The hon. Gentleman is shaking his head.
Clause 96(1) grants the Secretary of State the authority to make regulations requiring producers or importers of products including tobacco products, tobacco related devices, herbal smoking products, cigarette papers, vaping products and nicotine products to provide information about these products to specified persons. The regulations may also govern the publication of this information. Subsection (2) outlines specific types of information that may be required, including details about the ingredients, the risks posed by the product, the emissions or substances released by the product, the producer’s operations and any individual nominated by the producer to be responsible for the product. Subsection (2) also specifies that the regulations may also require sales data or market research relevant to the product. If subsection (3) already requires this, I do not think that providing that data to the general public is necessarily something there is precedent for, but I may be corrected on that. Subsection (4) affirms that the regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure, meaning that they will go to a vote of a Committee of the House.
The provisions in subsection (2)(b) on sales data go back to the point by the hon. Member for Dartford and raise questions about how the data will be used. Could the information be used to unfairly favour certain companies or enable them to gain an advantage over competitors? There are privacy concerns to consider. How will sensitive business information such as sales strategies, pricing models or consumer preferences be protected? While the Government want to limit the number of people who smoke and deter smokers from smoking, by not banning cigarettes outright they have given their indication that cigarettes are a lawful product to be bought by those who smoke already and who are over the age of 18 and anyone who chooses to smoke who was born on or before 1 January 2009. Having allowed businesses lawfully to exist, they should be allowed lawfully to get on with their job.
Subsection (3) suggests that the regulations will detail when and how information must be provided. That raises questions about the practicalities of the process. How frequently will the information need to be submitted? Will it be annually—in which case, how useful will it be? Or will it be quarterly, or more often—in which case, how burdensome will it be? Will there be specific deadlines? What penalties might businesses face if they fail to comply? Moreover, the process by which businesses submit their data and the verification of the information provided will need to be transparent to ensure that businesses are adhering to the rules consistently. Will there be regular audits or checks to ensure that the data is accurate and truthful?
The information required under this clause could provide valuable data for public health officials, researchers and policymakers to monitor trends in product composition, usage pattern and health impacts. However, a critical question is how effectively this information will be used to achieve tangible health outcomes. In other words, is it collecting information for the sake of collecting information, or is it collecting information that will actually be beneficial and useful? Will it help regulators to identify new risks or trends in the market? Will it support more targeted interventions to reduce smoking and vaping-related harm?
It is worth considering how information related to new products such as novel vaping devices or alternative nicotine delivery systems will be evaluated and whether the data will be used to inform better regulations in future. I suppose there is an argument that if particular flavours, for example, are prevalent in a particular area and there is an immediate harm in that area that correlates with a particular flavouring, that is a sign that there is a problem with that flavouring. But in practice, since we have been given medical evidence that suggests that any changes are usually over a period of time and fashions change over time, it will be very difficult to weed that out of a huge amount of information. It is therefore difficult to understand exactly how the information will be used. I am sure the Minister will be able to provide further information in that regard.
Clause 97 looks at studies that might be required. Subsection (1) authorises the Secretary of State to make regulations that require a producer of a relevant product to conduct a study on a product or an ingredient within it. The producer may be required to submit a report on the study’s findings to a specific person. That may be helpful, but if a company is asked to provide information on a product that it sells and the information is detrimental to the prospect of further sales, how impartial can that be considered, how much will the consumer trust that information and how much point is there in doing it?
Will the Minister consider whether the study should be done independently rather than by the producer? If so, how does he envisage that working? If the producer of the product commissions the report, the way in which the question is phrased, the way in which the study is designed and other things can influence the result that is achieved. That may lead to a bias in the study so that the Government will not get the information they really want.
Subsection (2) defines a relevant product as a tobacco product, a tobacco-related device, a herbal smoking product, cigarette papers, a vaping product or a nicotine product. Subsection (3) outlines the specific provisions that may be included in the regulations. They include determining when and how the study should be conducted and the report submitted, specifying the questions that the study must address and defining the content and structure of the report. Subsection (4) specifies that the regulations made under this clause will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, meaning that they must be approved by Parliament.
