Prevent: Learning Review

Statement

The following Statement was made in the House of Commons on Wednesday 12 February.

“With permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will make a Statement on the publication of the Prevent learning review into the perpetrator of the attack that tragically killed Sir David Amess on 15 October 2021.

Sir David Amess was a beloved Member of this House. A hugely respected parliamentarian, his popularity extended right across the political divide. To win and keep the respect of those outside one’s own party is, as we all know, a rare accomplishment. Over nearly 40 years of service in this place, Sir David fought every day for his constituents. He advanced numerous causes with compassion, persistence and skill, and Members on all sides of the House knew him as a warm, respectful and always fair parliamentarian. His legacy lives on, not least in Southend, which now has the city status he campaigned so determinedly for. He will never be forgotten, and as the motto on Sir David’s memorial shield behind me states, ‘His Light Remains’. While this House lost a hugely valued Member on that terrible day, Sir David’s wife and children lost a loving husband and a devoted father. They are in our thoughts and prayers today and always.

Together with the Home Secretary, who spoke with Sir David’s family recently, I recognise the courage and persistence they have shown in seeking the answers that they deserve. As the House will know, it was a heinous act of violence on 15 October 2021 that took Sir David away from those who knew and loved him. The killer, Ali Harbi Ali—and I will not say his name again—was convicted of murder in April 2022 and received a whole-life sentence. The judge said that this

‘was a murder that struck at the heart of our democracy’,

and he had ‘no doubt whatsoever’ that the nature of this case meant that the perpetrator

‘must be kept in prison for the rest of his life’.

The perpetrator had previously been referred to the Prevent programme and subsequently to the specialist Channel programme between 2014 and 2016, or between five and seven years before the attack took place. Immediately after the attack, a Prevent learning review was jointly commissioned by the Home Office and counterterrorism policing to examine what happened in the case and see whether lessons needed to be rapidly learned. It was completed in February 2022.

Last week, I made a Statement to the House on the Government’s publication of the Prevent learning review concerning the perpetrator of the abhorrent attack in Southport. Today, we are taking a further step to enable public scrutiny of Prevent, and in recognition of the seriousness of the terrible attack on Sir David, by publishing the Prevent learning review conducted in this case, too.

The perpetrator of the attack on Sir David became known to Prevent in October 2014, when he was referred by his school after teachers identified a change in his behaviour. The case was adopted by the Channel multi- agency early intervention programme in November 2014. An intervention provider who specialised in tackling Islamist extremism was assigned to work with him. The perpetrator was exited from Channel in April 2015 after his terrorism risk was assessed as low. A 12-month post-exit police review in 2016 also found no terrorism concerns. The case was closed to Prevent at that point. There were no further Prevent referrals in the five years between the case being closed and the attack.

The Prevent learning review examined how Prevent dealt with the perpetrator’s risk, and how far the improvements made to Prevent since he was referred seven years prior would have impacted on his management. The review considered both the handling of the case at the time and the changes that had been made to Prevent since the referral in 2014. It examined how far those changes addressed any problems identified, and then made a series of recommendations.

The reviewer found that

‘from the material reviewed, the assessment in terms of’

the perpetrator’s

‘vulnerabilities was problematic and this ultimately led to questionable decision making and sub-optimal handling of the case during the time he was engaged with Prevent and Channel’.

It identified that the vulnerability assessment framework was not followed, with the perpetrator’s symptoms being prioritised over addressing the underlying causes of his vulnerabilities. The reviewer ultimately found that, while Prevent policy and guidance at the time were mostly followed, the case was exited from Prevent too quickly.

The reviewer identified six issues: the support given did not tackle all of the vulnerabilities identified; record keeping was problematic and the rationale for certain decisions was not explicit; responsibilities between police and the local authority were blurred; the tool used for identifying an individual’s vulnerability to radicalisation was outdated; the school that made the referral to Prevent should have been involved in discussions to help determine risk and appropriate support; and the tasking of the intervention provider was problematic, with a miscommunication leading to only one session being provided instead of two.

The reviewer then examined how far changes in the Prevent programme since 2016 had addressed these issues. The reviewer recognised the significant changes that had been made to Prevent since the perpetrator was managed, in particular the introduction of the statutory Prevent and Channel duties under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The reviewer concluded that over the intervening period there have been considerable changes to policy and guidance for both the police and the wider Prevent arena, including Channel.

