Wednesday, 4 June 2025 • Lords

National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025

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13:28:00

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Lord Hanson of Flint

That the Grand Committee do consider the National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Exemptions for Certain Foreign Power Investment Funds, Education, Government Administration and Public Bodies) Regulations 2025. Relevant document: 23rd Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument)

Lord Hanson of Flint

My Lords, I am grateful to the Committee for allowing us to debate the four regulations relating to the foreign influence registration scheme as a single unit, but if noble Lords wish to discuss individual matters relating to them then we can do so. I know that, before I came to this House, noble Lords were instrumental in scrutinising and improving the foreign influence registration scheme during the passage of the National Security Act, and I am grateful for their consideration to date. There are four instruments to cover; I hope I can speak to them for possibly a little bit longer than I might normally have done just to outline where we are. Noble Lords will know that, on 1 April, the Government announced the foreign influence registration scheme—FIRS, as I will call it—which I can confirm will go live on 1 July 2025. The Government also announced recently that Russia would join Iran on the enhanced tier of the scheme. FIRS, as set out in Part 4 of the National Security Act 2023, will serve as a critical tool in our efforts to deter and disrupt hostile state activity. It will also enhance transparency around the influence exerted by foreign powers in our democratic process. As noble Lords will know, the scheme is underpinned by three principal objectives. The first is transparency. The scheme will require individuals who undertake certain activities on behalf of foreign powers to declare them. Where such activities constitute political influence, the relevant details will be published on a public register, ensuring openness and accountability. The second objective is deterrence. The scheme requires those engaged in malign activities for foreign powers either to cease such contact or to register it formally with the Government. The final objective is disruption. Failure to disclose relevant associations with foreign powers is an offence. This will be enforced by law enforcement, which can take decisive action against those who seek to conceal foreign state involvement. I hope that that broad principle is welcomed by the Committee; I know that it is. I turn to the four instruments before us. First, on Russia and Iran, the first two sets of regulations specify the entirety of the Iranian and Russian states on the enhanced tier of the scheme. This means, for Iran, the Supreme Leader; the whole of the Government, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran; and the judiciary of Iran. For Russia, this includes the President of Russia; Cabinet Ministers; government ministries; regional Governments; the judiciary; and the legislature. As my colleague, Dan Jarvis, the Minister for Security, set out in a Statement to the House of Commons: “The Iranian regime is targeting dissidents, and media organisations and journalists reporting on the regime’s violent oppression. It is also no secret that there is a long-standing pattern of the Iranian intelligence services targeting Jewish and Israeli people internationally”.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/3/25; col. 195.] As noble Lords will know, Russia poses an acute threat to UK security. In recent years, its hostile acts have included the deadly nerve agent attack that we witnessed in Salisbury, espionage, arson, and cyberattacks, including the targeting of UK parliamentarians through spear phishing campaigns. Specifying Russia and Iran on the enhanced tier will mean that anyone acting at their direction in the United Kingdom will face a choice: either they declare their activities to the UK Government or they risk five years’ imprisonment. That choice is down to them from the beginning of the scheme on 1 July. Both sets of regulations include a statutory five-year review period and a grace period for those who are in ongoing arrangements at the point of the scheme coming into force in order to allow them to register arrangements without there being a need to impact on legitimate activities. We have also set a number of exemptions in the scheme. This set of regulations introduces four new exemptions to the scheme. These exemptions, which sit alongside those already set out in primary legislation, are designed to uphold the principle of proportionality. They reduce the burden of registering routine or already transparent activities while ensuring that the scheme remains focused on addressing genuine risks. For example, these regulations include an exemption from the political influence tier of the scheme for a foreign power investment fund; this is intended to cover sovereign wealth funds and certain public pension funds. Then there are three exemptions from the enhanced tier. First, there is an exemption for funded study arrangements, such as scholarships awarded by foreign Governments. Secondly, there is an exemption for activities related to government administrative and technical services, such as those concerning nationality, immigration and tax-related services. Thirdly, there is an exemption for public bodies and arrangements to which they are party. Each of these exemptions has been carefully and narrowly defined to prevent the creation of loopholes that could be exploited for malign purposes. For example, a student from Russia or Iran on a government-funded scholarship would be exempt only in relation to activities directly connected to their course of study. Any other activity undertaken on behalf of those states would still require registration. The final set of regulations concerns the operation of the public register, and I will talk a little now about publication. In my view, that is central to delivering the scheme’s transparency objectives. The regulations set out the categories of information that will be published on the register. They are carefully limited to what is necessary to fulfil the scheme’s transparency aims, while ensuring appropriate safeguards for individual privacy. By default, registrations relating to political influence activities will appear on the public register. Where activities extend beyond political influence, they are registered on the enhanced tier and will not be published. It is important to emphasise that individuals and organisations that register under the scheme, and whose details appear on the public register, are acting responsibly and in support of transparency. The regulations also set out the information that may not appear on the register where it has been demonstrated that publication would be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, or to the prevention of crime, a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings; where it would put an individual’s safety at risk; or where it could result in the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. Lastly, the regulations also provide for information to remain on the public register for a period of 10 years following the conclusion of the relevant activity. This retention period is particularly important for identifying long-term trends and patterns in foreign influence. There is legitimate activity, of course, and I want to be clear that the scheme does not seek to deter that legitimate activity. Registering with the scheme does not mean that an individual is doing anything wrong, nor that they must cease their activities. We are also taking steps to ensure that registration remains as straightforward and simple as possible, and that those affected by the scheme are aware of what they need to do to comply. To conclude—I apologise for giving great detail on the four instruments before the Committee—self-evidently, the first duty of the Government is to keep our country safe; I know that view is shared across the Committee. That is why the Prime Minister placed national security at the heart of his plan for change. It is also why we are supporting the police and intelligence services to confront and combat the threats we face, including those from foreign states. The measures before us are among our decisive steps to bring into force the foreign influence registration scheme. I look forward to comments and questions from noble Lords, and I commend the regulations to the Committee.

