Mental Health Bill [HL]

Committee (1st Day)

15:54:00

Clause 1: Principles to inform decisions

Amendment 1

Moved by

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 11, at end insert—

“Equity

addressing inequalities in treatment, particularly racial inequalities, outcomes, and related provisions regarding protected characteristics”

Member’s explanatory statement The purpose of this amendment is to include a fifth guiding principle to ensure that there is equity in treatment and outcomes addressing inequalities related to protected characteristics, particularly racial inequalities, in the operation of the Code of Practice and the Mental Health Act 1983 more generally.

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1 standing in my name, I will also speak to Amendment 3 in my name. There are other important amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, in this group. Before I turn to my two amendments, I would like to make one general point. On these Benches we very much welcome this long-overdue Bill and will work with others to strengthen it further. The 1983 Act, which we are amending, is more than 40 years old and no longer reflects current understanding, attitudes or best practice in relation to severe mental illness or learning disability and autism. We need to ensure that the final law is truly fit to serve people’s needs for years to come, and our proposed amendments reflect a comprehensive effort to strengthen mental health services by promoting equity, tackling racial disparity, supporting the well-being of children and young people and ensuring that adequate resources are in place to deliver the Bill’s provisions. A brief look back at the history shows that significant changes to mental health legislation happen on average every 15 to 20 years. That is understandable because it takes time for legislative reforms to take shape and be implemented. This Bill is likely to be the legislation that impacts on the health and well-being of people with mental health conditions for the next two decades. During our debate, we will be raising issues. It may not be possible to deal with them all in the legislation but they are important to mental health services overall, so I hope the Government will view them as part of a wider package of reform, be they issues around resources in the community or the interface between this Bill and the Mental Capacity Act. It is all part of our wider scrutiny, and I hope that the Government welcome that. Amendment 1 would add a fifth principle to the existing four set out, which of course I fully support, and provide additional momentum towards the goal of addressing the racial disparities in the Mental Health Act. I believe that making equity one of the guiding principles, as in my amendment, would give it far greater clarity, weight and focus. If we look back at the underlying rationale for this legislation, addressing inequalities, particularly racial inequalities, is one of the key issues identified in Sir Simon Wessely’s review of the Act and is one of the key drivers behind this Bill. However, concerns remain in the sector and beyond that the Bill as drafted does not go far enough to address this deeply entrenched inequity. Adding such a principle would also reflect existing duties under the Equality Act and the requirements of the patient and carer race equality framework, a point made by many noble Lords at Second Reading. This would go some way to recognising one of the key drivers behind reforming the Act: to address racial disparities. I will give a quick reminder of the key facts. Black people are more than four times as likely to be detained under the Act than white people. Black people are over seven times more likely to be placed on a community treatment order, a CTO. On average, people from racialised communities have a worse experience of care and worse outcomes, and black and black British people are more likely to be detained for longer and to experience repeated admission. They are also more likely to be subject to police powers under the Act and to experience higher levels of restraint than white people. These are gaping disparities in the use of the current Act, and we must ensure that the Bill does something about them. My Amendment 3 is intended to probe whether the principles in subsection (2B) will be statutorily binding. Given that the code can only reflect law and act as guidance, placing the guiding principles in the code leaves a loophole in which they can be deviated from. That is the purpose of this amendment. The Bill provides an updating of the principles to be contained in the statutory code of practice, and that is welcome, but it does not include the statutory principles appearing in the legislation in the way that principles appear in Section 1 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. I am not clear about the reason for this distinction between the two pieces of legislation, hence this probing amendment. I would welcome an explanation from the Minister of the thinking behind this distinction. I am aware of strong views held by those working in the sector that it is hard to understand how the principles will be binding unless they are included in the Bill itself. Many feel that this would have much greater force than simply being referenced as “things the Secretary of State must consider” when writing the code. There is also case law. Back in 2005, R (Munjaz) v Ashworth Hospital Authority made it explicitly clear that the Mental Health Act code is guidance rather than instruction.

16:00:00

While know that the code should not be departed from unless there are good reasons, it remains a fact that, if the principles are written into the code in this way, they can indeed be departed from. Indeed, in the case that I quoted, it was ruled that the challenged policy was lawful but did deviate from the code of practice.

Finally, an important practical point is that health professionals responsible for these reforms simply will not have the time to review the code to understand exactly how the principles might apply. If they are fully incorporated in the Bill, that makes it clear to everyone making decisions under it that they must consider the principles when doing so.

There is a strong case for giving these principles statutory force to ensure that the Bill, when it becomes law, can provide a compass to decision-making under mental health law and give people more power to challenge treatments that fall short of these principles. I beg to move.

My Lords, I first apologise for not having been able to speak at Second Reading; I would have welcomed the Bill. In speaking to Amendments 2, 49, 52, 60, 112, 114, 118, 119 and 126 in my name, I declare my interests as honorary vice president of the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists, as a former member of the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust board, as a patron of the British Stammering Association, and as a stammerer myself. I thank the Royal College for its briefing and my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, for their support. I also warmly support Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler. I shall add amendments consistent with it in a later group. My amendments, which are supported by 49 professional, charitable and training organisations, are all based on the premise that speech and communication difficulties are an insufficiently recognised component of a very great number of mental ill-health symptoms and that professional speech and language therapy could—and should—enable more successful treatment. One study found that 80% of people accessing mental health services had a difficulty with language and 60% with communication or discourse. Especially in the case of children and young people, those with a mental health disorder report having five times more speech or language problems than those without. One study found that 81% of children with social, emotional and mental health needs had significant unidentified language deficits. One of the problems with the lack of specialised staff to help such children is the demoralisation or challenging behaviour that comes from frustration with unmet communication needs, quite apart from the impediments to treatment. I could quote many examples of this, as well as some success stories—for instance, where speech and language therapy effected a sizeable reduction in the use of restraint in a secure children’s home, or enabled psychological treatment to work and give the inestimable benefit of the ability to cope. I must emphasise that most of us take the ability to communicate for granted, perhaps without realising how essential it is to our lives. It is when it is lacking that you notice what it means. I am therefore sure that it must underpin the principles of this excellent Bill. Amendment 2 does that. Without a rider of that kind to the principles, we will not have effective treatment in very many cases of acute distress and challenging behaviour. Amendment 49 puts the speech and language therapist squarely in the frame of responsible clinician, so that where communication difficulties are the key problem, that can be tackled. Amendment 52 does the same for treatment decisions and Amendment 60 for care and treatment plans. Amendment 112 provides the same safeguard for detained patients who need to complain and Amendment 114 is to make sure that patients can understand their information on discharge, which is surely essential. Amendments 118, 119 and 126 have a similar function: to make sure that advance choice documents are properly understood and properly made.

