My Lords, I thank noble Lords for all those comments. I will try and answer them all and, if I fail, that will not be deliberate. I am grateful for the kind personal comments; I am bathing in the plaudits from various sides of the House, and I appreciate that. However, this is also very much a matter for the distinguished members of the committee.
I am going to start with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, then I shall try to pick up on any that have not been covered, on topics such as social media, as we go through. I am grateful to noble Lords for taking these issues seriously and for the range and extent of their comments.
The concern of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom, that complaints of harassment by Members of either House may be politically motivated and used to embarrass opponents is a view shared by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, and others. I assure the House that the members of the Conduct Committee are fully alive to the possibility of politically motivated complaints, as are the commissioners. We understand that we work in a political environment, and we have robust processes for identifying and rejecting frivolous or vexatious complaints.
I shall come to the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Swire, later on, but in truth I suggest that the risk he identifies is more imaginary than substantial. Paragraph 27 of the enforcement process says:
“No information will be made public unless or until a report is published”,
even if the commissioner launches an investigation. It is a confidential process, and if the complainant were to breach that confidentiality, they would, as paragraph 62 states, be committing
“a contempt of the House”.
When the commissioner’s report is ultimately published, it will either uphold or dismiss the complaint. If the complaint has been dismissed, the commissioner may withhold the name of the Member concerned or even decide not to publish a report at all. That has happened in the last year—not in the cases that have been mentioned today, though for obvious reasons I cannot go into detail—so I would argue that the scope to cause malicious political mischief is, in practice, very small. There is only political damage if the complaint is upheld and the Member is in fact guilty of harassment.
I would remind people—this goes to the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—that, in the definitions of “harassment”, we are following Section 26 of the Equality Act, which defines it as “unwanted conduct” that has the “purpose or effect”, so it can be unintentional, of “violating” a person’s “dignity” or
“creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”
for them. Whether Members of the House like that or not, it is the law.
I suggest that all the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, would achieve would be to prevent genuine victims of such harassment from complaining— and, let me be clear, there are victims. Even though allegations by Members of either House against noble Lords are extremely rare, there have been some cases where serious misconduct has occurred. In some cases, the details are not in the public domain because the complainants wished to remain anonymous, but I assure the House that there have been serious cases involving noble Lords.
To go back to my opening remarks on the Behaviour Code, the principles of respect and courtesy are there for the entire parliamentary community. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that they are not there just for the staff, although that is an important component. They are there for the whole parliamentary community. If we start having carve-outs for particular groups, we risk unravelling the entire behaviour code. I hope that, if the noble Lord presses his amendment, the House will reject it.
The noble Viscount has clearly stated his case—indeed, he talked to me about it beforehand—and has been consistent in so doing. He has been supported by others, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Deech. Nobody can doubt his honest advocacy of a wholly independent process with a strong legal flavour. In the end, it is up to the House to decide. It is not, in the end, up to the Conduct Committee. The Conduct Committee’s view is clear. What he suggests is very different from Commons procedures, for example, where you have three layers. First, the commissioners decide whether it looks as though the code has been broken. Secondly, there is the Standards Committee and, thirdly, the independent expert panel with no Members of the House of Commons on it. We could go that way, or we could go the way suggested by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. My view is that the existing system is fair and provides natural justice, and I dispute that it has been otherwise. But, again, whether the noble Viscount wishes to withdraw his amendment is up to him.
I will try to read my scribbles on what other things were said, and I will try to answer them correctly. I hope I have answered the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom. I of course contest his view that there has been a serious miscarriage of justice. The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, raised a number of questions in his four minutes. I will start with one on social media, which was also picked up by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and others. What we think we are trying to achieve here—what we think we have done—is just to say what the existing arrangements are. I do not want to get into particular cases, but I will mention the case of the noble Lord, Lord Ranger, which some noble Lords may remember. He carried on a parliamentary discussion on social media with somebody he had met on the Parliamentary Estate. In the view of the committee, this was parliamentary activity in an unusual situation. In most cases—in the vast majority of complaints that we get concerning social media—the comments by the Peer concerned could not by any definition be said to be part of parliamentary activity.
Then we have to go on and ask whether this is freedom of speech—whether it is about having an honest and robust opinion, having the ability to offend or insult, or whatever. Unless it is covered by the definitions of harassment and it is parliamentary, the code will not engage. So I suggest that all that we have actually done is put into the code the current practice. We have not been on mission creep in this or any other part of the code—I know that a number of Peers were concerned that we might have been.
For minor cases, I do not have a definition, but the idea is that we try wherever possible to keep out of the whole process as many as possible—that is partly for purposes of the noble Lord, Lord Swire. That is something that I have also corresponded with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, about.