Speaker

Viscount Stansgate

My Lords, I will not detain the Committee for long. I am in favour of the foreign influence registration scheme and I well remember when the Act went through the House in 2023. I support the transparency that my noble friend the Minister talked about, and I hope that this works. I echo what my noble friend said towards the end of his remarks, which is that registration in itself does not mean that someone is doing something wrong, but it will be part and parcel of what we hope will be a successful series of measures in support of the Act. I will raise a few items in the order in which they are laid before us, which is not quite the order in which my noble friend took us through them. The first relates to the exemptions for certain foreign power investment funds and so on. I understand—my noble friend made this point—that the exemptions are designed to ensure proportionality by reducing the amount of routine activity required. I am all in favour of increasing the transparency of foreign-power influence over UK democracy. I refer to Regulation 3 which exempts financial arrangements to provide financial support to students in FE and HE. It says and uses the phrase “where foreign powers give directions to the student or to the education provider”. I hope my noble friend will not mind if I ask exactly what that phrase means. The National Security Act 2023 (Foreign Activities and Foreign Influence Registration Scheme: Publication) Regulations 2025 are very important. I do not know how big a website we will end up with. Regulation 3 provides a whole series of exemptions. They seem to add up to quite a lot and made me wonder whether we might end up with so much of the information being exempt that it might not yield very much. What is the procedure for the Secretary of State to exercise one or more of these exemptions under Regulation 3 of that SI? On the regulations on Iran, I entirely understand—and this goes with the regulations on Russia—why Parts 1 and 2 cover the areas of official and government organisations and so on. In relation to the impact on businesses, charities and smaller micro-businesses, which the Explanatory Memorandum acknowledges will be the case, there are figures given about how long it will take to register—it is only £9.67 and so on. The draft impact assessment states that: “Registrations are likely to be completed by an employee in a Human Resources or legal compliance department”. Forgive me, but it seems that many micro-businesses do not have human resources or legal service operatives, so can my noble friend tell us whether that might prove to be a problem? On the last regulations, those in relation to Russia, the Explanatory Memorandum states: “Without this instrument, it would only be necessary for people acting at the direction of Russia to conduct political influence activity in the UK to register with FIRS”. That would not be enough. What in these regulations might be helpful in relation to the daily cyberattacks conducted on the UK? We have reason to believe that they emanate from hostile actors that might be based in Russia or acting on behalf of a hostile state. Finally, this is not in any of the regulations in this group, but I noticed the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has asked—and I ask now—why, at the moment, has China not been the subject of this SI process? Can the Minister give some idea of the Government’s thinking at the moment about whether China might in future, and, if so, when, come within the purview of the operation of the Act that we are discussing and the regulations that seek to give it effect?

