Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Bill

Committee (2nd Day) (Continued)

21:00:00

Amendment 19

Moved by

19: Clause 2, page 2, line 23, at end insert— “30ZA Independent financial monitoring of public sector companies(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the day on which the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 comes into force, instruct an independent body to conduct monitoring of the financial management of any public sector company with whom a direct award of a public service contract is made under section 30(1A).(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), “monitoring of the financial management” includes the auditing of accounts, the review of spending efficiency, and the making of recommendations to improve cost-effectiveness.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment requires that the Secretary of State instructs an independent body to conduct financial monitoring of the public sector companies.

My Lords, I suspect that this will be one of the shorter debates in our consideration of this Bill in Committee, but it is one of the most important. It will be short, I suspect, because this group is rather technical, but it has very great significance, not only for the operation of the railways but for the passenger experience. There are four amendments in this group, all of them in my name. The first two, Amendments 19 and 20, are closely related. They relate to the very peculiar situation in which we are now going to see the railways operated in this country: that is, that they are going to be practically unmonitored independently as far as their finance is concerned. Compare the railway sector to the water sector or to electricity. These sectors have economic monitoring to ensure that best value is being delivered to the customer. Nothing of the sort is envisaged in relation to our new nationalised railway. There is to be no economic monitoring and no supervision of the setting of fares, and that is what these amendments relate to. One is to do with charges to customers—that is Amendment 19—and the other is to do with the costs incurred by the utility. The railways are a utility, and that is how they are going to be run. Of course, if they were run by the private sector—as they would be if they were water or electricity—that economic monitoring would cover both the costs charged to the customer and the costs incurred by the operator, because their efficiency would be monitored. As I say, none of that is envisaged here. We are asked to assume that, in public ownership—I am not now talking about a Bill that is going to come to us in 18 months; I am talking about the direct consequences of this Bill as soon as it starts to come into effect and as these franchises move over—the Government are going to set fares in a reasonable way that is not exploitative of customers. It could be said that that can be assumed because it is not going to be run by the private sector—that the Government are not going to gouge our eyes out, because Governments do not do things like that. But they do. Tell somebody who is applying for an urgent passport at a cost of £1,000 that they are not having their eyes gouged out. Tell someone applying for a statement of their nationality that recognises an existing British nationality who is charged well over £1,000, including each time for their children on top, that they are not having their eyes gouged out—that is several thousand pounds for a family that are already British and simply want to have it recognised, as they are allowed to do, and register as British because they are already British. We know from experience that Governments are perfectly willing to charge very high fees for their services in order to make a profit. Sometimes, this profit has been complained about—for example, in relation to nationality, not least by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, and others on the Labour Benches when we have debated matters such as that. Who will decide how fares are set, what the logic is, and what the railways’ aim is in setting those fares? This is particularly true in the case of railways, because they inevitably have variable fares. It is part of the nature of a railway that they aim for the highest return they can get from particular passengers; they are then willing, because of the nature of the structure of the business, to take marginal fares to cover marginal costs from other passengers who might pay very little for the same journey because they are willing to go at a certain time or book a certain distance in advance, and things of that sort. Those who do not have that advantage may find themselves being gouged because they need to travel at the last minute or because they are captive customers. Do not forget how many captive customers the railways have. There are not necessarily a lot of captive customers on the long-distance railways, but on the commuter network, especially around London, they are, in effect, captive customers. How attractive to the Treasury to turn the railways into a mill for generating money for the Government, if that is what it wants to do. I am not saying what the fares policy should be. What I am saying is that there should be some independent monitoring of how it is done so that customers—or passengers, as I must remember to call them, remembering what I said to the noble Lord, Lord Snape, the other day—do not find themselves trapped in a system and exploited. No independent monitor is proposed, so we have to trust either the Department for Transport or Great British Railways. I am not sure which it will be in the long term, but in the short term, over the next few years, we have to trust the Department for Transport to set fares in a way that is not designed to maximise revenues from those who cannot resist paying them. Similarly, if this were in the private sector, through the setting of charges there would be economic regulation—as there is in the water industry, at Heathrow Airport and so forth—of the efficiency of the costs with which the railways conduct themselves. There is no sign of that either in the Bill. Again, we are asked to trust the Department for Transport to ensure efficiency. Considering how many staff the Department for Transport employed to monitor and shadow the staff employed by HS2 Ltd, I do not regard it as a great guarantor of the efficiency of delivery and the control of costs. There ought to be an independent body to do that. That deals, as far as I am concerned, with Amendments 19 and 20. We then come to Amendment 23, which is rather different but again relates to something the public should be entitled to know about: the great transfer of pension liabilities that will occur as a result of moving pension responsibilities from the train operating companies to the Department for Transport. I want to be clear about this: I completely understand that the staff are largely currently members of the national rail pension fund and that they will remain members of the same pension fund. The contributions and so forth should not in themselves change simply because of the Bill—I perfectly follow that. The costs will not increase as a result, but the purpose of this amendment is to probe where they will lie in balance sheet terms. Will they be a liability fully on the Government’s balance sheet? What consequence will that have for the national debt? This is something that we should know, because the railway pension scheme is, obviously, one of the largest pension schemes in the country. These are not trivial sums; they are very significant sums in terms of pension funds. Finally, I have Amendment 25 on lease payments. I will not trespass into this very deeply because a similar amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham is due to be debated later, and I know that he is much more knowledgeable about these matters than I am, but it is certainly the case that the lease arrangements that exist for the rolling stock are between the train operating companies and the roscos, the rolling stock finance companies. That is where the lease liability exists. Are these to be transferred to the Government? If they are, where will they sit in balance sheet terms? What balance sheet effect would that have? Therefore, there is the question of public debt. There are two separate strands to these four amendments. One strand relates to balance sheet liabilities and the effect on the Government’s balance sheet of the measures proposed. We are told that this Bill has no cost implications, but is that true? The other relates to how we ensure that the railways are properly and independently monitored to make sure that the fares they charge are not exploitative in circumstances where exploitation is open to them, that their costs are efficient and that they are efficiently delivered. Simply saying that we should trust the Government or the Department for Transport on this is, I suggest, not a satisfactory answer.

