Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Committee (5th Day)

16:16:00

Clause 76: Entry, search and seizure in England and Wales

Amendment 92

Moved by

92: Clause 76, page 45, line 7, at end insert— “(2A) The functions are exercisable only when accompanied by an authorised person from the police force.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment seeks to restrict investigators’ powers of entry, search and seizure to situations when they are accompanied by an authorised person from the police force.

My Lords, I shall be brief. When we discussed a previous group on Part 1 that was similar to this, I believe the Minister stated that those using search or other powers would always be accompanied by a police constable, so I suppose I am looking for confirmation that that is the same in this case. If it is, I am curious to know why we really need the powers and why it cannot be left to the police to exercise them. I have one other, more important question. On the powers in Clause 76, under the DWP powers, new subsection (4)(i) refers to “section 117 (reasonable use of force)”. Slightly oddly, I have just discovered that that was not included in the powers for the PFSA, so can the Minister explain why the DWP thinks it needs to be able to use reasonable force when the PFSA did not? I beg to move.

My Lords, as we consider Amendments 92 and 93 from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on his behalf, it is important to reflect on the balance between effective fraud prevention and the safeguarding of individual rights. Amendment 92 proposes that investigators’ powers of entry, search and seizure should be exercised only when accompanied by an authorised member of the police force. This approach could provide an additional layer of oversight and reassurance to the public, but it may also introduce operational complexities that could affect the speed and efficiency of investigations into public sector fraud. Similarly, Amendment 93 seeks to require court authorisation before the Secretary of State can appoint authorised investigators. This would introduce judicial oversight, which is a well-established safeguard in many areas of law enforcement, and it could help to prevent the potential misuse of investigatory powers. But it may also add—as I said before—procedural steps that could delay urgent investigations, possibly hindering the recovery of stolen public funds, which is what this debate is all about. Both amendments raise important questions about proportionality and accountability. I look forward to hearing the views of colleagues and the Minister on how best to achieve the right balance in this legislation, and I await their contributions.

My Lords, I also wish to be brief and will cut down my notes, but this is a good opportunity to raise a number of points. I am very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has spoken to Amendments 92 and 93, as supported, or added to, by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. I share the principle that underpins Amendment 92 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka—that the powers of entry, search and seizure provided for in Clause 76 must be exercised responsibly and proportionately, with proper regard for the rights of individuals. However, my main point here is that, while the amendment aims to provide a safeguard by requiring investigators to be accompanied by a police officer when exercising these powers, I suggest that we need to balance that safeguard with a degree of practicality. If the use of these powers is deemed serious enough to require a police presence, one might reasonably ask an obvious question: why would the police not simply carry out the action themselves, under existing powers—I think that was the point that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, made—rather than acting in an accompanying or supporting role? If these powers are to be used more routinely—for example, to support the investigation of lower-level but still costly fraud—do we risk placing a significant administrative and resource burden on our already overstretched police forces? I could say more on this, but I will not. Amendment 93, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to insert an additional layer of judicial oversight into the appointment of authorised investigators by requiring that their authorisation is subject to court approval, rather than left solely to the discretion of the Secretary of State. Without going into the detail, I support the principle behind this amendment. I will conclude by asking some questions of the Minister on process, which has been a consistent theme on this side in our previous four days in Committee. I am not expecting answers now; it is really to put down the questions along the themes that I have just spoken to. We have had some verbal reassurance from the Government that these powers will be used against property and not people. I am not quite sure how reasonable force can be applied against property but, more than this, it is clear from the text of the Bill that this is not legally guaranteed. Reasonable force could be wielded against people by DWP officers; I hope that the Government can provide more clarity on the balance of that. Can the Minister confirm that these powers could in fact be used against people, as well as property? That is quite an important point. Again, the argument is about whether the police or the DWP may be required. In addition, can she give us some more information as to why she believes these powers need to be granted to civil servants in the DWP? I say again that the police are the recognised authority, who have legitimacy, in the eyes of the public, to exercise and apply PACE powers. I feel that the Government have a duty to defend, quite strongly, why they want to grant these sweeping powers to members of a government department such as the DWP. We have a police service for a reason: officers are trained, regulated and experienced in using these powers appropriately. If fraud is suspected, particularly at a serious level, is it not right that it should be investigated by the police and not delegated to civil servants? My concluding comment is that we should be cautious about expanding investigatory powers without a clear and compelling case. My final question to the Minister is: what justification is there for bypassing the police? That plays into my main question, which is: whither the police and whither the DWP?

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their comments and questions. I will speak first to Amendment 92. The amendment would undermine the policy intent of this part of the Bill, so we cannot accept it. The DWP leads investigations into social security matters and, as a result, our staff are better positioned to search for items relevant to these investigations—the things that they deal with, such as benefit claim packs or documents related to fraudulent identities. Requiring the police to be present for all DWP search and seizure activity, including investigative tasks related to securing criminal evidence, would erode the anticipated obvious benefits of the measure to both the DWP and the police. Crucially, it would divert the police away from focusing on the crime within our communities that only they can deal with and dealing with the human victims of those crimes. These powers allow the DWP to apply to a court for warrants to enter a premises, conduct search and seizure and apply for and exercise production orders, with or without the police present. That clarifies the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. They provide the DWP with greater control over its own operations and ensure that police time is not spent undertaking administrative tasks on the DWP’s behalf. However, I reassure the Committee that safeguards are in place to govern the use of these powers. First and foremost, court approval must be granted for all warrants. The requirements for a DWP warrant application will be as strict as those for a police warrant application. Furthermore, the DWP intends to exercise these powers exclusively in cases involving serious and organised crime. This is not novel. Similar powers are already being used by HMRC, the Food Standards Agency and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which can undertake search and seizure activity without needing to be accompanied by the police. Amendment 93 would impose unique obligations on the courts that they do not face in respect of other government departments with similar powers. PACE powers do not require the individual exercising them to be appointed by the court and there is no clear reason for the DWP to be any different. DWP-authorised investigators, like others who exercise PACE powers, will be subject to the PACE code of practice relating to search and seizure activity and will be required to follow the same procedures and processes as the police when submitting a warrant application to the court. These are not standards set by the DWP; they are set out in PACE, which all bodies exercising these kinds of law enforcement powers must adhere to. Specialist training must be successfully completed before authorisation is given and only then can an authorised investigator exercise these powers on behalf of the Secretary of State. That approach ensures that the correct responsibilities are attributed to the Secretary of State and the courts. On the question relating to the PSFA, I am advised that it is not that a constable necessarily has to be present, but somebody with those powers, who may not be a police officer but could be from the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office, et cetera. As I said, the police do not always have to be there, if it is not necessary. There will be occasions when it will be necessary. For example, the previous Government published a fraud plan in which they recommended that powers of not only search and seizure but arrest be taken. We have decided not to take those powers, so if there needed to be an arrest, we would need to have police officers with us. If there were a risk of serious violence, again, the police would need to be present, but not otherwise. On the question of force, the provisions set out in Clause 76 provide powers under PACE to enable DWP serious and organised crime investigators to apply for a search warrant to enter a premises, search it and seize items, with or without police involvement in England and Wales. The clause also enables authorised investigators to apply to a judge for an order requiring an individual suspected of social security fraud to provide certain types of sensitive information when relevant to the criminal investigation. It also provides for the use of reasonable force to conduct a search, such as breaking open a locked filing cabinet to search for materials. The clause provides that these powers can be used by an authorised investigator who is authorised by the Secretary of State. To be clear, a warrant provides for the powers that can be deployed when that warrant is exercised. Our authorised investigators in DWP will not use reasonable force against people, although they may use it against property, such as breaking open a locked filing cabinet to retrieve a laptop or other evidence. However, the reason it has to be here is that, when the DWP applies for a warrant, that warrant must cover any activities that may need to be undertaken by either the DWP or the police, so although our investigators will not use reasonable force against people, it may be necessary for the police to do so when they are accompanying the DWP. That is why the legislation is drafted that way. If it were not, police out there on our warrant would not be able to use reasonable force and there may be occasions on which they need to do so. I hope that that clarifies matters for the noble Lord.

Can the Minister explain why the DWP needs that power but the PSFA does not? The two clauses in the Bill are otherwise identical and differ only in respect of the reasonable force element. If the PSFA does not need it, I do not understand why the DWP does.

16:30:00

The expectation is that we will be dealing with different kinds of crime. We are talking about serious and organised crime, where we will go out looking for evidence. We believe we do need these powers. If there is another argument behind that I am happy to write to the noble Lord. I have explained why the DWP needs them, and we clearly do need them in these circumstances because without them we could not conduct this work. The DWP has lots of experience because we already do this work; the police just have to go out with us, to be there and to do the searching. So we know what we need and therefore we know that we need these powers. If there is anything else I can add on the PSFA, I will write to the noble Lord.

The Minister may have just answered my question, which is a slightly opaque one, perhaps. Is it a good assumption that in any search of a property by the DWP when it suspects fraud, members of the DWP will always go prepared with the necessary back-up, including the police or members of the NCA, if they suspect it is going to be a challenging search—or is that wrong?

As I said, the police might need to be present if we felt there was a risk of any serious violence. If it was felt there might be a need for arrests or, as the noble Viscount has suggested, there was a possible risk of violence, the police would be asked to accompany DWP officers. I have given those assurances, so I hope the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in this short but, I hope, illuminating debate. I have concerns about these police powers being given to civil servants and I do not think I am alone in that respect. I am comforted, to some extent, by the fact that these will be used only in the cases of serious and organised crime. I wonder whether the solution, therefore, is to put that in the Bill and put that safeguard in place, because I think that would comfort most people who have the concerns that we have. Perhaps that is something that the Minister might be willing to discuss between now and Report. That said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 92 withdrawn.

Amendment 93 not moved.

Clause 76 agreed.

Clause 77 agreed.

Schedule 4: Social security fraud: search and seizure powers etc

Amendment 94

Moved by

94: Schedule 4, page 95, line 8, leave out “items subject to legal privilege,” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 4, page 101, line 15.

My Lords, government Amendments 94 to 97 are minor and technical in nature. In England and Wales, the common law does not permit access to material protected by legal professional privilege under any circumstances. However, relying on this common-law exclusion would not extend to Scotland. In addition, a different definition of legal privilege applies in Scotland. To ensure that the original intent is maintained, this position is now set out in a single provision within new Schedule 3ZD. These amendments make it explicit that if the information being sought relates to personal records which involve confidentiality of communications that could be maintained in legal proceedings in Scotland, it cannot be seized, copied or obtained, et cetera. This ensures that the same protections for information of this type apply in Scotland as they would in England and Wales. I hope that these amendments are clear and I beg to move.

My Lords, as we turn to government Amendments 94 to 97, I wonder, as I always do when there are lots of government amendments to their own Bill, whether enough thought has gone into it in the other place. I know that these proposals are primarily technical, with the key aim of simplifying the drafting of new Schedule 3ZD to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. Government Amendment 96 introduces a single clear prohibition on the seizure or examination of information of legal privilege. This streamlining could help to clarify the legal position for both investigators and those subject to investigation, ensuring that the Bill’s provisions are easier to interpret and apply in practice. Clarity in legislation is always desirable, especially in complex areas such as fraud investigation, where the rights of individuals and the needs of public authorities must be carefully balanced. At the same time, it is important to consider how these amendments interact with the Bill’s wider objectives of safeguarding public money and equipping authorities with the tools needed to tackle fraud and error effectively. Ensuring that information which is subject to legal privilege is properly protected is a long-standing principle within our legal system. These amendments appear to reaffirm that commitment without substantially altering the Bill’s intent. I have no problem in agreeing with what should have been in the Bill at the beginning.

My Lords, my remarks largely chime with those made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. The Committee will be relieved to know that this is my shortest speech. I offer some measured support for these amendments. They address the important principle of the protection of legally privileged material, and in a way that simplifies and clarifies the drafting of this part of the Bill. The right to legal professional privilege is, of course, a cornerstone of our justice system. That principle should be unambiguous in legislation of this kind. These amendments seek to express that safeguard more clearly through a single consolidated position. There is certainly merit in that. A simplified and consolidated statement of the limitation on investigatory powers in respect of privileged material is likely to be easier to apply in practice and could reduce the risk of inadvertent overreach.

My Lords, I am grateful for the support and take the chiding in the spirit in which noble Lords intended it. Government amendments are a key part of the legislative process. Noble Lords will have seen them from time to time, allowing for the refinement and improvement of Bills as they move through Parliament. It is critical that the Bill’s provisions comply with the distinct legal jurisdiction of Scotland. Every effort has been made to ensure that this is the case. We have worked closely with the Office of the Advocate-General for Scotland and with officials in the Scottish Government. Following an additional review of the Bill prior to Committee, the Office of the Advocate-General for Scotland identified the need for a minor amendment to ensure that the powers would operate in Scotland as intended. We felt it was important to make the law clear in the Bill. I am grateful for noble Lords’ grace on this.

Amendment 94 agreed.

Amendments 95 to 97

Moved by

95: Schedule 4, page 96, line 18, leave out “an item subject to legal privilege,” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 4, page 101, line 15.

96: Schedule 4, page 101, line 15, leave out from beginning to end of line 24 and insert— “Material subject to legal privilege 10 Nothing in this Schedule confers power to— (a) require any person to provide information, or(b) seize, remove, take a copy of or otherwise record anything,in respect of which a claim to confidentiality of communications could be maintained in legal proceedings.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment, together with my other amendments to Schedule 4, simplifies the drafting of new Schedule 3ZD to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 by creating a single prohibition on the seizure etc of information subject to legal privilege.

97: Schedule 4, page 103, line 4, leave out “items subject to legal privilege and” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 4, page 101, line 15.

Amendments 95 to 97 agreed.

Schedule 4, as amended, agreed.

Clauses 78 to 84 agreed.

Clause 85: DWP offence

Amendments 98 and 99

Moved by

98: Clause 85, page 51, line 27, leave out “, payment, credit” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment and my other amendment to clause 85 remove unnecessary references to a payment or credit, both of which are within the relevant definition of “benefit” already as a result of section 121DA(5) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.

99: Clause 85, page 51, line 30, leave out “, payment, credit” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my other amendment to clause 85.

Amendments 98 and 99 agreed.

Clause 85 agreed.

Clauses 86 and 87 agreed.

Clause 88: Independent review

Amendment 99A

Moved by

99A: Clause 88, page 54, leave out lines 5 to 7 Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would ensure that the Secretary of State did not have the power to direct the independent person to review only certain timeframes.

