Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Committee (3rd Day) (Continued)

14:54:00

Amendment 100

Moved by

100: After Clause 36, insert the following Clause— “Requirement to produce an annual report on cooperation with Europol(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the passage of this Act, lay before Parliament an annual report on cooperation between UK law enforcement agencies and Europol.(2) A further report must be published and laid before Parliament at least once per year.(3) An annual report under this section must include—(a) actions taken during the previous year to cooperate with Europol,(b) progress in reducing people smuggling and human trafficking, and(c) planned activities for improving future cooperation with Europol.”Member's explanatory statement This new clause would require the Government to provide an annual report to Parliament detailing the UK’s efforts to cooperate with Europol, its progress in reducing levels of people smuggling and human trafficking, and its plans to improve future cooperation.

My Lords, Amendments 100 and 101 are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord German. I will also speak to Amendment 206, tabled by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, with me and the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, as signatories. These amendments are all about co-operation with Europol in various ways, and I hope they are pushing at a very open door with the Government. They try to put some flesh on the bones of various aspirational texts of the last five years and to give some practical and operational content to what has remained a bit declaratory so far. Maybe the Minister will be able to give some information about what is going to happen to implement the reset document of 19 May. Amendment 100 asks for the Government to produce an annual report on co-operation with Europol, the idea being that if the Secretary of State is required to produce an annual report on co-operation between the UK’s law enforcement agencies and Europol, that will provide an impetus to have something to report on. New subsection (3) in Amendment 100 suggests that the annual report should include actions taken during the previous year to co-operate with Europol, progress in reducing people smuggling and human trafficking, and planned activities for improving future co-operation with Europol. It would not just be a report for its own sake—I am sure Home Office civil servants have quite a bit to do as it is—but it would be in order to say, “Oh golly, we’ve got to produce that annual report, so let’s do something”. Amendment 101 would require the Secretary of State to seek to establish a joint taskforce with Europol for the purposes of co-operation, which are set out: disrupting trafficking operations, enhancement of law enforcement capabilities, specialised training for officials involved in border security and immigration enforcement, and of that ilk. It takes two to tango, so obviously the amendment does not expect the UK Government to establish a joint taskforce with Europol on their own, so it says “seek to” establish a joint taskforce. Amendment 206 is a request for a unilateral obligation on the Government, saying: “The Secretary of State must provide adequate resources to law enforcement agencies”— that is, the national crime agencies, the police forces in England and Wales and the British Transport Police— “for the purpose of enhancing their participation in Europol’s anti-trafficking operations … The resources … must include technology for conducting improved surveillance on, and detection of, smuggling networks”. Just to look at the history of, and aspirations for, co-operation between the UK and Europol, we started about five years ago—obviously, we were once extremely significant in Europol; I know that I have said this before in the Chamber, but it riles somewhat. For 10 years, Rob Wainwright, a senior British police figure, was the distinguished director of Europol—we were in “pol” position, you could say. However, we must make the best of what we now have, which is the trade and co-operation agreement.

15:00:00

Part 3, Title V, is on co-operation with Europol, of which the objective is to

“establish cooperative relations between Europol and the competent authorities of the United Kingdom … in preventing and combating serious crime, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a common interest”.

That is good; that is the objective of co-operative relations, but there is not an awful lot of concrete specification there. Perhaps one of the most concrete is

“the provision of advice and support in individual criminal investigations as well as operational cooperation”

in Article 567. Article 568 says:

“The United Kingdom shall designate a national contact point to act as the central point of contact between Europol and the competent authorities of the United Kingdom”.

I imagine that that has been done and that it is the National Crime Agency. Then,

“the United Kingdom shall second one or more liaison officers to Europol”,

and vice versa, with Europol sending liaison offices in this direction.

The TCA is over five years old, but then there was an agreement in December 2023, which took nearly four years to be produced and then be updated. It was the Working and Administrative Arrangement establishing

“cooperative relations between Europol and the competent authorities of the United Kingdom”—

everything is a bit long-winded in its wording. That again talks about liaison officers, with the parties agreeing that

“liaison officer(s) seconded by the United Kingdom … shall work to facilitate cooperation under this Arrangement as well as under the Agreement”.

I am not sure whether liaison officers have actually been sent. I hope that the Minister can tell us that they have. Under this working arrangements document, there were also to be

“High-level meetings between Europol and representatives of the competent authorities”—

British authorities—which would

“take place regularly to discuss issues relating to Title V of the Agreement”,

which is the one that I quoted.

Finally, we get to the common understanding of 19 May, with several paragraphs about Europol under the heading

“Internal security and judicial cooperation”.

It says that the two parties

“believe that there is scope for reinforcing cooperation through quicker, better and deeper implementation of Part Three”

of the TCA. I must say that that strikes home, as I am not really sure how much has been achieved in over five years in implementation of Part 3. The 19 May document says:

“The United Kingdom and the European Commission will take the necessary steps to ensure that the pending arrangements underpinning the cooperation between the United Kingdom and Europol under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement are finalised swiftly”.

I would be most grateful if the Minister could tell me what those “pending arrangements” are. I cannot see his face terribly well—maybe it is because I have my reading glasses on and not my distance glasses—but I had the impression that he looked a little surprised, but that may just be my vision.

I happened to be in a meeting with the European Commissioner for Justice, Mr McGrath, this morning. I asked about this and an official mentioned that there were further working arrangements under discussion. I do not think I am giving any secrets away in saying that that included liaison officers. We have been talking about liaison officers for quite a long time without them actually landing. Very importantly, in paragraph 52, it says:

“The United Kingdom and the European Commission will also consider how to increase operational cooperation between the United Kingdom and Europol under the applicable rules”.

One idea under that operational co-operation would be for UK involvement in projects, including those on migrant smuggling. There have been important pledges about co-operation. There is still, for my taste, a little too much at the level of pledges rather than product. In a sense, these three amendments are designed to stimulate from the Minister a spelling out of what he sees as the possibilities, particularly in the areas covered by this Bill, on co-operation to stop and catch the criminal people-smuggling and migrant-trafficking gangs. Where are we at and where are we going, without too much delay, in co-operation between UK law enforcement agencies and Europol?

These amendments provide some specific suggestions, such as reporting on what is happening, and itemising the actions and operations that are the subject of UK involvement, particularly on smuggling, for the UK to provide sufficient resources to enable our agencies to participate in Europol projects and operations. Aside from saying that these are brilliant amendments and he will accept every word, I would like to hear from the Minister, in fairly concrete terms, where exactly we are in co-operating with Europol. We have probably heard quite enough about pledges, aspiration and intent. A little flesh on the bones would not go amiss. I beg to move.

My Lords, I have some points to make on these amendments and some questions, which the Minister or the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, may be able to deal with at the end. Amendment 100 proposes a requirement to produce an annual report. I am broadly not in favour of these. They seem to just dump a load of bureaucracy on departments, which then have to set up a team of people who spend all their time producing glossy documents that nobody reads, and it takes up a lot of time. I sort of understand why she said it, but the noble Baroness said that, if you have to produce a report, you then have to do some things to put in the report. I do not want the Home Office doing things just to put them in a report. I want it making sensible decisions on our strategic policing choices and doing those things, not things to fill a report up. There is a danger in putting in statute stuff that you have to do. These are not suggestions that the noble Baroness’s amendment is making; departments would have to do them as a priority over other things because it would be a legal requirement. I am not awfully keen on that. I am not entirely clear—by the way, this is not a request to make the proposed new clause broader—why the noble Baroness has picked just Europol. The problem with organised crime gangs and international groups—Europol deals with not just trafficking but drug trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism and cybercrime—is that these things are global problems, not European problems. Europe as a key territory for us in the issue of people trafficking, but it is not the only place people come from. We should remember that, large though the small boats problem is, it is still the case that the majority of people who come to the United Kingdom seeking asylum are not coming on small boats but getting here by some other mechanism, including those people who do not have a legitimate claim for asylum, and they are coming from countries around the world. Having this skew towards co-operating with just Europol would be unhelpful. I want Ministers and law enforcement agencies to decide which international agencies they are going to co-operate with based on the threat assessment to the United Kingdom, not based on a statutory provision to have to co-operate with one and not the other. Specifically in Amendment 101, about a joint task force, particularly concerning is subsection (3) of the proposed new clause. The amendment as a whole would force the Secretary of State to set up a joint task force, but, on what the task force has a duty to do, it says that that has to do with “matters which the Secretary of State or Director of Europol deem appropriate”. Fundamentally, it is not right that the director of Europol in effect gets to pick the priorities on which the Secretary of State is then forced to spend resources and focus, even if the Secretary of State does not agree that those are the things she wants to focus on. I want Ministers to remain accountable to Parliament and to make decisions that they think are appropriate and justify them accordingly. This would, in effect, give the director of Europol the ability to direct the resources of the British Government and the British taxpayer, which I do not think is appropriate. I turn to the last amendment in this group, Amendment 206, about participation in Europol’s anti-trafficking operations. It does not specifically say, but I presume by that we mean human trafficking operations, as opposed to drug trafficking operations. The amendment again would force the Secretary of State, using the word “must”, to “provide adequate resources to law enforcement agencies for the purpose of enhancing their participation in Europol’s anti-trafficking operations”. That means operations that Europol is doing. It does not give the Secretary of State discretion to make a judgment about whether she thinks that we should focus our efforts on those anti-trafficking operations but forces her to make available resources, whether she thinks that is appropriate or not—and I do not think it is. The scope and territorial extent of the Bill is the whole of the United Kingdom: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. I am not entirely certain why, for the purposes of proposed new subsection (1), the law enforcement agencies include only the National Crime Agency, police forces in England and Wales, and the BTP. Excellent force though the BTP is—I had some responsibility for it in the past—I do not know why Police Scotland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland are not included. Look at the breadth of Europol’s operations. It seems to me that Police Scotland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland will be absolutely interested in countering terrorism, cybercrime, drug trafficking and human trafficking. Particularly given Northern Ireland’s position, with a land border with a part of the European Union, it seems to me extraordinary that the amendment does not include the Police Service of Northern Ireland. That is an omission. There is a danger once you start listing things in primary legislation. My understanding of how interpretation works is that, by not including things in a list, you make it less possible for them to have the powers than if you had not had a list at all. Much as I understand the objective and think it perfectly reasonable—to improve co-operation with our partners in other countries on what is, inevitably, a transnational crime—the focus on Europol, and then not looking at other organisations and international law enforcement bodies we could be partnering with, would skew our focus. Ministers ought to be able to make judgments about where we put our resources. We do not have infinite resources. Ministers should have to decide, and law enforcement bodies should be able to choose, where the threats are and what the priorities are on an operational basis, day to day and month to month, not by looking at primary legislation. I think the fundamentals are misconceived, but there are quite a lot of problems, even if you thought that the fundamentals were not misconceived, in the way that the amendments have been drafted. I hope the noble Baroness will not press them. If she comes back on Report with amendments crafted in perhaps a more focused way, we could look at them further. However, in the way they are set out at the moment, they are not going to deliver the objectives she is hoping they would. I hope the Minister can touch on some of those points when he responds, and the noble Baroness may want to address them when she winds up at the end of this group.

15:15:00

My Lords, I echo the concerns of my noble friend Lord Harper. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. I have the pleasure of serving with her on the European Affairs Committee, she has great expertise and knowledge of these issues from her experience in the European Parliament, and she is our resident expert on these issues when we debate it in the committee. But she will know that we have had two separate inquiries which have covered these issues over the last year or so. One was on our and the EU’s policy on data adequacy, which is germane to the area of crime and policing; in particular, serious organised crime and the work of the NCA. More recently, of course, since the reset on 19 May we have been looking in forensic detail at the Government’s policy, as far as it is possible so to do. Very briefly, the reason I have some concerns about these amendments—I reiterate the point made by my noble friend—is because I take the view, if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. The evidence the committee heard from the National Crime Agency was that we were making organic, incremental changes and things were improving since our exit from the European Union in 2021. A good example of that is that, as the noble Baroness well knows, British police forces are able to take the operational lead in some of these big cases, particularly involving the National Crime Agency, cybercrime, people trafficking and modern slavery. Therefore, this amendment would, in effect, tie the hands of Ministers quite closely in terms of the strategic objectives that they are aiming to deliver in this area. We all want to work closely with our partners and friends in the European Union—the Liberal Democrat Chief Whip laughs, but he might try to listen to my remarks before being so presumptuous. We want to work closely with them, and we have worked closely over the last few years. There is more work to do on data adequacy, on sharing data. There are enduring problems about the view of the Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union in terms of the legal purview they have and the oversight that they wish to have with regard to joint operations. But these amendments are rather heavy-handed and circumscribe the flexibility of Ministers. Finally, there is an opportunity for proper scrutiny and oversight of the work of the NCA and others, by the Home Affairs Select Committee in the other place, our European Affairs Committee, and directly on the Floor of this House and of the other place. So, for those reasons, I echo my noble friend. On this occasion, although the noble Baroness does an excellent job in helping us understand these issues from her unique experience, I hope she will see that her amendments are unnecessary.

Interestingly, the challenge in the Bill before us is to smash the gangs. That was the statement from the Minister, and the issue of boats crossing the English Channel dominates the Bill and is the one that has been given the most effect. It was, of course, the previous Government who made this such a totem issue that they put it front and above all else, even putting it on the sides of lecterns inside 10 Downing Street. If the Government want to treat this matter—which is so important to the Benches on my right—with the Bill, as has been explained to us, we want to see how we best use our resources to tackle these problems in common. As I explained earlier, I have visited the Pas-de-Calais to examine all these issues. I was with the French police just after they had arrested the driver of a German motor car that had a blanket over the back seat with teddy bears on top. Underneath was a dinghy of exactly the sort that I had seen on the beach, and which had been demonstrated to us as one of the types that are used. Those dinghies had come from Germany in a German car, the number plate of which I have a photograph of, whose driver was arrested at the French border. I was told quite clearly by the officials there that these things come from across Europe, and that all the machines and bits and pieces are collected and used by different countries. Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey, as well as France and the UK, are all involved in this. Quite clearly, it would be right for the Bill to examine the level of cross co-operation between the forces which are to deal with this. Europol is, of course, the agency on the continent, and is the one that particularly reflects the chain I have just described. The scope of the relationship between us and Europol is defined by the TCA. I have seen no amendments relating to that agreement, but I am hopeful, as I know many Members of this House are, that we will see big changes to the TCA, which has not been used to give us the best result. It is quite clear that our relationship with Europol is defined by it. The scope of the co-operation is laid out clearly in Article 567. I will not read everything out, but it includes “the exchange of information … reports … analysis … information on … participation in training … and … the provision of advice and support”. Nowhere does it mention joint co-operation in activities to deal with the issues before us. I know that there has been some action, because we have seen it reported. The important aspect is the depth of that action with the body that has responsibility for policing these serious crimes across the parts of the European Union where this matter is arising. I have some questions on the specifics. First, what is the level of operational development between the British forces and Europol? Have we designated a national contact point, as the agreement outlines, and how many liaison officers do we have? The TCA, to which the previous Government agreed, says: “The United Kingdom shall ensure that its liaison officers have speedy and, where technically possible, direct access to the relevant domestic databases of the United Kingdom that are necessary for them to fulfil their tasks … The number of liaison officers, the details of their tasks, their rights and obligations and the costs involved shall be governed by working arrangements”. We need to know what the “working arrangements” are, and whether we have those liaison officers in place. My second question is therefore on the structural relationship. Do we have these liaison officers in place, and are there officers from Europol inside the UK and vice versa? That is what the TCA, which was agreed to by the previous Government, says should happen. The third element is whether the scope of co-operation in this document is sufficient to tackle the problems that we are now facing with this chain of operations across Europe, and which end up with us. This is an important issue, because we are talking about a serious crime that is being reflected across parts of Europe as well as in the United Kingdom. The relationship is important to us, because it includes the people with the operational ability, but we of course need to know whether there is co-operation in that operational ability. Without understanding that, we cannot be reassured that this matter—which, according to the Conservative Party, is at the top of the issues that the country is facing—will be tackled properly.

