. The new clause strikes a better balance between protecting individuals and upholding free speech. The word “insulting” is vague, subjective and open to interpretation: what one person finds insulting, another may see as fair comment or robust criticism. Laws should be clear and proportionate. Removing the term provides greater legal certainty and reduces the risk of overreach in public order policing, especially in the context of protests, political debate or challenging conversations in public spaces. The Government have already recognised such concerns. The word “insulting” was removed from section 5 of the 1986 Act by the Crime and Courts Act 2013, following widespread concern about its chilling effect on speech. The new clause would simply extend that same principle to section 4A, which relates to intentional conduct. If “insulting” is not sufficient for non-intentional offences, it should not justify criminal liability when intent is alleged either. The new clause would help to restore public confidence in the fairness and clarity of our public order laws. It would ensure that only serious conduct was subject to criminal sanction, while reaffirming the UK’s commitment to open, democratic debate—even when it is uncomfortable or challenging. Removing the word “insulting” from section 4A is a proportionate and necessary step to safeguard civil liberties without compromising public safety.

As the shadow Minister explained, the new clause seeks to remove the word “insulting” from section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986, which deals with intentional harassment, alarm or distress. That would raise the threshold for criminal liability by ensuring that the law only captures behaviour and displays that are threatening or abusive, not “insulting”. I fully understand the motivation behind the new clause, and am sympathetic to the need to strengthen protections for free speech and reduce the risk of criminalising conduct based on personal sensitivities. However, there are legitimate concerns that removing “insulting” could narrow the tools available to respond to deliberate and targeted harassment. Given the potential implications of this issue, we believe it warrants further consideration. I will reflect on what the shadow Minister has said and therefore ask him to withdraw his new clause at this time. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

60|0|3|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 95

Points on driving licence for littering out of a vehicle window

“(1) The Environmental Protection Act 1990 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 87, subsection (5), at end insert—

‘(5A) Where a person is found guilty of an offence of littering committed under section 87(1) that occurs as a result of litter being thrown, dropped or otherwise deposited from a vehicle, they shall also be liable to an endorsement of 3 penalty points on their driving record.’”—(Matt Vickers.)

10:30:00

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. Littering from vehicles remains one of the most persistent and visible forms of environmental degradation on UK roads. Despite existing fines, enforcement has been inconsistent and existing penalties have proven insufficient to deter such irresponsible behaviour. By introducing the possibility of penalty points on the driving licence, this measure would add a meaningful consequence that better reflects the seriousness of the offence and its impact on the environment and local communities. The addition of driving licence points introduces a real deterrent by linking antisocial environmental behaviour directly to a person’s ability to drive. Just as mobile phone use when driving or dangerous driving habits result in points, so too should reckless littering from vehicles. That aligns with the principle that the privilege of driving comes with broader responsibilities, including respect for public spaces and the environment. Roadside litter is not just unsightly; it also poses real risks to wildlife, blocks drainage systems and requires expensive clean-up operations, costing local authorities tens of millions of pounds annually. A stronger deterrent, such as penalty points, would help reduce the burden on taxpayers and protect the UK’s countryside, towns and roadsides. Similar approaches have been adopted internationally with success. For example, jurisdictions in Australia and parts of the United States have linked littering from vehicles to driving licence consequences, resulting in measurable behavioural changes. The UK should not lag behind in taking bold, effective steps to tackle that form of pollution and to protect our environment and wildlife. A study by National Highways revealed that 65% of drivers who admit to littering have thrown food and drink packaging from their vehicles. Additionally, the road safety charity, IAM RoadSmart, found that nearly 40% of motorcyclists had experienced car drivers or passengers throwing litter from windows while overtaking. The scale of the problem is huge. Roadside litter poses risk to wildlife, with discarded waste contributing to the deaths of millions of animals annually in the UK. Furthermore, the cost of clearing litter from roads is substantial. For example, between April 2020 and March 2022, 45,000 bags of rubbish weighing 451 tonnes were collected from the M6 motorway alone. National Highways estimates that more than 150,000 sacks of litter are collected by contractors every year, averaging 83 bags per mile of motorway annually. In short, introducing penalty points for littering from a vehicle would send a clear message that such behaviour is unacceptable and will carry real consequences. It would also reinforce the Government’s wider commitment to tackling environmental offences, empowering enforcement agencies and restoring pride in our public places.