While a number of the issues in the perpetrator’s case would most likely not be repeated today, there were still a number of areas that could be considered as requiring further work to mitigate future failures. The reviewer made four recommendations for actions to further strengthen Prevent. These were to improve the referral process, strengthen the initial intelligence assessment process, update the tool used to identify vulnerability to being drawn into terrorism, and to not reduce data retention periods.

Since the report, the Home Office and counter-terrorism policing have fully implemented all four recommendations. First, a single national referral form was launched to encourage a consistent approach to referrals, building this into new training packages and mandating its use via statutory guidance. Secondly, training has been delivered to police staff to strengthen the initial intelligence check stage, ensuring their understanding of Prevent is robust. Thirdly, a new Prevent assessment framework was rolled out in September 2024, which replaces the tools previously used to assess all referrals and cases in the Prevent system. Fourthly, data retention periods were fully reviewed in 2023, and a joint decision was taken by the Home Office and counter-terrorism policing to maintain retention review periods at six years, or six years after the 12-month review for Channel cases.

In addition to the publication of the Prevent learning review, we recognise the significant concerns that remain over the way in which Prevent dealt with the perpetrator, as well as the need to ensure that the recommendations it suggested for improving the scheme have been properly implemented. Last week, I set out to the House a series of new reforms instituted by the Government to strengthen the Prevent programme, recognising the vital work done by officers across the country to keep people safe. That included the creation of a new independent Prevent commissioner. I can today inform the House that the Home Secretary has asked the Prevent commissioner to review the Prevent programme’s interactions with the perpetrator in this case, and ensure the implementation of all relevant recommendations. We will ensure that the Amess family have the support they need to engage with the Prevent commissioner in this work, so that they can have confidence that it will get to the truth about any failings in the scheme.

Two further important issues have been raised that are relevant to this case—local policing and Members’ security. On local policing, concerns have been raised by the Amess family about the way in which Essex police handled this case. A complaint has been made, and referred back to the local force by the Independent Office for Police Conduct for consideration. That process must be allowed to follow its course. However, I can inform the House that the Home Secretary has written to the chief constable and the police and crime commissioner of Essex police asking them to set out how the investigation will be conducted, and to be kept updated as the investigation progresses.

Members’ security is something the Home Secretary and I care deeply about, and I know it is a matter to which Mr Speaker attaches the utmost importance, as will all Members across the House. A review of security measures for MPs commissioned under the previous Government has concluded, and all the recommendations have been implemented. We must ensure that the learnings from this case have been properly implemented.

I take this opportunity to thank Mr Speaker for his continued leadership on these matters. The Speaker’s Conference is specifically considering what reforms are necessary further to improve MPs’ security and safety, which is another important step. The Leader of the House, the Home Secretary and I look forward to working closely with Mr Speaker and all Members to ensure that the facts of the appalling murder of Sir David are properly considered as part of the Speaker’s Conference’s work, and that the Parliamentary Security Department implements the recommendations it made following the review it conducted in the aftermath of Sir David’s death.

I am also grateful to previous Home Secretaries and Security Ministers for their efforts in this area. Our democracy is precious, and this Government will defend it against any and all threats, not least through the defending democracy taskforce, where we are mounting a whole-of-government response to combat these threats, including ensuring that elected representatives can perform their duties safely and without fear.

To conclude, I pay tribute once more to Sir David. He was a giant of this House and we miss him dearly. In all that he did, Sir David epitomised public service at its best. It is beyond a tragedy that we can no longer seek his advice or rely on his wisdom. We can, though, follow his example and devote ourselves every day to the task of building a better, safer Britain. That is our shared challenge, and under this Government, nothing will matter more. I commend this Statement to the House.”