The impact of the studies is assessed in paragraphs 1418 to 1426 of the Government’s impact assessment. The background to that is that the TRPR currently requires nicotine vape manufacturers to submit toxicological data regarding the product’s ingredients, including its ingredients in printed form, when the chemical composition may change, and emissions, referring to the effects on the health of customers when inhaled and considering things such as the addictive nature of the product.
Currently, producers of non-nicotine containing vapes and other nicotine products such as nicotine pouches are not required to test their products or the ingredients contained within. Those products fall under the General Product Safety Regulations 2005, under which the only obligation is that a producer must supply a generally safe product. Therefore, manufacturers of vaping products should carry out tests on their products to determine how the device works, how it delivers nicotine and how the ingredients react with each other to produce certain emissions—that is important to protect consumers.
In some instances, we will see the use of new chemicals and ingredients that are not well researched or well tested. If a manufacturer wishes to put such an ingredient in its products, it could be required to perform studies on its safety. As I said before, it may be that the industry does that itself initially, but there must be a provision to allow the Government to commission independent research to avoid biases in that information.
Manufactured cigarettes are the most thoroughly researched tobacco product and also the most uniform. We know much less about other products, such as novel tobacco products, non-nicotine products and smokeless tobacco. They are a hugely diverse range of products and much less well studied. We currently depend entirely on manufacturers and lack the capacity to verify industry claims. Smokeless products are of particular concern; they are often produced by small and medium-sized enterprises in low and middle-income states and then imported.
There will be an impact to industry from the cost of carrying out a study of their products and ingredients and submit the study to the relevant body. If the test for menthol was added to the standard routine testing for tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide—TNCO—currently conducted on all cigarette brands, it would be expected to impose only a small additional cost. However, any additional tests that regulations require manufacturers to conduct would also have additional costs. If manufacturers have that product safety information for all the chemicals in their products, including for vapes, which have lots of different flavours—the long-term effects of vaping those chemicals are in many cases unknown, but suspected in some cases to be harmful—how will the Minister decide which chemicals to test? Will he require independent testing of all chemicals that are used in the vapes? That would take time: it is very difficult to work out what something will do over 20 years without waiting 20 years to find out.
I remember that when mobile phones were new there was a rumour that they might cause types of brain cancer. Around 20 years ago, I entered the cohort study of mobile phone use and health, or COSMOS, in which data was—and may still be—collected on my telephone usage and provided to university researchers in London. They measure my usage and periodically ask where I keep my telephone—whether in my front or back pocket, in a bag, or wherever—and whether I hold my phone to my ear when I am talking or hold it in front of me, on speaker. They also look at my medical records to see whether that usage has had any effect on my brain, and how many people who are in the study have subsequently got cancer. Does the Minister envisage encouraging the setting up of such long-term studies to check on the outcomes from vaping, for example?
There would also be a cost to developing the body that is required to review the studies that the producers of these products submit. For context, the extra cost of testing 12 tobacco products for menthol was around £50,000 per year. The cost to the relevant body of additional tests required by the regulations may be in a similar region. Those regulations would be subject to consultation, but has the Minister considered that the fewer flavours there are, the fewer chemicals that he needs to pay to have tested, or that he needs to encourage business to pay to have tested? The range of flavours means that there are more chemicals out there potentially needing investigation.
Clause 97 does not refer to conflicts of interest and does not require independent, objective experts—perhaps the Minister intends to include those in regulation. In instances in the past when tobacco companies conducted studies through their own research groups, they provided—perhaps unsurprisingly—remarkably optimistic conclusions about the hazards of smoking. I hope the Minister is not expecting such companies to mark their own homework again. The regulations should specify the qualifications of those conducting the studies and the methodologies that they should follow to help ensure that studies are scientifically valid and unbiased.