My Lords, Amendments 99A to 99C have been tabled, as ever, in the spirit of constructive scrutiny and with the aim of strengthening one of the more significant accountability provisions in the Bill: the independent review process set out in Clause 88. These amendments are modest, reasonable and necessary. They are not designed to undermine the intention of Clause 88 but quite the opposite: to give that clause the clarity, independence and rigour that an effective review mechanism surely must demand. Fundamentally, they seek to correct the text in the Bill as drafted, as this would not provide for a proper independent review process of the exercise of powers under this part of the Bill. As we have been clear throughout these days in Committee, having a proper, full and independent review mechanism is an essential requirement to balance the powers granted. Let me begin with Amendment 99A. As currently drafted, new Section 109J, to be inserted by Clause 88, allows the Secretary of State to direct the independent person to review only certain timeframes, saying in subsection (1): “The Secretary of State may give the independent person appointed … directions as to the period to be covered by each review under section 109I”. This, in our view, strikes at the heart of the independence that the clause is meant to enshrine. If the Secretary of State can determine the scope of the review in such a narrow and discretionary fashion, deciding what is in and what is out, we risk reducing the entire review process to something partial and predetermined. An independent reviewer must have the freedom to examine the full timeline of events, decisions and outcomes as they see fit, not just the periods that a Minister deems relevant. This amendment would remove the power for the Secretary of State to constrain that scope. It would ensure that the independent person can review what needs reviewing, not merely what it is convenient to review. Further to this, Amendment 99B addresses another area in which we believe the clause falls short of its intended purpose. As present, new Section 109J(3) states: “The Secretary of State may disclose information to the independent person”. We do not think this is adequate. For a review to be meaningful, the reviewer must be empowered to access all relevant material. It cannot be left to the Minister to determine what relevant information may or may not be disclosed to the independent person for review. By replacing “may” with “must”, this amendment would impose a basic but essential duty for the Government to co-operate with their own independent review mechanism. This should not be controversial. If the review is to be credible both in substance and perception, the provision of relevant documents, data and records must be a legal obligation, not a voluntary gesture. Our amendment would ensure that the independent reviewer could operate with true independence and without the bias that the discretionary drafting currently in the Bill implies. We must appreciate that if the Secretary of State can direct the scope and scale of these independent reviews, they cannot truly be called independent. As noble Lords across the Committee will know, the outcome of such a process is only as good as the information that is put into it. I am sure that this Minister would not allow biased information or timeframes or seek to direct the independent reviewer. But, as noble Lords have previously made clear in Committee, we must legislate for the future and future Ministers. This cannot be done on the basis of guarantees alone. I trust the Minister implicitly, but I do not know—indeed, none of us in this Committee knows—that we could always say the same about her successors. It is important that we ensure that this independent review process is independent from day one and there is no risk of it becoming a rubber-stamping body used to sign off favourable reviews on the back of limited information and narrow timeframes. Finally, Amendment 99C would compel the appointment of independent persons to carry out reviews in England, Wales and Scotland. The Bill in its current form allows the Secretary of State to do so but does not require it. We think that is a mistake. Public sector fraud is not a phenomenon confined to one part of the United Kingdom. If we are serious about building a coherent and credible national response, it follows that there must be consistent independent scrutiny across all three nations. Leaving this to ministerial discretion opens the door to uneven practice and potential political selectivity. By making the appointment of independent reviewers mandatory across the nations, we would create a consistent framework for accountability —one that reflects the devolved landscape while still holding the centre to account. Taken together, these three amendments seek to reinforce what I believe the Government want to achieve: an independent, well-informed and effective review mechanism. They would ensure that reviews are not unduly limited, that reviewers are not kept in the dark and that all parts of the UK are covered by the same standards of transparency. In short, these amendments would close the gaps that could otherwise turn an accountability provision into an optional exercise. I hope the Minister will reflect carefully on their intent and consider how they might help deliver a stronger, fairer and more credible oversight process. I beg to move.

My Lords, I rise briefly to add my support to the first two amendments in this group. While I agree with removing the discretion of the Secretary of State, Amendment 99A does not say what the period of the review should be. I suggest that it should be the same as the period of the review for the eligibility verification notices, which is annual, and that that is what should be in the Bill. It would be useful to hear from the Minister what the Government are proposing in that respect.

16:45:00

Amendment 99B would make it a requirement that the Secretary of State provides information. We had this debate on a previous group. Again, it would be better if the independent reviewer had the right to request whatever they wanted and there was an obligation that it be provided, but I will not repeat the debate that we had previously.

The final amendment in this group is unnecessary, as there is an obligation to appoint a reviewer in the beginning of new Section 109I(1). My read of this is that it simply allows the Secretary of State to have a different reviewer for England and Wales and for Scotland, but it is not an obligation to do so, so I am not sure that Amendment 99C is needed.

My Lords, as we consider Amendments 99A, 99B and 99C, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, it is clear that these proposals are focused on the mechanisms of independent review and oversight within the Bill. Amendment 99A would ensure that the Secretary of State cannot limit the independent person’s review to only certain timeframes, thereby supporting the principle of comprehensive and impartial scrutiny. Amendment 99B would require the Secretary of State to provide information to the independent person for the purposes of a review, which could strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the review process. Amendment 99C would compel the Secretary of State to appoint independent reviewers not just in England but also in Wales and Scotland, ensuring a degree of consistency and regional representation in oversight arrangements. These amendments appear to reinforce the Bill’s commitment to robust oversight and transparency, aligning with the existing provisions for independent inspection and review already outlined in the legislation. At the same time, it will be important to consider whether these changes might introduce additional administrative complexity or affect the flexibility of the Secretary of State to respond to evolving circumstances. As ever, the challenge is to strike the right balance between effective oversight and operational efficiency. I look forward to hearing the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, on whether these proposals best serve the aims of accountability and good governance within the framework of this Bill. It is amazing what changing the word from “may” to “must” can do, but it can make a big difference and I wait to hear the Minister’s reply.

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this short debate. I hope that I can answer the questions that have been raised. The first and most important piece of information is to remind the Committee that in the Commons my honourable friend the Minister for Transformation made it clear that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services will be commissioned to inspect the DWP’s criminal investigation powers for England and Wales and HMICS for Scotland. I hope that that is helpful. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, that the reason why we chose HMIC is that for more than 160 years it has been carrying out independent scrutiny of law enforcement in England and Wales, including the police. There is no danger whatever that it will be any kind of box-ticking exercise, if HMIC is doing it. I am sure that she can be reassured on that front. I hope that that shows the level of commitment that we have to the level of scrutiny. If we want to do it properly, HMIC is the body to scrutinise powers of this seriousness. But we have worked closely with HMICFRS and HMICS. We intend to operate in the same way as other law enforcement agencies that are subject to inspections by those bodies. What will happen is that, prior to each inspection, the DWP and the inspectorate body will mutually agree the period that the inspection will cover. That is to make sure that the inspection can cover all necessary activity that has been undertaken, which is a common way of operating. We have no reason to believe that it will not operate well in this case. We understand that sharing information is essential and will obviously not seek to misrepresent or hold back any relevant information. The legislation as drafted allows us to share all relevant information. But it is essential that the Secretary of State retains discretion—for example, being able to choose not to provide information that may be particularly sensitive and where sharing it could have a detrimental impact, such as on the outcome of an active case. The DWP will fully support and co-operate with the inspection bodies and its reports will make clear if we did not do that. But we want to do so, to make sure that we can deliver on these powers to the right standard. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for answering one question for me. There will indeed be inspectorates. HMICFRS will cover England and Wales and HMIC will cover Scotland to enable us to have a different reviewer in the two places. I hope that, given those reassurances, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, will not press her amendments.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. As we draw this debate to a close, I return to the fact that these amendments are rooted in the core values of fairness, transparency, independence and accountability. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Palmer, for their support, although I know that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has not supported Amendment 99C. The independent review mechanism outlined in Clause 88 should be one of the central safeguards of the Bill. It should ensure that the powers conferred are used proportionately, effectively and in the public interest. As it currently stands, that mechanism risks being weakened by loopholes and discretionary clauses that leave too much power in ministerial hands. I note the response about HMIC, but it still goes to the core that we want this Bill as a standalone and that those loopholes are necessarily closed. Amendment 99A speaks to a fundamental concern: the right of the Government to define the terms of their own scrutiny. That is not a mark of confident democracy. A review that can only examine certain timeframes selected by the very people being reviewed is not a genuine safeguard; it is a managed narrative. True independence means giving the reviewer the authority to follow the evidence wherever it leads, not wherever the Secretary of State allows. Amendment 99B is in many ways even more foundational. What is the value of appointing an independent person if that individual can be denied access to the very information that they need to do their job? We cannot have effective oversight if it depends on the good will of the department being examined. I take note of what the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, said. There is a huge difference, as I know well from my own time in government, between the words “may” and “must”. “Must” is a minimal expectation if we are to uphold the principles of openness and integrity. Anything less risks turning independence into theatre and accountability into a form without substance. Amendment 99C is about consistency. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, considers it unnecessary. However, if fraud knows no borders between England, Wales and Scotland, neither should scrutiny. We cannot rely only on the Secretary of State’s discretion to decide whether an independent review happens in one nation but not another, because that creates potential confusion and disparity and the appearance, if not the reality, of selective transparency. This is a probing amendment and I appreciate what has been said, which I will pick up on later. What we are aiming for is a duty to appoint independent reviewers across the devolved nations so that trust is not patchy but uniform across the United Kingdom. When taken together, these amendments must represent a clear and coherent vision that government power must be matched by government accountability. That review must be more than just process. It must be meaningful, showing that we do not fear scrutiny but welcome it, because it is through scrutiny that public trust is earned and retained. The Government have rightly set out to tackle fraud and protect public money, but if the public are to believe that this effort is both rigorous and fair, the checks that we place on those powers must be equally robust. These amendments deliver that balance, not to obstruct but to uphold the values that any confident, responsible Government should share. I urge the Minister to consider the purpose and principle that these amendments seek to preserve. Let us not pass up the opportunity to make this legislation stronger, fairer and more trustworthy. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 99A withdrawn.

Amendments 99B and 99C not moved.

Clause 88 agreed.

Amendment 99D

Moved by

99D: After Clause 88, insert the following new Clause— “Consideration of vulnerabilities(1) The Secretary of State must have due regard for the external circumstances pertaining to a person under investigation in respect of the mental capacity, economic circumstances, and physical and mental health of the claimant, particularly where the claimant is or may reasonably be considered a vulnerable person.(2) For the purposes of this section, a "vulnerable person" includes, but is not limited to, individuals who—(a) lacks mental capacity within the meaning of the Mental Capacity Act 2005;(b) are in receipt of, or have been assessed as eligible for, support relating to mental or physical health conditions;(c) could be reasonably regarded as vulnerable to domestic abuse or coercion.(3) The Secretary of State shall ensure that a fair and reasonable assessment of the claimant's circumstances is conducted before any deduction is applied.(4) The assessment under subsection (3) may consider evidence provided on behalf of the claimant, including medical reports, financial information, and input from authorised support workers or representatives.(5) All decisions to deduct welfare payments shall be documented, with explicit reference to how the claimant’s vulnerability was considered. (6) The records under subsection (5) shall be made available to the claimant upon request and subject to audit by an independent body.”Member’s explanatory statement This new clause would ensure that, before a deduction was applied, due regard was given to the wider circumstances and vulnerabilities of the liable person, which they would have to document, to be made available upon request by the claimant.

My Lords, Amendments 99D and 109ZA are in my name. Amendment 99D seeks to ensure that, before a deduction order is applied, proper and fair consideration is given to the wider circumstances of the person under investigation, especially where there may be indicators of vulnerability. It is an amendment rooted not in obstruction but in principle and in pragmatism. It recognises that, if we are to give public authorities powerful tools to detect and recover fraud, we must also ensure that those powers are exercised with fairness and, crucially, the full understanding of the person’s situation. Many individuals who fall under investigation may be living with complex challenges. I know that we touched on these matters earlier in Committee, but some of these issues are worth repeating. Some individuals may lack the mental capacity to understand what is being asked of them; others may be suffering from physical or mental health conditions that impair their ability to manage forms, deadlines or correspondence; and still others may be experiencing domestic abuse, coercion or forms of control that make it difficult or even impossible for them to make independent financial decisions. These people do not, certainly as yet, have a deputy, proxy or power of attorney in support. They remain in sole charge of their accounts. I am sure that noble Lords across the Committee would welcome reassurance from the Government, first, on how these people will be identified and, secondly, how the system and process will cope and adapt to reflect their needs and, where needed, to protect them. These are not on-the-edge cases; they are realities that front-line officials in the department and around the country encounter every day. If we are not careful, precisely these individuals may end up most at risk of enforcement action—not because they are wilfully defrauding the system but because they simply did not or could not understand what was expected of them. We must therefore be careful to differentiate error from intent to defraud. There will be cases where a person under investigation may not have understood what he or she was supposed to be doing but is technically fraudulent. This is exactly what this amendment seeks: it would require that the Secretary of State has due regard to the mental capacity, economic circumstances and health of the claimant, especially where there are indicators of vulnerability. It would also ensure that a fair and reasonable assessment of the person’s circumstances is conducted before any deduction is applied. I should say that this is not about softening our stance on fraud; it is simply about targeting it accurately and responsibly. The amendment also places emphasis on the evidentiary basis of decisions. It allows for medical reports, financial statements and input from support workers or advocates to be taken into account. Importantly, it also creates a clear paper trail by requiring that decisions to deduct are documented with reference to how the claimant’s vulnerabilities were considered. That documentation must be made available upon request and be subject to independent audit. I argue that this is important and not a form of bureaucracy—before noble Lords get up. So we come back to understanding how the test-and-learn operation and exercises will take account of this. Could the Minister give us some detail on how such cases will be identified and on the other questions that I asked earlier? I also ask her to help the Committee to understand what the Government will access in terms of information relating to these wider circumstances. We see it as vital that this information is taken into consideration. At this stage of the Bill, it is also right that we ask what kinds of protections the Government intend to put in place for vulnerable people generally. This extends to the Cabinet Office aspects of the Bill. I realise that my noble friend Lady Finn may have raised these questions earlier, but what process will be followed to ensure that mental capacity is assessed? What training will investigators have to recognise signs of coercion or distress, and what mechanisms will be available to review decisions, particularly where someone’s vulnerability has been overlooked? These are not academic questions; they go to the heart of what kind of enforcement regime we are creating and how confident the public can be that it will act justly, especially where people are least able to defend themselves. I turn to Amendment 109ZA. It is well established that the Government themselves recognise that disabled people face higher living costs than their non-disabled counterparts. We have had many debates in the Chamber that have highlighted these issues. We know that these costs are not optional; they are the result of essential needs—specialised equipment, personal care and accessible transport—and higher utility bills, among other things.

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According to estimates by Scope and other disability charities, disabled households face additional costs of hundreds of pounds per month, and this comes against a backdrop of fixed incomes and, often, limited earning power. Often, these costs cannot be recovered and have to be borne by the person without recourse to the state for help. For example, a person who suffers from epilepsy may have to replace breakable items considerably more often than a person without the condition. They may break their phone or glasses, for example, during a seizure. A person with autism, which sometimes manifests with sensory sensitivities, may need to buy special clothing without tags or seams, or specific or special foods if they are intolerant to textures or tastes. Someone who is blind or partially sighted may need specialist software, such as a screen reader or a tactile keyboard, or a guide dog, all of which come, as the Committee will guess, with ongoing costs.

Applying a direct deduction order without consideration of these realities risks putting individuals who are already on the margins into financial hardship or even destitution. This amendment is designed to help. It would place a clear duty on the Secretary of State to consider how a deduction might affect a person who is disabled—not to rule it out automatically but to weigh its impact appropriately and adjust accordingly.

It is also fully aligned with the Government’s existing obligations under the Equality Act. Section 149 on the public sector equality duty, with which I am sure the Committee is familiar, already requires public bodies to

“have due regard to … the need to eliminate discrimination … and … advance equality of opportunity”

for those with protected characteristics. This amendment would simply operationalise that duty in the context of direct deduction powers, ensuring that it is not abstract but meaningful at the point where real financial decisions are being made. Moreover, this duty to consider would not impose a heavy burden; it merely asks that the Government take reasonable steps to assess whether the person is disabled under the Equality Act definition and therefore whether a deduction would place them at a disproportionate disadvantage.

To conclude, we know that tackling fraud is vital—those points have been made on many occasions in the past four days—and the Bill rightly aims to strengthen the tools available to the Government in doing so, but we must also be clear that fraud enforcement must not become blind to context. A one-size-fits-all enforcement tool risks creating injustice. Disabled people are already statistically more likely to live in poverty and face administrative barriers and less likely to challenge official decisions. This amendment would provide a safeguard and a pause for consideration. I urge the Minister to reflect on the logic and values behind these proposals and to consider accepting this amendment so that the Bill can be not only firm in its purpose but fair in its application.

