My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson, Lord Moynihan and Lord Fuller, for tabling their amendments, as it provides me with the opportunity to restate the Government’s position on these points and provide some clarification. I join the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, in wishing Newcastle good luck in their forthcoming match. We can agree on some things in your Lordships’ House.
I start with Amendments 7 and 28, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. Before I go into a bit more detail, I would like to clarify whether incumbent owners or officers could be tested. Indeed, they can be tested. The regulator can test incumbent owners or officers where it has grounds for concern about their fitness or, for owners only, the source of their wealth—but, I repeat, only where there are grounds for concern. It is vital that we have a strong definition of an ultimate owner in order to give transparency to fans and hold owners to account. The Government are intent on providing the regulator with the tools to identify the ultimate owner as accurately as possible.
On the point from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, point on precedent, this is why the Bill’s drafting takes its lead from the precedent of other Acts using “influence or control”, including the Companies Act’s “persons with significant control” regime, and the economic crime Act’s “beneficial owners” regime. We are confident that we have the correct definition to achieve the Bill’s aim. It ensures that an individual who exerts significant influence over a club, more than that of any other owner, can still be identified as the ultimate owner even if they do not have formal legal control. In fact, without this definition, ultimate owners could circumvent regulation. It is fundamental that clubs have suitable custodians in order to secure the future of clubs and, most importantly, to protect the game that fans hold so dear. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord can understand the importance of the definition.
I turn now to Amendment 28. As I outlined in Committee, I agree that it is important that the industry has certainty as to what the regulator will consider significant influence by owners. That is why the Secretary of State’s guidance will be produced in good time in order to give this clarity. I want to make it clear that the Bill’s provisions that define “owner” in Clause 3 and Schedule 1 come into force on the day the Bill becomes an Act. That means that the obligation for the Secretary of State to produce this guidance comes into force on that day.
We have taken on board the valuable points the noble Lord raised in Committee. After looking at this again in detail, we stand by our position that the intent of this amendment is met without needing to change the Bill. We do agree that, before guidance is produced, clubs should not be expected to identify those who meet the definition of an owner by exercising significant influence or control. I would therefore like to provide greater reassurance that the scenario the noble Lord is concerned about should not be an issue. I can commit that the Secretary of State’s guidance will be produced before clubs are required to identify their owners who meet the definition of having significant influence or control to the regulator.
In response to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, on why we have not defined “significant influence and control” on the face of the Bill and are putting it in guidance instead, this approach is based on precedent. As I mentioned, the Companies Act also sets out the definition of “significant influence or control” in guidance rather than legislation. The Secretary of State’s guidance will give clarity to owners about who meets the definition.
Turning now to Amendments 42, 43, 44 and 45 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, I think it was a bit cheeky and that one should take a slight exception to the notion that Delia Smith is just a cook. I would argue that she is, through her professional career, arguably also a highly successful businesswoman. Leaving that point aside, however, the requirement to notify is there for a reason. Keeping unsuitable owners and officers out is a core part of the regulator’s regime. We want the regulator to block these individuals from entering the system, and not to have difficult, costly battles to remove them after the fact. So it needs to know who a club’s respective new owners and officers are before they buy or join the club. Put simply, the regulator needs to be able to gather the information that it needs to test them and work with them and the club to ensure that they submit a proper application in good time. It will help the regulator prepare to act quickly when it receives the application.
Clause 27 plays another important function. If a person has, for whatever reason, become an owner or officer of a club without the regulator first having found them suitable, they still have to notify the regulator as soon as possible after the event. Without this provision, there could be untested, unsuitable individuals in the system that the regulator was unaware of.
I move now to Amendment 46, in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson and Lord Markham. We agree that it would not be right for money related to terrorism to find its way into our clubs. The Bill, as already drafted, already stops that through its provisions on serious criminal conduct. Serious criminal conduct includes offences listed in Section 41 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. That is an extensive list of terrorism-related offences, ranging, to name a few, from membership of a banned organisation to encouraging terrorism to offences related to funding terrorism. Serious criminal conduct, including these terrorism offences, is considered under the ODT “source of wealth” and “honesty and integrity” tests. The club licensing regime lets the regulator block funding that is connected to serious criminal conduct. That is why we are confident that the Bill appropriately and thoroughly deals with terrorism-related activities.
Finally, I turn to Amendment 47, also in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson and Lord Markham. I am pleased to have another opportunity to highlight the information-sharing agreements that the regulator can and will use to its advantage. I absolutely agree that the regulator may need to work closely with other organisations and stakeholders when exercising its wider functions. I am grateful to the noble Lord for the discussions we have had on this point.
The Bill establishes a gateway for the regulator to share information with a range of organisations, including HMRC, the National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Office. It also creates a specific gateway for HMRC to share information with the regulator and empowers the Secretary of State to create other such gateways by regulations, as needed. The regulator may already consult whoever it needs to in order to make robust decisions. The regulator will seek information and expertise from relevant organisations to help it to stay live to both national and international concerns. The shadow regulator is already building a strong relationship with the NCA and law enforcement to ensure that the regulator is in a strong position to gather and receive the information it needs. We are confident that the Bill adequately empowers the regulator to gather such information. For the reasons I have set out, I would be grateful if the noble Lord could withdraw his amendment.