My Lords, one of the clear attractions of the new system should be increased transparency. There should be no chance that the new authority would be able to hide behind commercial confidentiality. One public body would make life very much easier in terms of national answerability. I do not agree with the mechanism suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, but he is making a valid point. Can the Minister confirm that the passenger standards authority, the passenger body that is going to be the champion of passenger standards, will have the power to investigate fares and report on problems? I gently point out that the Government will no longer be able to blame the train operators. All the blame will now fall on the Government, and passengers will make judgments based on that. It is therefore important that there is a public way for the Government to explain their decisions in relation to train fares and the fare structure overall.

First, I briefly note my intention to write to the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, on his points about public investment that I did not manage to address on Monday. I also intend to address later the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, on Monday. On fares, there is nothing new here. The regulation of fares has always been by government through its contracts with operators, whether public or private, and as far as this Bill is concerned, that will continue.

I want just to make the point that, as the Minister well knows, the fare system is so complicated that, in practice, people have not been able to understand it adequately in order to make those judgments, and one of the Government’s aims, quite laudably, is to make it simpler. I also point out that the Minister is talking about regulated fares, and I think about half the fares in the market are not regulated.

21:15:00

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. Of course, she is absolutely right. The fare system is far too complex, whether it is regulated fares or unregulated fares. One of the primary purposes of bringing train operations into public ownership is to provide the basis of rationalising that fare system without the associated complications of either compensation to private sector operators or, indeed, their saying that some of the information needed to do that is commercially confidential and hence cannot be used to rationalise the system that nobody understands. On Amendment 19, the department already holds its public train operating companies to account for their financial management through regular review of their management accounts and business plans, as part of its routine contract management activities. That is equally true in relation to privately owned operators whose costs are funded by taxpayers. This scrutiny supports the monitoring of performance against the Secretary of State’s priority to deliver an affordable and sustainable railway. The amendment refers specifically to the auditing of publicly owned train companies’ accounts. It is already the case that those companies must publish their audited accounts annually, which are available in Companies House, so there is already full transparency of their financial performance and management. The proposed amendment would add little value to the existing scrutiny of their financial performance by DOHL as shareholder, the Department for Transport’s contracting authority, and their own financial auditors, as well as the public via the public audited accounts. That would be an unnecessary additional cost to be borne by the taxpayer which I cannot support. Regarding Amendment 20, the department already publishes information on its website about payments made to operators under its rail contracts. The department’s published annual report and accounts also detail the department’s expenditure on each contract, as well as any associated year-end balances in respect of payments made in advance or still due to be paid. The Bill does not change that, so there is no need for the taxpayer to pay for an independent body to report on the same data. As I have said previously, the most significant financial impact of the Bill will be that taxpayers will no longer have to foot the bill for tens of millions of pounds in fees paid to private operators each year for the benefit of their shareholders. Amendment 23 raises the specific question of whether public ownership will expose the Government to pension liabilities that previously sat with private operators. Under the current national rail contracts, DfT funds the legitimate actual costs of the train operating companies. For example, this includes the net operational costs of running services and the cost of leasing rolling stock and pension contributions. The noble Lord, Lord Young, asked a specific question on Monday about how the Office for National Statistics might classify publicly owned operators in future. I cannot, of course, answer that question, as future classification decisions are a matter for the independent ONS, not for me or my department. What I can do is to confirm the current classification of the DfT contracted operators, which are all currently classified as public non-financial corporations, including the four DOHL-owned operators. I can also confirm what has happened previously when a service is transferred from private to public ownership. For example, following the transfer of services into DOHL, the ONS recently considered the classification of TransPennine trains, and concluded that they should remain classified as a public non-financial corporation. That fact that these publicly owned operators are classified in this way, along with the privately owned operators, means that their costs already impact the public finances. For example—and this is particularly relevant to Amendment 25—both private and publicly owned operators’ rolling stock lease payments already come out of the department’s resource budget. Turning to pensions, I cannot agree with those who assert that the franchising model left responsibility for funding pension liabilities entirely with the private sector. Even under the form of franchising that was in place before the pandemic, pension costs were to a substantial extent a long-term liability for the public sector. First, this is because the franchising system meant the bidder simply priced any changes in costs into their bids at reletting, changing the amount of subsidy payable to the operator or the premium receivable by Government. This meant that the burden of any increases in pension costs arising during the term of the contract would, at the point of retendering, be passed to the taxpayer. Secondly, in the more recent franchise competitions the department was required to share the risk of any adverse movements in pension deficit recovery payments, as that had become a risk that the private operators stated they were unable to bear. The Bill therefore does not materially change the Government’s level of exposure to liabilities. On the noble Lord’s second amendment regarding pension liabilities, in previous transfers to DOHL the transferring staff have remained within their existing section of the Railways Pension Scheme at the point of transfer. Railways Pension Scheme contribution rates will not change when services transfer from private to public sector operation and, as mentioned a moment ago, the cost of employer pension contributions is already borne by the Government under the terms of the existing contracts. The noble Lord may also find it helpful to know that the department already reports in its annual report and accounts the employer’s share of the net pension scheme surplus or deficit, the employer’s share of pension scheme assets and the employer’s share of pension scheme liabilities. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, transparency will be enhanced by public ownership. In respect of the question about the passenger standards authority, I am afraid it is too early to say what it will and will not do. That is why we are going to consult about its duties in order to make sure that it represents passengers’ interests in the best way possible. In view of these observations, noting in particular that the costs of public sector operations are already in the public domain, I urge the noble Lord not to press these amendments.