Subsection (3)(c) allows regulations to define the content and structure of reports that producers must submit. Although that provides flexibility to the regulators, it could also lead to confusion if the requirements for report structure and content were not clearly defined. Will there be a standardised format for reports, and how detailed will they need to be? Should the reports be publicly accessible? Will they remain confidential to the producers and regulatory bodies, or will they be more widely published, as the hon. Member for Dartford suggested other data should be?
These questions are important and the Minister’s intentions are important, as unclear guidance could result in inconsistent reporting across producers or even incomplete or misleading reports. The primary goal of requiring studies and reports is to provide regulators with information that could be used to improve public health outcomes, such as understanding the health risks associated with smoking, vaping or nicotine products. It is essential to question how this information will be used once submitted. Will it be analysed promptly and used to update product regulations to inform public health campaigns? If studies highlight emerging risks or issues, how quickly will regulators be able to act on the findings? The impact of those studies will largely depend on how efficiently the regulatory system uses that data to protect public health and respond to new threats. Are we collecting data for the sake of collecting data, so that the information is there, or are the resources going to be provided to look at the data, analyse it and act upon it? Otherwise, we may end up in a situation where we knew the answer but we did not see the wood for the trees.
Finally, clause 98 talks about the responsible person. Subsection (1) allows the Secretary of State to make regulations that require producers of tobacco products, tobacco related devices, herbal smoking products, cigarette papers, vaping products or nicotine products to nominate an individual who will be responsible for the information that must be provided under the regulations we have discussed under clauses 95 and 97.
Subsection (2) provides that the regulations may include provisions on who is eligible to be nominated as a responsible person. That could include requirements for the nominee to be a resident of the United Kingdom, or to have another connection to the country. Subsection (3) mandates that the regulations must prohibit a producer from nominating an individual without first obtaining consent, which seems to me very clear and straightforward. Subsection (4) clarifies that regulations made under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, requiring Parliamentary approval before becoming law.
The clause allows the Secretary of State to define who is eligible to be nominated as a responsible person. It is essential to ask whether there are any clear criteria for that eligibility. For instance, must the individual be a senior company representative, public health expert or legal representative? The definition of eligibility could significantly impact the effectiveness and accountability of the regulation. Subsection (2) of the clause mentions that the regulations may require the nominated responsible person to be
“resident in, or to have another connection to, the United Kingdom.”
What exactly constitutes a connection to the UK? One of my aunts moved to the States when she got married and she lived there and had her family there. Although she has sadly passed on, I have cousins in the States. Is that enough of a connection? What counts as a connection? Is it enough for the person to have a business address in the UK, or do they need to be a UK citizen or a UK taxpayer? Do they need to live in the UK for a certain period?
This is particularly important when considering that many of the largest players in the vape industry, such as Elfbar and Lost Mary, are Chinese companies and are headquartered abroad. To my understanding, Elfbar has used its geographical distance from the UK to stay at arm’s length from a range of controversies caused by their products, not least the selling of vapes with illegally high levels of nicotine and the use of TikTok influencers with large followings among children to promote their products, which I am pleased to hear the Minister will be countering with his own adverts.
The clause specifies that the regulations prohibit a producer from nominating an individual without their consent. What process will be put in place to ensure that consent is genuinely obtained and documented? Will there be a formal registration or reporting system for nominees, and how will we ensure that the nominee knows—and that we know that the nominee knows—that they have been nominated? Will the person responsible be held personally liable for product safety or compliance failure if the product manufacturer fails to meet certain standards? Will it be the responsible person facing the fine, penalty or other consequences, the company, or both? That is an important consideration given both the nature of the penalties and also the person’s willingness to be nominated.
The clause covers a broad range of products, including tobacco products, tobacco-related devices, vaping products, herbal smoking products and nicotine products. Will the nominated responsible person be expected to oversee compliance with specific regulations for each product category, or will there be a single standard compliance regulation for all? I think primarily of cases where large companies have major stakes in both the tobacco and vaping industries.