My Lords, I thank all who have contributed to this debate, not least the Minister, with his impassioned defence of the Government’s position. I shall try to deal with the individual points that have been raised.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, asked a simple question: does the whistleblower control the process? As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, indicated, a whistleblower is indeed an individual, and implicit within that is the whistleblower’s right to withdraw consent if they become concerned. That is an inevitable consequence of an individual pursuing a complaint. What I am less clear about in that objection to the amendment is that, while at the moment an individual could complain to the Armed Forces commissioner under the terms of the Bill, I do not know what the commissioner would do if the individual suddenly turned round and said, “No, I’m very worried about what I’ve embarked upon. I want to stop”.
It is true that the commissioner can look at thematic issues, and we expect that they will do so, but as far as I can see there is nothing in the drafting of the Bill that says the commissioner cannot look at something that an individual raises. Indeed, the Government’s objection to my amendment seems to be that there already exist facilities, processes and procedures that enable an individual to raise a concern. So I am not convinced that these objections are cogent. I accept that it is legitimate to ask the questions, but I do not accept that that is a justifiable reason for opposing the amendments that I have tabled.
The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, said in effect that whistleblowing was covered by the Bill but did not address the point that I and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised: why, if it is so good and desirable, is it the word that dare not speak its name in the Bill? That is what is beyond me, to be honest. “Whistleblowing”, as we have previously discussed, is legitimate text and terminology in other legislation.
The noble Lord, Lord Beamish, made an interesting point: very wisely, he concedes that, once the Bill is being operated, there may have to be tweaks and it may have to be reviewed, because we may find that it is not working just as we intended. He made the distinction between thematic and individual. I understand that distinction but, as I have explained, there is nothing in the Bill as far as I can see that would stop an individual at the moment making a complaint under the provisions of the Bill.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, again with cogent perspicacity, got to the heart of the matter. As she said, whistleblowing and complaints processes are different, so why would you not give the Armed Forces commissioner the tools to do what has to be done? She added that whistleblowing is a channel that—in her opinion, to which I am inclined to defer—would create more trust, and I think we all understand that more trust is certainly needed to reassure our Armed Forces personnel. I was struck by her observation that where we have got to in political thinking, and in parliamentary process, is that whistleblowing should almost be the norm, not the exception.
In short, I reiterate that I am glad that this debate is neither polemical nor party political, because we all want to arrive at the same destination. Where we have got to is a difference of opinion on the legal semantics. However, I firmly believe that the amendments I have tabled would enhance the Bill and help the Armed Forces commissioner to do the job better. I would therefore like to test the opinion of the House.