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 2, to which I have added my name, but first I declare my interests as listed in the register, especially as honorary vice-president of the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists and as an honorary fellow of the same organisation. I am able to speak briefly as a result of the excellent explanation of these amendments by my noble friend Lady Whitaker, which I am pleased to support. As we have heard, the lead amendment would place a requirement in the statement of principles to specify in the table the communication needs of the individual and recognise the disability, difficulty or difference to ensure they will be identified and supported. This requirement then flows throughout the Bill—as evidenced by the number of amendments to which I have also added my name—ensuring a thread of consistency for this vital area of support. These include, as we have heard, Amendments 49, 60, 112, 118 and 126, but I will not speak specifically to each of those and test the patience of the Committee. The importance of Amendment 2 is clearly laid out in the excellent briefing, as we have heard, prepared by the Royal College of Speech and Language Therapists and endorsed by at least 46 related organisations representing this crucial area of work and service. As we know, communication is fundamental and foundational to human life. It is central to how we express ourselves, how we understand others and how we interact. It is also fundamental and foundational to the aims of this Bill. It underpins the principles to inform decisions and is key to the matters to be addressed. Crucially, it ensures the individual is properly involved in the decisions taken as a consequence of this legislation. As we know, many people accessing mental health services have some form of communication disability, difficulty or difference. This can affect whether they are able to make themselves understood, understand what is being said to them, and how they interact with people. Left unidentified and unsupported, it can subject people to a range of negative outcomes, including inaccessible referrals, assessments, treatment and care and, potentially, unnecessary detentions and detentions longer than necessary. I first recognised this issue when I undertook my independent report for the then Government, published way back in 2009, about people with mental health problems or learning disabilities in the criminal justice system. At that time, I identified appropriate adults as a key group to support people with communication issues and recommended that they should receive specific training to ensure the most effective support. They still play an invaluable part in such communication. I also recommended the establishment of liaison and diversion services, and I am pleased that in the subsequent years they have been rolled out across the country and we now have 100% coverage for that service. These liaison diversion teams, placed in police stations and the courts, identify, assess and support people with complex needs, including mental health problems, to try to divert them away from the criminal justice system and support them along the criminal justice pathway. I recognised during this rollout that certain key additional services should be connected to the teams, including speech and language therapists, to enhance the support required for these people with communication difficulties in a variety of settings and circumstances. As the speech and language therapists who I have met over the years themselves identified, these many situations and settings include significant unmet communication needs among individuals on mental health wards, challenging behaviour relating to communication needs, lack of staff knowledge and skills in relation to communication needs in people with mental health conditions, and many more. Although it is welcome that the Bill’s Explanatory Notes highlight that a care and treatment plan “may also contain other information, for example, how the patient’s communication needs will be met”, clearly this is not sufficient. The Bill must therefore be strengthened to make it explicit both that communication is central to the Bill’s aims and that “communication disability, difficulty, or difference” must be identified and supported. This would help to ensure that people receive the best possible treatment and care to support their recovery, including through the necessary reasonable adjustments that should be made. It would also help to reduce the risk to them, including of their being unnecessarily detained, and to assure the wider public. These issues must also be fully covered in the code of practice. I hope therefore that the Government will recognise the importance of such communication being in the Bill and look forward to the Minister’s response on these points.

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of all these amendments, including Amendment 114 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. I apologise for having to scratch my name from the speakers’ list at Second Reading, as I had been struck down by the dreaded virus. In all areas of healthcare, communication between patient and healthcare professionals is extremely important for diagnosis and treatment, and to achieve the necessary outcomes. This is drummed into medical students and other health professionals daily. I declare an interest: I am an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists—an honour awarded to me by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who is not in her place, when she was its president. The citation of unknown accomplishments in mental health on my part was read out by the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, who is also not in his place. I remember, however, that although my professor at the time, Sir Ivor Batchelor—a well-known psychiatrist—was a quiet man, during our psychiatry clinical attachments he used to drum into us that not all mental health patients can communicate well. We had to be patient to learn and understand their ways of communicating to help them communicate their problem. I had forgotten that I was taught that; at the time, I think he hoped that he would make us all psychiatrists, but that did not happen. The noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, has highlighted the extent to which patients with mental health problems have communication disability, difficulty or difference. NHS Digital research has shown that children and young adults with mental health problems are five times more likely to have communication problems, and that in 81% of children with social and emotional needs their needs remain unidentified. Even without communication disability, difficulty or difference, people with chronic acute mental health problems also show communication problems. As the number of people with complex mental health needs increases, so does the need for more speech and language therapists. Very few multidisciplinary teams include such professionals and, where they do, most of the professionals work in in-patient settings. NHS Digital research suggests that there are about 256 such professionals, mostly working in in-patient secure settings. The provision of such services in community settings is patchy or non-existent, leading to long waits.

16:15:00

In paragraph 130, the Explanatory Notes recognise the need to address communication issues, stating that a person’s care and treatment plan “may” include other information, such as

“how the patient’s communication needs will be met”.

I suggest that this needs to go further and should say—I hope this will be in the code of practice, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley—that the needs of people should be identified and the plan should clearly state how those needs will be met.

