Crime and Policing Bill

1st allocated day

New Clause 52

Offence of trespassing with intent to commit criminal offence

“(1) A person commits an offence if the person trespasses on any premises with intent to commit an offence (whether or not on the premises).

(2) In subsection (1) “premises” means any building, part of a building or enclosed area.

(3) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale (or both).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

13:06:00

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 53—Arranging or facilitating begging for gain. Government new clause 54—Proving an offence under section 38. Government new clause 55—Special measures for witnesses. Government new clause 56—Causing internal concealment of item for criminal purpose. Government new clause 57—Secretary of State guidance. Government new clause 58—Department of Justice guidance. Government new clause 59—Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases. Government new clause 60—Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers. Government new clause 61—Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers. Government new clause 62—Interpretation of sections (Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers) and (Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers). Government new clause 63—Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices. Government new clause 64—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): supplementary. Government new clause 65—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): interpretation. Government new clause 66—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): confidential information. Government new clause 67—Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): code of practice. Government new clause 68—Extraction of online information: ports and border security. Government new clause 69—Extraction of online information following agreement etc. Government new clause 70—Lawful interception of communications. Government new clause 71—Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons. Government new clause 72—Meaning of “law enforcement employer”. Government new clause 73—Application of section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) to Secretary of State. Government new clause 74—Application of section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) to specified law enforcement employer. Government new clause 75—Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists. Government new clause 76—Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer. Government new clause 77—Interpretation of sections (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons) to (Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer). Government new clause 78—Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists. Government new clause 79—Consequential amendments. Government new clause 80—Power to give directions to critical police undertakings. Government new clause 81—Ports and border security: retention and copying of articles. Government new clause 82—Extradition: cases where a person has been convicted. Government new schedule 1—Amendments to Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Government new schedule 2—Confiscation orders: Scotland. Government new schedule 3—Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists. Amendment 157, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “The Anti-social” and insert— “Subject to a review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2014 being conducted and completed by the Secretary of State within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, the Anti-social”. Amendment 167, page 1, line 13, leave out “18” and insert “16”. This amendment would lower the age to 16 at which a court can impose a respect order on a person to prevent them from engaging in anti-social behaviour. Amendment 168, page 2, line 29, at end insert— “(9A) If a court makes a respect order against a person (P) more than once, then P is liable to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.” This amendment means that if a person gets more than one Respect Order, they are liable for a fine. Amendment 169, page 2, line 30, leave out from “behaviour” to end of line 31 and insert “has the same meaning as under section 2 of this Act.” This amendment would give “anti-social behaviour” in clause 1 the same definition as in section 2 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. Amendment 170, page 4, line 18, at end insert— “D1 Power to move person down list for social housing (1) A respect order may have the effect of moving any application the respondent may have for social housing to the end of the waiting list.” This amendment would mean that a person who receives a respect order would move to the bottom of the waiting list for social housing, if applicable. Amendment 171, page 8, line 2, at end insert— “(4A) A person who commits further offences under this section is liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates' court or a fine (or both); (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).”” This amendment sets out the penalties for repeated breaches of a respect order with a prison sentence of up to 5 years. Amendment 158, in clause 2, page 9, line 35, at end insert— “(4) Prior to issuing any guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must conduct a full consultation exercise.” Amendment 2, in clause 8, page 17, line 23, insert— “(3) To facilitate the ability of the Police, under the provisions of section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002, as amended by subsection (1), to seize e-scooters or e-bikes that have been used in a manner which has caused alarm, distress or annoyance, the Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, issue a consultation on a registration scheme for the sale of electric bikes and electric scooters. (4) The consultation must consider the merits of— (a) requiring sellers to record the details of buyers, and (b) verifying that buyers have purchased insurance.” Amendment 172, in clause 9, page 17, line 34, at end insert— “(c) section 33B (Section 33 offences: clean-up costs).” Amendment 173, page 17, line 34, at end insert— “(1A) Guidance issued about the enforcement of section 33 offences must ensure that, where a person is convicted of a relevant offence, they are liable for the costs incurred through loss or damage resulting from the offence.” This amendment would ensure the Secretary of State’s guidance on fly-tipping makes the person responsible for fly-tipping, rather than the landowner, liable for the costs of cleaning up. Amendment 174, page 18, line 3, at end insert— “(4A) The consultation undertaken by the Secretary of State must include an examination of establishing a penalty point fine to those found convicted of an offence under sections 33 or 87 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.” This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult on establishing a system for those who fly tip or leave litter to receive penalty points on their driving licence. Amendment 175, in clause 25, page 30, line 24, leave out “4” and insert “14”. This amendment would increase the maximum sentence for possession of a weapon with intent to commit unlawful violence from four to 14 years. The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation recommended an increase in his review following the Southport attack. Government amendments 24 to 33. Amendment 176, in clause 35, page 50, line 38, at end insert— “(4) If the offender has previous convictions for an offence under section 14 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025 (assault of a retail worker) or for shoplifting under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968, the court must make a community order against the offender. The community order must include a tag, a ban, or a curfew.” This amendment clause would require the courts to make a community order against repeat offenders of retail crime in order to restrict the offender’s liberty. Government amendment 34. Amendment 4, in clause 38, page 51, line 29, leave out “criminal conduct” and insert “conduct for criminal purposes”. This amendment would expand the remit of the offence created under clause 38 to include exploiting a child into conduct for criminal purposes. Amendment 7, page 51, line 31, leave out paragraph (b). This amendment would remove the requirement that for an offence of child criminal exploitation to be committed, the perpetrator did not reasonably believe that the child was aged 18 or over. Government amendment 35. Amendment 5, in clause 38, page 51, line 37, leave out “criminal conduct” and insert “conduct for criminal purposes”. This amendment would expand the remit of the offence created under clause 38 to include exploiting a child into conduct for criminal purposes. It is consequential on Amendment 4. Amendment 6, page 52, line 2, leave out “or” and insert— “(b) activity that is undertaken in order to facilitate or enable an offence under the law of England and Wales, or.” This amendment would expand the remit of the offence created under clause 38 to include exploiting a child into conduct for criminal purposes. Government amendments 36 to 49. Amendment 8, in clause 53, page 61, line 5, after “(A)” insert ““aged 18 or over”. This amendment would ensure children cannot commit an offence of cuckooing. Government amendments 50 to 66. Government motion to transfer subsection (4) of clause 59. Government amendments 68 and 69. Amendment 177, in clause 64, page 73, line 24, at end insert— “4A) For the purpose of this section— “Child” means a person under the age of 18. “Grooming” means meeting or communicating (in person or online) with a child and or their network (on one or more occasion) with a view to intentionally arrange or facilitate child sexual abuse (in person or online) for an act including themselves or others.” This amendment would introduce a legal definition of grooming. Amendment 178, page 74, line 31, at end insert— “70B Group-based sexual grooming of a child (1) This section applies where— (a) a court is considering the seriousness of a specified child sex offences, (b) the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming, and (c) the offender was aged 18 or over when the offence was committed. (2) The court— (a) must treat the fact that the offence is aggravated by group-based grooming as an aggravated factor, and (b) must state in court that the offence is so aggravated. (3) An offence is “aggravated by group-based grooming” if— (a) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, the offender, who was involved in group-based grooming, or (b) the offence was facilitated by, or involved, a person other than the offender grooming a person under the age of 18 and the offender knew, or could have reasonably been expected to know that said person was participating, or facilitating group-based grooming, or (c) the offender intentionally arranges or facilitates something that the offender intends to do, intends another person to do, or believes that another person will do, in order to participate in group-based grooming. (4) In this section “specified child sex offence” means— (a) an offence within any of subsections (5) to (7), or (b) an inchoate offence in relation to any such offence. (5) An offence is within this subsection if it is— (a) an offence under section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 (taking etc indecent photograph of child), (b) an offence under section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (possession of indecent photograph of child), (c) an offence under any of sections 5 to 8 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape and other offences against children under 13), (d) an offence under any sections 9 to 12 of that Act (other child 25 sex offences), (e) an offence under section 14 of that Act (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence), (f) an offence under any of sections 16 to 19 of that Act (abuse of position of trust), (g) an offence under section 25 or 26 of that Act (familial child sex offences), or (h) an offence under any of sections 47 to 50 of that Act (sexual exploitation of children). (6) An offence is within this subsection if it is— (a) an offence under any of sections 1 to 4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (rape, assault and causing sexual activity without consent), (b) an offence under any of sections 30 to 41 of that Act (sexual offences relating to persons with mental disorder), (c) an offence under any of sections 61 to 63 of that Act (preparatory offences), or (d) an offence under any of sections 66 to 67A of that Act (exposure and voyeurism), and the victim or intended victim was under the age of 18. (7) An offence is within this subsection if it is an offence under section 71 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (sexual activity in a public lavatory) and a person involved in the activity in question was under the age of 18. (8) For the purposes of this section— (a) “group-based grooming” is defined as a group of at least three adults whose purpose or intention is to commit a sexual offence against the same victim or group of victims who are under 18, or could reasonably be expected to be under 18.” This amendment would introduce a specific aggravating factor in sentencing for those who participate in, or facilitate, group-based sexual offending. Amendment 159, in clause 65, page 74, line 39, leave out subsection (2) and insert— “(2) An officer may seek independent judicial authorisation to engage in conduct which is for the purpose of obtaining data from the person. (2A) Authorised conduct may consist of an officer— (a) scanning the information stored on the device using technology approved by the Secretary of State for the purpose of ascertaining whether information stored on an electronic device includes child sexual abuse images, (b) requiring the person to permit the scan, and (c) requiring the person to take such steps as appear necessary to allow the scan to be performed.” This amendment subjects any searches of electronic devices to prior authorisation by a judge. Amendment 179, in clause 66, page 75, line 16, leave out subsection (7). This amendment would keep an individual under the duty to report child abuse despite the belief that someone else may have reported the abuse to the relevant authority. Amendment 3, page 75, line 31, at end insert— “(2) the duty under subsection (1) applies to— (a) any person undertaking work for the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, or any other Christian denomination on either a paid or voluntary basis, (b) any clergy of the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church, or any other Christian denomination, notwithstanding any canonical law regarding the seal of confession, and (c) any person undertaking work on either a paid or voluntary basis, or holding a leadership position, within the Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim or Sikh faiths, or any other religion, faith or belief system.” This amendment would ensure that the duty to report suspected child sex abuse covered everyone working for the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church whether paid or on a voluntary basis, including clergy, as well as all other faith groups. Reports received by clergy through confession would not be exempt from the duty to report. Amendment 10, page 76, line 28, at end insert— “(10) A person who fails to fulfil the duty under subsection (1) commits an offence. (11) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.” This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse that a failure to report a suspected child sex offence should be a criminal offence. Amendment 22, page 77, line 13, at end insert “or (c) an activity involving a “position of trust” as defined in sections 21, 22 and 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.” This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that any person working in a position of trust as defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, should be designated a mandatory reporter. Amendment 11, in clause 68, page 78, line 19, at end insert— “(7) The sixth case is where P witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse, such as pregnancy or a sexually transmitted disease, to an extent that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed. (8) The seventh case is where P witnesses a person (A) behaving in the presence of a child in a way that would cause a reasonable person who engages in the same relevant activity as P to suspect that A may have committed a child sex offence. (9) A failure to comply with the duty under subsection (1) is not an offence where the reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed arises from subsection (7) or subsection (8).” This amendment would implement part of recommendation 13 of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse that there should be a duty to report where a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse. Failure to report in these instances would not attract a criminal sanction. Government amendment 70. Amendment 9, in clause 80, page 84, line 22, at end insert— “(b) if the name change is by deed poll, 7 days prior to submitting an application for change of name (whichever is earlier), or”. This amendment would require relevant sex offenders to notify the police of an intention to change a name 7 days before making an application to do so by deed poll. Amendment 180, page 85, line 26, at end insert— “(11) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Level 4 on the standard scale.” This amendment imposes a fine of up to £2,500 if a registered sex offender does not notify the police when they change their name. Amendment 181, in clause 81, page 86, line 41, at end insert— “(10) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine not exceeding Level 4 on the standard scale.” This amendment imposes a fine of up to £2,500 if a registered sex offender does not notify the police when they are absent from their sole or main residence. Amendment 182, in clause 82, page 88, line 25, at end insert— “(9) If a relevant offender does not comply with the requirements of this section, they shall be liable to a fine at Level 5 of the standard scale.” This amendment imposes an unlimited fine if a relevant registered sex offender does not notify police if they are entering a premises where children are presented. Government amendments 71 to 73. Amendment 19, in clause 94, page 115, line 25, at end insert “, or (c) the person does so being reckless as to whether another person will be injured, aggrieved or annoyed.” This amendment would expand the offence for administering harmful substances, including by spiking, to include those who do so being reckless. Amendment 20, in clause 95, page 116, line 37, at end insert— “(6A) In determining a sentence for an offence committed under this section, the Court is to treat encouragement or assistance of self-harm, when preceded by a history of abuse perpetrated against the victim/other person by D, as an aggravating factor. (6B) The criminal liability for D, when the other person mentioned in subsection 1(a) or 1(b) commits suicide, and where D has subjected that person to physical, psychiatric or psychological harm, is the offence of murder.” This amendment treats encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm when preceded by a history of abuse as an aggravating factor in sentencing with explicit recognition of murder as the criminal liability for perpetrators who cause serious physical, psychiatric, or psychological harm that directly results in, or significantly contributes to, suicide. Government amendments 74 to 76. Amendment 14, in clause 102, page 124, line 16, leave out from subsection (1) to “where” in line 29 and insert— “(1) A person who possesses a SIM farm without good reason or lawful authority commits an offence. For the meaning of ‘SIM farm’, see section 104. (2) In subsection (1) the reference to a good reason for possessing a SIM farm includes in particular possessing it for a purpose connected with— (a) providing broadcasting services, (b) operating or maintaining a public transport service, (c) operating or maintaining an electronic communications network (as defined by section 32 of the Communications Act 2003), (d) tracking freight or monitoring it in any other way, or (e) providing or supporting an internet access service or the conveyance of signals (as defined by section 32 of the Communications Act 2003). This subsection does not limit subsection (1). (3) For the purposes of subsection (1),”. This amendment would mean that a person would only commit an offence if they possessed a SIM farm without a good reason, such as for broadcasting purposes, or lawful authority. Amendment 15, in clause 103, page 124, line 37, leave out from subsection (1) to “prove” on page 125, line 2, and insert— “(1) A person who supplies a SIM farm to another person commits an offence unless subsection (2) applies. (2) It is not an offence for a person to supply a SIM farm under this section provided the person (‘the supplier’) can”. This amendment would mean that a person would only commit an offence if they supplied a SIM farm without taking reasonable steps to confirm that the person receiving the SIM farm would have a good reason, including for broadcasting purposes, or lawful authority to possess the SIM farm. Amendment 16, in clause 104, page 125, line 34, after “interchangeably,” insert “and designed primarily” and line 39, at end insert— “(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), a device is not a SIM farm if it uses five or more SIM cards simultaneously or interchangeably for the purposes of provided data only services or internet access services or conveyance services.” This amendment would amend the meaning of “SIM farm” to cover only devices that are primarily used for calls and text messages and would exclude devices primarily used for data connectivity such as Bonded Cellular Devices used by broadcasters. Amendment 164, page 128, line 5, leave out clause 108. Amendment 184, in clause 108, page 128, line 10, leave out lines 10 and 11 and insert— “(2) No offence is committed under this section where a person wears or otherwise uses the item for—” This amendment would ensure that Clause 108 does not apply to people wearing the hijab, niqab or wearing a mask for health reasons. Amendment 185, page 128, line 25, at end insert— “(6) Within a year of this section coming into force, the Secretary of State must review the equality impact of the provisions of this section, and lay a report of the review before both Houses of Parliament within a month of its publication.” This amendment would require the Secretary of State to review the equality impact of the provisions of Clause 108. Amendment 165, page 128, line 26, leave out clause 109. Amendment 166, page 129, line 28, leave out clause 110. Government amendments 77 to 86. Amendment 161, page 131, line 29, leave out clause 114. This amendment would delete Clause 114 which would place restrictions on the right to protest near places of worship. Amendment 160, in clause 115, page 133, line 12, at end insert— “(4) Prior to imposing conditions under either Section 12 or 14, the senior officer of the Police Force in question must confirm that live facial recognition will not be in use, unless a new code of practice for the use of live facial recognition surveillance in public spaces in England and Wales had previously been presented to, and approved by, both Houses of Parliament.” Amendment 21, in clause 120, page 140, line 37, at end insert— “(8) The authorised persons listed in Clause 71A may not use the information referenced in subsection (1) for the purposes of biometric searches using facial recognition technology” Government amendment 87. Amendment 162, page 148, line 1, leave out clause 126. Amendment 163, in clause 126, page 148, line 13, at end insert— “(3) Within a year of this section coming into force, the Secretary of State must review the human rights and equality impact of the provisions of this section, and lay the report of the review before both Houses of Parliament within a month of its publication.” Government amendments 88 to 91. Amendment 183, in clause 141, page 168, line 5, leave out subsection (7) and insert— “(7A) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months. (7B) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat. (7C) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism. (7D) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent. (7E) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months. (7F) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.” This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist. Government amendments 92 to 101, and 134 to 151. Amendment 23, in schedule 9, page 229, line 15, at end insert— “(11) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for summary offences) does not apply to an offence under subsection (1).” This amendment allows the offence of taking or recording intimate photograph or film to be tried by a Magistrates’ Court at any time by disapplying the six-month time limit in s.127 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980. Government amendments 152 to 156 and 102 to 133.

Before I speak to the key Government amendments tabled on Report, I quickly remind the House why the Government have brought forward this Bill. It is a vital part of our safer streets mission, and contains a host of measures to tackle antisocial behaviour, retail and knife crime, and the epidemic of violence against women and girls, and to restore confidence and trust in policing. It is worth reminding the House that on the previous Government’s watch, shoplifting soared to record-high levels; there was a 70% increase in their last two years in office alone. Street theft was rapidly rising; it was up by almost 60% in just the last two years. Antisocial behaviour was rampant in our towns and cities, with 1 million incidents last year. In the year to June 2024, the crime survey of England and Wales estimated that 25% of people perceived antisocial behaviour to be a fairly or very big problem in their area. That is the highest level since at least March 2013, over a decade ago. Violence and abuse against shop workers was at epidemic levels. The British Retail Consortium said that incidents of violence and abuse against shop workers stood at more than 2,000 a day in ’23-24—up by almost 50% on the previous year, and nearly treble the pre-pandemic figures from 2019 to 2020.

I have been down to the local Co-op in Chesterfield and met one of the shop workers, who faced a terrible attack. Luckily, the people were jailed, but in so many cases there is a sense that shoplifters are able to walk out the door without anything being done. The traumatic effect that this has on shop workers has to be seen to be believed. Would the Minister say that the message the Bill sends to anyone who wants to walk out of a store after doing these things is that the police will come after them, and they will end up going to jail?

My hon. Friend puts that very well. Attacks on retail workers are totally unacceptable. The Co-op and the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers have done important work to highlight this issue and ensure that measures on it will be enacted through the Bill. The previous Conservative Government wrote off a number of the crime types I have just talked about as low-level crime, and allowed them to spiral out of control. At the same time, they decimated local neighbourhood policing teams, causing untold damage to our communities, as we all know.

On neighbourhood policing, I welcome the fact that we have some extra capacity coming into the west midlands, but I have not yet had clarification on whether the money that is coming to the west midlands will cover all the extra national insurance costs. The Labour police and crime commissioner is already saying that his budgets are underfunded under the Labour Government.

The right hon. Lady and I have had this discussion before, and I have made it very clear that the national insurance increases have been funded through the money that is available to police forces this year. That is in stark contrast to the situation under the previous Government, who did not make a proper allocation for the police pay award for last year. This Government had to supplement it when we came into power in July.

Will the Minister join me in celebrating the five new neighbourhood police officers we have in Harlow? I cannot take all the credit for them, because I only taught one of them maths.

Absolutely. I think we will have 3,000 additional neighbourhood police officers by the end of March next year, as part of our commitment to putting in place 13,000 neighbourhood police officers by the end of this Parliament. It has been clear throughout the Bill’s passage that it commands broad support across the House. I hope that over the next two days, right hon. and hon. Members from all parts of the House can come together and recognise the shared goals that the Bill fulfils. The Government are tireless in our drive to make our streets safer.

The right hon. Lady is setting out very clearly what the Bill is intended to be, and has rightly pointed to the cross-party support for the main thrust of it. Does she agree that that unanimity of purpose is put in grave jeopardy by the Christmas tree-ing of significant amendments relating to abortion? I know that she had a personal interest in this issue in opposition. These very dramatic changes to abortion law require a much fuller debate in this place than can be had on an amendment to a Bill that has the purpose that the right hon. Lady has set out. The Government never intended the Bill to be a Christmas tree Bill, but it has become one. The House runs the risk of fracturing its unanimity of purpose if those amendments are pressed to a vote and become part of the legislation.