I conclude by saying that I have taken some time to spell out many details that I am sure the Committee will be reasonably familiar with, but, at the same time, perhaps it is a test for the Minister to give us some full explanations as to the safeguards that they are putting in place. I beg to move.

My Lords, I warmly welcome these amendments in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger. I appreciated the detail that he went into because it is important that we remember that these direct deduction orders are real instruments of power. I am interested in how they will be used differentially, because I do not want them to be a blunt instrument. Therefore, it is worth remembering and considering those who might be on the receiving end of them. In an earlier group discussing search and seizure, I had been considering speaking but was in some ways put off, because I thought that the search and seizure measures were only meant for organised criminal gangs. As was pointed out, if that was in the Bill maybe it would be more reassuring. It is difficult to know how many people will be affected by the same powers. We want to differentiate, surely, between the vulnerable and an organised criminal gang. There are those who are technically fraudulent, but it is because they have made a mistake, and so on. I particularly thought of that because I listened to a vivid documentary recently about bailiffs and people who had got themselves into all sorts of distress and debt, with bailiffs kicking down their doors. I had that caricature in my head, and I do not want that to happen to those people. I am not suggesting the search and seizure measures will lead in that direction, but we should always think: who is on the receiving end of these powers? How did they get into that situation? How does the Bill make a distinction so that we do not, on the one hand, have a one-size-fits-all approach? On the other hand—this is a slight anxiety I have— I do not want us to simply get into a situation where we are saying that, because people are on welfare, they are vulnerable. That is equally a caricature, and I do not think it is helpful for us to see people always in a victim role. I would be interested—that is why I welcome this group—in making the distinctions and learning how the Minister envisages us making the distinctions between the multitude of people on welfare when these powers, which are quite severe in many instances, are going to be applied. How will that happen? Who makes the decision? I think that is why these amendments are very useful.

My Lords, I am pleased in this instance to express my strong support for Amendments 99D and Amendment 109ZA, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. I have not been quite so firm in my support for others, but Amendment 99D would ensure that, before any deduction is applied to recover debt overpayment, due regard is given to the wider circumstances and vulnerabilities of the liable person. There would be a requirement for this assessment to be documented and available to the claimant on request. This is a vital safeguard that would place fairness and compassion at the heart of the debt recovery process, ensuring that individuals are not pushed into hardship without a proper understanding of their personal situation. It aligns with my and my party’s commitment to a welfare system that is both effective and humane, recognising that people’s circumstances can be complex—gosh, they certainly can be—and that a one-size-fits-all approach to debt recovery is neither just nor practical. Amendment 109ZA—we have a wonderful numbering system—would further strengthen these protections by requiring the Minister to consider the additional costs of living with a disability before making a direct deduction order. This would be an essential step in ensuring that disabled people, who often face higher living expenses, are not disproportionately affected by debt recovery measures. Both amendments reflect the principles of proportionality and sensitivity that should underpin all government action in this area. They represent a significant improvement to the Bill’s framework for tackling fraud and error while safeguarding the dignity and well-being of the most vulnerable. Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who said she was a bit hesitant on this, I urge the Committee and the Minister to support these amendments, which would ensure that the pursuit of public funds is always balanced with compassion and respect for individual circumstances. At this stage of the Bill, as mentioned by the noble Viscount, these measures need to be introduced so that we can perhaps on Report include them in the Bill.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his amendments and to all noble Lords who have spoken. We all want to ensure that, when someone who is subject to these debt recovery powers is vulnerable, we are aware of that and take appropriate steps to treat them as we should. Before I turn to the individual amendments, I shall recap on how direct deduction orders will operate and what safeguards are there, as this is relevant to the debate. These powers are vital to recovering funds that are owed by debtors who are—just to remind the Committee—by definition not on benefits or PAYE. If they were, we would have other ways to deal with them. These are people who have some other source of income, owe the DWP money and have simply refused to engage with us at all, at any stage. That does not mean that none of them is vulnerable—of course, they may be—but this is the category of people that we are talking about. The department has long-standing powers to recover public money that has been wrongly paid in excess of entitlement, through deductions from benefits or earnings, but not for those in that category. There are important new safeguards for these powers. They are there only as a last resort. First, before they can be used, multiple attempts at contact must be made, of different types. We must make at least four attempts to contact someone, at least twice by letter. We not simply trying once and giving up. We must have really tried to engage with people who simply do not engage with us all. Secondly, when a direct deduction order is necessary, the DWP must be satisfied that any deduction, whether a lump sum or a regular deduction, will not cause the debtor, other account holder or their dependants hardship in meeting ordinary living expenses. That means that, legally, the DWP must ensure that there is enough money remaining in an account after a lump sum deduction to allow the debtor to meet their essential living needs. In response to the noble Viscount, deductions must be fair in all the circumstances. This would include consideration of any vulnerabilities or additional costs related to living with a disability. The noble Viscount helpfully outlined what some of those will be. The point is that they must be particular to the individual. Each individual’s circumstances will be different. As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, pointed out, not everybody who is poor is vulnerable, not everybody who is on benefits is vulnerable and not everybody who is disabled is vulnerable, necessarily. We need to understand their circumstances to know what is fair and ensure that they will not be pushed into hardship by a deduction. Thirdly, to ensure that the deduction is made in that way, the amounts will be decided following an affordability assessment based on information shared by the debtor’s bank and any subsequent representations made by the individual or their representative if they need someone to speak for them. Legislation sets out the maximum amounts that can be deducted for regular deduction orders. Fourthly, the Secretary of State can vary or revoke direct deduction orders in the light of a change of circumstances—for example, if the debtor had a change of income, made a new claim to benefit or something else of significance happened. Fifthly, when a direct deduction order is made, notice must be given to the bank and all holders of the account in question. If an order is still upheld after a review, or after considering information that has been presented, an individual who is not happy with that has a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. Finally, I remind the Committee that a code of practice for the new powers has been made available for noble Lords to review. This sets out revised guidance on ways to identify and support those who are vulnerable. Ahead of public consultation, our team continues to work on the code collaboratively with key stakeholders, including charities such as Surviving Economic Abuse and the Money and Pensions Service. These are important safeguards which I hope will alleviate noble Lords’ concerns. On Amendments 99D and 109ZA, it is worth looking at what these amendments would do in practice. While we all share the desire to protect vulnerable groups, these amendments would place additional legal duties on the DWP to consider the impact of any vulnerabilities that a debtor may have, even when it could not be reasonably possible for the DWP to know. These requirements would be imposed without providing any new ways for the DWP to obtain that information. As I have said, the direct deduction order power is one of last resort, aimed at those who are not on benefits or in PAYE employment, where all reasonable attempts to engage with the individual have failed. These are individuals who have not responded to repeated contact from the DWP’s debt management officials about their debt. In the absence of meaningful engagement from the debtor or their representative, the DWP will not be aware of their current personal circumstances. This puts the DWP in a difficult, if not impossible position, regarding the obligations that the proposed amendments would impose. However, we need safeguards. The new safeguards that are introduced in this Bill, which I outlined at the start of my speech, alongside the existing safeguards and departmental processes for supporting those who are vulnerable, reflect a better approach to protecting vulnerable people. I shall now set out some of those existing safeguards and processes that are outside of this Bill, for the record. Layers of support already exist within the DWP to support those who are vulnerable or have complex needs. They include proactive vulnerability checks at different points in the customer journey, and where vulnerable individuals are identified, to ensure that the necessary support and adjustments are put in place. Where any additional support or adjustments are identified by a DWP official or are disclosed by the individual, they are recorded on DWP systems to ensure that all officials know how best to support them.

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In addition, the DWP has a specially trained advanced customer support team with access to a range of tools and guidance to support our most vulnerable customers. The department can also enlist support from a DWP visiting officer, who can visit the individual, at home if necessary, to offer tailored support and advice, and, where appropriate, referrals can be made to external support. So, where individuals owe a debt to the DWP, there are robust existing safeguards to protect debtors who may be vulnerable or suffering financial hardship.

All debt recovery notifications include a prominent referral to sources of independent debt advice, money guidance and organisations which can support the individual in their engagement with the DWP. These communications also actively encourage those who are struggling with repayments to contact the department’s debt management team to discuss their circumstances. DWP debt management staff receive regular vulnerability training and have access to guidance and tools to help recognise signs of vulnerability in order to offer the appropriate support.

Where an individual or their representative makes contact, officials will work with them to understand their particular circumstances and take the most appropriate action. So I strongly encourage noble Lords or anyone listening to this: if anyone is in this position, the absolute best thing they can do is get in touch. The worst thing to do is not to get in touch, because if we do not know anything about someone, we are not in a position to be able to respond to any of the challenges or vulnerabilities they have. So, if anyone is listening and they are struggling, I urge them to please get in touch with the DWP.

Once the team are aware of the challenges, they have options. They can temporarily reduce the repayment terms, cease a direct deduction order, agree a voluntary repayment plan, temporarily suspend recovery entirely, or, in exceptional circumstances, all or part of the debt can be considered for a waiver.

Recognising the need to ensure that the DWP can engage with the appropriate representative concerning the new recovery powers, we have made government amendments to the Bill requiring banks to advise the department where it is known that the individual has a power of attorney or a deputy—that may speak to the point raised by the noble Viscount in relation to capacity.

I turn to other points that were made. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made some comments about the bailiff sector. Again, just for the record, although I know she was not talking about bailiffs here, the Government have now started a review of that sector, so I hope we will get to see some changes there.

Finally, on the question of the PSFA, obviously some answers were given on the record on this, I think on day two, but my noble friend Lady Anderson will be more than happy to meet and discuss or indeed to write if there is anything further on reviewing the record of that day. If anything is not clear, she will be happy to meet and to pick that up.

With those answers, to the effect that we agree with the objectives of the amendments but struggle with their impact, I hope the noble Viscount will be able to withdraw Amendment 99D.

My Lords, I am very grateful for the thoughtful and supportive contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, which we have heard throughout this debate. As it draws to a close, I want to return to the fundamental values that underpin Amendments 99D and 109ZA. I will not repeat everything I said before but, briefly, these amendments are not about hampering fraud enforcement but about ensuring that where serious powers are granted—powers that allow the state to intervene directly in someone’s financial life—they are exercised with the kind of care, discretion and humanity that should be the hallmark of any public authority in a just society. Amendment 99D asks a simple but fundamental question: how do we treat those whose circumstances may mean that they did not or could not understand or apply the rules? As the Minister herself said, rightly, we all want the same thing. Fraud must be pursued, but, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, alluded to, we must not collapse the distinction between error and intent, between misunderstanding and malice. The law and those who enforce it must have the tools to see the difference. Amendment 109ZA builds on this principle of proportionality; it addresses a reality that we all know—that disabled people may face higher costs of living by virtue of their condition. As I said earlier, the direct deduction order, if applied too bluntly, can turn an already stretched household into one facing crisis, and we must ensure that these powers are used with sensitivity. This is exactly what my Amendment 109ZA provides: a measured and sensible requirement. I appreciate the very sensible explanations that the Minister produced. I appreciate what she said and the fullness of her remarks. I shall make sure that I read all her remarks in Hansard to see whether they satisfy the concerns expressed in the amendments that I have tabled. I appreciate the fullness of what she has produced. Both these amendments provide something important. They place a protective guardrail on otherwise broad and serious enforcement powers. They ask us to apply judgment, not just rules, and to recognise vulnerability and not just liability. Separately, I also appreciate the safeguards that the Minister spelled out towards the end of her remarks. Broadly, people will support fraud enforcement when they believe it is fair, and they will support recovery powers when they trust that those powers will not be used to punish the vulnerable alongside the guilty. This is where the balance needs to be struck. I shall also look at Hansard because the Minister gave us a helpful explanation in terms of the balance required in the obligations placed on the DWP, and at whether in fact my amendments are too onerous or a bit overreaching. I would like to reflect on those questions. We may come back on Report with something, or we may not. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 99D withdrawn.

Clause 89: Enforcement of non-benefit payments

Amendments 100 and 101

Moved by

100: Clause 89, page 56, leave out lines 6 and 7 and insert— “(i) the period mentioned in section 71ZK(6)(a) for P to appeal against the outcome of the review has passed without P bringing an appeal, or”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 89, page 56, line 31.

101: Clause 89, page 56, line 31, leave out from “(5)” to end of line 33 and insert “may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of one month beginning with the day after the day on which P is notified of the outcome of the review, or(b) such longer period (if any) as the Tribunal considers reasonable in all the circumstances.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment means that the tribunal can extend the time limit for bringing an appeal in relation to an overpayment notice.

Amendments 100 and 101 agreed.

Clause 89, as amended, agreed.

Clauses 90 and 91 agreed.

Schedule 5: Recovery from bank accounts etc

Amendment 102

Moved by

102: Schedule 5, page 104, line 19, leave out “make” and insert “apply to the appropriate court for” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment removes the power of the Secretary of State to make direct deduction orders and instead provides for direct deduction orders to be made only by a court following an application by the Secretary of State to the court.

My Lords, in moving Amendment 102, I shall speak also to Amendment 122. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for putting his name to these amendments. These amendments are similar to those that I tabled in an earlier group in relation to Part 1. In this instance, they focus on removing the power of the Secretary of State to make direct deduction orders and instead suggests that DDOs be made only by the relevant court following an application from the Secretary of State. Throughout Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has helpfully stressed that, when we are having this discussion, particularly in this environment, it is very difficult to imagine a Minister other than the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, who I do not think of as a malign person. In this instance, this is not helpful, because as a Committee we must always take a decision based on what we think could happen in future—what powers are being created—and therefore we bring to bear as much as we can the safeguards as a Committee. I think that we can all agree, and we keep saying this, that it is important to note that the powers are in pursuit of a legitimate aim: here, to reclaim overpayment of money paid to welfare claimants. Following the previous group, we should not say that a welfare claimant, if they have defrauded the state, should be treated with kid gloves—I am not suggesting that. But whenever new state powers over the individual are created, a legitimate aim is not enough to mean that we should not have a more granular probing of the powers that have been created, which is why we as a Committee need to insist that powers are tightly drawn to guard against arbitrariness and limited to what is necessary and proportionate. When the Government award themselves powers, as they do in this part of the Bill, to intrude on the privacy of anyone’s bank account, check on its contents and remove money, there needs to be a strong legal justification. As yet, I am not convinced that we should not make it the job of the courts to best determine and assess when this is appropriate. In an earlier group, on search and seizure powers, the Minister reassured the Committee that we do not need to worry because this would happen only with court approval. I am suggesting that we might need court approval here. The DWP characterises DDOs as a power of last resort, which can be exercised only when the Secretary of State has given the debtor a reasonable opportunity to settle the debt and notified them of the possible use of the powers. I felt that the Minister’s helpful explanation earlier really brought this to life. On the other hand, there is no definition in the Bill of what, for example, a reasonable opportunity threshold might be. Ironically, one of the safeguards presented by the DWP is a check on affordability, in terms of fairness. This takes the form of account information notices. I know that we will have a number of amendments on that issue, but I want to dwell on this now, because these safeguards are one of the most egregious aspects of the Bill. To consider whether the debtor can afford to have funds deducted before the Secretary of State makes a DDO, page 105 of the Bill tells us that “the Secretary of State must obtain and consider bank statements for the account covering a period of at least three months”. One requirement of the account information notices is that the bank must not notify the account holder—or anyone associated with them, for that matter. Surely this, as I have mentioned in previous contexts, puts the bank in an invidious position of being compelled to breach any professional confidentiality that it owes its customer, even if its customer is a debtor, based on the word of the Government telling it that the account holder owes the DWP money. Compelling banks to hand over bank statements secretly, however benign the motives in relation to affordability checks—all without any external oversight, such as judicial authority —needs to be probed in terms of its efficacy and ethics, which is what these amendments try to do. Before issuing a DDO, the Secretary of State must give the debtor and any joint account holder notice of the proposed order and invite them to make representations, as the Minister explained earlier. On the basis of these representations, the Secretary of State will decide whether and on what terms to make the DDO, and may do so only if satisfied from bank statements and representations that the order is fair and that the liable person, the account holder and their dependants will not “suffer hardship in meeting essential living expenses”. That sounds so reasonable but, in reality, it hands extraordinary discretion to the Secretary of State, as there is no threshold to determine what constitutes hardship or essential living expenses. I am sure that, if we went around the Room, we would have various versions of what we need to live on and would argue over it. Who decides what is fair in this instance? I suggest that at least having an external court look at this would be more appropriate. Perhaps we would put such qualms aside, if these powers applied only to overpayments caused by deliberately fraudulent behaviour. I can see why going hard on fraudsters might be popular, but these powers to seize funds directly from bank accounts without judicial scrutiny will also apply to individuals who have been overpaid as a result of making a mistake when filling out one of those notoriously complex claim forms, who have failed to update a change in their circumstances, or who may just be struggling to navigate the system in general. Such errors—that is what they are—account for almost a quarter of overpayments. They include errors caused by the DWP’s own actions, as the carer’s allowance scandal revealed, but it is the likes of unwitting carers who will be on the receiving end of these powers, yet the negligent DWP staff who made the mistakes are nowhere caught by the powers that we are discussing. I say this not to have a go at the staff, in that instance, but to note, as we have talked about previously, that we do not need a one-size-fits-all situation. That was the point that the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, made and it is very important. All sorts of people will be caught up—people making mistakes, vulnerable people and some fraudsters—but they will all be treated the same.