I conclude with an example that was given to me of a Mr G, who was beginning to disengage and not attend regular appointments. Also, the neighbours complained, suggesting that he might be experiencing periods of acute psychosis. He was detained under the Act and transferred to a locked-door high-dependency in-patient service. While Mr G was an in-patient, the team identified his complex communication deficit and evolved a plan that would address this issue with the speech and language therapist, enabling him to be safe and cared for in the community. A session with his caseworker and care co-ordinator in the community enabled him to be cared for in the community successfully.

So the need for identifying a deficit in communication, in various areas, and the need for therapists to address this issue are obviously important. The Bill goes some of the way, certainly in the Explanatory Notes, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, that it needs to go further. I hope the Minister will be receptive to that idea, either in the Bill or certainly in the code of practice.

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 49 on this issue. I do not disagree with anything that has been said about the vital need for communication and to ensure that the patient understands what is happening and has access to specialist help. But I particularly want to comment on the proposal that speech and language therapists should become responsible clinicians. The role of responsible clinician under the Mental Health Act is really quite onerous. Of the 50,000 or so clinicians who take on the role and are appointed the responsible clinician when somebody is detained, the vast majority are consultant doctors. Fewer than 100—0.002%—have been psychologists or nurses. The appetite for taking on this role is low and, of all the members of the team who could take it on, it would be appropriate only in a very small minority of cases for it to be speech and language therapists. I do not want to rule them out because I know how valuable these people are, but we must see that, in practice, this will probably not fly very far. It is important that we concentrate on how we get proper communications, but this particular amendment would probably not find favour. I do not think that profession is yet trained to the full extent of what would be required for that role. Although I hope that it will be one day, this Bill is maybe too early for it.

My Lords, with the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, I did not suggest—and I did not hear any other noble Lord suggest—for a minute that language and speech therapists would become clinicians in their own respect. I said that they would be part of a team that would help to establish appropriate communication. As doctors, we are not the best people for that—so I do not see how the amendment cannot fly, when there is a need for such people.

I entirely agree with the noble Lord. However, the reality is that the responsible clinician, as mentioned in Amendment 49 to Clause 10, has a wide range of roles. It is very onerous and specific, so this is not likely to be a good idea for a speech and language therapist. I agree with the rest of what everybody has said.

My Lords, I declare an interest as an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, but without any qualifications, unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. For the reasons that have already been given, I entirely agree with the whole group of amendments, which have been proposed so much better than I could do—so I do not propose to say any more.

In supporting Amendment 1, I am delighted that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, began Committee with this focus on the impact of the Mental Health Act on racialised communities, because that is where this whole journey began, with the noble Baroness, Lady May, when she was Prime Minister, announcing it in that context—and then, of course, it became a wider reform of the whole Act. I served on your Lordships’ Joint Committee with the other place, scrutinising the Bill. In the course of that, I became aware of the relative strengths of civil society among some of the groups. There were excellent civil society groups speaking on behalf of people with learning disabilities and autism; they were highly professional and articulate. We had one evidence session on the effect of the Mental Health Act on racialised communities, but I saw that the strength of civil society and of media coverage in that area was less—so I am sympathetic to Amendment 1, which would give a profile to one of the main issues under the legislation. On whether the table should be in the Bill to be in the code or in the Bill sitting as primary legislation, I have sympathy for that proposition. We have learned that the code of practice merely reflects primary legislation. I am aware, of course, that the independent review came up with those four principles, and this fifth one was not part of that. I expect to hear the Minister say that it is already in the Equality Act, so we do not need to put it in the Bill—but I am persuaded of the merits of the amendment. During the whole process of an independent review, a White Paper, a response to a White Paper, a draft Bill, a Joint Committee and now the Bill before your Lordships’ Committee, it has become clear to me that many of the changes that ethnic minority communities need to see are in practice. They are in resources and training—people would not look to the Bill and see their needs as the first or an important priority in it. I would be grateful if the Minister would take seriously this consideration of putting this equity principle in the table and putting it in the Bill, full stop, and not within the code.

I begin by thanking all noble Lords who spoke to this first group of amendments in Committee. Before I comment, I refer noble Lords to my interests as set out in the register. I am not an honorary fellow of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, noble Lords will be relieved to know, but I should mention my previous work with a couple of think tanks—the Institute of Economic Affairs and Politeia, which have both published on health and social care issues. There is also my work at St Mary’s University, where I am a professor of politics and international relations, and which has recently applied to open a new medical school. I also sit unpaid on the advisory board of a start-up coalition, and I know that there are a number of start-up companies helping people with mental health conditions. I just wanted to cover those interests, in case anyone made any accusations. This group addresses the principles that will guide the application of the Mental Health Act, as set out in the Wessely review. Sir Simon pointed out, rightly, that there are already guiding principles in the code of practice, but that “there is limited awareness of these, and it seems very likely that they do not inform practice in the way they should”. Clearly, as noble Lords said at Second Reading, the important aim of including the four principles is to improve their application and ensure the highest level of care and therapeutic benefit for patients, while ensuring that all patients are treated as individuals. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, for her Amendment 1. Of course, equity is at the heart of the Bill, as my noble friend Lady Berridge just said. The Wessely review was commissioned by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead with the intention of understanding why a disproportionate number of black people were being detained and receiving community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act. I think all noble Lords welcome the idea of including equity in principle, as long as it then feeds through into practice. That is the key here, and my question for the Minister is: would putting the principle in the Bill make a difference to practice? How do we make sure that it makes a difference to practice, rather than simply adding the words or adding the principle? One of the values in the NHS constitution is that “everyone counts”. Does this equality duty go further than that, and would it have a greater practical significance? That is one of the questions we need to dig out and probe the Government on. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, makes an interesting observation with her Amendment 3. The principles were included in the Bill, as the Wessely review argued, to improve clinical practice. This is vital, because we know that the Mental Health Act is the legislation that is used to compel detention in hospital for treatment. This may very well raise awareness of the principles, but once again, how do we make sure that this is applied? We have to keep pushing this point, although I will not repeat it again, of making sure that this gets fed in to practice in the clinical setting. I also note the amendments in this group of the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker. I will not repeat the statistics that she read out about the impact of the lack of or inappropriate support for people with mental health issues or learning difficulties. Of course, it is not difficult to appreciate the complexities. Someone in my close family worked with speech and language therapists in his youth, and I could see the difference it made. It is almost too obvious to say, but how do you get your needs across if you cannot communicate them, or your needs are not understood by the person who is supposed to be offering treatment? As the noble Lord, Lord Patel, mentioned, this is included in the Explanatory Notes, but how do we make sure that it gets into the Bill and into practice? Obviously, it is a problem that is acknowledged by the Government, or it would not be in the Explanatory Notes, but why have the Government chosen not to go any further on this issue? I was very struck by what the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said about Amendment 49 and her concerns. Will the Minister address that debate? Of course, we all want to make sure that patients feel that they are understood. We know that patients have to be supported as much as possible to make sure they get their point across and that they are understood, in order to give them adequate treatment, but I noted the concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, even though the noble Lord, Lord Patel, intervened. Have the Government taken a view on this or does the Minister need to write to us? I look forward to her comments.