12:52:00

My Lords, I am responding to this Statement on behalf of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition with deep sadness. Sir David Amess was not just a colleague and friend of mine in the other place; he was a true servant of the people. His warmth, kindness, keen sense of humour and unwavering commitment to his constituents set an example to all parliamentarians. His murder was an attack on democracy itself and it is incumbent on us all to do everything in our power to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again. The Government are right to publish the Prevent Learning Review into this case. Transparency is crucial in restoring trust in our counterextremism strategies. It is only by learning from past failures that we can strengthen our national security. The findings of the review are concerning. It is clear that the vulnerabilities of the perpetrator were not adequately assessed, that record-keeping was inadequate and that a miscommunication led to an incomplete intervention. Most concerningly, the case was closed too soon, allowing a dangerous individual to slip through the cracks. These are not minor administrative errors but systematic failings that demand urgent attention. I welcome the fact that all four recommendations of the review have been implemented, but we must go further. The introduction of a new independent Prevent commissioner is an important step, but this role must have real teeth to scrutinise the system and hold authorities to account. The Prevent programme must be laser-focused on countering Islamist extremism—the ideology that led to the murder of Sir David. The independent review of Prevent by William Shawcross made it clear that, too often, the programme has been distracted by vague and politically correct priorities, rather than focusing on the clear and present threat posed by radical Islamism. This must change. The Government must also address the broader weaknesses in our counterterrorism approach. The British people expect that those who pose a clear danger to our country are properly monitored and, where necessary, detained. We must ask whether current powers are sufficient. Whole-life sentences for terrorists are welcome, but we should also consider greater use of terrorism prevention investigation measures and enhanced surveillance for those who leave Prevent but remain a risk. Additionally, this review has highlighted the crucial issue of MPs’ security. Public service should not come with a threat of violence. The Government must continue working with the parliamentary security department to ensure that MPs can serve their constituents without fear. More must be done to clamp down on online radicalisation, which played a role in this case. Social media companies must take greater responsibility for tackling extremist content. Finally, let us never lose sight of what this debate is truly about. Sir David’s light remains. His service, optimism and belief in his community live on. It is in his memory that we must commit to doing everything possible to prevent another tragedy of this kind. I support the Government’s effort to strengthen Prevent, but I urge Ministers to ensure that this programme never again fails, as it did in this case. We must be ruthless in our commitment to national security and unwavering in our resolve to protect the values that Sir David embodied. What specific measures will the new independent Prevent commissioner have at their disposal to ensure greater accountability and effectiveness in countering radicalisation? Secondly, given the concerns raised in the Shawcross review, how will the Government ensure that Prevent remains focused on the most pressing threats, particularly from Islamist extremism, rather than being diluted by other priorities? What steps are the Government taking to enhance the monitoring of individuals who leave the Prevent programme but may still pose a risk? Should stronger legal powers, such as TPIMs, be considered? How will the Government work with social media companies to crack down on online radicalisation? What consequences will there be for platforms that fail to remove extremist content? Lastly, what further reforms are being considered to improve MPs’ security? How will the Speaker’s Conference ensure that lessons from Sir David Amess’s murder are fully implemented?