I do not want to try Mr Speaker’s patience, but time has been allocated for that debate this afternoon. The hon. Gentleman is a very experienced Member of this House, and he will know that crime Bills often become Christmas tree Bills due to their very nature, as Members wish to table amendments on all sorts of areas of the criminal law. We have the Bill that is before us, and the amendments that have been tabled. The Government and, I hope, other parties in this House are committed to making our streets safer. Where there are gaps in the law, we will not hesitate to address them, and the Government amendments that have been tabled are very much directed to our achieving that end. I will start by going through them. New clause 54 will aid legal certainty and the consistent application of the new offence of child criminal exploitation. The new clause makes clearer to the courts that the offence is focused on the criminal intentions of the adult only, rather than those of the child. It puts beyond doubt that the offence captures circumstances in which the child is used as an entirely innocent agent and cannot satisfy all the elements of the intended criminal conduct themselves. The new clause also puts beyond doubt that the offence is capable of capturing earlier-stage grooming; as such, it addresses the concerns raised in amendments 4 to 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry). It will also cover perpetrators who arrange for another person to exploit a child on their behalf. At the request of the Scottish Government and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, we are also extending the offence of child criminal exploitation to Scotland and Northern Ireland. New clause 56 criminalises the highly exploitative and harmful practice of coerced internal concealment. It is commonly associated with county lines drug dealing, and involves a child or adult being intentionally caused to conceal drugs or other objects—such as weapons or SIM cards—inside their body to facilitate criminality. The new clause creates two new offences. The first targets perpetrators who intentionally cause a child to conceal a specified item inside their body. The second applies in cases where an adult victim is caused to internally conceal a specified item through compulsion, coercion or deception, or through controlling or manipulative behaviour, and where the perpetrator intends, knows or reasonably suspects that the item has been or may be used in connection with criminal conduct. These new offences will carry a maximum penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment.

13:15:00

New clause 57, which would replace clause 52, would enable the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance to the police and others in respect of the exercise of their functions relating to the new coerced internal concealment and cuckooing offences, as well as the child criminal exploitation offence and prevention orders. New clause 58 confers a similar power on the Department of Justice to issue statutory guidance to the chief constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland in relation to the exercise of its functions relating to the CCE and cuckooing offences.

Clause 53 creates an offence of controlling another person’s home for criminal purposes, known as cuckooing. The offence applies UK-wide. Clause 56 then adds the cuckooing offence to the list of lifestyle offences in schedule 4 to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which applies to Scotland. Parallel changes are made to schedules 2 and 5 of POCA, which apply to England and Wales and to Northern Ireland respectively. At the request of the Scottish Government, amendment 57 to clause 56 removes the amendment to schedule 4 to POCA.

Clause 57 creates a new offence that criminalises the making, possession, adaptation or supply of digital files or models designed to create child sexual abuse material. The offence applies to England and Wales. Amendments 59 to 68 to clause 57 better provide for protection from liability for the offence for the provider of an internet service who acts as a mere conduit for, or who caches or unknowingly hosts, a CSA image generator provided by a user. They extend liability to a natural person who is responsible for a body corporate, partnership or unincorporated association committing the offence. They remove the definition of a CSA image generator that is a service; on reflection, we have concluded that a CSA image generator cannot be used as a service, as an offender would require possession of the generator to use it. Finally, they amend the scope of the power to make regulations governing the testing of technology that might amount to a CSA image generator, to ensure the power is correctly targeted.

Clause 59 provides for an offence of administering or moderating of electronic services with the intention of facilitating child sexual exploitation and abuse. The term “child sexual exploitation and abuse” is in part defined by reference to a list of offences in schedule 7 to the Bill. New subsections (6) to (8) of clause 59 add a regulation-making power, subject to the draft affirmative procedure. This is to ensure that the list of offences can be kept up to date, particularly when new offences are created by Acts of the Scottish Parliament or of the Northern Ireland Assembly. In addition, amendments to schedule 7 add further Scottish offences to the list of child sexual exploitation and abuse offences specified for the purposes of clause 59. These amendments apply UK-wide.

Clause 76 confers powers on the Secretary of State to issue statutory guidance about the disclosure of information by the police for the purpose of preventing sex offences. Chief officers of police are required to have regard to that guidance. This provision applies to police forces in England and Wales, to the British Transport police—which operates GB-wide—and to the Ministry of Defence police, which operates UK-wide. At the request of the Scottish Government, amendment 70 limits the clause’s application to the BTP to England and Wales only.

Alongside the new offences in this Bill to tackle intimate image abuse, the Data (Use and Access) Bill includes an offence of requesting the creation of a purported intimate image without consent or reasonable belief in consent, including provisions relating to the powers of the civilian courts to deprive offenders of images and other property. To ensure consistency in the service justice system, an amendment is required to the Armed Forces Act 2006 to give the same deprivation order powers to service courts. Amendments to the Act require consent from British overseas territories and Crown dependencies—to which the Act applies—which it was not possible to gain in time during the passage of the Data (Use and Access) Bill. We therefore propose to make the amendment in this Bill instead.

The Bill was amended in Committee to provide for offences relating to dangerous and careless cycling. Amendments 74 to 76 make various consequential amendments to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 and other enactments. Clause 120 clarifies the existing power of the Secretary of State to give access to driver licensing information held by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency to various policing and law enforcement bodies, for policing and law enforcement purposes. Amendment 87 makes employees of the economic crime and confiscation unit in Jersey authorised persons for the purpose of these provisions.

The Bill applies to England and Wales, but it is important for knowledge and information to be shared with the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Scottish Parliament, for example, so that they are aware of what is happening here—and people may move from England or Wales to Northern Ireland or Scotland. We should ensure that information can be exchanged between police forces and other authorities here and those in the devolved Administrations: if we want security and safety for all our people, that really needs to happen.

I entirely agree with the hon. Gentleman about the importance of sharing information, good practice and policy development, and I hope that that will go from strength to strength under this Government. Let me now say something about abusive behaviour towards emergency workers. As we all know, they put themselves in harm’s way to protect us every day, and they deserve robust protection in return. That includes protection from racial and religious abuse, which is not only deeply harmful but undermines the values of decency, respect and public service. Unlike most people, emergency workers cannot walk away from abuse. When they enter private homes they do so not by choice, but because it is their duty to do so. Whether they are responding to a 999 call, providing urgent medical care or attending an incident involving risk to life or property, they are legally and professionally required to remain and act. They cannot remove themselves from the situation simply because they are being abused. The law must recognise that and ensure that they are properly protected in every setting, including private dwellings. At present, there is a clear and pressing gap in the law. Although existing legislation provides important protections against racially and religiously aggravated offences in public places, they do not extend to abuse that occurs inside private homes. Policing stakeholders have highlighted that gap, and have emphasised the need for stronger safeguards for emergency workers. New clauses 60 to 62 therefore introduce specific offences relating to the use of racially or religiously threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour towards emergency workers acting in the course of their duties. Crucially, that includes incidents that take place within a private dwelling. This is a focused and proportionate measure. It does not interfere with freedom of expression; rather, it reinforces the principle that emergency workers should be able to carry out their critical roles without being subjected to hate or hostility because of their race or religion. I hope that the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Monica Harding) will agree that these Government new clauses achieve the underlying purpose of her new clause 120. Clause 112 strengthens the protection afforded to nationally significant war memorials by providing for a new offence of climbing on specified war memorials without lawful excuse. We believe that the same protection should now be extended to other nationally significant memorials, starting with the statue of Sir Winston Churchill in Parliament Square. The Churchill statue, which is a prominent national symbol of Britain’s wartime leadership, has repeatedly been targeted and climbed on during protests in recent years. Including it within the new offence ensures the consistent protection of one of the foremost culturally significant monuments linked to national remembrance. Amendments 77 to 84 therefore expand the scope of the new offence to include other memorials of national significance, as well as adding the statue of Sir Winston Churchill to the list of specified memorials set out in schedule 12. New clauses 63 to 70 and 81 and new schedule 1 deal with remotely stored electronic data, clarifying powers for law enforcement agencies to access information stored online and extract evidence or intelligence for criminal investigations, to protect the public from the risk of terrorism and safeguard our national security. The powers will apply when law enforcement agencies have lawfully seized an electronic device, as part of national security examination at UK borders or when a person provides his or her agreement. New clause 70 also amends the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to permit the interception of access-related communications, such as two-factor authentication codes. Those reforms are necessary to ensure that our law enforcement agencies have clear powers to access vital evidence and intelligence when investigating serious offences, including child sexual abuse, fraud, terrorism and threats to national security, at a time when more and more information is stored remotely in the cloud rather than on people’s electronic devices. Let me now turn to new clauses 72 to 79 and new schedule 3. A crucial aspect of our safer streets mission is to rebuild public confidence in policing. Among other things, that means ensuring that only those who are fit to serve can hold the office of constable or otherwise work in our law enforcement agencies. As well as strengthening the vetting regime for police officers, the new clauses and the new schedule require the National Crime Agency, the British Transport police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and the Ministry of Defence police to establish barred persons lists and advisory lists, similar to those created in 2017 for territorial police forces in England and Wales The chief officers of these forces, and others, will be under a legal duty to consult the lists before employing or appointing an individual to prevent those dismissed from policing from rejoining another force in the future. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has announced a new police efficiency and collaboration programme to cut waste and bureaucracy. It is important that undertakings providing services to the police are delivering the most benefit, and unlocking the efficiency savings needed by forces to achieve better outcomes for the public. Announcing the Government’s intention to consult on establishing a new national centre of policing, the Home Secretary said that she envisaged the body’s being responsible for existing shared services, national IT capabilities, and force-hosted national capabilities. It is right that the Home Secretary has the powers to ensure that those capabilities are fully aligned with the priorities of the police efficiency and collaboration programme, and that they are adequately prepared for transition into the new body with no disruption to service delivery. New clause 80 ensures that the Home Secretary has the power to direct undertakings providing critical services and capabilities to policing to take appropriate action to strengthen their service delivery to better deliver our efficiencies programme, and, ahead of any future legislation to establish the national centre for policing, to remove any barriers to the transition of services into the new centre. We tabled new clauses 52 and 53 against the backdrop of the Government’s commitment to bring into force the repeal of the outdated Vagrancy Act 1824, which criminalises begging and many forms of rough sleeping. It is generally the case that when begging reaches the threshold of antisocial behaviour there are already sufficient powers available to the police and others to address that, but we have identified two gaps in the law that will arise from the repeal of the 1824 Act, which the new clauses would address. New clause 52 makes it a criminal offence for any person to arrange or facilitate another person’s begging for gain. Organised begging, which is often facilitated by criminal gangs, exploits vulnerable individuals and can undermine the public’s sense of safety. This provision makes it unlawful for anyone to organise others to beg—for example, by driving people to places for them to beg. That will allow the police to crack down on the organised crime gangs that use this exploitative technique to obtain cash for illicit activity.

The Minister is being very generous in taking interventions. Having worked for a homelessness charity, I have seen this issue at first hand. Does she agree that when there is an organisation behind the begging, the person forced to beg is actually being exploited, so these laws will help to tackle a form of exploitation?

My hon. Friend makes that point very well. These individuals are exploited by serious and organised criminal gangs, and we are going to clamp down on those gangs’ activity. New clause 53 re-enacts the offence of being on enclosed premises for an unlawful purpose. It will make it an offence for a person to trespass on any premises—that covers any building, part of a building or enclosed area—with the intention of committing an offence. Without this replacement offence, the police would be able to rely only on the trespassing provisions in the Theft Act 1968, which covers trespassing only in relation to burglary. It is important that the police have the powers to tackle all cases of trespassing with intent to commit an offence, and new clause 53 will ensure that.

13:30:00

New clause 82 amends the Extradition Act 2003. Under that Act, the UK can accept extradition requests where the requested person has already been convicted in the requesting state. When considering these cases, if the requested person was convicted in their absence and a UK judge determines that they did not deliberately absent themselves from their trial, a UK judge is bound by the 2003 Act to determine whether the individual is entitled to a retrial in the requesting state. First, the new clause aligns the provisions of the 2003 Act with the trade and co-operation agreement, which governs the right to a retrial in the context of UK-EU extradition co-operation. This will improve legal certainty and remove opportunities for confusion in the extradition system.

Secondly, the new clause responds to a recent Supreme Court ruling to the effect that the current drafting of the 2003 Act should be read as requiring a guaranteed retrial in the requesting state. The 2003 Act had previously been interpreted as a right to apply for a retrial, subject to the domestic laws of the requesting state. Several states cannot offer assurances to meet the conditions imposed by the judgment, and there is therefore a public safety risk of individuals being discharged if the new interpretation of the 2003 Act is left to stand. New clause 82 therefore reinstates the previous interpretation, which is that only the right to apply for a retrial is required to permit extradition in a case where the person was absent from the trial.

I want to comment on a few other Government amendments. First, in Committee, the Government added to the Bill provisions that are now clauses 29 to 33, which introduce a two-step verification process for the sale and delivery of knives and crossbows purchased online. Those provisions apply where a knife, crossbow or part of a crossbow is delivered to a residential address.

I congratulate the Minister both on the Bill as it stands and on today’s amendments. Near my constituency, there has been a troubling spate of recent incidents in which younger people, in some cases encouraged by older men, are filming themselves catapulting and injuring wildlife, and placing that footage on TikTok. The footage is deeply unpleasant, and I do not recommend anybody looks at it. Would the Minister agree that that behaviour goes well beyond antisocial behaviour, and may at some point require a ban perhaps on the sale of catapults, but certainly on their use for that purpose?

Sadly, that is not the first time I have heard about such appalling behaviour of attacking and injuring animals using catapults. I will certainly be raising that with my counterparts in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to see what more we can do. I am aware that this issue needs to be looked at, and I thank my hon. Friend for raising it. Amendments 24 to 33 will require operators of collection points for items such as knives and crossbows to carry out the same enhanced age verification checks before handing over knives to the buyer, or in the case of crossbows and crossbow parts, to the buyer or even the hirer of the item. Clause 30 imposes similar requirements on couriers. Clause 128 introduces costs and expenses protections for law enforcement agencies in civil recovery proceedings, under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, in the High Court or the Court of Session in Scotland. As currently drafted, it is not clear how the cost protection measure applies to pre-existing cases, particularly where cases have started before the provision comes into force but costs are incurred after the provision comes into force. As a result, it may be difficult and costly to determine which costs are covered. Amendment 89 provides that cost protections apply to any case where proceedings start after the measure comes into force. Schedule 15 to the Bill introduces reforms to the confiscation regime in England and Wales in respect of the proceeds of crime. Among other things, the reforms make provision for the provisional discharge of confiscation orders made under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, allowing outstanding confiscation orders to be placed in abeyance when there is no realistic prospect of recovery in the immediate term and all enforcement steps have been exhausted. Amendments to schedule 15 extend the provisional discharge measures to confiscation orders made under legislation predating the 2002 Act. Chapter 1 of part 14 provides for youth diversion orders, which are a new counter-terrorism risk management tool for young people who, on the balance of probabilities, the court assesses to have committed a terrorism offence or an offence with a terrorism connection, or to have engaged in conduct likely to facilitate a terrorism offence, and where the court considers it necessary to make the order for the purposes of protecting the public from terrorism or serious harm. The amendments to clause 139 make a change to the scope of YDOs to ensure that applications can be made for individuals up to and including 21-year-olds. Currently, a court may make a YDO in respect of a person aged 10 to 21, but exclusive of 21-year-olds. Following further engagement with operational partners on the types of cases that could benefit from a YDO, we have concluded that this change would increase the operational utility of the YDO and ensure that it can be considered as an intervention in a wider variety of cases involving young people. Clause 141(2) enables a YDO to include prohibitions or requirements relating to the respondent’s possession or use of electronic devices. The amendments to this clause set out a non-exhaustive list of some of the most common or intrusive requirements that may be imposed to support the police’s ability to monitor compliance with restrictions on electronic devices, providing a clearer statutory footing for imposing such requirements. For example, it would allow the court to impose a requirement on someone subject to a YDO to enable the police to access their device for the purposes of checking compliance with restrictions such as accessing specific websites or applications. It would allow the police to identify harmful online activity at an earlier stage and intervene before it escalates. As with other YDO measures, the court would need to assess that any monitoring requirements are necessary and proportionate for the purposes of protecting the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm. Technical amendments are also required to clauses 142 and 150 relating respectively to the definition of “police detention” for Scotland and Northern Ireland and to the appeals process in Northern Ireland. The amendments will adapt the relevant provisions for the purposes of the law in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The amendments to clause 151 provide that, where a person ceases to have a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with notification requirements but continues to fail to comply, they commit an offence. The other Government amendments in this group, which make necessary refinements to existing provisions in the Bill, were detailed in the letter that I sent last week to the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers), a copy of which has been placed in the Library. With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will therefore seek to respond to the non-Government amendments in this group when winding up. For now, I commend the Government amendments to the House.

I call the shadow Minister

I would like to express my appreciation to all those who have worked on the legislation to develop and shape the policies, whether they be the majority developed under the previous Conservative Government or members of the Bill team, who I am sure have provided helpful assistance to Ministers. As I am sure we will hear today, some of the measures in the Bill are the result of amazing people who have suffered the worst experiences, but who have worked to ensure that others do not have to suffer them in future. In addition, considering the context of the legislation, it is right to pay tribute to the excellent work of police officers across the country. Week in, week out, those serving in our police forces put themselves in harm’s way to keep our streets safe. Those who serve and place themselves in danger cannot be thanked enough. Many people ask themselves whether they would have the bravery to stand up and intervene. Officers across the country do so on a daily basis. Thanks to the efforts of the previous Conservative Government, the police force numbered over 149,000 officers in 2024, with 149,769 recorded in March 2024. This was the highest number of officers, on both full-time equivalent and headcount basis, since comparable records began in March 2003.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for setting out those policing numbers. Does he share my concern about the additional police officers we are getting? When I look at our figures for the west midlands, the boost is coming from deployments. I worry about where they are actually coming from and just how much of an increase we are really going to see.

I wholeheartedly agree. There are a lot of concerns about the neighbourhood policing guarantee and where the resource comes from: whether it is through specials or volunteers—of course, we want to see more of them—or redeployments. When people ring 999, they want to know that they are going to get the response they expected. They do not want to see that depleted to move officers from one bucket to the next. That has real consequences. The biggest hit to our police force numbers at the moment will be the national insurance rise—the tax that is taxing police off our streets.

The shadow Minister and I probably disagree on many things, but he is giving a very well-presented speech. Does he not recognise, however, that there may well be an increase in police numbers, but we have seen a decrease in police staff? In Essex, we lost over 400 police staff during the Conservatives’ period in office and a number of police officers have been redeployed to roles that could have been done by police staff.

I am glad to see all those police officers getting proper training through the hon. Gentleman’s maths teaching. I am glad he has new recruits in his part of the world, but people are concerned about the frontline numbers. The number of police on our streets is a huge concern to the public. The chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that the funding will not match the Government’s ambitions and falls short of maintaining the existing workforce. And just listen to the Police Federation, which states quite simply: “This Chancellor hasn’t listened to police officers.” Can the Minister confirm that by the end of this Parliament there will be more police officers than were serving in March 2024?

The shadow Minister will know from our time in Committee that I am an ex-police officer, and I thank him for his words about police officers serving the country. Does he agree that the Bill will give the police more confidence that they will have the right powers, so that they are able to make a difference?

I welcome lots of the measures in the Bill and I hope they will really help our police officers to keep our streets safe, but the police need the resource, funding and support to be out there enforcing the legislation we are putting forward today. I thank the hon. Member for his service—on the Committee as well as in the police force. The House will debate a number of amendments and new clauses today and tomorrow. The Opposition amendments are sensible and aim to improve the Bill, which our constituents would want us to get behind. Amendment 175 relates to the Government’s objective, which we all want to achieve, of reducing knife crime by 50%. We know the untold damage knife crime causes to victims, families and communities across the country. This legislation introduces a new offence: possession of an article with a blade or point, or an offensive weapon, with the intent to use unlawful violence. Let me put that in context. Imagine you are at home in your garden enjoying a nice peaceful afternoon with the kids. Suddenly, our hard-working police officers swoop in on a man walking down the street—a man carrying a knife or offensive weapon who is then proven beyond all reasonable doubt to have planned to use it for violence. He could have been coming for your neighbours, your friends or your family. This is a man who clearly needs to be locked up. Would you want to see him put away for four years or 14 years? In fact, with the sentencing review, whatever he is sentenced to, he is likely to serve significantly less. Who knows how much of that four years he would serve before he could walk back down your street?

13:45:00

Do not just take it from me that this is a more appropriate and fitting sentence. Take it from the professional the Government put in charge of assessing legislation relating to terrorism. Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has looked at the horrific incident in Southport. He supports the creation of this offence, but has said that the penalty appears to be too low. Knife crime has devastating consequences for our communities. Increasing the penalty to 14 years would send a clear and unequivocal message that such dangerous behaviour will not be tolerated, and that those who pose a risk to the public will face the most severe consequences. I urge Members to support this amendment.

On fly-tipping, people across the country are rightly furious to see tossers and fly-tippers dumping waste on our streets and green spaces. They are all too aware of the impact on our environment, wildlife and the ability of others to enjoy communal areas. Amendment 174 recognises the scourge that littering and fly-tipping represent across the country. According to figures compiled by DEFRA for 2023-24, local authorities in England dealt with 1.15 million incidents of fly-tipping, and are estimated to spend more than £11 million of taxpayers’ money cleaning it up each year. That money would be better spent on frontline services.

According to Keep Britain Tidy, littering and fly-tipping cost the country £1 million a year.[Official Report, 17 June 2025; Vol. 769, c. 206-207.] Does my hon. Friend agree that that is money that could go to frontline services, so it is about time we took more stringent measures to change behaviour, along with some good enforcement?