My Lords, I knew it would be only a matter of time before the debate turned to the European Union. However, I offer some support on this amendment, which seeks to introduce an annual reporting requirement on co-operation between UK law enforcement agencies and Europol. I do so not out of any dogmatic enthusiasm for greater institutional integration with the European Union, but because it touches on something far more important—that the Government should have a duty to come before Parliament and the British people and show us the work they have been doing to smash the gangs. We have all these questions already—how many gangs have been dismantled, how many people smugglers have been arrested and what impact that has had on the scale of the crossings—so, once this Bill comes into force, the pressure on the Government to answer them will be even greater. To that end, we think the requirement to report these numbers should be set out in law. This amendment speaks to earlier provisions tabled in our name in which we called for greater transparency about enforcement outcomes. If the Government are serious about stopping the boats, breaking the business model and restoring control, they should welcome the opportunity to show Parliament the evidence. However, I strike a note of caution. While co-operation with Europol is undoubtedly important, it must be driven by operational need, not ideological nostalgia. This Bill cannot be a backdoor to deeper alignment for its own sake. What matters is whether the relationship delivers results and helps our agencies do their job more effectively. If it does, let us support it; if it does not or if resources would be better deployed elsewhere, we must retain the flexibility to make those choices. I support the principle behind the amendment: let us have the data, see the progress and ensure that decisions about operational co-operation are rooted in the fight against serious crime and not some broader desire to turn back the clock on Brexit. That is the balanced and pragmatic path forward. The same principle of operational demand underpins our opposition to Amendment 101. We have spoken a lot about giving our law enforcement agencies the tools they need to combat illegal immigration, but we cannot tie their hands. With respect to the noble Baroness, I believe that our authorities can be trusted to determine whether a joint task force with Europol is necessary and I do not think that compelling them to do this in law is particularly sensible. Our concerns are much the same with Amendment 206. While I am sure that it is well intentioned, I will speak against it. However worthy its stated aim, it rests on a flawed premise: that this Chamber, and individual Members, should be in the business of directing operational law enforcement resources from the Floor of Parliament. Of course we expect the Government to ensure that our law enforcement agencies are adequately resourced. That is a basic responsibility. What I find more difficult to accept is the idea that we should begin legislating where those resources must go, as if we are better placed than the professionals to determine strategic priorities, operational partnerships or the most effective deployment of personnel and technology. Respectfully, what qualifies the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, to decide by statute how the National Crime Agency or our police forces should engage with Europol? Are we to micromanage from your Lordships’ House the balance between domestic enforcement and international co-operation? I do not believe those on the front line will thank us for it. We should not forget that enforcement against illegal migration and human trafficking is a complex, fast-evolving challenge. It requires flexibility, responsiveness and operational freedom, not rigid legal mandates handed down from Westminster. If law enforcement agencies judge that Europol operations offer the best return on effort and resources, then they will and should participate. But if priorities shift or if intelligence and tactical realities require a different focus, they must be free to act accordingly. This is a debate not about whether we support the fight against people smuggling—we all do—but about whether we think Parliament should start signing away operational discretion and tying the hands of those we rely on to deliver results. That is not a responsible use of legislative power. We need to be guided by practical application, not political aspiration. Let the experts lead and let Government support them in doing so, not box them in. For those reasons, I cannot support the amendment.

My Lords, I have a confession to make—and I hope that noble Lords will bear with me as I make it. As a Member of Parliament, I spent a lot of the period between 2016 and 2019 arguing for a close relationship with Europol when we were agreeing the Brexit referendum and agreements. I put a lot of pressure on the then Prime Minister and Home Secretary to ensure that they valued Europol and our close co-operation with it. I was disappointed in the outcome of the settlements achieved on that relationship. I therefore start from the basis that I believe that the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, are important. The approach of the current Government since 2024 has been to ensure that we encourage and engage in co-operation with Europol and other agencies to achieve the objectives that we have set.

15:30:00

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, in essence said—to paraphrase him—that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Recent arrests include those of a major Syrian organised gang responsible for smuggling at least 750 migrants into the UK and a Turkish national suspected of being a supplier of small boats. A German law enforcement operation resulted in 13 arrests across Germany and France. Six men were arrested who were wanted in Belgium over their suspected involvement in a major people-smuggling ring.

Disruptions made to more high-end harm targets have increased by nearly 25% over the past 12 months. We have closed twice as many social media accounts—a total of 18,000—used by smugglers to generate activity. We have increased the costs of boats and engine packages for the gangs involved in that in northern France, and the NCA seized 84 engines and 86 boats between July 2023 and May 2024. There has also been continued action by the new Border Security Commander, who will have legislative back-up under this Bill to achieve the objectives that I think the noble Lord and I both share: to put pressure on the gangs. That has all been done through co-operation and close engagement with Europol, among other organisations.

Those figures are extremely impressive—thank goodness for that—but can the Minister explain why over 21,000 people are arriving in the UK on boats?

The noble Lord knows that this is a complex challenge and that the Government are trying to undertake a range of measures to address it. He will also know—we will return to this in more detail later—that, with the scrapping of the Rwanda scheme, we have been able both to process more applications on asylum and to remove people from hotels and shut more hotels. We have also been able to provide greater investment in the sort of co-operation that the Border Security Commander will undertake shortly, and I believe that continued pressure will be placed on that issue. The noble Lord knows that it is a difficult challenge—I am not denying that—but we have a duty to disrupt, and that disruption involves close co-operation with Europol. I get the sense—I mean this in the nicest possible way—that these are probing amendments to get a view from the Government on the issues around Europol; all three press the Government on where we are with that. The noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Jackson, have challenged the drafting and objectives of the relevant clauses. I will address the first two amendments as probing amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord German, which seek to determine what we are doing with Europol. I accept those challenges and will respond to them. The Border Security Commander—the legal framework for such a role is in the early clauses of the Bill—will work with a range of international bodies, including Europol, to deliver the Government’s border security objectives, recognising that an international solution is required for the current international, cross-border set of challenges. The recent Organised Immigration Crime Summit brought together over 40 countries and law enforcement bodies, including Europol to unite behind a new approach to dismantle people-smuggling gangs and to deliver on the people’s priorities for a securer border. The amendments are pressing us to address that. First, there is the argument for an annual report to Parliament. Under the Bill, the Border Security Commander has to provide an annual report to Parliament and his work is very closely linked to that of Europol. We have a very strong relationship with Europol currently and a significant permanent presence in the agency’s headquarters in The Hague. The Home Office will continue to work with Europol to deliver the Government’s border security objectives, and the Border Security Commander has a key role in Europol being one of the agencies through which our objectives are being set. To answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord German, on joint working with Europol, we have 20 officers embedded as liaison officers in Europol headquarters, with teams across the European community. It would be challenging, and perhaps—dare I say—inappropriate to set statutory requirements that would seek to establish joint taskforce operations when these are currently operational decisions. Those operational decisions have the full support of government to work closely with Europol to help with data, criminal investigations and to ensure that we work in partnership. That is vital, given that many of the criminal gangs are operating in the European Community—in Germany, France, Belgium and Holland. That is why the Border Security Commander, as well as working closely with Europol, has established and worked with the Calais Group, its member states being France, Belgium, Holland and the United Kingdom, looking at close co-operation in those areas. We are ensuring that we have adequate resources for law-enforcement agencies to enhance participation in Europol’s anti-trafficking operations. There is regular interaction with Europol, and the commander is already providing strategic cross-system leadership across current and future threats to UK border security, protecting the UK border and going after the people-smuggling gangs. We believe that the legislation strikes that operational balance but also ensures that law enforcement and the UK intelligence community are supportive of the commander’s approach. By establishing that clear direction and leadership, we are creating a strong, cohesive system to boost the activities of Europol as a whole. There is a very strong operational relationship with Europol, led by the National Crime Agency. The director-general of the National Crime Agency regularly meets with his counterpart, Catherine De Bolle, to discuss relevant matters. The commander himself has engaged heavily with law enforcement since being appointed. We have doubled our presence at Europol, and we hosted Interpol’s general assembly in Glasgow in November 2024. We have also increased the number of embeds from the National Crime Agency in European organisations such as Europol. On an operational and strategic level, it is in the interests of both Europol—the European Community—and the United Kingdom to have that close co-operation. That is why in the period post the Brexit referendum, I and others argued for that strong relationship: because it was important. As the noble Baroness said herself, a UK citizen, Rob Wainwright, was the leader of Europol when we were in the European Community. I hope that there is not a sliver of difference between us. However, going back to what the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said, the amendments demand an annual report and taskforce co-operation, with us determining a third-party taskforce to be co-operated with. They also demand areas of resource—which we are dealing with, without the attack on operational independence that that approach may involve.

I thank the Minister very much for the explanation he has given so far, which I think indicates a surprising level of progress, given where we started from with the agreement that preceded this. The Minister has kindly told us that we have officers embedded in The Hague. Does Europol have similar officers embedded in the United Kingdom?

It is probably best if I reflect on that, because although I know who is embedded in Europol, I do not know offhand, unless I can find some inspiration in the next few seconds—I fear that I may have to check. I say that simply because this Minister and this Government are responsible for National Crime Agency liaison; we are not responsible for the Europol aspect of liaison with us. Rather than give the noble Lord an unhelpful answer, if he will allow me I will reflect on that in due course and give him a specific answer in writing, post this very helpful set of amendments, which I still hope will not be pressed.

I thank the Minister for that response. The tone and approach go very much in the direction and spirit of the amendments, even if their drafting is not entirely fit, in the Minister’s mind. He is right that they were designed to illustrate the very welcome change of approach of the current Government, who regard co-operation with Europol—and, indeed, with the EU generally—as important. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, said that we must be driven by operational need, not ideological nostalgia. I do not think you could find anything in the drafting of the amendments which is not operational. To be honest, I take slight exception to any suggestion that they are driven by ideological nostalgia. If there is any ideology, it is coming from those on the Opposition Benches, who are still displaying an allergy to the European Union. I have the pleasure of serving on the European Affairs Committee with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson. We are going to have some interesting discussions when we finalise our report on the reset. He referred to the leads from the National Crime Agency and the National Police Chiefs’ Council giving evidence to us a few months ago. I looked it up while he was speaking, and they referred to the more cumbersome, clunky and process-heavy post-Brexit arrangements. They were engaged in mitigation, so they were making the best—I am now using words they did not use—of a not great job. I am afraid that what is coming from the Benches to my right is a prejudice against working with the European Union.

I am listening very carefully to the noble Baroness. She knows that there has been cross-party support on, for instance, information-sharing in respect of the Schengen Information System’s second iteration, which we were members of in 2015, and it is incumbent upon this Government and the European Union to negotiate that information-sharing. We could ameliorate the clunkiness were the EU to be a little bit flexible, for mutual benefit, in sharing the SIS II data.

There are all kinds of things we can aspire to. Unfortunately, the arrangements the noble Lord’s party negotiated have certain constraints in terms of the legal operation of the European Union, and he knows that.

I am sorry to disturb the noble Baroness’s flow, but I want to place on record, in answer to the question raised by Members, that there are no Europol embeds in the UK. There is a Europol liaison unit, which is staffed entirely by UK police officers. I hope that is helpful.

I thank the noble Lord for that helpful information.

Forgive me, but I just want to be clear, because I think the noble Baroness may have, I am sure inadvertently, misunderstood me. I am very supportive of us co-operating with Europol. We did when I was in government as Immigration Minister, we do now, and I want us to continue to. I also want us to co-operate with law enforcement agencies around the world. What I do not want to do is fetter either agencies or the Government by skewing priorities towards only one of them. I want them to co-operate with all relevant agencies and make those decisions based on the threat assessment and the operational need. I want to do all those things, but I am very supportive of our co-operation with Europol and always have been. I do not want her to run away with the impression that I am not.

15:45:00

I thank the noble Lord; I was coming to his remarks. In his original remarks, he said precisely that—we do not want to co-operate just with Europe; we want global co-operation. Of course I want global co-operation, but the fact is that something like Interpol is not operational. Europol is operational and it is our next-door neighbour. It is obvious, because of the routes that irregular migrants take, that geography means we have to co-operate particularly with our European counterparts on issues such as people smuggling and migrant trafficking. That does not mean we do not want to co-operate elsewhere, in particular with countries of origin, but we do not have the same operational possibilities as we do with EU institutions and agencies. I was reminding the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, of the evidence we heard from senior police officers. They had to be diplomatic, and they are doing their best with the hand they have been dealt, but it is not ideological nostalgia to say that the TCA places serious limitations on those possibilities. One would not wish, frankly, to start from there. I hugely welcome the change of tone, the approach and the willingness—not this baggage or allergy to anything that has the word “Europe” in it. I know that the Minister personally and the Government want, within limitations that I do not necessarily endorse, to co-operate with the European Union and individual member states. It is not about politics or ideology; it is about whether we are going to catch major criminals. That is why we have to give our police and European police the tools to be able to disrupt the gangs—that is what we all claim we want. We must not allow ideology to impede that co-operation. I conclude that I am grateful for the reply from the Minister. I will reflect on whether I can submit something on Report that is more to his and the Government’s taste, but I welcome the positivity in his remarks and intentions about how we need co-operation. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 100 withdrawn.

Amendment 101 not moved.

Amendment 102

Moved by

102: After Clause 36, insert the following new Clause— “Further provision as to biometric information(1) In the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 in section 141 (fingerprinting)—(a) in subsection (1), for “may” substitute “must”;(b) in subsection (7), before paragraph (a) insert—“(za) any person (“ZA”) who is not a British citizen but who is attempting to enter the United Kingdom;”;(c) in subsection (8), before paragraph (a) insert—“(za) for ZA, on his arrival at a port in the United Kingdom;”;(d) in subsection (9), before paragraph (a) insert—“(za) for ZA, when he leaves the port in which he entered the United Kingdom;”;(e) after subsection (9), insert—“(9A) An immigration officer or constable may arrest without warrant ZA if ZA does not comply with a request from an authorised officer to take fingerprints at ZA’s port of entry into the United Kingdom.”;(f) after subsection (15), insert—“(15A) In this section “port” has the same meaning as in section 4 of the UK Borders Act 2007.”. (2) The Immigration (Collection, Use and Retention of Biometric Information and Related Amendments) Regulations 2021 are amended as follows—(a) in regulation 2 (photographs)—(i) in paragraph (1) for “may” substitute “must”;(ii) in paragraph (7), before sub-paragraph (a) insert—“(za) any person (“ZA”) who is not a British citizen but who is attempting to enter the United Kingdom;”;(iii) in paragraph (11), before sub-paragraph (a) insert—“(za) for ZA, on his arrival at a port in the United Kingdom;”;(iv) in paragraph (12), before sub-paragraph (a) insert—“(za) for ZA, when he leaves the port in which he entered the United Kingdom;”;(v) after subsection (15), insert—“(15A) In this section “port” has the same meaning as in section 4 of the UK Borders Act 2007”;(vi) after paragraph (16), insert—“(17) An immigration officer or constable may arrest without warrant ZA if ZA does not comply with a request from an authorised officer to take fingerprints at ZA’s port of entry into the United Kingdom.”;(b) in paragraph (1) of regulation 3 (attendance to be photographed) for “may” substitute “must”.”

My Lords, I very much hope that my Amendments 102 and 149 are in the spirit of what we are discussing this afternoon and, indeed, in the spirit of what the Government are attempting to do. I pray in aid both our earlier debate on the UK Government’s resilience action plan—I was in the Chamber when the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent, was on the Front Bench for that—and the Government’s other document, the National Security Strategy 2025, which states in paragraph 14, among many other things, that we will: “Expand our legal and law enforcement toolkit, to ensure the UK becomes a harder target for hostile state and non-state actors including criminal gangs engaged in illegal migration … Roll out a series of new measures to strengthen our borders, defend our territory and enhance the resilience of our critical national infrastructure”. I concede that there are other parts of this document, but they all pretty much say the same thing: “Security at home … Defend our territory … Make the UK a harder target”. Under “Pillar (i)—Security at Home” in paragraph 1, it says: “The first pillar of our Strategic Framework is to protect our people, bolster the security of our homeland and strengthen our borders against all types of threats, both in the physical and online space”. In paragraph 3, it says: “These multiple and interconnected threats require us to make ourselves a harder target to our adversaries. As a first step, the defence of our borders and territorial waters must be strengthened”. Hear, hear to all that. Then we come to the clauses in question and I find the drafting rather tentative, so my amendments seek to put a bit of muscle behind the Government’s intention. In proposed new subsection (1), my Amendment 102 would change “may” to must”, which would require immigration officers to take fingerprints from all people to whom that section applies. Section 141 applies to a person who does not present a passport at a port of entry, a person who has been refused leave to enter the UK and granted immigration bail, and any person who has been given a deportation order, among others. Currently, that too says only “may”, meaning that as things stand, as the legislation is proposed, the drafting suggests there is no requirement for immigration officers to collect this biometric information. My amendment would make it a duty to do so, in order to ensure an accurate collection of data. Secondly, the amendment would add a new person to whom Section 141 applies, “ZA”. This is any person who wishes to enter the United Kingdom—visitors, tourists, all immigrants and any arrivals whatever. Proposed new subsection (2) in this amendment would amend the Immigration (Collection, Use and Retention of Biometric Information and Related Amendments) Regulations 2021 to require immigration officers to take photographs of every arrival into the United Kingdom. This is all about ensuring that we know who is entering the country and that we have an accurate record of every person who crosses our border. If that person then commits a crime while in the United Kingdom, the police would have their fingerprints and photograph on record to enable them to investigate and prosecute. I cannot see why the Government would be opposed to this, given everything that they have said so far today. Amendment 149, the second amendment in my name, would amend the Immigration Act 1971 to insert two new sections. Proposed new Section 28IA would create new powers to seize identity documents from foreign criminals, asylum seekers, those awaiting deportation and those granted immigration bail. Immigration officers would be able to search for, seize and retain all such ID documents, and there are penalties within the amendment for those who do not comply, seek to falsify or misrepresent themselves. Proposed new Section 28IB states that immigration officers must give all the people they have seized this documentation from a new standard biometric government-issued identity card. This would be linked to the biometric information they have supplied, as laid out in Amendment 102. There is nothing very contentious or draconian there. It is just an attempt to garner the information we need to standardise that information and to have a better idea of who is in this country at any one time. I beg to move.