My Lords, I feel it necessary to start, instead of talking about the Bill, by offering our condolences to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, on the very recent loss of her dear husband, and to thank her, as I know all noble Lords will do, for her close engagement on these reforms over many years. I say to the noble Baroness, who said she would be watching if she could, that we absolutely understand why she cannot be with us today. We miss her and I know that the thoughts of all noble Lords will be with her at this very sad time. If I may make a few general points, as we know, this legislation has been in development for many years. I put on record my thanks for the collaborative and constructive nature of that work and the discussions I have held in my post over the past few months with Peers on all sides of the House. I extend my appreciation to the former Prime Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, for her highly significant role in commissioning the independent review which informed this Bill and to Sir Simon Wessely and all those who worked on this landmark review, which provided a blueprint for this Bill. Like other noble Lords, I am very pleased to have got to this point.

16:30:00

I thank many of the noble Lords present today, and those who cannot be present today, for their involvement in pre-legislative scrutiny, which has made this a better Bill. I also thank the many sector and stakeholder groups for their continued input and collaboration and the very good briefings they continue to provide, and those with experience of detention under the Act who so bravely and generously shared their stories and experiences to inform proposals for change and improvement. This is an important piece of legislation, and I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, that I welcome scrutiny. That is the way to make improvements. I look forward to debates in Committee and welcome the debate we have already had so far.

I ask for the indulgence of your Lordships to pay tribute to a retiring colleague in the Civil Service. Many noble Lords will have worked very closely with Matthew Lees over many years. He has been an instrumental player in seeing this Bill through pre-legislative scrutiny and into this Session. The strength of these reforms owes much to his hard work and effort over many years. I hope he is proud of his key role in this legislation—I know he will be shocked to know that I have mentioned him today—and I know that my thanks and appreciation are shared by many noble Lords who thank him and wish him well in his retirement.

I turn to Amendment 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, which would require a new principle of equity to be included in the statement of principles. The new principle would address

“inequalities in treatment … outcomes, and related provisions regarding protected characteristics”.

We absolutely know about the significant inequalities in experience and outcomes under the Act, particularly for those from minority-ethnic groups, people with a learning disability and autistic people. Indeed, this was a great driver for the noble Baroness, Lady May, in wanting to see the independent review.

I assure your Lordships that driving reductions in inequality is a guiding principle behind the reforms in the Bill, which seeks universally to improve experiences for all people who find themselves subject to the Act. As the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, suggested, it feels unnecessary to include equity as a specific principle because it is already a requirement of the Equality Act 2010, which is the legal framework protecting people from discrimination to which all those carrying out functions under the Mental Health Act must already adhere.

We recognise the need to tackle inequalities under the Act; to say that it is a “key driver” is rather understating the purpose. I know that noble Lords feel similarly to me that this is a major plank of why we are here. I believe that we already have the necessary legal framework to do this.

I turn to Amendment 2, tabled by my noble friend Lady Whitaker, who has also tabled a number of other amendments. Amendment 2 was supported by my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, both of whom spoke to these issues. They made the point that communication with patients, particularly when they have severe mental illness, is absolutely key. I associate myself with acknowledging the important role of speech and language therapists in this regard. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to set out, within the statement of principles in the code of practice, how, in fulfilling the principles, a patient’s communication disability, difficulty or difference will be identified and supported. The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, was also supportive of this intent.

I agree that people with communication needs are particularly at risk of poor experiences with mental health services, and they must benefit fully and equally from these reforms. So the statement of principles must comply with the Equality Act 2010, including the duty to advance the equality of opportunity between people who share a protected characteristic and those who do not. All those carrying out functions under the Mental Health Act must adhere to the Equality Act. Therefore, I suggest that the aims of the amendment are covered by existing legislative requirements, although I absolutely take on board the intent of the amendment.

I apologise for interrupting my noble friend’s eloquence, but it is not the case that speech, language and communication difficulties are a protected characteristic. Can she absolutely assure us that they do come under the Equality Act?