I could not agree more. A small minority wreak havoc on our countryside and our streets, and create absolute chaos. That is what this amendment is about: tougher sanctions to divert people from doing such mindless things. The money wasted every year on cleaning up would be better spent on frontline services, such as filling potholes or providing community services. Instead, it is used to clean up after those who have no respect for others or for our natural environment. The most common location for fly-tipping is on pavements and roads, which accounted for 37% of all incidents in 2023-24. The majority—59%—involved small van-sized dumps, or an amount of waste that could easily fit in a car boot. It is therefore logical to conclude that a significant majority of fly-tipping incidents stem from vehicles. Using a vehicle to dump a van full or a boot full of waste should come with real consequences, and the people who do it should feel that in their ability to use their vehicle, as well as through financial penalties. The previous Government increased fines for fly-tipping from £400 to £1,000, but we can go further to deter people from dumping on the doorsteps of others. The amendment would require the Home Secretary to consult on the establishment of a scheme of driving licence penalty points for fly-tippers and those who toss rubbish from vehicles. In Committee, the Minister pledged to engage with DEFRA on this issue. By passing this amendment, we could go further by committing to undertake a consultation to develop a workable and effective scheme. For the benefit of all those who want to be able to enjoy their green spaces, and for our environment and the wildlife that suffers at the hands of fly-tippers and those who toss waste, I urge Members to support the amendment. Let us send a message to the mindless minority who wreak havoc on our green spaces. Before concluding my remarks, I would like to draw the attention of the House to amendments 167, 168, 170 and 171, which, among other Conservative proposals, aim to strengthen respect orders. We have heard the Minister speak both in Committee and in the Chamber of the role these orders can play in tackling antisocial behaviour. The success of the policy will be contingent on its effective enforcement by the police, and on perpetrators being aware that they will face tough sanctions if they breach the orders. I hope the Government will continue to consider these amendments. I draw Members’ attention to these amendments as they are indicative of the constructive approach Conservative Members have taken towards improving the Bill in ways that we believe would benefit the legislation as a whole. I hope that Members across the House will give serious consideration to our amendments and new clauses over the coming two days. The Minister and I have spent more time together than she probably ever envisaged, and I believe we can agree that the Bill contains some sensible and proportionate measures: greater protections for our retail workers, efforts to tackle antisocial behaviour, and more measures to tackle vile and horrendous child exploitation. However, we can work together to go further, and that is what our Opposition amendments seek to do.

I begin by once again welcoming the Bill. It will deliver so much for my constituents by protecting people from crime and enabling tough action on antisocial behaviour, including in areas that have too long been labelled “low level” and ignored, such as the illegal off-road bikes that constituents so often raise with me. The Bill will introduce mandatory reporting for child sexual abuse—one of the key recommendations of the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, or IICSA. This is a long-overdue measure, which has long been called for by our Labour Home Secretary and Prime Minister personally. However, I remain concerned that the Government are not going far enough on the issue of mandatory reporting. I have therefore tabled three amendments to the Bill on that subject—amendments 10, 11 and 22—on which I will focus my speech today. Amendments 10, 11 and 22 are not intended to change Government policy—quite the opposite. They are intended to deliver the Government’s stated policy to implement the IICSA recommendations relevant to the Home Office in full. The Home Secretary stated in January that that was the Government’s intention, and reaffirmed that just yesterday, responding with a firm “yes” to my question after her statement on whether it remained Government policy to implement the recommendations in full. However, there are three significant gaps in our plans to implement recommendation 13 on mandatory reporting, where the Bill does not deliver what IICSA recommended. With these gaps, I am concerned that the duty to report will be ineffective in some of the settings where it is most needed. My concern applies to religious groups in particular. I will use the example of the Jehovah’s Witnesses—the religious group I grew up in—to illustrate how and why. Jehovah’s Witnesses have a deep cultural distrust of secular authorities, which, as happens in a lot of religious groups, leads to a culture of dealing with everything internally, including child sexual abuse, and reporting nothing to the police. Their internal processes for doing so are atrocious. Jehovah’s Witnesses have something called the “two witness rule”, which means that no action is taken on any report of wrongdoing unless there are two witnesses to it. There are never two witnesses to child sexual abuse. I give that context to highlight why the mandatory duty to report must be absolutely watertight, as IICSA recommended, to prevent people in the leadership of organisations like the Jehovah’s Witnesses from avoiding it. I will cover the three gaps in turn. First, there are no criminal sanctions if someone does not comply with the duty. I understand that the Government are proposing professional sanctions, such as a referral to the Disclosure and Barring Service and to relevant professional regulators, but that is not set out in the Bill and would apply to only a fraction of people under the duty. It would not, for example, do much in religious settings, where so many of the failings are happening, and where the duty would, if constructed properly, help immensely to protect children. IICSA was clear that failure to comply should be a criminal offence, and amendment 10 would make that the case. It proposes a fine as the appropriate sanction, which is in line with best practice overseas. Many other countries—France, Australia, parts of Canada and so on—have introduced mandatory reporting, and many have done so with criminal sanctions of this kind. While the Government will likely say that criminal sanctions could have a chilling effect that would stop people going into professions that work with children, the international evidence clearly shows that this does not happen—in the Australian state of Victoria, for instance. Professor Ben Mathews has done extensive research on mandatory reporting laws and their efficacy, which I thoroughly encourage the Minister to ask officials to examine. The second gap relates to those who come under the duty to report. IICSA recommended that the duty should apply first to anyone working in regulated activities with children under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, and the Bill uses that criterion—tick. However, IICSA also recommended that it should apply to anyone in a position of trust over a child, as defined by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which the Bill does not include. Amendment 22 would make it so. The Bill sets out a list of relevant activities in part 2 of schedule 8, which replicates about 90% of what is in the Sexual Offences Act. However, that missing 10% is critical; for a start, it includes sports coaches and teachers, which schedule 8 does not. Going back to my earlier example, section 22A of the Sexual Offences Act includes a very effective definition of religious leaders. Schedule 8 does include a definition of religious leaders, but requires such people to have “regular unsupervised contact” with children to be subject to the duty. That qualification will allow virtually any religious leader—be they paid clergy or a volunteer elder, like in the Jehovah’s Witnesses—to escape the duty, as very few have regular unsupervised contact with children, despite being in a significant position of power and influence. I personally know at least one person who was sexually abused as a child in that organisation. When they went to speak to religious leaders about it, in the presence of their parents—not unsupervised—they were advised that going to the police would mean bringing reproach on God’s name. So no report was made, by either the victim or their family, or by those religious elders. That is commonplace. Under the Bill as drafted, there is no sanction for that. Those elders are not mandated reporters; even if they were, the proposed offence in clause 73 of stopping someone else from making a report—an offence I very much welcome, for the record—applies only to other mandated reporters. If, therefore, someone pressures a victim or their parents not to make a report, that will not be illegal. That offence needs to be broadened, too. The National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children is calling for the Government to consider a broader offence of concealing child sexual abuse, to which I urge the Government to give serious consideration. I will give more detail on that later, if there is time.

The hon. Gentleman is making very important points, in particular on the Jehovah’s Witnesses cult. One of the methods Jehovah’s Witnesses use to ensure that issues like this do not escape from the organisation is threatening individuals with the act of disfellowshipping—being cut off from all communication with their own family. I wonder whether he will go a little further in recognising that, too.

I thank the hon. Member for that intervention. I am very pleased that other hon. Members in the House are aware of that issue, which is something I am trying to do some work on separately. It is certainly relevant to what I am discussing. To give the House a little more context on that, through the act of disfellowshipping, when the organisation decides that someone has committed a serious sin, it can essentially tell all their family and friends to cut them off permanently; the same applies if an individual chooses simply to leave the religion. Disfellowshipping is very rarely applied to perpetrators of crimes, and is more often applied to the victims who report them. It is an enormous problem that has to be dealt with, and I look forward to engaging with the hon. Member further on that. As I highlighted on Second Reading, the Australian royal commission that investigated the organisation’s handling of abuse cases found that while allegations had been documented by religious elders against 1,006 individuals in Australia alone, not a single one was reported to the police. We must tighten up this definition and ensure that it includes religious leaders. The Government could do so by amending the definition in paragraph 17 of part 2 of schedule 8, and by adding a further item to the list in relation to sports professionals to deal with that point as well. However, the much neater and stronger legislative solution would be to just do what IICSA said, and refer to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the definition therein, which amendment 22 seeks to do. The third problem relates to what triggers the duty to report. IICSA recommended that the duty should apply in three cases: first, when a mandated reporter is told by a child or perpetrator that abuse has taken place; secondly, when they see it happening; and thirdly, when they observe recognised indicators of child sexual abuse, which can range from things like a child being pregnant or having a sexually transmitted infection to other, more subjective indicators. Our Bill scores two out of three, as it does not include the third point on recognised indicators, which are also referred to as reasonable suspicion. Overwhelmingly, children do not report abuse that is being done to them at the time that the abuse is happening. Those who do report tend to do so years after it happens, when it is far too late to protect them and far too late, in many cases, to catch the perpetrator and stop them harming other children. The Australian royal commission in 2015 found that the average time for someone to disclose child sexual abuse was 22 years after it happened, so including reasonable suspicion is critical, and that is what my amendment 11 would do. Given the potentially subjective judgments needed in that case, amendment 11 would exempt the case of recognised indicators from criminal sanctions for non-compliance, which is also what IICSA recommended.

14:00:00

The Government may be of the view that including recognised indicators, and making my proposed changes to include positions of trust, would lead to a flood of additional reports that will overwhelm the system with false leads that prevent real cases of abuse being tackled. Those are very reasonable concerns, and I hear them, but, again, we must look to the international examples where this just has not taken place. In Australia there was an increase in cases after it brought in robust mandatory reporting laws, but the system adapted and coped, with existing screening processes to remove false reports working more effectively. Notably, the number of substantiated reports doubled, meaning that twice as many sexually abused children were being identified. This is making a huge difference.

We do not even have to go international to see that fears about floods of reports just do not materialise; we just have to go to Northern Ireland, which already has mandatory reporting for all adults—with criminal sanctions for non-compliance—as part of its broader legislation requiring the reporting of arrestable offences to police, and there is no overwhelming flood of reports over there.

I urge the Government to take these problems seriously. As I said at the outset, the Home Secretary has reaffirmed several times that Government policy is to implement IICSA’s recommendations, which fall under the remit of the Home Office, in full. I know that the Government will need to reflect on these issues in detail, so I will not press these amendments to a vote today, should the Minister not accept them, but I am aware that colleagues in the other place will press similar amendments. A number of hon. Members have signed them—amendment 22 has 12 signatures, for example—so there is a significant fear that, without these changes, the proposed mandatory reporting duty is too weak. We all want to get this right, but the impact assessment on a very similar version in the previous Government’s Criminal Justice Bill was damning, predicting only a very small increase in the number of reports.

I will, if I may, conclude very briefly by returning to what I mentioned earlier about the potential offence of concealing child sexual abuse. I looked at how to include this as an amendment to broaden discussion, but it was very difficult to phrase in the correct way. Essentially, the NSPCC has highlighted a number of cases where, it argues, the Bill does not go far enough to cover the multitude of ways in which reported abuse could be concealed and people who intentionally conceal this crime could be allowed to slip through the net. IICSA found a number of cases where it believed that a lack of reporting had bordered on concealment.

As a couple of examples, we can imagine that clause 73, as currently drafted, means that a senior leader of an organisation who chooses simply to move on an employee they suspect of committing child sexual abuse, rather than to ensure that they are reported to the authorities, may not be caught under the offence around preventing someone else from reporting, if their actions do not actively prevent or deter that reporting explicitly. Other actions could include communities, institutions or authorities destroying evidence of historical child sexual abuse in order to prevent it being reinvestigated, or in some other way hampering or interfering with investigations that are taking place. It could also include someone burying evidence of child sexual abuse after it has been reported to the authorities, so that it cannot be properly investigated. The Bill provides us with a strong opportunity to deal with some those issues, and I hope the Government will look at that as the Bill moves through the other place.

I thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, for calling me to speak, and I thank the House for listening to my contribution. I very much hope that the Government will continue to look at these issues in more detail so that we can find an acceptable solution.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I rise to speak to amendment 160, which stands in my name, and briefly in favour of amendments 157 and 158, also in my name. I wish to start by thanking all those who have campaigned over many years for some of the sensible changes to the Bill that we are discussing today. I also want to put on record my thanks to our fantastic police forces, including Greater Manchester Police, and also to my hon. Friends the Members for Frome and East Somerset (Anna Sabine) and for Sutton and Cheam (Luke Taylor) for their assiduous work on the Bill Committee. Liberal Democrat amendment 160 would ensure that the police cannot use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under sections 12 or 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, unless a new and specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been approved by both Houses. Regulations around the use of live facial recognition have been discussed many times in this House, and support for strengthening the current situation, bringing clarity and certainty to police forces, has gained support from all parts of the House, both in this Chamber and in Westminster Hall. I hope this amendment does the same today. The Liberal Democrats oppose the police’s use of facial recognition surveillance. It breaches the right to privacy and is far too often biased, particularly given its propensity to wrongly identify people of colour and women. In our manifesto last year, we committed immediately to halting the use of live facial recognition surveillance by the police and private companies. When data or technology, such as artificial intelligence, are used by the police, they must be regulated to ensure that they are unbiased. They must be used in a way that is transparent and accurate and that respects the privacy of innocent people. Policing should not intrude on this right for people who are not suspected of any crime. On the question of bias, much of the recent debate has centred around the National Physical Laboratory’s 2023 study into the equitability of facial recognition technology in law enforcement. This report is frequently cited by proponents of facial recognition, including the shadow Home Secretary, both at the Dispatch Box, when the Bill came before the House on Second Reading, and during a well-attended Westminster Hall debate last November as evidence that bias in the technology is on the decline. However, we should not overlook one of that study’s most critical findings. In live facial recognition—where a real-time camera feed is compared against a predetermined watchlist—the likelihood of false positives is not fixed. Instead, it depends heavily on the specific parameters of how that technology is deployed, particularly on the face-match threshold. That threshold, in turn, is influenced by both the size and composition of the watchlist, as well as the volume and nature of the people moving through the surveillance zone. The study recommends that, where operationally feasible, the police use a face-match threshold of 0.6 in order to reduce the risk of bias. However—and this is crucial—without clear regulation, police forces are under no obligation to adopt this or any specific standard. In other words, the presence of the technology alone does not ensure fairness. Without oversight, significant room remains for bias to persist in how facial recognition is applied. This leads to increased instances of the wrong people being stopped and searched—an area of policing that already disproportionately impacts black communities. New technologies in policing may well present good opportunities to improve public safety, and police should take advantage of them to prevent and solve crime. However, given that new technologies can raise significant concerns related to civil liberties and discrimination, we must ensure that any new powers involving them are scrutinised by both Houses. Liberal Democrat amendment 160 would ensure that the police cannot use live facial recognition technology when imposing conditions on public assemblies or processions under sections 12 or 14 of the Public Order Act 1986, unless a new and specific code of practice governing its use in public spaces has first been approved by both Houses. This will ensure democratic oversight of any changes to further legislation that may impact public privacy and civil liberties. I hope that the amendment will have support from across the House. I have just a few words to say on amendments 157 and 158, which would enable a review of antisocial behaviour powers. Antisocial behaviour, as Members have already mentioned this afternoon, blights communities, erodes trust, frays the social fabric and disproportionately affects the most vulnerable. Many colleagues have raised issues within their own communities, some of which I see in my constituency. We have off-road bikes in Heaviley, Marple, Offerton and High Lane. They are a persistent blight on my community. They intimidate people, endanger public safety and are just really annoying. But we must respond with laws that are not just tough, but fair and proportionate. That is why I urge all colleagues to support amendments 157 and 158, which would ensure that antisocial behaviour laws are reviewed before being changed, and that any new guidance is created with public input. I also welcome amendment 3, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Wells and Mendip Hills (Tessa Munt), which aims to ensure that the duty to report suspected child abuse covers faith groups. I encourage the hon. Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling) to seek her out as he will find a doughty ally in his attempts to improve the Bill as it impacts on faith groups. As I said on Second Reading, there are measures in the Bill that the Liberal Democrats support. Were our amendments to be accepted, the Bill would go even further towards keeping our communities safe in a way that is proportionate and that balances the civil liberties implications of giving the police more powers. I hope that the House will support our amendments.

I rise to support the Bill and to speak to amendment 20, which stands in my name and is supported by more than 50 Members from across the House. The measures in the Bill represent the most significant package of crime prevention and policing reforms in a generation. From strengthening action against shoplifting, knife crime and antisocial behaviour to introducing new powers to confront child sexual abuse, this legislation gives our police the tools they need to take back our high streets and town centres. I am proud to support the Bill, and I am proud that this Labour Government are showing leadership by putting victims first, supporting our police and turning the tide on crime after 14 years of Conservative neglect. It is in that same spirit of placing victims at the heart of our justice system that I have tabled amendment 20. It addresses an urgent and under-recognised issue: the devastating link between domestic abuse and suicide and the failure of our legal system to properly reflect it. My amendment is supported by Southall Black Sisters—a pioneering black feminist organisation founded in 1979, dedicated to empowering black, minoritised and migrant women and girls, particularly those fleeing violence. For over four decades, Southall Black Sisters has been a trailblazer in advocating for the rights and safety of some of society’s most marginalised women and girls and in addressing barriers rooted in racism, sexism and socioeconomic inequalities. Their mission is to dismantle the structural injustices harming black, minoritised and migrant women and girls, while fostering global solidarity for a future rooted in equity, justice and empowerment. I sincerely thank the dedicated staff at Southall Black Sisters for their help with my amendment. Too often those who drive their victims to suicide through sustained coercion, violence or psychological abuse walk away without consequence. While the Bill introduces welcome offences on serious self-harm, it still falls short of recognising the full impact faced by victims of domestic abuse, particularly when the abuse ends in suicide. The statistics should stop us in our tracks. According to the Vulnerability Knowledge and Practice Programme, suspected suicides linked to domestic abuse now outnumber domestic homicides. It is estimated that three women die by suicide every week as a result of abuse, yet since 2017 there has been just one conviction where a victim’s suicide was legally recognised as the outcome of domestic abuse—just one. That is not justice; it is a failure to see these women, recognise what they have endured and hold their abusers to account. Coercive control and psychological torment may leave no bruises, but the impact is every bit as lethal. When domestic abuse ends in suicide, it must be recognised for what it is: a crime. The injustice of this issue falls heaviest on those already most marginalised. Black, minoritised and migrant women face the highest barriers to safety—barriers rooted in racism, immigration insecurity, stigma and a lack of culturally competent services. Too often they are misjudged, criminalised or simply ignored. The justice system, and indeed society, must stop asking, “Why didn’t she leave?”, and start asking, “Why wasn’t he stopped?” That is the change that amendment 20 calls for. It shines a light on these deaths and makes it clear that when abuse leads to suicide, the law must see it, hear it and respond. I am pleased that, through this Bill, the Government are taking forward meaningful changes to deliver on Labour’s mission to halve violence against women and girls. I do not intend to press my amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Government will bring forward changes that recognise the link between abuse and suicide and ensure that our laws reflect that reality. In France, for example, the law was changed in 2020 to recognise suicide or attempted suicide as an outcome of domestic abuse. A perpetrator may now face up to 10 years in prison and a substantial fine if abuse is found to have significantly contributed to the victim’s death. That is the level of seriousness that the issue should demand. I am grateful to the Victims Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd (Alex Davies-Jones), for meeting me to discuss the issues that my amendment raises, and I welcome her invitation to submit evidence to the forthcoming Law Commission review. I also welcome the Minister’s recognition that current homicide laws do not adequately reflect these cases. I fully support the Bill’s mission to protect victims and restore trust in our justice system, but that justice must be complete. The women driven to take their own lives because of abuse must no longer be invisible to the law. In short, amendment 20 would criminalise abusers who drive victims to self-harm or suicide by introducing a new offence of encouraging serious self-harm or suicide following a sustained pattern of abuse. The Bill introduces new offences for encouraging or assisting self-harm but falls short of covering cases where victims die by suicide following sustained patterns of coercive control and abuse. Recognising this form of abuse in law is critical. The amended Bill would reflect the severe psychological impact of coercive control, enhance deterrence and increase survivor and public confidence in the criminal justice system. It would also compel judges, juries, coroners and the police to properly investigate and respond to such cases, treating them with the seriousness that they deserve. Ultimately, it would ensure that victims are not failed by a legal framework that continues to overlook the long-term and often fatal results of domestic abuse.