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In terms of recovering overpayments, the DWP has always had the option of using county court enforcement proceedings. This Bill wants to cut this out because the DWP argues that the county court method of enforcement is slow and resource intensive. But if it is proportionate that the failure of the state’s judicial infrastructure is an adequate excuse for undermining civil liberties, should it not be a matter of principle that there should be judicial processes in place before the Government to take money directly from individual bank accounts, and that if the courts are not able to cope, we should deal with the courts and not have individuals losing rights?

It is of course correct that it is government and politicians who decide the scope of this legislation. I am usually one of those people who worries about the judiciary becoming a barrier to political action. However, when a Bill hands over huge powers to the state to, for example, take money that it alone has decided a debtor can afford, based on reading their bank statements, and all by bypassing the normal judicial route of using the courts, it is right to query it.

Finally, one defence used by the DWP is that direct deduction order powers will not be promiscuously used, as they will be more used as a deterrent to primarily encourage repayment. Indeed, the impact assessment acknowledges that similar HMRC powers to deduct money from bank accounts were only used in 19 out of 22,500 cases evaluated. However, under these proposed direct deduction order powers, the debtor and any joint account holders will already have had their bank statements disclosed by their bank to the DWP before any measurable deterrent effect could be said to apply. This seems disproportionate for the Bill to give the Government the power to look through sensitive financial information in circumstances where the underlying power is hardly ever expected to be invoked and before the purported deterrent can even be said to have taken effect. Instead, my proposal is that these amendments will be a deterrent to the Government overreaching, knowing that powers will need to gain judicial authorisation. That might just rein in any cavalier attitudes to matters of privacy and proportionality in relation to welfare claimants being investigated. I beg to move.

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments so powerfully, and with considerable detail, explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I want to cross-reference a couple of things. I was unable to be here for the whole discussion on the last group in this Committee but I came in and heard the Minister reassuring us that there are layers of support in the DWP for identifying the vulnerable and that there is regular vulnerability training. I have to contrast that with one of my last contributions in this Committee and this Room, talking about the horrendous case of Nicola Green. I try to share as much as I can of what I am doing in the Chamber so that it is available to the world. I have to say that the little parliamentary video of that exchange, with its less-than-ideal lighting—no offence to anyone who is doing their best they can with the television—has, you could reasonably say, gone viral, because there is a flood of comments of people saying what the DWP has done to them. I cannot attest, of course, to the truth of every one of those comments, but there is a profound problem of trust with the DWP. I fully acknowledge that the Minister, when she was on the Opposition benches, and I have often spoken out strongly on this matter. The Government actually called an inquiry into the DWP’s treatment of disabled people after the EHRC expressed concern that equality had been breached. That is the context in which we are looking at these amendments. The noble Baroness is calling for people to have a day in court—to be able to have a genuinely independent voice in our greatly respected courts and put the case. If they indeed have committed fraud and can afford the repayments, or it is not a complete error by the DWP, or the DWP is at fault or is not being realistic about how much people need to eat and live, the court will make a ruling. That, surely, is regarded as a basic principle and right in our law.

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 102 and 122, which would require the Secretary of State to apply to the court for a direct deduction order—a DDO. I confess that I am struggling a bit to understand the circumstances in which the Secretary of State would be able to make a direct deduction order, as the Bill is drafted. I hope the Minister will be able to help me. When we discussed the DDOs in relation to Part 1 of the Bill, the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, correctly pointed out that a direct deduction order could be made only in circumstances where either there had been a final determination of the amount of the liability by a court or the person concerned had agreed that the amount was payable. I agreed then that that was an important safeguard, as it is a significant restriction on when the DDO process could be used under Part 1. I asked why, if the court was making the determination of liability, we did not just leave the court to determine the way in which it should be repaid, rather than requiring new powers for the Minister to make that decision. The noble Baroness was kind enough to offer to write to me on that, and I very much look forward to receiving her letter. However, I think the same issue may arise here, except that I am struggling to find the definition of the amount recoverable described in paragraph 1(1) of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill. Can the Minister please explain how the amount recoverable is determined, and by whom? Does this part have the same safeguard as Part 1, which is either final court determination or agreement by the person concerned, or is it at the discretion of the Secretary of State? I can see, in Clause 89, that the person must have been convicted of an offence or agreed to pay a penalty. That raises the question: does this DDO regime apply in cases or error, or not? Presumably, in cases of error there will not be a conviction or a penalty, so it does not apply in the case of error, but I am confused. I cannot find anywhere the amount being determined by a court; that is where I am struggling a bit. If the recoverable amount has not been decided by the court, then the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is likely to be necessary. That is particularly important because, just as it does in Part 1, for understandable reasons, the appeal process to the First-tier Tribunal against a DDO prevents a person appealing with respect to the amount that is recoverable. If that is the case, and the amount recoverable has not been determined by a court, I think there is an issue here.

My Lords, I am proud to support Amendments 102 and 122, which I tabled alongside the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. Amendment 102 proposes that the power to make direct deduction orders should rest with the courts following an application from the Secretary of State, rather than allowing the Secretary of State to impose such orders directly. This change would introduce an important layer of judicial oversight, ensuring that deductions from individuals’ bank accounts are made only after careful, independent consideration of the evidence and the circumstances. Although the Bill includes safeguards such as affordability and vulnerability checks, as enumerated by the Minister, and rights to representation and appeal, placing the final decision in the hands of the court would further strengthen public confidence in the fairness and proportionality of the debt recovery process. Amendment 122 is consequential on this approach, ensuring consistency throughout the Bill. By requiring court approval for direct deduction orders, we uphold the principle that significant intrusions into personal finances should be subject to the highest standards of scrutiny and due process. This is particularly important given the potential for hardship and complexities that can arise in cases involving joint accounts or vulnerable individuals. I hope the Minister can address that when she replies. These amendments do not seek to undermine the Government’s legitimate efforts to recover public funds lost to fraud or error but rather to ensure that such efforts are always balanced with robust protections for individual rights. I urge fellow noble Lords to support these amendments as a constructive step towards a more transparent and accountable system, and I am very pleased to have signed this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox.

My Lords, I have a degree of sympathy for the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill. It touches on a value that I know many of us across this House instinctively support: namely, that powers which interfere with the person’s finances should be subject to proper oversight and scrutiny—in other words, by a court and not by a politician. Let us start with that. The principle underpinning the amendment is sound. When the state seeks to impose a direct deduction from an individual’s account, that is no small matter. It affects not just policy outcomes but people’s daily lives, and we should never lose sight of that. Much was spoken about that in earlier groups. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, have suggested introducing a requirement for the court to authorise such a deduction because it reflects the gravity of that particular action. However—there is a however—although I support the sentiment, I have reservations about the practicality, and I am afraid that the remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, have increased my concerns. Requiring every direct deduction order to go through the courts will prove burdensome to the judicial system and may risk making this part of the regime so slow and administratively heavy that it becomes inoperable in practice. That would not only undermine the Government’s legitimate aim of tackling fraud effectively and speedily, but could also result in delays and uncertainty for claimants and public authorities alike. Just to be helpful to the Minister, can she enlighten us on the current state of the backlog in the courts—which is a message she might expect me to give—and how, therefore, Amendment 102, for example, might not be helpful to the process? I have another question about an appeals process. Everyone, I believe, has the right to an appeal, but how would this work, given the status of the courts? That is a question for the Minister to ponder over. We are, after all, talking about a mechanism intended to recover public money in a targeted and efficient way. If every deduction, regardless of scale or complexity, must first pass through court proceedings, we risk erecting a barrier that stifles the entire process. There must surely be a way of reconciling the desire for oversight with the need for operational efficiency—a challenge that I lay down to the noble Baroness, the Minister. So, while I cannot support the amendment as currently drafted, I agree that the principle of independent oversight should not be overlooked. There may be better ways of embedding that principle in the system through enhanced safeguards; clearer audit mechanisms; greater efficiency and speed—that is, in expediting the DDOs; and improving transparency around how deduction decisions are made and reviewed. I recognise this from all who have spoken, and I have listened carefully to all the speeches. I believe that these amendments, and particularly Amendment 102, starts a valuable conversation; even if its solution is not quite the right one, its motivation certainly is. I hope that the Minister can reassure the Committee that the Government recognise the need for these powers to be exercised responsibly but also sensibly so that they can operate effectively, and that they are open to exploring proportionate mechanisms of accountability that simply do not grind the system to a halt, and if so—a very simple question to end on: what could this system be?

My Lords, I am grateful for some really good questions. These are exactly the kind of questions the Lords Committee should be asking on these sorts of issues, and I hope to give decent answers. Should I ever get round to writing a book, somewhere in the credits it will say “Definitely not a malign person”. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that. It is the best compliment I am going to have today —you have to take them where you can find them in this business—so I thank her very much. Amendments 102 and 122, as we have heard, want to restrict the use of the direct deduction power to circumstances where a court has determined it necessary and appropriate. I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made her argument very clearly; I hope to try and persuade her that she does not need to press these amendments because I think we have a good case on this.

17:45:00

Let me take this in stages. The DWP at the moment can apply to the court for a third-party debt order in England and Wales. This would allow lump sum recovery directly from a debtor’s bank account. The rationale for introducing the DDO, as she observed, is to recover more public money without unnecessarily using the court’s time—which, as the noble Viscount pointed out, is at a premium—and without subjecting debtors to court proceedings at greater cost to them. Comparable powers are already used by HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service. There are sufficient existing safeguards and specific new safeguards introduced by the Bill which give significant protection to individuals. I hope they will help to alleviate the noble Baroness’s concerns.

I think it is worth explaining this, and it might help the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, by imagining this process in two stages. First, the department has long-standing powers under Section 71 and 71ZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to recover public money wrongly paid in excess of entitlement, however that came about. Those provisions include rights of reconsideration and appeal against the overpayment decision. If it seems that you have been overpaid, you can appeal the decision that you have been overpaid by a certain amount; you can go to mandatory reconsideration and, if that is rejected, you can go to the First-tier Tribunal and appeal the amount. That is about the amount.

Secondly, once the amount has been established—either you have agreed it, we have changed our mind, or a tribunal has made a decision—we then seek to recover it. If you are on benefits or in PAYE employment, we can do direct deduction orders already from your benefits or employment. We are talking now about people who have already got to that point. We now want to recover the money; they are not engaging with us, and we cannot do it, so what do we do? At the moment, we can go to court for a third-party deduction order. What we want to do now is to apply the same principles to those who are not on benefits or in PAYE employment, who have the money but do not want to pay it, as we do to those who are in that position.

In response to the noble Viscount, the powers will be used responsibly and sensibly. He knows from his great experience in this area that it is of no interest to anyone to have large numbers of deduction orders. One would hope that the person would be written to and told this is there, and that should bring people to the table to discuss their situation. At any point they can engage with us; we can agree a repayment plan and there is no need for anyone to go down this path. If we had to go to court every time, that would clearly lessen the incentive to engage, especially for those who are determined not to pay unless they are forced to.

Thirdly, the Bill already makes sufficient provisions for the debtor to challenge the direct deduction order through rights to make representations before any money is taken. They can come and challenge us and then they can appeal to the tribunal concerning the terms of the deduction order. I do not consider that this puts the debtor at disadvantage. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that the court will normally make a third-party debt order in the creditor’s favour, unless the debtor contests the application and evidences that it would be unfair or inappropriate. I do not see that requiring court authorisation would grant a debtor any additional safeguard over the proposed appeal rights in the Bill—they would still get to have their day in court if they wished it—but it would make routine and uncontested deduction orders unnecessarily complex to achieve if we were to go down the route that she described. As I said, that is on top of the existing mandatory reconsideration and appeal rights for the overpayment decision itself.

Finally, the Bill contains sufficient provisions to safeguard the use of the power, including protections to ensure that essential living expenses can be met and that recovery cannot reasonably take place by any other means. There is a definition of reasonableness for hardship in the code of practice. Hardship in the Bill is placed in the context of meeting essential living expenses, which is further described in the code. I refer to paragraph 6 of Schedule 5 to the Bill.

In terms of affordability, I wonder if the noble Baroness will bear with me. On her questions about bank statements, the next group is entirely about getting bank statements and whether we should do it or not. I wonder if she would mind if we return to the discussion on bank statements in that group, since the whole group is about that. I see her nodding, so I hope that is okay.

I turn to the comment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, about why the PSFA requires a court notice to determine a debt when the DWP does not. I hope I have established this, but the DWP has an existing well-established legislative framework, which I have described, to determine the recoverable amount—debtors have the right to mandatory reconsideration and appeal at the First-tier Tribunal against the overall amount. The PSFA will act on behalf of other departments, and the types of debt being pursued will vary more in scope and complexity, on a case-by-case basis. Given the many types of claim that the PSFA may pursue, it is therefore appropriate to build in that additional step, because it does not have the set-up that we have described.

I absolutely take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that people out there have had a bad experience of the DWP. All organisations make mistakes and the DWP is no exception. I regret that and, when we have complaints, we take all the steps we can to try to put them right. But my Secretary of State has made it part of her mission to try to reach out and look at ways to make sure that we can help to increase trust in the DWP. One thing she made clear in the Green Paper that she published was about wanting to review the whole way that the department does safeguarding, so we have already established a multidisciplinary team to support and join up our safeguarding approach across the department, and we are consulting on the new safeguarding approach as part of the Green Paper on get Britain working. We will actively go out and seek opinions. I have no doubt, from what the noble Baroness described, that we will get some back that will be hard to read, but hopefully others will be more positive and others will help us to make sure that we get that right. But the fact that we sometimes make mistakes does not mean that we cannot carry on doing the job that we have been given and make sure that we do the right things in relation to public money.

So the noble Baroness makes an important point, and I hear it, but the job of this Committee is therefore to make sure that we have the appropriate safeguards when we do that to try to make sure that we are protecting those at the heart of this. I hope that, with those reassurances, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, will be able to withdraw the amendment.

