Undersea Cables

Question

15:07:00

Asked by

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the recent severing of two fibre optic cables in the Baltic Sea and of the arrangements in place to protect undersea cables serving the United Kingdom.

My Lords, I refer to my interest as chair of the National Preparedness Commission and beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

We are working closely with international partners following the breakage of two subsea telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea a fortnight ago. It is important that we let those investigations run their course. Subsea cables are critical to UK telecommunications digital infrastructure, and we are committed to maintaining and enhancing the security and resilience of that infra- structure. We will continue to co-ordinate with security partners, the subsea cables industry and international bodies on this issue.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply and the recognition of the criticality to the UK of these subsea connections. What consideration are the Government giving to protection and making sure that we can recover quickly in circumstances in which those cables are disrupted or severed? I understand that in Australia, for example, the equivalent of Ofcom requires a licence from those making those connections, and that licence must specify what arrangements are in place for the immediate repair of any severed cable. Are we considering such measures or any others?

I thank my noble friend for that question. There are 64 cable systems that leave the UK, with 116 cables. About 200 cables break every year around the world, and 10 to 20 of those are in the UK. There is a system of payment from the companies for a ship which gives 24-hour, seven-days-a-week coverage for repairs, as well as systems, of course, to get other commercial repairs done at a slower pace. We work closely with others around the world, including the Australians, and are aware of that model. There are rather specific circumstances which mean that, at the moment, that does not work here, but the ability to get ships rapidly to broken cables is important and that is facilitated by the planning arrangements in place.

My Lords, protection is important, but there is no such thing as a perfect defence. Apart from repair, resilience is crucial in this area as in so many others. What stress-testing has been carried out to identify the range of impacts that could result from interruptions to our undersea infrastructure? What measures would be necessary to ameliorate the impact of those interruptions?

The cable system is regularly reviewed. As I said, 10 to 20 cable breaks occur per year, largely as a result of fishing, anchor pullage and undersea landslips. DSIT, the MoD and other parts of the system review this under the national risk assessment to keep looking at what is required for a resilient system.

My Lords, do we have an agreed retaliation doctrine?

As I have said, the view is that, of the 10 to 20 breaks per year, nearly all are due to fishing vessels, anchors and natural events under the sea. Clearly, that is not a retaliation issue. I think the noble Earl is talking about malign attacks, and we have to wait for the outcome of the investigations into the current breaks.

My Lords, the German Defence Minister was quick off the mark in ascribing the damage to sabotage. Do the Government agree? Do they point the finger at the Chinese or the Russians?

At the moment, the answer is neither, because an investigation is being undertaken by Lithuanian, Swedish, Finnish and German ministries to try to understand exactly what went on. Until that report is out, it is premature to speculate.

My Lords, it is not just undersea fibre-optic cables which bring vital supplies to our shores. UK energy security is highly dependent on undersea gas pipelines and electricity interconnectors. Recently, we have seen reports of suspicious Russian ships near Norwegian gas hubs. Pat McFadden has warned of cyberattacks on our energy networks. Can the Minister reassure us that the UK Government are actively working with our allies to provide adequate protection for our undersea energy infrastructure?

I thank the noble Earl for the question. This is an important area. As I have said, most of the breaks are not malign, but there is, of course, that risk. Regular reviews are undertaken as part of the national risk assessment. The MoD works with DSIT and others to look at what the risks are. We also work continuously with partners, including NATO. In 2023, there was a specific NATO action to look at critical undersea infrastructure co-ordination to make sure that a response and detection system was in place.

My Lords, the joint maritime operations centre, together with the embedded national maritime intelligence centre, are able to monitor shipping throughout our EEZ and European waters, so we know where those ships are. We know which Russian ships in particular are involved in this sort of operation. We have now purchased the RFA “Proteus”, which we should be able to get to where these events are happening. When will we get the second ship? When will we be on top of one of these when it is doing something? I do not know about retaliation, but would we then be able to arrest a ship in our EEZ that was damaging one of our cables?

I thank the noble Lord for the question. It is quite a long way from my brief in DSIT. If I may, I shall try to get somebody to answer it for him.

My Lords, according to experts, around 75% of transatlantic undersea cables in the northern hemisphere pass through or near Irish Sea waters. As a country that spends around 0.2% of its GDP on security and defence, the Republic of Ireland does not possess anywhere near the capability to protect them. Has this job fallen to the United Kingdom Government? If so, who is paying the bill?

The detection of breaks is done from land, but the ability to repair them is through an agreement with the commercial companies, which pay into a fund that allows a ship to be on 24/7 standby to provide protection. That is paid for by the companies that put the cables in place.

My Lords, we of course recognise and share the Government’s and House’s concern about increased Russian military activity around these undersea cables. I was pleased that the Minister a couple of times referenced the risk assessments going on, but can he tell the House a little more and expand on his earlier answers about those risk assessments? How do they take place and how often do they occur?

The national risk assessment is undertaken regularly and led by the Cabinet Office. In this instance, DSIT is the department responsible for the risk to the cables overall, but it is in collaboration with the MoD, the Cabinet Office and others, particularly in relation to assessing risks other than those that I have outlined.

My Lords, are these cables used only for civilian purposes or also for military purposes?

The cables provide the connections that we need for all purposes across telecommunications.

My Lords, may I tempt the Minister again to stray a little from his brief and to return to naval support? At the moment, RFA “Proteus” is the only ship that protects our undersea cable structure. Is his department making representations to the strategic defence review to ensure that a second vessel is purchased?

There are two vessels. The “Sovereign” is the repair vessel I referred to, which the cable companies pay for and is on standby 24/7 to repair the cables. “Proteus” has a different purpose; it is an MoD vessel that can take account of all underwater structures. It is not a DSIT vessel but an MoD vessel with broad responsibilities.

My Lords, one way to mitigate risk is to have redundancy in the capacity of the cables, but redundancy costs money for the commercial organisations that own those cables. What is DSIT doing to ensure that there is sufficient redundancy to give us the protection that we need?

I thank the noble Lord for a very important question. As I said, there are some 64 cable systems and 116 cables. We have a lot of redundancy in the system. Despite getting 10 to 20 breaks every year, they do not lead to an interruption because of that redundancy. Three things are important for the redundancy: the number of cables, the geographical diversity or spread of the cables—which provides protection—and the 24/7 emergency repair capability, with a planning consent that allows the vessel to get in very quickly.