Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Committee (2nd Day)

15:45:00

Clause 10: Acting for another public authority

Amendment 23

Moved by

23: Clause 10, page 8, line 19, leave out from second “authority” to end of line 21 Member’s explanatory statement This amendment seeks to probe where the Government expects it would be appropriate for the Cabinet Office to retain a recoverable amount which has been recovered on behalf of another public authority.

My Lords, our amendments in this group seek to understand the sort of relationship the Government envisage between the PSFA and other public authorities, how the PSFA is to be resourced and sustained, and how we can incorporate greater independent oversight into how the PSFA will cover its costs. Last week, our discussions covered the effect of the costs of counterfraud investigations undertaken by the PSFA on other departments and public authorities. As our Amendment 8 recognised, the Bill’s current proposals permit the recovery of costs by the Cabinet Office from public authorities, which could potentially be to their detriment. As we and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, pointed out, this could create a direct disincentive for those authorities to do the right thing and could lead them to fail to refer cases to the PSFA. As it stands, the PSFA, as constituted under the terms of the Bill, cannot undertake proactive investigations into public authorities even if it has information which constitutes reasonable grounds for an investigation. This places a massive burden of trust on public authorities to refer themselves to the Cabinet Office before an investigation can begin. This burden of trust is often open to abuse, as my noble friend Lord Maude of Horsham demonstrated to the Committee in his interventions last week. The Bill creates an additional and major disincentive for public authorities to do the right thing and invite an investigation because, under the its terms, it is likely that they will also be left out of pocket. As we will no doubt hear again in the spending review later this week, money is incredibly tight. Why would any public authority invite the Cabinet Office to undertake an investigation into fraud in its department, given that this would likely cost it money—something the Government have not denied and something they are unwilling to protect against? Amendment 23 seeks to understand this question further and is intended to provide the Government the opportunity to outline when they believe the Cabinet Office would seek to retain funds recovered on behalf of another public authority. Can the Minister assure the Committee that if the money allocated to a public authority is retained by the Cabinet Office following a counterfraud investigation, this will not come at the detriment of any policies, programmes or schemes the authority in question was planning or already had in progress? Counterfraud investigations should deter fraud, combat wrongdoing and recover funds. If money has been allocated to a public authority, it seems both sensible and correct that any money recovered should be returned to the relevant authority and not siphoned off into the Cabinet Office. I understand that Clause 10 states that agreement must be reached between the Cabinet Office and the relevant public authority before any money can be retained by the Minister. However, if a public authority has been subject to a counterfraud investigation, is the Minister certain it will have adequate agency in this discussion to make the case that it should have its money returned to it? Let us imagine that a council has been subject to a counterfraud investigation by the PSFA. The money has been recovered; those responsible have been removed from office and have been subject to penalties under the terms of the Bill. There is no reason to suspect the council is at risk of being defrauded any further, but the reputational damage has been done. The council may even have lost money to the PSFA under the terms of the Bill, stretching its budgets even more tightly. The council is in a desperate situation, but it has done the right thing. The PSFA is asking to keep the money it has recovered. Is the Minister certain that, in negotiating with the Cabinet Office over this question, a council in this state would have the capacity, resources and, crucially, agency and perceived legitimacy to do so? What are the reasons the Cabinet Office would give to justify why it needs this money? Would this be a conversation the council could expect to do well in or is this pretty much a done deal—the PSFA will keep keep the money it has recovered and the conversation would be more of a formality? Clarity on these questions now will help us and public authorities understand where they stand in these discussions and the extent to which the Cabinet Office will seek to augment its own budgets as a result of claiming funds originally allocated to public authorities. In a similar vein, our Amendment 25 seeks to ensure greater oversight of the amounts that can be claimed by the Minister when undertaking their functions and exercising the powers provided for in the Bill. The Minister in the PSFA appears to be in a position to determine their own costs and to recover them under the powers outlined in Chapter 4 of the Bill. Our amendment seeks to incorporate greater oversight in this process, and to ensure that there is a check on the Minister’s powers to recover amounts, by introducing a role for a recognised judicial authority. Requiring a court or tribunal to award the reasonable costs incurred by the Minister will prevent the Minister charging potentially unreasonable costs without appropriate oversight. In our view, this is a sensible measure; we hope that noble Lords will support it and that the Government will adopt it as a sensible check on the power of the Minister under this part. Our amendments in this group provide the Government an opportunity to address some questions that we have around where the money recovered from counterfraud investigations goes and whether the Government are confident that the discussion between public authorities and the Cabinet Office on this question will be a fair one that ultimately benefits the taxpayer. Furthermore, our Amendment 25 seeks to incorporate greater independent oversight over the amount of money that can be recovered as costs to the Minister to make sure both that this is proportionate and reflective and that there are safeguards on the power of the Minister; I hope that the Government will seek to incorporate it. I beg to move.

My Lords, I see the first amendment in this group as a purely probing amendment to try to clarify matters; I trust and have every hope that, in the debates on the Bill, they will be clarified. I ask the mover of Amendment 25 and the Minister to clarify something. I wonder about the change to the end of the amendment, which says “awarded by a court or tribunal in relation to costs”. I would have thought that that was covered already under Clause 13(2)(b)(i), which refers to “costs that are awarded by a court or tribunal on or in relation to a claim for a recoverable amount”; I agree with that. Then there is sub-paragraph (ii), which is about the Minister exercising their powers. Is that not covered by paragraph (b)(i) without adding it to (b)(ii)? This is a purely technical point because I think that it is there already.

Good afternoon, my Lords. I think that we are going to be as speedy as we were last week; the Chief Whip will continue to approve. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, would create additional burdens for the court system. They would also challenge the future viability of the PSFA and, therefore, its central mission of tackling public sector fraud. Before I move on, I want to respond directly to a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. I believe that what is at stake and what is really being contested here is a matter of approach. As I said in Committee last week, being invited in to investigate by a government agency ensures a collaborative approach. We are hoping that, by working with government agencies rather than imposing ourselves on them—this is what we are learning through our current test-and-learn approach—the agencies will engage with us, meaning that we will be more likely to succeed in getting the evidence base that we need to determine the fraud. On the specifics, the powers in the Bill let the PSFA investigate fraud against the public sector. A key rationale for this must be the deterrent effect. The PSFA must, therefore, be able to recover the money lost so that it can be used for public good and ultimately show fraudsters that their ill-gotten gains will not stay theirs for long. It is only reasonable that an element of costs recovery for the PSFA is part of this process. Amendment 23 would remove the ability of the PSFA potentially to charge for its services in future. The PSFA will act on behalf of other government departments, developing the expertise and capability required effectively to investigate fraud and recover the money lost. Providing the option to keep some of the recovered funds, subject to agreement with the public bodies concerned, will help fund the development of this expertise and will provide value for money for government and the taxpayer. I reiterate this point to provide a level of clarity on the issue highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. The PSFA would seek to recoup its costs and not necessarily to retain all the funds awarded. We will agree a portion with the public agency that we are acting on when the PSFA takes the case. That will be agreed in advance. Amendment 25 limits how the PSFA can recoup reasonable costs incurred in exercising the Chapter 4 recovery powers, meaning that only a court or tribunal can award them. There is already scope in Clause 13 for courts and tribunals to award costs in relation to a claim brought by the PSFA, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. However, this amendment would limit the operational flexibility of the PSFA and create extra burdens on the court system if we had to keep going back to the courts for all costs. A key aim of the Bill is to minimise the burden on the courts while ensuring that there are ample safeguards and protections in place. We already stipulate in the Bill that any costs charged have to be reasonable; we will be transparent about how we work out reasonable costs in our published guidance. However, we should always remember that investigating fraud and recovering losses is an expensive business for the Government. It is not fair that these costs are shouldered by law-abiding citizens. If you have committed fraud against the state, you should pay for this. On how the PSFA wants to charge for its services, it is important that we recognise that, regarding money between departments and the impact on value for money, it is not uncommon for departments to charge each other for their services. The impact assessment sets out how the powers in the Bill will support the PSFA to recover up to £53.7 million over 10 years under current modelling. A significant proportion of this would otherwise have been lost to government. We create value for money by bringing funds lost to fraud or error back to government so that they can be used for public good. I hope that that explanation reassures the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and that she will therefore not press her amendments.

I thank the Minister for her response. On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, we are looking at amending Clause 13(2)(b), on the relevant costs awarded in subsection (1) by a court or tribunal. The costs that are reasonably incurred by the Minister exercising powers in Chapter 4 are not determined by a court or tribunal, and the amendment seeks to see whether the tribunal should also play a role under subsection (2)(b). As we conclude the discussion on this group, I return to the central questions that our amendments seek to address—how we ensure that efforts to tackle fraud in the public sector are not undermined by asymmetrical powers and make sure that the outcome from the processes set out in this part of the Bill benefit the taxpayer. We are all agreed that fraud against the public purse must be confronted robustly, but in doing so we must not create a framework in which public authorities are financially penalised for their co-operation, nor one in which the Cabinet Office is both investigator and beneficiary, retaining funds without transparent justification or sufficient oversight. As we have discussed, the PSFA cannot currently initiate proactive investigations and the burden falls heavily on public authorities to refer themselves, even when doing so may lead to reputational harm and financial loss. That is not a system that encourages good behaviour; it is one that risks disincentivising it. Our amendments raise two practical concerns: first, that funds recovered through fraud investigations should as a matter of principle be returned to the authority from which they were taken, unless there is a compelling and transparent reason not to do so. We are concerned that, while agreement between the Cabinet Office and the public authority is required in the Bill, the agency and ability of a public authority to make a legitimate argument for retention of recovered funds may be impeded following a fraud investigation. Secondly, we wish to ensure that any costs that the Minister seeks to recover in undertaking these functions must be subject to independent oversight and not left to ministerial discretion alone. I totally take the point that the Minister made about the cost and burden on the judicial system, but there is also the principle of fairness and independence. These are not abstract points. They go to the heart of whether this legislation creates a fair and credible system, one that public authorities can engage with in good faith and that the public can have confidence in. Our role in opposition is not only to make suggestions as to how the Government could improve their proposals but to ask questions of the Minister and to seek further clarification on the points the Government have considered. I urge the Government, therefore, to reflect on these proposals. They do not diminish the aims of the Bill but rather strengthen them by ensuring that the powers it creates are matched by the accountability and fairness that must always underpin public service. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 23 withdrawn.

Amendment 24 not moved.

Clause 10 agreed.

Clauses 11 and 12 agreed.

Clause 13: Penalties etc

Amendment 25 not moved.

Clause 13 agreed.

16:00:00

Clause 14: Restriction on availability of powers: penalties

Amendment 26

Moved by

26: Clause 14, page 9, line 33, leave out paragraph (a) and insert— “(a) the period for appealing mentioned in section 60(2)(a) has passed without an appeal being brought, or”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 60, page 32, line 25.

My Lords, before I outline the amendments in this group, I will refer to government Amendments 30, 31, 104 and 105, as your Lordships will have noticed that these have been withdrawn from the Marshalled List. Together, these amendments had sought to ensure that there was no conflict between the prohibition on a bank telling an account holder that it had received a deduction order information notice from either the PSFA or the DWP in respect of the holder’s account and any possible subject access requests, and would limit how long the prohibition had effect. Unfortunately, we found that the wording of these amendments did not achieve the desired effect. For this reason, they have been withdrawn but we will retable them once they are compliant. I turn to the amendments in question. The current drafting of clauses in Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill may inadvertently prevent the First-tier Tribunal from exercising its right to extend the amount of time a person has to make an appeal, where there is good reason to do so. Therefore, government Amendments 26, 60, 63, 64, 86, 87, 100, 101, 119, 120 and 125 seek to prevent this from occurring and to clarify drafting across the Bill. These amendments ensure that the First-tier Tribunal maintains its ability to extend the time limit for an appeal where there is good reason to do so, at the discretion of the tribunal. These amendments do so across the provisions in the Bill where there is a route of appeal available. This will ensure the proper consideration of appeals and that the system is focused on fair judgments. I beg to move Amendment 26 in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