14:15:00

I rise to support my amendment 19, which seeks to amend clause 94, which brings in a new law to make spiking or administering a harmful substance an offence. I am grateful for the cross-party support I have received for this amendment from Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Green and Independent MPs. The intended law around spiking is a sound one, and it generally has cross-party support—indeed, it was a measure in the previous version of this Bill, brought in under the previous Government. My concern is that it has a defect and that there is a loophole. My amendment seeks to close that by ensuring that spiking by a reckless act is also an offence. Spiking is a hideous, heinous activity that destroys lives. It destroys people’s physical and mental health, and at worst, it kills people. The majority of victims of spiking—74%—are women, and the average age of those being spiked is just 26, but there is no typical spiking incident. The majority involve putting something in a drink, but needle spiking is also on the rise. The most likely place for spiking to happen is in a bar, pub or a club, but it can happen anywhere, including in a supermarket or on the street. Spiking is most commonly thought among members of the public to be motivated by sexual intent or to facilitate a theft, but in Committee we heard from Colin Mackie from Spike Aware UK about a very different type of spiking, which is what I think the new law fails to address. It is the rise in spiking that seems to have no particular intent behind it. It is sometimes referred to as prank spiking—spiking for, to quote the Government’s own guidance, seemingly “a bit of fun”. We heard from Colin Mackie about how his son Greg died through suspected spiking of that kind. The Bill criminalises spiking or administering a harmful substance with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy. I do not accept that every case of spiking fits into that definition. I will give an example of a scenario where recklessness would cover a case of spiking—by the way, I should say that recklessness is a well-trodden principle in criminal law, dating back over 200 years. It is an alternative to intent, so that if the prosecution fails to establish that someone meant to do something, it can alternatively establish that their actions were so reckless that they should be convicted. An example is assault causing actual bodily harm. The prosecution must establish the harm, but it can establish either that someone intended that harm or that they did an act so reckless that harm was bound to follow. It does not matter which it establishes to a jury; it will secure a conviction. It is the same with manslaughter: the prosecution can run a case that although somebody did not intend for someone else to die, their actions were so reckless that they should have known that someone might die, and it can secure a conviction. By the way, in the absence of law on spiking, those two offences are often used, but they are often defective, which is why the Government are bringing in their own spiking law. However, they have failed to replicate the principle of recklessness within it. I will give a hypothetical example. A group of friends go into a bar. Two of them have been taking illegal drugs—they have done it before—and they are enjoying themselves. They say to each other, “That friend in our circle—he needs to loosen up some more. He needs to stop his ridiculous opposition to having a bit of fun by taking these pills. I tell you what: we’ll do him a favour. Let’s not tell him, but let’s slip one of these pills we’ve been taking in his drink so he can loosen up and enjoy the evening like we are.” They go ahead and do that, and of course their friend, very likely, is harmed. He may not have done that drug before, or he may have been taking prescription drugs and the mixture is a cocktail. I am sure the House would intend that those two people had committed a crime, but when they are taken to trial I can see a scenario where their defence will say, “Members of the jury, my clients were foolish. They were silly. They shouldn’t have done it. But they didn’t intend to annoy their friend. They didn’t intend to injure their friend. What they intended to do was have a bit of fun and help him have a bit of fun. It was stupid, but they did not intend it.” How is a jury supposed to convict beyond reasonable doubt on that? Instead, if the prosecution could point to recklessness, it would be able to say, “Members of the jury, we do not care whether what these two people intended would be fun for that friend. It was so obviously reckless to any reasonable person that it must be a crime, and you must convict.” Clause 94 needs that much more wide-ranging, all-encompassing, tried and tested legal principle in it. My amendment would do just that. I thank Colin Mackie from Spike Aware UK for bringing that evidence to the Bill Committee, and Stamp Out Spiking, which has also done a huge amount, as well as Members no longer in this place who have been doing a lot of work behind the scenes.

I am not a lawyer, but my hon. Friend has deployed a clear and compelling argument. At the beginning of his remarks, he referenced how amendment 19, to which I am a signatory, commands cross-party support. In advance of anything the Minister may say, is my hon. Friend able to indicate, from conversations he has had with the Home Office and individual Ministers, the Government’s response? He seems to be making such a compelling case; it would be helpful if the Government accepted it.

I thank my hon. Friend. I was on the Bill Committee, where a similar amendment was tabled, so I can reference the Minister’s response at that time. I have also had a brief word with the Minister outside this place. The Government’s position seems to be that the type of activity I am describing is covered in the intent to annoy, but I hope that I have made it perfectly clear that all reckless acts are plainly not covered by an intention to annoy. I do not for one minute suggest that the Government wilfully do not want the law to work and to cover all scenarios, but I am left with the impression that they have not sufficiently addressed their mind to the gaping loophole that is staring them in the face. If they do not like my amendment, I urge them to draft an amendment of their own to deal with the issue. If just one person walks free following this law because they were able to convince a jury that their actions were not annoying—but they would have been deemed reckless—that will be a terrible failure of what the Government are trying to do in the Bill. I urge the Minister to think again, and I urge all across the House to vote for the amendment to force the Government’s hand.

I tabled amendment 161 on public order issues and the policing of demonstrations. Before I get to that, I welcome the proposals in the Bill on fly-tipping, and I look forward to the guidance that will be issued to the various authorities to deal with it. I am attracted by the Opposition’s amendments on what is included in that guidance, largely because, like other Members, my constituency is plagued with fly-tipping. I seem to be followed by a mattress throughout my constituency in virtually every area I visit. I come to public order and my amendment, which I tabled to try to get on the record the reality of what is happening with the public order issue and demonstrations. In the explanatory notes, the Government have set out this argument: “The regular protests following the events in Israel and Gaza on 7 October 2023 highlighted gaps in public order legislation, principally the Public Order Acts 1986 and 2023.” They have therefore brought forward proposals in response to the policing challenges of such protests. Since 7 October, I have been on virtually every national demonstration in central London organised by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and other groups. I understand the pressure on the police service; in fact, I have police constituents who have had their leave cancelled and all the rest because of the frequency of the protests, but that has largely been a response to the depth of concern about what is happening in Gaza. People have wanted to express their view, and one of the ways of doing that through our democratic system is to demonstrate and march and protest. All the demonstrations I have been on have been peaceful, good natured and—up until a few recent incidents—extremely well policed. In the explanatory notes, the Government set out that legislation is being brought forward in relation to three things, which I think we can all agree on. There is: “A new criminal offence of climbing on war memorials.” Secondly, there is “possession of a pyrotechnic article at a protest”, which is dangerous, anyway. The other is about concealing identity, although issues with that are referred to in other amendments, because that might well have an impact on the exercise of religious freedoms, particularly with regard to the veil and being able to dress. The Government do not cite in the explanatory notes the issue in clause 114 of restriction on protests at places of worship. In all the national demonstrations in London that have taken place, there has never been an incident outside a place of worship. Concerns have been expressed by some groups, but largely, I think, they have been by groups who have motivations other than concerns about public order. In the negotiations with the Metropolitan police on each demonstration that has taken place, there has been a long discussion in which the route is identified, and usually there is overall agreement to avoid any areas that could be seen as contentious and could provoke a reaction. Even when a place of worship, such as a synagogue, has been some distance from the demonstration, the organisers have tried to ensure not just proper stewarding, so that the demonstration does not go anywhere near it—usually, it has to be 10 or 15 minutes’ walking distance away—but that the times of services are avoided as well. Interestingly, until recently there had never been a problem, but the police seem to have hardened their attitude, I think as a result of coming under pressure from organisations that might simply not want the protest to go ahead in any form because they take a different attitude to what is happening in Gaza and Pakistan. [Interruption.] If the water the hon. Member for Selby (Keir Mather) is carrying is for me, I thank him.

14:30:00

I am concerned that not only are we trying to solve a problem that does not exist, but it could be solved in better ways. I am also worried about the drafting of the legislation. Clause 114 has the phrase:

“the procession is in the vicinity of a place of worship”.

We need clarity on what “in the vicinity” means. In the negotiations on the last demonstration, the protestors wanted to march to the BBC, and the police were concerned about a synagogue that was 10 or 15 minutes’ walk away. The protest organisers said, “Fair enough—we’ll make sure that the protest doesn’t go anywhere it if there is a service going on, so no one feels in any way anxious about that.” However, the wording of the clause is open to interpretation, and that interpretation is often done by police officers, who come under intense pressure from people who might have different motivations from those who are worrying about public order.

The other issue is that the clause refers to a procession that

“may intimidate persons of reasonable firmness”.

I have no idea what “reasonable firmness” means; in fact, I have not seen that term in legislation before. It may well have come up in court, and that may have set the precedent, but I have no idea what it is. In fact, I would not be able to determine whether Members stood with reasonable firmness on any issue, because that changes with time and with the circumstances.

I worry that if interpretation of these terms is left so loosely in the hands of police officers, they are put in an impossible position when it comes to these definitions and how they implement the measures. For a long time, while demonstrations have been going on, the police have tried to consult as best they can, yet even that demonstrates how contentious these issues can become. For instance, they have consulted the Jewish communities, but there are real arguments within that community about who represents them. The Board of Deputies of British Jews, which is normally consulted, represents an element of the Jewish community but certainly not the majority—and that board is now split, with 36 members contradicting the position of the majority. Other Jewish groups have not been consulted—or have only recently have been consulted—and they have expressed their concerns about how the police are making the decisions.

I tabled an amendment to delete clause 114 because I want to get on the record some of the facts around the issues. There have not been problems relating to places of worship on any of the national demonstrations. There is a procedure for negotiating routes and avoiding disturbance, which has worked pretty well until very recently. Also, before such legislation is produced, we need a great deal more consultation with a much wider community. The clauses leaves open the definition of “vicinity” and “reasonable firmness”, and opens up a system that is more difficult to implement than the current system, in which negotiations take place in an atmosphere of good will.

I worry about this legislation, and I hope that in the other place we might get clearer definitions, if nothing else. Before then, we might even get much more detailed guidance from the Government on how the Bill will be implemented; otherwise, it will cause more divisions, rather than settling some of the problems that some people perceive. I think some simply want to stop the protests. In my view, stopping them would undermine people’s democratic rights, and it would lead to people taking action in different ways. I would rather we channelled their concerns—and sometimes, yes, their anger—into forms of protest that are manageable, and a more constructive expression of people’s views.

Before the Bill reaches the other place, I urge the Government to think again about clause 114, and to see whether they could clarify some of the definitions, bring forward guidance and maybe halt the Bill’s implementation until there has been a much more thorough consultation with a wider section of the community. We all want the democratic right of protest upheld; I have never heard anyone in this House argue against that. However, we want that done in a way that does not cause harm to anyone, or deny people their democratic right to express their opinion. In this coming period, given international affairs, we will see more demonstrations, so it is important to get their management right through more effective legislation.

I rise to speak to amendments 4 to 8 on child criminal exploitation. I thank the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson) for their speeches and proposals. I voice my support for amendment 21, tabled by the hon. Member for Brent East (Dawn Butler), which would prevent driver’s licence information obtained by the police being used for the purposes of intrusive facial recognition and gathering biometrics, and amendment 164 tabled by the hon. Member for Liverpool Riverside (Kim Johnson), which would remove clause 108 and the ban on face coverings in protest situations. The hon. Member for Clapham and Brixton Hill (Bell Ribeiro-Addy) has also tabled mitigating amendments on that subject; amendment 184 would create exceptions, and not just defences, relating to health, work, and religious faith coverings. I also support amendment 185, which proposes an equality review. I hope the Government will look at them all. I welcome the efforts in the Crime and Policing Bill to protect vulnerable children, and I particularly welcome the introduction of a new offence of child criminal exploitation, which will signal to perpetrators that coercing, manipulating and exploiting children into criminal activity is child abuse and will be treated as such. Criminals are exploiting thousands of vulnerable children; Children In Need data shows that more than 15,000 children were at risk of exploitation in 2023-24, and that is likely to be just the tip of the iceberg. The perpetrators of exploitation include serious organised crime gangs, which are well versed in taking advantage of legislative gaps. Even though the Bill takes a huge step forward, areas of it must be strengthened if we are to protect children and bring the perpetrators of that abuse to justice. That is why I have tabled amendments 4 to 8. First, amendments 4 and 5 would amend the wording in clause 38 to ensure that the offence includes activities that put children at significant risk and are linked to criminal conduct but are not in themselves criminal offences. Examples of this include carrying large amounts of cash on public transport, being used as a look-out or decoy, and guarding unsafe accommodation alone. Amendment 6 expands the definition of “exploitative activity” to ensure that preparatory acts, such as grooming and coercion, are captured by the offence. I welcome the Minister’s comments earlier, and am grateful for the engagement with these amendments, but it is not yet obvious to me how referencing only the facilitation of future offences covers the gaps that would be closed by amendments 4 and 5, and amendment 6 seems to have been only partly addressed. I would therefore welcome further clarification, or a discussion of the issue with the Minister, ahead of consideration in the other place. Secondly, amendment 7 would remove clause 38(1)(b), which currently amounts to a defence if the perpetrator reasonably believes that the child is over 18, unless the child is under the age of 13. While such provisions are common in other areas of law, in the case of criminal exploitation, this clause risks undermining the prosecution of perpetrators due to the well-publicised issues of adultification and racism within the criminal justice system. The recent Independent Office for Police Conduct report into race discrimination and the Alexis Jay report on criminally exploited children on behalf of Action for Children both highlight the roles of adultification and racism in the criminalisation of children, and how it leads to failures in safeguarding responses specifically, but not only, for young black boys. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 is clear: children cannot consent to their own exploitation, and this principle must be upheld by our removing this part of the offence. Finally, amendment 8 to clause 53 would insert the words “aged 18 or over”. This would ensure that children could not be criminalised under the new offence of cuckooing. It would recognise that they are more often than not the victims, not the perpetrators, in these situations. The children targeted are often very young and extremely vulnerable, and they need protection, not prosecution. These amendments are not merely technical; they are essential. They reflect the lived experiences of children, and the findings of numerous reports and reviews that provide compelling evidence of the need for a more robust and child-centred legal framework. I urge all Members of the House to support these proposals. Together, we can take a decisive step towards better protecting vulnerable children from exploitation.

Before I move on to the amendment I want to speak about, I thank the Minister for the speed with which the Government have brought forward this Bill. It addresses important issues around protecting retail workers and tackling shoplifting and antisocial behaviour—issues that communities such as the towns and villages that I represent feel have been overlooked all too often. I really welcome the Government’s urgency of action in recognition of the great campaigns fought by many unions, including USDAW, and also of the real sentiment of my constituents that these crimes need to be taken far more seriously. Today, though, I want to focus my time on amendment 19 to clause 94, in the name of the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson), which brings forward important legislative action on spiking. I do so on behalf of a constituent. I will call her Sarah today because, understandably, she has asked to be kept anonymous for the purpose of the story she wishes me to share with all Members, but that in no way diminishes the great bravery that she has shown in her work on this. It is a real privilege for Members of the House to meet constituents who, having experienced deeply traumatic, incredibly difficult moments in their personal life, show a resilience and depth of character that lots of us could not even dream of, and who turn their pain and personal trauma into a powerful force for change. That is deeply true of Sarah, and of so many women right across the country who have been victims of spiking. Sarah’s story is her own, but it has themes that will resonate with far too many people here and across the UK. It starts on her birthday. Like most of us, she was looking forward to celebrating her birthday with her friends. They had organised drinks in a nearby town, and the night started off filled with fun and joy. It ended, though, with Sarah alone, traumatised, confused and unable to speak, in a car park outside the venue after she was spiked. Sadly, this horrific act is one that far too many women across the country are falling victim to. After she was spiked, Sarah tried to do what she could. She had lost control of her words. She tried to call out for help, but she felt unable to. An ambulance was called, but did not know what to do. It waited there with her, but did not take her to hospital or make sure that she got the aftercare and testing that she needed. She was left to fend for herself. What is really tragic is the fact that on top of all that trauma, and despite how difficult that moment in the car park must have been for her, it was not the only time in this experience that she felt alone. At every step—when she engaged with the police and the authorities, and when she pushed for action—she was ignored. There was insufficient action and insufficient focus. There was minimal follow-up and no prosecution, and the police took no further action on her case.

14:45:00

Many of us—possibly including myself, if I am being completely candid—would be completely flattened by that, but not Sarah. She turned that pain into a mobilising force and a determination to push for action. Working with Spike Aware UK, she has been campaigning for a specific offence of spiking for some time, and she is as excited as I am to see that finally being brought forward by the Government in the Bill today. This real, meaningful change will ensure much more focus, much more action and hopefully much greater awareness of the damage that spiking can do, of the seriousness of the offence, and of the seriousness of the consequences that will hopefully now follow it.

I thank my hon. Friend for his brilliant articulation of Sarah’s story, which for too many of us, including myself as the MP for Darlington, is not uncommon. Before I was elected as the MP, I raised this issue in Darlington because a number of people there had been affected by spiking. Does he agree that bringing this provision into law today is important because for so many people—often women and vulnerable people—not being believed when they report being spiked is one of the big barriers to seeking justice?

A lot of us have been inspired by my hon. Friend’s campaigning before she arrived in this place, and her intervention is a powerful example of why. It is exactly that moment—that lack of belief—that far too many victims of spiking are encountering when they go to the authorities at the moment, and it is that lack of belief that we are looking to completely undercut in legislating to make this a specific offence today. Sarah reached out to me because, excited as she is about the Bill, she rightly wants to ensure that we are delivering it as fully as possible. I know that it is the same motivation that made the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East table his amendment. I thank the Minister for taking the time to speak to me about this amendment on Friday. I know from the conversations she has had with officials that they are confident that, as drafted, the Bill would capture the fullness of possible offences related to spiking.

I am grateful to the hon. Member, particularly for setting out the case of his constituent, who was here in Westminster yesterday; indeed, I also met her. Does he accept that it is those of us elected in this Chamber who make decisions, and that assurances from officials that cannot be articulated in this House—I am looking for that articulation—are not a good reason not to back my amendment?

I thank the hon. Member for all the work he has done on this important issue through tabling the amendment, not just now but in Committee. I do not want to put words into the Minister’s mouth, but I am pretty sure she will be able to articulate some of those officials’ views back to him when summing up. However, I want to ask the Minister, as I am sure the hon. Member and other colleagues would want to, that, as we go through this process—and given that she cares so passionately about this issue—she continues to test that understanding with officials. We owe it to Sarah and the many other victims of spiking to ensure that we get this right. I know the Minister is as determined as I am to ensure that happens, and I really hope that as a result we can fully test officials’ understanding and that view before we finally get the Bill into law, to ensure that we are taking the fullness of action needed to tackle spiking. That fullness of action is important, because the issues that Sarah encountered and the challenges that far too many people face from spiking right across the country are not ones that we can solve with legislation alone. That is an important part of why we are acting by bringing forward a new clause today, and why we are discussing amendment 19. If the Bill is finally passed and finally brings forward that specific offence that so many of us have been looking for, I hope that it will not be the end of the story. I hope the Minister will be able to bring forward further action, working closely with police chiefs and commissioners, to ensure that this is drilled into their strategic visions as part of our national strategy to reduce violence against women and girls. We need to make sure that forces appropriately prioritise spiking cases, that officers are appropriately trained to encounter them and take them seriously, ensuring that deadlines around collecting CCTV are not missed before crucial evidence is deleted. We need to ensure that right across the country, there is not a single force that is not taking this issue with the seriousness that it deserves. I will certainly be reaching out to both my police and crime commissioners to urge them to do exactly that, and I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts about how this Government can make sure that we use all the powers and tools at our disposal to ensure that police forces are doing so too. If we are to deter possible perpetrators of this crime, it is important that the severity of this new legislation and the new penalties are well understood, too. I would therefore welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how we can ensure that we are disseminating the action we are underlining today, and hopefully bringing into law in due course, to ensure that right across the country no one is under any illusions that spiking is not a deeply serious offence. It will be treated as such by this Government and by the police, who will go after them with the full force of the law. For far too long, victims like Sarah and far too many people—typically women—right across the country have been left exposed to spiking. They have been left feeling like they are victims and left to go through their experiences alone. Fantastic organisations like Spike Aware UK have done all they can to champion their cause, to bring them together, to mobilise and to reinforce the need for change, but it is only through action nationally and delivering through our police forces right across the country that we can finally do justice to the severity of this issue and to the passionate campaigning of constituents like Sarah, who for far too long have felt that they have been suffering alone. I am glad to see this legislation coming forward and to see this specific spiking offence included. I look forward to working with the Minister to ensure that we can deliver it in as ambitious a way as possible.

As we have heard, the Bill is broad in scope. Before I turn to the couple of amendments that I support, I want to recognise that the Bill’s scope is evidenced by the breadth and number of amendments and new clauses. It is worth gently reminding ourselves that a number of the measures were carried over from the Criminal Justice Bill, which sadly fell due to the general election almost a year ago, though there are obviously new clauses and amendments. I hope the Minister is in listening mode, in change mode and is willing to work across the House, and I hope that she accepts some of these amendments, because they would go a long way to further improving this legislation. I have read through the Bill, and much of it goes right to the heart of the communities we seek to serve and represent. There are topics in the Bill that regularly pop up in my inbox and I am sure into colleagues’ inboxes as well. I want to cover two specific areas. The first is fly-tipping and littering—an issue that I have spoken about on many occasions in this Chamber since I was first elected. I support the amendments and new clauses tabled by the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers). In an intervention earlier, I touched on the cost of littering to the country. I think I said that it was £1 million, but I meant £1 billion; I hope that can be firmly corrected, because it is a big difference.[Official Report, 17 June 2025; Vol. 769, c. 189.] (Correction) The principle is the same—it is money that could go back into our communities—but £1 billion spent on managing littering and fly-tipping is a huge amount of money that could otherwise buy a huge amount of services for constituencies up and down the country.

Does the right hon. Lady’s calculation of £1 billion account for how people feel, for the degradation of pride in areas where people fly-tip, and for the failure of local services to be able to afford to collect and clean up rubbish tips on the side of our roads? I wonder if there is a multiplier effect in how people feel about their areas because of all this fly-tipping.

The hon. Lady makes an important point. There is a social and community cost that is difficult to evaluate. I am fortunate to have some fantastic volunteers and groups, including the Wombles group, that go out and litter pick. I do not mind going out and helping when I can. There is a great sense of a community coming together, but nothing is more frustrating than litter picking a street, walking back and finding that one of the tossers has just tossed some more litter out of their car.

I do not think the right hon. Member was pointing at her shadow Minister when she was accusing somebody of being a litter tosser—I think it was just a dramatic gesture, because nothing could be further from the truth. Building on the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Darlington (Lola McEvoy), does the right hon. Member agree that when people see potholes unfilled, litter uncollected, overgrown verges and general disrepair—when they are walking through decline—they feel hopeless, not just about their communities, in which they take such pride, but about the ability of their council and elected officials to act on their most immediate priorities? Does she agree that when we restore pride in place by fixing these problems, we help to create a confidence that politics can deliver a better community?

