Undersea Internet Cables

Question

11:18:00

Tabled by

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the cutting of undersea internet cables in the Baltic Sea in November 2024.

My Lords, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, and with her permission, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in her name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Vallance stated on 3 December 2024, we continue to work closely with international partners following the breakage of subsea telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea on 17 and 18 November 2024. We must let those investigations run their course.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. He will be aware that on Christmas Day, the “Eagle S”, a Cook Islands-registered vessel and part of the Russian shadow oil tanker fleet, cut more cables in the Baltic Sea. I am delighted that the Finnish coastguard authorities arrested that vessel while it was still in international waters and brought it to port. Do the UK Government applaud the Finnish authorities’ reaction to that, as I do, and would they act similarly in UK coastal waters?

Of course, we are keen to support any country which supports international law and freedom of navigation, and Finland acted appropriately. As a member of JEF, we work very closely with Finland. The noble Lord will know—no doubt this will come up in many of the questions that follow—that the UK Government are leading a number of Joint Expeditionary Force operations. Operation Nordic Warden, for example, involves operations with respect to the Baltic. NATO is taking action with Baltic Sentry. All of us are acting more robustly with respect to the threats, as we see them, in the Baltic Sea and beyond, to ensure that we protect critical underwater infrastructure.

My Lords, NATO’s launch of Operation Baltic Protector and the other initiatives the Minister has mentioned are to be welcomed, but of course, the threats to our undersea infrastructure extend far beyond the Baltic and one or two isolated areas. What action is being taken to extend this initiative to a more comprehensive approach to our vulnerabilities? What discussions are being had to ensure that the actions of the military are fully co-ordinated with civilian investment in redundancy and resilience to ensure that we have a properly comprehensive approach to this very dangerous situation?

The need for greater resilience across government is something that the Government are taking up. We understand the need for all departments, not just the Ministry of Defence, to take action on resilience. The noble and gallant Lord will also have seen that the Ministry of Defence has taken action on other threats that have occurred in other areas, including the channel and the North Sea. We expect further attention to be given in the defence review to what resources and capabilities are needed to ensure we deal with what is an increasing and emerging threat.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, will participate remotely.

My Lords, with undersea internet cable interference presenting only the latest challenge to security, along with threats to energy supply, banking, telecommunications, shipping and other potential use of viruses, should traditional defence chief responses, based on naval and military interventions, remain the main strategies in response? Should we not be reprofiling our expenditure towards nuclear deployments, defence satellite communications, selective sanctions enforcement, political exchange through dialogue and old-fashioned negotiations in conflict zones? The military option, costing billions in Ukraine, has hardly been a success.

To deal with the last part of the question first, I am pleased to see the Prime Minister in Kyiv pursuing what has been a cross-government—and across all parties in majority—defence of freedom and democracy in Ukraine and what that means for the rest of Europe and beyond. With respect to the other points that my noble friend made, he is right to draw attention to the increasing threats to critical underwater infrastructure. The military option is one option that we need to use. I say that because, as I have said at this Dispatch Box before in answer to, I believe, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, and others, we must deter people from doing things in the first place. The use of maritime assets and underwater drones, the actions of the Joint Expeditionary Force and those of NATO are key to protecting these vital cable links on which much of our livelihoods, data, telecommunications, energy and so on depend. Military resource is one way in which we have to deal with that.

My Lords, in light of recent concerns over security of undersea communication cables and the involvement of foreign state actors in potential sabotage, how do the Government plan to balance their intention to reset relations with China while addressing the risk posed by Chinese entities to our critical infrastructure?

I thank the noble Baroness for her question. The Government’s position with respect to China, as I have said on many occasions, is to co-operate, to compete and to challenge. Those are the three strands of the policy. The Ministry of Defence will challenge China, where appropriate or necessary, to ensure that the international rules-based order is protected, whether that is to do with critical underwater infrastructure or with other areas in the world where the rights of navigation and free passage are threatened. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for that, not alone but with our allies, and we will challenge China where necessary to ensure that the international rules-based order is protected.

My Lords—

My Lords, how are we dealing with the threat to transatlantic undersea cables from hostile actors? Around 75% of the cables in the northern hemisphere pass through or near Irish sea waters. However, in a recent response to me on the Floor of this House, the noble Lord, Lord Vallance, seemed to suggest that the task of protecting these cables is carried out by a single ship which, with respect, does not sound remotely credible. As an esteemed Defence Minister, can the noble Lord advise me of what arrangements are actually in place to safeguard these cables serving the British Isles and how much of the bill is being paid by the Irish Government?

I will leave what the Irish Government pay for to the Irish Government. Regarding the protection of critical underwater infrastructure, the UK has a large number of assets. The noble Lord of course points to the maritime assets that we make available, some of which we cannot discuss openly, but we also have surveillance aircraft and other means of protection. We will see in the defence review further suggestions as to what we might do in that respect. Let us make no mistake about it: one of the key functions of the Government is to protect the underwater infrastructure on which our livelihoods and prosperity depend. We will do that. It is not only about dealing with things when they happen but about deterring people from doing them in the first place. The Government will take the action necessary to achieve that.

My Lords, undersea energy cables are being targeted by the Russian shadow fleet. My understanding is that all three power cables between the Baltic and Nordic countries were targeted last week. Undersea gas pipelines and electricity interconnectors are a critical part of our energy security, both now and— even more—as we transition to net zero. What actions are we taking with allies to deter, monitor and protect our undersea energy infrastructure?

A lot of action is taking place. I have pointed to the work of the Joint Expeditionary Force that has taken place, and we have mentioned the maritime assets that have been deployed to protect infrastructure. We have seen the announcement of Operation Nordic Warden, which is another JEF initiative and is run from Northwood. We are applying artificial intelligence to some of the information that comes into there to predict the ships that may threaten those undersea cables. Alongside that, Secretary-General Rutte of NATO recently announced Baltic Sentry. There is a lot of work going on to deal with this. Do we have to give it greater priority? Of course we do. Ten years ago, we were not talking about the threat to undersea cables in the way that we are now. It is another way in which the threats to this country are changing and transforming. The defence of our realm needs to change and transform to meet those threats, which is what we are seeking to do.

My Lords—

My Lords, the principal response to this threat in the Baltic is coming from NATO. May I press the Minister a little further on the contribution that United Kingdom naval assets are making to that endeavour? In particular, the planned multi-role support ship was always intended to be an important contributor to that. May I ask for a report on progress on that important new addition to the fleet?

If I understand the noble Baroness rightly and she is talking about the provision of a second additional ship to support and augment the ship “Proteus”, that will be part of the defence review. On the other assets that she talks about with respect to the Baltic, she will know that in December 2023, under the previous Government, a huge maritime collection of ships across NATO and JEF was sent to the Baltic, including UK maritime assets and UK surveillance aircraft. There was a further initiative in June 2024, again under the previous Government, and just recently we have had the announcement of Operation Nordic Warden, as I have said. All the way along, there have been significant UK contributions. Another thing that is important, since we are often questioned about this, is that it is not only the contribution that we make in terms of our assets but the thought leadership, co-ordinating power and other leadership potential that the UK provides. Let us remember that it was in 2014, under the previous Government, that JEF was set up under UK leadership. It has worked particularly well. We should sometimes recognise what this country contributes to the defence of the world as well as some the challenges that face us.