My Lords, I may have expressed myself very poorly when I presented these amendments, but I think it is fair to say—I do not mean to sound overcritical—that the Minister has misconceived all of them, or at least the three that I spent some time on. So perhaps the House will indulge me if I simply run through once again the points that I was hoping to make but obviously have not done so very successfully. I shall start with the remark about pensions. I was not asking the question, “Who funds the pension contributions?” That is an interesting question but one to which I already had the answer, so I did not feel that I needed to ask it. I was asking a specific question about where the balance sheet liability lies, which is a very different question. Are the accumulated liabilities, including unfunded liabilities, now going to score effectively as government debt—the whole package, not the payment year by year? It is the difference, if you like, between the balance sheet and the profit and loss. I have asked a question about balance sheet and the Minister has answered a question about profit and loss. I do not expect to get anything further out of him today but, once he has had a chance to reflect on my comments, he may want to write to me because it is a point that needs to be properly explored and indeed, I suspect, will be returned to in relation to leases when my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham takes the matter up later. On the question of fares being charged, I take the Minister back to the pre-Covid period when the system under which we operate at the moment was functioning in the way that was expected—Covid of course destroyed and damaged the operation of that system. It is true that not all the fares but a large number of them were set by the Government, but the Government in that case had no interest whatsoever in allowing the train operating companies to make super profits or to exploit passengers who were effectively captive. It will be a different matter when the company operating the trains is a subsidiary of the Department for Transport, and any surplus—we must bear in mind that there are railway lines in this country that generate surpluses—will accrue to the department and therefore presumably to HM Treasury. I put it as a counterfactual question to the Minister: does he believe that, if passport issuance or visa issuance were in the hands of the private sector, the Home Office would allow the private sector to set such outrageously high fees and keep the profits? Of course it would not. The only reason why the Home Office can set such very high fees for a captive audience is that it can keep the profits, or at least they score against the expenditure of the Home Office. It has a financial interest in super returns, which is not true if the super returns are to be retained by the private sector, as was the case under the system that we are currently operating under when it was effectively running. So I do not think the Minister has quite grasped my point. A similar question arises in relation to costs. He has explained—and I do not deny for a moment—that the department publishes information on what it pays to the train operating companies under its contracts. I am not asking: what do they pay? I am asking: is it efficiently spent? Once it becomes part of the department, there is no interest in demonstrating that efficiency has been achieved if political interests overwrite that. There will be no way of knowing with confidence whether efficiency is being achieved unless there is some sort of independent monitor. It is possible that having reflected on my closing remarks the Minister wants to take these matters up in correspondence, or we can come back to them on Report. But I think his responses—and I blame myself for this—have failed to understand the points I was getting at. I thought they were reasonably clear but obviously I did not do a very good job. With that, and with the leave of the Committee, I would like to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 19 withdrawn.

Amendments 20 to 23 not moved.

Amendment 24

Moved by

24: Clause 2, page 2, line 23, at end insert— “30ZA Impact on open access operatorsThe Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the day on which the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 comes into force, and annually thereafter, lay before Parliament a report on the impact of the awarding of public service contracts to public sector companies under subsection 30(1A) on open access operators in the United Kingdom.”

My Lords, earlier in Committee we had a debate on the value of open access and I am not proposing to repeat that. But now that the noble Lord has drawn my attention to the biblical text Getting Britain Moving—which I understand is now the Government’s plan for the railways in the country, the Williams review having been set to one side—I will draw attention to what that document has to say about open access. It too is full of praise. It says: “Open access has a proven track record in driving competition”— competition in this context, at least when the Labour Party was thinking about it before the election, was seen as an attractive thing— “and better passenger outcomes in countries whose services are run predominantly by public operators”. We will have a service “run predominantly by public operators”, and the implication here is that: “Open access has a proven track record in driving competition” and has “better passenger outcomes”, so it must be a very good thing. That is not the impression I get from the debate so far. I have the impression that there is a degree of resistance to open access on the part of the Government. Indeed, there is a qualification, even in this document, on that. It has to add “value and capacity” to the rail network. Who has to be persuaded that it adds value? Here the document says something that rather confuses me. It says: “The ORR will continue to make approval decisions on open access applications”. My understanding was that Great British Railways, not the Office of Rail and Road, was going to make decisions about who could run passenger rail services on the network. Clarity from the Minister on what the intention is in that regard would be very helpful. If it is Great British Railways, we run into the problem that allowing this to happen will result in competition. The whole purpose of Great British Railways —like that of Lord Ashfield, to whom I referred earlier —is to eliminate what could be regarded as wasteful competition. This contradiction that lies at the heart of the proposition causes me considerable concern. At the root of it is a rather technical question concerning what is referred to as abstraction. The assumption on the part of those who run the railways—and this has been true of the Department for Transport as well; it is not something new, but I have every reason to think it will continue—is that if somebody provides a railway service in competition with the Government, it is abstracting fares income that otherwise would accrue to the Government. So there is a cost to the Government or Great British Railways, depending on where we are in this process, in allowing open access to operate.