My Lords, I support the excellent amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Swire. I begin with a confession, which I think is shared by most of my colleagues on these Benches, that we were all whipped in 2006 or 2007 in the other place when in opposition to oppose identity cards. It was a period when there were serious concerns about the infringement on civil liberties of identity cards. Tony Blair, our former Prime Minister, got a lot of things wrong over the years, but he was absolutely right on identity cards. If I were to go back in time and vote again, I would support identity cards, for many reasons. We are talking almost 20 years ago and the world has changed significantly in terms of transnational travel, patterns of serious organised crime, and the challenges of large numbers of people moving across the world, a minority of whom are doing so for nefarious reasons and for criminal enterprises. The Minister knows that I have great respect for him. I know he serves in the greatest tradition of patriots in the Labour Party who have served in government and he wants to do his best to protect our borders and the safety and security of our country. However, we can no longer have these slightly erudite debates about ID cards and civil liberties when we have so many huge challenges, particularly the threat of Islamist terrorism and other serious organised crime. If we look abroad, we see that other countries have taken this very seriously as well, including many English-speaking countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand and of course the United States. What bedevils us is the lack of co-ordination and collaboration in terms of sharing data. I have been nice about the Minister and now I am going to be nasty. I have asked him four or five times the same question—I dare say it is his officials’ fault, not his—about whether we collect data on students whose visas are rescinded as a result of criminal activity. For various reasons, he has had to answer that he cannot give me that information, telling me the Home Office does not collate that data, there are too many databases, or it would be too expensive to collect that data. I am not blaming him as such, but that is symptomatic of the difficulty of being able to properly co-ordinate data in the public interest to fight crime. Therefore, we should consider anything that can assist that, whether it is facial recognition—I know there are civil liberties issues and in China we see some very major infringements of civil liberties, so I do not want to go down that road—iris scans, fingerprints, et cetera. The ability to collect that data for people coming in—

My noble friend Lord German is going to speak on the entirety of the amendments, but I did not want to lose the theme of ID cards. I have a question, because I genuinely do not understand. We have had big, long debates about ID cards in the past and maybe we will again in the future, but how are ID cards supposed to help in the case of irregular migration? Employers who are employing people illegally are presumably meant to be checking documents at the moment to make sure that people have the right to stay and the right to work. How does an ID card actually help? If employers have the means to check whether someone has the right to work legally—that is an alleged pull factor, although of course the Migration Advisory Committee has always advised that that is actually not true—can the noble Lord explain to me what ID cards add as a supposed deterrent to irregular migrants, when employers should already be checking documentation? How do they add value to that particular issue?

16:00:00

Well, if there are appropriate safeguards—I know that is a big “if”—and if there is proper scrutiny and oversight of the issuance of those ID cards, I believe they would allow a number of key agencies, such as the NHS, local authorities, adult social care, children’s services, police forces, the National Crime Agency and others, to be in a position to track those individuals who are identified as previously predisposed to commit crime, and often serious crime. I absolutely respect the liberal position—and also the Liberal Democrat position. They believe in an individualist freedom not to be tracked by the state. We know that there are occasions across the world where that sort of surveillance is for pernicious, irregular and completely immoral reasons. But that is not our country. We have a parliamentary democracy, with checks and balances to ensure that that would not be abused. Indeed, the Information Commissioner has wide-ranging powers. So I have crossed the Rubicon on the principle of ID cards—but this is not a balloon debate on ID cards, so I must press on. My own party has also been complicit in some of these significant difficulties. We made a big mistake in ending exit controls—I cannot remember when it was, but I think it was in the early 1990s under the Major Government. That was a significant mistake that we made. But we can also learn from our friends in the European Union, who have the European travel information and authorisation system, which is coming on stream, and EES—the entry and exit system—because they understand the importance of collecting data in order to facilitate fighting crime. So we need to focus on collecting data and using it effectively to join up the dots on crime fighting and to make sure that we know who is in the country—who is coming in and who will be leaving—which is what my noble friend’s amendments would do. Putting that obligation on a statutory footing, in order to track those individuals, would be a start of the imperative for departments, particularly the Home Office, to start joining the dots on the data they hold in order to work properly to protect people. I have to mention that, only two days ago, Mr Thomas-Symonds, the Cabinet Office Minister, was on LBC. He was completely stumped by the presenter, who asked what questions they ask people who say they are applying for asylum when they come ashore near Dover. He was not able to confirm any of the questions. The presenter asked whether they ask the individual, “Who trafficked you? What nationality were they? Where did you actually come from?” Maybe the Minister will answer this, but I am not sure that there is a particular protocol for collecting the most basic data—and that is not even when we are talking about IT databases. So my noble friend’s amendments are excellent. They begin the process of really taking seriously the challenges that we face in protecting our border. We are following the lead of many countries across the world that similarly take these threats to national security and safety seriously. The Minister has generally been in the right place—I read the debate on the statutory instrument on biometrics with my noble friend in March—and he is saying the right things. He would give us a lot of sustenance and support in that campaign to make our country safer were he to be minded to support my noble friend’s excellent two amendments.

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Swire’s two amendments, which are well-intentioned, well drafted and have the right approach. Strengthening the ability of state agencies to be able collect this information would be very helpful. However, at this point, I part company with my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough, which I do not do very often. I will not allow him to tempt me at length on this, but I do not agree with him at all on ID cards. I hope she does not find that it damages her reputation, but I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, on this point. She asked the right question: how does having ID cards solve any of these problems? In his excellent introduction, my noble friend Lord Swire highlighted that we already require people who come to this country as migrants to have identity documents and that their biometric information is on a database. We require those who employ them, for example, to check their employment status. There is a gap in that, which we will come to deal with in later groups on Clause 45. The Government rightly are looking to strengthen that to include not just traditional employment models but some of the new employment models that are not currently captured but which have been highlighted publicly, including by the shadow Home Secretary, when talking about the problem that the gig economy, for example, and those who deliver things are not captured by the traditional models. That is important, but we already require people to check that information. Those employers who are operating illegally and choose not to do it still will not do it even if we have ID cards. My worry about ID cards—and then I will stop talking about them, because it is not strictly within the scope of these things—is that you put the burden on those of us who are lawfully in the country and who should not have to keep being asked for ID when we have the right to use such services. All the public services that we access, including the NHS—except, rightly, for emergency care—the DWP and so on, require you to evidence that you have a right to be in the country and to access those services. We rightly do not insist that the NHS does it for emergency care, but, if you go to a hospital for planned treatment, they will check that you are entitled to have free NHS care. They may not always do so, but they are legally supposed to—those checks already exist.

I have to ask my noble friend a fundamental question. Regarding the biometric data that we currently retain across all the agencies of government, if that system is working, why have the Government—and indeed the previous Government, who he served and I supported—no idea how many illegal immigrants there are in the country? Why do they have no idea of the veracity of the estimate that one in 10 of the 9 million people in Greater London are illegal immigrants? We simply do not know the numbers. ID cards may not be perfect, but they may go some way to enabling us to have a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the challenge facing us in the delivery of public services. At the moment, we are flying blind and cannot use the data. The Government simply do not know how many people are in the country.

I was coming to this. This is where I do agree with my noble friend. There is a big difference between having ID cards—which, in effect, puts the burden on the rest of the population and would not materially affect how we deliver services or protect ourselves—and data. His point about the state needing to be better at collecting and using data is a very good one. I was always sceptical about the state using data, but we have seen how the private sector uses it effectively to deliver better services. Having had some responsibility in the past for some of our agencies and having used their services, I know that people sometimes have concerns and have the “big brother” conversation. One thing I know is that the powers of our intelligence agencies, for example, are on a legal footing under the Investigatory Powers Act. There are very clear controls within which Ministers, who are accountable to Parliament, have to make decisions. In the past, I have signed warrants for intercepting communications, and there are very clear rules about how that works. All that is overseen by a judicial check, to make sure that the law is being enforced properly. I think there are appropriate safeguards and that we could do a better job in collecting and using data and delivering services. The private sector does a much better job at this. This is true across government, not just in the Home Office but in the NHS and other organisations that use data. I distinguish between the two points. I absolutely support collecting and using data to deliver services, but I do not think it follows from that that we will have to require people to carry identity documents.

To adjudicate between my noble friends Lord Harper and Lord Jackson, I think that my noble friend Lord Harper has a point. We can do something short of full-scale electronic data collection and the identity card system. The problem at the moment, frankly, is the cost, and it was a problem at the time. My noble friends may recall the cost—I think it was £3 billion or something of that order—to install a full ID system all those years ago, during the Blair Government. God knows what the Chancellor of the Exchequer would do if she was suddenly presented with the cost of a full ID system. However, I agree with my noble friends Lord Harper and Lord Swire that we need more data, particularly in the area of immigration, where we simply do not know what is going on, in London or anywhere else.

I thank my noble friend for his attempt to adjudicate between me and my noble friend Lord Jackson. He makes a good point. This is where the state needs to get much better at using data to make policy decisions—by the way, this is not a criticism of the current Government; we had our challenges in office as well—and operational decisions, deal with threats and be nimble enough to recognise that those threats do not remain static but change. The state has to be much better at altering its focus to deal with the threats as they face us today. I regret that I disagree with my noble friend, as I try not to do so, but I strongly support my noble friend Lord Swire’s amendments, and I hope that they will get a fair hearing from the Government. Even if the Government do not like the way they are drafted or whatever, I hope they will take them away and have a think about whether my noble friend’s amendments make a good point and could be incorporated into the Bill in due course.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for tabling these amendments relating to the provision of biometric information by those seeking entry into the United Kingdom. I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Harper and Lord Jackson for that interesting duel, which contributed greatly to this debate. Amendment 102 would extend the powers under Section 141 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 by mandating the collection of biometric information from those awaiting deportation, those who have been arrested for an immigration offence and asylum seekers. Currently, the ability to collect fingerprints from such people is optional, and therefore we cannot be certain that immigration officers are collecting enough information to enable sufficient protection of our borders. My noble friend’s amendment goes further and would require the fingerprinting of everyone who is not a British citizen who seeks to enter the country. My noble friend has raised this issue on numerous occasions, and he is right to do so. If we do not know who has entered our country, and indeed who is already here, we cannot take adequate measures to prosecute crimes and deport those with no right to be here. Importantly, my noble friend is proposing that we use biometric information primarily in cases where the person in question has failed to provide us with any other form of identification that would show who they are, where they came from and why they wished to enter the UK. These are not needlessly intrusive questions. Noble Lords who are lucky enough to travel abroad this summer will be asked exactly those questions, and rightly so. Every nation has to understand who is coming in. As I have mentioned before, the consequences of not knowing can be dire. I remind noble Lords that the massive Iranian terror attack, which was only just intercepted, was plotted by those who arrived without paperwork on small boats and in the back of lorries. It is a matter of national security that we know who is entering the UK. My noble friend Lord Swire has proposed a sensible amendment to this Bill, which would give our law enforcement agencies the information they need to begin to build up this picture. Amendment 149 is also built on this principle and seeks to introduce robust powers, allowing immigration officers to search for, seize, retain and make use of identity documents for certain categories of non-British nationals and to issue biometric registration cards in their place. This amendment once again speaks to the fundamental principle of border security: that we must know who is trying to enter the UK and where they are from, and try to determine why. The amendment has clear provision for returning all documents once the relevant period is passed and is a sensible proposal designed to ensure that our immigration officers have access to as much information as possible when making the decisions needed to safeguard our borders.

16:15:00

This proposal would equip officers with the power they need to obtain the information they require, and it would be a safeguard against any risk that individuals could destroy or tamper with their identity documents while going through the application process. This is not an academic concern. The Crown Prosecution Service itself has said that the

“destruction of documents disables the authorities from establishing where an entrant came from, in order to increase the chances of success of a claim or application and/or to thwart removal … These offences have the real potential to undermine the whole system of immigration control”.

This amendment directly seeks to reduce that risk, keep these important documents safe and ensure that efforts to undermine our borders are both addressed and combated.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Swire, for tabling these amendments, if only because we have been able to revisit matters from the past 17 years on the benefits or otherwise of ID cards. I had the pleasure, or misfortune—delete as appropriate—to be in the Home Office in 2009 when we had the ID card rollout. I think I have said to the House before that I had ID card No. 3 at the time and had lots of biometric information taken from me. In fact, I remember travelling to Austria on my ID card instead of a passport—such was the pleasure of having that ID card. I am pleased to see that the noble Lord, Lord Swire, has revisited his vote in the Commons and that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, has suggested similar. However, that debate is for another day. It is not one we can revisit today, as it does not really feature in any of the amendments before us. While it provides an interesting historical perspective on the rights and wrongs of having ID cards, it is the amendment before us from the noble Lord, Lord Swire, that addresses biometric information, and, if I may, I will focus on that.

I have enjoyed this exchange with the Minister on that vote. I have been trying to find out if there was any chance that I was not around during that vote; I was Minister of State in Northern Ireland at the time, and I was rather hoping that I was stuck over there. Unfortunately, because of a lack of data collection, there seems to be no way of finding out about my presence or otherwise at that time.

Perhaps I can help the noble Lord. If he was in the building, he would have voted that particular way; otherwise, he would not have been a Northern Ireland Minister for very much longer. However, it is immaterial whether he was in the building or not; the Government he supported voted to abolish ID cards. Let me put that to one side, however; it is a debate for another day. The proposed new clause in Amendment 102 is intended to require all foreign nationals to provide biometric information on arrival to the United Kingdom or face arrest if they fail to do so. I have no problem with biometric information and using it to secure our borders and protect the public. I have no problem with the fact that it is already a cornerstone of our immigration system, as it enables us to identify foreign nationals who are coming in and out of, or staying in, the United Kingdom. Individuals who seek to enter the UK are required to provide biometric information as part of their application for entry clearance or, indeed, an electronic travel authorisation. This allows us to do what I think the noble Lord wants us to do: to verify identity and assess suitability before arrival. We already compare applicants’ fingerprints against immigration and law enforcement databases, and that already enables us to identify those who may pose a threat in coming to United Kingdom. Requiring biometrics to be provided before a person travels to the UK also reduces the need for Border Force officers to deal with people who pose a threat on arrival. Where a person arrives in the UK without the necessary entry clearance or electronic travel authorisation, we already have existing powers to capture their biometric information, and we can use reasonable force where necessary to do so. We already check biometrics at the UK borders, using e-gates that can match facial images to images contained in passports. For visa holders, we check their fingerprints at the primary control desks. Let me remind the Committee that the Government remain vigilant in their duty to protect our borders. As recently as March 2025, we introduced new legislation which significantly enhanced our ability to collect such biometric information at the border. I know the noble Lord has good intentions, but were this new clause to be enacted, all foreign nationals would need to provide their biometric information, including people who are normally excused. This would include people who are physically unable to enrol with their biometrics or who are exempt from immigration control, such as sovereigns or heads of state, and that is neither practical nor proportionate. For me, this is a key issue. The noble Lord and I are both former Northern Ireland Minsters, so he will know that under the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, there is no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. As part of the common travel area arrangements, the UK does not operate routine immigration controls on journeys within the common travel area, and no immigration checks are undertaken. Under his new clause, we would be unable to implement a policy of taking everyone’s biometric information as they enter Northern Ireland from Ireland without introducing a hard border. I do not think he wants that, but that is what the new clause would mean. Turning to Amendment 149, on seizing identity documents—

If the Minister thinks that my noble friend’s amendment has some merit, one way of dealing with this issue as the EU implements its EES checks would be to exchange biometric information with the Irish Republic so that, as people come into the common travel area, we can collect that information. Earlier, we talked about sharing information with our European partners. Dealing with the issue in this way does not require a hard border on the island of Ireland, but it hardens the border around the common travel area, which I think would be welcomed.