The noble Baroness has not answered one question that I had. My understanding from Clause 89 is that these DDO rights—or however one describes them—can be used only where a person is convicted of an offence under this Act or any other enactment, or agrees to pay a penalty under Section 115A of the 1992 Act. Does that mean, therefore, that this does not apply to situations of error and that it is only fraud?

I apologise; I forgot to answer that. No, it does not. These measures apply to any kind of overpayment but, as I described, they are only matters of last resort. We have to have gone through all the other possibilities and people must simply have failed to engage. So this really will happen only if somebody is absolutely not engaged with us at all. As is the case with deductions from benefits or deductions from earnings, they are available as a tool for overpayments, whether or not they will be used.

I thank the noble Lords who spoke on these amendments for appreciating—even if they did not support—the spirit of what they are trying to do. Despite that, I do actually want to do this rather than just wanting the spirit. But I know that the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, feels that it will not work practically. But we have had a slightly contradictory answer there, because they are either absolutely the last resort and will hardly ever be used—in which case they will not clog up the court system, to be fair—or they will be used a lot more, which means that there is all the more reason for them to go through the courts, if they will be used liberally from the point of view of a safeguard. So I did get confused about that. Some thoughtful points were made. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, usefully probed the Minister—in a way that I was not able to—on exactly when and in what circumstances. These questions about the distinction between error and where the overpayment came from matter in relation to the powers that have been created.

Will the noble Baroness give way?

Yes, of course.

I am sorry to interrupt—I never get to say that anymore. I thought it might be helpful for the Committee if I clarified. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, referred to Clause 89; that actually refers to administrative penalties and recovery for non-benefit payments, not for benefit payments. I should have made that clear. I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in full flow—please carry on.

It is very helpful for these things to be clarified. As noble Lords can see every time we are in Committee, I have so many pieces of paper, so I appreciate that and am not saying that I am on top of all the detail. However, I think it is important, in the spirit of the way that the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, was motivated to support these amendments, that this is not just about the detail; there is an important principle here. I really liked the viral film mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, because people do care about this Bill and what its impact will be, and we have to be able to answer all the questions as the legislators who are debating it. People know that we are involved in this, and I sometimes feel that it is unclear exactly what will be acquired by all these powers. The problem with saying that these powers will hardly ever be used is that these powers are going in the statute book, so they can be used. I am not going to talk about bank statements again, but the reason I raised them on this group is because, before a DDO can be introduced, you have to check bank statements through the mechanism of the affordability checks that we will go on to discuss, and that is a breach of privacy. If we are giving the DWP the power to do this, we need to have a check. The way we have done that historically is to rely on the courts to take money. As this is related, I am trying to see whether this could be a useful check to make sure that these powers are not exploited. We have plenty of time to go, so I think some of us may come back with a version of this amendment—potentially better worded—when we get to Report. It is not just to fly the flag for civil liberties but, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, said, a need to have trust in the system. If the Bill is to be taken seriously by people who do not just think that it is draconian and who do not do the caricatures that the Minister wants, it must be watertight in its safeguards and protections, as well as in the powers that it creates. Those two things have to live together; otherwise, it will be discredited before it even hits the statute book.

I just want to pick up on something quite interesting that the noble Baroness said, which leads me to ask a question of the Minister. I am not expecting an answer now. It is to do with the capacity or number of cases. I have no idea how many DDO cases could end up going to the courts, but it may be more than the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, thinks. I am just reminded of my experience of the Child Maintenance Service: it looks at those people who we know can pay and who are not paying, and they go all the way to the courts. There are many thousands. I rest my case by saying that there is a danger that the courts could be clogged up, but it would help the Committee to have some idea, perhaps in writing, of the number of cases that would or could go to court as a consequence of these amendments.

I will write to the noble Viscount. As he knows from his experience with the Child Maintenance Service, as each form of enforcement comes into view, more and more people simply pay without it being necessary, so a sort of funnel comes down. If we have any information about scale, I would be happy to write.

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 102 withdrawn.

Amendment 103

Moved by

103: Schedule 5, page 105, line 18, leave out from beginning to end of line 33 on page 106. Member’s explanatory statement This will prevent the DWP from being able to compel banks to disclose the bank statements of benefits recipients to decide whether to issue direct deduction powers.

My Lords, I move Amendment 103 on behalf of my noble friend Lady Kramer, who is in the Chamber. We are all playing ducks and drakes with where we are. The amendment was tabled by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. It would prevent the Department for Work and Pensions from compelling banks to disclose the bank statements of benefit recipients in deciding whether to issue direct deduction orders.

18:00:00

The amendment is vital to protect the fundamental right to privacy for some of the most vulnerable members of society—those who do not speak up for themselves and those who rely on the social security safety net. The current proposal would allow the DWP to intrude into the financial lives of claimants without the robust oversight and safeguards that are the hallmark of a just system. Such sweeping powers risk undermining trust in public authorities. They could have great effect and lead to disproportionate and unnecessary invasions of privacy, especially when alternative, less intrusive means of verification are available. Furthermore, we have long argued that any powers granted to government departments, particularly those involving access to sensitive personal information, must be exercised with utmost restraint and subject to rigorous checks and balances.

Allowing the DWP to bypass the courts and directly compel banks to hand over personal financial data, if that is the case, sets a dangerous precedent and is not in keeping with the principles of natural justice. If there are genuine grounds for suspicion of fraud or error, the proper course is to seek a court order ensuring independent oversight and accountability. The amendment strikes the right balance between tackling fraud and upholding the rights and dignity of benefit claimants. I urge noble Lords to support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer. I beg to move.

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, who has clearly and eloquently outlined the reasons for this amendment, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, tabled, and to which I attached my name. The noble Lord talked about the risk of loss of trust in public authorities. We should also look at the other side of this: the loss of trust in banks. People may have heard the acronym GDPR. People might not know all the ins and outs but they think that anything to do with bank accounts is private stuff. They want to trust that if their information is with the bank, it is not going to be handed out to anyone else. We have a situation whereby, although the situation has improved in recent years, still 2.1% of Britons are unbanked. That figure is significantly higher for the under-25s. It is also higher in some regions and nations; for example, Scotland. We have to think not just about the impact on attitudes towards the DWP. I thank the Minister for acknowledging in her response to my previous contribution that the department has a long way to go. However, bank statements contain all sorts of information beyond what is relevant to anything the DWP knows about. For example, people may find themselves in a difficult situation after a relationship has broken down, and their bank statement may reveal all kinds of things about their personal life that they really do not want anyone else to see. There may be purchases they consider embarrassing. They do not want anyone else to see them. Getting the whole copy of the bank statement is not going to provide just information relevant to what the DWP is doing or not, or any other income and so on. There is going to be a lot of other material as well. As the Bill is currently written, it is disproportionate, as the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, said.

Very briefly, I absolutely support the amendment. I raised some of my concerns when moving my amendment in the previous group. When I heard that bank statements could be requested, I thought it was not true and I kept having to check it. I thought, “This cannot be right”, because throughout the passage of the Bill we have been assured by the Minister, “Oh, no. We do not want any details. We are only going to have the name. There is no surveillance”. I then thought, “Oh my God, they can get the bank accounts of individuals, allegedly to check whether they have enough money in their bank account, saying that they are doing it only because they are being nice to them”. I am of the generation who think that if you lose your bank account, there is serious jeopardy. In other words, I would never show my bank accounts around. I am paranoid about anyone seeing my bank accounts. I worry about that sort of thing, although it is not that I have anything to hide—just to note. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, indicated, you can find out from people’s bank accounts what their politics are, their trade union affiliations and their sexual preferences —all sorts of things. On the idea that the DWP will not be looking at that but will just be checking how much money you have, it cannot do that. It is essential that we think twice about this. These account information notices also apply to joint bank accounts. I know that we are going on to discuss joint accounts in a minute, but that means that those pots of intimate, private, sensitive and granular information held within a bank statement can be revealed about individuals who are not on benefits, who are not debtors, who are not involved at all—they simply share a joint account. I would like this removed from the Bill. It is too scary.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for tabling this amendment. I recognise the spirit in which this proposal is made—a desire to ensure that the use of direct deduction powers is subject to proper scrutiny and does not override individual rights without appropriate justification. However, I must express some serious reservations about the effect that this amendment would have. By removing the ability of the DWP to request relevant bank statement information from financial institutions before issuing a DDO, we risk undermining the very evidential foundation that should underpin the use of this power in the first place. If we are to give Ministers and their departments powers to recover money owed to the public purse—a legitimate policy objective that is supported on all sides of this Committee—we must also ensure that those powers are exercised responsibly and on the basis of proper evidence. Access to account information, under strictly controlled conditions, is part of what makes that possible. Without it, the risk is not simply inefficiency or delay. The greater danger is that deduction decisions could be made with incomplete or inaccurate information, leading to inappropriate enforcement action or simply to missed opportunities to recover legitimately owed funds. Neither outcome would serve the interests of fairness, nor would they deliver good value for public money. We have heard throughout Committee about the importance of a system that is not only robust but proportionate and just. I entirely agree—as our amendments and interventions thus far have made clear. However, for a system to be proportionate, it must be informed, which requires access to evidence. I reiterate the concerns that we raised on these Benches at Second Reading. Schedule 3B (1)(2) (b)(i) makes it clear that an eligibility verification notice, which would serve to identify or help to identify fraud, can be applied only to the bank account “into which a specified relevant benefit has been paid”. As my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott set out at Second Reading, we are concerned that this creates a substantial loophole which could be exploited by fraudsters who are, as the government amendments have suggested, able to find out whether they are being pursued by the DWP through an information request. This is a real issue. It seems a likely and obvious outcome that such a person could move money between the relevant account and another, held with different bank, to avoid scrutiny. We submit that for this to be an enforcement regime, there cannot be any loopholes or workarounds which may permit a fraudster to hang on to the money that they have stolen from the taxpayer. As we stated at Second Reading, the Bill as set out suggests that the Government will be tied up in a legal bind, ensuring in statute that they cannot verify or ultimately pursue the recovery of funds that are not held within the account specified. However, with the right safeguards and with responsible communication of information, there is surely a way in which this regime can be constructed that is responsible and fit for purpose. We believe that the Government must expand their capacity and ability to access further bank accounts held in the name of the relevant person to prevent them simply opening another account and moving money around, which, as the Bill is currently drafted, seems to be a clear and easy way for them to avoid both proper scrutiny and will prevent the money being recovered. Perhaps the Minister will say whether parallels can be drawn with the current system set out between HMRC and the banks for the recovery of tax resulting either from overpayments or tax fraud, which I am sure she will say works. That may be helpful. Finally, I want to respond briefly to the concerns raised about whether these provisions amount to a snoopers’ charter—a charge that has been raised throughout the passage of the Bill. It is right that we scrutinise the scope of these powers carefully, but it is also important to be clear about what the Bill does and does not do. In our view, the Bill sets out defined and limited circumstances under which verification measures may be used. It cannot be doubted that an informed and fair decision on deduction orders can be reached only if it is grounded in accurate and up-to-date information. I believe that it is for the Government to make it absolutely clear in Committee how these safeguards on process will function in practice and how transparency and accountability will be maintained. I understand the sensitivities involved in accessing bank data. That is why these safeguards and oversight mechanisms are important. With that, I hope that noble Lords will reflect on whether the amendment achieves that balance, and I look forward to the Minister’s response on how the very valid concerns that it speaks to can be addressed.

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. As we have heard, this amendment would remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the department in response to notices, including bank statements, for the purposes of making a direct deduction order. However, getting this information from banks, including relevant bank statements, is not only instrumental to the effectiveness of the direct deduction power—it is crucial as a necessary and important safeguard to ensure the affordability of deductions, which is why we cannot accept this amendment. I remind the Committee that the recovery powers proposed under the Bill are ones of last resort. They are for those not in receipt of benefit or in PAYE employment who have other income streams or capital and who repeatedly refuse to engage with the DWP to agree an affordable repayment plan. Without the information shared by the bank, the DWP would have no means to consider the debtor’s financial circumstances and would therefore be prevented from meeting other obligations and vital safeguards in the Bill, such as establishing an affordable deduction rate and avoiding causing hardship. Put simply, if we do not know how much money someone has, we risk taking more than they can afford to repay at that time. The DWP is working collaboratively with the Money and Pensions Service on “ability to pay” checks, using bank statements and, where possible, the standard financial statement principles, to prevent financial hardship. These checks will consider the debtor’s essential living expenses, such as housing and utilities, and the Bill provides that direct deduction orders must not cause the debtor hardship in meeting these expenses. Using bank statements in this way allows the deduction to be affordable and fair based on the individual circumstances, rather than a blanket approach of leaving a set amount in the account which, if not set high enough, could prevent the debtor from meeting those essential costs. The information gathered through these notices is proportionate and other provisions in the Bill restrict the use of bank statements obtained under this power. They are solely for the purposes of recovering the money that is owed. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that it is a legal requirement not to use the information for any purpose other than debt recovery. That is spelled out in paragraph 3(10) of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 of the Bill. I also remind the noble Baroness that all this can be avoided, including obtaining information from a debtor’s bank, if the individual agrees to get in touch to discuss and agree an appropriate repayment plan. In that case, we will not need bank statements because we can talk to them and ask for appropriate evidence, and they can provide evidence of other kinds, if that is sensible. I will just pick up on a number of things. We are not interested in looking at what people spend their money on. It is worth reminding the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the Committee that we have said different things at different times because there are different measures in the Bill. For the EVM over here, there is no transaction data—absolutely not, under any circumstances—and I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that we are looking only at the bank account into which we pay benefits. Fresh sentence: over here, the DWP’s debt recovery powers are aimed at different people, who are not on benefits as, by definition, the EVM is only for those on benefits. It is aimed at people who are not in PAYE employment, who owe the department money and who will not engage. If at least four attempts have been made to contact them but they simply have not got in touch, we can start to use the powers. In that case, we do have the power under our debt recovery powers to go to any bank account that they have; we are not limited to the bank account into which we pay benefits. As I have just said, we are not interested in looking at what people spend their money on. The power can be used to recover debt only in cases where somebody is not in receipt of benefits, as I have described.

18:15:00

Telling people about it is quite interesting. In response to the points made by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, the DWP will not explicitly notify an individual at the time that their bank statements are being obtained. This is to avoid tipping them off and, as he suggested, avoiding repayment and moving funds. However, it is not secretive, as others have suggested, because they would have been made aware of the power in advance, as it would be clearly set out in the relevant debt notifications that the DWP may obtain the statements without further warning. This gives the individuals an opportunity and further reason to engage with the DWP. Where the DWP considers that a DDO can be made, at that point it will notify the debtor and any joint account holder that the proposed order has been calculated using the bank statements and invite their representations. Again, as I have said, individuals can avoid the debt recovery actions proposed under Part 2 by engaging with the department regarding their outstanding debt.

On banks, this is not unprecedented. The obligations under this are no more onerous than those given by the courts on freezing orders or third-party debt orders. Providing bank statements is already a requirement under comparable powers—HMRC and the Child Maintenance Service.

On joint accounts, again, if a joint account is what we have to use, we will, but all of this can be avoided simply by somebody engaging in the first place. There may be cases when an overpayment is owed by somebody who is not on benefits anymore. In fact, there will be cases of people not on benefits or PAYE. If they do not want to do that—and I understand that many of us have things that we would rather not share with other people—the simplest way around that is to get in touch, discuss it and avoid these powers having to be used.

I understand the points made from different directions of the Committee, but I hope that that is enough to allow the amendment to be withdrawn.