21:30:00

This is, of course, completely contrary to everything one knows about competition. It is contrary to the experience in other countries; it has been seen that open access has actually allowed fares to come down. The European Union claims they have come down by 28% in the best case studies it has examined. I think I referred to that at Second Reading—it may have been on Monday, but I have certainly referred to that report. There has been a 28% reduction in fares, better-quality services and the driving up of demand. Overall, it is a win for everybody, although not necessarily in all cases a win for the state operator. If the state operator is to make the decision—and this is why it is so important to know whether it will be Great British Railways or the ORR—the argument from abstraction is always going to point the dial towards “no” rather than “yes”. So the amount of open access to be allowed is likely to be very limited, despite passenger benefits in terms of fares, service and frequency that might accrue from it.

The purpose of these amendments, as I say, is not simply to sing the praises of open access—I think we did that in the debate on the previous amendment. It is to ask, very seriously, how this assessment will be made, and what warmth and encouragement will be extended to operators that wish to offer competing and supplementary services, or whether the offer of open access will in effect be made a nullity by an excessively tight application of the principles of abstraction.

My Lords, there are of course some excellent examples of open access operators and some very successful ones, but I am a bit sceptical. We have a Government who are so opposed to competition on the railways that even very good train operators, such as Greater Anglia, have to be removed as a priority. I am sceptical that the Government would be keen to encourage further open access operators. I think I drew attention to this in our debates on Monday. I feel it is illogical that the Government are putting an end to the train operators that have fully rounded franchises but will tolerate open access. Open access is, in reality, capitalism red in tooth and claw, in comparison with the role of train operating companies managing the franchises they have. The Government here are set up as a judge and a jury over open access operators and whether more will be allowed. Can the Minister tell us how the judgment will be made on future open access operators, or tell us with total frankness that we have what we have and are unlikely to get any more?

The Bill before the House is specifically about the ownership of services currently operated under contract to the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers or Welsh Ministers. Transferring and retaining these services in public ownership will not affect open access operators or prevent them running as they do now. It is therefore not necessary, as in Amendment 24, to require the Government to lay a report on the impact of public ownership on open access operators, given that this Bill will not affect the rights of those operators to access the network and run services. I emphasise that as part of the wider railways Bill, any proposed changes to access arrangements and the body that decides them will, of course, be subject to consideration and debate by your Lordships’ House before they are implemented. I beg for some patience in this debate. Turning to Amendment 27, which requires the ORR to produce an independent report on access, I again reassure the House that under the present public ownership Bill, the ORR will continue its role in relation to access decisions. There is therefore no need for this amendment; an independent function is already in place that will decide on access to ensure there is no disadvantage to non-publicly owned operators. We will set out further detail on GBR roles and responsibilities in the coming months. Given those reassurances and that this Bill does not affect the rights of open access operators to run services, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, once again I am being deflected more than answered. I did not suggest that existing open access operators were going to be closed down. In fact, it says quite explicitly in the biblical document Getting Britain Moving that current “independent operators (such as Hull Trains and Lumo) … will remain”. I take it that the existing operators are guaranteed to remain, at least as far as the current terms of their arrangements are concerned. I find it very worrying that the Minister cannot say whether his long-term vision includes allowing the ORR to make these decisions, or taking it, which I understood is very much the logic of his Bill, into Great British Railways. It simply is not enough to say that this can be deferred. Open access operators that might want to bid for new services—not the existing ones, I grant you—are now going to be entering a period with a very chilling effect, because they will not know whether open access is going to be welcomed in the future. They will not know, when the new Bill comes forward in 18 months’ time, whether they are going to be welcomed or turned away. That is a direct consequence of this Bill and not something that can simply be deferred on the grounds that it will all be wrapped up in 18 months or so. I find it very unfortunate that the Minister cannot give a franker and more candid answer on the Government’s intentions at this stage. I fear that the effects for passengers of the measure in front of us are therefore going to be detrimental, even in the short term. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 24 withdrawn.

Amendments 25 to 41 not moved.

Amendment 42

Moved by

42: Clause 2, page 3, line 32, at end insert— “30D Annual report of public operator liabilities(1) The Secretary of State must lay before Parliament, within six months of the day on which the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 is passed, and annually thereafter, a report on the public sector financial liabilities arising from the award of public service contracts to public sector companies under section 30(1A).(2) The report published under subsection (1) must include details of—(a) rolling stock leasing liabilities;(b) pension scheme liabilities;(c) property leasing liabilities;(d) other financial liabilities such as debt.” Member's explanatory statement This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report examining the impact of train company liabilities transferring onto the public sector balance sheet under nationalisation.