Lord Cryer

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for bringing these SIs to the Grand Committee. Like my noble friend, I shall speak briefly about one or two points, in my case, specifically about Iran and the provisions that apply to Iran and, more specifically, about the effectiveness of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has developed a notorious reputation over the past 30 or 40 years. It came along with the revolution in 1979 and has established itself as an arm of the Iranian state since then. I particularly want to talk about Iran for one reason: Iran is probably the only significant world power that is effectively run by clerical fascists. I cannot think of a parallel country. It is a state that uses proxies all over the world. We all know about Hamas and Hezbollah, but there are other proxies, and this has been covered extensively in the mainstream press. The IRGC uses criminal gangs to further its aims in this country and other countries across Europe and the world. I have two questions for the Minister. Can he confirm that anybody who does not register a relationship with the Iranian state, who fails to register an interest or a connection, will be committing a criminal act and be subject to criminal prosecution? Does that also apply to anybody who has a clear relationship with an IRGC or Iranian state proxy, for instance Hezbollah or Hamas? Would that also apply to others? For instance, there have been parliamentarians in the past—I hope that there are none now, but there probably are—who have accepted money from PressTV. They will have to register that in the normal way, but do they also have to register it under the provisions of the statutory instruments that we are talking about today?

Speaker

13:45:00

Speaker

Secondly—my noble friend probably expects me to raise this matter—can we look again at the full proscription of the IRGC? The effect of full proscription is open to debate. The actual effect would certainly not be a magic wand, but nevertheless it would send a signal to the regime in Tehran and the people who run the IRGC. I welcome these SIs and think that we are being entirely serious, but such action would underline the seriousness with which the British Government approach the IRGC and the proxies who carry out its evil ends.