New clause 95 seeks to add three penalty points to the driving licence of a person convicted of littering from a vehicle. While I am sure we all want to see robust consequences for those who throw litter on to our streets, we do need to consider carefully how workable the proposal of the shadow Minister is. Currently, the number of prosecutions for littering when litter was dropped from a vehicle is low due to the requirement for the individual to be identified, which can prove difficult. The opportunity therefore for the courts to impose such a punishment would be limited. The new clause also appears to assume that the person throwing the litter out of the vehicle would be the driver, which is not necessarily the case, and there will be instances when the offender does not have a driving licence to endorse in the first place. Is the shadow Minister suggesting that in such cases the driver—it could be a bus driver or a coach driver—should nevertheless be held liable? However, I agree that this is a serious issue, so I will ask my counterpart in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs with responsibility for policy on littering to consider the benefits of designing a workable system to enable the endorsement of penalty points for littering offences committed from vehicles. Local authorities can already issue civil penalties of up to £500 to the keeper of a vehicle from which litter has been thrown, and that amount doubles if not paid within 28 days. That civil penalty was introduced following consideration of the difficulty of identifying the individual who threw the litter. That measure can help when video evidence shows only the vehicle from which the litter has been thrown. The civil penalty also provides a more immediate means of redress and prevents pressures on the court system. I am grateful to the shadow Minister for raising the issue. As I said, I will talk to my counterpart at DEFRA. However, for the reasons I outlined, I ask him not to press the new clause.

I thank the Minister for her comments and welcome the commitment to look at the issue, but I will press the new clause. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

61|0|4|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 96

Theft of tools from tradesmen

“(1) The Sentencing Act 2020 is amended as follows.

(2) In Chapter 3, Aggravating Factors, after section 72 insert—

(1) This section applies where the court is considering the seriousness of an offence specified in section 7 of the Theft Act 1968.

(2) If the theft was of tools from a tradesman, the court—

(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and

(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.’”—(Matt Vickers.)

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

62|0|4|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 97

Access to public funds for organisations supporting criminal conduct

“An organisation or group will not be eligible for public funding if there is evidence that it—

(a) actively promotes or supports criminal conduct, or

(b) seeks to subvert the constitutional integrity or democratic institutions of the United Kingdom through violent or illegal means.”—(Matt Vickers.)

I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time. The new clause would ensure that taxpayers’ money was not used to support organisations or groups that promote or condone criminal activity or seek to undermine the democratic fabric of the United Kingdom through violence or illegality. It is a fundamental principle that public funds—taxpayers’ money—should serve the public good, not be channelled directly or indirectly towards those whose actions threaten public safety, the rule of law or constitutional order. By setting clear criteria for eligibility, the clause would protect public trust in Government spending and send a strong signal that support for criminality or violent extremism will not be tolerated or subsidised by the state. It also provides a consistent basis for denying or withdrawing funds from groups whose conduct falls outside the bounds of lawful democratic engagement. Public funds must be allocated with care, transparency and accountability. It is vital that taxpayer money is not inadvertently used to support organisations that undermine the very laws, institutions and democratic values that uphold the UK’s civil society. The new clause ensures that public funds are directed to organisations that act in good faith and within the law, thereby maintaining public confidence in Government funding mechanisms. The UK rightly protects the right to lawful protest and freedom of expression. However, there is a critical distinction between legitimate democratic dissent and organisations that support criminal conduct or use violence to pursue political or ideological goals. The new clause draws that line clearly. Public money should never subsidise those who break the law or undermine democratic institutions through illegal means. The recent controversy surrounding the Irish rap group Kneecap underscores the importance of the new clause. The group has faced criticism for lyrics and public statements that appear to glorify violence and support proscribed terrorist organisations. For instance, during performances, a band member allegedly stated that “the only good Tory is a dead Tory” and suggested that people should kill their local MP. He also expressed support for groups banned in the UK. Those actions have prompted investigations by British counter-terrorism police and raised concerns about the potential misuse of public funds in supporting such entities. By implementing the new clause, we can prevent money from being allocated to organisations that promote or condone criminal conduct, ensuring that funding supports lawful and constructive contributions to society.