My Lords, this is not a great time to address the rather arcane subject of what is and what is not public expenditure. But it is absolutely vital to the future of the railways, and this group of amendments is one of the most important in the whole Bill. Any Government have limits on how much they can borrow, and we discovered two years ago what happens if a Government go through those limits. Within those limits, there is fierce competition between spending Ministers for access to borrowing to fund their projects. That process is probably going on as we speak, with competition between social housing, new hospitals and the rest. Historically, as I said on Second Reading, transport fared very badly under that system when it was nationalised. Final decisions are made in a star chamber, or equivalent, and as I know from experience, transport gets squeezed. One advantage of privatisation was that a big chunk of investment was shifted off the government balance sheet on to the private sector, and as a result there was a huge increase in investment. Railtrack was clearly in the private sector. When Network Rail was set up by the previous Labour Government, they were very anxious that it should be a private company and so kept off the PSBR. They devised a rather elaborate form of corporate governance. It was a company, but it had no shareholders. Instead, it had 114 members—some licence holders and some members of the public. That kept it off the books for a bit, but the Treasury was so worried about this that it told Labour Ministers at the time to stop criticising Network Rail bonuses in case the ONS should use that as an excuse to reclassify it. Eventually, reality caught up and Network Rail was reclassified, in 2014. It could no longer borrow what it needed to keep the projects going. My concern is that what happened to Network Rail is going to happen to GBR, and the Government are taking a gamble in setting it up. When Network Rail was reclassified, it had to divest around £1.8 billion by selling property assets, including retail units and spare capacity on the telecoms network. It deferred renewals works and postponed completion dates. It had to renegotiate a whole lot of contracts. As a result, its underlying costs increased. The question is: how will GBR be classified? It will not have the pretence of a private company like Network Rail; this will be a nationalised industry. The Minister is unable to give any assurance that it will not be reclassified or classified as public sector, as he said in response to my noble friend on Amendment 19. The Minister has argued that this will not make any difference because the TOCs do not spend capital. I recognise that that was the case during the pandemic and after it, but it certainly was not before. I will not repeat the example I gave earlier of Chiltern, which spent a substantial amount of private capital investing in the railway, including building new stations. The noble Lord, Lord Snape, endorsed that comment. The Minister has also argued that, because the roscos remain in the private sector—this is an amendment the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, may speak to—the investment in new trains they made during the franchise system, by borrowing money privately and purchasing the rolling stock, will continue to flow. He told us during the first day of Committee, on Monday, that, whatever the position regarding the future nationalised industry, “it must already apply to the four publicly owned train companies”.—[Official Report, 21/10/24; col. 506.] He has used those four TOCs ordering new fleets as evidence to support his claim that ordering new trains will continue as before. However, to compare the present accounting arrangements for TOCs that are now in-house, which the current law treats as being prepared to be returned to private sector competition, with the accounting arrangements that would exist for a permanent public monopoly—which GBR is—is to compare apples with oranges. The creation of GBR will create a completely new system, which will change the way in which the ONS categorises expenditure. Those different accounting treatments will make investment in rolling stock harder, as it will be in competition with other demands for public investment.

21:45:00

At the moment, given that the private operators have only short-term contracts, only a fraction of the full liabilities is counted in the national accounts. However, if all operators are permanently within the public sector—that is what is proposed—meaning longer rolling stock leases, this could add billions of liabilities to public sector net debt. The integration of track and train within a single entity, as set out clearly in Labour’s Getting Britain Moving document, will mean that GBR will fail the ONS market body test, meaning that its liabilities will be consolidated into the DfT’s accounts. If GBR’s accounts are fully consolidated, much as National Rail’s are, this means that ordering and leasing new trains would create an increased liability that would immediately appear on the Government’s balance sheet, increasing national debt, even if the money to manufacture the trains was coming from the roscos and raised on the capital markets. So we are back to where I was when I was Transport Secretary, competing against other demands—new hospitals, new schools and the rest.

Without knowing the structure of GBR, I am afraid that the Minister simply cannot say with any confidence that there will be no impact from public ownership on the way the ONS classifies liabilities. If he cannot say how the ONS will classify liabilities, he simply cannot say that there will be no impact on investment.

