Electricity Capacity Mechanism (Amendment) Regulations 2024

Considered in Grand Committee

15:45:00

Moved by

That the Grand Committee do consider the Electricity Capacity Mechanism (Amendment) Regulations 2024.

My Lords, this instrument was laid before the House on 18 November 2024. It seeks to revoke and alter several provisions in assimilated Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity, relating to the capacity market. For ease, I will refer to this as the assimilated electricity regulation. The instrument makes targeted, technical amendments which are intended to support the continued operation of the capacity market, Great Britain’s main mechanism for ensuring security of electricity supply. It does not introduce any practical changes to the operation of the capacity market. Before outlining the specific provisions of this draft instrument, I will briefly provide some context. Great Britain’s electricity capacity market was introduced in 2014 and is designed to ensure that sufficient electrical capacity is operational and on the system to meet future predicted demand, thereby maintaining security of supply. The capacity market scheme provides all forms of existing and new-build capacity with the right incentives to be on the system to deliver when needed. It covers different types of electrical capacity, including generation, storage, consumer-led flexibility and interconnection capacity. Through capacity market auctions held annually one year and four years ahead of delivery, the aim is to secure the capacity needed to meet future peak demand under a range of scenarios. This is based on advice from the capacity market delivery body—the National Energy System Operator. Capacity providers which are successful in the auctions are awarded capacity agreements, which range in duration from one to 15 years. The capacity market was introduced in 2014. Since then, it has contributed to investment in just under 19 gigawatts of new, flexible capacity needed to replace older, less efficient plant as we transition to a net-zero economy. The capacity market was originally approved under European Union state aid rules for a period of 10 years. Following the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, a requirement in EU law for approval of up to 10 years was brought into domestic law as part of the assimilated electricity regulation. To date, the capacity market has been successful in ensuring that Great Britain has sufficient electrical capacity to meet demand and continues to be required to maintain security of supply and provide confidence to investors. On the detail of the instrument, it revokes and alters a number of provisions relating to capacity mechanisms in the assimilated electricity regulation, including Article 21.8, which requires that “Capacity mechanisms shall be temporary” and “shall be approved … for no longer than 10 years”, and other references to such mechanisms being temporary. The instrument also revokes provisions that either are no longer considered to be necessary or require minor correction following the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. We are seeking to make these changes so that our post-EU exit legal framework reflects the continuation of current arrangements for maintaining a secure electricity supply, since there remains an ongoing need for the capacity market to ensure sufficient investment in reliable electricity capacity. Furthermore, following the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, the domestic subsidy control regime was introduced. The subsidy control regime does not require subsidy schemes to be granted an approval or limited for a specified period. Therefore, the approval requirement in the assimilated electricity regulation does not reflect our post-EU exit arrangements. Of course, it is important that we keep the capacity market under review and there are multiple controls set out in domestic legislation, all of which will be retained. This includes a statutory requirement for my department to review the capacity market regulations every five years, which provides an opportunity to review the need for the scheme. Ofgem also undertakes an independent five-yearly review of the capacity market rules. Furthermore, the Secretary of State can decide not to hold a capacity market auction. These embedded controls all remain as part of the wider domestic capacity market legislative framework. In conclusion, this draft instrument revokes and alters certain provisions related to the capacity mechanism in the assimilated electricity regulation. This includes a requirement for an approval lasting no more than 10 years, as well as references to capacity mechanisms being of a temporary nature. These changes are being made to ensure that our domestic legislative arrangements reflect the continuation of the capacity market, which is Great Britain’s main mechanism for ensuring electricity security of supply. I beg to move.

My Lords, I want to use this as an opportunity simply to ask a question of the Minister. Why do we not take the advice of Professor Dieter Helm, in his review of energy policy, which was that instead of us providing the capacity mechanism centrally, we require anyone providing electricity into the system—wind generator, solar generator or whatever—from an intermittent source to provide firm power, in other words to pay for some capacity for the times when the wind is not blowing? If that were done, this whole arrangement would be unnecessary. We would have a much clearer idea of the total cost of intermittent energy if the supplier were also paying for some of the back-up capacity that is necessary to meet the occasions when intermittency prevents delivery of the power. The only argument I have heard against this is that, if you do it wind farm by wind farm, the aggregate amount of capacity would be statistically greater than is necessary to meet the fact that some wind farms will be producing when others are not, but that surely can be overcome by saying that a certain statistical proportion of the necessary capacity should attach to any intermittent generator. Then we would have a more rational, more credible and more manageable system than the one that we have under these regulations.