New clause 97 seeks to block public funding of groups or organisations that promote criminal conduct or seek to subvert the democratic functions or constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom. I understand from the shadow Minister’s remarks that this stems from comments made by a group that has previously received funding through the music export growth scheme; the Committee may find it helpful to be reminded that that decision was taken under the previous Government, and it is this Government who have had to deal with the consequences. While I utterly condemn the remarks made by the group, I stress to the Committee that it is the subject of an ongoing police investigation and it would therefore be inappropriate to comment any further. However, I want to make it clear that the Government do not believe that individuals expressing the views that we have heard should be receiving taxpayer funding. I know that the Prime Minister has asked the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to review urgently the music export growth scheme in the light of the comments that have emerged. It would be right to wait for that review to conclude before considering what further action may need to be taken. Therefore, I ask that the shadow Minister withdraw new clause 97. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

63|0|4|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 98

Enforcement plan for sale of stolen equipment at car boot sales

“(1) The Equipment Theft Act 2023 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 3 (Enforcement), after subsection (3) insert—

‘(3A) An enforcement authority must put in place an enforcement plan to enforce regulations made under section 1 at temporary markets in their area.’.” —(Matt Vickers.)

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

64|0|4|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Clause 99

Inspection of police force firearms licensing departments

“(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 54 (appointment and functions of inspectors of constabulary), after section (2) insert—

‘(2A) A police, efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy inspection of a police force that is conducted by the inspectors of constabulary must include an inspection of the efficiency and effectiveness of the police force’s firearms licensing department.’.” —(Matt Vickers.)

10:45:00

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The new clause addresses a crucial gap in the current police inspection framework. Over the years, tragic incidents have demonstrated the potential consequences of failures in firearms licensing. Public confidence in the licensing process hinges on the assurance that robust, consistent and professional standards are being applied across all police forces. While some forces operate highly effective systems, others have been found lacking, sometimes with devastating outcomes, yet at present there is no statutory requirement for HM inspectorate of constabulary and fire and rescue services to review firearms licensing performance as part of its routine police efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy inspections. The clause would put that right by ensuring that inspection of firearms licensing departments becomes a core part of how we assess the overall efficiency and effectiveness of police forces. By embedding that into the statutory inspection framework, we send a clear signal that public safety and accountability in firearms licensing is not optional, but essential. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for North Cotswolds (Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown) for his dedicated service as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on shooting and conservation. Throughout his tenure, Sir Geoffrey has been a steadfast advocate of responsible shooting practices and the preservation of our countryside. His efforts have contributed significantly to the ongoing discourse on firearms licensing and the importance of effective oversight in that area. His work underscores the need for continuous evaluation and improvement of our systems to ensure public safety and trust. Importantly, the clause does not impose undue burden on our forces. It simply makes explicit what many already expect to be standard practice: that the licensing of deadly weapons is subject to the same scrutiny and performance benchmarks as other areas of policing. It is a measured, reasonable and necessary step towards a safer, more consistent and more transparent firearms licensing regime across England and Wales.