With all due respect to the noble Lord, I was moving to the view that the amendment does not have merit; that is the nature of political life, as the noble Lord knows. Having poured that large bucket of cold water on Amendment 102, let me return to the question of Amendment 149 and seizing identity documents. I reassure noble Lords that immigration officers already have powers to seize and retain identity documents and to require them to be produced. Under Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971, immigration officers have a power to require persons, on examination, to produce identity and other relevant documents, which may then be retained until the person is given permission to enter the UK. It allows immigration officers to take all reasonable steps and gives them powers to search and to seize documents relating to identity. Schedule 3 to that Act extends the powers in Schedule 2 to persons liable to detention for the purpose of deportation. Furthermore, there is a power in the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimant, etc.) Act 2004 whereby relevant documents in the possession of the Secretary of State may be retained where they may facilitate the removal of a person who may be liable to removal. Amendment 149 is therefore covered by existing legislation. As for the noble Lord’s third amendment, on the issuance of biometric documents to individuals whose identity documents have been seized, again I must gently express some reservations. We already issue foreign nationals with status in the UK with biometric immigration documents in the form of an e-visa. Unlike physical documents, they cannot be lost, stolen or tampered with. We also issue asylum seekers with application registration cards that contain facial images and evidence that they have submitted a protection claim. We do not issue biometric immigration documents that confirm the holder’s status to people who have no lawful UK immigration status or an outstanding protection claim in the UK. We do not provide documentation that could be used for identification purposes, to avoid creating the impression that someone is in the UK lawfully. Since November 2024, we have stopped issuing physical biometric cards to foreign nationals granted status in the UK. Having to issue physical biometric cards to people whose documents were seized would generate additional costs—without adding them up, there would be several million pounds’ worth. It is also important that the Committee recalls that the misuse of identity documents is a criminal offence under the Identity Documents Act 2010, and the supply of equipment for the creation of false documents is similarly proscribed under the Specialist Printing Equipment and Materials (Offences) Act 2015. I hope that that explanation helps the noble Lord. Obviously, he can return to this on Report if he wishes to, but I hope that he will withdraw his amendment, having heard my defence of the Government’s position.

My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister, but I do not agree with his position. This would have provided him with an opportunity to send a very strong signal out to all those watching these debates and following the issue of immigration very closely. There was a lot in what he said about officials having the power and how they could do this and that, and it was all tentative again. My amendments sought to ensure that they did these things. That is the only way we can get a degree of certainty. I hope that we can return to this in the future. I strongly suspect that the Government’s position on this will have to change but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 102 withdrawn.

Clause 37: Repeal of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024

Debate on whether Clause 37 should stand part of the Bill.

My Lords, I rise to oppose the question that Clause 37 stand part of the Bill. The Government’s proposal to repeal the safety of Rwanda Act goes to the heart of our differences in this debate. The previous Government introduced a substantive deterrent: people whom the United Kingdom had identified as illegal immigrants or asylum seekers would have to be relocated to Rwanda for processing, asylum and resettlement. Those who were successful in claiming asylum would have remained in Rwanda, and they would not have been permitted to return to the United Kingdom. In this clause, the Government are tearing up that plan. They are instead proposing to introduce a new border commander with no actual command and no required relevant experience, and they are proposing a handful of laws that seek to criminalise supply chains, which are almost entirely located abroad. We have sought to be helpful to the Government with many of our amendments, but this is a matter on which, unfortunately, we just disagree. We on this side recognise some fundamental truths which the Government seem intent on ignoring. The first is that supply in this matter is driven by demand. The second is that supply will always try to meet demand, even under absolute prohibition. I referred at Second Reading to the 18th Amendment in the United States, which, as I am sure noble Lords will agree, was quite a bit stronger than anything the Government are proposing in the Bill, yet still failed. The third and final truth is that, if you want to stop supply, you need to stop demand. The Government’s approach is obsessed with supply—the supply of boats and ID documents—but there is almost nothing here to affect demand. The simple fact of the matter is that, while there are thousands of people willing to pay massive sums of money to come to the UK illegally, there will be criminal gangs ready to take the money and get them here. The same can be said for pretty much every other criminal enterprise. The fact that these things are illegal, by definition, does not matter to the criminals who sustain them. The previous Government recognised this fact and decided to go after the demand, by ensuring that those who sought to come to the UK illegally would spend as little time here as possible. This worked: illegal migrants considering making the channel crossing last year were quoted many times as saying that they were waiting for the Rwanda scheme to be abolished. Migrants in Calais told journalists that they were waiting for Labour to get into government before coming to the UK, because they knew that the party would scrap the Rwanda policy. I put it strongly to your Lordships that this is clear evidence that the Rwanda plan was acting as a deterrent.

16:30:00

Before the Minister gets up to tell us about the cost-benefit ratio, might I remind him that a deterrent is not designed to be regularly used. Our nuclear deterrent, for instance, we have, thankfully, never used. We cannot measure the Rwanda plan on the number of people who went to Rwanda; we need to judge it on the number of migrants who never travelled in the first place.

Furthermore, the Government have repeatedly claimed that the Rwanda policy was pointless. The Minister said on 1 July that it was

“costly, ineffective and did not remove people”.—[Official Report, 1/7/25; col. 588.]

Of course, the problem with this statement, and with all his criticisms of the Rwanda policy, is that they cannot be proven. It cannot be proven that the scheme was ineffective because it was never allowed to begin. The Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act received Royal Assent on 25 April 2024. The election was called a month later and then this Government came in and cancelled the policy.

The Government entered office with a clear deterrent. Since then, they have scrapped this plan and tried to replace it with a wholly inadequate alternative, the result of which we are discussing today. Look at the results: Home Office data shows that a further 2,599 migrants made it to Britain in the week to 5 July. That includes 879 people who crossed on 30 June alone—the highest daily figure so far this year.

I know the Minister will want to draw attention to discussions the Government are having with the French on this issue, but before he does I remind him that nearly four times as many small boat migrants made it to Britain, in one recent week, than the French managed to stop. On a wider scale, the numbers are simply awful: they are 48% higher than the figure for the first six months of 2024, and 75% higher than 2023’s equivalent figure of 11,433. It is crystal clear that the removal of the deterrent has done exactly what we expected—it has encouraged more and more people to make the journey to the United Kingdom—because they have done so in increasingly significant numbers.

In Clause 37, the Government formally propose to repeal the safety of Rwanda Act, which underpinned our deterrent. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Sharpe for stating his intention to oppose this clause standing part of the Bill. In pursuing this path, the Government are formally repealing a policy introduced by the previous Government, who sought to address the problem of illegal migration at source. Clause 37 does not merely repeal a piece of legislation; it repeals a strategy designed to make it clear that the United Kingdom would not be a soft touch for illegal migration and that those who paid criminal gangs to reach our shores would not be rewarded with indefinite leave to remain.

I appreciate the arithmetic of this situation, that Clause 37 will almost certainly stand part of the Bill. However, we on these Benches are very clear: Britain needs to have a deterrent if we are to have any hope of stopping the boats and securing the borders. That is also the view of the National Crime Agency. There must be a third-country removal scheme in place, in which illegal migrants will be removed to a safe third country and have their claims processed there. To simply remove the previous deterrent without any form of alternative is naive and, indeed, reckless. Can the Minister explain how the Government are going to deter illegal migration? What is the replacement?

The numbers speak for themselves: the removal of the deterrent has encouraged a massive increase in the number of crossings and the Government are instead proposing to legislate themselves out of the situation, while welcoming greater and greater numbers of migrants at the taxpayer’s expense. On this side of the Committee, we oppose the question that this clause should stand part of the Bill.

My Lords, I welcome Clause 37 very warmly. For some of us it is the best bit of the Bill. I am really pleased, for once, to be able to unequivocally support my Front Bench and my noble friend the Minister. My noble friend the Minister did not have the pleasure of sitting through the debates about the Rwanda Bill in this House; I do not really want to put him through it all again, because it is like a nightmare in my mind and it is quite difficult to recall everything that was said at the time. But I remind the Committee that, on a number of occasions, your Lordships’ House rejected key bits of the Bill, and it went through only because of the majority in the Commons. We had ping-pong, ping-pong, ping-pong, and eventually we had to give in. To now try to resurrect it through this clause stand part device seems a bit perverse. I will just remind noble Lords why we were so opposed to the Rwanda Bill. First of all—I have to see whether I can read my notes here—there was the failure to meet the concerns of the Supreme Court. Saying Rwanda is safe then and for always does not make it safe. I can remember noble and learned Lords and others on the Cross Benches—one of whom may well want to speak today—saying, “We’re being asked to say that night is day and put that into legal form”. It was ridiculous. So, for the lawyers among us, it was really quite distressing that we were having to put our name to that. The United Nations High Commission on Refugees had concerns, at the heart of which was the belief that the Act was not compatible with international refugee law—the refugee convention. There was the disapplication of the Human Rights Act, highlighted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights—the current chair is no longer in his place, but I am sure he would agree with what the previous committee said. That committee emphasised the universality of human rights, which this piece of legislation rode a cart and of horses through. There were particular concerns around the treatment of LGBTI+ people, who would potentially not be treated well, as well as concerns about children, which was one of the main issues that I took up during the passage of the Bill. On the treatment of age-disputed children, there were fears that they would be removed to Rwanda because they had wrongly been assessed as adults, and then there was a difficult provision, if they could prove that they were children, for them to be sent back to the UK, in effect as parcels. Many of us thought that was dehumanising of children and went against children’s rights. I am sure my noble friend the Minister will be terribly pleased to hear that we will be debating age assessment later in Committee. But it is worth pointing out at this point that just yesterday, the i newspaper published the latest analysis by the Helen Bamber Foundation of FoI data. That found that in 2024, at least 678 unaccompanied asylum-seeking children were initially classed as adults but then found to be children by local authorities, and that was over half of those who were so referred. Had the Rwanda Act been in operation now, how many of those children might have been sent to Rwanda and got stuck there? That is the question that I would put. In addition, there was never a proper child rights impact assessment or anything like that. Finally, the noble Lord talked about a deterrent. I seem to remember that, in all the paperwork we were given—it was probably an impact assessment or something—that there was a very clear reference to academic work which suggested that there was no evidence of a deterrent effect in this kind of legislation. The noble Lord also talked about us being a soft touch for illegal migrants. Please can we remember that most of those who come across on the boats, putting their lives at risk, are seeking asylum? They have an international right to do so. Please do not let us write them off as “illegal migrants”. That is all I wanted to say. I warmly welcome that the Government have taken this step, because it is a very positive step in the name of human rights and international refugee law.

My Lords, I think the noble Baroness was a little unkind to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, who made an admirable speech: gallantry in a hopeless cause is always extremely impressive. I thought Owain Glyndŵr was speaking to us. I was reminded of the gallant knight in “Monty Python”, who has all his limbs struck off, but bravely says, “No, no, it’s only a flesh wound”, and fights on. It was tremendous. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, also slightly abbreviated the history of the Rwanda Act in this House. It began with the Rwanda treaty, which this House recommended, on the advice of its International Agreements Committee, could not and should not be ratified until the various supervisory and legal constructs needed—and set out in the treaty itself—existed. Because they did not exist; they were to be set up. Various judges were to be appointed, courts were to be formed and supervisory monitoring procedures were to be put in place—none of that existed. This House recommended that the treaty should not be ratified. The Bill itself had three fundamental problems for this House. First, as the noble Baroness said, there was the fundamental “Alice in Wonderland” absurdity that we can, by so voting, change facts: we can make Rwanda safe by declaring Rwanda safe. The noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Nottingham, spoke powerfully on that subject. Secondly, there was the problem of our international commitments. It was impossible—in the view of this House, which voted several times on it—to reconcile the Bill and the treaty with our international commitments. We were telling people, “You may never have your claim for asylum heard in this country. You may claim asylum in Rwanda. You may claim from the Rwanda Government the right to become a citizen of Rwanda. But you may never claim the right to become a citizen of the United Kingdom. We are going to send you to Rwanda, we are never going to let you come here and we are never going to hear your case”. To make that fit with the refugee convention is impossible—that is what this House determined. Keeping the Rwanda Act on the statute book would be absurd. If we mean what we say about a rules-based, legal global order, we really need to pay attention when what we are doing ourselves is clearly in breach of a central plank of the rules-based order. That is completely different from what this Government are, as I understand it, seeking to do with offshoring the exercise. Although I do not like that—it is a very bad idea that people’s claims should be considered abroad, because it will be harder to ensure that they get appropriate legal advice and age assessment, if their asylum case heard in a foreign country—it is completely different from what we were going to do with Rwanda. With the Rwanda Act, we were not just offshoring but offloading; we were putting on the Rwanda Government the responsibility of considering the future of these people. We were saying, “It’s absolutely nothing to do with us and we refuse to touch it”. That simply will not do. We have to applaud the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I note that his Scottish colleague was cunning enough to disappear before we came to the question of whether Clause 37 should stand part. I am a Scotsman and know that there are some battles that it is best not to fight. It is very gallant of the noble Lord to be here to make his case, but it would be absurd if he were to succeed.

16:45:00

My Lords, there is another fine detail which neither noble Lord has mentioned but which worried some of us very much—that, in offloading to Rwanda, we would be enabling a whole new business model for traffickers, because those sent to Rwanda would be such vulnerable prospective customers for the traffickers.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I am a veteran of those dreadful, seemingly endless debates and I too recall them with some horror, including the ping-pong. But let us put this in perspective. That policy was chosen because it replicated the only purely successful means of stopping illegal immigrants coming on boats to a country—the Australian example. Instead of Rwanda, it used Nauru, near the Solomon Islands, and established over 10 years or so a successful arrangement whereby people coming on boats across the Timor Sea to Darwin and so forth were immediately detained and sent within 24 hours to Nauru to be treated. Not only did that immediately stop the boats but it has led to a cross-party arrangement in Australia that is, frankly, to die for here. The Liberal Party brought in those arrangements, the Labor Party then eventually won a general election and abolished them—

If I may correct the noble Lord, the Australian arrangement was offshoring, not offloading.

That is not true; it was offloading as well, because the decisions were taken by the Government in Nauru at the behest of the Australian Government, although they obviously had a back-up situation and did not entirely hand it over. However, if the noble Lord will look at it, he will see that it was very similar to the arrangements with Rwanda. As he will recall, we had not only arrangements with the Rwandan Government but a back-up arrangement—a monitoring committee—which he acknowledged during those debates was composed of the most distinguished international lawyers and so forth, who would check whether anything was going wrong.

I want to draw my noble friend back, in case noble Lords missed it, to the very interesting political point he made—which I can validate from conversations I have had with a member of the Australian Government—that the Australian scheme was introduced by a Liberal Government, the equivalent of the Conservatives, and then reversed by a Labor Government, who realised that they had made a terrible mistake and, when they came back into government, wanted to keep the scheme. Does he think that might be this Government’s experience in trying to deal with this important issue?

Exactly. It is such a pity. We made the point on ID cards just recently that one of the worst aspects of our system of government is new Governments coming in and instantly reversing policies carried through by the preceding Government. ID cards were an example where my noble friend Lord Jackson admitted that we might have been wrong. In some cases, we were right, by the way—we should have cancelled HS2. My noble friend Lord Harper might not necessarily agree with me there. None the less, sometimes new Governments can get it right as well as get it wrong, but the constant changing of policies of this kind between Governments is a real issue. Australia got it right: the Liberal Government brought it in; the Labor Government then rejected it and realised they were wrong. The Liberal Government brought it back, the Labor Government accepted it, and they now have a bipartisan approach which, in effect, means there is very little illegal immigration into Australia. It is the only extant example of this problem being dealt with. Not only that, but the success of the bipartisan approach in Australia enabled them to go on to deal with legal immigration very transparently. There is a debate every year with a proposal from the Government on how many legal immigrants should be accepted into the country, broken down by different categories— students, families, workers in various categories, asylum seekers and so forth. That is then is debated in parliament and a view is taken. That is a model of what we are all trying to achieve here. If we could get to that position here with a bipartisan approach and an open debate every year in Parliament, that would be wonderful. This may seem like “Monty Python” land in some ways in its fantasy, but it is a reality in Australia.

I see the point that the noble Lord is making, but it is important that he recognise that what the Australian Government did, and did again, was to arrange for Australian asylum hearings to take place offshore. What we were arranging was for people to be told that they could never have a United Kingdom asylum hearing; we were going to forcibly send them to Rwanda where, if they wished, they could have a Rwandan asylum hearing. That is completely different.

With respect, it is not completely different. The fact is that the Australians arranged a successful deterrent, which is what all Governments are trying to achieve. What the last Conservative Government were trying to achieve was obviously not entirely the same as the Nauru/Australian example, but it was broadly the same, and, as the noble Lord must agree, with many checks and balances to ensure that people were properly treated. That is what the present Government are throwing away. All that effort, finance, agreement, and legislation—three Bills, I think—are being chucked aside for, in effect, nothing, because this Bill gives no deterrent factor. It is completely absent. We all agree that the gangs should be smashed, and that work can carry on side by side with any other work on a deterrent, but there is no work on a deterrent going on of the kind that the previous Government had. We need a deterrent.

Can we just nail this myth? It was not a deterrent. Between the signing of the partnership with Rwanda on 14 April 2022 and 5 July 2024 when this Government took office, 83,500 people arrived by small boats—some deterrent.