My Lords, the murder of Sir David Amess highlights the urgent need to strengthen our counterterrorism strategy if we are to prevent similar tragedies in future. The terrorist threat is continually evolving. More extremists now follow multiple ideologies, or none at all, with the internet and social media fuelling self-radicalisation. Conspiracy theories, personal grievances, misogyny and anti-Government sentiment further blur the picture, making credible threats harder and harder to predict. To stay effective, our approach must adapt to this increasingly fragmented and unpredictable landscape. The review that was made public yesterday highlights that Sir David Amess’s killer had his Prevent file closed too soon in 2016—a failure the Home Office and counterterrorism police have known about since at least February 2022. Yet, as we heard last week, less than three years on, a similar pattern of failure has been identified in the review following the Southport stabbings. This suggests that, while much may have been done to improve the workings of Prevent in the last decade, some critical lessons have still not been learned. We therefore echo the sentiments of Sir David’s family in welcoming the fact that light has finally been shone on those failings, following yesterday’s retrospective publication of the 2022 report. The Liberal Democrats have consistently raised concerns about whether the Prevent strategy is the most effective mechanism for addressing radicalisation. Unfortunately, recent events confirm that its shortcomings are not isolated incidents, and I therefore welcome the Government’s decision to task the new Prevent commissioner with reviewing the handling of Sir David’s case. Can the Minister confirm that the commissioner will have a broad and independent mandate to conduct a thorough assessment of Prevent? Will the Government commit to placing this role on a statutory footing to ensure accountability and effectiveness? Any comprehensive review must also examine how Prevent collaborates with stakeholders, including police and crime commissioners and elected mayors. Community engagement is central to an effective counterterrorism strategy. Can the Minister outline how local communities will be consulted in the development of future counterextremism policies? The current system is simply not equipped to manage emerging risks effectively. We live in a world where counterterrorism casework involving young people is increasing, and more referrals are now for individuals with a vulnerability rather than an apparent ideology. To tackle both emerging and traditional forms of radicalisation, we urgently need a system that is built for the reality of modern extremism.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their comments and contributions and I will try to answer the questions accordingly. I begin with the praise given to the late Sir David Amess by the noble Lord. Like him, I served in Parliament with Sir David—in my case, for 28 years. I shared with him a role on the Panel of Chairs, chairing debates in committee and in the House. I found him to be an honest, open colleague who stood up for his constituency with immense passion, and I am very pleased that Southend is now a city as a result of Sir David’s campaign. I also want to remember that primarily, Sir David was a father and a husband, and his family grieve much more than we will ever know. Our thoughts are with them today. The noble Lord and the noble Baroness talked about the failures of the Prevent system in the case of the convicted killer of Sir David. There were a number of recommendations, and six findings were highlighted in the report. The Government wanted to publish those findings to ensure that they were open and transparent, and that the concerns raised would not be hidden behind a secret report. It is right that we did that this week, and it is also important that we look at the four recommendations in the report. To date, the Government have completed all four recommendations on key issues. I hope that that will give some comfort to those who have been the victims of previous attacks. Having said that, we recognise that there are a number of considerations. The Shawcross report, which the noble Lord mentioned, made a number of recommendations; again, the Government have accepted those. They are in the process of implementing, I think, 31 of the 32 recommendations and will complete those in due course. The noble Lord asked whether we need to look at other forms of monitoring. The terrorism prevention measures, which are in place to monitor people who are on the radar or who have had convictions, are extremely important and the Government keep them under regular review. The noble Lord also mentioned the Prevent commissioner, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. We have given the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, a temporary position for the moment, and have asked him to do three things, in effect: a sprint review of what happened in the specific case of Southport and the murders that took place there; a sprint review of what happened in relation to the murder of Sir David Amess, now that this document has been published; and a long-term review—which may well be taken forward with the full-time commissioner, who is shortly to be appointed—of the Prevent legislation as a whole. That review will look at legislation and the operation of Prevent; examine any specific lessons learned from those two horrific incidents—Southport and the murder of Sir David; and examine whether there are any recommendations to bring back to Ministers to continue to improve the position and help ensure that we stop future murders. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned that there is considerable focus on potential Islamist and neo-Nazi terrorism, and that that is considerably fuelled by online activity. We are committed to looking at the implementation of the Online Safety Act, which will come into real effect on 17 March this year. But my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has also written to tech companies, asking them to be very wary of what I would term illegal criminal terrorist content and to remove it, pending the Government’s own review of whether there needs to be further action downstream through the Prevent review as a whole. Online radicalisation is extremely important and is the driver of many of these sole individuals who commit horrific crimes without any organisation behind them. They learn and they mirror, and the Government are extremely cognisant of that self-radicalisation online. I turn to some of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, made. It is extremely important that we look at the whole question of internet regulation and at the six failings that were identified and the four recommendations that we have now implemented. I recognise the concerns that have been raised, but there is still a very positive story to tell about much of what is happening in Prevent. Since Prevent was put on a statutory footing by the previous Government in 2014, and onwards since 2015, some 5,000 individuals have been referred and have successfully gone through what I will term de-radicalisation programmes, having been identified as vulnerable individuals with a range of tendencies that are driving them to potential activity. That success has been positive, even though there are terrible failings, of which the murders of Sir David and the three young girls in Southport are critical examples. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, the role of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will be to look at Prevent legislation and policy; to oversee and ensure implementation of recommendations from previous reports and reviews, including the one on Sir David; to look at the coronial process; and to look at general Prevent learning reviews. It will be independent of government: no one who knows the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will doubt that he will be independent of government. His job is to make recommendations, raise critical issues and, along with the general political process of the House of Commons and House of Lords, hold Ministers to account on the delivery of these recommendations. I shall end where I started. Sir David Amess was a good man. He did not deserve the death that he had. He served his constituents well, and we need to be cognisant of the fact, particularly those of us who hold public office as elected Members of Parliament or Members of this House, that what happened to Sir David could have happened to any of us, at a surgery or at a public meeting. I am extremely cognisant of the fact that we need to address this. Going back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the Speaker’s Conference is looking at security. Operation Bridger, the police-Home Office response for Members of Parliament in particular, is looking at security requirements generally. On a case-by-case basis, Members of this House can be examined and supported by Operation Bridger. That is extremely important, because the key thing is that the murder of Sir David Amess was an attack on democracy in this society. It was an attack on all of us, and on all the values that bring us to this House and to the House of Commons. So, I praise his work and I mourn his loss, but our lesson from this event must be to ensure that we improve the Prevent strategy to prevent radicalisation of further individuals downstream.