My Lords, I note the Minister’s remarks about the withdrawal of some government amendments. I will not go through them all. I look forward to their redrafting. I start by making the small point that there is an element of unpreparedness to the Bill. I realise that there is quite a lot of work in progress. My understanding is that it is an unusual approach to take, to withdraw and then redraft. The Minister will probably say that I am going too far, and I therefore look to a further explanation of that point. Putting that to one side, the amendments that the Government have tabled appear at least in principle to be sensible changes, which permit a tribunal to extend the time limit for bringing an appeal about a direct deduction order. This relates to a DDO appeal in the public sector section of the Bill but also, as I understand it, in the DWP section, as it applies to the eligibility verification notice in respect of the agreed arrangements between the banks and the DWP. Here I refer to government Amendment 87 in particular. However, this provides me with an opportunity to do a bit of questioning. Can the Minister outline some of the situations in which the tribunal could consider it “reasonable” to grant an extension to the review period? I suspect she will say that this is up to the tribunal to decide, but it would be helpful to understand the obvious reasons—and some of the less obvious reasons—why the tribunal could offer some leniency. I presume that the appeal process would include an appeal not just on the DDO but to delay a payment of the DDO and to seek a reduction in the amount payable per week, with the total amount payable over a longer period. Is there an expectation that a longer period has a maximum length of time applied and a cut-off? Otherwise, it could be endless. In the process of considering and drafting this amendment, I am sure that the Government have had regard to precedent and to how this provision has been used in other Acts. I am aware that similar provision exists in other statutes and, if the Minister could share examples with us of where extensions have been granted to individuals, why and for how long, it would help and allow the Committee to understand the practical ramifications of this amendment. I hope that the circumstances are exceptional, but the wording used in the amendment is for it to be seen as “reasonable in all the circumstances”. I hope that that adds to my argument. Are there parallels to be drawn and lessons learned—for example, from the child maintenance system, for which I had responsibility—where the paying parent is defaulting on DDO payments and the tribunal system is therefore involved? Can some analogies be created? As I said earlier, there is merit in seeking to allow greater flexibility in granting an appeal. Individuals should have adequate opportunity to exercise this right, but within reason. The amendment is, to that extent, well intentioned and it is something that we support. However, we must also be alive to the risk posed by so-called bad actors. We must ensure that flexibility does not come at the cost of action. We need to make sure that this appeal system allows those with genuine concerns to be heard and recognised, while minimising opportunities for vexatious complaints that are designed to delay and clog up the system, rather than use it responsibly. For example, it could be easy for an individual to claim that he is not able to fulfil his obligations to pay his DDO because, he states, he is suffering from mental health problems or has fluctuating psychotic episodes. What is the tried and tested system for tribunals to assess these claims thoroughly and have the necessary powers to refute or rebut what may be deliberate and vexatious claims? In seeking precedent here, what is the experience of appeals to tribunals in other sectors—on the volume of cases, the exceptions and the knock-on effect on courts’ resourcing and delays to all cases in the pipeline? It would be most welcome to have some further clarity from the Minister about the considerations that she has towards the amendment, particularly in reference to precedent, which gives us some idea of how this is going to work. I finish by echoing the words from my noble friend Lady Finn, who said on the last group—and she is right—that fraud against the taxpayer must be confronted robustly. My arguments on this group form the basis of that.

I thank the noble Viscount for his comments, some of which, as he will appreciate, will be explored in more detail as we get to the DWP part of the Bill, Part 2. We will explore all these issues in more detail later in Committee, including some of the examples that he seeks about how all the powers in the Bill have precedent already, although I will touch on some. However, I will start by querying the noble Viscount and pushing back a little on the suggestion that we were unprepared with this Bill. There was a genuine drafting error. Mistakes happen; human beings are known for making them occasionally. Given the late tabling of some of the amendments, a level of genuine solidarity and collaboration across your Lordships’ House, about how we work and move forward, may be better judged. Regarding some of the points made, I will start with the specific point about what kind of circumstances would be reasonable to extend the timeframe for appealing an overpayment notice. In all circumstances, it is wholly up to the tribunal to decide what would be a reasonable extension from one month. There are recognised principles to guide the exercise of discretion to extend time periods, or not, which the tribunal will consider. A three-stage approach is applied to consideration of any extension: first, assessing the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply with the time limit; secondly, considering why the default occurred; and, thirdly, evaluating all the circumstances of the case to enable the tribunal to deal justly with the application. I will address the point made about civil penalties and examples of how they are used from the position of the PSFA. We will address this in more detail with the DWP as we move forward. There is precedent across government for civil penalties to be issued to the civil standard by officials delegated to by Ministers, instead of penalties being issued by court. Examples include the Environment Agency and the APHA. In instances where penalties are issued in the above manner, it is also standard practice across government departments such as the Home Office, the Environment Agency and HMRC for appeals to be made to a court or tribunal as the final route of challenge should an individual feel that a penalty, including the amount, is unfair or incorrect. We are seeking to emulate those powers for the PSFA. In instances where penalties are not issued by officials and are issued via courts, the courts have the right to extend the specified period within which an individual or business may appeal a decision. This is part of the civil procedure rules. The noble Viscount touched on the Child Maintenance Service. As we progress through Committee, I will use it in many examples regarding the powers of the PSFA and how we will seek to use the precedent already established by the CMS. With that, I hope that noble Lords will appreciate that these amendments are important to ensure that the Bill as it stands does not interfere with the tribunal procedural rules. Those rules are in place for good reason. While it was not our intention to impact the discretion that tribunals have on appeal timeframes, we want to bring absolute clarity to this. This also creates additional protections for people who want to engage their appeal rights. I therefore hope that your Lordships will support these amendments, which I commend to the Committee.

Amendment 26 agreed.

Clause 14, as amended, agreed.

Clauses 15 and 16 agreed.

Clause 17: Direct deduction orders

Amendment 27

Moved by

27: Clause 17, page 10, line 19, leave out “make” and insert “apply to the appropriate court for” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment removes the power of the Minister to make direct deduction orders and instead provides for direct deduction orders to be made only by a court following an application by the Minister to the court.

My Lords, in moving Amendment 27, I will speak also to Amendments 29, 62 and 75, which relate to debt recovery and concerns about the proportionality, even constitutionality, of the Bill’s use of direct deduction orders. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for his support in this endeavour. The purpose of these amendments, and those in the later group starting with Amendment 102, is to transfer the powers of the Minister in Part 1 and of the Secretary of State in Part 2 to make direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders to relevant courts, whether the county court in England and Wales or the sheriff court in Scotland. Before I look at the substance of this issue, I note that Amendment 29 addresses Clause 19(2) and paragraph 3(2) of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill, whereby the Minister or the Secretary of State are required only to believe that a person holds the bank account in question. Other provisions require such belief to be reasonable, so inserting the word “reasonably” before “believes” would impose a reasonableness test. Not having such a test removes the balance of proper scrutiny and any threshold for a belief. This needs to be addressed to prevent unscrupulous intrusion. Meanwhile, Amendment 62 probes the circumstances in which orders can be restarted where they have been suspended, because I am confused about why that is necessary. To return to the fundamental principles at stake in Amendments 27 and 75 in particular, and the broad theme, for centuries the rule of law and the separation of powers have ensured that a person is innocent until proven guilty and cannot be punished by political diktat. The Executive cannot arbitrarily take action against a person, even a debtor, in the manner that the Bill gives the relevant Minister. The Bill allows the Minister to order a bank to supply sensitive information for the purposes of debt recovery, without either judicial oversight or individual knowledge. On our first day in Committee, we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, the shocking details of how Clause 7 allows relatively junior civil servants in the Cabinet Office to apply for a warrant to enter and search premises and seize anything they have reasonable grounds to believe has been obtained in the commission of fraud. If handing police powers to civil servants was not chilling enough, here are powers that facilitate the state raiding bank accounts.

16:15:00

These measures, whether they are for fraud by a person or error on the part of the state—between which this part of the Bill fails to distinguish—allow the Minister to get financial information from a person’s bank account and take their money without telling them, or without judicial authorisation, and with the only potential recourse for the person affected to appeal after being informed that the orders have been made. This is where the Bill lacks clear safeguards.

In the Bill’s previous incarnation, in the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, stated, a similar power enables the collection of highly sensitive personal data, yet comparable powers under the infamous Investigatory Powers Act are subject to rigorous safeguards, judicial authorisation, scope limits, oversight and redress mechanisms. In this Bill, these measures contain few of any such protections. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, made a similar reference:

“It is absolutely flabbergasting that there are greater checks and balances for investigating matters of national security than for investigating what could be minor benefit fraud”.—[Official Report, 22/4/24; col. GC 448.]

Just to emphasise, none of us here supports fraud against the state; it is a fraud of our fellow citizens as taxpayers and is completely unacceptable. However, I want to tackle this without compromising on liberties. Let us consider other ways that the state deals with fraud. In the context of proceeds of crime—essentially, fraud—the prosecution is required, under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, to apply to the court for confiscation or account-freezing orders. Prosecutors are not permitted, for all the right reasons, simply to go into a person’s account and take money directly with no judicial authorisation.

Similarly, attachment of earnings orders, which are similar to deduction of earnings orders, mean that a person may apply to the court to require a person’s employer to make payments to them directly from their pay. The only difference is that these orders are made by an independent court, but the Bill proposes to allow a Minister—whose role, by its very nature, is not independent but involved in politics—to make these orders. The status quo provides judicial authorisation where there has been wrongdoing, whereas these parts of the Bill require neither judicial authorisation nor, in many instances, proof of wrongdoing.

I am sure that the Minister will use expedition as the reason for there being no judicial authorisation in the Bill. As we keep hearing, you want to recover debts as quickly as possible and the courts are just so slow, but would it not also be expeditious to reclaim money in the context of those other framework examples that I have used? Yet those orders are made only by a court on application—why is that? It allows an independent court to consider all the circumstances of the case, which is important as it could be that an overpayment in this instance is made due to an error of the state. Just to remind ourselves, alarmingly, statistics show that 70% of appeals against DWP PIP decisions were upheld, highlighting systemic flaws that judicial scrutiny could detect and correct.

Whether the county court or the magistrates’ court is the right place could be explored further but note that these amendments, if moved on Report, would trigger hundreds of consequential amendments to ensure proper judicial authorisation. I agreed with the Public Bill Office not to table all these consequential amendments at this stage, not to clog up the Marshalled List. What that inadvertently revealed was just how many instances in the Bill Ministers are afforded to avoid judicial authorisation. Let me ask each Member here today: would we be happy for the Government to access our bank accounts without notice, without judicial authorisation and without suspicion of wrongdoing, merely because we received a payment from the state? If not, why should we expect it of others?

It is worth considering as well at this stage how these orders will be triggered. As with other aspects of the Bill, it will be based on algorithms indicating when a person’s account goes above a certain threshold, triggering an automated system whereby account information will be required from banks and money can be taken away. I will return to the problem of algorithms in another group but, for now, there are two things to reflect on. What if someone receives a gift of money deposited in their bank account? What if someone has not spent as much as usual in a particular month? Are we seriously saying that someone who has been given, say, £50 for their birthday or has been thrifty, meaning they have an extra few pounds in their account, could trigger the mechanism in the Bill that suggests that they must be doing something dodgy, so suddenly the Minister is able to see their account information?

It also seems that, yet once more, this is all about low-hanging fruit. Sophisticated fraudsters and organised criminals—who we can be sure are keeping a very close eye on this Committee and the Bill—are simply likely to use multiple accounts to keep their amounts under the threshold, or will use overseas accounts, thereby rendering the provision of the Bill useless, apart from punishing the most vulnerable for inadvertently breaching new bank rules.

Finally, I cannot see how the Bill will not end up leading to all sorts of litigation. It is worth noting that in the Netherlands the Government introduced the system risk indication, an algorithmic tool designed to detect welfare fraud by analysing data from various sources. Proceedings were brought in the District Court of the Hague, which found in NJCM v The Netherlands in 2020, that the measures were a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR. France and Denmark have introduced similar measures, which are currently subject to litigation. The measures we are discussing today go much further.

All these amendments seek to do is to reduce that sort of risk of lawfare and provide appropriate oversight. They do not eliminate the power to order a bank to supply information. They retain the state’s right to make the respective orders. Payment will still be made to the Minister. They do not alter the civil penalties also available under the Bill, but simply seek to temper constitutional concerns about proportionate treatment of state action and appropriate judicial scrutiny to ensure that everyone is treated fairly before the law.

I hope the Minister will agree to look at these modest amendments, which have serious intent to make the Bill fairer.

My name appears on these amendments because I and my party are worried about powers being given to Ministers rather than to the courts. This puts the power in the courts because “the Minister” does not necessarily mean the Minister; someone quite low down in the Civil Service could make this decision. I think it is open to abuse. I hope that when the Minister replies she can perhaps tell me how this fits in with a garnishee order on a bank. Garnishee orders have long been part of our legal system, whereby a debtor can collect money from the bank direct with an order from the court. I am amazed that we can have such a Bill here—I brought this up at an earlier meeting with the Minister—without “garnishee” appearing in it, because this is part of our current legal system. I invite the Minister and the mover of the amendment to incorporate that in their reply.