It was never deployed as a deterrent. As my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower said, it was never put into operation. The idea that the Minister can say that it did not work is nonsense, because it was never actually tried. First, there were all the judicial reviews and additional challenges that were sustained, and then there was the general election, so it never actually happened. It is a myth to believe that it somehow did not work or that it was not a deterrent. We do not know, frankly. The great pity about all this is that we will never know whether it would have been a deterrent. I fully confess that I do not know whether it would have acted as a deterrent or not; no one could say until we saw the effects. Indeed, in the case of Australia, it was quite a long time before people realised that this was an effective deterrent. It took about 10 years before it was fully realised that this did work and was a means of doing it, and that would likely have been the case here. A policy without a serious deterrent is not really a policy at all; that is the problem. I am sure the Minister will say that what the Government are now doing with France has considerable potential as a means of deterring people from coming across, but that depends on relations with France. I am all in favour of having favourable relations with France. I believe that the UK and France are particularly important countries in the European context these days, and I fully commend what happened over the last couple of days—I think King Charles in particular played a blinder in bringing the countries together—but none the less, we have to look at whether this will work as a deterrent. I understand that the talks on this are going on this afternoon, and that therefore the Minister may not have much information and may be unable answer questions, but currently only 6% of people will be sent back under this scheme. It is hardly a deterrent to say that 94% of people will stay here and only 6% will be sent back. Obviously, it is sensible to start in a small way and ramp it up as time goes on, and I am sure that the Minister will argue that, but if you have a whole gamut of people coming over and only a small proportion are returned, what sort of deterrent is that? Will it not also fall foul of the problems that the previous Government had, where any individual who is asked to go back to France immediately has recourse to a lawyer who seeks to keep them here, and maybe succeeds in that effort, and therefore the whole scheme begins to unwind in a morass of legal challenges? That is what happened to the last Government: they became bogged down in a whole series of legal challenges. That is the danger, and that is why we are becoming afraid of the ECHR. The Government have had a year to think about all this. Unless they have a clear plan that encompasses these other extraneous elements that protrude into the problems they have, there is no serious possibility of stopping the boats. Therefore, while I understand why the Government, having decided not to go ahead with the Rwanda plan, have given themselves the resources that were devoted to Rwanda and used them in a new way to develop the Bill, they will have to go very much further if they hope to stop the boats. I am afraid that we need a much more decisive, thorough and holistic approach to this problem than that we have had so far.

My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower. Unlike a number of noble Lords here, I was unable to take part in the earlier iterations of debate on the Bill. I was a very strong supporter of it, but, as a member of the Government, it was not within my area of responsibility, and I was, sadly, excluded. Therefore, unlike others, I relish the opportunity to volunteer my support for it this afternoon. Fundamentally, this argument is about whether or not you believe in the deterrent effect. As was mentioned in Tuesday’s debate, and on previous occasions, the challenge we face—and I think the noble Lord, Lord Alton, highlighted this in the Joint Committee’s report when he was introducing his amendments earlier in the week—is the enormous number of displaced people around the world who, under the refugee convention, would potentially have a claim for asylum. The fact is that those volumes cannot all be accommodated here. The extra challenge we get from the issue of small boats crossing the channel goes directly to one’s interpretation of that convention; this was the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, raised when she talked about people coming across the channel from France. It is the Joint Committee’s view, but it is not a universal view and it is not my view, that the refugee convention protects people fleeing persecution who come directly to the United Kingdom. Most of these people enter the European Union on the southern borders, so they have crossed—

My Lords—

17:00:00

I will finish the point and then of course I will take the noble Baroness’s intervention. They cross a number of safe European countries before they get to their final safe EU country of France. I absolutely accept that a number of them—not all of them; some of them are economic migrants—are absolutely fleeing persecution, but they have not come directly to the UK, and therefore I do not feel that they benefit from the protection of the convention. On that point, I will take the noble Baroness’s intervention, and then I will make some progress.

I thank the noble Lord. It is not simply what I say or the Joint Committee on Human Rights says; it is the UN High Commission on Refugees, which is given the responsibility of overseeing the refugee convention. It is very clear that the Rwanda Act went against that convention, and it does not accept this interpretation of what coming immediately from a safe country means. While I am up, the noble Lord talked about all these people coming here, but what proportion of asylum seekers do we in this country take in, as opposed to other European countries? My understanding is that we are not a country that is taking more than our share.

I shall deal with those points briefly. First, I do not accept that the UN is the arbiter of what the convention means. It is our job in this House and the House of Commons to make laws and set out our immigration policies. We should not subcontract that to outside organisations that sometimes have a very eccentric view of the world, and it is not one that is supported by the British people. This comes down to the point about numbers. I am a strong supporter of our long tradition of taking genuine asylum seekers and refugees in the United Kingdom, but we can do that only if we retain public support for it. I say to those who oppose stronger and tougher controls on who can come here and make it clear that it is only people who follow our laws that they are in danger of forfeiting that public support and confidence. If we do not deal with this issue, at some point—and I think we are getting very close to it—the public will say, “We just don’t want anybody. We’re not interested in their circumstances. We’re not interested in what’s happened. We want to control the number of people that are coming here”. I think that would be a tragedy. I say to those who oppose tougher border controls that they are running a real risk of altering public opinion so that it does not support it. When we get these schemes right—I referenced earlier in the week the scheme that we set up for those fleeing the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine—they have huge public support. In my part of the world, I had no complaints about the Ukraine scheme. But when people think people are taking the mickey out of us, as they do with these small boat crossings, public support is not there and is not supportive. In a democracy, we should be mindful that we have to carry the public with us. On this issue of deterrence, I think you have to have a deterrent. My noble friend demonstrated earlier the success in Australia. It was very telling that one political party in Australia opposed the scheme, and then when it came back into government it recognised that it was necessary. Although it would be politically convenient if that happened to this Government—if, in the end, what they are proposing was a failure and they suffered some political damage from it—the bit of me that wants my country to be successful, having had some responsibility for our borders in the past, does not want that to happen. I want to get this right. If we had won the election and been able to implement the Rwanda scheme, it would have been a deterrent. It would have sent a very clear message to people that paying thousands of pounds to people smugglers to cross the channel was a fruitless endeavour. The one thing we know about the people who pay people smugglers is that they expect to get what they pay for and, if they were not able to get to the United Kingdom and stay here, they absolutely would not have carried on paying people smugglers and that business model would have collapsed. I completely accept that it was perfectly reasonable for people to disagree with the Rwanda scheme in the way that it was set up, whether it was Rwanda or a different country, but the problem the Government have is that Clause 37 repeals our scheme and, as my noble friend said, replaces it with no alternative deterrent at all. We have just seen this afternoon what the Prime Minister has announced. Obviously, we have not seen all the detail—we have just seen the headlines—but a one-in, one-out scheme has now been announced. The problem with that is twofold. First, as my noble friend said, I am not sure what the legal underpinning of that is. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out whether the scheme that has been announced today, in both its pilot and its full form, will require any further primary legislation to make sure it can be implemented, and if it does need primary legislation, whether it is going to be inserted into this Bill before it leaves the House. Also, I fear it will be subject to enormous legal challenge and the Government will have exactly the same problems as we had with the Rwanda scheme. It will take them ages to be able to scale it up. The final flaw is that the public want to stop the volume of people coming here and, although a one-in, one-out scheme might alter the composition of the people coming, by definition a one-in, one-out scheme will not reduce the numbers. If we can only send somebody back to France and get another person, we might change who they are, but we are not going to deal with the numbers problem at all, so for a lot of the public the scheme will be a failure by its very definition. As I said, I strongly support what my noble friend said. I think the Government are making a terrible mistake with this clause—not from my perspective, but from their own perspective. They are going to find that, welcome though some of the measures in this Bill are that support the powers the Government have—I have already referred to some of the later clauses that strengthen the controls on those working illegally, and where the Bill has measures in it that are strengthening the system, I support them—completely removing a deterrent without putting anything in its place, not amending it but completely scrapping it, is a mistake, and I fear that the Government will come to regret it. That will not be a good thing. It might be a short-term political advantage for us, but it will not be a good thing for the country. I would rather, if they had some disagreements with the detail of the scheme, that they had reflected on that and altered it. If there was a clause here that was making changes to the Rwanda scheme—for example, the way it was dealing with the processing, or maybe even picking up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, about who did the processing—that would have at least been an argument that we could have entered into, and it would have been a better argument than scrapping it overnight without anything at all to replace it. I fear the Government will come to regret having done so. We will know from the robust remarks of my noble friend that we did our best to stop them making that terrible mistake. I only hope that we are not proved to be correct.

My Lords, I remember those long evenings over the last two years when we debated the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. The words of Pyrrhus come to mind, because noble Lords on the then Opposition Benches, particularly the Cross-Benchers and the Liberal Democrats, eventually prevented the Act from happening by a circuitous route. As Pyrrhus said, “One more such victory and we are doomed”. I think that the Government will reap the whirlwind of overpromising to smash the gangs and potentially not delivering. It is important to make the point again that there is no plan B. We have spent £209 million this year giving money to the French, and yet we are told that we might send back 50 illegal migrants a week. That is one in 17 migrants. At the time when the Rwanda policy was developed, the number of illegal entrants crossing the channel was 45,700 in 2022. We are now in a position where we have had a 55% increase in those channel crossings in the last year, so it is not working. Of course, my noble friend Lord Horam is right to make the point that it is impossible to judge the efficacy of the policy because it was never rolled out properly. It is no good the Minister complaining about that because his Government, for purely cynical political reasons, decided to draw a line in the sand and curtail and end the scheme. The scheme was popular with the public. Even after the Supreme Court hearing and judgment in November 2023, a Savanta poll found that 47% of people supported it and only 26% were against it. For too long, our asylum system had been overwhelmed by those who sought to abuse our generosity and bypass legal immigration routes. The current system was not only unsustainable—it still is—but fundamentally unfair to those who follow proper procedures and wait patiently for their applications to be processed through legitimate channels. The Rwanda scheme was always about breaking the business model of people smuggling. The Rwanda partnership addressed the root cause of this crisis by fundamentally disrupting the business model of the criminal gangs that profited from human misery—I think we agree that that is the number one priority. When people understood that making dangerous channel crossings would not lead to permanent settlement in the UK, the economic incentive for these perilous journeys disappeared. This was not merely theoretical: as my noble friend said, there have been examples of countries working together—Australia, for instance, but also Denmark and Israel—to return irregular or illegal migrants. Far from abandoning our humanitarian obligations, the legislation strengthened our ability to help those most in need. By creating an orderly, managed system, we could better focus our resources on genuine refugees who required our protection. Rwanda, as a safe third country with a growing economy and commitment to refugee protection, offered a new life with dignity and opportunity. The Act reasserted parliamentary sovereignty in matters of immigration policy. The British people voted repeatedly for Governments committed to controlling immigration. This legislation ensured that elected representatives, rather than foreign courts—I know some noble Lords do not like that term—determine how we implement our policies. There were economic benefits. We always hear from Ministers how expensive the Rwanda scheme was, but, actually, by the time of the general election, the National Audit Office found that we had spent something like £318 million. That is not an insignificant amount of public money, of course, but the Minister quotes a £700 million figure—I would like him perhaps to write to me to outline how he gets that breakdown, because I am not sure that the NAO would necessarily agree with him. But we are now spending £4.7 billion every year on the asylum system and hotels. So, on a cost-benefit analysis, a scheme that potentially reduced the pull factor was probably better value for money. The legislation demonstrated Britain’s commitment to international co-operation in addressing global migration challenges. Of course, the Government approved of this in principle. In May, we saw the slightly unedifying sight of the Prime Minister travelling to Albania to go cap in hand to the slightly dubious Prime Minister of Albania, Edi Rama, seeking offshore processing facilities in Albania. Unfortunately, he was several months too late. The Italian Government had gone in before and the charms of Madame Meloni surpassed those of Mr Starmer—I cannot think why. The Government obviously believe in the principle of offshoring the processing of asylum seekers, and it is disingenuous to say that that is not the case. We wish them well if they wish to pursue other opportunities to explore working and collaborating with other countries. The safety of Rwanda Act 2024 represented compassionate but firm governance—compassionate towards genuine refugees who deserved our protection and firm in our determination to prevent abuses of our asylum system. The legislation delivered on our manifesto commitment of 2019. But as I said, Labour Peers, Cross-Benchers, Liberal Democrats and Bishops—all unelected and unaccountable —conspired to thwart this legislation; to undermine, traduce and attack the Bill at every turn; not to improve it or to scrutinise it but to wreck it. We should not be surprised at the specious claims by lawyers in this House that the legislation was “unlawful”, which demonstrated their own anti-democratic inclinations and propagated the fiction that unelected courts have sovereignty over our own elected Parliament and a Government with a strong electoral mandate. That is completely wrong. Parliament is supreme, as a casual reference to Sections 7 and 23 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 makes clear.

17:15:00

I just want to correct the noble Lord. I cast a vote two weeks ago, along with other Members of this House and of the House of Commons, for the senior judge from the United Kingdom to the European Court of Human Rights. He is the only elected British judge who exists.

The European Court of Human Rights is not recognised as a traditional court of jurists as one would recognise, for instance, the US Supreme Court. Many of the people representing their countries are from NGOs who have vested interests in different areas. It is not comparable to our own Supreme Court, the US Supreme Court and many others. I stand to be corrected. This is the debate we had during the discussions and deliberations on the safety of Rwanda Act. The erroneous notion that international law is sovereign over the UK Parliament, and that we cannot pass laws contrary to international treaties such as the ECHR, is pernicious and hugely undermines the faith and trust the electorate have in our governance. Such a notion was explicitly refuted in a Supreme Court ruling in 2021. Real demonstrable damage is being done by such mischaracterisation and errors. The excellent report for the Centre for Policy Studies authored by my noble friend Lord Lilley, recently published, highlights that the proportion of asylum claims granted first time jumped from 25% in 2010 to 67% in 2023. We have to ask ourselves why that is the case. Why are we so out of step with so many other countries such as France, Italy, Spain and Germany? Some 42,000 asylum seekers are awaiting appeal outcomes, with 40% citing human rights grounds. This Government have instead doubled down on lawfare, on the rule of lawyers and not the rule of law. Today the newspapers report that our Attorney-General has apparently appointed himself as Deputy Prime Minister with an effective veto over all government policy and a “snitch clause”, encouraging civil servants to dob in Ministers who fall foul of the Attorney-General’s zealous, unbalanced and damaging interpretation of international law. This extends to vetoing potential domestic legislation. It will not end well. To finish, this Government had a great opportunity to consolidate and build on the work we had done in government, and we would have cheered them on and wished them well. It is a matter of great regret for the future of our country, for people who are looking to government to protect the safety and security of our borders, that they were not able to do that.

My Lords, I support my noble friends in opposing this clause. While I will try to avoid repeating what my noble friends have already said, to take a starting point, I did speak in the debate at the other end on this because it was important that, as has already been somewhat alluded to, this turned out to be quite a significant deterrent. I appreciate that the Minister may disagree with my interpretation, but he will remember that when this started happening and became law, people started moving to Ireland, to Dublin. People left this country because they were concerned about being caught up in the process of being sent to Rwanda. People could see it with their own eyes. In 2022 the number of crossings meant that 45,000 people came to our shores through small boats, then it started to fall when the Prime Minister at the time announced that. Once there was legal wrangling, all of a sudden the number of people coming across on illegal crossings started to rise again. The numbers cannot be refuted. I appreciate that this was in the Labour Party’s Change manifesto for government, which estimated that it would save £75 million a year by scrapping this policy. It also anticipated that it would save, I think, a few hundred million pounds more by ending hotels. That has not happened either. Nevertheless, in the first half of this year, we have seen 20,000 people coming to these shores. That is a significant uplift and, with no deterrent, there seems to be no change in the trend. I hope that what the Prime Minister has announced while we have been debating this amendment will be successful. I will not repeat the questions from my noble friend Lord Harper. It is critical to come back to aspects of the constitutional arrangement, which is why we ended up where we were. We had had the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, then the Illegal Migration Act 2023. I am not going to debate that, because we will come on to it later in Committee. The High Court having ruled in favour of the then Government, the Court of Appeal and then five members of the Supreme Court spoke unanimously. I think it was perfectly valid for the UK Government, who were responsible for international relations, to try to correct how Rwanda had been maligned by those five judges. Yes, that was also considering representations made by lawyers and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, but nevertheless, as I think I referred to previously, Rwanda is a prominent member of the Commonwealth. It is a nation that joined the Commonwealth because of values. The Commonwealth does not let just anybody in. Also, Rwanda had just recently held the presidency of the Commonwealth. That in itself is no mean feat. So it was perfectly valid of the Government. As we know, if judges come up with a decision that Parliament does not like, the recourse is for Parliament to then put in place a new law. That is why I was more than happy to support that legislation at the time. I respect that this is a manifesto commitment, but it feels very tokenistic. As my noble friend Lord Horam pointed out, the scheme in Australia involved a number of factors, not only the offshoring and processing but the turn away policy—how the Australian navy worked with boats—but nevertheless it was clear that the Government were not going to accept illegal criminal activity. We all know that the smugglers do not care whether people live or die as they push them out into the very dangerous channel. This is just one line in a campaign, and I think the Government will come to regret not having something effective in this regard. As I say, we will come on to the Illegal Migration Act later. I encourage the Government to think carefully about what happened and to recognise that every time they undermine the deterrent, unfortunately, the number of people handing over thousands of pounds to smugglers will just increase. I am sure nobody in this Committee wants to see that.

My Lords, we on these Benches support this clause in the Bill and support the Government’s action. The rest of it was very irresponsible. Getting rid of that project, which was announced in this Chamber by the Labour Party leader at that time, was the right thing to do. It also means that we can have better standing with our international colleagues, as we have had already with the UNHCR and with the French President, who was quoted as saying that this was a way of getting a better relationship with France.