That is an important point about pride in where we live and about hope. As I travel around the country, I often take a mental note of the number of potholes I drive across; there is a noticeable difference from one authority to another. I have to say that Walsall is quite good at the moment when it comes to filling potholes. The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about litter and communities. My local authority of late has been successfully prosecuting some litterbugs. I have seen a couple of examples on social media just this week of individuals who have been treating the high street in Pelsall as their own personal litter bin, and the local authority has gone after them and fined them. That sends a strong message, but there is more we can do. Although much of this is about clearing up after these people, we also need deterrence to stop this happening. A lot of it is down to a lack of respect for the community and antisocial behaviour, for want of a better word, and it is a burden that we should not expect the taxpayer to keep shouldering. We have reached something of a tipping point, and we need to do something more than letting people walk away with a slap on the wrist. Whether it is bin strikes, as we have seen in Birmingham, rural fly-tipping or littering, a lot of our communities feel absolutely fed up and overwhelmed, and they want action. I support the amendments tabled by the shadow Minister because, taken together, they form a serious and joined-up response that would help to protect and support not only our communities and those who want to keep them clean, but the local environment and wildlife too. Similarly, it is often local farmers who face the burden of fly-tipping. When fly-tipping happens on their land, the cost of removing it falls to them. It hardly seems fair that they are left to foot the bill for waste that they did not create. Amendment 172, on clean-up costs, seeks to address that. I have heard time and again from frustrated landowners and farmers that the system often punishes the victims of fly-tipping, not the perpetrators.

Does the right hon. Lady have any thoughts on the idea that people who hire somebody privately to take away their rubbish are often being held accountable for that third-party company dumping the rubbish illegally? People are at a loss to know what they are supposed to do.

The hon. Lady makes another important point about tackling waste crime—I think that is the technical phrase for it. Again, that is something that I see locally. Enforcement matters, but there also has to be strong reminder—I hate to use the word “education”, so perhaps “reminder” is best—to our constituents: if somebody comes to you and says they will clear your rubbish away, your need to think carefully about where they are putting that rubbish. In my constituency, fridges and mattresses have been dumped. I was driving down Bridle Lane last year and saw a whole lorry or van-load of rubbish that had been fly-tipped in the middle of the road. That meant that the road had to be blocked. That is outrageous and it needs to stop.

15:00:00

I support amendments 173 and 174 on cost liability guidance. They build on the principle that those who cause the mess should pay to clear it up. It should not fall, as it has time and again, on stretched local authorities and private landowners to clean up the aftermath of that criminal behaviour. I touched on enforcement earlier. Unless offenders are financially liable, any deterrent will be limited.

On litter, we must consider driving licence penalty points for those who are caught throwing litter out of cars. Again, that would be a deterrent—something to remind people that it is simply not acceptable to throw litter indiscriminately out of a car. I accept that that would affect drivers, but I think that they must take responsibility for the passengers in their cars.

I will leave my remarks there, Madam Deputy Speaker, because I hope to catch your eye tomorrow to speak to further amendments and new clauses. Today has indicated that there is a lot of cross-party support for doing more to tackle fly-tipping and litter, which are a scourge on our communities.

Lawlessness, antisocial behaviour, street crime and shoplifting have dragged our communities down. When people believe that they can act with impunity, without fear of apprehension or respect for others, we need Parliament to come down hard to restore law and order and give the police the resources that they need to make our streets safe again. I therefore take this opportunity to welcome the Crime and Policing Bill, which put right the years of damage and disregard caused by the previous Government. My focus today is on street racing, a problem that stretches across the country but has become a curse in Bassetlaw, where cars speed along a stretch of the A57, the by-pass that runs through Worksop and then into the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Jake Richards). Those unofficial road-racing events are organised via social media. People meet up in an edge-of-town car park and then stage races up and down the A57, attracting huge crowds who come to witness the speeds and the flashy souped-up cars with booming exhausts. Residents living close to the A57 hear the noise, including the screeching of tyres, but they are terrified that they or a family member will get caught up with the racers as they drive home or go about their daily business. The fear of a nasty accident is all pervasive. Across the country, people who have turned up to watch the racing have died, such as 19-year-old Ben Corfield and 16-year-old Liberty Charris from Dudley, and 19-year-old Sophie Smith from Radcliffe—young lives needlessly lost.

Let me say, in the spirit of openness, that as a young man I perhaps did not always drive as responsibly as I do now. Although the hon. Lady is making an important point, there is an educational component to this. Will she join me in commending the work of the Under 17 Car Club and its Pathfinder initiative, which teaches young drivers about the dangers of driving in that fashion?

My concern is that such unorganised racing events are held to show off how fast and noisy cars can be—there needs to be much stronger action to control that. I worry that there will be further deaths and accidents if the police are not given the powers to deal with it. In Bassetlaw, I visited residents who told me that their lives are a living hell, with their nerves on edge every weekend. Not only do they hear the noise, but the fronts of their houses have become viewing platforms for the crowds.

I thank the hon. Lady for making that point, because I have experienced exactly what she describes on my own street in Henley. We had a problem with street racing—boy racing, if we can call it that—and I phoned the police on several occasions. They said, “We know it’s happening, but we don’t have the resources to come and deal with it.” Eventually they got so many calls that they acted. They put in place some sort of prevention order for antisocial behaviour, but that could be done only once—they could not do it over an extended timeframe. Does she feel that the powers should be strengthened for the police to stop that intimidating and antisocial behaviour?

I very much agree; that is why I am raising it today. The hon. Gentleman talks about public space protection orders, which I will come to shortly, but I think the law needs to be strengthened to give the police much stronger powers to deal with the problem. It is not a local phenomenon, because it is happening right across the country and people are using encrypted social media to organise the groups. Since those visits, I have been working with Bassetlaw district council and the police on this issue. That council has joined forces with Rotherham council, and they are bringing forward a public space protection order, which I just mentioned, to cover the whole of the A57—from outside Worksop all the way to Rotherham—with the ambition of prohibiting car cruising and giving the police the ability to serve fixed penalty notices, prosecute or issue fines for breaches. In the meantime, I have worked with the police to install a CCTV camera at a key point on the A57, and there are plans to put up a second. The camera is being used to collect data on the vehicles that turn up for cruising events. The police then send pre-enforcement letters to the car owners. The owners were not necessarily driving at the time, however, because quite often young people have borrowed their parents’ car, meaning that the notices are being sent to parents—but I think that is just as good, to be honest. The police say that that is helping to reduce involvement. The police tell me that they have put dedicated staffing into patrolling the A57 for the next four weekends. Their zero-tolerance approach will include fines, seizure and reporting to the courts. They are also sharing live intelligence on vehicles moving around the county, in order to be proactive and prevent cruising and meets before they happen. They have been successful, they believe, in preventing racing before it starts. Like me, the police are fearful that someone could die or be seriously injured, so they regard this matter as a high priority. I am disappointed that the local police of the hon. Member for Henley and Thame (Freddie van Mierlo) do not consider it in the same way. This is a serious issue. Most weekends on Friday, Saturday or Sunday night, such cars are present. People perhaps just meet in an empty supermarket car park to compare their vehicles, but on other occasions they take the opportunity to race. I have been out to look at the cars myself to see who those individuals are. At first, I thought that they were using their vehicles to engage in crime, but the whole focus is on showing off their souped-up vehicles. We have already had deaths—quite often of the people who go out to witness the speeding—so I am calling for much stronger action to prevent further death.

The increased orders in the Crime and Policing Bill, such as respect orders, will help to tackle antisocial behaviour. Does my hon. Friend think that they could be a vehicle—sorry, poor choice of word—to address the gatherings that she has described?

I agree with my hon. Friend—those orders could be used. The Bill strengthens the ability to seize motor vehicles when they are used in a manner causing alarm, distress or annoyance, but this is a nationwide problem, and I ask the Minister for a private discussion to consider whether the Bill can be strengthened to make it criminal to organise, promote or attend an unofficial road-racing event. I welcome the Bill because it respects and recognises the daily risks our shop workers face. My constituent went to buy a pint of milk in his local Sainsbury’s at Easter time. He was queuing up for the milk when somebody rushed in and swept the whole shelf of Easter eggs into a bag. They call it “supermarket sweep”, and it is the new form of shoplifting. It is not someone sneakily putting something in their pocket or bag—it is people stealing food to order very publicly, and it is food that is worth a lot of money.

In my constituency of Darlington, I have witnessed people doing what my hon. Friend described so often that it is now a common source of conversation between me and the assistants working in those shops. Does she agree that USDAW’s campaign to protect shop workers, which has been going on for years, is brilliant and that it is excellent that this Labour Government are going to finally introduce the right punishments for people who commit aggravated assaults against shop workers?

USDAW was the first union I ever joined, and I very much support its campaign. I share the fear that shop workers have, because there is nothing they can do. They have to sit or stand and watch the crime happen, for fear of being assaulted or abused—that is the advice that USDAW and their management have given them. The law has to be strengthened to protect them. They have to go to work every day and face that fear, which creates inordinate stress. That is unacceptable.

My hon. Friend is giving a powerful speech. In my constituency of Bournemouth East, I regularly talk to shop workers who are experiencing the scourge of shoplifting—no, wholesale looting—and they are being made to feel incredibly unsafe. I am thinking of the staff of Tesco in Tuckton, the Co-op on Seabourne Road and Tesco on the Grove in Southbourne. I am also thinking of the owner of a wine shop who has a hockey stick beside them, so that they can chase away shoplifters who try to take carts of wine bottles. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is very good news that our Labour Government are introducing a new offence of assaulting retail workers and ending the effective decriminalisation of shoplifting? Will she also commend the Co-op party, which, like USDAW, has campaigned so hard for this new law?

I wholeheartedly agree. It is not just USDAW; the Co-op party has campaigned vociferously on this matter, too. It is so important, and I very much welcome the action this Government are taking. This has gone on for too long. People need to feel safe in the workplace, and this is the best step we can take towards that. Shop workers in Worksop town centre also have to deal with an inordinate amount of antisocial behaviour. For example, I have been told about how young people come into Greggs, take food from the cabinets and throw it about. The shop workers there feel so fearful that they have not taken the covid screens down, because they do not want to be attacked. The intimidation they feel is not acceptable. I have visited an opticians where the management escort their staff out of the workplace to their cars on a regular basis. It was particularly bad last winter, when I spoke to staff and management there because I was so concerned. I have had meetings with the council and the police to tackle this issue. I welcome the Government’s commitment to increasing neighbourhood policing, with more police in our town centres. Everybody tells me they want to see more police walking the streets so that they feel safe as they go into town and can make the choice about where they shop. I do not want people to think about their safety when they go into town centres in my constituency. It is a priority that they know where the police are, know them by their names and feel safe as they go into town. This Bill goes to the heart of many of the issues that have broken our country, and we are doing what we can to repair it.

There is not a huge number of areas of the Bill that impact Scotland directly, given the role of the justice system in Scotland, but road traffic law is one of those areas. Antisocial behaviour involving vehicles has been raised by several Members today, and some powers, including those over vehicle licensing, remain reserved.

15:15:00

It is important to remember that, although a lot of this antisocial behaviour is committed by young people—it is not exclusively young people; many older drivers and users of motorised vehicles commit antisocial behaviour—and it has a big impact, the vast majority of children do not engage in violent behaviour. The long-term trend for referrals to the Children’s Reporter in Scotland for both offence and non-offence grounds shows a significant reduction. However, road traffic offences and antisocial behaviour using vehicles have a significant impact, which amplifies the effect for the community.

In 2025-26, the SNP increased police funding to £1.64 billion—an increase of £90 million on 2024-25—to support police capacity and capability, and the Scottish Government are providing almost £57 million in additional resource funding, which is an increase of 4% compared with the 2024-25 published budget.

One of the issues that police officers and communities raise with me regularly is the use of e-bikes. The legal use of e-bikes and decisions around their use is, broadly, a reserved matter for the UK Government. To be legally used in the UK, e-bikes must meet the criteria of an electrically assisted pedal cycle: the electric motor should not be able to propel the bike when it is travelling at more than 15.5 mph, and the maximum power output should be 250 W. Police Scotland has published advice on e-bikes, including through awareness campaigns, to provide clarity on the standards required for them to be permitted to ride on public roads, including safe and responsible use.

The hon. Gentleman is making an excellent speech. This is, indeed, a serious problem across the country. In my constituency, many residents are concerned about speeding e-bikes of various types. I am pleased that our local force, Thames Valley Police, is taking more action, and I would urge it to go further. I am glad to hear that Police Scotland is also taking action on this terrible menace.

I am pleased to hear that work is ongoing throughout the country. I should have said at the start that I am speaking to amendment 2, which stands in my name. The SNP recognises that there have been calls for further legislation on licensing, which is what my amendment relates to. The SNP tabled a similar amendment in Committee relating to off-road bikes. Everyone who uses our roads and paths is responsible for respecting other road and path users and for following the rules and guidance in the highway code. Unfortunately, a significant minority of road users are not respecting the rights of other road users and are riding motorised vehicles illegally on our roads and paths. In the worst cases, they have caused serious injury and death to either themselves or other people, causing huge heartache for the families affected.

I commend the hon. Member for making that important point—these young people who are using off-road bikes are not only tearing up communities and green spaces, but putting themselves at severe risk. I commend him for bringing that point to the House, because it is such an important one.

It goes to the point made by the hon. Member for Tewkesbury (Cameron Thomas), who talked about his experience as a young driver and being a more responsible driver now. I would echo that myself, and I am sure most people recognise that in themselves. Some of it is inexperience, sometimes it is just plain stupidity, but that education is important to help tackle the issue, and ensure that people understand the potential consequences of such actions both for themselves and for other people. A particularly good education piece was done in north-east Scotland, when children from all over the area went to a large venue and were given a hard-hitting and pretty blunt message, including videos of serious road accidents where people had been either seriously injured or killed. When they went into the venue they saw a fine-looking car; when they came out, that car had been crushed as if it had been in an accident. That was a hard-hitting experience, and lots of young people came out of it with a new respect for driving and using motor vehicles. I turn now to off-road and quad bikes, and particularly e-bikes, which the amendment is focused on. The SNP supports Police Scotland and its partners in dealing with illegally modified vehicles and the misuse of off-road vehicles. The Scottish Government are considering ways forward, in partnership with Police Scotland and local authorities, to tackle vehicle nuisance and related safety issues. That includes continuing to liaise with the UK Government—a lot of work has gone on behind the scenes between the devolved Administrations and the UK Government, and I welcome that work by the Minister and her civil servants, which has been helpful. The ongoing collaboration ensures that Scottish interests are considered in any UK-wide decisions affecting road safety. We are also considering further options, including liaising with the UK Government on a cross-party basis, and community engagement regarding the potential use of mobile safety camera vans to deter registered vehicles from speeding on public roads. The amendment calls on the Government to conduct a consultation on licensing and tracking the ownership of e-bikes and e-scooters, which in many cases are required to be insured, although the public are generally not aware of that. I will make a final plea to the insurance sector, which I think could be doing a lot more to make it clear to people what insurance does and does not cover. The modification of vehicles—that was raised earlier by the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Jo White)—is one such issue, and I do not recall seeing a great deal about that in insurance documents I have received over the years. The insurance industry could do a lot more to increase public awareness and try to tackle such issues and support the Scottish and UK Governments in their objectives.

I will be speaking to a number of new clauses, but I will start by setting out a tiny bit of context and saying why the Bill is so important for my town. At the heart of Ipswich is a community—neighbours who support each other, and small businesses that serve us in the town centre and that are seeing real shoots of recovery. However, there is no doubt that when I was proudly elected as its MP, we were arguably at our lowest ebb for generations. Regenerating our town is not just about economics; it is about rebuilding our community, and that is exactly what the Bill helps to deliver. I welcome the Government’s new clauses and amendments, which strengthen the Bill further. This has been a good conversation and cross-party debate, but I say gently to the shadow Minister, who tried to claim credit for a number of the changes, that I do not think the argument “If only we’d had 15 years, rather than 14” will wash with many of the people watching. The challenges that we have spoken about did not happen overnight; they were years in the making. Although I appreciate the conversations that we have had today, we must acknowledge the years of suffering that many of our residents, businesses and emergency services—I will come to them in a moment—have faced. With those years behind us, I welcome the amendments that introduce important provisions to help turn that tide. The Bill gives the police the power they need to tackle mobile phone thefts and recover stolen goods. As has been said, we are scrapping the £200 shoplifting threshold, which has disproportionately hit small and independent businesses in my town and across the country. It also introduces tough new respect orders to tackle the worst antisocial behaviour offenders, so that our town centre is no longer blighted by the same offenders again and again. Any retail worker in any corner of our town will be able to list a shocking litany of abuse, harassment and sometimes even violence. As has been said, USDAW and the Co-operative party have done incredible work in that area, but such abuse is not part of the job, which is why the Bill creates the specific offence of assaulting a shop worker. New clause 52 will introduce a new offence of trespassing with intent to commit a criminal offence. It will give the police the necessary powers to act when individuals enter a premises with the intention of committing serious criminal acts, be that burglary, theft, assault or criminal damage. For businesses in towns such as Ipswich, that matters hugely. I speak regularly with local shop owners, small business owners, and retail workers who are proud to serve their communities but who have seen at first hand the impact of rising theft, vandalism, break-ins and antisocial behaviour on our high streets. The new clause gives our police a tool to intervene early before harm is done and when there is clear intent to commit a crime. The amendments also extend protection to those who protect us. That is why I strongly support new clauses 60 to 62, which strengthen the law to ensure that emergency workers are properly protected from the threats, intimidation and abuse that they all too often face while simply doing their jobs to serve the public. Too many of our frontline police officers, paramedics, NHS staff and firefighters have faced unacceptable abuse. Let me be frank: it is utterly disgusting that those serving our communities and country, who keep us safe, sometimes with great sacrifice and selflessness, all too often suffer such unacceptable behaviour. I am sure that everyone in the Chamber has heard awful stories of emergency workers who have endured abuse on account of their race or religion, and the new clauses make clear the consequences for an individual if they engage in such bigotry. As I said earlier, we should never accept such things as simply being part of the job. The new measures ensure that when people threaten or insult those emergency workers, there are clear criminal consequences. To our frontline workers, I say this directly: “This House stands with you. You deserve not just our gratitude, but our full support. You protect us, so we will protect you.” Another sad indictment of the last few years is the absolute impunity for violence against women and girls. I speak to so many women in Ipswich who feel uncomfortable, particularly at night. Women have been told to keep an eye on their drinks for fear of spiking, and victims of other heinous crimes have felt that they are fighting not just the perpetrator, but a system stacked against them. I therefore strongly support stronger stalking protection orders and the new spiking offence. However, the Bill is about more than new laws; it is also about faster justice, stronger protections, and proper accountability for police and councils when victims are let down. That is why I support new clause 59, which rightly removes time limits for civil claims in child sexual abuse cases. The law should never compound the trauma of victims by closing the doors to justice simply because too much time has passed. New clauses 54 and 56 also apply much stronger protections for children and young people. The abuse and coercion of children is a grotesque crime, and the cowards using children to carry out their criminal operations should face the full force of the law. We know this abuse can be pernicious, and the tactics that are used are constantly evolving, but these new clauses and other parts of the Bill seek to tackle the issue head-on. Like the Bill, the new clauses also put victims where they should always have been—at the heart of the legal system. The Bill sends a clear message: we will no longer tolerate survivors being shut out by the technicalities of the system. Their voices matter, their experiences matter and their right to seek justice matters. Public confidence does not just rest on tough talk or new offences; it rests also on a system that people trust—trust that the police will respond, victims will be supported, those who commit crimes will be held to account, and powers granted will be used fairly, proportionately and with accountability. The safety of our communities cannot rest on central Government alone. I welcome this Bill’s focus on partnership—not passing problems between agencies, but solving them together. The national initiative matches our local initiative in Ipswich. I have been working with Labour-led Ipswich borough council to put in place a groundbreaking partnership with Ipswich Central to tackle street drinking in our town centre. The Bill is proof that if we work together, we can deliver at every level. While we bring forward fully formed and fully costed plans to make a difference to the lives of people in my town, and in others, I am only too aware that some people still want to divide communities such as ours in Ipswich. They rarely offer real solutions, policies or change. Instead, they simply want to feed resentment, and pit neighbour against neighbour. I know that we are stronger when we stand together—not divided by fear or set against each other, but united in our determination to make our town and our country safer, fairer and more secure for everyone. That is exactly what the Bill will give us.

15:30:00

Order. Before I call the next speaker, I inform the House that I plan to call the Minister at 3.50 pm, which would give the remaining Members bobbing about five minutes each.

I rise to support amendment 19, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson). I hope that the Minister listened to the compelling case that my hon. Friend made, and to the compelling case made by the hon. Member for Hitchin (Alistair Strathern) on the issue of spiking more generally. I want to put on record my support for my constituents, Colin and Mandy Mackie, and their organisation, Spike Aware UK. I do not think any of us can fully comprehend their experience: the police knocked on their door to tell them that their 18-year-old son had died at college from a drug overdose, but they subsequently found out that his non-alcoholic drink had been spiked by five ecstasy tablets. As other Members have said, there was no support or help for the family in that situation. The police assumed that he had died of a drug overdose although they did not know that, and they subsequently apologised to the Mackies for their treatment of them. What I particularly admire about Colin and Mandy is how they have focused their efforts on ensuring that their experience is not shared by anyone else. That is why I very much welcome the inclusion of spiking in the Bill, which is a continuation from the Criminal Justice Bill introduced in the previous Parliament. The point to be made is about certainty, and the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East brings certainty to the situation. I have been in this House with previous Ministers who have been told by officials that spiking was already covered by legislation, and therefore there was no need for specific mention of spiking.

On that point, will my right hon. Friend give way?