I am grateful for my noble friend’s intervention. I will later make specific points about speech and language therapists. The revised code of practice will give guidance for decision-makers and those involved in care and treatment on how to support individuals with communication needs to make sure that their voices are heard. Following Royal Assent, we will draft, and consult on, a code of practice, and it will be laid before Parliament. In addition to the code, we will lay secondary legislation to support the reforms set out in the delegated powers memorandum. I am committed to sharing papers setting out further details on this, including what we expect the content of care and treatment plans to cover, some of which is highly relevant to this debate. Amendment 3, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and also spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, would mean that the individuals and organisations referenced in Section 118(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 must have regard to the code of practice when making decisions. It seeks to probe whether the principles set out in the table in Clause 1 of this Bill—under new Section 118(2B) of the 1983 Act —will be statutorily binding. Practitioners are already under a statutory obligation to take account of the code when making decisions under the Act. Anyone who must have regard to the code of practice under Section 118(2D) must therefore also have regard to the statement of principles that the Secretary of State must include in the code when carrying out specified functions under the Act. That includes all those referenced in Section 118(1). The Government expect practitioners to follow the code. Anyone seeking to depart from it must have compelling reasons for doing so. Reasons for any departure must be recorded clearly, as courts have the power to scrutinise such reasons to ensure that there is sufficiently convincing justification for not following the code. I believe that this is the right approach, because relevant individuals and organisations must have regard to the code and, in turn, the principles. But the system is not so inflexible that a principle must be followed irrespective of the circumstances, because there could be very rare cases whereby it could create a risk that an individual is not being treated according to their own particular needs, which is not the intention of the Bill.

I think the Committee would understand that if it was to do with a therapeutic intervention. This is about the principles according to which clinicians and others have to work when dealing with the Act. First, can the Minister enlighten the Committee as to which principles, as a framework, would not be suitable for a particular patient? It is a principle. Secondly, my noble friend tabled this amendment because case law on codes of practice in the public sector goes back to 1998 and Regina v Islington Borough Council, in which the court made it very clear that public bodies have the right to deviate on admissible grounds where there is good reason. I can see no reason, unless the Minister can give one, why deviating from a principle is acceptable. That is why my noble friend wants the principles to be in the Bill. I could understand if it was a restrictive practice, but it is not; it is a principle.

To add to what the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, has said, I am having a problem understanding why the code is not statutory.

I thank noble Lords for their interventions, for which I am grateful. They give me the opportunity to say now what perhaps I should have said at the outset: I will of course reflect on all the points that are raised as we move forward. I will be honest and say that I am not sure that what I am about to say will do justice to the points that have been raised. Overall, the real concern is about making very complex legislation even more complex. We are wrestling with our attempt to update the Mental Health Act—we are not starting from scratch. That is the point I would like to like to move on to. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, raised a comparative point about the Mental Capacity Act and asked why, if that could include principles, it is not possible for the Mental Health Bill to. To extend what I have just said, it is because the Mental Capacity Act was structured around principles from the outset when it was drafted and did not have to meet the challenge that we are trying to debate today. As I said, we are currently looking at amending the existing Mental Health Act, which has not been designed or structured around statutory principles. In my language, I would say that we are starting from an entirely different place.

I hate to interrupt the Minister’s flow, but we are going to come back to the code of practice again and again. Can she outline whether we will get to see a draft of that code? If the argument from the Government is that it needs to be in the code and not on the statute, it would be very helpful to see a draft code of practice before Report, at the very latest.

Those of us who were here in 2006 listened to the Minister’s predecessor at the Dispatch Box making pretty much the same speech that she has made now, and nothing has changed in the meantime. We are trying to do what we can to make sure that we do not have the same situation for the next 20 years. I take the point that the Mental Health Act 1983 was not built on principles. Does the Minister accept that it is time that we moved forward to a situation where both the Mental Health Bill and the Mental Capacity Act are built on principles, including that the people who are subject to them have rights to dignity and so on, as we have seen set out in different places, and that if they are not treated in that way they have the right to take people to court?

16:45:00

We should bear in mind that some of us are very worried that aspects of the Equality Act are currently under attack, sometimes from members of the medical profession. Does the Minister accept that that is therefore not an adequate protection and that the evidence before us says as much? In answering, will she perhaps respond to my noble friend Lord Scriven’s point and give us examples where people have been able to take action by reference not to the law but to a code of practice being ignored, because I am not aware of one?

I thank noble Lords for their interventions. I will take the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, first. Following Royal Assent, we will be drafting and consulting on a revised code of practice, which will be laid before Parliament. We will be working with key partners to ensure that everyone is trained in the new Act before the first major phase of reforms. I hope that that will be helpful. I hear the disappointment in the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. On her request for specific examples, I will need to write to noble Lords on that. I hope noble Lords realise that not having the principles in the Bill, as the amendment refers to, does not mean that there is less intention that they apply. For me, it is about the way of getting there, rather than the commitment to it. However, I hear the question about that point. Amendment 49, on the matter of speech and language therapists, is in the name of my noble friend Lady Whitaker, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friend Lord Bradley. I turn first to the question raised by my noble friend Lady Whitaker. It is true that not all speech and language difficulties or differences would count as a disability under the Equality Act 2010, so my noble friend makes a relevant point. The definition of who can and cannot be approved as an approved clinician was spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. That definition is set out not in primary legislation but in instructions issued by the Secretary of State, under the power in Section 12ZA of the current Mental Health Act. These instructions have the same status as secondary legislation, so it is our belief that it would not be appropriate to specify in primary legislation that speech and language therapists can be approved clinicians, because all other professional groups are covered only in the instructions. For that reason alone—but noble Lords should bear with me—we will seek to reject this amendment. However, I can commit that we will be revising the statutory instructions under Section 12ZA following the passage of the Bill, and we are very happy to consider extending the criteria to include speech and language therapists. I offer an invitation to the royal college to discuss this matter with the department and to consider how it can work to support and encourage those of its members who may be interested in this role. I am aware that time is not on my side. However, a number of amendments in this area have been tabled—

I wonder whether I can be of help to the Minister. The timing is advisory so, if there are important points that the Minister wishes to make, she should please go ahead.

I have never had so much encouragement to carry on speaking. Noble Lords will be glad to know that the flashing clock always makes me very nervous. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kamall.

Can I just add to what the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, just said? I have never before sat through a Committee where the Minister has been restricted in going beyond any advisory time. She should say what she darn well likes. She may have to respond to an awful lot of complicated spots in this; there is no reason at all why she should not carry on, in my view—and that of everyone else in the Committee, I think.