13:09:00

My Lords, I declare an interest in that I conducted the first Prevent review in 2011 and started what became the Shawcross review, which I strongly support. I thank the Government for the remedial steps that have been taken, as described in the Statement, following the loss of a valued colleague with whom I too was in the House of Commons and had many happy exchanges. Can we now be a little bit more positive about the future? Does the Minister agree not only that there have been successes, as he just described, but that some of them have been quite remarkable in turning young men and women from becoming potential terrorists, and that we should not let up in enhancing the effectiveness of Prevent in what is an extremely challenging and difficult area of work, which is sometimes underestimated?

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for both his previous work on helping to support to development of the counterterrorism strategy and his comments. As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, there have been around 5,000 successful Prevent referrals since 2015, and there are people now living productive, constructive lives who may have gone down the radicalisation route had Prevent intervention not taken place. I add that I was in the Home Office from 2009 to 2010, and in the Ministry of Justice from 2007 to 2009, and when we dealt with Prevent then it was an entirely different world. There was no Twitter or Facebook; the internet was relatively in its infancy. In the 14 to 15 years between then and my return to the Home Office, there has been the dark web, radicalisation, fake news—a whole range of things. One of the key issues for the future is asking the tech companies to step up to the plate on what they need to do to help support the Prevent strategy and deradicalisation. That is why my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has written to tech companies, following both the Southport and Sir David Amess reviews, to ensure that we can examine, with them, their responsibilities once the Online Safety Act comes into effect on 17 March. I am grateful for the noble Lord’s support. He is right that Prevent can be a success and we should not throw it out on the basis of failings that are self-evident but which are not the full story of how the Prevent strategy has worked.

My Lords, I welcome the Minister’s typically generous remarks about my former colleague Sir David Amess, who was a personal friend and a fine and decent public servant. The city status of Southend-on-Sea and the Children’s Parliament, which he helped to found, are fitting tributes to a good life and one well spent. Having represented a constituency which was 16% Muslim, I know the difference between those who follow the Muslim faith and those who follow the pernicious poison of Islamism. On the latter, can the Minister reassure the House that the Islamist proselytising that we have often seen across the prison estate, in madrassas and in some mosques in this country will be part of the review, and that the Government will take those issues seriously? If Prevent is in a position to intervene early with some individuals in those settings it may head off some of the much more serious criminal activity.

I am grateful for the noble Lord’s comments. The loss of Sir David was felt keenly across the House, but particularly by those who shared his political party or were close to his region. He will be forever remembered for the Adjournment debate, now named the Sir David Amess Adjournment Debate, in the House of Commons. For those who do not know, Sir David was always first up in every Adjournment debate to raise about 46 issues to do with Southend. Of those, 42 or 43 ended up in some positive outcome for his constituents. I should mention that, before Southend, he was the Member of Parliament for Basildon. The noble Lord raises extremely important points. There is a criminal threshold for individuals who promote Islamist or neo-Nazi terrorism, or terrorism related to any other form of hate, such as misogyny. It is extremely important, if evidence is brought forward and the threshold is crossed, that the police take action via the CPS. The Prevent strategy is particularly about younger people being radicalised by those who have criminal intent and have provided criminal material, or individuals who have crossed that threshold and are having their own grievances or immaturities exploited by individuals for the purpose of terrorist activity. The Prevent strategy is about helping people who are going down that route. I think the noble Lord is referring to the criminal threshold, which is for the police and the CPS to determine. They have my full support to prosecute anybody who encourages terrorist activity.