I thank the shadow Minister for explaining new clause 99. I note the work of the hon. Member for North Cotswolds and, in fact, I am due to meet him soon to discuss the subject of firearms. The new clause would require every PEEL inspection to include an inspection of the efficiency and effectiveness of a police force’s firearms licensing department. I hope that I can persuade the shadow Minister that this change is unnecessary and, indeed, would be damaging, as it would curtail the independence of HMICFRS and its freedom to shine a light on the most pertinent issues facing policing. It is vital that HMICFRS is independent from policing and from the Government. As part of that, it must have the freedom to set its own inspection programmes and frameworks when deciding how to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces in England and Wales. That allows it to inspect police forces on the most pertinent and high-profile issues facing policing and to assess the basics of forces’ operational and organisational activity. In no other area of policing does the law set out what the inspectorate must include in its regular inspections. The change proposed by the new clause would set a most unhelpful precedent. HMICFRS conducts detailed sector consultations ahead of each PEEL cycle to determine what will be covered in its assessment framework and how forces will be graded. It regularly updates its frameworks as necessary to include or remove areas for assessment where it identifies priority issues. HMICFRS also consults publicly on its inspection programme and frameworks before they are laid in Parliament. It consulted publicly on its latest programme, covering 2025 to 2029, late last year. The final programme was published in March 2025, following the approval of the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary already has appropriate powers to commission the inspectorate to conduct additional inspections into high-profile and concerning issues, should the need arise. We saw that with the disorder in summer last year. If there are concerns about a force’s performance in respect of firearms licensing, the local policing body may also commission the inspectorate to assess its efficiency and effectiveness. In line with our manifesto commitment, we will further empower HMICFRS to intervene in failing forces to ensure that the most high-risk recommendations it makes are properly acted upon by police forces. As part of its recently approved programme, HMICFRS plans to commence a thematic inspection of firearms licensing later this year. It will use that inspection to highlight good practice and make recommendations for improvement to all police forces. The Government will carefully consider the outcome of the inspection and any recommendations made to us following it. Firearms licensing by police forces is fundamental to keeping the public safe. We keep firearms licensing under review, and in February we published the Government response to the 2023 firearms licensing consultation, which contained a number of important commitments focused on continuing to improve firearms licensing controls. We will shortly be issuing to chief officers of police refreshed statutory guidance on firearms licensing, which will contain stronger guidance for police licensing departments around domestic abuse, evidence of violence and the requirements for referees for firearms applications. There is also now in place a national programme of training on firearms licensing for forces across England and Wales, run by the College of Policing. That will drive up standards and deliver a more consistent approach and good practice across police forces. The training is considered to be mandatory for forces and we are amending the statutory guidance to make that clear. In addition, the performance of firearms licensing departments in forces is being monitored by the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for firearms licensing, Deputy Chief Constable David Gardner. He has developed a table setting out performance data for firearms licensing departments in police forces, which was published in April this year and will be updated every quarter. It includes the percentage of applications received and decided in four months by forces. The table provides greater transparency on performance, including the time taken by licensing teams when dealing with firearms licensing applications. For all the reasons I have set out, I think the new clause is unnecessary, and I urge the shadow Minister to withdraw it. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

65|0|5|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

New Schedule 1

Civil penalties for service providers and content managers

1 In this Schedule—

“penalty notice” means a penalty notice under section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty) or (Failure to comply with content removal notice: civil penalties);

“relevant officer”—

(a) in relation to a penalty notice under section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty), means the coordinating officer;

(b) in relation to a penalty notice under section (Failure to comply with content removal notice: civil penalties), means the senior authorised officer of the issuing force who proposes to give the notice;

“respondent”—

(a) in relation to a penalty notice under section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty), means the service provider to which the notice is to be given;

(b) in relation to a penalty notice under section (Failure to comply with content removal notice: civil penalties), means the service provider to which, or the content manager to whom, the notice is to be given.

2 (1) The relevant officer may give a penalty notice only after—

(a) the officer has given the respondent a notice of intent,

(b) the period for the respondent to make representations in accordance with the notice of intent has expired, and

(c) the officer has considered such representations (if any).

(2) A “notice of intent” is a notice—

(a) specifying that the relevant officer proposes to give a penalty notice, the officer’s reasons for doing so and the proposed amount of the penalty,

(b) inviting the respondent to make representations to the officer about the proposal, and

(c) specifying the means by which, and the period within which, any representations must be made.

(3) The period specified under sub-paragraph (2)(c) must be at least 28 days beginning with the day on which the notice of intent is given.

3 (1) A penalty notice must—

(a) give reasons for the imposition of the penalty;

(b) specify the amount of the penalty and how it is to be paid;

(c) specify the period within which the penalty must be paid;

(d) contain details of the right of appeal against the penalty (see paragraph 6);

(e) set out the consequences of not paying the penalty.