Lord Purvis of Tweed

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cryer. I have a high level of sympathy with the points that he raised. Indeed, when we discussed the Iran sanctions regime in Grand Committee, many of those arguments were made and made powerfully. I hope that the Minister will respond to that specific point. I also associate myself with the questions asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate. I want to expand on a couple of them and ask some further supplementary questions. First, I thank the Minister for outlining in clear terms the instruments. There are areas where I agree with him very strongly. The FIR scheme, which was passed as a result of considerable cross-party work, is one that I and my party support. As a veteran of each stage of that Bill, now Act, and all of the discussions there, I am very pleased that the Government are now in a position to bring this scheme into effect. It is an important measure. I thank the officials for their work in putting it together because its importance will rely on the fact that it is both reliable and enforceable; it therefore has to be right. I know that there has previously been some debate around the speed at which the Government are doing it but, from my point of view, it was always about getting it right. On implementation, it is interesting to see these measures. I will ask a couple of questions relating to them. As the Minister indicated, we previously discussed in the Chamber the announcement that Iran and Russia and their state entities are to be on the first enhanced tier list. I will come to China in a moment. I am content on the publication of information under Sections 65, 68 and 70, as these regulations state, but can the Minister say a bit more about how searchable they will be and how easily accessible they will be on GOV.UK? I know that there will be an online portal. Can the Minister say a little more about that? The value of them will be in how transparent and accessible they are, rather than just being available online, but that is a minor consideration. I now want to ask a couple of questions with regards to publication. The regulations state that, in terms of one of the exemptions from publication, the Secretary of State will be able to make a decision if a person will have information published about them that is likely to be seriously prejudicial to commercial interests. I would suspect that anybody who does not wish their information to be published, even if they have to do so under threat of prosecution, will state that that information is prejudicial to their commercial interests. I hope that the Minister is able to say that that is an extremely high bar and it will be very hard to litigate, because what I want to see avoided is anybody who is in a position of seeking to hide the information, having been forced to register it, then having a whole phalanx of lawyers to state what the commercial interests may well be. That will drive a coach and horses through the principle of the transparency of this. I hope the Minister can reassure me on that point. I will come back to some of the aspects of the exemptions in a moment, but first, on Iran, I am satisfied, as I said in the Chamber in response to the Statement. I hope that the Minister will take very seriously the points raised in the Chamber. It was referenced in the impact assessment of the regulations: “Iran may introduce reciprocal measures to monitor the overseas activities of the UK government. Persons could be prosecuted if engaged in unregistered arrangements or activity, even if the activity itself is legitimate. There is a potential risk of discrimination and exclusion against the diaspora of Iranians living in the UK”. What proactive work is being done, given that the Home Office has recognised that there may well be a threat to the diaspora within the UK? How has that community been contacted in advance of the scheme being put into operation, given the fact that the risk has already been identified? I hope that the Government are doing this, because we have already seen—as the Minister is well aware, and as we debated in the Chamber—the reach of the Iranian regime within the UK and the threat to those who have sought asylum from it. The same will apply to Russia: the same risk assessment was provided for Russia, of course. I should state that I have a slight interest when discussing Russia and Russian sanctions, given that I have been sanctioned. I appreciate that the guidance is being issued, but can the Minister confirm that, for the bodies listed in the regulations, any commercial or legal entities in the UK that are providing services for these entities will equally come under the remit of the Part 1 and 2 bodies in the legislation? There should be no loopholes for UK-based entities providing services for those entities because, as we know, Russia and Iran are expert at seeking to circumvent arrangements that the UK puts in place. I noticed that the impact assessment, under “Rationale for intervention”, mentions “certain academic and research activities which are directed by the government of Iran”, and it is similar for Russia. That leads me on to the exemptions. The Government have identified that “academic and research activities” are a tool that is being used, and they are now bringing forward an exemption for them. I do not understand this, and I hope the Minister can say in very clear terms the rationale behind exempting exactly those areas of activity which the rationale in the regulations cites as reasons for their being brought in. I hope that we will be able to have a bit more clarity when it comes to the exemptions. It is important because we know that these very areas, which include academia, research and the use of sovereign funds, and those that are facilitating the investment and advice of those sovereign funds, are exactly the instruments by which we have seen attempted foreign interference. The area where we have seen that on “an epic scale” is from China. That leads me to the point that the noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, indicated with regard to China. This week, we have been debating the Government’s strategic defence review. It starts with reference to China supporting the Russian war of aggression on Ukraine. We know that the director-general and the former director-general of MI5 have referred on the record to the enormous efforts that the CCP and the Chinese Government have deployed with regard to espionage and attempted espionage in the UK. In October 2023, the director-general went public and said that more than 20,000 people in the UK had been approached covertly by Chinese spies. We know that that pace has accelerated since then, but the Government do not believe it is warranted for China state enterprises or state entities to register their activities under the enhanced tier. The noble Viscount quite rightly quoted the Secondary Legislation Committee of this House, which drew to our attention the threat posed by China, and the Home Office’s response as to why China is not on the enhanced tier list. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee quoted the Home Office saying, and this may be in the Minister’s notes: “Countries are considered separately for specification on the enhanced tier and decisions are made based on a robust evidence base”. I have not seen any evidence base published by the Government as to why China would not be on an enhanced tier, given the “epic scale” of its attempts not only to subvert our institutions but to co-opt them to act in espionage. The director-general of MI5 gave examples of more than 20 instances where China was actively seeking to use UK companies and universities, through investments and learning agreements, to access sensitive information and technology. The Government are proposing to exempt those exact areas from these measures, and I do not know why. The Minister also referenced the exemption of sovereign wealth funds. This piqued my interest, because I raised this during the passage of Bill. I raised it in January 2023 when I specifically cited the “sovereign wealth fund of a state, which might or might not be listed on a stock exchange and which may or may not, in effect, be a private sector arm of the interests of a foreign power”.—[Official Report, 11/1/23; col. 1476.] I sought clarification from the Minister in the previous Government with regard to that, and I was told that sovereign wealth funds would be within the scope of this legislation. I just cannot understand why this Government have changed the assurance that I received from the previous Government, so that sovereign wealth funds will no longer be part of this. The deployment and the investment of sovereign wealth funds and pension funds in key UK infrastructure is of course something that we should focus on, whether or not it is part of the information to be published. I hope very much that Chinese investment, sovereign wealth funds and pension funds, and also the lack of published information for those who will claim some form of commercial sensitivity, will not be used to circumvent what we worked very hard to achieve, which is to prevent the kind of interference that the Government have said they are concerned about. I hope that before we are asked to support these regulations in the Chamber, we are given very clear reassurances, so that my concerns can be assuaged.