In a nutshell, I am concerned about the gamble the Government are taking with the future of the railways by going back to the pre-privatisation system, where Ministers will have to compete against other spending departments for what the railways need. I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendment 44 requires the Secretary of State, within 12 months of enacting the Bill, to publish an annual report on the relationship between the provisions of the Bill and the leasing of rolling stock to public sector companies. My preference would have been to end the private ownership of rolling stock, but the Bill officer suggested that such an amendment was beyond the scope of the Bill—hence this silly weak amendment that I am putting forward. The background is that, during Second Reading, on 7 October, the noble Baroness, Lady Blake of Leeds, laid down the principles of the Bill. She said: “This Bill will ensure that trains are run for the benefit of the British public, not for the profits of shareholders around the world”. She added that, by ending the current franchise system for passenger railways, “the taxpayer will save between £110 million and £150 million a year in fees”.—[Official Report, 7/10/24; cols. 1831, 1833.] The Government have already said that they will not bring rolling stock back into public ownership. However, the new system, operated by a public company, will still need rolling stock, and the Government have not provided a great deal of clarity on that so far. By leaving the rolling stock in private hands, they will be negating their own principle, which was to deny profits to shareholders around the world. The Bill will not facilitate public ownership of passenger railway services. Instead, it will facilitate what I call “rent a carriage”. That will guarantee massive profits for rolling stock companies—roscos—which do not build or commission trains but make huge profits. Last year, roscos charged £3.1 billion for leasing out rolling stock and had a profit margin of 41.6%. That is a profit of £1.29 billion in one year, extracted from customers and the public purse. The actual amount which the shareholders have extracted from roscos is likely to be much, much bigger—more of that in a moment. I looked at the accounts of one of the roscos and it is full of financial engineering. The £1.29 billion profit which it declared for a year is far greater than the savings for the passenger services that the Minister said would be £110 million to £150 million a year. There is no justification for the profiteering of roscos, especially as the payments are guaranteed and in future will be guaranteed by the state—at worst, it can simply print the money—so the risk is very low. The return should be no higher than the yield on any government bond, which is technically called a risk-free rate of return. The actual returns extracted by rosco shareholders are much bigger than the dividends. Let me illustrate that with quotes from the accounts of Porterbrook, which is one of these companies. It is owned by foreign shareholders: Canadian pension fund manager Alberta Investment Management; Luxembourg-based Allianz Capital Partners; EDF Invest, which is owned by the French Government; and Australian infrastructure investor Hastings Funds Management. Porterbrook’s 2023 accounts show a payment in dividends of £150 million. In 2022, it was £285 million. That is £435 million in dividends in just two years, which is far greater than the expected total saving of £110 million to £150 million for the publicly operated passenger service. The company also shifts profits through intra-group transactions. In 2023, it paid £154 million interest on its debt, which included £153.5 million to other entities in the same group—not to an outsider, but within the same group. In 2022, it made interest payments of £162.4 million, which included £161.2 million to other group entities. In the absence of additional information, it is hard to know whether such payments are genuine. They are probably not. Of course, profits are also shifted to avoid taxes. Interest payments give the company a tax-deductible expense, even though the transactions are not arm’s length and may lack economic substance. This company paid no corporation tax in the last two years, dividends are paid to foreign investors, and they did not pay any UK tax on those. This really is organised looting, permitted by the last Government, and I urge the Minister to ask HMRC to investigate these companies. Over the last two years, Porterbrook extracted at least £750 million in returns for its shareholders, or an average of £375 million a year. This is far greater than the £110 million to £150 million which the Government hope to save by ending passenger rail franchises. I have referred to only one company, which is by no means the largest one, but I am sure the Minister gets the substance of my arguments. Billions of pounds can be saved by ending the role of current roscos in the railway industry. Leasing out rolling stock is effectively a licence to print money. I understand from rail company executives that the useful economic life of a carriage is around 30 years or more. The cost of a carriage is normally recovered through rental or leasing arrangements over a period of five to seven years. This being so, the rental charges of 23 to 25 years are pure profit, nothing else. There is absolutely no economic justification for this. The Government can help by stopping the use of current roscos. They can buy direct from manufacturers or set up a Great British Railways leasing company. All of these options are preferable to the current practice. I hope that, as a first step towards ending profiteering, the Minister will agree to publish the annual report that this amendment calls for. It should provide data about the returns extracted by shareholders in dividends, intragroup transactions, related-party transactions and various profit-shifting techniques. Of course, my preference is to end this roscos circus altogether.

My Lords, I offer my support to Amendment 44 and, beyond that, want to support and reiterate what my colleague has just asserted. I agree that, consequent upon the Bill, the whole of the rail system needs to be kept under review during the period of transition. The privatisation of British Rail imposed costs on rail users and taxpayers. There were costs that resulted from the disorganisation of the system which might have been alleviated by rational central planning. There were also costs that arose from the profit-seeking and rent-seeking of the agents of privatisation. Some of the main train operating companies have been paying large dividends to their ultimate owners. These include consortia of foreign banks and foreign national rail companies, as we have heard. The companies that own the rolling stock and lease it to the train operating companies have been deriving large and exorbitant rents. These companies are of course called the roscos. The three largest companies, Porterbrook, Eversholt Rail Group and Angel Trains, own 84% of the UK’s rolling stock. They were established in 1994, at the time of the privatisation. They acquired their rolling stock at vastly undervalued prices and substantial profits were reaped when they were sold on to subsequent owners. These companies have complicated structures of foreign and domestic ownership. Between 2012 and 2018, the three largest roscos passed on a total of £1.2 billion to their parent companies in the form of dividends. We have heard that this sum has recently become even more exorbitant. The Government appear to have concluded that it would be far too expensive to bring these companies into public ownership. It should be observed that the era of the roscos has coincided with the demise of our railway manufacturing industry, the remnants of which have now fallen into the hands of foreign owners. This demise has been due, in part, to the activities of the rolling stock companies. Instead of providing a steady flow of orders for new rolling stock, they have often opted to refurbish their existing stock. This has made it unprofitable to manufacture trains in the UK. The train manufacturers are now in foreign hands, and they may decide to retreat abroad. To avert this, there needs to be a consistent stream of rolling stock replacements, subject to a centrally managed plan. The question is how this can be achieved. Others may have opinions to offer on this matter, but I believe that, when Great British Railways is properly established, it should undertake this task. Great British Railways would not be remitting exorbitant dividends to financial consortia, such as the owners of the existing roscos do, and it would not be paying eye-watering salaries to its executive staff. As a consequence of such savings, it would be able to offer attractive rates of return to funds borrowed from capital markets, which might assist investment in new rolling stock.