My Lords, this instrument revokes and alters several provisions of the assimilated EU regulations relating to the internal electricity capacity market. The draft regulations make changes necessary for the operation of the capacity market following our withdrawal from the European Union and they revoke the 10-year approval requirements. We do not oppose these changes—I just say that to start with. Our electricity capacity market was introduced in 2014. The measure is designed to ensure that maximum output is always available and thus that we can maintain sufficient electricity capacity to meet future predicted demand, always ensuring the security of electricity supply. As we have heard, the capacity market covers generation, storage, consumer-led flexibility and interconnector capacity. It is about ensuring the security of this supply at all times. Auctions are held annually, one year and four years ahead of delivery, to ensure that we have supply when we need it and can meet future peak demand in a range of scenarios, based on advice from the capacity market delivery body, the National Energy System Operator. The capacity market was originally approved when we were part of the EU and was made under the European Union’s state aid rules for a period of 10 years. Following our withdrawal, this requirement was brought in and enshrined in our domestic law as part of the assimilated electricity regulations. The capacity market will continue to be required to maintain the security of supply and investor confidence. This market will be of even greater importance as we seek to decarbonise our electricity generation by 2030 and, at the same time, see an ever-growing increase in electricity demand. The draft regulations revoke the requirement that “Capacity mechanisms shall be temporary” and “shall be approved … for no longer than 10 years”, and other references to such mechanisms being temporary. The draft instrument also revokes several provisions that require minor correction. As I said, we do not oppose the recommendations in the instrument, but I wanted briefly also to turn to some broader points. As we seek to reach net-zero carbon generation by 2030 and beyond, the Government have a continued dependency on unabated gas and propose that carbon capture and storage should be used as a key part of our energy mix. Indeed, the clean power 2030 plan has around 35 gigawatts of unabated gas on standby for security of supply, and this requirement for gas capacity will remain throughout the early 2030s until more low-carbon dispatchable power comes on board to replace it. Although required, back-up reserve gas generation that is used intermittently and only when necessary is also very expensive, understandably. The Government have agreed to invest some £22 billion over the next 25 years in carbon capture technology to help make sure that we can have this unabated gas without adding to our greenhouse gas emissions. The week before last there was a debate in the Chamber on the Science and Technology Committee’s report on long-term energy storage. We have also had a couple of Questions about the Russian shadow fleet and the attack on Baltic power cables. Of course, renewable energy is not always reliable, and everybody knows that it needs to be backed up by a wide variety of other sources to help ensure the security of supply. On that basis, can I ask the Minister about the Government’s proposed energy mix going forward to net zero and beyond? I am a little concerned that we continue to have this requirement: it is basically solar, wind and dispatchable gas backed by CCS and nuclear. Will the Minister say a word about how the Government will keep this mix under continuous review? I encourage them to invest in alternative renewable technologies, such as wave, tidal and geothermal, that are able to provide the dispatchable power that we need. What is the Government’s thinking on that? We must also ensure that all the wind energy we generate is available and can be used. As I said, there is also a need to radically increase our medium and long-term energy storage, which is available to help us get through periods when other sources of renewable energy are not on tap. I hope that the reforms to the capacity market already announced will help make that happen. More must also be done to reduce demand; as the Government know, the best energy is the energy we never use. Turning to this SI, I note that, as the Explanatory Memorandum says, “there is a requirement to review the Electricity Capacity Regulations … at least every five years to determine whether they are meeting their objectives and remain fit for purpose”, and I note that the Minister said the Government will continue to keep the controls in place. As we are going through such a rapid period of change, we welcome the fact that the Government have brought forward the plan to decarbonise our power generation by five years, but what consideration have they given to the need to review these mechanisms more than every five years? What might trigger that? What is the Government’s thinking on those matters?

My Lords, these regulations represent an essential step in ensuring the continued security of electricity supply in Great Britain. This SI builds on the work initiated by the previous Conservative Government, which reviewed electricity market arrangements in 2022. The task in hand is to amend the existing provisions of the Energy Act 2013 following the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union and align our national electricity market with the post-Brexit reality. These amendments are crucial to ensure that the capacity market can continue to operate effectively and flexibly in a changed regulatory environment. As we transition towards a low-carbon energy future, securing a reliable electricity supply requires robust mechanisms that incentivise investment in reliable and flexible energy sources. The amendments introduced by these regulations are intended to bolster the capacity market’s role in supporting the security and reliability of electricity supply in a period of evolving energy needs and shifting market conditions. These changes enable the UK to pursue an independent course, while ensuring that the capacity market continues to provide the stability and security our energy grid requires. By revoking outdated EU provisions, the UK can define its own market mechanisms that better reflect national priorities, including transition to a low-carbon energy future and enhancing energy resilience across Great Britain.

