I will speak to amendment 51 in my name and set it in the context of clause 22. Subsection (1) repeals section 22 of the Bus Services Act 2017, which stated that the relevant authorities listed in that section could not
“in exercise of any of its powers, form a company for the purpose of providing a local service”
in England. Its repeal allows the wide-scale creation of municipal bus companies. That was in the Labour party manifesto, from memory, so I understand why the Government are doing that, and there was also reference in the King’s Speech to encouraging the expansion of the municipal bus company sector. There are currently eight such companies in England and Wales.
It is clearly the Labour party’s ideological position—we should be clear about it—that the state is better placed to run the commercial operations of bus companies than the private sector. That is not about provision, routes, capacity or approach to additional needs; it is the nuts and bolts of how to run a commercial operation—purchasing or leasing, maintaining, training and operating a bus company. Why would a local authority be better at the things that I have just mentioned than a specialist business, the main operation of which is exactly that?
It is a truism that local authorities are not traditionally renowned for their efficiency, and the same could be said of national Government. It is not impossible for them to do a good job—in previous sittings, I have made positive reference to one or two of the existing municipal bus companies that do—and I will not be ideological in the opposite direction, but running commercial operations of this kind is not a natural strength of local authorities. Cost management, customer relations and maintenance and renewal are all natural strengths of the private sector. From my perspective, therefore, this policy change is a very odd decision.
Clause 22 exposes the political approach of Labour, which is more interested in creating the supplier than supporting the passenger. We have seen that theme in clause after clause throughout the Bill. Subsections (2) to (5) create new requirements that mirror existing subsections (1), (2) and (13) of section 74 of the Transport Act 1985, which disqualify directors of existing public transport companies from being members of the local authority that owns the company.
The new requirements will ensure that directors of the new local authority-owned bus companies formed after the repeal of section 22 of the 2017 Act, which I have already referred to, are subject to the same governance requirements. If we are going to do this, that is a sensible safeguard. Subsection (2) provides that a director of a local government bus company who is paid to act in that capacity or is an employee of the company or of a subsidiary is disqualified from being elected or being a member of a relevant authority that controls the company, so there is a degree of separation.
Subsection (6)(b)(ii) disapplies section 73(3)(b) of the 1985 Act, which relates to money borrowed for the purpose of or in connection with a public transport company’s provision of local services. That removes the restriction on existing LABCos in England accessing private borrowing where the money is borrowed for the purpose of or in connection with providing local bus services. I can see why private businesses that have good control of their costs would do that, but allowing additional public sector borrowing by municipal bus companies as well as the very significant commercial risks associated with franchising is another concerning element of the clause.
This is franchising with knobs on. Not only is the local transport authority taking direct commercial responsibility for the provision of services, which has not happened before, it is then, instead of contracting out those services for a fee—which is what franchising is in the majority of cases—going the extra step and being the other side of the charterparty in operating the company to which it is franchising. That is a doubling up of the commercial risk and bets taken by local authorities, and on top of that, they are being allowed to raise debt as part of the operating company. I fear that there may be some trouble ahead as a result of this approach.
What control will be applied to that debt? Who is responsible for the debt on the failure of a LABCo? That is an important question. Does the debt fall with the LABCo or revert to the local authority as the only shareholder? Will it come back to the local transport authority as the ultimate owner? What provisions are in place to protect the public purse? My concern is that this bit has not been properly thought through.
LABCos have an obvious potential conflict of interest. They are owned by the local transport authority, which is the contracting body for the bus services that they supply. Whether true or not, there is a risk of an impression of impropriety if there is not a proper arm’s length approach, so we have to go the extra mile. If we as a Committee decide to support this clause, it is incumbent on us, where we recognise that people will likely think that there is an overly close relationship, to put the safeguards in place now to prevent any indication that that might be the case.
The local authority, as an emanation of the state, should bend over backwards to ensure fair play in the tender process and to ensure that that process is obviously fair—that justice is not just being done, but being seen to be done. It is equally obvious that any contract award process from the local transport authority to a LABCo must be fair.
Coming on to amendment 51, the Procurement Act 2023 sets out a fair process to ensure that no underhand tender activities are being undertaken by a local authority—that is its rationale. Yet although clause 22 takes steps to ensure that directors are at arm’s length from local transport authorities, and cannot be elected members either, it currently does not prevent an exclusion under the Procurement Act for the award of contracts to new—as opposed to existing—LABCo operators. That is a clear lacuna and mistake in the drafting of the clause.
The clause is trying to take account of the transitional processes where there is an existing LABCo—there are eight that we have discussed previously. As it is currently worded, however, it does not prevent local transport authorities from setting up new municipal bus companies. In fact, Labour is encouraging them to do that—or going further than that, as the King’s Speech expressed the desire that there should be many more. Despite that, the clause allows the exclusion of the provisions in the Procurement Act. That cannot be the Government’s intention, or if it is, the Minister needs to tell the Committee that that is the case. That is my first question: is it the Government’s intention to allow the exclusion of the provisions of the Procurement Act in such circumstances—yes or no? If it is, why should those provisions be excluded?
Amendment 51 in my name would fix that oversight. It would ensure that any contract awarded after a franchising scheme by a franchising authority cannot be exempt from the Procurement Act 2023 unless it is awarded to a LABCo that meets the specific criteria that it was already providing services on 17 December 2024. In other words, we accept the transitional need for LABCos that have been operating over the last years, or that are currently operating, to be excluded.
However, any new LABCo should be properly compliant with the Procurement Act 2023. That protects the ability to roll over a transitional contract where the previous provider was a legacy LABCo, and stops the creation of a new loophole that would allow a local transport authority to misuse roll-over clauses to bypass the proper tender process and award to its own bus company.
It cannot be the Government’s intention to allow such an abuse of tendering, so if they will not adopt my amendment, what other effective steps will they take? How will they stand up for fair competition, the taxpayer and the passenger—or is their focus, again, on the supplier?