I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness for helping me out there. I referred to my invitation to the royal college. Given this commitment to pursue these changes, that will be subject to agreement with the royal college. I hope that will be of assistance to noble Lords. I turn now to Amendment 52 in the name of my noble friend Lady Whitaker, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friend Lord Bradley. It seeks to ensure that clinicians consider a patient’s communication needs and make reasonable adjustments as part of the new clinical checklist; this requires clinicians to consider a number of matters when deciding on a patient’s treatment, with the aim of making treatment more patient-centred. We share the goals of this amendment. However, the checklist already requires the clinician to take steps to assist and encourage the patient to participate as fully as possible in the decision-making process. We consider assistance to include making reasonable adjustments to account for a patient’s communication needs, which is something that noble Lords have rightly raised as being of concern. We very much intend to make this clear in the code of practice, which will already provide specific guidance on the need to make reasonable adjustments under the Equality Act. For example, the clinician should provide information in an accessible form, perhaps by involving an interpreter, a signer or someone who can communicate via the person’s preferred communication method. My noble friend Lady Whitaker has also tabled Amendment 60, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, and my noble friend Lord Bradley. It seeks to ensure that the new statutory care and treatment plan introduced by the Bill covers “information about a patient’s communication disability, difficulty, or difference”, and how these might be identified and supported. The Bill makes it clear that a statutory care and treatment plan is a plan made in accordance with regulations, so we intend to set out in regulations that a patient’s plan must include, among other things, information that is important for the treating clinical team to be made aware of during the patient’s detention. This is to encourage the treating clinician, as noble Lords have spoken about, to consider the individual needs of patients—including communication needs—so that the appropriate reasonable adjustments can be made. A record of how their needs will be supported should be evident throughout their plan, which should, as far as possible, be developed in consultation with the patient and others, such as their family members. Regarding the identification of any communication needs, as already set out in the Mental Health Act code of practice under the Equality Act, mental health professionals should already be identifying and making any reasonable adjustments to account for a person’s communication needs. Where applicable, a patient’s care (education) and treatment review may also identify and make recommendations about a patient’s communication needs. We intend to set out in regulations that these recommendations must be attached to the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan, so that they can inform planning and delivery of care. I hope that this will reassure noble Lords that the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan should cover any communication needs and how they will be met, but in reflecting on this debate I will ensure that the actions we are proposing take account of this. Amendments 112 and 114, tabled by my noble friend Lady Whitaker, would require managers of hospitals or registered establishments to provide information in an accessible format when discharging duties under Clauses 39 and 41 to give information on complaints to detained and conditionally discharged patients. I agree that it is important that all patients can access information about their detention, including the complaints process, and in a format that is accessible to them. However, the clauses are already drafted with the overriding obligation that the patient is helped in whatever manner is practical to understand the information being given to them. Therefore, it is unnecessary to add the words in the amendment proposed by my noble friend. Additionally, hospital managers have an existing duty under the Equality Act to make reasonable adjustments based on disability, which is the legal basis for ensuring that information for patients is accessible. I reiterate that I understand that communication needs will not always be related to the letter of the Equality Act. There is already guidance in the mental health code of practice on how a patient’s communication needs should be considered when providing information on complaints. When we come to revise the code, we will engage with stakeholders to explore whether further guidance on the complaints process, including how information on complaints should be provided, is required. Amendment 118 in the name of my noble friend, supported by my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Lords, Lord Patel and Lord Bourne, seeks to ensure that the advance choice document template is available in a format that the service user can understand. We strongly agree with the principles of this amendment and are committed to mitigating any barriers that people may face to creating an advance choice document or making their wishes and feelings known in advance. Where a person wishes to make an advance choice document, our intention is that they are given a standard template to complete, alongside supporting guidance and, where the individual wishes to receive it, the support of mental health practitioners. The template should prompt the individual to think about the sort of things they may wish to consider and decide in advance of becoming unwell. We will work to develop these resources. We also plan to set out in guidance to health commissioners that these resources and the support provided by mental health practitioners must be delivered in a way that is accessible to individuals and that responds to their needs. That will be in line with the Equality Act and the public sector equality duty. Of course, if a person wishes to create a record of their wishes and feelings in another format that is easier, they absolutely may do so. We have purposefully made it that individuals do not need to complete a prescribed form in order for their advance wishes and feelings to be considered at a later stage. I agree with the need and hope that this will provide maximum accessibility and increase patient voice and autonomy. Finally, Amendments 119 and 126, tabled by my noble friend Lady Whitaker and supported by my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Lord, Lord Patel, seek to ensure that the support provided to people to create an advance choice document is responsive to the needs of people with a “communication disability, difficulty or difference”. I agree that is important. To achieve this, it is important that support and information around advance choice documents respond to people’s needs individually, so that no one is unfairly disadvantaged. That includes communication needs.

17:00:00

The Equality Act and the public sector equality duty already require that providers of services to the public make reasonable adjustments for people with disability and other protected characteristics. I assure noble Lords that the guidance to services responsible for informing and supporting individuals will be very clear about these requirements and what needs to happen in practice to ensure that those with communication needs can create an advance choice document.

I go back to where I started on principles in the Act. This was a matter about where they should sit. This overarching point was considered very much in the pre-legislative scrutiny. I recall that the committee recognised the challenges of inserting principles into existing legislation, and I say to noble Lords that the approach we have taken is in line with that recommendation.

With that final comment, and for the reasons I have outlined in my response, I am grateful to noble Lords for their consideration of these amendments and for tabling them. I hope they will feel able not to press them.

I thank the noble Baroness for her extremely comprehensive but very helpful response to all the amendments, and I am happy to withdraw.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Amendments 2 and 3 not moved.

Clause 1 agreed.

Clause 2 agreed.

Clause 3: Application of the Mental Health Act 1983: autism and learning disability

Amendment 4

Moved by

4: Leave out Clause 3 and insert the following new Clause— “Application of the Mental Health Act 1983: autism and learning disability(1) Section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (application of Act: “mental disorder”) is amended as follows.(2) Omit subsection (2A).(3) Omit subsection (4).(4) At end, insert—“(4A) Mental disorder does not include autism or learning disability for the purposes of this Act.””