My Lords, the amendments proposed in this group by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, provide us with an opportunity to question the Government on the mechanisms they propose using to recover money. It is vital, as the noble Baroness said, that the powers provided for in this part are proportionate and sensible. We are particularly interested in Amendment 29, which chimes closely with our belief that a reasonableness test should be incorporated as part of the exercise of powers. In this instance, the Minister must “reasonably believe” that a liable person holds an account with a bank before the bank can be served with an account information notice. We need to recognise that compliance with the provisions in the Bill, however proper and correct, will come at a cost to banks. This amendment seeks to impose a duty of due diligence on the Cabinet Office, which, as the party responsible for issuing the notices, should rightly be held to a high standard before it starts imposing responsibilities and costs on third parties. As it stands, the Bill risks creating a situation in which the work that should really be done by the Cabinet Office is shifted over to banks. It is feasible that a civil servant in the PSFA, without the need to meet a reasonableness test, could send out information notices to dozens of banks and wait for them to come back to them to confirm whether or not the person in question does, in fact, have an account. I am sure that the Minister currently anticipates that civil servants will send out only a limited number of notices to the banks that they believe are relevant. However, it is not unrealistic to imagine that, during a busy period, someone in the Cabinet Office could be tempted to serve all the banks on their list with a notice and wait for them to revert, having done all the work. More importantly, there is nothing to prevent a civil servant from doing so. This is a serious point: it risks the workload being shifted from the Civil Service over to the private sector, burdening banks with non-profit-making tasks that they are legally obliged to undertake. The Cabinet Office’s civil servants must strive to reach the highest standards; the law should be clear on this point. Amendment 62, also in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, speaks to a principle that we have identified in our Amendment 55; namely, that a person against whom a deductions from earnings order has been served should not be held to an indefinite order if it has been suspended. The Bill, as it stands, would allow an order to be restarted at any point. For the liable person—and, in the case of orders against a joint account, for the other person with money in the account—this would create a great deal of stress and uncertainty. It also grants the Cabinet Office the ability to wield a great deal of power over the liable person, with few checks. The Cabinet Office should have the power to recover funds from the liable person that has engaged fraudulently, of course, but, in our submission, it should not have the power to threaten a liable person with a suspended deductions order for an unlimited period of time. If it makes the decision to suspend an order, the Cabinet Office should be tied to a specific period of time in which it can restart the order. The Cabinet Office should be held to this standard, and the liable person should be protected adequately. We disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that a suspended order should never be restarted, although we firmly agree on the principle that this power should be checked and should not be left open for an unlimited period of time. I hope that the Government will consider these proposals as reasonable checks on the power of the PSFA in relation both to its ability to shift work over to third parties and to how it can wield these powers over liable people. We rightly expect the Cabinet Office to exercise these powers to a high standard. Ensuring that it does not outsource its workloads and that it concludes any checks or procedures within a certain time period are both proposals that speak to this high standard. I am sure that the Minister is confident that the officials in her department will meet these standards and, as such, that she will have no hesitancy in being able to back these proposals.

My Lords, given the tone of the debate that we have had so far, it may be helpful if I start by giving noble Lords some clarity on some of the issues that have been discussed. Direct deduction orders are a mechanism by which public funds lost to fraud and error can be recovered directly from a liable person’s bank account. However, DDOs will be used only if the liable party has repeatedly chosen not to engage with the investigation and to come to the table. This is not the first and only mechanism for engaging to recoup funds; that is an important principle here. At this point, it is also important for me to clarify exactly what is being said about junior civil servants. The people who will undertake this work are trained members of the counterfraud profession, and the PACE powers have to be approved by a magistrate. The appropriate safeguards are in place. While I am at it, I reassure the Committee that no algorithms will be used by the PSFA for anything to do with financial information gathering and the powers outlined here. I remind noble Lords that the liable person will be kept informed at the outset and throughout the process of a fund recovery. Amendments 27 and 75 would, together, restrict the use of the direct deduction power, so that it can be used only following an application to the appropriate court. We agree with the sentiment that there should be protections in place to ensure that direct deduction orders are used proportionately and appropriately. However, this would place unnecessary and avoidable additional work on the courts, and reduce the effectiveness of the power and the amount of taxpayers’ money returned to the public purse. By this stage of the process, a liable person would have already agreed that the amount is recoverable or the courts would have made a final determination that it is.

16:30:00

The garnishee order, raised by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, is to get money from a third party. We want to get it directly from the fraudster, which is why it would not be appropriate for this legislation.

Furthermore, the debt recovery mechanism that we are proposing is not new to government. It is already used without needing to apply to the courts—by HMRC, under Schedule 8 to the Finance (No. 2) Act 2015, and the Child Maintenance Service, under Part 3 of the Child Support (Collection and Enforcement) Regulations 1992. There are established best practices for how it can be used effectively and proportionately, which will be utilised by the PSFA.

The Bill already makes sufficient provision specifically for the debtor to challenge the direct deduction order through rights to make representations before any money is taken, and to request an internal review and then an appeal to the tribunal concerning the terms of the order. I cannot stress enough that the debtor can avoid this power entirely by working with the PSFA to agree affordable and sustainable repayment terms.

I trust I have reassured the Committee that the Bill contains sufficient provisions and safeguards for an individual to avoid this power entirely, and that they have the right to challenge the terms of the order to the PSFA and then to a tribunal should it not agree.

The noble Baroness mentioned a moment ago that a direct deduction order can be made only when a person has already agreed that an amount is recoverable. Could she point out where that is in the Bill? I cannot find it anywhere.

My Lords, I am assured that it is in the Bill. I ask noble Lords to bear with; as soon as that has been passed to me, I will highlight exactly where in the Bill it is. It is in Clause 12. That was like magic.

Could the noble Baroness explain again why a garnishee order—the collection of debt from a third party—is not mentioned in the legislation at all?

My Lords, a garnishee order is used to obtain money directly from a third party. That is not the process that we are undertaking; we are regaining money directly from an individual, as opposed to a third party. I am happy to write to the noble Lord with more guidance on that, but that is my understanding. I move on to Amendment 29, which would necessitate a “reasonable belief”, rather than a “belief”, that a bank account is held by the liable person prior to the PSFA requesting bank statements from the bank to inform decisions on direct deduction orders. In practice, the PSFA will already be operating at this level as it will already, through the course of its fraud investigation, have developed an overview of the liable person’s financial information. In addition, having thrilled the Committee with my recitations from Managing Public Money last Wednesday, I am excited to be able to quote from another government page turner, The Judge Over Your Shoulder. All “public law powers” must be exercised with “reasonableness or rationality—following a proper reasoning process and so coming to a reasonable conclusion”. Making a Minister’s belief a “reasonable” belief therefore has no effect, because they are already subject to it. In addition, Clause 19 lets the PSFA issue a general information notice to banks, which provides confirmation of the accounts that a liable person holds. The amendment is therefore not adding anything new. Amendment 62 seeks to remove the ability to restart a deduction from earnings order once it has been suspended. For some context, a deduction from earnings order is a mechanism by which public funds lost to fraud and error can be recovered directly from a liable person who is not in PAYE employment. Having listened to the debate, I have some sympathy with noble Lords; however, it is important that the PSFA remains able to issue, vary, suspend and restart, or revoke a deduction from earnings order, for very human reasons. We need to be able to suspend and restart a deduction from earnings order due to a temporary change in the liable person’s circumstances; for example, if they were temporarily hospitalised. People’s lives, as we know, can be messy; it is important that we have the flexibility to recognise that. Where it is more appropriate to revoke the order altogether, this is provided for in Clause 47. The purpose of the amendment therefore overlaps with existing provision which gives the necessary flexibility while maintaining clear communication with both employers and liable persons, maintaining a fair and transparent debt recovery process. If this provision was adopted, an unfortunate consequence would be the end of such flexibility and the reluctance of anyone to suspend payments due to having to restart the process. I hope that this explanation reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will withdraw Amendment 27.

My Lords, I have a number of points. It was very interesting that the Minister concluded in relation to one of these amendments that “people’s lives can be messy”. It is precisely for that reason that in saying that DDOs will be issued only due to a lack of engagement, without any consideration of why that lack of engagement might happen, it might well be because people’s lives are very messy, to quote the Minister. So I am not convinced by that at all.

To reassure the noble Baroness, efforts to engage with a liable person would not be just a one-off hit. There would be over a dozen attempts, under my understanding of the Act. So it is not just a one-time effort to engage with each liable person. By the time we got to the process of a direct deduction order, there would have been multiple efforts to engage with the liable person.

It is quite feasible that I have missed the multiple efforts in the reading of the Bill. Maybe it is there—it might be another bit that I have missed. But I do not think that is clear, so maybe that could be clarified. I am sure that this is the intention—the problem is the principle. We were given the explanation that I thought we would be given: we are doing this directly and not going for judicial authorisation because the courts just have too much work on. I always worry about an explanation that says that it will cause too much work for the courts. On this basis, we may as well cut out sending anyone to a court and put them into prison—because that court process is so darned long-winded for everything, is it not? But we do not say that, because the court system sets in place safeguards to ensure that people are not unfairly treated. We do not have a direct situation where a Government of the day simply decide that the courts are dispensable with. That is the principle that I was trying to raise here, so I do not think that is a satisfactory answer. I was also unconvinced by the argument, which I will go through, that HMRC already has powers to deduct money directly from bank accounts under Schedule 8 to the Finance (No.2) Act 2015. Actually, there are statutory safeguards, including the requirement that HMRC retains £5,000 in the debtor’s accounts, and guidance about who HMRC should deem as at a particular disadvantage. That is not in this Bill. It is part of that Bill, which was cited as a reassurance to me. The comparison with child maintenance is also a false comparison. Child maintenance is money owed by one parent to ensure provision for their dependant who does not live with them. That differs greatly from an individual claiming money from, for example, the social security system, who potentially has been overpaid—as I keep pointing out, through no fault of their own. I do not think those two things count as equivalences at all. I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for the amendment on stop-starting DDOs. I have some sympathy with her approach in terms of them being permanently never allowed to start again. My nervousness with it is that it feels so arbitrary. The explanation given was that people have messy lives, which is fine, but I do not want to be in a situation whereby I am nodding through a system that means that people could keep having their direct deduction orders stop and start because of the messiness of government. We are told that it is the messiness of people’s lives, but it is not clear that that would be the only reason why this would occur; it is not in the Bill. Of course, I shall not press my amendments, but I imagine that I will return with some of them on Report.

Amendment 27 withdrawn.

Clause 17 agreed.

Clause 18: Accounts which may be subject to a direct deduction order

Amendment 28

Moved by

28: Clause 18, page 11, line 17, leave out “a reasonable period of time” and insert “5 years” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment seeks to specify a reasonable period of time for the recovery of an amount from a personal bank account, so as to protect the partners of liable persons from having an amount deducted from their joint account after five years.

My Lords, our amendments in group 4 are designed to improve the system of debt recovery that the Bill seeks to establish to make sure that adequate protections are given to the liable person, and that the Cabinet Office is held to a high standard in the exercise of the powers it is being granted. It is essential that we recover debt and combat fraud—I think that we are all agreed on that—but we must remember that in this Bill we are creating a system that will engage with and be run by real people. In these amendments we seek to tease out the practical problems that those real people might come up against while using this system. As we have heard, real people might well have messy lives. We have identified several potential such problems, and in this group we want to flag them to the Government so that they can make any changes needed. Our Amendment 28 seeks to clarify the standards used by the Minister when determining whether or not they should make a direct deduction order to a joint account. The decision to make a deductions order from a joint account is a serious one, as it directly affects a person who is not liable, unless in cases which fall under Clause 18(3). The Minister must therefore be clear that certain conditions have been met before such a decision is taken, so that those who hold a joint account with the liable person are adequately protected from such an order. The formula outlined in Clause 20(2) is a blunt tool, which we feel will struggle to operate fairly and effectively in practical terms. The formula assumes that the liable person’s interest in a joint account is of a fixed proportion, meaning that if there are two people holding a joint account, the Government will assume that 50% of the funds in that account relate to the liable person. This has some obvious pitfalls, not least that, upon being informed that they are subject to a direct deduction order, the other account holder could move most of their assets out of the joint account, into a separate one. Say two people had a joint account with a balance of £50,000, split evenly between the account holders. Upon being informed that they were subject to a direct deduction order, the non-liable person could remove £24,999 of their funds into a separate account, leaving £25,001 in the joint account. Under the mechanism provided for in the Bill, the Government are to assume that 50% of these funds regardless belong to the non-liable person. This mechanism risks creating an obvious loophole, in which the liable person, could, in essence, protect 50% of their assets by keeping them in a joint account. Conversely, the formula could have the reverse effect of penalising the non-liable person, if that person is due more than 50% of the assets in the joint account. While the Minister is required under Clause 18(1) to assess the liable person’s beneficial interest, there is no requirement that they apply the deduction order to reflect this. Indeed, the Minister “must” presume that the liable person’s interest is proportionate, in line with this formula. Our amendment makes it clear that the use of the formula to work out a liable person’s beneficial interest must only be a last resort. The Minister must make a proper assessment of the liable person’s beneficial interest before they resort to using the mechanism in Clause 20(2), which has many attendant problems, some of which I have highlighted. Our Amendment 34 seeks to tie the Cabinet Office to a duty to provide notices to all other relevant persons within seven working days. At present the requirement is that the Cabinet Office undertakes this duty within a time period that it can itself determine. While the recovery of funds is of course right, we must consider the impact that this will have on the liable person. Indeed, it is highly likely that a deduction order will affect not only the liable person but other third parties who are not directly involved. For a person with a joint account, this will be the case. The Cabinet Office is responsible for ensuring that the liable person and other third parties affected by a direct deduction order are informed of the fact as soon as possible. The Bill currently states that the notice must be given to the liable person “as soon as reasonably practicable”, but we believe that the Government should comply with this duty within seven days. Allowing this period to be determined by the Cabinet Office itself is not a secure guarantee, and the liable person should have a right to be informed of this fact within an explicit timeframe, both for their benefit and that of affected third parties.