Lord Davies of Gower

My Lords, these four draft regulations represent the next step in operationalising the foreign influence registration scheme established under Part 4 of the National Security Act 2023, a piece of legislation introduced by the previous Conservative Government. I am sure that the Minister will be pleased to hear that we support these instruments. They provide essential tools better to protect our national security from covert foreign influence, a matter of the utmost importance. As the Minister explained, the regulations are designed to enhance transparency, deter malign activity and enable earlier disruption of potentially harmful arrangements directed by hostile states. In an increasingly complex and contested geopolitical environment, this is both necessary and timely.

Speaker

14:00:00

Speaker

The regulations before us set out exemptions, publication arrangements and country-specific designations. Crucially, they bring into effect the enhanced tier of the registration scheme, specifying Russia and Iran as foreign powers under that framework. Both states have demonstrated sustained hostile activity against UK interests, and the inclusion of a wide range of their political, military, intelligence and judicial institutions is appropriate and proportionate. We also recognise the value of the exemptions outlined, particularly those designed to avoid capturing routine, transparent or technical engagements. The exemptions covering areas such as public administration, education and sovereign investment funds reflect a careful attempt to strike the right balance between security and legitimate co-operation.

Lord Purvis of Tweed

The noble Lord has obviously made a decision that, even though China is not on the enhanced tier, Confucius institutions, Chinese pension funds and Chinese state funds will now be exempted. I assume that the Conservatives support that.