My Lords, in moving Amendment 4, I will speak to the Schedule 1 stand part notice, which is consequent on Amendment 4. Both appear in my name. I will not speak to the other amendments in this group, although my understanding is that Amendments 5 and 38 to 41 inclusive—tabled, variously, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Hollins, and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven—are effectively trying to achieve the same thing but by different means. I will leave them to speak to their amendments, because I want to explain why I have structured mine in this way. I must begin by thanking Jen Smith at the Bill office for her great patience and expert assistance to this non-lawyer in producing this and a number of other amendments. I also want to stress that I am not, unlike many people taking part in this debate, an expert in this area, but I seek to represent voices of people who have reached out to me who may not otherwise be heard in your Lordships’ Committee. I will set out the background to Amendment 4. I had a detailed briefing from the group Liberation, a user experience group led by people who have experience of mental distress and trauma, which has the slogan “for full human rights”. It is seeking a complete end to involuntary detention in psychiatric hospitals and forced treatment for the people it represents—people given mental health diagnoses. It asked me to exclude all people from what is known as detention or sectioning. Liberation says that involuntary detention and forced treatment are forms of disability-based discrimination, and these people should not be subject to them. This may not be the case under the European Convention on Human Rights—I acknowledge that the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, signed a statement to that effect in the Bill—but I understand that it can be argued to be the case under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I note, however, that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has, in line with Articles 12 to 14 of the UN CRPD, strongly endorsed a complete end to involuntary hospitalisation and compulsory treatment and recommended the removal of Article 5.1(e) from the ECHR—the paragraph that limits right to liberty if people are judged to be “of unsound mind”. It describes it as “not compatible with our 21st-century understanding of human rights”. I note that the recent report on the situation in the UK from the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, particularly paragraphs 79 and 80, expresses concern about the lack of government measures to end disability-based detention and that the then Conservative draft mental health Bill continued to allow involuntary detention and forced treatment. The Bill brought before us by the Labour Government still has the same kind of provisions. The argument is that the Bill as it stands remains non-compliant with the UN CRPD deinstitutionalisation guidelines and the World Health Organization publication Mental Health, Human Rights and Legislation: Guidance and Practice, in which countries are urged to replace institutions with high-quality services. I can almost feel your Lordships’ Committee saying, “How can that be possible?” Starting from now, that looks like such a long way away. That was indeed the question that I put to Liberation, which presented me with a number of case studies from around the world. I imagine that the Minister is aware of the case of Trieste, in north-eastern Italy, which almost managed to abolish involuntary detentions. They have been replaced with wide-ranging and accessible community services, based on a whole-person approach. Its community mental health centres are open 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and they play a key role in preventing people reaching a point of crisis. This has enabled people with mental health diagnoses to remain in and be part of their local community, in line with Article 19 of the UN convention. Compulsory psychiatric treatment orders are still possible, but the numbers are very low and orders typically last seven to 10 days. In Spain, Act 8/2021 recognises the legal capacity of all adults and stipulates that disabled people should receive the same legal treatment as non-disabled people, including those with mental health diagnoses and learning disabilities. This is still not complete equality but it is heading that way and has made further progress than we have. Costa Rica, Peru and Colombia have all taken steps in this direction. In Peru, for example, a recent study on the impacts of crisis interventions indicates that involuntary detention rates have been significantly reduced and that, when people are detained, they typically leave hospital after a couple of days. In Mexico, the general health law of 2022, a national civil procedure code, says that everybody has legal capacity, including people with mental health diagnoses. It enables access to supported decision-making for everybody. Mexico City, in particular, has set a real lead in delivering on this, but I acknowledge that not all of Mexico has. Why have I tabled an amendment that would, in effect, end detention for those with autism and learning difficulties? I feel like I must apologise to the people I have spoken to, as I did not feel able to put down another amendment—this a probing amendment, by nature—as I looked at the realistic situation. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, in starting our debate, referred to the extreme lack of resources. I and many others have amendments later in the Bill referring to the need for it to specify the level of resources. I am sorry that I did not feel able, even in this probing stage of Committee, to table another amendment. I would like to, and I would very much welcome the Minister’s comments on how we sit in that UN framework and whether the Government have a long-term goal to reach the kind of levels that an increasing number of other countries have attained, as I have just set out in my quick survey. But I have to look at the reality of the statistics. I have looked at the figures in the briefing from the Royal College of Psychiatrists. The number of recorded detentions in 2023-24 is 52,500. We really have to reflect on that number. Of those, we have seen a fall, to 1,880, in the level of detentions relating to learning disability and autism—that seems a step in the right direction. We are talking about disabilities. Can we really continue, a quarter of the way into the 21st century, to detain people for their disability rather than provide them with the support they need in the community? That is a question this amendment seeks to raise. I want to reflect on the fact—we will come back to this again and again—that people are not getting the help they need, and that is leading to the state of crisis we have now. I note in Mind’s briefing that people are crying out for help and not getting it. In June 2024, very urgent referrals to crisis teams for adults were 45% higher than a year before. I should here declare my position as a vice-president of the Local Government Association and refer to the LGA briefing, which talks about the significant resource implications for councils of the Bill as it stands as presented by the Government. There are voices here that should be heard. We should frame this in the context of the international situation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. That is why I have tabled this amendment. I hope we can have a constructive discussion and see some real progress here today. I beg to move.