I thank the Minister very much for responding in that manner, but it is rather like a court case where they say that the jury should disregard what happened. Once the information is out there, human nature makes it very hard to avoid it. If you are the DWP and you look at a bank account and see something that you should not, it is hard then to ignore it. The nature of man and woman is not to ignore things that they see. I am afraid that that just came to my mind: it is like these television dramas where the barrister or lawyer raises points, and the judge says, “The jury should disregard that”. You cannot disregard what you see in a bank statement even if you decide that you should not really have seen it. This is a very dangerous precedent, and I do not think the Minister is living in the real world.

I just remind the noble Lord that these DWP staff are authorised fraud investigators and they work on our fraud teams. In the nature of their work, as it is for anybody who works in fraud or law enforcement, they will end up seeing information, in the course of an investigation, that is not relevant. If he thinks that that means that that information will necessarily get into the outside world, then I ask him to rethink that. Our staff are professionally trained. They are professionals who operate under professional standards, authorisations and accreditation. They know what their job is. If staff come across information and the law quite clearly says that it may be used for only one purpose, it will be used for only that purpose.

I am sorry, but this does not take account of rogue members of the DWP. I am sure that 99.99% are exactly as the Minister says, but the idea that everyone will observe those rules is—I say again—not the real world. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer.

Amendment 103 withdrawn.

Amendments 104 and 105 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.

Amendments 106 to 108

Moved by

106: Schedule 5, page 107, line 12, at end insert “the bank where the account in question is held,” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment, together with my amendments to Schedule 5, page 108, line 1 and Schedule 5, page 108, line 5, requires a notice under paragraph 5(1) of new Schedule 3ZA to be given to the bank in question.

107: Schedule 5, page 108, line 1, leave out “, including before it is given to the” and insert “before it is given to the other” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 5, page 107, line 12.

108: Schedule 5, page 108, line 5, leave out “before it is given to the persons to whom it is required to be given,” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 5, page 107, line 12.

Amendments 106 to 108 agreed.

Amendment 109

Moved by

109: Schedule 5, page 108, line 12, at end insert— 5A “(1) Before any direct deduction order under this Schedule is made, the Secretary of State has a duty to consider its effect on any person who—(a) is a victim of domestic abuse, or(b) the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be at risk of domestic abuse.(2) For the purposes of this paragraph, “domestic abuse” has the meaning given by section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021.”

My Lords, the amendment seeks to ensure that, before any direct deduction order is made under this schedule, the Secretary of State must consider the effect of such an order on any person who is a victim of domestic abuse, or whom the Secretary of State reasonably believes to be at risk of domestic abuse. While the Bill rightly includes very important safeguards, such as affordability and vulnerability checks, and limits on the amounts that can be deducted to protect debtors from undue hardship, these general measures may not provide sufficient protection for those experiencing or at risk of domestic abuse, whose circumstances are often uniquely precarious and complex. Victims of domestic abuse frequently face financial control and instability, and the imposition of a direct deduction order could inadvertently place them at greater risk, either by exacerbating economic hardship or alerting an abuser to their financial situation. It is therefore essential that the Secretary of State has a specific statutory duty to assess the impact on this particularly vulnerable group before any order is made. By adopting this modest amendment, we would strengthen the Bill’s existing safeguards and ensure that the most vulnerable are not further disadvantaged by well-intentioned recovery mechanisms. I urge noble Lords to support the amendment in the interests of justice, compassion and the protection of those at risk. I beg to move.

My Lords, I offer my strong support for Amendment 109, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. It proposes a vital and compassionate safeguard that ensures that, before any direct deduction order is made, proper consideration is given to whether the individual involved is a victim of domestic abuse—or certainly at risk of it. We know that domestic abuse too often includes economic and financial control. Perpetrators may take over access to bank accounts, manage benefit claims in their partner’s name or use coercion to extract money. For victims in these circumstances, a deduction order made against a joint or controlled account is not just a technical enforcement step but can be catastrophic and expose them to further harm, deepen their financial insecurity and reinforce the very cycle of abuse that they are trying to escape. The amendment puts in place an essential duty that, before such a deduction is imposed, the Secretary of State must ask a basic question: is this person safe? Are they vulnerable specifically to domestic abuse? Could such action cause caused further harm? I am sure the Committee will realise that these comments are not new. This is not about creating loopholes but about making sure that we do not inadvertently punish the very people who most need our protection. If our system is to be just, it must distinguish between those who are deliberately defrauding the system and those who are themselves being defrauded, manipulated or coerced in private and invisible ways. I fully recognise—others may raise this point—that this kind of information is not always easy to obtain. As we know, domestic abuse is often hidden, and victims may be reluctant or unable to disclose it. But that is not a reason to avoid the responsibility. On the contrary, it is precisely why we must build protective considerations into the decision-making process. So, if a red flag is raised—whether through third-party evidence, existing support services or patterns in the account—the system must be capable of pausing, asking the right and necessary questions and adjusting course. That is surely not an undue burden; it is what we should expect of a responsible, modern enforcement regime. Of course, I also note that the Government already have duties under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021—I expect we will hear this from the Minister—and under the wider Equality Act to consider how their decisions impact vulnerable groups. But this amendment gives practical effect to those duties in the specific context of direct deduction orders. It does not create new rights out of thin air; it reinforces and operationalises obligations that the state already carries. So I ask the noble Baroness two questions. In the system and process designed, and having reached proof of concept with the banks—at least on two occasions; I refer back to previous comments—who is responsible for recognising these issues in respect of account holders? Is it the banks? To what extent do they know such detail about their account holders? Or is it the DWP? Is it more likely to know of such matters? Obviously, in the discussions leading up to and beyond the decision to give out benefits, such issues surely would have emerged. Perhaps the Minister can enlighten us on the precise responsibilities here. Perhaps the Minister can also confirm that the banks would not see the analysis of vulnerability as a key part of their responsibility—that is linked to my previous point—but that their role is simply to raise a red flag with deliberately limited data, as has been outlined, where there is that match of an account holder in receipt of benefits who also has £16,000 or more in an account. The final question, which chimes with questions asked on perhaps day 4 of Committee, is: how often are such checks carried out by banks, as requested by the DWP? Or—I need to be put right again; forgive me—is the algorithm such that a flag is raised on a 24/7 basis by an algorithm that does a match? Then a report is given to the bank’s responsible person—let us call him the banking manager. There is a thread running through this debate about how to balance power and protection. Indeed, it is an issue on which noble Lords across the Committee agree; therefore I warmly welcome this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, as it provides us with another opportunity to test out the Government and raise our concerns. This amendment is principled, proportionate and practical. I hope the Government will take it seriously, in the spirit it is meant, and reflect carefully on the values it enshrines. I believe it gets to the very essence of what the Bill is about. With that, I look forward to the answers from the Minister.

My Lords, I am grateful, as ever. The subject of Amendment 109, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, is very much as it was in the fourth group, with the earlier amendments in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger. The Committee agrees on the objective in that area and we are simply going to talk about the best way to achieve that. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for raising this issue but again, for reasons not dissimilar to those articulated earlier, his amendment is not the best way to achieve this. However, I hope I can give him the assurance that he is looking for. The DWP very much understands the importance of this issue. The noble Viscount is right that we have statutory obligations, but it is also embedded in the department. All our front-line staff are trained in addressing the issue of domestic violence, the training is regularly refreshed and we engage with stakeholders: the department take it very seriously. We are committed to continuing to support victims and survivors of domestic abuse whenever they interact with the department. We have experience in this area, as well as existing guidance and processes for supporting victims of domestic abuse. As I say, the training our front-line management staff receive includes assessing affordability and identifying and dealing with vulnerable customers. My officials have been looking in detail, specifically at how victim survivors could be impacted by the measures in the Bill, and working closely with key stakeholders, including the charity Surviving Economic Abuse, to ensure that the code of practice sets out the right approach to mitigating risks for victim survivors of domestic abuse. The current draft of the code of practice includes steps officials will take to identify signs of domestic abuse, where possible, to identify risks and to support the individual. However, although I recognise the important intent behind this amendment, the fact is that it would apply to anyone affected by a direct deduction order, including debtors and non-debtors. Similarly to the earlier Amendments 99D and 109ZA from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, it does not require or enable the DWP to take any action to identify possible impacted individuals or provide any new means by which the DWP could do so.

18:30:00

Proposed new sub-paragraph (1)(a) of the amendment places a duty on officials to consider the impact any time a person was a victim, even where the DWP did not and could not know that this was the case. Proposed new sub-paragraph (1)(b) implies a duty to assess whether there is reason to believe that the person is at risk of domestic abuse, but in most cases officials would not be able to make that assessment without engagement from debtors.

As I said previously, the proposed direct deduction order is a power of last resort for people who have not engaged with the department, who are not benefit claimants and who are not in PAYE employment. So, without input from the debtor or a representative on their behalf, the DWP will be unaware that a person may be a victim of domestic abuse—much as I discussed earlier on the position of vulnerable people. That is why our current notifications, and any developed for use in relation to the new powers, will actively encourage debtors to contact the DWP to discuss their circumstances, as well as signpost individuals to independent sources of help and advice, and organisations that can contact the DWP on their behalf, such as Citizens Advice.

Those within the scope of this amendment could include joint account holders, but the DWP is extremely unlikely to have any direct engagement with other account holders who are not the debtor or others in the debtor’s household and consequently could not reasonably assess whether such persons were experiencing or at risk of domestic abuse, unless directly notified. Therefore, placing a legal duty on the DWP would again put officials in an unfair, if not impossible, position.

Instead, new paragraph (6)(1)(b) in Schedule 5 already imposes a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the amount of any deduction is fair in all circumstances, including for victims or survivors of domestic abuse where the circumstances are known to the department or a risk is identified by departmental officials. This, coupled with the safeguards I have described and the engagement we are undertaking with key stakeholders, achieves the shared objective that the noble Lord and I have.

On the questions raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, with this amendment we are discussing solely the debt recovery powers, so that applies only to them and not to the EVM measures to which I think his questions related. But, if I misunderstood that, I am happy to take this up with him later if there is anything else I can help with.

I hope that reassures noble Lords that these concerns are being taken very seriously in both the department and the Bill, and that the DWP is taking steps to mitigate risks for victims, survivors and those at risk of domestic abuse. I hope the Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 109 withdrawn.

Amendment 109ZA not moved.

Amendment 109A

Moved by

109A: Schedule 5, page 108, line 14, at end insert "following an affordability assessment in relation to the liable person and" Member’s explanatory statement This amendment requires the Secretary of State to undertake an affordability assessment before making a direct deduction order.

My Amendments 109A and 109B address the twin issues of affordability and minimising social harm. Amendment 109A deals with the Government’s proposed “affordability assessment”, which is my term, not the Government’s. Amendment 109B requires a de minimis amount to be left in an individual’s bank account following the application of a deduction order. Neither amendment breaks new ground and both are within the terms of government policy. If we are going to pursue this policy, it has to be transparently fair and minimise social harm, which is the purpose of my amendments. It needs to be stressed that both amendments are strongly supported by UK Finance, which is the collective voice for the banking and finance industry. These are the people who will have to undertake the hard work of implementing this policy, so their views should be taken seriously. I am not a natural proponent of UK Finance—I have spent much of my working life criticising insurance companies and banks for how they treat people—but it is a relevant participant in this process and its views should be taken most seriously. On Amendment 109A, as I mentioned, there will be an affordability assessment. It is pretty well hidden—there is no reference to it in the Bill—but paragraph 52 of the Explanatory Notes states that direct recoveries “will only happen once affordability and vulnerability checks have been carried out”, so there will be checks. There is a more explicit reference in paragraph 723, which states specifically that “prior to pursuing a direct deduction order”, the Secretary of State will consider “the affordability of recovery”. That affordability assessment is an inherent part of the legislation, even though it is only implied in the Bill rather than required explicitly. My amendment is a probing amendment to press the Government on whether it would be better to have this in the Bill. To paraphrase the Government’s position as I understand it, recovering benefit overpayments through the debt recovery measure will be a last resort and the Minister may make a direct deduction order only if satisfied that it will not cause a liable person to suffer hardship. Maybe the Minister could put the intention of the legislation into the Government’s words. UK Finance has said that it welcomes this intent but is concerned that the existing safeguards may not provide the level of protection that vulnerable consumers need in practice. Perhaps it knows its customers better than we do. For this measure to be effective, an affordability assessment is essential: one that is carried out by the DWP and is accurate and realistic. I understand that the DWP is working with the Money and Pensions Service to flesh out the detail of the process. It is obviously essential that the DWP can understand the circumstances of vulnerable customers to ensure that the affordability assessment is fair and will not lead to social harm. We know that organisations such as the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory panel—the Money Advice Trust and Citizens Advice have been campaigning for some years for improvements in government debt practices. This is not a new problem. I mentioned in the previous sitting the comments made by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, but it is relevant to repeat them. It said that the DWP “does not understand well enough the experience of vulnerable customers and customers with additional or complex needs … We remain concerned about the potential negative impact on protected groups and vulnerable customers of DWP’s use of machine learning to identify potential fraud”. This goes back to an earlier debate but it highlights that the evidence to hand is that the DWP is not very good at assessing affordability. It is reasonable, by means of proposing this amendment, for the Government to explain how the affordability will be assessed. If the proposals do not appear to be adequate, I will want to return to this issue on Report. Similarly, Amendment 109B is a probing amendment. It lacks much of the detail that a specific proposal would need but proposes that there should be a de minimis amount left in an individual’s account following the application of a deduction order. The intention is that individuals should not be left without access to essential funds and should not suffer undue hardship. This is not a new proposal because there are other circumstances in which debts owed to the Government, where the Government have powers to extract money from people’s bank accounts, permit a de minimis amount. There are the comparable HMRC direct recovery of debt measures where there is a de minimis balance of £5,000. There is a similar arrangement in Scotland. Scottish law is a mystery to me, but there is a parallel arrangement under Scottish law that, in circumstances where debts can be taken, they have to leave at least £1,000. The problem arises—talking about both sorts of deduction orders—that there is a possibility of extracting money and leaving the individual with no income whatever to meet routine payments such as rent. Because the bank account is frozen, they may also have made prior commitments and, when those arise and these private arrangements seek money from the bank account which has been driven down to zero by the deduction order, the individual is left in an extremely difficult situation as debts that they have incurred are not able to be met. There is also the issue of money for routine costs. If someone depends on their bank account to feed their family and the account is driven down to zero, that will also incur considerable and unwarranted hardship. It is quite clear that, following existing practice, this legislation should permit a de minimis amount to allow routine financial transactions to continue where barring them would cause social harm. There is a particular problem that, once the 28-day period has been triggered during which people can object to the proposed deduction order, the account is effectively frozen. In fact, it is frozen until the end of the unlimited period the DWP has in order to reply to the appeal against the deduction order. There is potential for considerable social harm and that is why it is important that at least some agreed sum of money is left. I suggest £1,000 in my amendment but I am really raising the issue in principle. If the Government can come back on Report with a proposal along the lines I suggest, that would be good. If they do not, I will seek to raise this issue. Both these amendments seek to avoid social harm, and I hope the Government will take the points on board and come back on Report with suitable amendments to avoid the problems identified, not just by me but by bodies in membership of UK Finance which deal with the customers who will be caught by these provisions.