Given the strictures on time, I had better not. Previous Ministers said that there was no need for specific legislation on spiking, because it was already covered. Campaigning, including by your colleague, Madam Deputy Speaker, the First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means, the hon. Member for Bradford South (Judith Cummins), and by my former colleague, Richard Graham, demonstrated that there was a need for a specific measure, and that if we are going to have a specific measure, it needs to bring certainty. Part of that certainty is for the benefit of the police and others. The police should know that that reckless behaviour is also a crime, and there should not be any dubiety when they arrive at a venue to find someone in a partially conscious state or unable to articulate what has happened to them. It will also allow campaigning to be clear that whatever the circumstances, a drink is spiked or a person is injected, and that is a crime. Amendment 19—or perhaps another amendment that the Government might bring forward in the other place—would bring clarity, which is important. That is what we need to bring about. As the hon. Member for Hitchin said, that can lead to the greater training of the police and NHS workers to be able to support people in a spiking situation. I hope the Minister will reflect on everything that has been said today. The final point I will make relates particularly to Scotland. We need to have a common approach across the UK; it should not matter whether somebody is spiked in Glasgow, Manchester or Cardiff. That is not to disrespect the devolution settlement and the different approaches of the criminal justice system. The effect and the impact should be the same wherever people are, and the criminality should most certainly be the same, whether the behaviour is intentional or reckless.

In the interests of time, I will skip through the many amendments I want to support, but there are a few that will really make a difference to people in Milton Keynes Central. First, I reiterate what my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Jo White) said on street racing. Unfortunately, we had a Formula 1 driver who said that his success was based on practising on the grid roads of Milton Keynes, which really encouraged loads of people to decide to race there. In terms of stalking and spiking, the most egregious bit of spiking for me is the premeditation—sourcing the materials, bringing them to the venue then using them on a person. That is not a crime done on the spur of the moment: significant premeditation comes into it. One of the major issues we have had in Milton Keynes is organised begging outside our shopping centre. It is organised by gangs. People often look like they are homeless, or they are assumed to be homeless by caring residents in Milton Keynes, but in reality they are housed by the council, and they are exploited. They have a rota for which corner or which shop they can each sit in front of during which period of time, and the majority of the proceeds that people donate go to an organised crime network. Those individuals are being exploited in other ways as well. New clause 53 is so important in addressing this issue as the real, true crime that it is—not the crime of the people begging but of those organising the begging. I also rise in support of new clause 55, which is on special measures for witnesses, particularly around youth justice. That is very important. As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling), many people who experience sexual abuse do not come forward for years and years, so new clause 59, which would remove limitations, is really important. Let me address a couple of other things in the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton North East (Kirith Entwistle) made such an important speech considering domestic abuse, and she explained it very well. New clause 71 is about barred persons not having employment in law enforcement. We must recognise that, following the case of Sarah Everard, confidence in law enforcement is at an all-time low. When people call law enforcement because they have experienced domestic abuse, sexual harassment, rape or stalking, they are at their most vulnerable and they need to know that the people responding to those incidents—no matter which law enforcement service—will treat them according to the law, and not with some of their own natural biases, as we have seen. That brings me to my final point. In terms of confidence in policing, we need to ensure that all law enforcement is done with clarity of law, not because of particular campaigning, as we have seen with the enforcement of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which we will debate later.

I was incredibly fortunate to sit on the Bill Committee considering this legislation. It is clear that, although opinions differ on details, we all share a common goal of tackling crime in a meaningful way, so that we can make people feel safe in our communities again. As a community-focused liberal, I have stated many times that keeping people safe and instilling safety in our neighbourhoods are some of the most powerful ways that we can foster strong communities and improve the quality of life and freedom of opportunity that everyone in our country should enjoy. I am grateful to the Government for their willingness to engage with the points that we all made in Committee, particularly to the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips), and the Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North and Cottingham (Dame Diana Johnson). Despite several productive conversations, it is frustrating that several important additions to the Bill were rejected by the Government in Committee. For that reason, I rise to speak in favour of several new clauses before us. Although several of the measures closest to my heart—those regarding community policing, knife crime and stalking—are not before the House today, there are several pressing new clauses that I feel I must speak to. They pertain to what should be fundamental rights in our country: the right to freedom from oppression, and the right of access to proper healthcare for women. I congratulate the hon. Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling) on the courage he demonstrated in his speech earlier, and encourage the Government to consider the measures he spoke to if they come back from the Lords, if not to consider them beforehand. I start by expressing my support for amendment 19, which deals with spiking and was tabled by the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson). Spiking is a horrendous offence—a deeply violating act of harm and potential exploitation that must be treated with the utmost seriousness. In Committee, we heard evidence from Colin Mackie, who is the chair and co-founder of Spike Aware UK. Colin gave important evidence for the Committee to consider, indicating that spiking offences can often be intended as pranks, rather than intended to cause harm. His son Greg died in a suspected drink-spiking incident in a club, and Colin has since campaigned alongside Greg’s mother Mandy for a change in the law to stop similar incidents from occurring. I also thank the hon. Member for Hitchin (Alistair Strathern) for raising broader concerns about spiking. I agree that further measures need to be introduced, including A&E awareness, so that testing takes place, further evidence can be gathered and a conviction can be secured. Amendment 19 is a sensible and necessary clarification of the law. It makes clear what seems painfully obvious: that what matters in spiking cases is not the nature of the intent, but the recklessness and callousness of the act itself. I encourage Members across the House to support the amendment when we vote. I am also pleased to support amendment 160, as well as related new clauses 92 and 93, which we will discuss tomorrow. Taken together, these amendments create vital safeguards around the right to protest; they would subject facial recognition technologies to the proper scrutiny of a regulatory framework for the first time, and would enshrine the right to protest. From many people in my constituency of Sutton and Cheam and from campaigning groups such as Liberty, I know that these measures are long overdue, and will provide much-needed clarity to police forces as they use new technologies to fight crime. Police forces themselves are asking for these measures, and I am looking forward to a briefing later this month from the Minister on that subject. In particular, I remind the House that Hongkongers in my community are deeply worried about the impact of unregulated use of facial recognition technology on our streets. They fear that, if compromised, such technology could provide a powerful tool to the Chinese Communist party in its transnational oppression of Hongkongers here on our streets in Britain. We know that facial recognition technology can be a powerful tool for police forces as they try to keep us safe, but as with any new technology with great capacity to infringe on our liberties in daily life, it must be properly regulated. Liberal Democrats have a proud tradition of standing up for those civil liberties, arguing that we must never throw them away or sleepwalk into surrendering them. Amendment 160, which the Liberal Democrats have tabled, is rightly in that tradition. It would make sure that facial recognition technology cannot be used in real time for biometric identification unless certain conditions are satisfied, such as preventing or investigating serious crimes under the Serious Crime Act 2007 or public safety threats such as terrorist attacks, or searching for missing, vulnerable people. It would also make the use of such technology subject to judicial authorisation, with a judge needing to approve its use and appropriately define its scope, duration and purpose. These regulations would allow for safe use of this important tool, protecting our civil liberties while keeping us safe from crime.

In the time remaining, I will speak to amendment 9, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion) and is supported by many Members across the House, including myself. I welcome the Government’s provisions to limit sex offenders’ ability to change their name, and I know that many other Members also welcome them. I pay tribute to tireless campaigners such as Della Wright, who have campaigned for such provisions for many years and who I had the privilege of meeting at an event organised by Emma Jane Taylor, another tireless campaigner and a constituent of mine. Emma Jane is a survivor, and has spoken very bravely about the lifelong impact of child sexual abuse. Like many survivors, she has channelled her pain into campaigns such as this one and has set up a charity, Project 90-10. That charity is based on research showing that 90% of child sexual abuse is carried out by persons known to the victim. We are right in the House to focus—as we have in the past—on online abuse and abuse by strangers, but we should not forget that 90% of child sexual abuse is carried out by someone the victim knows. Work by Project 90-10 raises awareness of good safeguarding practices. Emma Jane brought to my attention the loophole that allows sex offenders to change their name and, potentially, continue to offend untraced. Amendment 9 would strengthen the name change provision in the Bill by requiring sex offenders to notify the police of their intention to change their name seven days before submitting an application to do so. Even if the Government do not adopt amendment 9, either here—I know that it will not be voted on—or in the other place, it is important for them to monitor the success of the changes that are in the Bill, and, in particular, the number of sex offenders who do, and do not, come forward to comply with the rules. I hope that the Government will monitor developments closely, and will introduce new legislation if the loophole is not closed, as they intend it to be. Child sexual abuse is a wicked and despicable crime, and the Government are right to introduce these measures, as well as the others about which Members have spoken so eloquently. I ask the Government to follow up on the Bill’s implementation, and to monitor that extremely closely, as this matter is important to many Members of this House.

15:45:00

I am grateful to Members for setting out the case for their amendments, and I will seek to respond to as many Members as possible in the remaining time available. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West (Matt Vickers), tabled amendments 167 to 183, which echo many of the amendments considered in Committee. I do not propose to repeat the considered responses that my ministerial colleagues and I provided at that stage, but I will deal with a couple of the amendments to which the shadow Minister referred today. Amendment 175 deals with the possession of weapons with intent to use unlawful violence. It seeks to increase the maximum sentence for possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon with the intention to use unlawful violence from four years to 14. Increasing the maximum penalty for that offence in isolation, without looking at other possession offences, would result in inconsistency in the law in this area. We have set the maximum penalty for the “possession with intent” offence at four years’ imprisonment to be consistent with the maximum penalties for all other knife-related possession offences. We will conduct a review of the maximum penalties for knife-related offences, and establish whether they are still appropriate. The shadow Minister said that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation had recommended that the sentence for the new offence of possession of a weapon with intent to cause violence should be increased substantially. In his recent report, the independent reviewer recommended the creation of a new offence for cases where an individual prepares to kill more than two people. He said: “If this offence is created, then there is no need to reconsider the maximum sentence for the proposed offence of possessing an article with violent intent under the Crime and Policing Bill.” As I have said, the Government are considering creating such an offence, so increasing the maximum sentence for the new offence of possessing an article with violent intent is unnecessary. We will debate the matter further tomorrow, when we consider the shadow Minister’s new clause 143. The shadow Minister also tabled, and referred to, amendments 172 and 173, which would make those responsible for fly-tipping “liable for the costs of cleaning up.” When local authorities prosecute fly-tippers, on conviction, a cost order can already be made by the court, so that a landowner’s costs can be recovered from the perpetrator. While sentencing is a matter for the courts, guidance on presenting court cases produced by the National Fly-Tipping Prevention Group, which the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs chairs, explains that prosecutors should consider applying for compensation for the removal of waste, and we will consider building on that advice in the statutory guidance issued under clause 9. Amendment 174 concerns points on driving licences as a penalty for fly-tipping. Again, sentencing is a matter for the courts, but I will ask my counterparts at DEFRA, who are responsible for policy on fly-tipping, to consider the benefits of enabling the endorsement of penalty points for fly-tippers. The hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) spoke to amendment 160 on the use of live facial recognition in the policing of protests. Live facial recognition is a valuable policing tool that helps to keep people safe. Its use is already governed by the Human Rights Act 1998 and data protection laws. I do, however, recognise the need to assess whether a bespoke legislation framework is needed, and we will set out our plans on this later in the year.

On facial recognition, does the Minister agree that my amendment 21 would stop the police accessing everybody’s driving licences to use them for complete surveillance, which is not the intention of the Bill?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point. I probably will not have time to go into detail, but the amendment is not required because what my hon. Friend describes is not what the Bill is intended to do. I am very happy to speak to her outside the Chamber about that, but I reassure her that that is not its intention. On amendment 157, the Home Office regularly engages with frontline delivery partners and practitioners to understand how the antisocial behaviour powers are being used, and their effectiveness in preventing and tackling ASB. That is why the Bill includes measures to strengthen the powers available to police and local authorities. New requirements in the Bill for local agencies to provide information about ASB to the Government will further enhance our understanding of how the ASB powers are used to tackle antisocial behaviour. On amendment 158, I want to make it clear that housing injunctions and youth injunctions are not novel. They are already provided for in legislation in the form of the civil injunction, which is being split into three separate orders: the respect order, the youth injunction and the housing injunction. The youth and housing injunctions retain elements of the existing civil injunction that are not covered by the new respect orders—namely, elements relating to offenders under 18 and housing-related nuisance ASB. I also assure the House that any revisions to the ASB statutory guidance are extensively consulted on with relevant stakeholders, including frontline practitioners. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Hazel Grove, also spoke to amendment 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills (Tessa Munt), which would apply the duty to report child sexual abuse to anyone working or volunteering in any capacity for religious, belief or faith groups. I know that she has had an opportunity to discuss that amendment in recent days with the Minister who has responsibility for safeguarding. Turning to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North West Cambridgeshire (Sam Carling), I thought it was very helpful and useful for the House to hear his experience and knowledge of the issues involving Jehovah’s Witness groups, and he brought to life what it means when such reports are made. On amendment 10, the Government do not consider that it would be proportionate to provide for a criminal sanction that may inadvertently create a chilling effect on those who wish to volunteer with children or enter certain professions. We are creating a specific offence of preventing or deterring a person from complying with the duty to report, and anyone who seeks deliberately to prevent someone from fulfilling their mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse will face the full force of the law.

Will the Minister give way?

I will continue, because I need to cover other amendments that have been tabled. On amendment 11, assessing the signs and indications of abuse can be complex and subjective, particularly for the very large number of non-experts that this duty will apply to, many of whom are engaging with children infrequently or irregularly. We have therefore chosen to focus the duty on scenarios in which a reporter has been given an unambiguous reason to believe that they are in receipt of an allegation of child sexual abuse. Amendment 22 seeks to add a reference to the legislative definition of “positions of trust” in schedule 7. However, a person occupies a position of trust only in relation to specific sexual offences committed against a specific child, and the term’s value as a definition for a reporter of abuse is therefore limited. The amendment also has the potential to create confusing duplication, given the significant overlap between regulated activity with children and positions of trust. The list of activities in schedule 7 has been drawn up to set out activities involving positions of trust that may not be adequately covered by the definition of regulated activity. The Government will of course keep this list under review, and amend it if necessary. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton North East (Kirith Entwistle) spoke to amendment 20, which relates to the new broader offence of encouraging or assisting self-harm in clause 95. She made a very passionate speech on this issue, and I know that she, too, has met the Minister to discuss it in recent days. On sentencing, the courts must already consider the circumstances of each case, including aggravating and mitigating factors, and follow relevant guidelines set by the independent Sentencing Council. Where a defendant has previous convictions, this is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing. On whether a charge of murder should be brought in the circumstances set out in the amendment, I have to say to my hon. Friend that the amendment is wholly inconsistent with the criminal offence of murder, which has different elements that must be met before a person can be convicted. That said, it is important to recognise that where the encouragement or assistance results in suicide, the separate offence of encouraging or assisting suicide applies; manslaughter may be charged if there is a direct link between the abuse and the suicide. The right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) spoke to amendment 161, which aims to delete clause 114. The clause will allow the police to impose conditions on a protest near a place of worship if the police have a reasonable belief that the protest may deter individuals from accessing the place of worship for religious activities, even if that effect is not intended. That gives the police total clarity on how and when they can protect places of worship, while respecting the right to peaceful protest. A number of hon. and right hon. Members spoke about spiking, including my hon. Friends the Members for Hitchin (Alistair Strathern) and for Darlington (Lola McEvoy), the right hon. Member for Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweeddale (David Mundell), and my hon. Friend the Member for Milton Keynes Central (Emily Darlington), as well as the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson), who tabled amendment 19. Before I say anything else, I pay tribute to all those who have campaigned on this issue for many years, including families and campaign groups. Richard Graham, a former Member of this House, was a pioneer of the case for bringing forward a spiking amendment. As discussed in Committee, the offence as drafted already captures a wide range of criminal behaviours, which cover both spiking and non-spiking incidents; for example, it covers the victim being pepper sprayed. As for the reference to a specific intent to “injure, aggrieve or annoy”, that wording is of long standing and has been widely interpreted by the courts. Every case will be judged on the facts. For instance, if someone administers a harmful substance as a prank, they would likely be found to have intended to “annoy” or “aggrieve”. The broadness of the new offence, and the increase in the maximum penalty as compared to the penalty for the existing offence under section 24 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, is, in the Government’s view, sufficient. Introducing recklessness as an alternative to intent risks over-complicating the law and is unnecessary for securing appropriate convictions. The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East spent a lot of time looking at this issue, so I want to address it. The spiking clause in the Bill is modelled on the offence under the 1861 Act, which does not have a recklessness test. In the 2004 case of Gantz, an intention to “loosen up” the victim—he referred to that intention in the example he gave today—was covered; it may be helpful for him to reflect on that. We also understand that as recently as last month, a person was convicted of spiking another person “as a joke”. We therefore deem that the inclusion of “recklessness” is unnecessary to ensure the appropriate convictions that we are looking for with this new offence. However, we are very happy to continue to have conversations about this to ensure that we get the law absolutely right. Many other speeches were made today that I would like to comment on, but I am running swiftly out of time. In my earlier comments, I referred to amendments 4 to 8 from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion (Siân Berry). I fully understand why amendment 2 was tabled by the hon. Member for Moray West, Nairn and Strathspey (Graham Leadbitter), but those who cycle have a duty to do so safely and in accordance with the highway code, and they are wholly responsible and liable for their actions. In conclusion, I hope that in the light of the responses I have given to the amendments today, Members will not press them. I commend new clause 52 to the House.

16:00:00

The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83E), That the clause be read a Second time.

New Clause 53

Arranging or facilitating begging for gain

“(1) A person commits an offence if, for gain, the person arranges or facilitates another person’s begging.

(2) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both).

(3) In subsection (2) ‘the maximum term for summary offences’ means—

(a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, 6 months;

(b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 54

Proving an offence under section 38

“(1) This section applies for the purposes of section 38.

(2) Where it is alleged that a person (D) intended to cause a child to commit an offence, it is sufficient to prove that D intended to cause the child to do an act which would amount to the commission of that offence.

(3) Where it is alleged that a person (D) intended to cause a child to do anything outside the United Kingdom which would constitute an offence if done in any part of the United Kingdom, it is sufficient to prove that D intended to cause the child to do an act which, if done in any part of the United Kingdom, would amount to the commission of that offence.

(4) Where it is alleged that a person (D) intended to facilitate the causing of a child, in future, to—

(a) commit an offence, or

(b) do anything outside the United Kingdom which would constitute an offence if done in any part of the United Kingdom,

it is sufficient to prove that D intended to facilitate the causing of the child in future to do an act which would amount to the commission of that offence, or would if done in any part of the United Kingdom amount to the commission of that offence.

(5) In proving for the purposes of this section whether an act is one which, if done or if done in any part of the United Kingdom, would amount to the commission of an offence—

(a) if the offence is one requiring proof of fault, it must be proved that—

(i) D believed that, were the act to be done, it would be done with that fault, or

(ii) D’s state of mind was such that, were D to do it, it would be done with that fault;

(b) if the offence is one requiring proof of particular circumstances or consequences (or both), it must be proved that D intended or believed that, were the act to be done, it would be done in those circumstances or with those consequences.

(6) For the purposes of subsection (5)(a)(ii), D is to be assumed to be able to do the act in question.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 55

Special measures for witnesses

“(1) Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (special measures directions in the case of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses) applies to relevant proceedings under this Chapter as it applies to criminal proceedings, but with—

(a) the omission of sections 17(4) to (7), 21(4C)(e), 22A, 27(10) and 32 of that Act (which55 make provision appropriate only in the context of criminal proceedings), and

(b) any other necessary modifications.

(2) Rules of court made under or for the purposes of Chapter 1 of Part 2 of that Act apply to relevant proceedings under this Chapter—

(a) to the extent provided by rules of court, and

(b) subject to any modifications provided by rules of court.

(3) Section 47 of that Act (restrictions on reporting special measures directions etc) applies with any necessary modifications—

(a) to a direction under section 19 of that Act as applied by this section;

(b) to a direction discharging or varying such a direction.

Sections 49 and 51 of that Act (offences) apply accordingly.

(4) In this section ‘relevant proceedings under this Chapter’ means any proceedings under this Chapter except proceedings relating to an offence under section 38, 48 or 49.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 56

Causing internal concealment of item for criminal purpose

“(1) A person (‘A’) commits an offence if—

(a) A intentionally causes a person other than A who is a child (‘C’) to conceal a specified item inside C’s body, and

(b) the condition in subsection (3) is met.

(2) It does not matter whether the specified item gets inside C’s body by an act of A or C or another person.

(3) The condition is that A—

(a) knows or reasonably suspects that the specified item has been used in connection with criminal conduct, or

(b) intends the specified item to be, or knows or reasonably suspects that the specified item may be, used in connection with criminal conduct.

(4) A person (‘A’) commits an offence if—

(a) any of the following occurs, where B is a person other than A who is not a child—

(i) A compels B to conceal a specified item inside B’s body,

(ii) A coerces or deceives B into concealing a specified item inside B’s body, or

(iii) A engages in controlling or manipulative behaviour towards B, as a result of which B conceals a specified item inside B’s body, and

(b) the condition in subsection (3) is met.

(5) It does not matter whether the specified item gets inside B’s body by an act of A or B or another person.

(6) A is to be treated as acting in a way mentioned in subsection (4)(a) where A intentionally causes another person to act in that way (as well as where A acts in that way themselves).

(7) In considering whether a person’s behaviour towards B is controlling or manipulative, regard may be had to the nature of the relationship between the person and B and to any of B’s personal circumstances which may make B more vulnerable than other persons.

(8) For the purposes of this section the following are specified items—

(a) controlled drugs within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971;

(b) psychoactive substances within the meaning of the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016;

(c) a mobile telephone;

(d) a SIM card;

(e) an electronic device;

(f) cash;

(g) a payment card;

(h) jewellery;

(i) any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to persons, or capable of causing serious injury to persons;

(j) any weapon to which section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (offensive weapons) applies, as that section applies in England and Wales.

(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend this section for the purpose of changing the items which are specified items.

(10) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or a fine (or both).

(11) In this section—

‘child’ means a person under the age of 18;

‘criminal conduct’ means—

(a) a criminal offence, or

(b) anything done outside England and Wales which would constitute a criminal offence if done in England or Wales;

‘electronic device’ means any device on which information is capable of being stored electronically and includes any component of such a device;

‘payment card’ means a credit card, a charge card, a prepaid card or a debit card;

‘SIM card’ means a removable physical subscriber identity module.