16:45:00

Amendment 50 suggests an important change that would place a duty on the Minister to set out in writing the reasons why, after an application to vary a direct deduction order was made, a certain decision was reached. There is no requirement in the Bill that the applicant be informed of anything other than the decision reached, which is an unsatisfactory level of detail. It is absolutely reasonable that an applicant be informed of the reasons why a decision was made. Not only that—this is also an important mechanism of oversight. Compelling the Minister to provide their reasoning would allow the applicant to hold the Minister to account and allow a fuller review of their actions should the applicant choose to initiate one. If the Minister is confident that the decisions reached following an application to vary are fair and balanced, we do not see why she would not consider this as an addition to the text of the Bill. Transparency is of paramount importance to building trust, and we believe that this change would make the exercise of the powers in the Bill more effective and more responsible.

Our Amendment 53 seeks to address what we believe to be an oversight in Clause 30, which makes provision that a direct deduction order be revoked in the event that the liable person has died. In this event, the order is revoked but there is no requirement that the liable person’s surviving family or the executor of their estate be informed of this fact. As I am sure noble Lords will be aware from their personal experience, the death of a family member is not only an incredibly upsetting experience but an administratively stressful one. Family members can suddenly have mountains of paperwork to deal with, accounts to sort and close, and bills to cancel. Unless family members are particularly learned in counterfraud legislation, they will be unaware that their family member will no longer be subject to a direct deduction order. Naturally, these family members will be worried about doing the right thing, and it would be a disaster to inadvertently defraud the state by following inaccurate or false advice. Having confirmation of this fact in writing from the Cabinet Office would be a much-needed reassurance and would provide clarity and certainty to people during a particularly stressful and emotionally turbulent time.

Finally, our Amendment 55, which I largely covered in my previous intervention on group 3, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, seeks to prevent suspended orders being held indefinitely over the heads of liable persons. In the exercise of these powers, we need to have proper regard to the effect they will have on liable people and their families. We covered the arguments in the debate on the previous group.

In conclusion, while we support the overarching aim of the Bill to strengthen debt recovery and protect the public purse from fraud, we must ensure that, in doing so, we do not compromise fairness, due process or basic accountability. The system we are building here will directly impact individuals and families, not abstract entities, and we must therefore approach its design with care and rigour. The amendments we have tabled in this group seek to address specific shortcomings in the Bill. They aim to ensure that powers are exercised transparently, that those affected are adequately informed and protected and that Ministers and officials are held to account on the decisions they take. Whether they concern the use of blunt formulae to estimate financial interests, the need for timely notification to innocent third parties, the right to understand the reasoning behind ministerial decisions, or the importance of clarity following a person’s death, our proposals are intended to make the system more humane, more accurate and more just.

We urge the Government to give serious consideration to these amendments. A fair and functional system of debt recovery must be one in which people can have confidence, and that confidence rests on the safeguards, transparency and procedural fairness that these changes would help to secure. I beg to move.

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity presented by this group of amendments to talk about some of the safeguards in the Bill for the recovery powers. The liable person will always be provided an opportunity to voluntarily repay, as I said in the previous group. The Bill affords them rights of making representations, and review and appeal to a court or tribunal. There are set maximum regular deduction rates and we have written into the legislation that deductions must be fair and affordable. Vulnerability will be considered at every step of the way and action taken where appropriate to tailor our approach accordingly. As the Government have developed this approach, we have had to balance necessary and proportionate safeguards against the requirement for operational flexibility to efficiently and effectively recover money that the liable person should never have had in the first place—money that could and should have been used for the public good. I firmly believe that we have struck the right balance here. Unfortunately, the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, while well intentioned, will negatively impact our recovery activity while not providing any meaningful additional protections. Amendment 28 would limit recovery from joint accounts if the liable person had a sole account from which the full amount owed could be recovered within five years. To reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, what this amendment misses is that recovery from a joint account is already limited to the beneficial interest of the liable person. I understand her concerns about how that would be allocated but we believe we have a responsible medium here. The joint account holder is able to make representations on this matter to ensure that the funds taken into consideration are solely those of the liable person. The amendment therefore limits the operational flexibility of the PSFA to undertake recovery action and provides no further protection to joint account holders. The time taken to recover will depend on the facts of the particular case and on the amount being recovered—five years may be suitable for some amounts but may not be where the PSFA is recovering substantially larger amounts and is seeking to do so over a longer period. There may also be circumstances where repayment needs to take place over a longer period; for example, for those who are vulnerable or face hardship but none the less have the money to make repayments. It is important that the PSFA retains the flexibility required to recover a wide range of debts of varying amounts and to tailor repayments to the liable person’s circumstances. Amendment 33A would require the PSFA to try to establish the joint account holder’s beneficial interest before using the formula defined in the Bill. This is duplicative and already provided for under Clause 20(3), which states that “the presumption does not apply where the Minister has reason to believe that the liable person’s beneficial interest is different from the presumed share”; that is, on review of the statements obtained for the account in question. As mentioned already, all joint account holders will have the opportunity to make representations as to their beneficial interest before any money leaves the account. Amendment 34 would require the PSFA to provide the direct deduction order notice to the liable person within seven working days of it being provided to the bank. However, the current drafting already stipulates that the order must be shared “as soon as reasonably practicable”. I cannot foresee many circumstances where this would ever be more than seven days; after all, we want the money back. It is also important to maintain an element of flexibility to ensure that the banks have sufficient time to put in place the restrictions under Clause 26. This is to prevent the liable person from moving money out of their account and circumventing the debt recovery process. Amendment 50 relates to applications to vary direct deduction orders and would compel the PSFA to set out its reasons behind any decision. This amendment is duplicative. The PSFA would be doing this anyway as a matter of good public law. The liable person should know why applications have been agreed or rejected, and it is necessary they know why if they are then to take up their review and appeal rights. The PSFA would also publish guidance on applications to vary, setting out its high-level approach. Amendment 53 relates to the unfortunate circumstance where someone dies while a deduction order is in place. It would compel the PSFA to write to the next of kin or estate to confirm the cessation of the order. The Bill already stipulates that the order ceases as soon as the PSFA becomes aware of a death. This simply creates another administrative burden for the PSFA as it would be expected to hold information on next of kin or personal representatives—information that the banks themselves are unlikely to hold as it is not mandatory for this information to be given to banks by account holders. The suggestion in Amendment 55 is an interesting one. It would prevent suspended direct deduction orders being restarted after a period of 24 months. This would impact the discretion that the PSFA could offer to those who owe money but have experienced an impactful, if temporary, change in their circumstances; for instance, through losing a job or undergoing medical treatment. It would also limit the operational flexibility of the PSFA, which would still have a duty to establish the most appropriate way of responding to such circumstances, balanced against the duty to recover money lost to fraud and error. For example, someone may come forward to the PSFA after a DDO has been put in place and seek to negotiate because of a change in their circumstances. They may seek to engage directly and to negotiate their payments going forward but then fail to see things through. This could happen over a period of two years; we would then have to start the process all over again. Moreover, the Minister will already have the power to revoke a DDO if the liable person’s circumstances necessitate it. I hope that these explanations reassure noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

There is one matter that occurs to me in respect of Amendment 53. In the event of somebody’s death, where the deceased has been subject to a DDO, could this be included in the “Tell Us Once” service? That is, where a next of kin registers the death with the registrar, could the DDO be highlighted as part of the “Tell Us Once” service? Of course, this would include the highlighting of that revocation.

I thank the noble Viscount for giving me the opportunity to reassure him that, yes, it can and it will.

On Amendment 55, I understand that 24 months may not be the right number, but it cannot be right that an order can stay open indefinitely so that, 10 or 15 years later, the PSFA can suddenly start taking money from the account again. There must be some sort of drop-dead point; I wonder where that should sit.

I beg the leave of the Committee to consider that; I will reflect on it and come back in due course.

I thank the Minister. I thank my noble friend for bringing up the “Tell Us Once” service. A lot of people have said that it has brought them a lot of comfort after a relative has died; if this service could be incorporated here, that would be very good indeed. In this group of amendments, we have made the case that, although the objectives of recovering public money, tackling fraud and commanding support are not in question, as we have constantly reiterated in Committee, the mechanisms by which the Bill proposes to do so raise legitimate concerns that cannot easily be brushed aside. I emphasise that our amendments do not seek to frustrate the intent of the legislation; on the contrary, they are designed to ensure that the framework being created is legally sound and operationally effective. We are talking about powers that will reach into people’s bank accounts and affect the relationships that they have with innocent third parties, whether they be joint account holders or dependants; I heard very clearly what the Minister said about joint bank accounts but there are still issues here that may have to be worked through or thought about. This is a significant undertaking on behalf of the Government, and it comes with a weighty responsibility to get the detail right. Today, we have raised not theoretical issues but practical, real-life scenarios where the Bill, as it is currently drafted, could cause confusion, injustice or unnecessary distress. We have heard how a blunt formula could allow assets to be shielded or, worse, wrongly seized. We have pointed to the risk of leaving innocent third parties in the dark. We have also highlighted the critical importance of transparency when powers are exercised and challenged. I should say that, in terms of the innocent third parties in the dark, the “Tell Us Once” commitment is most welcome. It is not enough to say that the Cabinet Office will act reasonably. The law must require the Cabinet Office to do so. It must give people the right to be informed, the right to understand decisions made about them, and the right to challenge those decisions with the benefit of clear reasoning and evidence. We are not opposing the principle of direct deduction orders. We are simply asking for a system that reflects the complexity of real people’s lives and relationships, and that recognises that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. We believe, therefore, that these amendments are proportionate, constructive and necessary. They would not weaken the Government’s ability to recover funds; they would strengthen the public’s trust in how that ability is used. I say again: we support the aim of the Bill but, if we are to ask the public to accept a system of such reach and impact, we owe it to them to ensure that it is as fair, clear and humane as possible. I believe that our proposals today are a step towards achieving just that, and I hope the Government will give them the serious consideration they deserve. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 28 withdrawn.

Clause 18 agreed.

17:00:00

Clause 19: Requirement for banks to provide information

Amendment 29 not moved.

Amendments 30 and 31 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.

Amendment 32

Moved by

32: Clause 19, page 12, line 35, at end insert— “(11) In performing their functions under this section the Minister must have due regard to the operational and opportunity cost burden placed on the bank.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would require the Minister to have due regard to the cost burden placed on the bank as a result of the use of powers granted to the Minister under Clause 19.

I apologise to your Lordships. The Committee will be fed up with hearing from me before the afternoon is out. No? Excellent. We all agree that fraud against the public purse is wrong and must be tackled, but we must also be honest about who is being asked to do the work and at what cost. Banks are expected under the provisions in the Bill to dedicate staff, systems and time to support public sector fraud investigations or enforcement efforts. This may be in the form of complying with information notices, processing and applying deduction orders, or liaising with government departments. These activities are not core business functions for a commercial bank. They are not revenue generating. They do not serve the bank’s shareholders or contribute directly to its customers’ financial well-being. They are, in essence, a form of public service being performed by a private entity. Here is the crux of the matter: every hour a member of the bank staff spends assisting with a public fraud case is an hour that they are not spending on risk management, product development, client service or revenue generation. That is a real and measurable opportunity cost: the bank is being asked to sacrifice its own commercial objectives to achieve a government policy goal. Regardless of the fact that this is a goal with which we all agree, we need to recognise that this is a burden on banks, even if it is in pursuit of a good objective. Of course, banks have legal and moral obligations to help prevent criminal activity—and they do. However, we must be cautious about crossing the line between reasonable regulatory compliance and the outsourcing of state enforcement functions to private firms, without proper consideration of the attendant costs and effects that this could have. It is also worth considering the cumulative effect. Banks are not only being asked to support fraud detection but simultaneously are dealing with sanctions enforcement and a growing raft of compliance burdens. The more we demand of banks in public service roles, the more we divert their resources away from their essential commercial purpose: financing the economy. So, while the fight against public sector fraud is essential, we must be alive to the costs that we are placing on others to carry it out. Our Amendments 32, 38 and 54 would demand that the Minister has due regard to the costs that they are imposing on banks as a result of the exercise of their powers. We return to our core theme of proportionality: building into the Bill a regard to the cost burden on banks is a way that the imperative of tackling fraud is sensibly and responsibly balanced with the attendant costs that it imposes on private entities. Further to this, our Amendment 33 would require the Minister to undertake a review of the costs being imposed on banks within 12 months of Clause 19 coming into effect. This amendment works alongside our Amendments 32, 38 and 54 in establishing the principle that the Minister must have due regard to the costs imposed on banks, and furthers this by demanding that the Minister undertakes a review of these costs a year after the provisions in the Bill come into force. In creating a duty to have due regard and combining it with the requirement for a review after a year, we have proposed sensible amendments which impose on the Minister an important obligation to the banks on which the Bill so heavily relies. We must make sure that, in our efforts to tackle fraud, we work alongside partners in the banking and financial sectors, not against them. These amendments will ensure that the Bill does that. Finally, our Amendment 40 would ensure that the relevant bank is involved in determining the amount of money that it could recover to cover the costs incurred by complying with the demands under the Bill. At present, the Minister is able to unilaterally determine what a bank’s reasonable costs are. As I have outlined in my remarks, in complying with the Bill banks will incur not just an operational cost but an opportunity cost. Banks understand the complexity of their own systems; they know what it takes to divert staff from commercial roles to public service tasks. They are best placed to quantify the impact of compliance on customer service, internal risk management and technical infrastructure. To exclude them from this process of determining costs, to impose obligations without consultation or a mechanism for cost recovery, would be to create an asymmetric relationship in which the state demands and the private sector simply absorbs. We are not asking for a blank cheque or for banks to name any figure they please, but there must be a structured and collaborative process, grounded in evidence, in which banks have a say in what their involvement truly costs and in how those costs are acknowledged and, where appropriate, reimbursed. This is therefore a sensible amendment which seeks to create that relationship between the Cabinet Office and the banks on which it relies. I hope the Government will consider it as a reasoned improvement to the Bill. In conclusion, it is important that we do not overlook the practical realities of who is being asked to shoulder the burden of implementation. The provisions in this Bill place real and ongoing demands on the banking sector—not only in staffing and systems but in opportunity costs that affect banks’ ability to serve customers and grow the wider economy. Our amendments do not seek to weaken the fight against fraud but to ground it in a framework of fairness, partnership and proportionality. By requiring that Ministers have due regard for the costs imposed, that those costs are reviewed and that banks have a say in assessing what they are owed, we introduce essential balance and accountability into this regime. These are moderate, practical and constructive proposals. If we are to maintain the willing co-operation of the banking sector in delivering the public good, we must also treat banks as genuine partners, not simply as instruments of policy. I hope the Government will take these amendments seriously, and I urge noble Lords to support them. I beg to move.