Lord Davies of Gower

Indeed—I think I will cover that point as I go along. Although we support the intent and scope of these measures, scrutiny must not end there. These regulations are not purely technical instruments; they go to the heart of how the UK responds to evolving and increasingly sophisticated state threats. It is in that spirit that I raise three points. First, the omission of China from the enhanced tier is quite simply a glaring absence. There is now consistent cross-party consensus, reflected in previous debates in both Houses and across the intelligence community, that China poses a systemic and strategic challenge to the United Kingdom. China has targeted Members of this Parliament, launched cyberattacks on UK institutions and engaged in covert activity on British soil. In 2021, it sanctioned two Members of this House and, in 2024, the Government publicly attributed malicious cyber campaigns against MPs and the Electoral Commission to the Chinese state. These are not isolated incidents; they are part of a wider sustained pattern. Given this record, it is difficult to understand why China has not yet been put under the enhanced tier of this scheme. The Government have stated that they do not comment on individual countries, and that designations are made on a case-by-case basis. However, this is not about speculation but about providing clarity and strategic coherence in our approach to national security. The public and Parliament are entitled to understand the rationale behind such decisions, particularly when the state in question has been repeatedly named by the intelligence community as a principal source of hostile activity. Indeed, the Home Office’s own professional guidance lists Russia, Iran and China as the foremost state-based threats. The director-general of MI5 has echoed this view, as has already been said this afternoon. So why the inconsistency? What message does it send, either to those carrying out covert activities or to our international partners, when a state widely recognised as a threat is excluded from a scheme specifically designed to counter exactly this kind of behaviour? I therefore urge the Government to reconsider this decision, or at the very least to provide a clearer public explanation of their current position. On enforcement and oversight, effective implementation is vital and registration requirements must be communicated clearly. Guidance must be accessible, and enforcement must be proportionate and consistent across sectors and regions. Can the Minister confirm that the necessary resources are in place to support enforcement, and that compliance will be monitored in a structured and transparent manner? We note that Section 82 of the National Security Act 2023 requires the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the scheme’s operation, which is welcome, but can the Minister confirm whether that report will include an assessment of the effectiveness of the current exemptions, and whether further exemptions or additional country designations are under active consideration? Finally, although this scheme is a welcome development, we must acknowledge that it is only one part of a much broader challenge. Hostile states are adapting constantly. Disinformation, cyber interference, economic coercion and influence operations now span multiple domains. Responding effectively demands not just new legal frameworks but a whole of government approach, with sustained investment in resilience, cross-sectoral co-ordination and continued international alignment. In conclusion, we support these measures, which are necessary, appropriate and overdue, but they must be implemented in a manner that is robust, proportionate and responsive to the evolving nature of state threats—not just today but in the years ahead. We remain concerned about the exclusion of China from the enhanced tier. We urge the Government to keep this matter under close and continuous review, and to act with greater transparency about the strategic direction of our national security posture.

Lord Hanson of Flint

My Lords, I am grateful both to the contributors to this short debate and for the broad support that has been given for the regulations before the Committee. I will try to answer each noble Lord in turn. There might be a bit of overlap, because some of the issues that have been raised do overlap, but I will try to cover the points raised by each noble Lord in turn. I shall start with my noble friend Lord Stansgate, who mentioned cyber and cyberattacks. I assure him that the security services, the agencies, the Home Office and the UK Government are acutely aware of hostile states potentially undertaking attacks, and of criminal gangs doing the same. Significant work, which my noble friend would not expect me to talk about in public, is ongoing to ensure the safety and security of our citizens. I give him that assurance as a whole. My noble friend asked in particular about the exemptions for students and the impact on small businesses or small organisations. I will take the latter first. The registration process is designed to be as simple as possible—this touches on a point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Davies. The Home Office anticipates that the process should take a maximum of 30 minutes. We are not expecting small businesses or micro-businesses to register in large numbers if they are in direct relationships with foreign powers, but—again, this goes to a point made by a number of noble Lords—there is comprehensive guidance online to support the registrant and their process, and to support individuals and larger organisations. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating, self-evidently, but we are confident that that will be a relatively simple process from 1 July onwards. Again, I put out the hand of friendship to all noble Lords: if there is feedback downstream on how the scheme operates, from any perspective that is brought to their attention, we would welcome it. My noble friend Lord Stansgate also asked for clarification on the education exemption. Where someone is in an arrangement with a foreign power and is completing a course in further study, they do not necessarily need to register activities, but it is reasonable to complete the course of education; to uphold the reputation of the provider; to meet the standards of conduct expected by the providers of financial assistance; and to notify any person of personal information. Again, I hope that that is helpful. My noble friend Lord Stansgate and the noble Lords, Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Davies of Gower, mentioned China. I may as well hit that point and discuss it at this time. I think that they all know the answer to the question they asked, but I will give it in the phraseology I have to use. Each country is considered on its merits and no decisions have been made. Countries are considered separately for specification and decisions are made on evidence. On China more broadly, we have been clear as a Government that we are going to take a consistent, long-term, strategic approach to managing the UK’s relations with China. This means co-operating where we can, competing where we need to and challenging robustly where we must, including on areas of national security. However, each country is considered on its merits and no decisions have been made. The regulations before the Committee highlight two specific nations where we believe there is a significant threat—Russia and Iran—which is why we have brought them forward. I hope that helps my noble friend Lord Stansgate on his points. I am pleased to see my noble friend Lord Cryer continuing his long interest in issues related to Iran. I know that he has raised this in the Chamber on a number of occasions. He asked what happens if there is a failure to register. That will be a criminal offence in the event of an individual’s activities coming to light linked to a registered nation under the regulations before us today and will carry a potential penalty of five years’ imprisonment. That is not for me to judge. That is for the courts to judge and the police to prosecute, but that is certainly part of this issue today. My noble friend mentioned in particular the impact on parliamentarians. There is no requirement for parliamentarians who are being lobbied to register with the scheme, and that allows the democratic process to continue. He commented on proscription and mentioned Hamas. Hamas is not specified. The regulations would cover anyone in a relationship with the IRGC in Iran but, as ever, for any organisation, at any time, the Government keep under review the question of proscription. At the moment, this is where we are, but we keep everything under review at all times accordingly. As my noble friend will know, the arrests on 17 May of three Iranian nationals who have been charged with offences under the National Security Act show that the Government are consistent. That matter will go before the courts and be determined by the judiciary in due course. My noble friend also mentioned proxies. Although I have touched on this, I think it is important that I say that it is the person who is in a relationship with the foreign power who has to register. Therefore, those who are proxies are within the scheme, for example, companies acting under the direction of the Russians or the Iranians. If the proxy is not registered, then the person in the UK acting on their behalf could well be committing an offence. Again, it is our intention to ensure that we act in the interests of national security and of the United Kingdom as a whole. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, raised a number of points. Again, I am grateful for his broad support and thank him for that support to date and in getting the legislation in this House in the past. He mentioned commercial interests and asked whether this is a high bar. Let me, I hope, reassure him that the Government’s intention is that it should be a high bar. UK companies providing services to bodies listed will have to register. The exemptions are carefully crafted to ensure that what is out of scope is as narrow as possible, while still fulfilling the scheme’s aim. We have put in place exemptions on sovereign wealth funds, which he talked about. The exemption for sovereign wealth funds is not about prioritising growth over national security as national security remains the first priority of Government, but about ensuring that the scheme remains proportionate. The link between a sovereign wealth fund and a foreign power is inherently transparent, so requiring them to register with the scheme would bring very limited benefits. I hope that answers his point.