(12) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 36D (inserted by section 38), after the entry for section 38 insert—

‘section (Causing internal concealment of item for criminal purpose) (causing internal concealment of item for criminal purpose)’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 57

Secretary of State guidance

“(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance to relevant officers about the exercise of their functions in connection with—

(a) the prevention, detection and investigation of offences under section 38;

(b) CCE prevention orders under section 40;

(c) CCE prevention orders within the meaning of Chapter 2A of Part 11 of the Sentencing Code (orders made on conviction);

(d) the prevention, detection and investigation of offences under section 53;

(e) the prevention, detection and investigation of offences under section (Causing internal concealment of item for criminal purpose).

(2) A relevant officer must have regard to any guidance issued under this section.

(3) ‘Relevant officer’ means—

(a) a chief officer of police, within the meaning of section 101(1) of the Police Act 1996,

(b) the chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police,

(c) the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, and

(d) the Director General of the National Crime Agency.

(4) But subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to the exercise of functions in connection with the matters in subsection (1)(a) or (d) by—

(a) the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, or

(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency,

in relation to Scotland.

(5) The Secretary of State may revise any guidance issued under this section.

(6) Before issuing any guidance or revisions under this section, the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(7) Subsection (6) does not apply to revisions if the Secretary of State considers that they are not substantial.

(8) The Secretary of State must publish any guidance or revisions issued under this section.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 58

Department of Justice guidance

“(1) The Department of Justice in Northern Ireland (‘the Department’) may issue guidance to the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland about the exercise of the Chief Constable’s functions in connection with—

(a) the prevention, detection and investigation of offences under section 38;

(b) the prevention, detection and investigation of offences under section 53.

(2) The Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland must have regard to any guidance issued under this section.

(3) The Department may revise any guidance issued under this section.

(4) Before issuing any guidance or revisions under this section, the Department must consult such persons as it considers appropriate.

(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to revisions if the Department considers that they are not substantial.

(6) The Department must publish any guidance or revisions issued under this section.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 59

Removal of limitation period in child sexual abuse cases

“(1) The Limitation Act 1980 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 11 insert—

(1) None of the time limits given in the preceding provisions of this Act apply to an action to which this section applies.

(2) This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under a statute or independently of any contract or any such provision) which meets conditions 1 to 3.

(3) Condition 1 is that the damages claimed by the claimant consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the claimant.

(4) Condition 2 is that the claimant was under 18 on the date on which the cause of action accrued.

(5) Condition 3 is that the act or omission to which the claimant’s personal injuries were attributable constituted sexual abuse.

(6) This section applies in relation to actions brought, and causes of action accrued, before (as well as after) this section comes into force.

(7) But it does not apply in relation to a claim which, before this section comes into force, was settled by agreement between the parties or determined by a court (whether or not the determination is subject to appeal).

(8) This section does not apply to any action brought for damages under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

(9) This section does not apply to a cause of action surviving for the benefit of a person’s estate by virtue of section 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, except where an action was brought by the person before the person’s death.

(1) This section applies where an action to which section 11ZA applies is brought after the expiration of the time limit that would apply but for that section (disregarding the possibility of the time limit being disapplied under section 33).

(2) The court must dismiss the action if the defendant satisfies the court that it is not possible for a fair hearing to take place.

(3) The court must also dismiss the action if—

(a) the action was begun, or the cause of action accrued, before section 11ZA came into force,

(b) the defendant satisfies the court that, because of the application of section 11ZA, there would be substantial prejudice to the defendant if the action were to proceed, and

(c) having regard to that prejudice, and the prejudice to the claimant if the action is dismissed, the court is satisfied that it would not be equitable to allow the action to proceed.

(4) In this section “the court” means the court in which the action has been brought.’

(3) In section 12 (special time limit for actions under Fatal Accidents legislation) after subsection (1) insert—

‘(1A) An action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 may not be brought if—

(a) section 11ZA would have applied to an action by the person injured to recover damages in respect of the injury, and

(b) the death occurred after the expiration of the time limit that would have applied but for that section (disregarding the possibility of that time limit being overridden under section 33).’

(4) In section 14B(1) (overriding time limit for negligence actions) after ‘section 11’ insert ‘or 11ZA’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 60

Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers

“(1) A person (‘D’) commits an offence if conditions 1 to 4 are met.

(2) Condition 1 is that D—

(a) uses towards an emergency worker (‘E’) threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or

(b) displays or gives to E any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting.

(3) In this section ‘D’s relevant conduct’ means the conduct of D that meets condition 1.

(4) Condition 2 is that D—

(a) intends the words or behaviour, or the writing, sign or other visible representation, to be threatening, abusive or insulting, or

(b) is aware that they may be threatening, abusive or insulting.

(5) Condition 3 is that D’s relevant conduct is racially or religiously hostile towards E.

(6) Condition 4 is that D’s relevant conduct—

(a) is engaged in by D with intent to make E believe, or is likely to make E believe, that immediate unlawful violence will be used against E by D,

(b) is engaged in by D with intent to provoke, or is likely to provoke, the immediate use of unlawful violence against E by another person, or

(c) is engaged in by D with intent to cause E harassment, alarm or distress, and causes E harassment, alarm or distress.

(7) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in the magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or a fine (or both).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 61

Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers

“(1) A person (‘D’) commits an offence if conditions 1 to 3 are met.

(2) Condition 1 is that D—

(a) uses threatening or abusive words or behaviour, or

(b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening or abusive,

within the hearing or sight of an emergency worker (‘E’) likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress by D’s conduct.

(3) In this section ‘D’s relevant conduct’ means the conduct of D that meets condition 1.

(4) Condition 2 is that D—

(a) intends the words or behaviour, or the writing, sign or other visible representation, to be threatening or abusive, or

(b) is aware that they may be threatening or abusive.

(5) Condition 3 is that D’s relevant conduct is racially or religiously hostile towards E.

(6) It is a defence for D to show that—

(a) D had no reason to believe that there was an emergency worker within hearing or sight who was likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress, or

(b) D’s conduct was reasonable.

(7) D is to be taken to have shown a matter if—

(a) sufficient evidence of the matter is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(8) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 62

Interpretation of sections (Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers) and (Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers)

“(1) This section applies for the interpretation of sections (Threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour towards emergency workers) and (Threatening or abusive behaviour likely to harass, alarm or distress emergency workers).

(2) ‘Emergency worker’ means an emergency worker, within the meaning of section 3 of the Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Act 2018, acting in their capacity as such.

(3) The conduct of a person (‘D’) is racially or religiously hostile to another person (‘E’) if—

(a) at the time of that conduct, or immediately before or after that time, D demonstrates towards E hostility based on E’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group, or

(b) D’s conduct is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their membership of that group.

(4) It is immaterial whether D’s hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in subsection (3).

(5) In subsection (3)—

‘membership’ , in relation to a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group;

‘presumed’ means presumed by D;

‘racial group’ means a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins;

‘religious group’ means a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief.

(6) A person whose awareness is impaired by intoxication is to be treated as aware of anything they would be aware of if not intoxicated, unless they show that their intoxication—

(a) was not self-induced or

(b) was caused solely by the taking or administration of a substance in the course of medical treatment.

(7) In subsection (6) ‘intoxication’ means any intoxication, whether caused by drink, drugs or other means, or by a combination of means.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 63

Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices

“(1) Where an electronic device has been lawfully seized, a senior officer may authorise an enforcement officer to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before it was seized.

(2) A senior officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that—

(a) the information mentioned in subsection (1) includes information that is relevant to a reasonable line of enquiry which is being, or is to be pursued, by an enforcement officer for one or more relevant purposes, and

(b) it is not reasonably practicable to obtain that information by other means.

(3) The power conferred by virtue of subsection (1) may be exercised only to extract information—

(a) which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the device was seized, and

(b) which the person exercising the power considers necessary and proportionate to extract for the purpose of 63 obtaining information which is relevant as mentioned in subsection (2)(a).

(4) An authorisation under subsection (1) also confers powers to—

(a) access an online account of the kind mentioned in that subsection, and

(b) examine any information accessible by means of such an account.

(5) The power conferred by virtue of subsection (4)(b) may be exercised only to the extent that the person exercising the power considers necessary and proportionate for the purpose of determining whether information may be extracted under the authorisation.

(6) A person who is given an authorisation under subsection (1) may arrange for a person to exercise the powers conferred by the authorisation on their behalf.

(7) For the purposes of this section, each of the following are ‘relevant purposes’—

(a) in every case, the purpose of preventing, detecting, investigating or prosecuting crime;

(b) in a case where the device mentioned in subsection (1) was seized under section 43E of the Terrorism Act 2000, the purpose of protecting the public from the risk of terrorism;

(c) in a case where the device was seized under Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, a purpose connected with—

(i) protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, or

(ii) preventing or restricting an individual's involvement in terrorism-related activity;

(d) in a case where the device was seized under Schedule 11 to the National Security Act 2023, a purpose connected with—

(i) protecting the United Kingdom from the risk of acts or threats within section 33(3) of that Act, or

(ii) preventing or restricting an individual's involvement in foreign power threat activity.

(8) In this Act,

‘online account’ means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible.

(9) References in this Act to the extraction of information include its reproduction in any form.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 64

Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): supplementary

“(1) An authorisation under section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices) may be given—

(a) orally or in writing;

(b) subject to specified conditions.

(2) An authorisation under section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices) must specify each of the online accounts in respect of which it is given.

(3) As soon as reasonably practicable after giving an authorisation under section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices), a senior officer must record in writing—

(a) if the authorisation was given orally, the authorisation (including any conditions to which it is subject), and

(b) in any case, the senior officer’s reasons for being satisfied as mentioned in section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices)(2).

(4) Any information which has been extracted under an authorisation under section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices) may be retained for so long as is necessary in all the circumstances; but this is subject to section (Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): confidential information).

(5) Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices) does not limit any other power relating to the extraction of information or otherwise.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 65

Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): interpretation

“(1) In section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices)—

(a) “enforcement officer” means a person listed in the first column of the following table, and

(b) “senior officer”, in respect of an enforcement officer, means a person listed in the corresponding entry in the second column of the table.

(2) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the table in subsection (1)—

(a) so as to add a reference to a person,

(b) so as to remove a reference to a person, or

(c) so as to modify a description of a person mentioned in that table.

(3) In section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices)—

“crime” means—

(a) conduct which constitutes one or more criminal offences in any part of the United Kingdom, or

(b) conduct which, if it took place in any part of the United Kingdom, would constitute one or more criminal offences;

“criminal offence” includes—

(a) a service offence within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act 2006, and

(b) an SDA offence within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (Transitional Provisions etc) Order 2009 (S.I. 2009/1059);

“involvement in foreign power threat activity” has the same meaning as in Part 2 of the National Security Act 2023 (see section 62(1) of that Act);

“involvement in terrorism-related activity” has the same meaning as in Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (see section 4 of that Act);

“terrorism” has the same meaning as in the Terrorism Act 2000 (see section 1(1) to (4) of that Act).

(4) References in section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices) to an electronic device which has been lawfully seized include—

(a) a device possession of which has been taken under—

(i) section 448(3) of the Companies Act 1985;

(ii) section 2(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987;

(b) a device which has been produced in compliance with—

(i) a notice under section 2(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987;

(ii) a notice under section 197 of the National Health Service Act 2006.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 66

Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): confidential information

“(1) This section applies where—

(a) information has been extracted under the power conferred by virtue of section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices)(1), and

(b) it appears to any person accessing the information as a result of the exercise of that power that the information is, or contains, confidential information.

(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (7), as soon as reasonably practicable after accessing the confidential information, the person must ensure that—

(a) the information is made inaccessible, or

(b) where the extraction involved a copy being made of the confidential information, the copy is destroyed.

(3) The duty in subsection (2) does not apply if—

(a) the confidential information is comprised in other information which is not confidential information, and

(b) it is not reasonably practicable for the confidential information to be separated from that other information without prejudicing its use in relation to a reasonable line of enquiry of the kind mentioned in section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices)(2)(a).

(4) Where the duty in subsection (2) is so disapplied, the person accessing the confidential information must ensure that it is not—

(a) examined or copied, or

(b) put to any use other than as mentioned in subsection (3)(b).

(5) In this section ‘confidential information’ means information which constitutes or may constitute—

(a) confidential journalistic material within the meaning of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (see section 264(6) and (7) of that Act), or

(b) protected material.

(6) In this section ‘protected material’ means—

(a) so far as this section applies to England and Wales—

(i) items subject to legal privilege, within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see section 10 of that Act);

(ii) excluded material within the meaning of that Act (see section 11 of that Act);

(iii) special procedure material within the meaning of that Act (see section 14 of that Act);

(b) so far as this section applies to Scotland—

(i) items in respect of which a claim to confidentiality of communications could be maintained in legal proceedings;

(ii) other material of a kind mentioned in paragraph (a)(ii) or (iii) of this subsection;

(c) so far as this section applies to Northern Ireland—

(i) items subject to legal privilege within the meaning of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/1341 (N.I. 12)) (see Article 12 of that Order);

(ii) excluded material within the meaning of that Order (see Article 13 of that Order);

(iii) special procedure material within the meaning of that Order (see Article 16 of that Order).

(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide for circumstances in which the duty in subsection (2) does not apply in relation to protected material of the kind mentioned in subsection (6)(a)(ii) and (iii), (b)(ii), and (c)(ii) and (iii).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 67

Section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices): code of practice

“(1) The Secretary of State must prepare a code of practice about—

(a) the exercise of the power to give an authorisation under section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices)(1), and

(b) the exercise of the powers conferred by such an authorisation.

(2) The code may make different provision for different purposes or areas.

(3) In preparing the code, the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Information Commissioner,

(b) the Investigatory Powers Commissioner,

(c) the Scottish Ministers,

(d) the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and

(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) After preparing the code, the Secretary of State must lay it before Parliament and publish it.

(5) After the Secretary of State has complied with subsection (4), the Secretary of State may bring the code into force by regulations.

(6) After the code has come into force the Secretary of State may from time to time revise it.

(7) A person must have regard to the code of practice for the time being in force under this section in exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, the powers mentioned in subsection (1).

(8) A failure on the part of a person to act in accordance with the code does not of itself render the person liable to any criminal or civil proceedings.

(9) But the code is admissible in evidence in criminal or civil proceedings and a court may take into account a failure to act in accordance with it in determining a question in the proceedings.

(10) References in subsections (2) to (9) to the code include a revised code, subject to subsection (11).

(11) The duty to consult in subsection (3) does not apply in relation to the preparation of a revised code if the Secretary of State considers that the proposed revisions are insubstantial.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 68

Extraction of online information: ports and border security

“(1) In Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls), after paragraph 11A insert—

11B (1) This paragraph applies where an electronic device is detained under paragraph 11 after having been—

(a) searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or

(b) examined under paragraph 9.

(2) A relevant senior officer may authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began.

(3) The power conferred by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may be exercised only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began.

(4) An authorisation under sub-paragraph (2) also confers powers to—

(a) access an online account of the kind mentioned in that sub-paragraph, and

(b) examine any information accessible by means of such an account.

(5) The power conferred by virtue of sub-paragraph (4)(b) may be exercised only for the purpose of determining whether information may be extracted under the authorisation.

(6) The powers conferred by virtue of this paragraph are exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be detained under paragraph 11.

(7) A constable who is given an authorisation under sub-paragraph (2) may arrange for another person to exercise the powers conferred by the authorisation on their behalf.

(8) In this paragraph—

“online account” means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible;

“relevant senior officer” , in relation to a constable who is given an authorisation under sub-paragraph (2), means another constable who—

(a) is of a higher rank than the constable who is given the authorisation, and

(b) has not been directly involved in the exercise of any power under this Part of this Schedule to take the electronic device or to question a person from whom the device was taken.

(9) References in this paragraph and paragraph 11C to the extraction of information include its reproduction in any form.

11C Any information which has been extracted by virtue of paragraph 11B may be retained by a constable—

(a) for so long as is necessary for the purpose of determining whether a person falls within section 40(1)(b),

(b) while the constable believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings, or

(c) while the constable believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971.’

(2) In Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (border security), after paragraph 22 insert—

22A (1) This paragraph applies where an electronic device is retained under paragraph 11 after having been—

(a) searched or found on a search under paragraph 8, or

(b) examined under paragraph 9.

(2) A relevant senior officer may authorise a constable to extract information accessible by means of one or more online accounts which were accessed by means of the device before the search or examination began.

(3) The power conferred by virtue of sub-paragraph (2) may be exercised only to extract information which was accessible by means of the online accounts at the time the search or examination began.

(4) An authorisation under sub-paragraph (2) also confers powers to—

(a) access an online account of the kind mentioned in that sub-paragraph, and

(b) examine any information accessible by means of such an account.

(5) The power conferred by virtue of sub-paragraph (4)(b) may be exercised only for the purpose of determining whether information may be extracted under the authorisation.

(6) The powers conferred by virtue of this paragraph are exercisable only for so long as the electronic device continues to be retained under paragraph 11.

(7) A constable who is given an authorisation under sub-paragraph (2) may arrange for another person to exercise the powers conferred by the authorisation on their behalf.

(8) Where a constable makes such an arrangement, the person exercising those powers on their behalf is to be treated as an examining officer for the purposes of Part 4 of this Schedule.

(9) In this paragraph—

“online account” means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible;

“relevant senior officer” , in relation to a constable who is given an authorisation under sub-paragraph (2), means another constable who—

(a) is of a higher rank than the constable who is given the authorisation, and

(b) has not been directly involved in the exercise of any power under this Part of this Schedule to take the electronic device or to question a person from whom the device was taken.

(10) References in this paragraph and paragraph 22B to the extraction of information include its reproduction in any form.

22B Any information which has been extracted by virtue of paragraph 22A may be retained by a constable—

(a) for so long as it is necessary for the purpose of determining whether a person is or has been engaged in hostile activity,

(b) while the constable believes that it may be needed for use as evidence in criminal proceedings,

(c) while the constable believes that it may be needed in connection with a decision by the Secretary of State whether to make a deportation order under the Immigration Act 1971,

(d) while the constable believes it necessary to retain the information—

(i) in the interests of national security,

(ii) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security, or

(iii) for the purpose of preventing or detecting an act of serious crime, or

(e) while the constable believes it necessary to retain the information to prevent death or significant injury.

22C (1) Paragraphs 18 to 22 apply to information consisting of or including confidential material that is retained by virtue of paragraph 22B(d) or (e) as they apply to a copy consisting of or including confidential material that is retained by virtue of paragraph 17(3)(d) or (e), but with the following modifications.

(2) Paragraph 18(7) is to be read as if the reference to paragraph 17(3)(b) or (c) were a reference to paragraph 22B(b) or (c).

(3) Paragraph 19 is to be read as if—

(a) the references in sub-paragraph (3)(c) and (6) to the person from whom the article was taken from which the copy was made, and

(b) the reference in sub-paragraph (7) to the person from whom an article was taken from which a copy was made,

were references to the person from whom the device mentioned in paragraph 22A(1) was taken.

(4) Paragraph 20(4) is to be read as if the reference to a person from whom the article was taken from which the copy was made were a reference to the person from whom the device mentioned in paragraph 22A(1) was taken.

(5) Paragraph 21(7) is to be read as if the reference to the person from whom an article was taken from which the copy was made were a reference to the person from whom the device mentioned in paragraph 22A(1) was taken.

(6) Paragraph 22 is to be read as if—

(a) the reference in sub-paragraph (7) to paragraph 17(3)(b) or (c) were a reference to paragraph 22B(b) or (c);

(b) the reference in sub-paragraph (9) to the person from whom the article was taken from which the copy was made were a reference to the person from whom the device mentioned in paragraph 22A(1) was taken.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 69

Extraction of online information following agreement etc

“Schedule (Amendments to Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022) amends Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (extraction of information from electronic devices) in relation to the extraction of information accessible by means of online accounts.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 70

Lawful interception of communications

“(1) The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 48 insert—

(1) The interception of a relevant communication transmitted by means of a telecommunications system is authorised by this subsection if—

(a) the interception is carried out by or on behalf of a person who has been authorised under a relevant power to access one or more online accounts, and

(b) the interception is carried out for the purpose of enabling the person to access those online accounts.

(2) A “relevant communication” means a communication transmitted as part of a process used to—

(a) establish or verify the identity of a person, or

(b) establish or verify that a person is a natural person.

(3) A “relevant power” means a power conferred by—

(a) paragraph 11B of Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000;

(b) paragraph 22A of Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019;

(c) section 37(1A) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 by virtue of section 40 of that Act;

(d) section 41(1A) of that Act;

(e) section (Extraction of online information following seizure of electronic devices) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.

(4) The interception of a communication transmitted by means of a telecommunications system is authorised by this section if it is incidental to, or is reasonably carried out in connection with, conduct that is authorised by virtue of subsection (1).

(5) In this section “online account” means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible.’

(3) In section 229 (main oversight functions), in subsection (4)(e)(i), after ‘47’ insert ‘, 48A’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 71

Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons

“(1) Before employing or appointing any person, a law enforcement employer must check each barred list to ascertain whether the proposed employee or proposed appointee is a barred person.

(2) A law enforcement employer may not employ a barred person or otherwise appoint a barred person to any position.

(3) For the purposes of this section a person who is to be seconded to work for a law enforcement employer, and who will not be employed by that person, is to be regarded as being appointed by that person.

(4) Before designating a person as a community support volunteer or a policing support volunteer under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002, a chief officer of police, and the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, must check each barred list to ascertain whether the person is a barred person.