18:45:00

My remarks will be brief. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, for tabling Amendments 109A and 109B, which seek to introduce further safeguards into the process by which direct deduction orders are applied. These amendments are clearly driven by a legitimate concern. I am sure it is one that we all share; no one should be pushed into destitution—note that word—because of enforcement action taken by the state. We on these Benches broadly support the intention behind these amendments. As we expand the state’s ability to recover funds lost through fraud, we must do so in a way that is measured, proportionate and fair. We agree that the person on the receiving end of a direct deduction order must be treated with dignity and that the enforcement should never push a person below the threshold of subsistence. However, while we agree on the principle, the Bill as currently drafted already contains sufficient protections to give effect to that principle. These amendments propose going further. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, set out, they would hard-wire specific mechanisms into the legislation itself with a mandatory affordability assessment and a fixed, safeguarded amount of £1,000 to be left in a person’s account. While we understand the motivation behind these proposals, we are not persuaded that they strike the right balance. First, on the affordability assessment, the key question is not whether such considerations should be made—they absolutely should be—but whether placing a rigid requirement in the Bill is the best way to achieve it. Secondly, regarding the safeguarded sum, the proposal to set a fixed floor of £1,000 may be well intentioned but risks creating unintended consequences. For some individuals, that figure may be appropriate, but for others with significantly higher levels of debt or multiple fraudulent claims—of which there are a few, I am afraid—it may act as an unjustified barrier to recovery. A blanket threshold does not easily accommodate the complexity of individual circumstances. We must not forget what this system is designed to do. We are talking about the recovery of public funds that were obtained unlawfully. These are not arbitrary deductions, but actions taken in response to fraud—in some cases, large-scale fraud—committed against the public purse. These funds belong not to the state in the abstract but to the taxpayers, the public and the people who rely on our public services. I remind the Committee of our duty to recover them on their behalf. We must exercise this power responsibly and we believe the Bill enables that. We must also ensure that we do not design a system that is so laden with friction that it fails to deliver on its core purpose of upholding the rule of law and restoring funds to the public where fraud has occurred. These amendments raise important points, and we welcome the values that underpin them. We are committed to ensuring that the system is fair, proportionate and humane. We are confident that the existing provisions in the Bill, supported by robust guidance and operational safeguards, provide a sufficient framework to achieve those goals without introducing additional complexity that may compromise the system’s effectiveness. Before the Minister thinks that I am writing yet another speech for her, I have some questions for her, which may also be helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Take the case of someone who has taken money fraudulently but finds himself destitute through his own actions and might otherwise be on the streets, homeless —or worse, hungry. What help can the state give to him? What options are there? As a basic, I presume that he will still be eligible for universal credit, albeit, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, it would be subject to an agreed deduction for his misdemeanours. He would therefore still get support, assuming that he is not allowed to keep the £1,000 in his account. As the noble Lord said, the money and advisory services are there, and Citizens Advice is there. They are there to offer advice, but what support is there for such people in extremis? The Minister may say that the household support fund is also there and could be called upon, but that fund is subject to local help and is in the gift of local authorities to give out. Would destitute people come into that? In conclusion, we do not support these amendments, but I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for prompting this important and short debate. We look forward to working together to ensure that the final system strikes the right balance between fairness and firm recovery of debt.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Davies for raising this, and to the noble Viscount for his observations. I agree with my noble friend that affordability assessments should be conducted—he has made that clear, and we certainly want to do that as we think it is important—before a direct deduction order is issued, but we regard this amendment as unnecessary and duplicating existing provisions. Paragraph 6 of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 of the Bill, provides that recovery must not cause hardship to the debtor, any joint account holder or dependant, and must be fair. Paragraph 3 requires the DWP to obtain, via an account information notice, bank statements covering at least the most recent three months in order to help make that assessment. Further detail on how affordability will be assessed will be set out in the code of practice, a draft of which is available to Members; I am sure that my noble friend has had the opportunity to see it. It sets out the principles that will apply when affordability is assessed. They include ensuring that essential living expenses and other reasonable financial commitments are identified and protected. Officials are working closely with organisations such as the Money and Pensions Service to develop the code and, as required by Clause 93, a formal public consultation will be conducted on the draft before it is first issued. As I have already outlined, affordability assessments must and will take place prior to enforcing a deduction order. These checks use banks statements, allowing DWP officials to consider expenses such as housing and utilities, enabling the deduction to be affordable, fair and based on individual circumstances, rather than a blanket approach of leaving a set amount in the account which could, if not set high enough, prevent the debtor from meeting those essential costs, as the amounts will vary from person to person. For regular direct deduction orders, paragraph 6(3) of new Schedule 3ZA requires that any regular deductions made by the DWP each month must not exceed 40% of the monthly average amount credited to the account during the last period in which statements were assessed. Regulations will be made under paragraph 24(2)(d) to further set a maximum rate of 20% for all cases that have not arisen due to fraud. These figures are maximums, rather than fixed deduction rates. Deduction rates will vary as officials take any affordability, hardship factors or other relevant circumstances into consideration. This approach mirrors that already used effectively in the DWP’s existing powers of deduction from earnings or benefits, and it is not obvious why it should be different in these circumstances. Given the safeguards outlined, requiring that £1,000 be left in one or more of the liable person’s bank accounts in every case where a DDO was sought is unnecessary, as the safeguards will already achieve the outcome intended by this amendment. Regarding the specific questions, I reassure my noble friend that we are alive to the concerns of UK Finance, which we meet regularly. We are working with MaPS and relevant debt sector organisations on this. He mentioned a comparison with HMRC. HMRC has confirmed that its power is a one-off deduction of a tax debt, not a regular deduction. As a result, it does not assess customers’ affordability as part of the process. Its safeguard instead requires it to leave a minimum of £5,000 across the customer’s accounts to stop taxpayers being left with insufficient funds to cover basic needs. We are taking a different approach: we are assessing affordability, and we will have clear sight via bank statements of the debtor’s ability to repay. In addition to the work we are doing with MaPS, we are working with relevant stakeholder organisations to make sure that our communications with debtors are clear, to help them understand what we are doing and to engage in the best possible way. I remind the Committee that before any deductions are taken, account holders will be notified and given the chance to make representations. They can provide relevant information about their financial position and evidence relevant to affordability. Even at that stage, the department’s preference is to reach an agreed position with the debtor. If reasonable payment terms can be agreed and they are maintained by the debtor, the DWP will not make a deduction order. My noble friend and I clearly want the same thing: to make sure that any recovery is affordable. We have taken different routes, but I hope that what I have said today will help him to accept that our route is doing the job and, in the light of that, he will withdraw his amendment. I am sorry, I forgot to respond to the noble Viscount about destitution. I may have to come back to him on that, because it would depend very much on somebody’s circumstances. Although the household support fund is locally determined, some directions, steers and guidance are given by the centre by the DWP to local authorities. But the fund is significantly there to help with the cost of living. In relation to someone who is destitute and has committed fraud, people may still, if they have an ongoing entitlement to benefit, have been subject to a loss of benefit penalty as part of a process. So it would very much depend on the circumstances. But if I can find anything else useful, I should be happy to put that in writing to the noble Viscount.

I thank the noble Viscount and my noble friend the Minister for comments on my amendments. It has been useful to receive a coherent assessment and description of how this process will work. I will read carefully what was said and consider whether it is an issue that needs to be pursued at a later stage. I thank those who have spoken. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 109A withdrawn.

Amendment 109B not moved.

Amendments 110 to 121

Moved by

110: Schedule 5, page 108, line 39, leave out “, or a method for calculating the amounts,” Member's explanatory statement This amendment means that a regular direct deduction order given by the Secretary of State must specify the amounts to be deducted.

111: Schedule 5, page 109, line 5, leave out “, or different methods for calculating the amounts,” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on my amendment to Schedule 5, page 108, line 39.

112: Schedule 5, page 109, line 8, leave out “, or method for calculating the amount,” Member's explanatory statement This amendment means that a lump sum direct deduction order given by the Secretary of State must specify the amount to be deducted.

113: Schedule 5, page 110, line 19, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement This amendment, together with my amendments to Schedule 5, page 111, line 7, and Schedule 5, page 111, line 15, would replace the tag “first notice” with “pre-deduction notice”. This has no substantive effect but is intended to be easier to understand.

114: Schedule 5, page 111, line 7, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 5, page 110, line 19.

115: Schedule 5, page 111, line 14, leave out “, or calculated in accordance with,” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on my amendments to Schedule 5, page 108, line 39 and Schedule 5, page 109, line 8.

116: Schedule 5, page 111, line 15, leave out “first notice” and insert “pre-deduction notice” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 5, page 110, line 19.

117: Schedule 5, page 112, leave out lines 14 and 15 Member's explanatory statement This amendment removes a provision that is redundant (because paragraph 7(5) applies in relation to every direct deduction order).

118: Schedule 5, page 113, line 8, leave out “(6), (7)” and insert “(6) to (8)” Member's explanatory statement This amendment ensures that a bank must comply with a further information notice.

119: Schedule 5, page 114, line 31, leave out from “(1)” to end of line 37 and insert “may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of one month beginning with the day after the day on which the appellant was—(i) given a copy of the direct deduction order, or the varied direct deduction order, in a case within sub-paragraph (1)(a) or (b), or(ii) notified under paragraph 12(3) or, where a review was sought, paragraph 18(6), in a case within sub-paragraph (1)(c), or(b) such longer period (if any) as the Tribunal considers reasonable in all the circumstances.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment means that the Tribunal can extend the time limit for bringing an appeal in relation to a direct deduction order of the Secretary of State.

120: Schedule 5, page 116, line 8, at end insert “, or (b) such longer period (if any) as the Tribunal considers reasonable in all the circumstances.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment means that the Tribunal can extend the time limit for appealing against a penalty under Part 2 of Schedule 5.

121: Schedule 5, page 116, line 15, at end insert— “Deputies 22A (1) This paragraph applies where a person (a “deputy”) acts on behalf of an account holder (including a liable person) in relation to their account by virtue of—(a) a power of attorney, or(b) an appointment by, or an order of, a court.(2) The following provisions apply in relation to the deputy of the account holder as they apply in relation to the account holder—(a) paragraph 1(7);(b) paragraph 3(5)(b) and (c);(c) paragraph 3(9);(d) paragraph 3(9A);(e) paragraph 5;(f) paragraph 11(1); (g) paragraph 12;(h) paragraph 13(3), (6) and (8)(b);(i) paragraph 14(3);(j) paragraph 15(3);(k) paragraph 16(2);(l) paragraph 18;(m) paragraph 19.(3) Paragraph 13(7)(a) and (b) applies in relation to the deputy of the account holder instead of the account holder.”Member's explanatory statement This new paragraph ensures that new Schedule 3ZA to Social Security Administration Act 1992 operates effectively where a person acts on behalf of an account holder by virtue of a power of attorney or an appointment by, or an order of, a court.

Amendments 110 to 121 agreed.

Amendment 122 not moved.

Schedule 5, as amended, agreed.

Clause 92: Disqualification from driving

Debate on whether Clause 92 should stand part of the Bill.

We have an issue on this proposal to remove driving licences from people who fail to pay their debts to the DWP. We effectively had a debate on the issue at Second Reading, and I am sure that there will be a debate on this at Report. The purpose of having another prolonged debate at this stage, when situations and positions are so clear, is limited. Although there are clear arguments about effectiveness, and it was advanced that the experience of the child maintenance system, where such a power exists already, indicates the success of the policy, the problem is that we do not have a clear counter to that. We know what we know: very few driving licences are deducted or abolished because of action by the Child Maintenance Service. Is that because it is an effective policy and everyone complies, or because it is rarely used because it is ineffective? We simply do not know. The proponents of the proposal here will say that that demonstrates the policy’s effectiveness, but I think it is reasonable to continue to express doubts about that. However, that is a separate issue. My objection, fundamentally, is about the philosophy of what is being achieved here and about the nature of state power. I am sure we all agree that the state should have the power to decide who is safe to drive on the public roads. I have no problem with that; that is the responsibility that we as a community have entrusted to the state. The issue is whether that right should be used for other purposes. Is the fact that you can or cannot have a driving licence related to other factors? In my view, it should not be used for other factors; that is an overextension of state power, which is the fundamental reason why I oppose this part of the Bill and why I am suggesting that the clause, and consequently the schedule, should not be passed. This is an issue of principle, as I have explained, and I am sure that we will return to it on Report—so enough said.

19:00:00

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and speak to this stand part notice, also signed by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, set out the question of principle about whether we allow access. I will make a couple of practical arguments and one point of comparison. I start with the practical arguments. I was just thinking back to the second-ever vote that the Green Party won in either House of Parliament, which was an amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb calling for a review of rural bus services. Losing your driving licence might be an inconvenience, if you live in London—in most parts—but, if you live in the depths of the countryside, it effectively totally traps you in a situation where huge practical disadvantage will happen in your life. It is worth noting that Clause 92 allows the disqualification of a licence for two years. I acknowledge that this is by a court—it is different to what we were talking about before—but I also acknowledge that the option of jail is available here. I am not quite sure how a court will make a judgment—if it is a really serious offence, where will you place those issues? My comparative point is to note that, back in 2023, the then national lead for the police for fatal crash investigations, Andy Cox, made some very strongly worded statements about people who get 12 points on their licence. He said that too many people were using exceptional circumstances to get out of losing their licence. In fact, one in five people who end up with more than 12 points on their licence in three years succeed in pleading exceptional hardship and therefore do not their licence and can continue to drive. The really important point here is that, as the national lead for fatal crash investigations pointed out, some people in that situation go on to kill on the roads. We have a situation where people who are driving dangerously and illegally are able to keep their licences, which is quite a contrast to people who have not been accused of doing anything wrong on the roads but may potentially be suffering from that penalty. Again, we are talking about something that is potentially hitting recipients of benefits, and I rather suspect that a lot of those people who manage to plead exceptional hardship in court, and keep driving with 12 points on their licence, have a fair amount of privilege in their life and can employ fairly expensive lawyers to keep driving. There is a real imbalance there, which should be cause for concern to the Committee.

My Lords, I oppose the proposition that Clause 92 and Schedule 6 should not stand part of the Bill. Clause 92 provides for disqualification from driving to be a sanction that is available in the most serious and persistent cases of benefit fraud, where a recoverable amount remains unpaid despite all reasonable efforts at recovery. I do not wish to step on the Minister’s toes by speaking in defence of this provision. Perhaps I should anticipate another speech that she will be making—we will probably be in broad agreement. However, we must be clear that this is not about punishing people arbitrarily but about ensuring that there is an effective deterrent against repeated and deliberate non-compliance with efforts to recover public money. We have a precedent for this, as we noted at Second Reading. The same mechanism exists in the child maintenance enforcement regime. We have learned from that experience that deterrents do work—or we think that they work. I will return to that in a moment. Fewer than five driving licences were seized under those powers, because the power to impose a disqualification was sufficient to prompt compliance. It was a last resort that rarely had to be used, precisely because it was effective in changing behaviour before reaching that point. In the spirit of trying to be helpful to the Government here, what evidence can be produced that the threat of taking away a driving licence is indeed a deterrent? One statistic could be the number of cases of non-payment from those people whom we know have the ability to repay unlawfully gained moneys but who resolutely refuse to do so and are on the cusp of having their licences taken away. To ascertain the numbers that may have miraculously fallen at this point is one way of defining whether the deterrent has worked. One might assume that any numerical drop in non-paying numbers immediately before a licence withdrawal defines that deterrent. I listened carefully to the remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Perhaps the fall could be seen to be larger in rural areas, as the deterrent would be more significant there than in urban areas. The Minister may be able to enlighten us on this or add that to a letter that hopefully will be coming our way. This is about proportionate enforcement. Clause 92 does not create a routine sanction. It does not apply automatically. It is not triggered for minor mistakes or for those who are acting in good faith. It exists as a targeted and time-limited measure, for use only when all other routes have been exhausted and when the liable person is wilfully refusing to repay money, which—let us not forget—has been obtained unlawfully. Some may argue that disqualification from driving is a severe consequence—the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, has made that point. However, we must weigh that against the seriousness of fraud against the public purse. This money could have been used to fund front-line services, support the vulnerable or maintain trust in the welfare system. Those who persistently abuse the system must know that there are consequences for their actions, which will be followed through. This clause provides one such consequence that is proportionate but effective. We have been consistent throughout Committee in saying that enforcement must be fair but credible. If the consequence of not repaying fraudulently obtained benefits is no more than a polite letter and no meaningful follow-up, then we send entirely the wrong message. Clause 92 helps to restore that balance. It does not criminalise poverty or target vulnerable people. It sets out a power that, in exceptional cases, can be used to bring about compliance when other tools have failed. I therefore oppose the removal of Clause 92 and Schedule 6 and urge colleagues to do the same. I am interested to hear the remarks of the Minister.

