I am pleased to be opening this debate, although, given the turnout in the Chamber, it seems to be a minority interest among Members of Parliament, notwithstanding the fact that the legislation affects some of our most basic freedoms and rights. Before I address amendment 1, I hope you will forgive me, Madam Chair, if I briefly indulge in a preamble. There are a couple of issues that I want to impress on the Minister in the hope that he will respond favourably and, if not accept my amendment, agree to consider the principles it raises in the other place. Given the number of senior lawyers there, this legislation will be examined by some pretty stringent legal eyes.
First, Madam Chair, I hope you will agree that we established on Second Reading that this Bill is highly discriminatory. One of the truisms we always utter in this House is that we all stand equal before the law, but I am afraid that where this legislation is concerned, that is just not true. The Minister would be unable to wield against me the powers he is seeking to bring in under this Bill; it would not be countenanced because I have no right to citizenship elsewhere. However, there are Members of this House against whom the Minister could wield that power. Although he could not wield it against me, he could wield it against two of my children, although not against the other one—I have three. He could wield it against the children of the former Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak); against the children of the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt); and against the children of the former Deputy Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden). I am trying to illustrate to the Minister that this legislation is highly discriminatory, and unusually so. He is tampering with some of the basic tenets of British justice through this Bill—a principle has been established in the Supreme Court that he is attempting to reverse—and I want him to have in mind that he is trying to embed that discrimination in law. I hope and believe that that is not his primary motivation, but he must comprehend that before he takes this step.
Secondly, I say to the Minister, who has a distinguished record of service in the defence of this country and now serves as Security Minister, that much of the Bill is, let us face it, focused on those accused of committing terrorism here or overseas. Terrorists win in two ways: first, by the physical injury that they inflict and the fear of that physical injury that they are likely to inflict by exploding bombs, killing people and all the horrors we have seen in our lifetimes over the past 30 or 40 years, if not longer; and secondly, by a long, slow undermining of our way of life and by sowing division within our society. Their long game is to force us to twist ourselves in knots around the freedoms that make us different, which they despise, and slowly to erode our standard of living and the atmosphere in which we live, and we have seen that before in this country.
The Minister is old enough to remember the evolution of the Diplock courts in Northern Ireland, where hearings were held without juries. We dispensed with the basic freedom of the right to a jury trial in Northern Ireland for a while, largely because of accusations of violence towards juries. It was proven later that this was part of a known strategy by the IRA to make the Six Counties ungovernable, other than by military colonial means, so the IRA saw that move as a triumph. What terrorists want in the long term is a twisting of our natural freedoms. They want us to make compromises in our legislation that undermine our sense of belonging in our nation and create a division not just between the governed and the Government, but within society. This legislation, I am afraid, starts to do exactly that.
On Second Reading I pointed out, as I have possibly already done today—I hate to be repetitive—that this legislation and this power create two classes of citizenship in the UK. There are those who can have the order removed and those who never can have it removed. As use of the power has accelerated over the past two decades, and we are using it now more than we ever did, it creates a feeling of unease among those whose citizenship is conditional.
I will explain to the Minister why I tabled amendment 1. As I said on Second Reading, my view is that he is undermining some of the basic tenets of British justice with what he is attempting to do with this legislation. With this amendment, I am attempting to swing the pendulum back a little in the cause of fairness before the law. As he will know, individuals subject to this power have the right to appeal on a number of bases, and courts will decide whether to allow their appeal. Broadly, there are three areas on which they can appeal: the first is whether the decision was proportional; the second is whether it was procedurally fair; and the third is whether the Minister or the Home Secretary has made a mistake over whether the person has a right to citizenship elsewhere and so may in fact be rendered stateless. As he knows, that is not allowed under the legislation.
If I have had my citizenship deprived essentially at the stroke of a pen by the Home Secretary, and I win an appeal, it seems unfair, given that I have won that appeal on the basis of fact, that the Government can continue to deprive me of my citizenship pending a further appeal by them. Ordinarily, I would have got rid of this legislation, but the Minister seems insistent, and he won on principle at Second Reading, and that is fine. I am therefore appealing to his sense of good old British fair play to say, “This individual has won their first appeal on the basis of fact. Unless we have some profound reason to dispute that fact, we will not appeal, in which case they get their citizenship back.” On the basis of the fundamental British value of “innocent until proven guilty”, that person should get their citizenship back, particularly if a judge decides that the three conditions outlined in my amendment are satisfied.