(5) A chief officer of police, and the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, may not designate a barred person as a community support volunteer or a policing support volunteer under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002.

(6) A law enforcement employer may not enter into a contract for the provision of services if the terms of the contract would permit a barred person to be involved in the exercise of law enforcement functions.

(7) A local policing body may not enter into a contract for the provision of services to a chief officer of police if the terms of the contract would permit a barred person to be involved in the exercise of law enforcement functions.

(8) In this section ‘barred list’ means—

(a) the police barred list maintained under Part 4A of the Police Act 1996;

(b) the British Transport Police barred list;

(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary barred list;

(d) the Ministry of Defence Police barred list;

(e) the National Crime Agency barred list;

(f) the Scottish police barred list maintained under section 59A of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (asp 8).

(9) In this section ‘barred person’ means a person who is included in a barred list.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 72

Meaning of “law enforcement employer”

“(1) In section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons) ‘law enforcement employer’ means—

(a) a chief officer of police;

(b) the Director General of the National Crime Agency;

(c) the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force;

(d) the British Transport Police Authority;

(e) the Civil Nuclear Police Authority;

(f) a local policing body;

(g) the chief inspector of constabulary appointed under section 54 of the Police Act 1996;

(h) the Independent Office for Police Conduct;

(i) the Secretary of State, when exercising functions relating to the Ministry of Defence Police;

(j) the College of Policing;

(k) a person specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(2) A person may be specified in regulations under subsection (1)(k) only if the person has law enforcement functions.

(3) If a person has both law enforcement functions and other functions, the person may be specified only—

(a) in relation to the exercise of the person's law enforcement functions, or

(b) in relation to the exercise of such of those law enforcement functions as are of a description specified in the regulations.

(4) Subsection (1)(i) does not preclude the Secretary of State being specified in relation to the exercise of law enforcement functions of a description not within that subsection.

(5) In this section ‘law enforcement functions’ means functions of a public nature that relate to policing or law enforcement.

(6) Regulations under this section may not contain provision which would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament, if contained in an Act of that Parliament.

(7) Regulations under this section may not contain provision which—

(a) would be within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly, if it were contained in an Act of that Assembly, and

(b) would not, if it were contained in a Bill in the Northern Ireland Assembly, result in the Bill requiring the consent of the Secretary of State under section 8 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 73

Application of section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) to Secretary of State

“(1) The duties in section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) (1) and (2) apply in relation to the Secretary of State only to the extent that the proposed employee or proposed appointee will be involved in the exercise of the functions of the Ministry of Defence Police.

(2) The additional duties in subsections (3) and (4) apply where the Secretary of State is proposing to arrange for an existing employee or existing appointee to become involved in the exercise of the functions of the Ministry of Defence Police (not having previously been so involved).

(3) Before making the arrangement, the Secretary of State must check each barred list to ascertain whether the existing employee or existing appointee is a barred person.

(4) The Secretary of State may not arrange for an existing employee or existing appointee who is a barred person to become involved in the exercise of the functions of the Ministry of Defence Police.

(5) For the purposes of this section, a person who is seconded to work for the Secretary of State is to be regarded as an existing appointee of the Secretary of State (if not an existing employee).

(6) In this section references to the Secretary of State are to be read in accordance with section (Meaning of ‘law enforcement employer’)(1)(i).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 74

Application of section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) to specified law enforcement employer

“(1) The duties in section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred person) (1) and (2) apply in relation to a specified law enforcement employer only to the extent that the proposed employee or proposed appointee will be involved in the exercise of specified law enforcement functions.

(2) The additional duties in subsections (3) and (4) apply where a specified law enforcement employer is proposing to arrange for an existing employee or existing appointee to become involved in the exercise of specified law enforcement functions (not having previously been so involved).

(3) Before making the arrangement, the specified law enforcement employer must check each barred list to ascertain whether the existing employee or existing appointee is a barred person.

(4) The specified law enforcement employer may not arrange for an existing employee or existing appointee who is a barred person to become involved in the exercise of specified law enforcement functions.

(5) For the purposes of this section, a person who is seconded to work for a specified law enforcement employer is to be regarded as an existing appointee of that person (if not an existing employee).

(6) In relation to a specified law enforcement employer, section (Law enforcement employers not to employ etc barred person)(6) applies as if the references to law enforcement functions were to specified law enforcement functions.

(7) In this section—

‘specified law enforcement employer’ means a person who is specified as a law enforcement employer in regulations under section (Meaning of ‘law enforcement employer’)(1)(k);

‘specified law enforcement functions’ means the law enforcement functions in relation to the exercise of which the person is specified.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 75

Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists

“(1) Before employing or appointing any person, a law enforcement employer must check each advisory list to ascertain whether the proposed employee or proposed appointee is included in an advisory list.

(2) For the purposes of this paragraph a person who is to be seconded to work for a law enforcement employer, and who will not be employed by that person, is to be regarded as being appointed by that person.

(3) Before designating a person as a community support volunteer or a policing support volunteer under section 38 of the Police Reform Act 2002, a chief officer of police, and the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, must check each advisory list to ascertain whether the person is included in a advisory list.

(4) The duty in subsection (1) applies to the Secretary of State only to the extent that the proposed employee or proposed appointee will be involved in the exercise of the functions of the Ministry of Defence Police.

(5) In subsection (4) references to the Secretary of State are to be read in accordance with section (Meaning of ‘law enforcement employer’)(1)(i).

(6) In this section ‘advisory list’ means—

(a) the police advisory list maintained under Part 4A of the Police Act 1996;

(b) the British Transport Police advisory list;

(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary advisory list;

(d) the Ministry of Defence Police advisory list;

(e) the National Crime Agency advisory list;

(f) the Scottish police advisory list maintained under section 59A of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (asp 8).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 76

Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer

“(1) The duty in section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists)(1) applies to a specified law enforcement employer only to the extent that the proposed employee or proposed appointee will be involved in the exercise of specified law enforcement functions.

(2) The additional duty in subsection (3) applies where a specified law enforcement employer is proposing to arrange for an existing employee or existing appointee to become involved in the exercise of specified law enforcement functions (not having previously been so involved).

(3) Before making the arrangement, the specified law enforcement employer must check each advisory list to ascertain whether the existing employee or existing appointee is included in an advisory list.

(4) For the purposes of this section a person who is seconded to work for a specified person is to be regarded as an existing appointee of that person (if not an existing employee of that person).

(5) In this section—

‘specified law enforcement employer’ means a person who is specified as a law enforcement employer in regulations under section (Meaning of ‘law enforcement employer’)(1)(k);

‘specified law enforcement functions’ means the law enforcement functions in relation to the exercise of which the person is specified.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 77

Interpretation of sections (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons) to (Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer)

“In sections (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons) to (Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer)—

‘advisory list’ has the meaning given by section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists)(6);

‘barred list’ has the meaning given by section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons)(8);

‘barred person’ has the meaning given by section (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons)(9);

‘British Transport Police advisory list’ means the advisory list maintained by the British Transport Police Authority under Part 2 of Schedule (Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists);

‘British Transport Police barred list’ means the barred persons list maintained by the British Transport Police Authority under Part 1 of Schedule (Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists);

‘chief officer of police’ has the same meaning as in the Police Act 1996 (see section 101(1) of that Act);

‘Civil Nuclear Constabulary advisory list’ means the advisory list maintained by the Civil Nuclear Police Authority under Part 2 of Schedule (Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists);

‘Civil Nuclear Constabulary barred list’ means the barred persons list maintained by the Civil Nuclear Police Authority under Part 1 of Schedule (Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists);

‘law enforcement functions’ has the meaning given by section (Meaning of law enforcement employer)(5);

‘Ministry of Defence Police advisory list’ means the advisory list maintained by the Secretary of State under Part 2 of Schedule (Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists);

‘Ministry of Defence Police barred list’ means the barred persons list maintained by the Secretary of State under Part 1 of Schedule (Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists);

‘National Crime Agency advisory list’ means the advisory list maintained by the Director General of the National Crime Agency under Part 2 of Schedule (Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists);

‘National Crime Agency barred list’ means the barred persons list maintained by the Director General of the National Crime Agency under Part 1 of Schedule (Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 78

Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists

“Schedule (Special police forces: barred persons lists and advisory lists) makes provision for barred persons lists and advisory lists to be maintained by—

(a) the British Transport Police Authority,

(b) the Civil Nuclear Police Authority,

(c) the Director General of the National Crime Agency, and

(d) the Secretary of State.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 79

Consequential amendments

“(1) In the Police Act 1996 omit—

(a) sections 88C to 88E

(effect of inclusion in police barred list);

(b) section 88K (effect of inclusion in police advisory list).

(2) The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 is amended as follows.

(3) In section 42(3AA) (person on police barred list not eligible for appointment as Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis)—

(a) the words from ‘the police’ to the end become paragraph (a);

(b) after that paragraph insert—

‘(b) the British Transport Police barred list (within the meaning of section (Interpretation of sections (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons) to (Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer)) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025;

(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary barred list (within the meaning of that section);

(d) the Ministry of Defence Police barred list (within the meaning of that section);

(e) the National Crime Agency barred list (within the meaning of that section);

(f) the Scottish police barred list maintained under section 59A of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (asp 8).’

(4) In section 42(3B) (person on police barred list not eligible for appointment as Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis)—

(a) the words from ‘the police’ to the end become paragraph (a);

(b) after that paragraph insert—

‘(b) the British Transport Police barred list (within the meaning of section (Interpretation of sections (Law enforcement employers may not employ etc barred persons) to (Application of section (Duty of law enforcement employers to check advisory lists) to specified law enforcement employer)) of the Crime and Policing Act 2025;

(c) the Civil Nuclear Constabulary barred list (within the meaning of that section);

(d) the Ministry of Defence Police barred list (within the meaning of that section);

(e) the National Crime Agency barred list (within the meaning of that section);

(f) the Scottish police barred list maintained under section 59A of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 (asp 8).’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 80

Power to give directions to critical police undertakings

“In the Police Act 1996, after section 40C insert—

(1) The Secretary of State may give a notice under this section to a critical police undertaking.

(2) An undertaking is a “critical police undertaking” if—

(a) it provides facilities or services to two or more police forces,

(b) the provision of facilities or services to police forces is its principal business activity,

(c) it is wholly or partly funded by grants from the Secretary of State, and

(d) the Secretary of State considers that the facilities or services it provides to police forces are calculated to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the police.

(3) A critical police undertaking to which a notice is given under this section must comply with any directions given to it under this section by the Secretary of State.

(4) A direction under this section is a direction requiring the critical police undertaking to which it is given to take, or not to take, action specified in the direction.

(5) The action that a direction may require a critical police undertaking to take includes (for example)—

(a) entering into agreements, including contracts of employment;

(b) appointing officers;

(c) exercising a function of management in a particular way;

(d) providing information to the Secretary of State.

(6) The Secretary of State may give a notice or direction under this section only if the Secretary of State considers that giving the notice or direction is calculated to promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the police.

(7) Before giving a notice or direction under this section the Secretary of State must consult the critical police undertaking to which the notice or direction is to be given.

(8) A notice or direction under this section must be given in writing.

(9) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, and publish, a notice or direction given under this section.

(10) The Secretary of State may vary or revoke a notice or direction given under this section by giving a further notice or direction under this section.

(11) A requirement to provide information as mentioned in subsection (5)(d) does not authorise or require a disclosure of information in contravention of the data protection legislation within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 2018 (but, in determining whether a disclosure would do so, the power to impose requirements by virtue of this section is to be taken into account).

(12) In this section “undertaking” has the meaning given by section 1161(1) of the Companies Act 2006.’”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 81

Ports and border security: retention and copying of articles

“(1) Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (port and border controls) is amended as follows.

(2) In paragraph 11—

(a) in sub-paragraph (2)(a), for ‘a period not exceeding’ substitute ‘the period of’;

(b) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—

‘(3) Where an article is detained by virtue of paragraph (a) of sub-paragraph (2), a senior officer may extend the period mentioned in that paragraph by up to 7 days.

(4) A senior officer may only exercise the power conferred by sub-paragraph (3) if the senior officer has not been directly involved in the exercise of any power under this Part of this Schedule to take the article or to question a person from whom the article was taken.

(5) In sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) “senior officer” means—

(a) where the examining officer who detained the article is a constable, a constable of a higher rank than the examining officer,

(b) where the examining officer who detained the article is an immigration officer, an immigration officer of a higher grade than the examining officer, and

(c) where the examining officer who detained the article is a customs officer, a customs officer of a higher grade than the examining officer.’

(3) In paragraph 11A, after sub-paragraph (3) insert—

‘(4) An examining officer may authorise another person to exercise the power conferred by sub-paragraph (2) on their behalf.’

(4) Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 (border security) is amended as follows.

(5) In paragraph 11—

(a) in sub-paragraph (2)(a), for ‘a period not exceeding’ substitute ‘the period of’;

(b) after sub-paragraph (2) insert—

‘(3) Where an article is retained by virtue of paragraph (a) of sub-paragraph (2), a senior officer may extend the period mentioned in that paragraph by up to 7 days.

(4) A senior officer may exercise the power conferred by sub-paragraph (3) only if the senior officer has not been directly involved in the exercise of any power under this Part of this Schedule to take the article or to question a person from whom the article was taken.

(5) In sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) “senior officer” means—

(a) where the examining officer who retained the article is a constable, a constable of a higher rank than the examining officer,

(b) where the examining officer who retained the article is an immigration officer, an immigration officer of a higher grade than the examining officer, and

(c) where the examining officer who retained the article is a customs officer, a customs officer of a higher grade than the examining officer.’

(6) In paragraph 12(6), for ‘the person from whom it was taken’ substitute ‘—

(a) the person from whom it was taken, or

(b) where the Commissioner considers that there is another person to whom it would be more appropriate to return the article, that person.’

(7) In paragraph 16(6)(b), for ‘the person from whom it was taken,’ substitute ‘—

(i) the person from whom it was taken, or

(ii) where the Commissioner considers that there is another person to whom it would be more appropriate to return the article, that person,’;

(8) In paragraph 17, after sub-paragraph (3) insert—

‘(4) An examining officer may authorise another person to exercise the power conferred by sub-paragraph (2) on their behalf.

(5) A person authorised under sub-paragraph (4) is to be treated as an examining officer for the purposes of Part 4 of this Schedule.’

(9) In paragraph 19(3)(a), omit ‘where the examining officer is a constable,’.

(10) In paragraph 20(8), in the definition of ‘senior officer’—

(a) in paragraph (a), omit ‘where the examining officer is a constable,’;

(b) omit paragraphs (b) and (c).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Clause 82

Extradition: cases where a person has been convicted

“(1) The Extradition Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 20 (case where person has been convicted: category 1 territories)—

(a) in subsection (5), for the words from ‘the person’ to the end substitute ‘any of the following applies—

(a) the person would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial;

(b) the person would be so entitled unless a court in the territory concerned were to decide that they deliberately absented themselves from their trial;

(c) the person was entitled as mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) but expressly waived that entitlement;

(d) having been informed that they were entitled as mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), the person failed to exercise that entitlement before the end of the period permitted for exercising it.’;

(b) after subsection (7) insert—

‘(7A) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person convicted at a trial at which they were legally represented (but not present in person) is to be treated as having been convicted in their presence.’;

(c) in subsection (8), in the words before paragraph (a)—

(i) after ‘constitute’ insert ‘(or would have constituted)’;

(ii) after ‘have’ insert ‘(or would have had)’.

(3) In section 85 (case where person has been convicted: category 2 territories)—

(a) in subsection (5), for the words from ‘the person’ to the end substitute ‘any of the following applies—

(a) the person would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial;

(b) the person would be so entitled unless a court in the territory concerned were to decide that they deliberately absented themselves from their trial;

(c) the person was entitled as mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) but expressly waived that entitlement;

(d) having been informed that they were entitled as mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), the person failed to exercise that entitlement before the end of the period permitted for exercising it.’;

(b) after subsection (7) insert—

‘(7A) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person convicted at a trial at which they were legally represented (but not present in person) is to be treated as having been convicted in their presence.’;

(c) in subsection (8), in the words before paragraph (a)—

(i) after ‘constitute’ insert ‘(or would have constituted)’;

(ii) after ‘have’ insert ‘(or would have had)’.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

New Schedule 1

Amendments to chapter 3 of part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022

“1 Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (extraction of information from electronic devices) is amended as follows.

2 In the Chapter heading—

(a) for “information from” substitute “information:”;

(b) after “devices” insert “and online accounts”.

3 (1) Section 37 (extraction of information from electronic devices: investigations of crime etc) is amended as follows.

(2) In the heading, omit “from electronic devices”.

(3) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) An authorised person may extract information accessible by means of an online account if—

(a) a user of the account has voluntarily provided access to the account to an authorised person, and

(b) that user has agreed to the extraction by an authorised person of information accessible by means of the account.

(1B) The power in subsection (1A)(b) may be exercised only in relation to information which is or was accessible by means of the online account at such time or times as have been agreed by the user of the account.”

(4) In subsection (2)—

(a) for “power” substitute “powers”;

(b) after “(1)” insert “and (1A)”.

(5) In subsection (5)—

(a) after “(1)” insert “or (1A)”;

(b) after “electronic device” (in both places) insert “, or accessible by means of the online account,”.

(6) In subsection (6)—

(a) in the words before paragraph (a), after “the power” insert “in subsection (1) or (1A)”;

(b) in paragraph (b), after “(1)” insert “or (1A)”.

(7) In subsection (7), after “(1)” insert “or (1A)”.

(8) In subsection (8), after “(1)” insert “or (1A)”.

(9) In subsection (9), after “the power” insert “in subsection (1) or (1A)”.

(10) In subsection (10)—

(a) in paragraph (a), for the words from “information” to the end substitute “information—

(i) likely to be stored on the device, or

(ii) likely to be accessible by means of the online account, and”;

(b) in paragraph (b)(ii), after “(1)” insert “or (1A)”.

(11) In subsection (11), after “(1)” insert “or (1A)”.

(12) In subsection (13)—

(a) after the definition of “information” insert—

““online account” means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible;”;

(b) for the definition of “user” substitute—

““user” —

(a) in relation to an electronic device, means a person who ordinarily uses the device;

(b) in relation to an online account, means a person who ordinarily uses the account.”

4 (1) Section 38 (application of section 37 to children and adults without capacity) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (2) insert—

“(2A) A child is not to be treated for the purposes of section 37(1A) as being capable of—

(a) voluntarily providing access to an online account for those purposes, or

(b) agreeing for those purposes to the extraction by an authorised person of information accessible by means of the online account.

(2B) If a child is a user of an online account, a person who is not a user of the account but is listed in subsection (3) may—

(a) voluntarily provide access to the online account to an authorised person for the purposes of section 37(1A), and

(b) agree for those purposes to the extraction by an authorised person of information accessible by means of the online account.”

(3) In subsection (3), for “subsection (2)” substitute “subsections (2) and (2B)”.

(4) In subsection (4), after “(2),” insert “or the power under section 37(1A) by virtue of subsection (2B),”.

(5) In subsection (5)—

(a) after “37(1)” insert “or (1A)”;

(b) after “(2)” insert “or (2B)”.

(6) After subsection (7) insert—

“(7A) An adult without capacity is not to be treated for the purposes of section 37(1A) as being capable of—

(a) voluntarily providing access to an online account for those purposes, or

(b) agreeing for those purposes to the extraction by an authorised person of information accessible by means of the online account.

(7B) If a user of an online account is an adult without capacity, a person who is not a user of the online account but is listed in subsection (8) may—

(a) voluntarily provide access to the online account to an authorised person for the purposes of section 37(1A), and

(b) agree for those purposes to the extraction by an authorised person of information accessible by means of the online account.”

(7) In subsection (8)—

(a) in the words before paragraph (a), for “subsection (7)” substitute “subsections (7) and (7B)”;

(b) after “and (b)” (in each place) insert “, or for the purposes of subsection (7B)(a) and (b),”.

(8) In subsection (9), for the words from “prevents” to the end substitute “prevents—

(a) any other user of an electronic device who is not a child or an adult without capacity from—

(i) voluntarily providing the device to an authorised person for the purposes of section 37(1), or

(ii) agreeing for those purposes to the extraction of information from the device by an authorised person;

(b) any other user of an online account who is not a child or an adult without capacity from—

(i) voluntarily providing access to the online account to an authorised person for the purposes of section 37(1A), or

(ii) agreeing for those purposes to the extraction by an authorised person of information accessible by means of the online account.”

(9) In subsection (10), after “and (b)” (in each place) insert “or (1A)(a) and (b)”;

(10) In subsection (11), in the definition of “relevant authorised person”, for the words from “person”” to the end substitute “person”—

(a) in relation to the extraction of information from an electronic device for a particular purpose, means an authorised person who may extract the information from the device for that purpose;

(b) in relation to the extraction of information accessible by means of an online account for a particular purpose, means an authorised person who may extract the information accessible by means of the online account for that purpose;”

5 (1) Section 39 (requirements for voluntary provision and agreement) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) A person (“P”) is to be treated for the purposes of section 37 or 38 as having—

(a) voluntarily provided access to an online account to an authorised person, and

(b) agreed to the extraction by an authorised person of information accessible by means of the online account,

only if the requirements of this section have been met.”

(3) In subsection (2), for the words from “to provide” to the end substitute “to—

(a) provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it, or

(b) provide access to the online account or agree to the extraction of information accessible by means of it.”

(4) In subsection (3)—

(a) in paragraph (d), for the words from “may” to the end substitute “may—

(i) refuse to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it, or

(ii) refuse to provide access to the online account or agree to the extraction of information accessible by means of it, and”;

(b) in paragraph (e), for the words from “P refuses” to the end substitute “P—

(i) refuses to provide the device or agree to the extraction of information from it, or