16:00:00

I turn now to the effect of this SI. The proposed amendments aim to streamline the capacity market to better address the evolving needs of electricity security in Britain today. A key change is the removal of the temporary label from the capacity market, enabling it to operate without a fixed duration. This change should provide greater flexibility for energy providers, supporting long-term planning and investment in infrastructure. With the removal of the temporary status, the capacity market will be able to operate on a more permanent basis, ensuring a stable framework for electricity generation and demand-side response measures.

This in turn should facilitate the development of new technologies and the integration of diverse energy sources, enhancing the UK’s overall energy resilience. These changes will encourage private sector investment in new generation capacity, including the construction of low-carbon power plants, gas peaking plants and energy storage facilities. The removal of arbitrary time constraints will allow these investments to be planned over longer horizons, which is essential for infrastructure with a long lifespan. Furthermore, it will create opportunities for innovative technologies that could play a pivotal role in the future of energy provision in the UK, enabling us to meet our future energy demands sustainably and efficiently.

These regulations revoke outdated EU provisions to align UK legislation with the post-Brexit needs of the domestic market. Specifically, Regulation 3 removes the reference to the capacity market as a temporary measure, while Regulations 5 and 6 revoke the requirement for the capacity market to be approved for no longer than 10 years. Although these amendments are designed to improve the functioning of the market, they raise an important question. How will the Government ensure continued accountability and oversight in the absence of the implementation plan requirement?

It is important to note that the Government have received broad support for these amendments following consultation with key stakeholders, including the energy industry. There has been no significant opposition from industry or Members of Parliament during earlier scrutiny stages. Moreover, the Government’s consultation processes in 2022 and 2024 indicated a clear preference for retaining the capacity market as the primary mechanism for ensuring electricity supply security, reinforcing the ongoing work initiated by the previous Conservative Government and validating the need for these regulatory changes.

I now turn to some questions and concerns. Although these amendments are designed to improve the efficiency and flexibility of the capacity market, one or two questions must be addressed. Given the removal of the 10-year approval requirement for the capacity market, how do the Government plan to ensure that long-term energy investments, particularly in low-carbon technologies and flexible capacity, are sufficiently incentivised to continue to support the transition to a net-zero energy system by 2050? Finally, with the removal of the requirement for the Secretary of State to prepare and monitor an implementation plan for the capacity market, what steps will the Government take to ensure continued oversight and transparency in the market’s operation, particularly as it evolves to address future energy challenges and technological advancements?

My Lords, I am most grateful to noble Lords who have taken part in this short but none the less interesting debate. As we move to a clean power system and closer to achieving net zero, it will be critical to ensure we have adequate flexible electricity capacity that can be ramped up quickly when renewable generation is low, such as on dark, still days. We believe the capacity market remains an effective insurance mechanism for security of electricity supply, providing revenue certainty to market participants and a secure and affordable electricity supply that families and businesses can rely on. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Offord, for his general support for the regulations. I certainly acknowledge that a lot of the groundwork was undertaken by the previous Government, as he suggested. I can also assure him that we as a department will continue to provide oversight of the way the arrangements will operate. As for the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, the noble Lord, Lord Offord, referred to the REMA consultation, which we have debated as well. I think that Professor Helm’s proposals were considered by the previous Government, who decided not to take them forward. My understanding is that there was thought to be insufficient evidence that putting responsibility for procuring flexibility on generators, which would mean decisions being taken at a project rather than a system level, would lead to a low-cost capacity mix. Many respondents also expressed concern that this option would increase risks on renewable generators, leading to higher strike prices and overall system cost without the compensating benefits of efficiency or security of supply. We remain of the view that the current system is probably the best way to manage the issues that I have referred to. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his support. The question of reviews was also implicit in the question from the noble Lord, Lord Offord, and alongside the five-year reviews, each year an assessment is made of the required capacity to meet the expected level of peak demand in four years’ time. The majority of the predicted capacity required is secured well in advance. A proportion of capacity requirement is secured one year in advance, based on latest demand forecasts, so it is a continuous process, if you like. We keep the capacity market mechanism itself under constant review and consult regularly on amendments and incremental reforms. In late 2024 we consulted on a number of changes to the capacity market to ensure security of supply and enable flexible capacity to decarbonise. We hope this will ensure that supply can meet demand as we transition to net zero. As for the comment about the mix of technologies going forward, the report by NESO and my department’s clean power action plan set out our view of the technologies by around 2030. We will rely on unabated gas as the main mature, reliable technology capable of filling that role at the moment. We expect that the amount of unabated gas we need will reduce as we deploy more low-carbon technologies. Our aim is to move gas into a reserve role, used primarily to ensure security of supply. The noble Earl also mentioned tidal and other technologies, and we remain open to those possibilities. He may know that I am meeting the noble Lord, Lord Alton—tomorrow, I think—to discuss tidal, so we are not ruling out the use of those technologies. I am grateful to noble Lords.

Motion agreed.