I am grateful for this debate on Clause 37. I apologise to my noble friend Lady Lister and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, for forcing them to go through it yet again. I admire their tenacity and that of those on all sides who were in this House at the time for sticking at it and making this House’s views known to the then Government during the passage of what became the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Act 2024. Clause 37 repeals the Act in its entirety. There is an honest disagreement between me and the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Jackson, Lord Harper and Lord Horam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, as to the objectives of the Government. I will try to explain why we have that honest political disagreement. This Government have taken a view that the Act was expensive, ineffective, contrary to human rights legislation and not greatly meaningful in its delivery of the objectives that the noble Lord, Lord Horam, outlined clearly, including the potential for a deterrent. Between the signing of the agreement on 14 April 2022 and the formation of the new Government on 5 July, 83,500 people arrived in small boats, with 31,079 of them arriving in the year to March 2024. Deterrent or not, I do not think that individuals who were arriving were closely monitoring the passage of that Bill. They were looking at the principles behind it, and there was no deterrent there. As to cost, I used the figure of £700 million, and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, asked me to break it down for him. I am happy to help him with that figure: £290 million was paid to the Rwandan Government as an arrangement fee; £50 million was spent on flights, contemporaneous and in advance; £95 million was spent on detention centres; £280 million was spent on the fixed costs of the scheme. I confess that I slightly underestimated in saying £700 million, because £715 million has been spent to date. If we look at the savings that potentially are in play and not just at the £715 million that we spent, we find that we have potentially saved £100 million in upcoming annual payments to Rwanda, and a further £120 million that the UK would otherwise be liable to pay once 300 individuals had been relocated to Rwanda. That is without the additional internal staffing and operational costs in government to date. I remind the Committee that with the £715 million, plus the further costs, four people went to Rwanda. The noble Lord, Lord Horam, is indicating to me that the scheme did not have time to develop, but four people went to Rwanda. If not all of them, the majority of them were volunteers. Is that a good use of taxpayers’ money? Let us not rely on me, who has a manifesto commitment on this issue, which the Government are implementing. I happened to be in Committee on Monday 8 July, when the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said: “I also happen to think that many of us opposed the Rwanda proposal because it was a load of old rubbish—because it was not going to work. That is why we opposed it”.—[Official Report, 8/7/25; col. 1248.] When I was nobbut a lad in the Labour Party and the then John Selwyn Gummer was a Minister, I never thought I would stand up in the House of Lords several years later and say, “I agree with John”, but I agree with John, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, because it was a load of old rubbish. That is from a Conservative Back-Bencher who has held very high office in government. I appreciate that three former Members of Parliament in another place—four, in fact, with the noble Lord, Lord Horam—expressed a view, but it is not one that I share.

17:30:00

I appreciate what the Minister is saying, but, ultimately, this is a decision about whether or not Rwanda is a safe country. Do the UK Government believe that Rwanda is a safe country or do they agree with the Supreme Court that it is an unsafe country?

The noble Baroness makes a very good point. Members of this House expressed strong concerns when the Bill, now an Act, was debated, particularly about the previous Government’s statements under Section 19(1)(b) of the Human Rights Act. They could not say that the Bill was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Government were seeking to overrule a Supreme Court judgment that the Act did not provide safeguards when Rwanda was subsequently deemed unsafe. I confess that I was not here; I was having what we call an interregnum between the House of Commons and this House. However, having watched the debate from afar, I know that that was one of the concerns that were raised. In fact, the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ report said it was incompatible with the ECHR and, more widely, that the policy outsourced the UK’s obligations under the refugee convention and referred to the difficulties in guaranteeing compliance with the principles of that legislation. I think that was the reason that members of the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrat Party, and from the Cross Benches, and a number of Conservative Peers, rejected the proposal on several occasions, until such time as the then House of Commons fulfilled its manifesto commitment—I accept that—to bring the scheme in. The scheme was never going to work.

My Lords—

Before I let the noble Lord, Lord Jackson in, let me answer the noble Lord, Lord Horam, who asked how I know. I know because four people volunteered to go on the scheme. The scheme did not work and would not work. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, confirmed his view that it did not work. This is an honest disagreement between us, and that is where we are. I will take the noble Lord’s intervention before I carry on.

I am delighted that the Minister prays in aid my estimable noble friend Lord Deben. Three things are certain in life: death, taxes and the fact that he will disagree with his Front Bench. That aside, on safety, for the avoidance of doubt, the Supreme Court did not express a conclusive view about the risk of Article 3 ill-treatment of relocated individuals in Rwanda. That issue was not the subject of detailed argument at the hearing of the appeal. On the refoulement issue, the Supreme Court concluded that it was unnecessary for it to determine it. As such, the High Court’s determination that Rwanda was in general safe for individuals removed under the MEDP was not disturbed. That is the fact of the matter.

Politics is about the exchange of views and ideas and the delivery of policies. I think we have reached an impasse. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, and Opposition Back-Benchers think that the scheme would have worked, and the Government think that the scheme was expensive and would not have worked. That is the clear blue—or red—water between us on this. I am grateful for my noble friend Lady Lister’s support for the Government in taking the steps that we have taken. The UK will also exit the UK-Rwanda treaty as part of ending this partnership and it is therefore appropriate for the Government to repeal the safety of Rwanda Act. Clause 37 will achieve this. In doing so, it is also important that we address the issue that has been endemic in the discussion we have had today, that somehow this was a deterrent and the removal of this clause and the removal of the scheme will therefore end that deterrent. I just refer noble Lords to Clauses 1 to 12 of this Bill, which establish a new Border Security Command and put in place resources of £150 million and £280 million over the next few years to establish very strong action on the meaningful issues that are important to us all. We have created co-operation with the French, Dutch, Germans and Belgians through the new Border Security Commander on tackling the small boats at source. There is the work that the border commander has been doing with the French Government as part of the preparations for today’s conference between the President of the Republic of France, the Prime Minister and other representatives. There is also the work that the Government will do under Clauses 13 to 17 of this Bill to create new offences to bring people to justice if they provide activity on the issue of supplying articles, handling articles, collecting information and offences committed outside the United Kingdom. There is also Clause 18 on endangering another during the sea crossing to the United Kingdom, as well as powers to search on electronic devices to bring people to justice in that way. This Bill is full of deterrent activity that, if and when implemented by the Government after being passed by both Houses, will make a real difference. I am pleased to say to the House that, hot off the press today, the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of France have now finished their deliberations and, speaking with the President at a news conference just a few moments ago, the Prime Minister has confirmed a new UK-France returns pilot scheme. The Prime Minister has said that the scheme will come into force in a matter of weeks. Migrants arriving via small boats will be detained and returned to France in short order. In exchange for every return, a different individual will be allowed to come here via safe and legal routes, which individuals in this House have been pressing this Government to have. There will be strict security checks, open only to those who have not tried to enter the UK illegally. The suggestion is that, under the pilot, 50 people per week will be sent back to France across the channel—as I recall, even in this very week alone, that will be 46 more than left under the Rwanda scheme. For the first time since we left the European Union, the UK has secured a bilateral agreement with France to pilot the return of illegal migrants across the channel. This tightly controlled pilot will be, I hope, the premise for further action downstream. The UK-France summit today has seen both nations strengthen co-operation on border security. We know that there is no silver bullet on this issue. We know that the returns pilot is part of a border crackdown, but it is the culmination—and this goes again to the value of the Border Security Command in this Bill—of six months’ work by the Border Security Commander with the Home Secretary, my right honourable friend the Member for Pontefract, Castleford and Knottingley, the French Interior Minister and the French-established new Compagnie de Marche. That is real progress in developing real, positive action. I can even go back to our discussions about Europol earlier today, on ensuring that we tackle smuggling gangs and disrupt their business model, that we have stronger law enforcement and that we dismantle this multi-million pound black market. This is not just about gangs; it is about lives. The Rwanda scheme was ineffective, costly and did not deliver. The Government’s proposals in this Bill, and the statements by the Prime Minister and the President of France today, will add greatly to the potential to impact this heinous crime and business.

Can I just check, now that the Prime Minister and the French President have announced the details of the scheme, whether the Minister’s contention is that what has been announced today—once it has had a pilot and been scaled up—is, in effect, the Government’s attempt to put in place a deterrent that he thinks will, over the term of this Parliament, have the desired effect of driving down the number of people crossing the channel to effectively as low as you can get it? Is that his contention?

The Government are doing a range of things. The border security Bill is one of them. We have put the £150 million and £280 million for future SRs into the Border Security Command. Our work with the French so far has prevented 12,000 crossings this year alone through joint patrols and intelligence services. We are funding a new unit of specialist officers to increase patrols. We have a new specialist intelligence unit stationed at Dunkirk being launched today. Additional drone pilots are being launched. We have funded an extra 100 specialist National Crime Agency intelligence officers who will be stationed with Europol—to go back to the points that we mentioned earlier. The NCA has seized 600 boats. Germany is already looking at changing its laws because of action that we have taken with the Border Security Command. We have put in place a landmark agreement with Iraq. We have practised and worked through illegal working raids. Arrests have increased by 50%. We have boosted asylum decision-making. Since the election, 30,000 people have gone back—a 12% increase since the previous Government. We have work upstream with Vietnam and Albania to stop people making the journeys from those countries in the first place.

So he really cannot say.

Look, if we are going to talk about more people coming, can we go back to 2016? Can the noble Lord tell me how many people arrived on a small boat in 2016, compared with July 2024? I will tell him. There were 400 in 2016 and over 30,000 in 2024. We have a legacy of complete and utter failure by that Government, of which he was a significant member in the Cabinet. These are strong, practical measures; the Rwanda scheme was not, which is why I commend Clause 37 to the House. I ask the noble Lord to reflect on what we have said. If he chooses to vote at some point to remove Clause 37, I and, I think, many other Members of this House will stand together to oppose him.

I thank all the noble Lords who have taken part in this very interesting debate. It has been a microcosm of the numerous debates in your Lordships’ House over the last few years. I was momentarily flattered by being afforded the word “gallant” by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, but I realised quite quickly that it was insincere. It will not be surprising to noble Lords on the Liberal Democrat Benches and the Government Benches that I disagree with more or less everything that they have said in this debate. In relation to the deterrent, the Government have not created a credible alternative to the Rwanda scheme. They have not grasped the necessity of stopping demand by deterring illegal migrants from making the journey in the first place. I simply cannot understand how they believe that they can stop the boats without a deterrent. The Minister implies that the Bill is a deterrent. The Government claim that simply instituting a Border Security Commander with nothing to command and creating three new offences will deter illegal migrants. This is clearly not the case. Picking up on a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I remind the Government of what David Coleman, the Emeritus Professor of Demography at the University of Oxford, told the Public Bill Committee in the other place. He said: “It is, I think, very much second best to the idea of trying to deter migration for asylum claiming in the first place. That, of course, was dismissed by the present Government as being unfeasible, unworkable and unkind, so the Rwanda scheme was scrapped… it seems to me that the only obvious way of deterring movement to Britain is by making the movement to Britain unattractive”.—[Official Report, Commons, Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill Committee, 27/2/25; col. 50.] Regardless of what the Minister or the Liberal Democrats want to claim, offshoring to a safe third country has worked. As has already been mentioned, particularly by my noble friends, Australia is the only country that has been successful in stopping small boats—by establishing offshore detention facilities in Nauru and Papua New Guinea. This reduced arrivals to virtually zero. It has worked so far for the Government to claim that Rwanda would never have worked. This is manifestly false. I hope that the Government come to realise what a mistake they have made by not instituting a deterrent. However, for now, I will withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill.

Clause 37 agreed.

17:45:00

Clause 38: Repeal of certain provisions of the Illegal Migration Act 2023

Amendment 102A

Moved by

102A: Clause 38, page 31, line 9, leave out “11” and insert “12” Member's explanatory statement This amendment would add section 12 (period for which may be detained) to the list of sections of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 to be repealed.

My Lords, in the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who is not in her place, I will move Amendment 102A and will speak to the consequential amendments, because I was planning to speak in support of this amendment. I had assumed that the noble Baroness would be here to explain it, so I will briefly quote from briefings that some of us have received from ILPA, BID and Detention Action. The briefing says: “Section 12 IMA, since 28 September 2023, has sought to enable the Executive to (a) decide the reasonableness of the length of all forms of immigration detention, intending to overturn an established common law principle which provides for judicial oversight over the length of detention as an important safeguard against arbitrary detention, and (b) continue to detain persons after the reason for their detention (pending examination, removal, or deportation order/decision being made within a reasonable period of time) falls away”. I probably will not be quite as helpful to my noble friend the Minister as I was on the previous group, but I will start by welcoming the repeal of most of the Illegal Migration Act; needless to say, I do not support the other amendments in this group. However, the omission of Section 12—one of the very few sections to survive—is worrying, because I fear it may reflect an attitude towards detention that I had hoped we had seen the back of with a change in government. We will be returning to the question of detention and the case for a time limit at a later date but, as I will probably be away then, I hope the Committee will bear with me for raising some more general points about detention. In justification, I cite the UNHCR’s observations on the Bill. It emphasises: “Detention of asylum-seekers and refugees should be a measure of last resort and both necessary and proportionate in each individual case”. It therefore recommends the repeal of Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act, which it fears could mean in some cases detention for periods inconsistent with standards in international refugee and human rights law. Previously, it had pointed to the policy of indefinite detention as a key point of concern. This concern has to be the greater so long as Section 12 remains on the statute book. It has been a full decade since the inquiry into the use of immigration detention on which I served, established by the APPGs on refugees and migration, called for a 28-day time limit on detention. It argued that detention should be an absolute last resort, with a presumption in favour of community-based solutions. It is depressing that, despite countless reports, including that of the official Brook House inquiry, making the same case in the intervening 10 years, here we are again. One of those reports was by the Home Affairs Committee in 2019, chaired by the now Home Secretary. It pointed out that the UK is the only country in Europe without a limit on the length of time someone can be held in immigration detention. Having reviewed the evidence, it concluded: “There is a rapidly growing consensus among medical professionals, independent inspectorate bodies, people with lived experience and other key stakeholders on the urgent need for a maximum time limit”. The committee called on the then Government to “bring an end to indefinite immigration detention and to implement a maximum 28-day time limit with immediate effect”. That was in 2019. Of course, nothing happened. One has to ask: what has changed the Home Secretary’s mind? The consensus is still very much there. Indeed, the evidence of the harmful effects on health, particularly mental health, has mounted, including last year from the Royal College of Psychiatrists. Moreover, as Refugee Tales, which met with some of us the other day, found during its walking inquiry into immigration detention, the damaging impacts last long after release. It notes that: “For those with lived experience, ‘detention never leaves you’”. A series of reports by Women for Refugee Women over the past decade have underlined the particularly damaging impact of detention generally on women, the majority of whom are survivors of rape and other forms of gender-based violence. Their most recent report warns: “Locking up women who have already survived serious violence and abuse retraumatises them, causing profound and longlasting damage to their mental health”. Shockingly, its latest research found that despite the Home Office banning such practices, male detention centre staff still subjected women in intimate situations to constant supervision. For a brief period, the previous Government flirted with alternatives to detention with two pilot schemes. In an assessment of these pilots, the UNHCR wrote that: “Alternatives to Detention provide a people centered approach to supporting asylum seekers whilst waiting for case resolution without any evidence of a reduction in compliance with UK Home Office directives”. The evidence from the pilot shows significant improvement in the mental health and well-being of participants and that alternatives to detention are cheaper and offer better value for money compared with the cost of detaining asylum seekers. One would have thought that would appeal to Governments of any persuasion. It was thus disappointing that, when we debated the guidance on the detention of vulnerable persons last October, my noble friend the Minister told us it was the new Government’s policy to “expand the detention estate”. Apropos of that, I understand that the review of that guidance is still ongoing. Can my noble friend the Minister give me an assurance that any changes it proposes will strengthen, and not weaken further, the safeguards for vulnerable people in detention? Just about finally, returning to the question of indefinite detention, whenever I raised the issue with Ministers in the previous Government, I was met with the semantic response that detention is not indefinite because it comes to an end. We all know that, in this context, “indefinite” means without a specified end or time limit. I hope this semantic distinction did not lie behind Minister Eagle’s recent response to an Oral Question, when she stated: “Immigration centres are not used for indefinite detention”,—[Official Report, Commons, 2/6/25; col. 18.] because, if there is no reasonable prospect of removal, the person has to be released. Yet in the year ending 31 March 2025, just over a third of those leaving detention had been held for 29 days or more, and as many as 533 for six months or more. I trust that my noble friend will accept that we do apply indefinite detention, with important, limited exceptions, in this country. I hope he will acknowledge the harm that this does to those affected. Will Members of your Lordships’ House still have to be making the case for a time limit and minimal use of detention a decade on from now? In conclusion, repeal of Section 12 of the IMA is the absolute minimum needed to even begin to meet the UNHCR’s concerns, echoed by the JCHR, which, like the UNHCR, also called for its repeal: “to restore certainty and ensure compliance with Article 5” of the ECHR. This point is underlined by the Bar Council, which, along with numerous other bodies, argues for repeal with reference to the rule of law and access to justice. I hope that my noble friend will give serious thought to this, and also to the case that will be made in later amendments for a clear time limit and the development of alternatives to detention. I beg to move.