(2) The period specified under sub-paragraph (1)(c) must be at least 28 days beginning with the day on which the penalty notice is given.

4 The relevant officer may at any time withdraw a notice of intent or penalty notice by giving notice to that effect to the respondent.

5 (1) This paragraph applies where a penalty notice is given under section (Failure to comply with content removal notice: civil penalties).

(2) The respondent is excused from paying the penalty if the respondent shows that they took all reasonable steps to comply with the content removal notice or (as the case may be) decision notice.

(3) A penalty notice under section (Failure to comply with content removal notice: civil penalties) (or a notice of intent) may be given without the relevant officer having established whether sub-paragraph (2) applies in respect of the respondent.

6 (1) The respondent may appeal to the court against a decision to give a penalty notice.

(2) The grounds for appeal are—

(a) that the decision was based on an error of fact;

(b) that the decision was wrong in law;

(c) that the amount of the penalty was unreasonable;

(d) in a case to which paragraph 5 applies, that the respondent is excused from payment by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) of that paragraph;

(e) any other reason.

(3) Any appeal must be brought before the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the penalty notice was given.

(4) The court may—

(a) allow the appeal and cancel the penalty,

(b) allow the appeal and reduce the amount of the penalty, or

(c) dismiss the appeal.

(5) An appeal is to be a re-hearing of the relevant officer’s decision to impose the penalty and is to be determined having regard to any matter which the court considers relevant (which may include matters of which the officer was unaware).

(6) Sub-paragraph (5) has effect despite any provision of rules of court.

(7) In this paragraph “the court” means—

(a) the county court, if the appeal relates to a penalty notice given to—

(i) a content manager who is habitually resident in England and Wales,

(ii) a service provider where the provider’s registered office, or principal office in the United Kingdom, is in England and Wales, or

(iii) a service provider where the provider has no office in the United Kingdom;

(b) a sheriff or summary sheriff, if the appeal relates to a penalty notice given to—

(i) a content manager who is habitually resident in Scotland, or

(ii) a service provider where the provider’s registered office, or principal office in the United Kingdom, is in Scotland;

(c) a county court in Northern Ireland, if the appeal relates to a penalty notice given to—

(i) a content manager who is habitually resident in Northern Ireland, or

(ii) a service provider where the provider’s registered office, or principal office in the United Kingdom, is in Northern Ireland.

7 (1) A sum payable as a penalty under section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty) may be recovered as a debt due—

(a) if the coordinating officer is a member of a relevant police force, to the chief officer of that force, or

(b) if the coordinating officer is a National Crime Agency officer, to the Secretary of State.

(2) A sum payable as a penalty under section (Failure to comply with content removal notice: civil penalties) may be recovered as a debt due to—

(a) the chief officer of the issuing force, or

(b) if the issuing force is the National Crime Agency, to the Secretary of State.

(3) An amount paid by way of a penalty under section (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty) or (Failure to comply with content removal notice: civil penalties) must be paid into the Consolidated Fund.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

Clause 132

Regulations

Amendment made: 79, in clause 132, page 143, line 20, at end insert—

“(4A) This section does not apply to regulations under section (Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales)(3).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

Clause 134

Extent

Amendments made: 81, in clause 134, page 144, line 21, at end insert—

“(aa) sections (“Relevant user-to-user services”, “relevant search services” and “service providers”), (Coordinating officer), (Notice requiring appointment of content manager), (Appointment of content manager following change of circumstances), (Replacement of content manager), (Duty to notify changes in required information), (Failure to comply with content manager requirements: civil penalty), (Unlawful weapons content), (Content removal notices), (Content removal notices: review), (Decision notices requiring removal of unlawful weapons content), (Failure to comply with content removal notice: civil penalties), (Guidance), (Notices) and (Interpretation of Chapter) and Schedule (Civil penalties for service providers and content managers);”

Amendment 18, in clause 134, page 144, line 23, at end insert “(except section section 41(6))”.