My Lords, I fully support the Prevent strategy. It is vital, as one of the four legs of the Contest strategy. Along with Pursue, to arrest the people who did it, Prevent obviously tries to prevent the thing happening, and Prepare ensures we prepare for the consequences. One thing that needs to be addressed, which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, raised, is that there is a handful of TPIMs in place. For those who are unaware of what that means, it refers to people who are not charged but have appeared in court, and conditions are put on how they live in free society. One of the most effective measures is their relocation, but it is also expensive, as is the surveillance that surrounds them. Over time, the security services have suppressed the number of people under TPIMs because, having served them, they have to follow these people, as do the police. This situation seriously needs looking at, because we now complain that the police and others did not look at these people to prevent them committing the awful crimes we have heard about today. That suppression, which happens partly through resourcing but partly through accountability, does us no good. I cannot comment on whether 200 or 50 people need to be on these orders, but it needs to be more than a handful, because we expect others to bear that risk. When it goes wrong, we say, “Why didn’t you do something?” It is because we have suppressed the number under TPIMs. The place to decide whether they should be on them is called a court. I am afraid that, in my view, it has not happened in sufficient cases.

The noble Lord brings a lot of experience to this topic. He is right that a very small number of individuals are currently on TPIM orders. For the House’s information, I publish on a regular basis the number of those on TPIM orders. A Written Ministerial Statement on this was published in, maybe, the last two weeks. From memory, the latest figure is certainly low. I cannot remember the exact figure, but it is under 10. There is an argument to be had but, in a sense, it is not for Ministers. The TPIM legislation is there. If the police and the courts have severe concerns about individuals who may have previous prosecutions, but in this case do not have a prosecution in the specific area, TPIMs are a tool that can be used. It comes with a cost and potential further risks, but it is a valuable tool. Throughout my time in this field, TPIMs have been a way in which individuals who have not committed a crime can be monitored because of the danger they pose, and action can be taken in the event of them moving towards potential terrorist activity. The noble Lord makes a valuable point, but I cannot, at the moment, give him a plan on resources. However, his point is noted and I will take it back to officials.

My Lords, I too pay tribute to Sir David. My thoughts are with his family, in particular with his daughter, who is being very courageous in pursuing this issue. I declare my interests as set out in the register. I thank the Government for the openness and transparency they have shown by publishing this Prevent Learning Review and emphasise the importance of defending democracy by ensuring the security of Members of Parliament, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the Minister have both said. Would the Minister agree that the best will in the world and the most thorough procedures, carried out in the most diligent way, cannot guarantee the absence of terrorism, while maintaining the freedoms that we cherish in a liberal democracy—particularly in relation to attacks by lone actors. Would the Minister care to comment on the inference that dedicated professionals involved in these processes might be ignoring credible threats because of political correctness?

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his question. Again, he brings a perspective that is helpful to inform government policy as a whole. I am not aware of anybody having their reputation slurred by political correctness, but I say genuinely to him that I have a great admiration for all individuals, in the police and elsewhere, who work to help the Prevent programme have the successes that it has. There are failings in these cases—again, every individual can fail at different times. Are they systemic? That is what we are asking the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, to look at. Are there suggestions for improvement? Yes, there undoubtedly are. Are there suggestions for future legislation? Probably. But the question for me is: is it still worthwhile investing in support for professionals to undertake diversionary work for younger people who are coming into contact with neo-Nazis and Islamists, or indeed who are forming views which will lead to terrorist action downstream? The answer to that question is a resounding “Yes”. As the Government, we have to give full support to those professionals who are making judgments that I do not have to make on a daily basis, but they do. They deserve our full support, but that does not mean that we do not have to learn lessons when things have gone wrong—and in this case, and in the case of Southport, things have gone wrong and lessons need to be learned.