My Lords, I rise to oppose this amendment. I am afraid—and she will not be surprised, I suspect—that I broadly disagree with everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has just said. Let me set out the reason why. First, she mentioned that the Home Secretary changed her mind and wondered why that might have been. I obviously cannot get inside the Home Secretary’s mind. I suspect what has changed, between chairing the Home Affairs Committee and now, is that she is now the Home Secretary and responsible for protecting the borders and the security of the United Kingdom. Whoever holds that responsibility is sometimes confronted with reality; despite things that they might have liked to have done, they are confronted with the reality of keeping the country safe. What the Home Secretary, I suspect, will have realised is that there is a cohort of people here who she thinks should be removed, as they have no legal right to be here, and she has realised that unless you detain them, you are not able to carry out your functions of keep the country safe. Now, I do not know whether that is the reason why—the Minister may or may not confirm it—but I suspect that the realities of office have changed her mind, for this reason. We do not detain people indefinitely. The power to detain people is in order to facilitate their removal from the country and to protect the public. The Home Secretary has to have reasonable grounds to believe that, and people are able to challenge that through the judicial process. The noble Baroness quoted some statistics; I will quote the same statistics but the other way around. Two-thirds of people are detained for 28 days or fewer. It is true that some people are detained for a long period of time. In most of those cases, the reason for the lengthy detention is the responsibility of the individual themselves: it is because they are trying to avoid being removed from the country that they have no legal right to be in, throwing up legal challenge after legal challenge. That is the reason why they are detained. If they wish to cease being detained, they could comply with the deportation order that they have been issued by the Home Secretary, get on a plane and leave the country. It is the fact that they do not wish to comply with the law that means they are held in detention. The Home Secretary must have a reasonable belief that she can ultimately remove them—otherwise, she would not have the legal power to detain them. If we were to have what the noble Baroness suggests, which is a fixed statutory time period of 28 days, all that would do would give a bigger incentive to people with no right to be in this country to legally challenge decisions. Unless you could get all those legal challenges heard and decided within 28 days, all those people would have to be let out of detention, and we would cease to be able to remove any of them from the country. That would include some people who are not just here illegally but a present danger to people in this country. I strongly support the ability of the Home Secretary to detain people and not to have a fixed time limit, which would simply be an incentive for those people to delay. If the noble Baroness looks into the details of who stays here in detention for a long period of time, it is people trying to avoid having to leave the country when they have no right to be here, throwing up legal challenge after legal challenge. The alternative way of dealing with it, if you really want not to detain people, is to reduce the opportunities for them to challenge the decision, and for deportation orders to be able to be carried out swiftly. Then we would not need to detain people. I am afraid that I suspect the Home Secretary has realised that detention is necessary to protect the public and to make sure that we can enforce the necessary deportation decisions. I understand why people do not like it, but I am afraid it is a bit naive to think that everyone who comes to this country, or who overstays their welcome and is in this country without legal authority, goes when they are asked to. You sometimes have to use the power of the state and detention, and you sometimes have to enforce their removal, because otherwise they do not go. If you do not demonstrate that you have a robust system, you will have even more people coming here because they think that, once they get here, they are never going to be removed. One of the important reasons for having a deterrent is that, if you look at the total number of people we remove, you want to get to a position where the balance between enforced removals and those who go voluntarily is much more in favour of those who go on a voluntary basis, because it is quicker and cheaper for everybody, but that happens only if people realise they are going to have to go at some point. If people think they can get away with staying when they have no right to be here, we have to use the powers that we have at our disposal. I accept that it is not ideal, but I am afraid there are limited choices for Ministers if they want to enforce a robust immigration system. Detaining and removing people where necessary ensures you command the confidence of the public that you have a robust system. If that confidence disappears, the public will not support anybody coming here, whether legally or not. As I have said in debates on earlier clauses, that would be a tragedy.

I support the amendment for the removal of Section 12 and will address one or two of the points that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, made. I agree with him that voluntary methods of return are obviously the best. They are usually done very speedily and without fuss. When the explanation is provided and people have had the chance to have that internal conversation, they work very well indeed. So I would put that as a number one factor in this whole issue of how you remove people.

18:00:00

To be clear, the amendment intends to remove Section 12 of the IMA, which enables the Home Secretary to decide the reasonableness of length of immigration detention. That, in turn, overturned common-law principles, as was made clear when we debated it in this House. The common-law principle provides for judicial oversight over length of detention as a safeguard against arbitrary detention. That is one of the bases on which the English and Welsh legal system stands. It also gives the power to the Home Secretary to continue to detain someone after the reason for their detention ceases.

One of the objections is that you need to be able to make these judgments. The principle we are falling back on by removing Section 12 is the existing common-law basis of this country. Existing legislation provides very broad statutory powers to detain migrants with no time limit, except for children and pregnant women. But it is the courts that hold those powers, and that is a very important safeguard and part of the rationale for returning it to where it was before. That is why that should be restored.

The JCHR supported the repeal in order to ensure compliance with Article 5 of the ECHR—the right to liberty unless its deprivation is in accordance with the law. Of course, the other part of this is that the UNHCR has always complained about this matter. It worries that the retention of Section 12 leaves in place the risk of arbitrary detention of asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons, and encourages us to repeal it. So it is not as though we are taking away everything in the protections; we are actually going back to a position where we could use existing legislation, built upon the common-law principles of this country. We will support this amendment.

I wish to comment on the other two amendments in this group, even though they have not been spoken to yet. I am slightly bewildered but, if I have it right, Amendments 112 and 113 would introduce powers to detain unaccompanied asylum-seeking children who are exempt from removal in limited pre-removal scenarios, and to detain such unaccompanied children under these powers, which would become lawful only if regulations were made. Bail is possible but restricted to eight or 28 days, depending on the grounds, and legal challenges will be very limited during the first 28 days, subject only to bad faith or natural justice exceptions.

If I have that correct, that leads me to understand that these amendments would allow the detention for up to 28 days of children, and those children would then have to be detained in facilities. I remember very well the sorts of facilities we used to have, where there were cartoon pictures—Mickey Mouse—on the wall, and noble Lords will remember when the previous Government asked for the removal of those cartoon characters from the walls of a children’s detention centre.

What it will do is increase the time for which these children will be detained. The worst thing you can do for a young person is detain them for any length of time. The current way of dealing with it—maybe overnight or for 24 hours—was acceptable, but not detaining children for 28 days. I hope that the Government will reject these proposals on the grounds that we already have existing legislation protecting children and we need to maintain and uphold that. However, I could be entirely wrong as I have not heard the arguments put forward for it.

My Lords, I would like to go back to what the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said in pointing out the problems we have with the amendment. Detention centres are used, as the noble Lord said, for those with no legal right to be here—and whether that is a man or a woman who has come with no legal right to be here and who is subject to detention, that is a very good reason. They are also used for those whose identity is being established or where there is a risk of absconding. If there were no detention after 28 days and, as the noble Baroness proposed, a right to community arrangements instead, we would not be honouring the wish of the people of this country to control illegal migration, or indeed the overall figures. There would be constant fears that people who came here without any right to be here, or whose identity was in doubt or who were at risk of absconding, would likely disappear into the ether and we would have no trace of them. I also do not think that it is a good idea to suggest that we make gender differences in applying the law. It is very important that the law applies equally to men and women. I am sorry about the children, but I think the message should be to the parents who have put the children in this position, “Do not do it. Do not endanger your children. Do not subject them to the arrangements which must be made if populations are to be protected and the laws upheld. Stay elsewhere”. That would be a very good signal, because we would save children from being put on small boats by what I believe to be irresponsible parents who may be endangering the lives of their very own. I therefore hope that we keep the detention centres for as long as is needed—and we keep people in them for as long as is needed—under the arrangements now proposed in the Bill, and in existence, so that we can properly process those who have a right to be here and those who have no right to be here.

My Lords, Amendments 102A, 115A, 115B, 115C, 115D, and 115E, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, seek to repeal Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023. This section sets out that “relevant persons” may be detained for as long as the Secretary of State deems “reasonably necessary” to carry out examinations or removal, to make an immigration or deportation decision, or to issue removal directions. As with many of the decisions to repeal sections of the Illegal Migration Act, I question the noble Baroness’s intent on this point. Why does she oppose the exercise of reasonable detention to carry out an examination or to facilitate a removal process? As the Government themselves recognise, these are important powers that allow the Government to facilitate an operable migration system. If even this Government believe that Section 12 should be retained, this tells us something about its necessity. I wonder what the noble Baroness proposes instead. What would she do, for instance, if a person refused to undergo an examination? What would she do if a decision was made to remove a person but, because the state could not detain them, they simply ran off? This does not seem to us to be a reasonable or proportionate amendment and I therefore oppose it on this basis. Amendment 112 in my name seeks to reintroduce Section 11 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which the Government in this Bill are proposing to repeal. This Section of the Act introduced a new legal power to detain individuals specifically in connection with the Government’s duty to remove people who enter the UK illegally. Let us be clear about the provisions in this Section. Section 11 provided to immigration officers and the Home Secretary the clear, legal authority to detain people who fell within the removal duty framework, to hold them lawfully during processing and to enforce removals, while also incorporating safeguards for children and pregnant women. What in this do the Government disagree with so much that they feel that they have to repeal this Section of the Act? We are clear on this side of the House that people who come to the United Kingdom illegally must be removed. I will set out my position briefly and then invite the Minister to explain why he and the Government want to axe this provision from law. We believe, as we have set out before, that those who come to the United Kingdom illegally should not be allowed to remain. What is the purpose of having law if we allow people to break it with no consequence? Is this not the equivalent of allowing shoplifters to hang on to what they have stolen? Is this not the same as allowing those who break into people’s homes to keep hold of the things they have taken after they have been caught? Without this provision, we are directly allowing people to benefit from their criminality. To us on this side, it is wholly irresponsible for a Government to allow those who break our laws to benefit from their activities. I hope the Minister takes this opportunity to really defend what his Government are doing. To us, the decision to repeal Section 11 seems reckless. Furthermore, our Amendment 113 similarly seeks to reintroduce Section 13 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which sought to reduce the administrative burden on our courts by reducing the chance that we would be faced with vexatious appeals early on in the detention process. This Section also sought to delay access to immigration bail. This has many benefits, the main one being that it addressed the problem that individuals who crossed illegally could be released on bail before the Home Office could organise their removal, leading to long delays, absconding or the person simply disappearing into the system. Removing this provision poses a clear risk of complicating the removals process, clogging up the courts and fundamentally undermining the Government’s capacity and ability to get those people who should not be in this country out. I hope the Minister will similarly explain why the Government think this move is a sensible one. Can he assure the House now that this decision will not create any increase in the backlog, and can he confirm that this will not delay the process of removing those who come here illegally? Can he commit now to the reincorporation of Section 13 into this Bill, if any of his answers to those questions are in doubt?

I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments. I first thank my noble friend Lady Lister for moving the amendment on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I will first acknowledge the question she raised on the adults at risk in detention guidance. I happen to know also that she has tabled a Parliamentary Question, which is due for answer shortly. I expect to respond to the review within a couple of months and any changes in the proposals that are brought forward will be subject to parliamentary approval. I will be answering her question in much more detail in very short order, and I hope that will help her to resolve that issue. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord German, the shadow Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, and my noble friend Lady Lister for their contributions. I will start with Amendments 112 and 113 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel. The amendments seek to retain the powers of detention and the powers to grant immigration bail where a person is subject to the duty to remove under the Illegal Migration Act 2023. They are reliant on the provision to impose a duty to remove on the Secretary of State, which this Government are seeking to repeal.

18:15:00

We have discussed the reasons why we seek to repeal large parts of the Illegal Migration Act in amendments that we have already dealt with and will have future discussions about them. To summarise for the purpose of this group, the vast majority of the Act is being repealed, including provisions relating to the duty to remove, which was part of the previous Government’s Rwanda scheme. The Act was never fully implemented and, where it was, in many cases it brought chaos, frankly. Put simply, without the duty to remove, the associated powers of detention and powers to grant immigration bail, which Amendments 112 and 113 seek to retain, would have no effect at all.

We have already established powers of detention covering the examination, administrative removal and deportation processes, as well as powers to grant immigration bail where the Secretary of State or the court considers it to be the more appropriate action. To maintain the detention and immigration bail powers under the Illegal Migration Act, as the noble Lord wishes, would likely cause confusion when they cannot be effected without the Secretary of State’s duty to remove. There is a conflict there; I hope the noble Lord will look at it and, for the moment, not press those amendments.

The amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, helpfully spoken to by my noble friend, including Amendment 102A, seek to add Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act to the list of sections of the Act repealed by the Bill. We have discussed the Government repealing legislation that does not work. However, to support an effective system, certain provisions of the Illegal Migration Act are being retained where they have been assessed as offering potential operational benefit. One such measure is Section 12. I know that my noble friend has moved Amendment 102A on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, but I hope I can at least explain to her where the Government are coming from so that she understands it in more detail.

Long-standing case law has culminated in the Hardial Singh principles, which provide in effect that detention is lawful only where there is a realistic prospect of the person’s removal from the UK within a reasonable timescale. Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act placed two of the Hardial Singh principles on a statutory footing, confirming in primary legislation that detention timeframes should always be reasonable. It clarifies—for everybody, I hope—what constitutes a reasonable period of time for the Secretary of State, rather than the courts, to make their judgment. This is appropriate, since the Home Office is in full possession of all the relevant facts and best placed to decide whether continued detention is reasonable in all circumstances. Section 12 also provides for detention to continue for a reasonable period while arrangements are made for a person’s release. This is particularly important when we need to make provision for foreign national offenders to be placed under electronic monitoring or to make safeguarding referrals for vulnerable people. Section 12 therefore has valuable purposes, to echo some of the points made by the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Harper.

Section 12 applies to all immigration detention powers. Amendments 115A to 115E, which are consequential to the amendment that my noble friend moved on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, seek to ensure that all immigration detention powers to which Section 12 applies are repealed. It is right that Section 12 is retained for all the immigration detention powers to ensure consistency, whether that be for the detention of persons subject to examination, a deportation order or the administrative removal of persons who are unlawfully in the United Kingdom. These are essential tools that allow for the proper operation of our immigration system, and the retention of Section 12 is part of that.

My noble friend may have a disagreement on that and may not be in favour of detention per se, but the reasons I have set out are at the discretion of the Home Secretary, who, along with me in this House, will be held accountable for them. It is important that we retain that; otherwise, we have no effective ability to ensure that people are detained, for the reasons why people occasionally need to be, under a framework that has some legal backing. Whatever our disagreements with the previous Government over the Act as a whole, the decision to retain that is to ensure that the Secretary of State retains that ability to ensure management of individuals who may be on their way out of the United Kingdom, may be a danger to others in the United Kingdom or may be awaiting further assessment. It is important that the power is retained, and I therefore urge my noble friend to withdraw the amendment, for now at least, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

I thank the noble Lords who spoke. As I said, we will come back to the issue of detention later, and it is helpful to have heard the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, because I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord German, in particular will take them on board when he comes to move his amendment later. I point out to the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, that no one is talking about people just roaming around, free to go where they like. I made the point that, in the pilots, there was no evidence of a reduction in compliance with UK Home Office directives. They are not just a holiday camp or something.

I am sorry, but what I meant was the community frameworks about which the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, spoke.

That is what I was talking about: the pilots showed that there was a very effective way, alternative to detention, that still kept people where they were supposed to be. The noble Baroness might like to read the UNHCR report about the pilots. I thank the noble Lord, Lord German, for his support. He probably explained what Section 12 is about rather more clearly than I did, so I thank him for that. My noble friend the Minister dealt with Amendments 112 and 113, so I will not refer to them. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, asked what would happen next if this amendment were successful and we removed Section 12. It would be the status quo ante—not some kind of strange situation that we have never seen before. I will not go on much longer, because I am conscious of time moving on. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister. I apologise for doubling up by asking a Written Question and then saying it, but when I wrote the Written Question this amendment had not been tabled. The Written Question was an alternative, and I am sorry that he has had to put up with it twice. I will leave it to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, to read what my noble friend said. It is helpful to have it spelled out exactly why the Government are not repealing Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act. I suspect I still do not agree with him, but it is helpful to have those reasons. I absolutely understand, and I will not push him to deal with the points I made about indefinite detention, alternative detention and so forth, because that debate will be had at a later date; it is just that I probably will not be able to be there for it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 102A withdrawn.