My Lords, I have amendments in later groups on the EVM section of the Bill with a similar effect to these, looking at the costs to the banks. This is not just about the impact on the banks, however. As many of us know from the experience of being politically exposed persons, when you put onerous responsibilities and costs on the banks that relate to a particular class of customers, you can create a disincentive for the banks to provide services to them. Most of us have probably had the experience of being PEP-ed, and it is not terribly pleasant. Here, if we are putting a load of costs on the banks that relate to benefit recipients, we make it less likely that those vulnerable people will be able to access banking services. The Government need to think about this quite carefully.

My Lords, I was going to make a very similar point. We have to consider the serious consequences of the Government, in effect, turning banks into de facto government inspectors, as well as the unintended consequences such as those for politically exposed persons. Goodness knows that that has not gone well. It has created all sorts of chaos. I am very anxious about private institutions, in effect, being asked to do the Government’s dirty work in many instances. I want to query, though, banks being able to charge for the hard work they do via new paragraph 8 in Schedule 5, in which there is a provision for the bank to be able to deduct a fee from the debtor’s account to meet its reasonable costs in complying with the order, which is a ridiculous situation. It amounts to state-backed approval of funds being taken directly from the bank accounts of private customers to deal with administrative retrieval of overpayments. By the way, the maximum amount that banks could charge would be set by the Secretary of State via regulations, which is also not reassuring. Although I do not want the banks to be used, I also do not want them to be able to charge their own clients to do the job that the Government have demanded they do. I feel very queasy about all this. On the discrimination point, if these measures identify a range of types of bank clients who are causing more trouble than they are worth, the obvious decision will be to debank. It makes perfect sense that they would think, just like every other private sector organisation, “Do I really want people on benefits living in my house?” We have seen this discrimination time and again. There is a serious danger of unintended consequences here that the Government have to take seriously.

My Lords, I did not speak at Second Reading, but the Bill has attracted my interest for the reasons a number of noble Lords have pointed out about procedure and due process. I share the concern about the risk of debanking en masse a group of individuals whom banks will view as not particularly good customers in terms of the money they deposit and as they now come with greater risks. I would also like to know what the Government’s thinking is on that issue. Looking at this from the point of view of the bank, I am a bit concerned about the relationship between Clause 19(4) and Clause 19(10). Clause 19(4) says: “The Minister may give an account information notice relating to an account only for the purpose of determining whether to make a direct deduction order in respect of the account”. If the bank receives such a request for an account information notice, but for some reason considers there may be a different purpose in that request, what is the bank supposed to do? Clause 19(8) says: “The bank must comply with a notice given under this section”. However, Clause 19(4) puts a clear limit in terms of the lawfulness of giving an account information notice. Who is to assess whether there is any doubt as to the purpose of that account information notice? In Clause 19(10), it says: “Information given to the Minister in response to a notice under this section may be used by the Minister for the purpose of exercising the core functions but not for any other purpose”. Of course, the core functions are wider than the purpose identified in Clause 19(4), which says that you can give an account information notice only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. But then, in Clause 19(10), that information may be used for wider purposes than enabling the taking of that decision. That puts the bank in a bit of difficult position. It is told that it must comply with a notice but also that the notice must be only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. If it has any doubt, presumably it owes a duty to its customers and will have to consider how to behave in that situation. Further, it is also told that the information it will be providing may be used for wider purposes than simply the making of a direct deduction order. I would like to hear from the Government how they see the relationship between these various provisions in Clause 19, and where that leaves the bank in that kind of scenario.

My Lords, is it not always the case that you get the most difficult question just before you stand up? I am going to speak really slowly until I get a speaking note that gives me the appropriate answer. I confirm that the Government are extremely mindful of the burdens this Bill places on business, including the banking sector. We want to ensure that it is not subject to disproportionate burdens or costs in complying with these measures. I will start by referring to the Bill’s published impact assessment, which sets out all the expected costs to businesses, including banks, of the PSFA measures. This has been green rated by the Regulatory Policy Committee and sets out the minimal expected costs to businesses where it has been possible to do so, including to banks for Part 1 of the Bill’s measures. Throughout the development of this Bill, we have tried to strike the right balance between requiring actions from banks in a fair and proportionate way while achieving our policy intent of recouping vital public funds lost to fraud and error. This is why there has been sustained engagement with key representatives of the sector, including UK Finance, individual banks, building societies, HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority. Some of this is reflected in government amendments that we will discuss later in Committee. We know that the sector is supportive of the Bill’s objectives from the evidence provided by UK Finance in Committee in the other place. We have benefited from the sector’s operational insights, which have led us to table a number of amendments as a direct result to ease the implementation and delivery of the recovery powers. The PSFA and the DWP will, for their relevant measures, will continue to work closely with banks on the design and implementation of relevant measures, including consulting on relevant regulations.

17:15:00

Amendments 32, 38 and 54 would require that we have due regard for the impact on banks when responding to direct deduction information notices. These amendments are not required because, as I hope I have demonstrated, we already have due regard to the sector and shall continue to do so.

Amendment 33 would require the PSFA to undertake after 12 months a review of the costs to banks of actioning general and account information notices under Clause 19. This would create an admin burden on the PSFA, when it should be using its resources to pursue fraudsters. In any event, there are already provisions under Clause 24 for banks to be able to deduct administrative costs; this would offset what the review would be able to report on.

On the subject of costs, Amendment 39 would ensure that provisions to recoup these are always included in a direct deduction order. Amendment 40 would ensure that the relevant bank is involved in determining the amount of money that it could recover to cover its costs. Both of these amendments are duplicative. We are committed to working with the banking sector on admin costs. We intend for these to be reasonable both for those paying and for the banks themselves. Clause 37 already requires the PSFA to consult with persons who represent the interests of the banks and any other appropriate persons in developing the regulations pertaining to the bank’s administrative costs.

I turn to noble Lords’ specific points. We are very live to concerns around debanking and bank reporting requirements. We are working with the banks, HMT and the FCA to develop guidance, which will come forward in due course. This is a live issue that many of us have experienced. Given the nature of some of the concerns that have been raised, obviously, this will be also a point of discussion later in Committee when we get to Part 2 of the Bill.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mentioned administration charges. Clause 37, which we will reach later in Committee, contains the power to make, through regulations, further provision as to admin charges that can be imposed by the banks. This power will be used to introduce a cap on the charges that can be imposed under this clause, which can be adjusted in line with inflation, and to ensure that the charges remain at all times reasonable. This is in line with the approach taken by HMRC, which outlined the amount that a bank could charge for its admin costs via the Enforcement by Deduction from Accounts (Imposition of Charges by Deposit-takers) Regulations 2016. The amount specified in those regulations

“is the lesser of … the amount of those administrative costs reasonably incurred by”

the bank

“and … £55”.

However, I remind noble Lords that that was made in 2016, so it may be slightly out of date.

On the questions asked by noble Lords about information gathering, the information gathered under Clause 19(4) can be requested only for the purpose of determining a direct deduction order. However, if we find other fraud against the public sector, we can act on it under Clause 19(10).

If the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, is comfortable with me doing so, I will reflect on the specifics of his questions; if there is something that I do not believe I have covered here, I will revert to him in writing.

I hope that these explanations reassure noble Lords and that they can therefore withdraw or not press their amendments.

Can I just press the Minister a little more? I realise that, as she rightly said, we will explore these matters later in Committee—in particular, when we look at the DWP aspects of the Bill—but it would be helpful to have a bit more information on what the banks are thinking. What is their experience in terms of the work that has been undertaken so far? As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said—she is concerned about the so-called government inspectors approach taken by the banks—obviously, they are not doing this out of the good of their hearts. So it would be helpful to have a little more information, given that the work is by no means done; it is a work in progress. I have certainly been pulled up for calling this whole process a pilot scheme—I think that it is called “test and learn” or something—but some more information for the Committee at this early stage would be very helpful.

My Lords, it would be inappropriate for me to speak on behalf of the banks, and I do not think that noble Lords would want me to do so. But as far as I am aware—having said I will not speak for them, I am now going to—the banks are supportive of the approach we are taking. In terms of fraud, we are working very closely with them. The banks, however, want us to be as similar to HMRC as possible, and we are trying to do that. Given that those are regulations they currently work with in day-in, day-out, that is what we are trying to emulate. I think that is as far as I can go. The noble Viscount should be reassured that we are engaging directly with UK Finance regularly, and he might want to reflect on the evidence that it gave in Committee stage in the other place about how comfortable it was with this section of the Bill.

I think it is fair to say that UK Finance and the banks, in terms of all the evidence that I have read, are obviously happy to sit down with Ministers to try and negotiate their way through this Bill. I do not think that is entirely fairly or accurately described as them being happy with this. They are being asked to do things by coercion in this Bill. I am not saying that word to be offensive. I mean they have not chosen to do it—the Government have told them they have to do it. In many instances, banks are required to do what the Government tell them in relation to their own customers or face penalties if they do not. Consequently, they are trying to negotiate the best of a bad deal. That is not quite the same as an enthusiasm for the Bill. I think that is worth noting, as we would not want to mislead.

I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that what I actually said was that I did not want to speak on behalf of the banks. However, I find the word “coercion” a complete exaggeration and unnecessary. Just to clarify as well, the banks will not face penalties at any point in the Bill, unless I am to be corrected—and if I am wrong, I will correct the record. This is a process of trying to recoup government funds—taxpayers’ funds—to make sure that we get the money back. That is what we are trying to do and that is why this legislation is in place. We are working with the sector to make sure we can get our money back.

I think we all want to see a system that robustly tackles fraud against the public purse but that also recognises and respects the practical consequences of how it is delivered. The debate on the amendments in this group has shown that we need to be honest about the fact that in this Bill we are asking commercial banks to step beyond their core functions and dedicate staff time, infrastructure and internal resources to deliver outcomes for the state. When the public sector is asking the private sector to help to tackle public sector fraud, that is no small ask and should not be treated as such. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, have correctly highlighted the problems when you place onerous responsibilities on the banks in regard to a class of individuals. There is obviously a danger that it is going to make it less likely that vulnerable people can access services because the banks will just decide it is not worth the bother and will debank difficult or troublesome people. Those are very important areas to be worked through. I really appreciate that the Government are still in discussions, but we are actually legislating here and now, and it is a bit uncomfortable that the discussions are obviously still ongoing while we are trying to refine the legislation. It would be good if we could keep this alive with what the banks actually want to conclude. The amendments that we have proposed today on requiring due regard for cost, on ensuring review after implementation and on giving banks a voice in determining their recovery of the cost are all designed to introduce fairness, clarity and proportionality in what would otherwise be quite a heavily one-sided obligation. The amendments do not dilute the objective of the Bill, nor do they place unreasonable burdens on government. They recognise that the success of this policy depends on continued collaboration and good will from the financial sector, and that is something that cannot be taken for granted if banks are expected to absorb ever-growing public responsibilities without recognition or recourse. We have heard much today about partnership in tackling fraud, but partnership requires reciprocity; it means listening, engaging and sharing responsibility—not simply offloading it. These amendments are an invitation to government to show that they understand that principle and to embed it in the Bill. Before I finish, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for pointing the potential inconsistency in Clause 19, between subsections (4) and (10). We would be interested to hear how that will operate. This is not a question of principle—

Before the noble Baroness—I hope—withdraws her amendment, I need to clarify something, as I misunderstood the advice that I received from my Box. I need to apologise to the Committee and to make it very clear that there are penalties up to £300 a day that could be on banks —but it is more likely to be £300 under Clause 53, which is why we are working with them on guidance and why there are ongoing conversations.