22:00:00

My Lords, I rise briefly to support my noble friends Lord Young of Cookham and Lord Moylan on their Amendment 42, which calls for an annual statement setting out the liabilities to the public purse. As I said on day one, the whole rail system is duplicated, messy and costly. Given that this Bill is piecemeal and without the other substantive and necessary reforms, it runs the risk of not fixing the problem but making it worse and costing the taxpayer even more. As has already been noted, in the Labour Party’s Getting Britain Moving document, there is a section titled “Failure is increasing costs”, which talks about the savings to be made. The Government’s September press release hails the Secretary of State as having “fired the starting gun on rail reform”, and clearly notes that it will be “saving taxpayers up to an estimated £150 million every year in fees alone in the process”. So we will bank that—well, the Treasury will, rather than the taxpayer—but the indication from that is that there will be savings of at least £150 million every year. I am not disputing that figure, but what other savings will there be? I was reading the other day that nationalisation could be costing the taxpayer £1 billion per year by the end of this Parliament. There is an argument that it is only because of privatisation that we can see what the system costs and what is profitable and what is not. There is a legitimate concern that the cost will once again become opaque, with the passing of this Bill and when it starts to take effect. In assessing the virtue of these reforms, not just from an ideological point of view, the country should know what else it is taking on, not least because it will effectively be the owner or shareholder, not just of the railways but now the liabilities of the companies which will be transferred on to the Government’s balance sheet.

My Lords, the amendment and the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Young, indicate the obvious advantages of nationalisation in terms of greater access to information and transparency; it has disadvantages, which the noble Lord set out, but it also has advantages. The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, was compelling: the evidence and information he gave us illustrated much better than I have heard before the issues that have been referred to—I referred to them on Second Reading and on Monday—regarding the imbalance between the attitude of the Government towards the speed of taking over the train operators and the fact that they are prepared to leave well alone the roscos, which can quite clearly be seen to be exploiting their situation and therefore getting excess profits as a result. I will be very interested to listen to the Minister’s explanation of why that is happening.

My Lords, at this hour I would like to expand considerably on my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham’s remarks on his amendment, but I find there is nothing I can add, given how well expressed his argument was technically. I shall say only that I hope the Minister, by contrast to his response to the previous group, will recognise the serious balance sheet issues that arise in relation to lease obligations. I understand that, while the department currently recognises its obligations to the end of the current contracts, most of which are a matter of months or very few years away, when the responsibility transfers to the Government, they will be responsible for the lease payments for the whole of the life of the remaining contracts for the lease of the trains and these will therefore represent a balance sheet liability, not simply an ongoing cost, that may well need to be recognised. I am not, as I say, as proficient in these matters as my noble friend, but I hope very much that the Minister treats that seriously and gives us a proper and robust answer about how this is to be treated. I shall save the bulk of my remarks for the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, with which, it may surprise noble Lords, I have a great deal more sympathy than they might expect, certainly as far as his analysis is concerned, though not necessarily with his solution of total nationalisation and so forth. The fact is that there is a very large amount of capital in the world, and a capital is seeking a return. However, this capital is not buccaneering 19th-century capital of the sort that built the railways in the first place; this is not capital that is looking for investments at risk; and this is not capital that sees that it might win a large prize on one investment in its portfolio but is willing to tolerate the total loss of another investment in its portfolio. This is capital that is looking for risk-free returns—or returns that are close to being risk free—but at a rate of return that is considerably higher than it would achieve if it invested in government bonds. Such capital is to be found throughout our economy—this is a criticism not of the current Government but of the previous Government and of the Labour Government as managed by Gordon Brown—because it is the basis on which funding is now provided to most of our utilities. That is why they all belong to large, foreign—although they are not necessarily foreign, and I do not object to the fact that they are foreign, so I will drop that word—investors who are looking for super returns and are achieving them because the Government are so accommodating towards them. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, asked why the Government do not do something about this and why they do not nationalise the roscos as well. That would be a true nationalisation. As I said at Second Reading, this Bill is not really a nationalisation of the railways; as I said in Committee on Monday, it is more like dismissing your chauffeur at the end of his contract. That is all that is really happening. If you are nationalising something, you normally have to pay for it and you normally acquire assets. That is not what is happening here, because the assets are all left in the private sector. The Bill’s headline claim of nationalising the railways—after all, that is the main purpose of this Bill: to get a headline out there quickly—is largely bogus. The main reason that the Government are not acquiring the roscos is that they cannot afford to do so. There is a second reason that the Government are not acquiring the roscos or going even further—as I suspect the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, would—by seizing their super profits and acquiring them at a price that would reflect a reasonable rate of return closer to the risk-free rate of return for the rest of the period of their leases. That reason is that this Government, rather like the previous one, are wholly dependent on that source of funding for nearly every infrastructure project that they want to carry out, be it railways, environmental stuff, net zero and so forth. In fact, there was a great conclave of these investors only a week or so ago, at which the Government told them what wonderful prospects they would have with their super, close-to-risk-free returns if only they would invest in Britain. It is not that we will get less of this sort of finance that is so objectionable to the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, under this Government; we will get a great deal more of it. That is the simple explanation, whatever the Government say, as to why they will not do what the noble Lord would like them to do, and which anybody who values true competitive capitalism would also consider to be moving towards terminating an outrage.

My Lords, I do not want to reply to the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, because I would be here all night picking holes in every point he made in reference to me. Perhaps I may help the Minister out. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, talked about the liabilities of Network Rail. The composition of government debt published by the ONS includes the liabilities of Network Rail, but the assets acquired with that debt are excluded. That means that the government debt is overstated. In a balance sheet, you will have assets and liabilities. In the ONS approach, only Network Rail’s liabilities are included in the debt. I understand that, for quite a long while, the Treasury has been looking at reconfiguring the composition of public debt, and I very much hope that, soon, it will do the proper thing by either taking off the debt altogether from the ONS numbers or including Network Rail’s assets as well.