Amendment 20, in clause 134, page 144, line 38, after “37” insert “(1) to (4)”.

Amendment 19, in clause 134, page 144, line 38, after “73” insert “(1)”.

Amendment 21, in clause 134, page 144, line 38, after “75” insert “(1) to (5)”.

Amendment 80, in clause 134, page 145, line 5, at end insert—

“(aa) section (Delivery of knives etc);”.

Amendment 22, in clause 134, page 145, line 6, at end insert—

“(ba) section 37(5) and (6);”.

Amendment 82, in clause 134, page 145, line 10, at end insert—

“(fa) section (Dangerous, careless or inconsiderate cycling);”. —(Dame Diana Johnson.)

Clause 135

Commencement

Amendments made: 83, in clause 135, page 146, line 3, after “105,” insert

“(Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences), (Anonymity for authorised firearms officers appealing convictions for qualifying offences), (Authorised firearms officers: reporting directions) and (Authorised firearms officers: anonymity orders)”.

Amendment 23, in clause 135, page 146, line 3, after “126,” insert

“[Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims],”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

Question proposed, That the Chair do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

It is customary at this stage of our proceedings to say a few words to mark the end of our deliberations in Committee. It certainly feels a very long time ago that we started this process. I have been reflecting on the tumultuous events that have happened while this Committee has been sitting. We have had the death of the Pope and the election of a new Pope. We have had the saving of the British Steel industry and some rather interesting local elections as well. Against that backdrop, although we have had some disagreements, particularly over some of the new clauses, I welcome the fact that the measures in the Bill command a substantial degree of cross-party support. I have also learned a few new things. I had no idea what potting was until my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd raised it in the Committee. I am pleased that the Bill’s provisions and the nearly 100 new clauses have had the benefit of rigorous scrutiny by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee over the eight days we sat. I thank you, Dr Allin-Khan, and your co-Chairs, Sir Roger, Ms Lewell and Mr Pritchard, for keeping us in very good order. I thank my fellow Ministers, my hon. Friends the Members for Birmingham Yardley and for Pontypridd, for womanfully sharing the considerable workload in Committee with me, and I thank the Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Selby, for keeping us in good order. I thank the Opposition Front Bench, including the hon. Member for Stockton West, who I think must be setting some new parliamentary record for the number of Bills back-to-back on which he has led for the Opposition. I thank the hon. Member for Gordon and Buchan, who reminded us that the proceedings on a Public Bill Committee are a marathon and not a sprint—one of her contributions was certainly a marathon in terms of the speaking notes she had provided for her. I thank the Clerks, Hansard Reporters and Doorkeepers. I pay tribute to all hon. Members who have served so diligently on the Committee from both sides, and made such thoughtful and valuable contributions. The Bill teams, other officials and lawyers from the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Department for Transport, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology have all provided excellent support to the Committee. The Bill is, I believe, much enhanced as a result of our deliberations. The new measures we added will help us all the more with the delivery of our safer streets mission. I just realised that, of course, I have not paid tribute to the Liberal Democrat members of the Committee, and want to do so—I do not want them to feel missed out. I thank them for their contributions. I look forward to further debate on Report, which I am sure will come soon. On that basis, thank you, Dr Allin-Khan. Question put and agreed to. Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

11:02:00

Written evidence reported to the House

CPB 120 Action for Race Equality

CPB 121 Diaspora Alliance

CPB 122 RMT Union

CPB 123 Street Workers Collective Ireland, Red Umbrella Éireann, Sex Workers Alliance Ireland, Ugly Mugs Ireland, Reclaim the Agenda, Alliance for Choice Belfast, and Dr Caoimhe Ní Dhónaill (joint submission)

CPB 124 Sage Homes

CPB 125 The Children’s Society

CPB 126 Women First team, part of FiLiA

CPB 128 UK Safer Internet Centre (UKSIC) and South West Grid for Learning (SWGfL)

CPB 129 International Centre of Justice for Palestinians

CPB 130 Muslim Association of Britain

CPB 131 UKHospitality

CPB 132 Release