I thank the Minister. To conclude, these amendments are not on a question of principle, because we all support the purpose. It is a question of practicality and fairness and maintaining a constructive relationship between the state and the financial institutions on which it relies. I urge the Government carefully to reflect on that relationship and urge noble Lords to support the amendments in the interests of a Bill that is both effective and equitable. On that basis, I beg to withdraw.

Amendment 32 withdrawn.

Amendment 33 not moved.

Clause 19 agreed.

Clause 20: Joint accounts

Amendment 33A not moved.

Clause 20 agreed.

Clause 21: Further requirements before making a direct deduction order

Amendment 34 not moved.

Clause 21 agreed.

Clause 22 agreed.

Clause 23: Content and effect of direct deduction orders

Amendment 35

Moved by

35: Clause 23, page 15, line 3, leave out “, or a method for calculating the amounts,” Member's explanatory statement This amendment means that a regular direct deduction order given by the Minister for the Cabinet Office must specify the amounts to be deducted.

My Lords, these amendments all relate to the determination of deduction amounts for regular direct deduction orders. Government Amendments 35, 36 and 37 amend Clause 23 to ensure that a regular direct deduction order from the Public Sector Fraud Authority must specify the amounts to be deducted. Government Amendment 43 is a consequential amendment to Clause 26. Government Amendments 110, 111, 112 and 115 make an equivalent amendment for regular direct deduction orders issued by the DWP under Schedule 5 to ensure that the order must specify the amount to be deducted. These amendments arise from the continued engagement that we are having with representatives of the finance industry, as I said in the last group, and seek to address their concerns. In this case, concerns were raised that the Bill potentially placed an unnecessary decision-making responsibility on banks and financial institutions—specifically, a duty that they may be required to provide or make a calculation of the amount to be deducted when receiving a regular direct deduction order. They requested that we remove these implied duties if it was the Government’s intent to always specify amounts to be deducted. As this is the intent of the PSFA and the DWP, we agree with the proposed suggestion to remove the references to calculations and make it explicit that government should always specify the deduction amount. These amendments achieve that under both parts of the Bill, address this concern and clarify the duties on the banks when making a regular direct deduction. I therefore beg to move the amendments tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

My Lords, the government amendments in this group are in principle welcome. They sensibly seek to simplify deduction orders and ease the operational burden they place on banks—which, let us be clear, are intimately involved in enabling the exercise of the provisions in the Bill. However, the real issue here is not with the content of the amendments but with the process that led to their necessity. These changes are not minor corrections, nor are they are clarifications. They alter the way in which deduction orders function and work operationally. They exist because the Government have belatedly taken on board feedback from banks and financial institutions—institutions that clearly, and surprisingly, were not properly consulted before the Bill was introduced. As I said in the debate on the previous group, this raises serious concern about how the Bill is being developed.

17:30:00

If the Government are still, at this late stage, negotiating with the very organisations on which the entire delivery of this regime depends, it calls into question the adequacy of the preparation and engagement that took place at the outset. It suggests that key delivery partners—the banks—were treated as an afterthought rather than essential collaborators, and that is the crux of the problem. Banks are not peripheral actors in the Bill; they are central to the entire enforcement mechanism. Without their co-operation, the Bill simply cannot operate. How can it be right that their input is only now being factored into the design of the process? It is not responsible to legislate in this way, by amendment and last-minute revision, rather than through meaningful consultation at the drafting stage.

These late-stage amendments also strengthen the case for our Amendment 40, which would give banks a say in determining the costs they incur in complying with the obligations imposed on them by this legislation. If this group of amendments proves anything, it is that the Government cannot reliably anticipate the real-world implications of what they are asking banks to do, nor the operational and financial impact that these tasks impose. Amendment 40 is not radical: it simply says that those carrying the cost of implementation should be part of the process that defines and accounts for that cost. If banks are to be treated as partners in the effort to tackle fraud, and not just instruments of delivery, they must be engaged meaningfully and transparently from the outset, not as an afterthought.

We support these government amendments but believe they also serve as a compelling argument for why our Amendment 40 is not just reasonable but necessary. We must ensure that the banks and financial institutions are properly consulted at all relevant stages so that we work with these vital partners, not against them.

My Lords, I appreciate the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, specifically her questions as to why calculations for DDOs are in the Bill in the first place and why the need for this change did not come to light earlier. Referencing calculations is established practice in the context of employers making calculations for deduction from earnings orders, hence the drafting reflected here for direct deduction orders. Continued engagement with the financial sector has covered an array of content related to the Bill. As we have moved to discuss implementation, any issues raised have been considered and, where appropriate, acted on by officials in order to smooth the implementation of the powers. This Government have been engaging extensively with the financial sector. It requested that we remove references to banks calculating amounts to be deducted through a regular DDO. This is because the banks felt that it would create an excessive burden that gave them too much responsibility for making decisions regarding deduction amounts. Utilising the deduction order information notices, the PSFA will already have a fuller understanding than the bank of the liable person’s total financial affairs. Along with its obligation to ensure that deductions are fair and affordable, it is right that the PSFA determines what the deductions will be, and it provides another safeguard. I therefore hope that your Lordships will support these amendments. I commend them to the Committee.

Amendment 35 agreed.

Amendments 36 and 37

Moved by

36: Clause 23, page 15, line 8, leave out “, or different methods for calculating the amounts,” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 23, page 15, line 3.

37: Clause 23, page 15, line 11, leave out “, or method for calculating the amount,” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment means that a lump sum direct deduction order given by the Minister for the Cabinet Office must specify the amount to be deducted.

Amendments 36 and 37 agreed.

Amendment 38 not moved.

Clause 23, as amended, agreed.

Clause 24: Bank’s administrative costs

Amendments 39 and 40 not moved.

Clause 24 agreed.

Clause 25 agreed.

Clause 26: Restrictions on accounts: banks

Amendment 41

Moved by

41: Clause 26, page 16, line 14, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement This amendment, together with my other amendments to clauses 26 and 27 to the same effect, would replace the tag “first notice” with “pre-deduction notice”. This has no substantive effect but is intended to be easier to understand.

My Lords, this next group of government amendments seeks to bring further clarity to the process of engaging with banks on direct deduction orders. Government Amendments 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 113, 114 and 116 seek to clarify the purpose of the previously named “first notice” by renaming it a “pre-deduction notice” for the PSFA and the DWP respectively. It is just changing the name, nothing more. These minor and technical amendments reflect that the Government are acting in response to feedback from the banking sector about the description of notices. It felt that the naming was confusing, so we have changed it. We appreciate the sector’s engagement. Similarly, government Amendments 106, 107, 108 and 118 follow on from feedback from the sector for greater clarity on the approach to the issue and subsequent processing of the notices, and make the application of the powers easier for financial institutions to understand. They support the intention that all relevant parties impacted by the debt powers of the Bill are correctly notified of the action to be taken. I beg to move.

It is great to be having a dialogue with the noble Baroness. We welcome the Government’s amendments in this group which, taken together, amount to a series of technical clarifications and improvements to the Bill. As the noble Baroness said, they do not fundamentally alter the policy intent, but they help to tighten its operation, provide greater clarity and ensure that the provisions are more workable in practice. We broadly support these amendments and will not oppose their inclusion. However, I note that even so-called technical amendments can have material consequences for those tasked with delivering the measures in the Bill—whether public bodies, private firms or individuals. It is important that any changes, however minor they may appear, are properly explained and fully understood by those affected. I also take this opportunity to remind the Committee that, when a Bill is heavily reliant on secondary legislation and technical detail, as this one is, we must be especially vigilant in making sure that these fine-tuning amendments do not obscure bigger questions of transparency, proportionality and accountability. We will continue to keep a close eye on those issues as the Bill progresses. So, while we support this group of amendments, we urge the Government to maintain the spirit of openness and collaboration that they have shown so far as further changes inevitably arise, and to ensure that the cumulative impact of even minor adjustments is properly assessed. With that said, we are content to support these amendments.

I take this opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for both her engagement and support for this group of amendments and her wider engagement on the Bill. While these amendments alone are relatively minor, together they reflect the importance of the ongoing consultation with key stakeholders, which is intrinsically linked with a desire to ensure that the legislation is as clear, precise and straightforward to implement as possible. The PSFA has consulted departments, public bodies, academics and non-public sector groups over many years of policy work to identify and resolve gaps in debt management powers across government. The PSFA has continued to work with stakeholders to consult on these powers as they go through Parliament and is committed to continuing to do so during implementation. We have listened directly to feedback raised by the financial sector and are taking the steps necessary to bring the clarity it seeks. I therefore hope that your Lordships will support these amendments.

In support of my noble friend Lady Finn and in the spirit of agreeing with what is going on, I just want to ask a probing question of the Minister that is perhaps a little unfair. As we have noticed, there are a number of government amendments here and there is work in progress. The agreement between the Government and the banks continues. Does she have any idea when this will end? In other words, as Committee progresses, should we expect further government amendments as the banks and the Government work together to nail down the detail of agreements concerning the Public Sector Fraud Authority and the Department for Work and Pensions?

I thank the noble Viscount. I feel like these may be famous last words, but I am assured that we hope not to table any more government amendments in Committee.

Amendment 41 agreed.

Amendments 42 to 44

Moved by

42: Clause 26, page 17, line 2, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 26, page 16, line 14.

43: Clause 26, page 17, line 8, leave out “, or calculated in accordance with,” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on my amendments to clause 23, page 15, line 3 and clause 23, page 15, line 11.

44: Clause 26, page 17, line 9, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 26, page 16, line 14.

Amendments 42 to 44 agreed.

Clause 26, as amended, agreed.

Clause 27: Restrictions on accounts: account holders

Amendment 45

Moved by

45: Clause 27, page 17, line 11, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 26, page 16, line 14.

Amendment 45 agreed.

Amendment 46

Moved by

46: Clause 27, page 17, line 12, leave out “in relation to an account that they hold” and insert “(other than a bank) in relation to an account” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment inserting a new clause after clause 36.

My Lords, we recognise that there can be extenuating and difficult circumstances where someone has to take over another’s personal and financial affairs, such as making a power of attorney. Government Amendments 46, 61 and 121 clarify the role of a legal deputy with regard to the direct deduction order provisions for the PSFA and the DWP. These amendments follow our ongoing engagement with the financial services sector, which sought clarity as to how it would carry out a direct deduction order where a legal deputy has been put in place. We have benefited from the operational insight of the banks and have tabled this amendment to ease the operationalisation of the recovery powers. Government Amendment 61 inserts an additional clause after Clause 36 to ensure that the provisions about direct deduction orders in Part 1 operate effectively where a person acts on behalf of an account holder by virtue of a power of attorney or as a court-appointed deputy. The amendment has the effect that any direct deduction order provisions and requirements have to be carried out by any legal deputies of the liable person, ensuring that recovery action can still proceed effectively. Government Amendment 46 is a consequential amendment to ensure that the restrictions to prevent someone frustrating the direct deduction order will also apply to a person acting on behalf of an account holder. Government Amendment 121 makes equivalent provision for the DWP as government Amendment 61 does for the PSFA. This brings clarity to the financial institutions that have to deal with deputies. It also brings protections to the liable person, ensuring that they are not unfairly given a non-compliance penalty if it is in fact their legal deputy who is not engaging with us on repayment or attempting to frustrate a deduction order. I beg to move.

My Lords, we welcome the Government’s amendment to make provision for cases where an individual with liability under the Bill has a person with power of attorney appointed to act on their behalf. This is a pragmatic step recognising that in some circumstances an individual may not be capable of handling their own financial affairs, whether due to age, illness or incapacity, and that there must be a clear legal route for compliance and communication to proceed. It is right that, despite these circumstances, we should continue to recover public money that has been gained through fraud, given that adequate safeguards are in check, which I and my noble friend Lord Younger will address later in Committee. We therefore support the principle behind this amendment. It brings a degree of clarity and certainty to what could otherwise be a difficult area and ensures that the processes set out in the Bill can still function effectively when a liable person is not acting for themselves. However, we wish to raise a concern which we hope the Minister can provide reassurance on. While this amendment provides for cases where a power of attorney exists, it does not appear to make provision for what happens when no such power is in place. In reality, there will be vulnerable individuals who may not have granted a power of attorney and who may also lack the capacity to manage their affairs independently. In such cases, how will the provisions about direct deduction orders, as set out in Part 1, continue to operate effectively? Who is to be regarded as liable under the provisions in the Bill? Who will be entitled to challenge a notice or a penalty? Without a mechanism to address this situation, there is a risk that enforcement could falter—or worse, that it could proceed inappropriately without proper safeguards in place for the individual concerned. We would therefore welcome the Government’s thoughts on how such cases will be handled in practice and whether there are plans to issue guidance or put in place safeguards to ensure that vulnerable individuals without formal representation are not unfairly affected by the processes introduced by this Bill.