Lord Purvis of Tweed

I am grateful to the Minister. On one hand I can understand it, on the other hand, I just disagree with him, respectfully. Sovereign wealth funds are not just one thing that is obvious to see. Sovereign wealth funds can be extraordinarily broad in their scope, their legal complexity and their financial instruments, which can be spread across a number of different jurisdictions. That is why they are used by state entities. We seek to have good relationships with some, because we want them to invest in the UK, but others are used for the very reason of their complexities. I just do not understand the rationale of the Government to have a blanket exemption for any fund that is principally owned by a sovereign Government. That is notwithstanding the further dilution of the share capital that the Government are now proposing, from 25% to 100%. I do not understand the rationale for this.

Lord Hanson of Flint

Well, we may end up having an honest disagreement, and that is fair. That is what politics is about; sometimes we do not necessarily agree. The exemptions that the Government have brought forward today match the exemptions contained in the primary legislation. They include routine diplomatic activity, recognised news publishers and legal activities carried out by lawyers. These were the exemptions introduced through the regulations being debated today. They ensure, we think, that the scheme’s requirements remain proportionate to the threats that we face. We have been very public about those threats in this debate, in the House of Commons and in the regulations.

Speaker

14:15:00

Speaker

We are not trying to put on unnecessary burdens that are difficult and damaging. All exemptions have been carefully crafted by the Government to ensure that we do not provide a loophole for state actors to evade the scheme—that is not our intention. If we have made an assessment that Russia and Iran are threats to the United Kingdom’s national security—which is why we are putting in place these regulations based on the primary legislation—then we are not going to be putting in place loopholes so they can get around those. We are putting in place a scheme that is proportionate and effective.