My Lords, I thank noble Lords and thank the noble Viscount for doing some of my job for me, for which I am always grateful. I want to try to explain why the Government are doing this. Clause 92 inserts new Section 80C into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to enact the “disqualification from driving” power. Schedule 6 inserts new Schedule 3ZB into the 1992 Act, containing the substantive provisions of the “disqualification from driving” power introduced in Clause 92. The introduction of this allows the DWP to apply to a court to disqualify a person temporarily from driving if they persistently and deliberately fail to repay their debt. It is therefore essential to boost the DWP’s ability to recover public money. However, it is worth being clear that this is a power to deal with a small subset of debtors who are persistently frustrating the recovery practice—I will come back to that in a moment. Preventing an evasive debtor from driving unless they repay is within the Government’s control in a way that they cannot circumvent. While it will be used as a last resort, it is an additional and effective tool in cases where debtors simply refuse and evade repayment. As I think I said at Second Reading, the latest results from the UK transport survey showed that 74% of adults have a driving licence. Debtors are unlikely to want to be inconvenienced by being unable to drive. They can avoid disqualification and any other enforcement action by making voluntary repayments. Schedule 6 sets out when the power may be used and how it will operate, including rules on the operation of suspended and immediate disqualification orders, variation and revocation of orders, as well as the grounds on which an order may be appealed. Appeals may be made to the appropriate court on points of law, including the terms of an order or the court’s decision to make, not make, vary or revoke an order. In accordance with Clause 90, this power will be used as a last resort and, as outlined in Schedule 6, only for the most serious cases for debts with at least £1,000 outstanding. The aim is to deter debtors from deliberately choosing to evade repayment, such as by moving their capital out of reach when they have the means to pay. Only when all other attempts at recovery have failed, including the new direct deduction order, will DWP be able to apply to the court for a suspended disqualification order. If the court agrees that the debtor had the means to pay but did not repay without a reasonable excuse, it will order the debtor to make what it assesses to be affordable repayments. The debtor can avoid being disqualified by making these repayments set by the court. Only if the debtor does not comply with the court’s repayment terms can the DWP apply for an immediate DWP disqualification order. It is at that point—again, only if the court agrees—that the debtor can be disqualified from holding a licence for up to two years. Before either a suspended or immediate order can be made, the debtor will have an opportunity to be heard by the court. It is important to note that the court cannot make either a suspended or an immediate order if it considers that the debtor has an essential need for their licence, such as that they need to drive as part of their job or to care for a dependant. The role of the court throughout this process is an important safeguard, which we have included to ensure a balance between taking robust action against those who deliberately evade recovery and preventing undue hardship. We recognise that stopping someone from driving is a serious step, so my department has built in several other safeguards to give debtors every opportunity to avoid that. For example, missing a single instalment will not normally result in an immediate disqualification order and, even where someone becomes disqualified, they can get the right to drive back when they start making their repayments and the court considers that repayments are likely to continue. But persistent evaders who have the means to pay their debts will no longer be able to evade paying. In response to my noble friend, I think he is challenging me as to why this is a good and effective means of doing it. I accept that it is unusual, but there is a small subset of the most evasive debtors: people who could pay and just will not. They might be, for example, debtors who transferred their money into cryptocurrency, or fraudsters who moved their capital to offshore accounts that the DWP cannot easily get at because they are outside our jurisdictions. It simply does not seem appropriate. If we cannot do anything else, there is one thing the state can do: suspend or remove their driving licence to pull them to the table. There may be some people for whom this is the only thing that works, so we want to keep it there in our armoury. The power has been used effectively by the Child Maintenance Service. I do not know whether we can go into enough detail in the CMS debt management data to find out whether I can answer the questions that the noble Viscount is asking, but I will have a look at that. But certainly the Child Maintenance Service believes that this is an effective tool for bringing people to the table when nothing else works. The Bill includes strong safeguards. The power will not and cannot be used where someone cannot afford to pay. The Bill is clear in paragraph 1(4) of new Schedule 3ZB, in Schedule 6, that the court must be satisfied that the person failed to pay “without reasonable excuse”. That clearly excludes cases where they do not have the means to pay the debt. Of course, the debt must also be of a certain value. Clause 90 says that it must not be “reasonably possible” to recover via other methods, including direct deduction orders, and that this can be used only after they have been given reasonable opportunities to pay.

19:15:00

In response to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in Schedule 6, it says that the court cannot make the order if satisfied that the person has an “essential need” to drive. That might include those who drive to work or for caring responsibilities, or if somebody makes the case to the court that they live in a very rural area and there is no means to go anywhere without a car. It is quite clear that that could be considered an essential need. It has deliberately been drawn broadly so that the court can make an appropriate judgment in that circumstance.

I hope that what I have explained about the way that it will work, the many safeguards that are built in, the limited point at which it can be brought in and the ways that it can happen is enough to persuade my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

I appreciate the noble Baroness’s very full response. This is more of a probing question. We have obviously been debating and talking about driving licences. The ultimate punishment or sanction is prison, but we obviously do not want to exercise that if possible, both for the individual and because we do not want to clog up prisons. But what other sanctions could there be? We have been talking about driving licences, but I know that, in the Child Maintenance Service, taking away passports was raised as a possible sanction. What thoughts does the noble Baroness have on that front?

We are not proposing removal of passports on this occasion.

I thank noble Lords who took part in the debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for her support. I am disappointed that the Conservatives, the party of individual freedom, did not see fit to support my argument. There are a couple of issues that could be helpful to the debate which is likely to take place on Report. If it is possible to get further statistics from the Child Maintenance Service about people who were threatened and then gave in—I cannot totally see how that is possible—that would be good. There is also the issue of the discriminatory nature of the punishment between different groups of people. As I have made clear, that is a practical objection, which is not why I am against this measure at heart. It would be useful in debate to know more of that practical question. As I have read the paper so far, it is about people who require a driving licence to carry out the functions of their job. However, my noble friend the Minister said that it would cover people who need to drive to work. Perhaps she could interrupt me if she is able to clarify.

It is up to the court to determine if someone has an essential need for a licence. We have deliberately drawn it broadly so that the court can make that determination. Examples were given of somebody who needed a car to go to work or maybe had essential caring responsibilities. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I raised the possibility of somebody who lived somewhere so remote that there was no public transport. Again, that would be a case that they would make to the court. The position is deliberately drawn broadly to allow the court to make that determination.

Thank you; that is helpful. I withdraw my objection to Clause 92 standing part of the Bill.

Clause 92 agreed.

Schedule 6 agreed.

Clause 93: Code of practice

Amendment 122A

Moved by

122A: Clause 93, page 60, line 9, after “a” insert “final” Member's explanatory statement This amendment and another to clause 105 in the name of Viscount Younger would compel final codes of practice to be laid before Parliament, before the provisions in the Act could come into force.

My Lords, we now turn to what I believe is the last group for today. I will speak to Amendments 122A, 122B and 122C, which largely concern the code of practice and matters relating to the codes of practice as set out in Clause 93. These amendments are not only sensible but vital if we are to ensure that the framework for exercising these powers is both transparent and democratically accountable. Fundamentally, our amendments recognise that the code of practice is not a peripheral procedural matter; it is a foundational document. It will guide how sensitive and powerful enforcement powers are exercised. It will shape the expectations placed upon investigators, the protections afforded to individuals and the standards against which public officials will be held. In short, it will govern the operational culture of the entire system. Amendment 122A would ensure that the final version of the code is laid before Parliament before these new provisions in the Bill can come into force. I feel it is important at this stage to reiterate that we are being asked to grant significant new powers, including powers of entry, search, seizure and direct deduction, and it is therefore wholly appropriate that Parliament sees, and has the opportunity to scrutinise, the final version of the rules that will help determine how those powers are used. We welcome that, and thank the Minister—I perhaps should have said this earlier—for making good on her promise to release draft versions of the code to noble Lords ahead of Committee, although we feel that it is even more important that we have a binding assurance from the Government that a final version of these documents will be made available to Members of both Houses ahead of the Act coming into force. Amendment 122B would further strengthen this by requiring a public consultation on the draft code before it is issued. I have a feeling that the Minister may have confirmed this earlier; nevertheless, I raise it now and await her reply. Consultation is not just a box-ticking exercise, it is a vital part of democratic policy-making, especially in areas where the state will be interacting with vulnerable people, seizing property or accessing private data. Consultation allows front-line practitioners, civil society groups and those with lived experience to offer their perspective and to flag where guidance may be unclear, safeguards may be weak and unintended consequences might arise. We must not underestimate the value of that input. We have said many times that our primary goal and function throughout Committee is ensuring that the Government come out with a Bill that is ready to go. We want a public authorities Act that combats fraud effectively and deters criminality in the future but also works for the people who will undertake and be subject to its provisions. It really is important that we get all these balances right and that we incorporate these review mechanisms now, so that the Bill is ready to go once it becomes law. Finally, Amendment 122C would ensure that any subsequent change to the code is not only laid before Parliament but subject to parliamentary review. This is a particularly important point, because it speaks to the danger of incremental change, where guidance can be revised behind closed doors, without scrutiny or proper debate. These codes are not trivial; they are the operational blueprint of this entire regime. If we in this House and the other place are to fulfil our role as scrutineers and custodians of civil liberties, we must retain the ability to oversee how these powers evolve. If the Government’s position is that these powers will be used proportionately, lawfully and with care, they should have no difficulty in agreeing that the rules that govern them should be open to parliamentary oversight, public consultation and full transparency. That is not a constraint; it is a safeguard for both the public and the state. As I have said before, we are of course all agreed on the need to tackle fraud, but we must also agree on the need to exercise these new powers with clarity, accountability and respect for the values that underpin our legal and constitutional system. We believe that these amendments would help to ensure that. I urge the Minister to accept them, or, at the very least, to recognise their merit and return with similar provisions that enshrine the same principle. Parliament broadly supports what the Government are doing, and if the Government intend to exercise these powers responsibly, with adequate safeguards, consideration and the principle of proportionality that I and my noble friend Lady Finn have returned to several times in Committee, I assume and hope that Parliament will have no problem supporting what the Government do in their code of practice. However, parliamentary oversight, to ensure that the Government are tied to these important principles not just now but in the future, is an important safeguard which we feel must be made explicit in the Bill. In conclusion, these are reasonable, proportionate and constructive proposals. They would not hinder the Bill’s effectiveness; rather, they would make the Bill more effective once it comes into force. I see that, miraculously, there is no one else wishing to support—I am sure it is no reflection on my remarks—but I genuinely look forward to the Minister’s closing remarks. I beg to move.

My Lords, in the absence of a crowd of supporters, I thank the noble Viscount for setting out his amendment so clearly. I hope that my remarks will reassure him and give him the confidence that he does not need to press ahead with these amendments. Amendments 122A, 122B, 122C and 129 seek to compel the Secretary of State to conduct a public consultation on the DWP’s code of practice for the debt recovery powers, to lay a final code before Parliament before the powers in this Bill come into force and to subject any changes to the code to parliamentary review. Amendment 128 would require the Minister for the Cabinet Office to lay a code of practice before Parliament on the administration of penalties before the PSFA’s powers under Part 1 can come into force. The provision made for a code of practice in Clause 93 is important for the DWP’s debt recovery measures, providing transparency and reassurance on how the debt recovery powers will be operationalised. However, we think these amendments duplicate existing provisions in the Bill and therefore are not necessary. The DWP’s code of practice on debt recovery powers will complement the provisions in the Bill, setting out guidance and key principles, including how and when the new recovery powers will be used. Extensive collaboration continues to take place with a wide range of stakeholders, including the Money and Pension Service, the charity Surviving Economic Abuse and the finance sector, to develop this code of practice. The purpose of this engagement is to ensure the code provides relevant operational guidance on matters such as vulnerability and to give clarity for debtors subject to the powers and their representatives. We are grateful to all organisations for their helpful collaboration and guidance. Drafts of all the DWP codes of practice have been made available for review by noble Lords upon request. While there is no requirement on us to provide drafts of these codes alongside the legislation or even to legislate to produce one, we understand their importance and want to be transparent with Parliament. This is also why new Section 80D(6), as inserted by Clause 93, already requires us to carry out a formal public consultation before the first code is published and to lay each issued version before Parliament. In response to the noble Viscount’s questions, the Government are consulting on all codes. Both the DWP and the PSFA will publish them before first use. We have already said in terms of the debt, this will be done before the new debt powers in Part 2 of this Bill are used. However, I should note that Amendment 129 as drafted would prevent all the other provisions in the Bill that are not subject to the debt code of practice coming into force until the debt code was issued. I am not sure if that was the intention of the noble Viscount, but it would obviously be disproportionate and unnecessary. It is also not clear from the amendment what parliamentary review of future changes to the code would entail but I am going to assume the noble Viscount would like Parliament to have the opportunity to challenge or scrutinise the code each time it is updated. If so, that would not be necessary or proportionate. The code will be revised periodically to keep it up to date with operational considerations and processes, and the Bill makes provision for each issued revision to be laid before Parliament. The noble Viscount mentioned the importance of Parliament seeing the rules. It is worth understanding that the debt code of practice does not contain statutory provisions, nor does it place obligations on others. Rather, it sets out how the department will operationalise the new recovery powers. The Bill clearly sets out in considerable detail the legal obligations introduced. Other substantive provisions set out in regulations will, of course, be subject to normal opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny. I am also unaware of any precedent for revisions to a code of this nature to be considered by Parliament or subject to its approval. Amendment 128 takes us back to the PSFA in Part 1 of the Bill. Noble Lords will recall that we have already discussed Clause 62, which makes provision for the PSFA to produce a code of practice that will explain how and why civil penalties will be calculated and imposed to ensure the powers are used transparently and reasonably. This clause stands part of the Bill. A draft of the PSFA code of practice has also been provided to noble Lords, as was promised in Committee in the other place. As I mentioned, the PSFA intends to consult widely on the code of practice prior to the publication of the finalised draft, which will be before the first use of the penalty powers. Indeed, Clause 62(4) states: “The Minister must lay the code of practice, or any reissued code of practice, before Parliament”. I have outlined that the provisions already in the Bill go above and beyond what is required for legislation of this kind because we recognise the importance of the code of practice and have done so in the spirit of transparency. With those assurances, I urge the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, the codes of practice are documents which we feel, from how the Bill is drafted, are being treated as ancillary—I set out my stall on that earlier—when, in truth, they are central. These codes will be the compass by which investigators navigate the use of intrusive and sensitive powers, they will be the primary reference point for those administering the system and those subject to it, and they will set the standards by which the system is judged. Having said that, I have noted the Minister’s responses and reassurances, particularly on the publication of the codes, if I heard her correctly, so I appreciate all that. I will look further at the purpose behind our Amendment 129, and I take her point on that. I am not in the business of wrecking the Bill—I know she did not say that—and will reflect before Report on that amendment and the responses the Minister has given to the other amendments. I appreciate all her responses. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 122A withdrawn.

Amendments 122B and 122C not moved.

Clause 93 agreed.

Clause 94 agreed.

Committee adjourned at 7.31 pm.