17:45:00

While we support this amendment in principle, we urge the Government to look carefully at the wider landscape of capacity and representation and to ensure that the Bill can operate fairly and lawfully in all cases, not only where a power of attorney is in place. This, again, addresses our view that we must take these days in Committee as an opportunity to try to imagine how the Bill will function practically. We hope that the Government take this chance to bring on board some of our concerns and take action to address and clarify this issue—which, in our submission, would make achieving the purpose of the Bill easier and make the Bill more effective.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for raising those specifics and for the collegiate nature of her contribution, giving me enough time to get the appropriate reassurances from my colleagues. I also thank her because we have not yet really discussed the vulnerability protections that are in place, and this gives us an opportunity to do so. As we progress through Committee, there will be many opportunities to discuss this, but I welcome the opportunity to provide some level of reassurance now. Existing government standards on vulnerability, such as His Majesty’s Government’s debt management vulnerability toolkit, will be utilised by the PSFA. Vulnerability assessments will be carried out at the start of each investigation. These will review any evidence of financial, social or personal vulnerability and then determine how best to engage with the personal impact and subsequent enforcement action. Vulnerability will be kept under regular review as a case progresses and the vulnerability assessment will be regularly updated. During debt resolution, the liable individual will have additional opportunities to identify vulnerabilities. Debt resolution policy will take vulnerable customers into account and there will be a range of adaptations and forbearances on offer to support them. We will publish further guidance on this issue related to vulnerabilities. These amendments resulted from direct engagement with the finance sector. We have been keen to seek its insight on how to use these powers and to table amendments that bring clarity to its roles. However, these amendments also ensure that those who act as a legal deputy on behalf of an account holder must adhere to the terms of any deduction order put in place. They set out clear obligations for them and put protections in place for the liable person whose affairs are being looked after by such a deputy. I hope your Lordships will support these amendments.

Amendment 46 agreed.

Amendments 47 to 49

Moved by

47: Clause 27, page 17, line 13, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 26, page 16, line 14.

48: Clause 27, page 17, line 16, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 26, page 16, line 14.

49: Clause 27, page 17, line 22, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 26, page 16, line 14.

Amendments 47 to 49 agreed.

Clause 27, as amended, agreed.

Clause 28: Applications to vary

Amendment 50 not moved.

Clause 28 agreed.

Clause 29: Variation

Amendment 51

Moved by

51: Clause 29, page 18, line 1, after “order” insert “other than under subsection (7)” Member's explanatory statement This amendment removes an unnecessary requirement to seek representations from account holders before a direct deduction order is varied in circumstances where their consent is required in any event.

My Lords, I turn to a group of amendments designed to remove duplication and bring greater clarity to certain parts of the debt recovery powers for the PSFA and the DWP. Government Amendment 51 seeks to simplify drafting by removing an unnecessary requirement for the PSFA to seek representations on an application to vary a deduction order where, in order to make such a request, all account holders must have already consented. Government Amendments 52 and 117 seek to leave out redundant subsections to remove duplication. The subsections referenced outline that a bank must comply with a varied direct deduction order as per Clause 23(5) for the PSFA or new paragraph 7(5) in Schedule 5 for the DWP. However, Clause 23(5) and new paragraph 7(5) already state that a bank must comply with every direct deduction order. Government Amendments 98 and 99 remove unnecessary references to a payment or credit in Clause 85, both of which are within the relevant definition of “benefit” already as a result of Section 121DA(5) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. These amendments will help make the Bill as clear as possible, which I trust is welcomed by your Lordships’ Committee. I beg to move Amendment 51 tabled in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

My Lords, I will speak very briefly on this group of government amendments which make a number of technical and definitional clarifications to the Bill. We on these Benches broadly support the changes in this group. These amendments serve an important purpose in tightening the language of the Bill and ensuring that the provisions are legally coherent, internally consistent and practically operable. We recognise the importance of ensuring that statutory language is as clear and precise as possible, not only for those who will be responsible for implementing these powers but also for those who may be subject to them. In some cases, these amendments address minor inconsistencies in wording; in others they bring greater alignment between different parts of the Bill or between this Bill and the existing legislation. These are the kinds of technical improvements that are important to ensure that legislation operates as intended and we welcome the Government’s attention to detail in this regard. It is, of course, always preferable for such clarifications to be made earlier in the process—sorry to spoil it; it was getting too friendly—but we appreciate that, particularly in complex Bills such as this one, a certain amount of refinement is inevitable as the provisions are examined more closely by Parliament. While there is no need to dwell at length on what are by nature technical changes, we support the amendments in this group and are pleased to see the Bill improved through their inclusion.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. I simply end by stating again that the effect of these amendments is to clarify the drafting and remove redundant drafting that is already provided for. It is important that we have clear and precise legislation to aid implementation of these powers, all of which will be used to tackle the scourge of fraud against the public sector. Therefore, I hope noble Lords will provide their support to these amendments.

Amendment 51 agreed.

Amendment 52

Moved by

52: Clause 29, page 18, line 24, leave out sub-paragraph (ii) Member's explanatory statement This amendment removes a provision that is redundant (because section 23(5) applies in relation to every direct deduction order).

Amendment 52 agreed.

Clause 29, as amended, agreed.

Clause 30: Revocation

Amendment 53 not moved.

Clause 30 agreed.

Clause 31: Further information notices

Amendment 54 not moved.

Clause 31 agreed.

Clause 32: Suspension of direct deduction orders

Amendment 55 not moved.

Clause 32 agreed.

Clause 33 agreed.

Clause 34: Reviews

Amendment 56

Moved by

56: Clause 34, page 20, line 20, after “must” insert “appoint an independent person to” Member's explanatory statement This amendment would ensure reviews of decisions to make a direct deduction order are undertaken by an independent person.

My Lords, our amendments in this group seek to address an important point—the feedback loop which exists in the review mechanism for direct deduction orders. We believe that in order to have a legitimate review of a decision the review pathway has to be independent from the office which made the initial decision. We need to make sure that adequate checks and safeguards are in place so that the exercise of the powers under this Bill are both effective and fair. This is not only important from a political or constitutional perspective; it is the only way that we will create a legitimate and trusted system to combat fraud. In practical terms, the Bill means that if a person affected by a direct deduction order or a joint account holder wishes to challenge that decision, the case is sent back to the very department that made it. This is not how we build confidence in public institutions nor how we meet the standards of fairness the public expect. This is, in essence, a legal framework which allows the Cabinet Office to mark its own homework. As the Government have made clear, the PSFA will remain a very small team for the foreseeable future. Under the system currently proposed in the Bill, close colleagues will be reviewing one another’s decisions. It is natural that one should expect this process to be independent but, based on the Government’s proposal before us, this can never be the case. We on these Benches consider it an impossibility that a review system set up in the way the Government have set out can inspire confidence and hence command legitimacy. We have therefore tabled amendments in this group to give the Government the opportunity both to make these changes and to make the Bill operate with greater effectiveness and legitimacy. Our Amendment 56 would compel the Minister to appoint an independent person to undertake a review of a decision when an application for a review is made. This amendment addresses the heart of our concern that, on receiving an application for review, the Cabinet Office should appoint an independent person to review what the Cabinet Office has decided. It should not be the case that the Cabinet Office reviews what the Cabinet Office has decided. In our view, this is a common-sense amendment rooted not in politics but in principle. It reflects a widely accepted and fundamental tenet of good governance: those who exercise power should not also be the final arbiters of whether that power was exercised lawfully or fairly. Independent review is not a novel concept; nor is it controversial. To embed this principle here would be not radical but responsible—and it is essential if the Government hope to build public confidence in a new, far-reaching enforcement mechanism. Building on that, our Amendments 57 and 58 would permit the independent person to reach a decision as to whether a direct deduction order should be upheld, varied or revoked. These amendments do not seek to hand the power to implement these decisions to the independent person; rather, they would ensure that they can make a determination on one of these three outcomes, which they must then communicate to the Minister, who must then share it with the applicant. We are not seeking to create a rival executive power or trying to strip the Cabinet Office of its authority. We are proposing a balance: the Government would retain ultimate responsibility, but that responsibility would be exercised in the light of a fair and independent review, not an internal second glance. These amendments would ensure not only that the review process was made independent from the organisation that made the original determination but that the applicant would have sight of the decision that was reached by the independent person in relation to their case. This mechanism would ensure not only that the Minister, with their respective lines of accountability to Parliament, would maintain the power to implement a decision but that reviews of their actions would be truly independent and accessible to the liable person or joint account holder. Ensuring that the sweeping powers provided for in the Bill have proper, independent oversight mechanisms is fundamental to making sure that we balance the imperative of combating fraud with our responsibility to wield these powers proportionately and fairly. People must be assured that they can make a request for a review that will be independent and fair. This is the only way in which we can garner trust and create a system that is truly legitimate in the exercise of its powers. Finally, our Amendment 59 sets out a proposal for how such an independent reviewer could be constituted as part of the Bill. As is made clear in proposed new subsection (2), the nominees for appointment to the position of the independent reviewer must, or should, undergo a pre-appointment hearing before the Public Accounts Committee; this would build in some accountability to Parliament ahead of the final appointment being made. I emphasise that, although this amendment sets out just one vision of how the independent reviewer post could be formed, it speaks fundamentally in support of our view that the review mechanism built into the Bill must be independent of the Cabinet Office. The review process has the potential to impact significantly on how a deduction order is applied to a liable person or a relevant joint account holder. It is important that the process for review is effective, legitimate, independent and fair. The only way we can see this being achieved is through the incorporation of an independent review mechanism, a proposal for which we have set out in this group of amendments—Amendment 59 in particular. Ensuring that liable parties can be assured of a fair review is a duty that we owe to those over whom Cabinet Office officials are exercising these powers. Providing a review process that relates back to the original body that made the decision is inadequate and, in our view, does not fulfil the obligation to provide effective avenues of appeal and redress. We must always remember that a person affected by a direct deduction order may have legitimate grounds to request a review of the decision. They deserve to know that, if they do so, they will be heard not by the same body that sanctioned them but by someone who is genuinely independent, impartial and fair. The Government have argued that the powers in this Bill are necessary to tackle public sector fraud, but powers without independent scrutiny are at risk of creating overreach. If we are asking the public to accept strong measures in the name of fraud prevention, we must also guarantee that those measures will be exercised with proportion, accountability and justice. To allow the Cabinet Office to be judge and jury in its own cause does not meet that test. Our amendments, therefore, offer a sensible solution. They provide a pathway to restore confidence in the process—a pathway to fairness, legitimacy and the rule of law. I urge the Government to adopt them, and I urge noble Lords to support them. I beg to move.

18:00:00

My Lords, I welcome the spirit of this group of amendments. I am not clear that I understand entirely how the independent review process might work, but I do understand the importance of having an independent review process; the case for this was made convincingly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. Despite the fact that we are whizzing through these amendments at great speed, I do not think that it would be right to underestimate the huge amount of power that this Bill gives the Cabinet Office. There appears to be an atmosphere of consensual camaraderie, which it is pleasant to be involved in—it may be an atmosphere I am less used to—but I emphasise the amount of concern outside this Committee about the implications of this Bill. The people who are concerned are not all hucksters or fraudsters: they are ordinary people who have genuine fears around the possibilities of the absolutely unintended consequences of the Bill if we do not have adequate safeguards. So I am keen on anything that strengthens safeguards. I hope, therefore, that the Government will consider these amendments seriously. I think that they are very helpful. I am particularly keen, of course, on the idea that liable persons, as they are described, deserve to have somewhere they can go to make an appeal. They deserve to know, as was suggested, that, if they have legitimate concerns, they will be heard. So much of what appears to be in this Bill happens behind the backs of liable persons, which creates an atmosphere of fear, suspicion and nervousness. I do not think that people are just being paranoid here. Consider—this has been mentioned before and will no doubt come up again—the Horizon scandal. There is nothing more frustrating than feeling as though you have been treated badly somehow but you do not know where to go. You have nowhere to appeal to. It may be that you have a perfectly legitimate explanation for something. What we saw in Horizon was “computer says no”. What we could have here is the Cabinet Office, which has just imposed something on you, not taking any notice if you should go and complain. That is a very important part of this: people deserve to know that their concerns can be heard, and so on. There is a danger in this discussion sometimes. I fear that, if one raises concerns about this Bill, there will be an inference that one is not taking fraud seriously. That is absolutely not the case. I have constantly made the point, for example, that I worry about the conflation of error and fraud. This does not mean to say, though, that, where there is genuine fraud, we should not want to clamp down on it as hard as we can. But it is also fair enough that we need to have a system in which there is public confidence. To clamp down on fraudulent activity, we need a watertight, safeguarded Bill that targets fraud and does not pick up any number of non-fraudulent issues, which will undermine public confidence. The intention of these amendments is to help enhance public confidence that there is a mechanism through which an independent body can review a process that could be corrupted inadvertently by a department having the capacity to mark its own homework, and, in that instance, not always see the wood for the trees when people raise concerns.