My Lords, I have heard the passion and fury from Katie Amess, David Amess’s daughter, over recent weeks, demanding a full inquiry. I would just like to say that she is very much her father’s daughter and he would be so proud of her. She feels that the Government are ignoring her. I ask the Minister whether he will please look seriously at her common-sense suggestion that the Axel Rudakubana Prevent inquiry is expanded to include Katie’s father’s murderer, Ali Harbi Ali, because, as she says, it is wrong to pick and choose which murders Prevent failed to prevent should be investigated. Also, does the noble Lord agree that both cases have a lot in common, not least that politicians can get distracted by some bizarre blame games. When Sir David died, there was a swathe of people discussing online civility—anything but discussing radical Islamism. After the Southport killings, what have we been discussing? Selling knives on Amazon. It does not feel too serious to me. A full inquiry into both together would be helpful for everyone.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness. We have ordered a public inquiry into the Southport murders. We agreed to do that and we are looking currently at terms of reference and a number of other measures to get that inquiry under way. We have asked for an initial Prevent review from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in relation to the murder of Sir David. Like the noble Baroness, I pay tribute to Sir David’s daughter, Katie, who has done herself proud in standing up for the legacy of her father, and also in standing up to make sure that her father has justice and that lessons are learned. That is a vital role for her to do. We will first review the examination by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, of what has happened, on top of the reviews that have been undertaken, which we published this week. In the light of that, we will consider further discussions downstream. That might not satisfy the noble Baroness now, but I am trying to put that into the context of where we are to make sure that we do not lose valuable lessons from what happened to Sir David.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the very gracious and moving tribute he paid to the late Sir David Amess. I was fortunate to be elected on the same day as Sir David, 42 years ago. All of us will never forget the day the news came through of his tragic murder. We owe it to him, on all sides of this House, to make sure that we get this policy right.

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I know he was elected in 1983 in North West Norfolk. It does not seem like 42 years ago. I went down in flames in Eddisbury on that day. I pay tribute to the fact that he won his seat, as did Sir David on that day. Again, from my perspective, we have a lot of political knockabout in both Houses at times, but you can also spot and respect integrity, and Sir David had integrity. It is important that we recognise and celebrate that. While we will always have political differences, including with the noble Lord now, we must recognise that behind the politician is a person with a family and a commitment. Whatever drives us into politics for our own values, this is the place to debate them. We should be able to debate them outside, in our constituencies and in public, without the fear of attack or death by those who disagree with the principle of democracy, and not least with the individual who is the face of their ire. It is not just Sir David but my former colleague in the House of Commons, Jo Cox, and many people from Northern Ireland who have stood their ground, put their views forward, been in the public domain and found themselves subject to violence as a result. That is not the way we should be doing things in this United Kingdom.

My Lords, I too want to thank the Minister for what was not just a kind and generous tribute to Sir David but also an immensely sensitive Statement, and on point in terms of how to address the issue. These things affect us all. David was a neighbour of mine and was one of the first people to welcome me, a Yorkshireman, down to Essex, and to make me feel at home. We are about to debate the Holocaust. A Holocaust survivor once said to me a few years back that the thing that she noticed most coming to Britain after the war was that the policemen smiled, and that it was easy to meet councillors and officials. What happened to David threatens that. That ease that we have in this country is very much central to what makes us tick and we need to be able to hold on to that.

Absolutely. The noble Lord and I were elected on the same day—9 April 1992—to the House of Commons. One of the great joys I had as a Member of Parliament, was, yes, debating in Parliament, but actually it was having face-to-face surgeries where I walked into a room and did not know who was going to walk through the door and I did not know what problems they would bring; or I would go to a fête or a factory; or I would walk down the street and be stopped by individuals who asked for help and support or sometimes wanted to make a vigorous point about a particular aspect of government policy. That is the essence of our democracy. The noble Lord has reminded us that the murder of Sir David was an attack on that democracy. For those who have witnessed the growth of authoritarian regimes such as those who will be the subject of the debate shortly on the Holocaust, this democracy of ours is open and should be willing and transparent. We should be held to account for our views and our actions, but we should do so in a way that is with peace, tranquillity and fair and open political debate. The murder of Sir David and the murder of Jo Cox in the political context were horrendous attacks on them and their families, but also on our democracy.