Amendment 103

Moved by

103: Clause 38, page 31, line 11, leave out “28” and insert “29” Member's explanatory statement This amendment would repeal section 29 of the Illegal Immigration Act 2024, which requires the Secretary of State to remove people who have sought to use modern slavery protections in “bad faith”

My Lords, with this group of amendments we return to issues relating to modern slavery and human trafficking, which we have debated on the basis of what I described, I think, as amendments from the “eminent quartet”, led by the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, who has an amendment in this group but obviously is not able to be here. It is very much on the same grounds as our amendments. I too am very conscious of time and of the fact that a number of noble Lords have a distance to get home tonight. It is a pity, because this is an important set of amendments on important issues, but I will do my best to let them catch their trains. Amendment 103 would repeal Section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act. I really query why the Government are leaving themselves the option to use it. Section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act allows for the disqualification of victims of trafficking from modern slavery protections on grounds of “bad faith” or “public order”, including convictions which could have been as a result of exploitation. Noble Lords may recall that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has talked in debates on this Bill—it is something that we have covered on previous Bills as well—of the inadequate use, if I could put it that way, of Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act, which deals, inadequately, with offences which victims of modern slavery are compelled to commit. Section 29, if enforced, would make the disqualification a duty rather than at the discretion of the Secretary of State, unless there are compelling circumstances—and it is not easy to get these recognised. It extends the duty to any length, or shortness, of imprisonment. The IOM has called for its repeal because of the risk of victims who are wrongfully removed being re-trafficked or facing retribution in their home countries—something which is all too frequent a fear. Removal can be while conclusive grounds decisions are awaited. The Minister in the Commons, responding to similar points, said that individual circumstances will always be considered and that the CPS has a discretion not to prosecute. In our view, this is not sufficient protection. I recall the forensic and very trenchant analysis during the passage of the then Bill that limiting the public order exemption would severely limit the ability to convict perpetrators and dismantle organised crime groups and would increase victims’ vulnerability to further exploitation. Amendment 117 in this group seeks to remove all the sections in the Nationality and Borders Act relating to modern slavery. Removing these provisions would ensure that the UK is acting in a way that is compatible with the international rights of victims under the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, or ECAT. I will come back to ECAT, if I may, and to the ECHR.

18:30:00

The International Organization for Migration tells us that, by the end of 2023, with the changes from NABA enacted, only 53% of reasonable grounds decisions made in the first six months of 2023 were positive, compared to 90% in the same period in 2022. Noble Lords will understand our concern about that. Noble Lords do not need reminding that trauma-informed approaches must sit at the heart of the national referral mechanism, giving potential victims access to appropriate support and psychologically informed environments, and that a disqualification from such an environment and support system cannot occur in the absence of legal representation, or indeed in the face of any restrictions and constraints on it.

Amendment 172 would insert a proposed new clause on information sharing, or rather on restricting a public authority which is determining whether someone is a victim of modern slavery and human trafficking sharing information with other authorities, including immigration authorities, which might lead to deportation or prosecution. I have talked a certain amount about information sharing today in Committee, so I will not cover the same ground again.

Amendment 182 would insert a proposed new clause to provide a victim with a positive conclusive grounds decision—in other words, recognition as a victim who would have leave to remain with the opportunity to access support, recover, live a positive life and be eligible for settlement. The 2022 Act introduced restrictions on the criteria for granting leave to remain to confirmed victims of trafficking. Supporting victims is not only important for each individual but it supports that individual in turn to support police investigations and prosecutions—something which, quite properly, the Government are concerned to ensure. It is not as if we do not understand that security in every sense—physical and practical—is essential for recovery. We recognise the vulnerability to re-trafficking and these amendments pick up points made in the modern slavery action plan published in March of this year, which we very much support. Support and security must be for long enough to be effective.

Amendment 205 would require legislation to incorporate the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings into UK law and the Secretary of State to report on compliance. ECAT provides in Article 14.1 that:

“Each Party shall issue a renewable residence permit to victims”

when the competent authority—the NRM in our case—

“considers that their stay is necessary owing to their personal situation”

or

“for the purpose of their co-operation with the competent authorities in investigations or criminal proceedings”.

The Home Office over the years has taken the view that it is possible to assist proceedings from abroad. That is something that I have never accepted, and I doubt I ever will.

Victims of these crimes need huge support and time. Imagine not being in the same country where the investigation is going on. I cannot be the only Member of this House who finds it difficult to conduct meetings online, and that is as nothing compared with this situation.

Article 14.2 specifically recognises the circumstances of children who are victims and requires:

“The residence permit for child victims, when legally necessary, shall be issued in accordance with the best interests of the child”—

terminology which will be very familiar to noble Lords—

“and, where appropriate, renewed under the same conditions”.

The canter through all this does not really do justice to the situation, and I hope that the organisations and, indeed, victims who are aware of this debate will understand that compressing the arguments does not mean that their situation is not fully recognised and that there is not huge concern for them. I beg to move.

My Lords, on the overall issue, I strongly support the various provisions in legislation to make sure that victims of modern slavery and trafficking are properly protected. There is, however, a balance to strike, because the people we want to protect are actual victims of modern slavery and trafficking. We have to be very careful because, if you have a blanket exemption for anyone who claims to be a victim of modern slavery and trafficking, you just create a massive gap in our laws where anybody who is then intercepted ends up claiming to be a victim of modern slavery and trafficking to avoid being removed from the country. That has two incredibly damaging consequences. One is that they are able to undercut our immigration control, but they also damage public support for and acceptance of genuine victims of modern slavery and trafficking. We have to have a system which recognises that there are many bad actors out there who will take advantage of every weakness in our legislation. I do not support the first amendment in this group, which seeks to get rid of the Home Secretary’s ability to remove people who have sought to use modern slavery protections in bad faith: the sorts of people I have talked about who try to use these provisions, where they do not apply, to try to avoid our immigration controls. I think it is reasonable that the Home Secretary is able to do that. I know from my experience, and I have no reason to suspect it is now any different, that the officials in the Home Office who look after this area of policy are expert, competent people who do their very best to try to make these decisions. I have met victims of modern slavery. I met the people who implemented this legislation when my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead was Home Secretary and I was in the Home Office, and I have a lot of confidence that they get the decisions right—not in 100% of cases, because people are not perfect, but I think we have a good system—but we have to have the power to deal with people who act in bad faith. Amendment 117 repeals a whole bunch of sections of the Nationality and Borders Act that actually provide the protections for victims of modern slavery, such as their ability to get leave to stay in the United Kingdom for a period of up to 60 months and to have a recovery period. Those are all very valuable protections that ought to remain, so I do not support that amendment. Very briefly, given that my noble friend Lady May is not able to be here, I briefly support the thrust of her amendment, Amendment 183. That looks at making sure that people who are victims of modern slavery and perhaps have committed criminal offences but under duress are not then punished for a second time as a result of only having committed those offences under duress. I think that amendment has a lot of merit. If my noble friend Lady May were to bring it back on Report, I would consider supporting it. If there are any flaws or weaknesses in the way it is drafted, it would be good if the Minister were able to set them out today or would engage with my noble friend and the people who have supported the amendment to deal with them so that we could have an agreed position on Report. With those relatively brief comments and mindful of time, I will sit down.

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 172. I would genuinely press the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to elucidate the meaning behind it, because I find it quite confusing. The amendment seeks to prevent the proper authorities gaining any information about a person. I read the wording very carefully. It refers to “suspected victims of slavery or human trafficking”. It could be that that status changes, and that a person was originally suspected of being a victim but when further inquiry took place it proved not to be the case. Therefore, I find it odd that under this restrictive amendment—I am happy to be disabused if I have got it wrong—a public authority would be speaking to, for instance, adult social care or adult social services, children’s services and others but would be prevented on a statutory basis from talking to anyone else on the chance that, somewhat down the line, that person may have criminal charges laid against them. At that stage, they may be found not to have been truly a victim of slavery or human trafficking. To specifically rule out “a customs official ... a law enforcement officer … a UK authorised person”— I am not entirely certain what that is—or “the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom” seems pretty draconian and restrictive. Perhaps the noble Baroness might wish to enlighten us about the meaning behind this amendment. However, for the reasons I set out, I do not think it would be appropriate to incorporate it into the Bill, and on that basis, I oppose it.

My Lords, I have my doubts about Amendment 182, which would insert a new clause after Clause 48 for victims of human trafficking, granting them leave to remain for at least 60 months, access to support services and employment, and eligibility for settlement after five years. Returning to the point made on these Benches by my noble friend Lord Harper and picked up on a different amendment by my noble friend Lord Jackson, I fear that there is always a doubt about real victims of human trafficking and slavery, who everyone feels the deepest of sympathy for and wants to support. However, by creating a system that gives undue advantage to such people, as Amendment 182 would do, one would, I fear, increase the perverse incentive for anyone to claim that they were a victim of human trafficking and slavery. That would create endless additional bureaucratic and other expenses for our legal system and our Home Office arrangements in trying to check the mushrooming of claims. I am not in favour of this more generous treatment under Amendment 182. I also have certain doubts about Amendment 205, which would require the Secretary of State to introduce legislation to adopt into UK law the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, partly because we have made progress on many of these matters in UK law. At this stage, it is not very sensible to start adopting additional international frameworks, some of which are recent, while others relate to distant periods that we already cover. This would over-bureaucratise the system and add an additional expense. Where there are genuine claims, we must make our own laws work.

18:45:00

I will respond very briefly to the points that have been made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, which are, in fact, quite complex, if you look at the range of matters that have been discussed. First, in trying to be comprehensive, you have to touch a lot of corners. As was described earlier in this debate, and in the debate on Tuesday, the real problem that we are facing is, first, identification and making sure that people who are identified are not punished, and then making sure that they have a swift process through the machinery of the NRM—national referral mechanism—and are then helped to move into a better life. There have to be changes in legislation to bring that together, which is why this suite of amendments is in place. I have heard references to “international law”. I have to keep saying that it is actually Members of this Parliament who vote to make these international legal frameworks happen. I was not a member of the Council of Europe when that protocol and convention were put in place, but if a framework has the support of the United Kingdom delegation, which is substantial and cross-party, that means it is something that we are contributing to. That is the issue about international frameworks and laws that we set ourselves: we are very much part of the machinery that makes them and puts them in place, especially in the Council of Europe, where I am a member of the Parliamentary Assembly. I understand why the Home Office argues that modern slavery protections are being abused by people who falsely claim that they are victims to avoid deportation, or who seek to keep serious offenders in the country who would otherwise be removed. I understand that argument, but where is the evidence for that widespread abuse? Perhaps when he sums up, the Minister could tell us whether there has been a sufficient number of cases to lead us to believe that there is abuse of the current system. If there is not widespread abuse, there must be protections and ways in which the Government can deal with these outliers where they think they might happen in the process. In conclusion, as we heard on Tuesday from the noble Baroness, Lady May, the situation is not improving; it is getting worse, and more adults are being confirmed as victims of trafficking. So we certainly have to come back to this matter to ensure that we have the right legislative underpinning to make it happen.

My Lords, I am afraid that I must disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, yet again, by speaking against the amendments in this group. I shall touch on each one briefly, starting with Amendment 103, which would repeal Section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act 2024, as set out in the explanatory note. The explanatory note provided by the noble Baroness has a flaw. It fails to recognise that Section 63 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, to which her amendment ultimately pertains, refers both to a person who has claimed to be a victim of slavery or human trafficking in bad faith and to a person who is a threat to public order. Let us be clear about who we are talking about in these amendments: people who have tried to use modern slavery protections in bad faith and people who are a threat to public order and public safety for British citizens. The clause as it stands would allow the Government to remove these people from the United Kingdom and ensure that they would not be eligible for indefinite leave to remain as a result of their claims made in bad faith of eligibility and the modern slavery protections. We on these Benches raised our concerns about those who would seek to exploit loopholes in modern slavery protections at some length earlier this week. The provisions in Clause 29 of the Illegal Migration Act seek to address this by allowing the Government to identify bad actors who are abusing the system and to remove them from the United Kingdom. Not to do so would be an insult to all those people who suffer at the hands of slave-masters and who should rightly hold a genuine entitlement to protection. The amendment seeks to apply those protections to those who are acting in bad faith or those who are a threat to public order. It is no wonder that even this Government have decided, in their drafting of the Bill, to keep this provision in force. I seriously question why the noble Baroness seeks to question modern slavery protections in such a way. As such, we cannot support the amendments.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for the way in which she has approached the discussion. I hope that I can convince her straight away by saying that the Government are steadfast in their commitment to tackling modern slavery in all its forms and to supporting survivors. That is why we had the debate on Tuesday, in which I re-emphasised that. Care should be taken to avoid unintentionally weakening the protections afforded to victims of modern slavery and to public order. Repealing the majority of the modern slavery measures in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 would do just that. That Act put protections of and support for potential victims of modern slavery, stemming from the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, into primary domestic legislation for the first time, building on the Modern Slavery Act 2015. The proposed amendments would repeal these. I come at it from a different perspective from the noble Lord, Lord Harper, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor. In my view, the measures being lost would include the right to a recovery period in the national referral mechanism; the circumstances in which confirmed victims may be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK; and where the rights and protections can be withheld on the grounds of public order or bad faith, in line with Article 13 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. These measures ensure that support and protections and removal from the modern slavery system are available to all who require them. It is vital to retain them. Section 29 is the sole modern slavery measure in the Illegal Migration Act 2023 to be retained. It would, if commenced, amend the public order disqualification to allow more foreign national offenders to be considered on a case-by-case basis for disqualification from modern slavery protections on public order grounds. Here, I share the view of His Majesty’s Official Opposition. Section 29 needs to be retained in its current form so that we can examine the national referral mechanism and agree with partners our priorities for long-term reform. As I mentioned on Tuesday, Section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act sets out a range of measures. It is not necessary to replicate that defence elsewhere in legislation. On restricting information shared in respect of the modern slavery identification, the Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides certain bodies in England and Wales with a statutory duty to notify the Secretary of State. The information provided for that notification enables the UK to fulfil its international and other obligations. The duty to notify is discharged for consenting adults by making a referral to the national referral mechanism or, where the adult does not consent, by completing an anonymous entry on the digital system. This information allows us to provide a better picture of modern slavery and helps improve law enforcement responses. It does not include information that identifies the person, unless the person consents to that information being included. Child victims do not need to consent. If a person is identified as a potential victim of modern slavery or trafficking, they are eligible for the recovery period that I mentioned earlier. Imposing restrictions on the information provided would be to the detriment of our obligations to such vulnerable people. I agree that it is vital that the UK complies with its obligations, including as a signatory to the Council of Europe convention that the noble Lord mentioned. Implementation and compliance with these obligations does not require full incorporation into UK law. I say on behalf of the Government that the UK complies with its obligations under the convention by a combination of measures contained in domestic legislation, guidance and the criminal justice system. The modern slavery statutory guidance provides a framework where we can ensure that the convention continues to be monitored through reporting of the Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. Finally, the Government are committed to ensuring victims can access the necessary support for whatever length of time it is required. Following a positive conclusive grounds decision, confirmed victims of modern slavery receive support from the modern slavery victim care contract and can continue receiving tailored needs-based support through the recovery needs assessment process via the NHS, local authorities and others. That specialist support also includes assistance to access the labour market, vocational training and education and application support for a national insurance number. The Government do not place an overall time limit on how long a victim can remain in support. Following a conclusive grounds decision, victims of modern slavery are considered for temporary permission to stay. That is all important and gives real support to victims of modern slavery. I have not mentioned the amendments individually, but collectively that response shows that the Government are committed to their international obligations, want to support victims of modern slavery and believe that the retention of the measures in the migration Act is vital to doing that in a fair and appropriate way. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Davies, does not disappoint me because these were his Government’s provisions, so of course I would have expected him to speak in support of them. I think that my speech was in fact accurate as to the content of the amendment that he referred to and was fuller than the explanatory statement. I think that we and Conservative noble Lords start from different points of view; they seem still to demonstrate a culture of disbelief with regard to people who claim that they were victims of modern slavery and as to whether one gives them the benefit of the doubt as a starting point or disbelieves them. Using terms such as “real victims” discounts the fact that there is an NRM procedure with the reasonable grounds and conclusive grounds arrangements that the Minister has referred to. We do indeed have Section 45, which provides a defence in certain circumstances, but regarding only some offences. As I have said, that is inadequate. I will not go back over the information-sharing arguments because of the time and because we have—well, I have—addressed them today. However, secure reporting is understood to be very important, including by the previous Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, and the current anti-slavery commissioner has said: “We need to be able to give these victims the confidence that if they do come forward their perpetrators will be held to account and that they will continue to receive the support and care that they need”. The current director of labour market enforcement has also said: “There needs to be an expectation on the part of workers that if they go to an authority to demonstrate that they are being exploited, that will not prejudice their right to be in this country”.

19:00:00

In our view, ECAT is not overbureaucratic. Obviously, we would prefer—by definition, I suppose—to see it in legislation rather than relying on guidance and the combination of other measures to which the Minister has referred.

I am intrigued by the Minister’s argument that Section 29 should be retained in order that the NRM can be examined—I think that is what he said; it is what I wrote down, but I will have a look in Hansard— because I do not understand how it is necessary to keep the section on the statute book in order to examine the NRM. However, examination of the NRM may be a matter for another day. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 103 withdrawn.

House resumed.

House adjourned at 7.01 pm.