My Lords, I, too, have a few comments to make on these amendments. I very much support the intention behind them. I would like to understand a bit more about Clause 34 and how it will operate. Paragraph 219 of the Explanatory Notes says: “This clause introduces a process for review of deduction orders by an authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision maker upon application by relevant parties”. As far as I can see, there is no mention in the legislative text of the authorised officer who conducts the review being of a higher grade. Perhaps I have missed it, and it is somewhere else; if so, I would be grateful to know where. If it is not somewhere else, it may be that the Explanatory Notes made that point on the basis of general principles of administrative law. Either way, it would be useful to know where that comes from. My second point concerns the grounds for review, which are very narrow. Clause 34(4) says: “An application for a review under this section may not be made on, or include, any ground relating to the existence or amount of a payable amount (unless the amount is said to be incorrectly stated in the order)”. The grounds for appeal in the following clause are equally narrow. Is my understanding correct that the reason these grounds are so narrowly drawn is that there has already been a final determination of the payable amount by a court or tribunal—which was the reference to Clause 12 that we were given earlier on? Can the Minister give us some examples of grounds for review, given how narrowly drawn that provision is in Clause 34(4)? Finally, I note that there is no time limit imposed on the Minister for carrying out the review. The applicant would have to put in an application within 28 days, but they might just sit and wait for the outcome of that review for an indefinite period. Would it not be a good idea to include a clear time limit on the reviewer—ideally the independent reviewer—or the authorised officer for that review to be concluded?

My Lords, I will say very briefly that I support the concept, at least, behind these amendments. It cannot be right that the Minister marks his own homework. The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, talked about what it says in the guidance notes. I do not know whether this is the right mechanism but, at the very least, if a review is to be carried out by the department, it must be by somebody who was not at all involved in the original decision and is not answerable to anybody directly involved in the decision-making process. That needs to be set in stone somewhere, not just in guidance notes or whatever that can be changed at a whim by any future Government. This is one of the weaknesses throughout this. We have lots of safeguards, but they are all in codes of conduct, future statutory instruments or whatever; they are not set in stone in the law and therefore are not strong safeguards. That is a general thought. I have a feeling that I know what the answer will be: if they do not like the outcome of the review, they can go to the First-tier Tribunal. But that is a big leap from going back and saying, “Can we have an independent review?”. A First-tier Tribunal is, effectively, a full legal process. We need something that works and in which people can have confidence at the first level, before needing to take it to the much more legalistic, costly and complicated process of the First-tier Tribunal. I think the Minister will say that that is the answer, but I am not sure that I agree.

This is a popular set of amendments. I agree entirely that there should be an independent review. That is something that somehow has to be in the Bill. What worries me about the noble Baroness’s amendments is that they talk about an “independent person”. Those are the words in the amendment. An independent person is somewhat different from an independent review. I can see a wonderful job opportunity in having panels of independent persons who could be available to be appointed. During the debate on this Bill, one has somehow to put flesh on the concept of an independent review, how it is set up and how people can make their complaints. One of the real problems of modern life is that, if you want to make a complaint, you have to be able to do it on a computer and use IT. Is there going to be a process whereby you do this in a letter form in some way or another? These amendments, in seeking to put right the lack of an independent review, latch on too closely to the concept of an independent person, which in my view is completely different.

My Lords, I have lots of bits of paper, and they are all written in my handwriting, which means that it will be even harder for me to read them—so bear with me. Amendments 56, 57, 58 and 59 would establish a new body with responsibility to conduct reviews of direct deduction order decisions. Under the current drafting, internal reviews can be requested to challenge, for instance, whether a direct deduction order is the most appropriate form of repayment or whether the deduction amount is fair and affordable. Internal reviews are important, as they provide a straightforward and affordable way for the liable person to present a challenge to direct deduction order decision-making. They are an impartial element of many review processes. Indeed, if we turn to cross-government precedence, we can look at Child Maintenance Service and HMRC deduction orders. Both of these include an internal review stage without necessitating the creation of another new body. For DDO reviews, the reviewing officer will be a trained authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision-maker. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, that is in Clause 66(3) of the Bill. They would not have been involved in this case until a review had been requested. They may decide to uphold, vary or revoke the direct deduction order. This decision will be based on an assessment of the material held and any relevant new information provided by the liable person. To reassure the Committee, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, anticipated, if the liable person disagrees with their decision, there are further appeal rights through the First-tier Tribunal. We specified the First-tier Tribunal for ease of access; no costs are awarded, and there is quick access to justice. We believe that that is a responsible option. We believe that the amendments are duplicative, as there is already the right to independent review built into the legislation. Also, the proposals outlined in the Bill would not require the extra costs or resources that the application of these amendments would. I highlight Clause 64, which already creates the role of an independent person, who will have the responsibility of reviewing how the PSFA are using the powers and whether this is being done correctly, ensuring another layer of independence and safeguard. On some of the specific questions, Clause 35 outlines the appeal process. The liable person can make representations before the DDO and then make appeals to vary the terms throughout engagement. The noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, asked why the liable person cannot challenge the amount owed in the internal review. That was not quite his question, but this is the answer I have. All reviewing appeal options will clearly be signposted to the liable person throughout our interactions with them; the liable person will already have had opportunities to challenge the amount owed, either as a result of fraud, error or the application of a penalty, in the relevant court or tribunal proceedings. We believe that that provides more than ample opportunity to challenge. While we want to let people present their positions, we also do not want them to be allowed to excessively frustrate the recovery process and cause unwanted delay in the return of vital funds.

18:15:00

With regard to examples, the PSFA will publish additional guidance on the review process for direct deduction orders. Factors taken into consideration will vary depending on the particular question in case. For example, it could include whether we have chosen the most appropriate bank account on which to apply a direct deduction order, whether a joint account holder has a different beneficial interest or whether the deduction amount is too high.

With regard to the question raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on the powers afforded to the Cabinet Office and—not to put words in her mouth—what punishment there is for bad behaviour or misuse of the powers, which is at the heart of some of her contribution, the PSFA will be held accountable for its use of powers conveyed in the Bill. There are stringent measures in place to ensure that authorised officers and investigators making decisions are well trained, competent and aware of the impacts of their decisions. The processes that sit behind the use of these powers will include a variety of projections and safeguards to prevent misuse or incorrect usage.

There are also independent oversight arrangements to ensure that the PSFA is held accountable externally to HMICFRS—the constabulary—and the independent person, as well as through established routes for dealing with complaints across government. This includes, for example, the ability for complaints to be referred to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, which investigates complaints about the NHS, government departments and other public bodies in the UK. Wherever any complaint or occurrence of misconduct is substantiated, swift action will be taken to redress. This would include dismissal.

With regard to the appointment of an independent—

Maybe I should just clarify. I am not suggesting that the Cabinet Office is full of malign people out to behave badly, and I was not suggesting that they all need to be punished. I was more suggesting that the reason why it would be useful to have an independent review body was for exactly the reasons that fellow noble Lords have pointed out—that if people wish to challenge decisions that are made, it is very important they feel they can go to a body where they will not necessarily be working directly with the people who made the original decision, as has been described. No one is suggesting that there is an evil, scheming group there. The comparison with the Horizon scandal that I was trying to make was about the sense of intimidation and fear when someone feels that they have been wrongly treated, then when they appeal or try and go to a body to sort it out and it ends up being the same people who punished them in the first place. Maybe I misspoke before, but it is this that I am concerned about—so I would like this independent review body to exist so that those who are liable have somewhere independent to appeal to, straightforwardly.

My Lords, in response to the noble Baroness, I state that there is the First-tier Tribunal opportunity, in terms of there being an independent process to go to. That is why we have put in place the additional safeguards with regard to the independent person who will be appointed to review all cases at their discretion, not at that of the Cabinet Office, as well as HMICFRS—so there is someone who has oversight. That is also why we are making ourselves subject to the IOPC for matters of complaints, as outlined in the Bill. The noble Baroness raises a very important point about Horizon. I assure noble Lords that the Horizon scandal and how we ensure that it is not repeated has been central to this Government’s thinking on safeguarding. In light of the seriousness of events, the Government wish to proactively ensure the highest levels of oversight in new legislation, and that is why they exist in this Bill. With regard to one of the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on the appointment of the independent person subject to a parliamentary pre-appointment hearing, the Government cannot commit to this at this stage. Cabinet Office guidance states that it should be discussed between the relevant Secretary of State and the chair of the relevant Select Committee. The Government want to make sure that the independent person is demonstrably independent and are exploring all available routes to achieve that. I hope that we will be able to discuss that further in due course, but with these explanations I hope that I have reassured noble Lords and that therefore they will not press their amendments.

I just wanted a bit more clarity in terms of the Child Maintenance Service, which she alluded to. My understanding is that, if there is a problem with cases looked at by the CMS, they go up to a different level to ICE—the independent case examiner—and complaints are reviewed. I am a little bit confused as to exactly what the Minister’s argument was. Backing up the argument from my noble friend Lady Finn, we are strongly looking for independence in the public sector. I was not quite sure whether the Minister was saying that it was okay because rather like the Child Maintenance Service there is an independence or if it is something else?

I apologise if I was not clear. My point was that internal reviews are already a normal process within government. HMRC, the DWP and the Child Maintenance Service already adopt them.

I thank noble Lords and thank the Minister for her response. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, may feel that this is consensual camaraderie. However, I can assure her that, while I am very grateful to the Ministers on the Bench opposite for their constructive engagement, I do not think there was very much consensual in what I said in my Second Reading speech on the powers of the Cabinet Office and various other parts of the Bill. I really did emphasise that I was very concerned about junior civil servants being granted sweeping powers, with the reviews and redress being carried out merely by a higher-grade official—the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, made that point—within the same department and not by an external body. The concern has always been that the Cabinet Office is appointed as investigator, juror, judge and debt collector. The individual affected has limited power to challenge the decisions, and then only after the damage has been done. I have been very clear, I hope, on those concerns and will be clear as we carry on going through the Bill. This debate has laid bare a crucial flaw at the heart of the Bill, one which speaks not just of good process but to the principle of fairness, accountability and trust in government. We cannot expect the public to accept that legitimate and fair review decisions as impactful as a direct deduction order can be undertaken by the same department that made the order the first place. Our amendments in this group offer a simple, reasonable and principled solution that, when a request for a review is made, that review must be carried out by an independent person or body. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, in this regard that we refer to an “independent person” but in Amendment 59 we refer to establishing a body to serve as an independent reviewer, so we are probing at the moment on how that might be set up, rather than being specific. The point is the independence of the body or the person. This should not be a colleague or a coworker and not someone in the same chain of command. No system of justice can command public confidence if it allows a single team to be judge and jury in its own cause. Let us be clear. We are not seeking to tie the Government’s hands or strip departments of their operational roles; we are proposing a balanced and proportionate framework that keeps Ministers accountable to Parliament but ensures that the initial decision is subject to meaningful independent scrutiny. That is a safeguard for the individual and for the integrity of the system itself. This matters because the consequences of these powers will be real—they are sweeping powers, as I have repeatedly said—and immediate for the people affected. If those people are to have any confidence in the fairness of the system, they must know that their right to request a review is not simply a paper exercise. It is not good enough to say that this will be a small team and the risks are manageable. In fact, the small size of the PSFA makes the case for independence even stronger. Close colleagues reviewing each other’s decisions behind closed doors is a recipe not for fairness but for suspicion and mistrust. Our amendments, particularly Amendment 56, place a simple duty on the Minister to appoint an independent person or body when a review is requested. Amendments 57 and 58 ensure that that person can reach a clear conclusion to uphold, vary or revoke the order and that the applicant is told what the decision is. Amendment 59 provides a model for how such a reviewer might be appointed, with proper parliamentary scrutiny. If we truly believe in the legitimacy of these powers, we must also believe in the legitimacy of the mechanisms that hold them to account. A fair and independent review process is a necessity. This is not just a procedural issue; it is a test of whether this Government are serious about wielding these powers with proportionality, care and respect for the people over whom they are exercised. The public will not trust a system that allows the Cabinet Office to mark its own homework, and nor should they. These amendments provide a path forward—a way to deliver a fraud prevention system that is strong but just, decisive but accountable, and both effective and legitimate. I urge the Minister to accept this principle of independence and to adopt these proposals or some version of them as important measures which would improve the system of review that the Government have presented. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 56 withdrawn.

Amendments 57 and 58 not moved.

Clause 34 agreed.

Amendment 59 not moved.

Clause 35: Appeals

Amendment 60

Moved by

60: Clause 35, page 21, line 3, leave out from “person” to end of line 5 and insert “may not bring an appeal under subsection (1) after the end of— (a) the period of 28 days beginning with the day after the day on which the person was notified of the outcome of the review, or(b) such longer period (if any) as the Tribunal considers reasonable in all the circumstances.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment means that the tribunal can extend the time limit for bringing an appeal in relation to a direct deduction order of the Minister for the Cabinet Office.

Amendment 60 agreed.

Committee adjourned at 6.27 pm.