My Lords, every casualty in the Iran-Israel conflict is one that could have been avoided, but it is worth remembering that, in the same period, almost as many people have been shot in Gaza simply queuing for food, and the crisis in the region continues.
On Iran, the US clearly decided to escalate to de-escalate. It may yet re-escalate, because the whiplash of posts from the President this morning are hard to follow with a degree of reassurance, but I hope that a ceasefire can be operational, even though the most recent updates require us to be somewhere between pessimistic and cautiously optimistic. The Trump Administration seem to think that war plays out like a reality TV show, but this is real violence with real deaths and real-life consequences, not so much for egotistical men in their 80s and near-80s as for the victims, who are primarily civilians—women and children in particular.
The Tehran regime is clearly homicidal, but we may find out that it is probably not suicidal. The US and Netanyahu Governments are clearly tactical, but we will find out that they are probably not strategic. The Minister told the House last Thursday that the US was seeking to de-escalate at the very time it was deciding to escalate. The immediate repercussions are being seen, and we cannot now know for certain what will follow.
Trump and Hegseth said the Iranian nuclear programme was obliterated and ended. Now US officials are giving a more sober view of “damaged” and “delayed”. The IAEA’s information is probably more reliable: that it is likely that there has been significant damage—but this is difficult to verify. Even more difficult to verify is the impact the strikes will have on preventing weaponisation in the medium term. The IAEA warned against military strikes for the very reason that they would likely make it even harder to verify, and I suspect that may be the reality now.
Unquestionably, Iranian options in the next period are more limited than they would have been 10 days ago, but it is rash to think that we know whether Iran will continue to act immediately or play a game of time on a calendar it has operated under for many years. I was in Iraq the last time Iran claimed the US would pay irreparable damage, for the killing of Soleimani outside Baghdad Airport; instead, it signalled and then performed a largely performative display of attacks near Erbil. Full escalation or controlled tit-for-tat is a delicate dance where miscalculation is deadly, but it may well be being played out.
We therefore cannot predict the next 48 hours from Tehran, not to mention the next 48 days; nor for that matter, and with deep regret, can we necessarily predict that from the Trump Administration. We can predict heightened rhetoric taking on increasingly macho and jingoistic terms. From loose talk of regime change, the current Tehran regime will likely become even more repressive, and more secretive and patient in rebuilding its proxy relationships and other interests.
Last week in the Chamber, and just a few moments ago, we heard noble Lords drumming a jingoistic beat. We also heard—more rightly in my view—caution. I would advise the House to listen to the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Lamont—the noble friend of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. These Benches agree with the Government’s position of not participating.
As much as I agree that Iran should not have nuclear weapon capability—and I strongly agree that Israel should have the ability to defend itself against unacceptable calls for its destruction—we continue to see too many tacticians and too few strategists. As an Iraqi friend, who, incidentally, detests the theocratic dictatorship in Tehran, told me recently, Netanyahu was a cheerleader for regime change in Baghdad 20 years ago and helped persuade Bush and Blair. He handed it to Iran. He wanted Gaza to be in violent competition with the West Bank to prevent a two-state solution and bolstered Hamas. He successfully lobbied Trump for the US to leave JCPOA, which restarted the weapon capability path of nuclear Iran, and now he has positioned Trump into looking weak if he did not join his tactics on bombing and regime-change rhetoric. At each step of the way, quick tactical wins led to strategic errors.
We of course hope for a ceasefire with Iran, but we fervently hope for respite for the civilians in Gaza and the West Bank too—so I close with regard to the situation there. It is alarming, after all the suffering of the civilians within Gaza, to see the recent reports of Hamas now recruiting. The very circumstances exist now for Hamas to regain strength. This is what we were told would be inconceivable with the war aims of the IDF. Reconstruction preparedness is now even harder, given the policy choices for the Gaza Humanitarian Fund to be a mercenary and profiteering operation to supply food and medicine.
So I ask the Government: what work are they doing with our allies to ensure that food is being supplied, and on the restrictions at the border—not assisted by the Knesset law preventing UNRWA working with third parties to co-ordinate the delivery of food and medicine—to ensure that the people of Gaza no longer have to experience the indignity of queuing in danger areas for food? Will the Government provide clarity on the future funding for both programme and humanitarian assistance for the people of Gaza delivered through UNRWA after July?
The medieval scenes that we see, of people having to queue to receive food and medicine across an apocalyptic backdrop, mean that the current situation must end. The GHF approach has been a deadly failure, and the acute shortage of food, deliberately being withheld at the Gaza border, must end. I hope that, if there is breathing space with Iran and Israel, we can at least focus on getting the aid in, which is desperately needed.