Viscount Stansgate

On the subject of exceptions, in Regulation 6 of the statutory instrument on publication, for example, how is Parliament going to know the extent of the exemptions that have been granted? On the face of it, we will not know.

Lord Hanson of Flint

If my noble friend allows me a moment’s reflection on that detail, I will respond to him with a fuller, meaningful reply. I believe that we are going to be transparent in all of this. The whole purpose of these regulations is to provide transparency and ensure that we tackle national security and give proportionate responses. Colleagues and I will reflect on the point he has made and I will respond to him in detail if I can.

Lord Purvis of Tweed

This is our only opportunity to debate this in detail—by the way, I do not detract from the Minister’s intent at all. I have two questions. First, forgive my ignorance, but do the exemptions also apply—

Lord Hanson of Flint

I have not quite finished my responses to the noble Lord yet.

Lord Purvis of Tweed

Well, does he wish to do that now? I will then be able to ask him the question about it. Do the exemptions apply to the enhanced-tier activities too? The policy rationale in the Explanatory Memorandum cites academia and economic activity, and the Government are proposing to exempt those. My second point was that, if he wanted to write to the noble Viscount and myself in advance of us being asked to approve these in the Chamber, that would be of benefit.

Lord Hanson of Flint

I am trying to explain to my noble friend and to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, that we have put exemptions in. I have explained in my opening speech what those exemptions are and have indicated that they are meant to be designed to be proportionate. If there are points that the noble Lord and my noble friend wish to press further, I will try to answer those today, but I have just indicated that I will reflect on those to see whether I can give further guidance prior to the end of this contribution. If we are not able to do that, then I will ensure that, before this is brought before the House on Monday or Tuesday next week—whichever day the final regulations are presented—we will have clarification on those points in the hands of my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I am trying, as ever, to be helpful. The noble Lord also asked the question about how accessible public registration will be. Information on only the political tier will be published. It will be accessible via an online register, which will be linked to the registration portal. It will be on GOV.UK, and there will be filters to support those searching. Again, I say to the noble Lord that the purpose of that transparency, and the whole purpose of these regulations, is to ensure that the Government register concerns on areas of international security, look at where that registration and influence is and flush out that influence in terms of individuals who are currently operating potentially in a covert way but will, in future, have to register, with the details published online. If they are not registered and are subsequently found to be operating, they will have to face the force of the law in the courts on those issues. The noble Lord also asked who decides and who polices the exemptions. That is a broad area of concern for him, I think. The exemptions have been set out in the regulations that we have laid. If an individual does not meet the exemption criteria, they must register their arrangement with Iran or Russia. If they do not register that arrangement, they will commit a criminal offence. There are existing measures to address risks associated with international students as a whole. On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, about the exemptions applying to the enhanced tier, there will be an annual report that will set out the exemptions under regulation. There will be different exemptions according to each tier. When I look later today at Hansard—which is always helpful to Ministers—I will reflect on what has been said by my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, on that issue. If my response today has not met their concerns, I will ensure that they have a letter in their hand by Monday morning. I will hold myself to that over the weekend. I think I have covered most of the points that have been made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, in our discussion today. Although I did not refer directly to him and the points that he raised, I think that I have covered elsewhere the issues that he raised on exemptions, China and so on. I hope that I have satisfied him. In summary, I thank my noble friends Lord Cryer and Lord Stansgate and the noble Lords, Lord Purvis of Tweed and Lord Davies of Gower, for their contributions. I hope that they have clarity that the purpose of these regulations is to provide protections on national security for UK citizens from malign foreign influences of countries that are undertaking activity in the United Kingdom that is causing disruption to indigenous citizens of those countries who live here and to the United Kingdom as a whole. The purpose is to provide openness and transparency around the links between the Iranian regime or the Russian regime and individuals who are operating on their behalf. The regulations are an improvement on where we are now and give clarity. They provide exemptions, but we believe that those exemptions are proportionate. I commend these regulations to the Committee.

Speaker

Motion agreed.

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