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who contributed to this discussion. First, I should say that the objective of this limited Bill before the Committee remains to unify track and train, to provide better services to passengers, to reduce the cost of the railway and to increase the railway’s income. The phrase I would use to start with is, “We are where we are”. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, referred to Network Rail. I am very familiar with its arrangements post being put back on the Government’s balance sheet. All I can say to the noble Lord is that managing it is and has been a difficult job. However, it has still managed to make significant investment in the railway infrastructure of Great Britain. In some ways, its exposure to being in the public sector did it a great deal of good. I was paid significantly less to chair it than my predecessor was; its chief executive is paid significantly less than any of his predecessors and to my mind, he does a very good job. The organisation is a good deal more frugal than it used to be, yet it still does some very good things in operating the railway infrastructure. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, knows that Chiltern was always an outlier. There was no other plausible large-scale investment in railway infrastructure by a train operating company; certainly, there has been no recent interest in it. If you looked at the owners of the train operating companies now, you would see that their balance sheets simply would not support it. Of course, the noble Lord knows that I cannot predict what the Office for National Statistics will or will not say. Although the suggestion is that, after six years, LNER was still capable of being put back in the private sector, there was absolutely no evidence that it or Northern, which was in public ownership for four years, was being prepared at all. There was also no move in the previous Government’s department to do so. Nevertheless, there was no change in the status of the public accounts of those companies. The noble Lord may speculate that there might be in future, with these arrangements, but I could equally assert that experience suggests that there will not be. My noble friend Lord Sikka made a further point about the treatment of the assets and liabilities of Network Rail. I will write to both him and the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, about that. On the other hand, I recognise completely the passion with which my noble friends Lord Sikka and Lord Hanworth spoke about the rolling stock companies. Again, we are where we are. I heard my noble friends’ arguments with interest, but the Government will not buy back the rolling stock companies. Great British Railways will enable a longer-term view of the rolling stock market and it will reduce the margins it needs to make. Everybody is right to say that rolling stock lasts for 30 to 35 years, but a railway that is more accurately able to predict how long that rolling stock should last and where it should be used will reduce the uncertainty of relatively short-term leases. It will also significantly reduce the cost of those leases and will actually enhance competition in the market. We will see how that market evolves over time. Having said all that, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, said that the Treasury would like to redefine what is public expenditure and what is not. I am sure that is the case—it would like to get some liabilities off the balance sheet. The whole point of having an independent ONS is so that the Treasury, led by politicians, cannot adjust the figures and the liabilities to suit its convenience. What has not come out in this debate is that there is competition between the roscos to supply the wants of the train operating companies. Originally, there were three, now there are four, and there have been two recent entrants. The competition between them has driven down the costs. The Government, who on Monday spent time trying to persuade foreign investors to invest in infrastructure, will have been a little disappointed to hear the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, being less than complimentary about the investments that they have made in some important parts of the infrastructure.

22:15:00

I turn to the thrust of my amendment. As the Minister said, he cannot predict what the ONS will do. To that extent, I remain concerned that there is a huge gamble here of a significant sum of money coming on to the department’s balance sheet. The department will then have to get more money from the Treasury or cut back on other bits of its expenditure. I look forward to the Minister’s detailed reply on what I confess is an abstruse subject around what is and what is not public expenditure. In the light of his letter, we may want to come back to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 42 withdrawn.

Amendment 43 not moved.

Amendment 44

Tabled by

44: Clause 2, page 3, line 32, at end insert— “30D Review of relationship between provisions of section 30(1A) and the leasing of rolling stockThe Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the day on which the Passenger Railway Services (Public Ownership) Act 2024 comes into force, lay before Parliament a report on the relationship between public sector contracts awarded under section 30(1A) and the leasing of rolling stock to public sector companies.” Member's explanatory statement This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish an annual report on the relationship between the provisions of the Bill and the leasing of rolling stock to public sector companies.

I am very grateful to the Minister and all the other noble Lords who have participated in tonight’s debate. Let me make it clear that my proposal would not stymie competition among manufacturers. It seeks to eliminate the financial intermediaries that are making 41.6% profit on top of whatever the manufacturers are paid. These roscos do not make trains and they do not test them; they are there simply to make extra profits. Competition among manufacturers will remain. The Minister has said that the Government do not wish to buy back rolling stock companies. I am not asking the Government to buy back rolling stock companies. I am suggesting setting up a Great British Railways leasing company, so that these intermediaries can be eliminated. That would wipe them out, and my estimate is that it would save probably around £2 billion a year. I refer only to one company, which had taken out £750 million over a two-year period. It would be beneficial to set up a Great British Railways leasing company. However, I hear the Minister’s arguments and will reflect upon them. For the time being, I will not move the amendment.

Amendment 44 not moved.

Amendments 45 and 46 not moved.

It is now 10.18 pm. I am unable to get agreement from the usual channels to finish the last amendment, which is a bit disappointing. If I cannot get agreement then we will have to adjourn. In all my years as Opposition Chief Whip, I have never been in a situation where one amendment cannot be finished off.

My Lords, I understand that there has been agreement with the usual channels. I do not think that the matter is in my hands.

In this situation, the House will resume. It is very disappointing. Never in my time as Opposition Chief Whip would I have acted like that.

House resumed.

House adjourned at 10.19 pm.