My Lords, I declare my interest as a vice-president of the National Autistic Society and a co-chair of the APPG on Autism, and I have responsibilities for close relatives who are on the autism spectrum. I will speak to Amendment 5 first, and to the Mental Capacity Act, which is not the Act we are looking to change but it is my contention in this proposed clause that the Mental Capacity Act has a relationship with the Mental Health Act. There has for some years been concern about the deprivation of liberty safeguards as defined in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. They were inserted into the Mental Health Act 2007 following the Bournewood judgment in the European court which involved an autistic man whose liberty was denied, whose carers were ignored, and who had had what I can best describe as an autistic meltdown that resulted in his incarceration for a very long time. Although the Mental Capacity Act has much to commend it, there has been ongoing concern about the deprivation of liberty safeguards—often referred to as DoLS—and I managed to obtain a House of Lords inquiry into the Act in 2013, ably chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, who is in his place today. I will quote a section of the summary of that inquiry that deals specifically with deprivation of liberty safeguards. The House concluded: “The provisions are poorly drafted, overly complex and bear no relationship to the language and ethos of the Mental Capacity Act. The safeguards are not well understood and are poorly implemented. Evidence suggested that thousands, if not tens of thousands, of individuals are being deprived of their liberty without the protection of the law, and therefore without the safeguards which Parliament intended. Worse still, far from being used to protect individuals and their rights, they are sometimes used to oppress individuals, and to force upon them decisions made by others without reference to the wishes and feelings of the person concerned”.

17:15:00

While I welcome the removal from the Mental Health Act 1983 of the presumption of mental illness in people with autism and learning difficulties, there is concern that once it is removed the Mental Capacity Act will be used more frequently with all the implications that I have just read out because nothing has changed the DoLS based on the Mental Capacity Act as we understand it today.

I am grateful to the Law Society for drafting Amendment 5, which strengthens the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and gives more liberty to P, in the example used, in determining the treatment and assessment of an individual case. I strongly urge the Minister, who has been so helpful in her deliberations and communications on this Bill, not to step out of the frying pan and straight into the fire of the Mental Capacity Act and to adopt this amendment.

I move briefly to Amendments 39 and 41. Under the Bill, it will be possible to detain autistic people and/or people with a learning disability if they have a coexisting mental health condition. Amendment 39 would provide that the behaviour risk that meets the criteria for detention must be wholly due to the psychiatric disorder and not to unmet needs. Failure to provide services to support an inability to obtain employment, make friendships or relationships or cope with everyday challenges can and often is difficult for neurodiverse people. Autism is, as we have already heard, a communication disorder. We know that these services are not always available and that that can lead to behaviours that sometimes are not properly understood. The delay in implementing this Bill once it becomes an Act of Parliament, which was flagged at Second Reading, is clear evidence of the fact that the services that we will talk about in the course of this Bill are just not there in the geographical spread or number that we require.

Therefore, I say to the Committee that the Bill should protect people with autism and psychiatric disorders, particularly those who have been denied or unable to obtain appropriate services which has led to what is often euphemistically called an autistic meltdown, behaviour that sometimes can be quite challenging, I appreciate. It should be identified in its own right, and that alone should be the criterion for detention when a mental disorder is identified.

Similarly, Amendment 41 would require that the psychiatric disorder and the reasons for that alone are listed on the statement when a patient is detained and that autism and learning disability should not be listed as the reason for detention. It may be appropriate in other types of documentation associated with the patient but not on the reason for detention.

I pay tribute to the work that the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, has done in relation to this matter. This is a matter that we considered in great detail in the Joint Committee. I am grateful that that gives us the opportunity to discuss in the round the legal basis on which people are detained. The independent review did not recommend what is currently in the Bill, which is the removal of learning disabilities and autism from the Act. The Joint Committee’s report quotes it saying, “the risk of completely removing learning disabilities and autism from the Act is too high”. The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, outlined one of the reasons for that, which is that if you remove the legal basis for detention under the Mental Health Act, then the bucket that these individuals and patients would fall into without Amendment 5 would be the Mental Capacity Act. In the consideration by the Joint Committee, there is the other danger that—when there is no co-occurring mental health condition—you end up with people coming through the criminal justice system, instead of being detained under the Mental Health Act. That is the worst of all the evils we could be discussing here today and would be completely inappropriate. I would be grateful if the Minister will ensure two things when we know that these are dangers: first, an increase in diagnoses of co-occurring mental health conditions to use the Mental Health Act; and, secondly, an increase in the use of the Part III criminal justice provisions. It is important that we know the exact statistics for the group with learning disabilities and autism before implementation of the Act. Then we would know whether the Act has caused an increase in diagnoses of co-occurring mental health disorders and an increase in the use of the criminal justice system. I believe that currently 39% of people detained with learning disabilities and autism are detained under Part III of the Act. I see the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, nodding. It is important that we remember that New Zealand tried this, removing learning disabilities and autism from its mental health legislation. I cannot remember whether it had the co-occurring mental health diagnosis provision, but, only a few years later, it had to amend the law, as it had caused an increased number of learning disabilities and autism patients to come in through the criminal justice system. What would be the position if the Bill were amended in accordance with Amendment 5? The evidence that we received in Joint Committee was that there would be no patients—that community facilities would be at a level where they could not think of anybody who would need to be detained. I wish the world were thus, but the ideal world portrayed in that way does not exist. Even with the community facilities that we all wish to exist, it seems clear to me that there would be circumstances in which there would still be a need to detain. I recognise that, in reality, we may see that increase in diagnoses of co-occurring disorders. Physicians may reach for that to protect someone—to detain them to get them treatment. However, it was made clear to us that 28 days is a relatively short time. You can be detained for assessment, but it can take many days to get the level of distress down—I do not want or like to use the word “meltdown”—to assess the mental health of the person and whether there is a co-occurring disorder. The Joint Committee came up with a special exceptional tribunal that would still allow the Mental Health Act to be used in that small number of cases—once community facilities are as we would like them to be—to continue detention. Why? For the reasons outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning: the protections under the Mental Health Act are much greater. You have the nominated person, you can go to the Mental Health Act tribunal, and—ker-ching—you get Section 117 aftercare, which, of course, is not available under the Mental Capacity Act. If Amendment 5 were accepted, we would have no Mental Health Act, no co-occurring diagnoses, no criminal justice system—I hope—and no Mental Capacity Act to refer to. If a clinician is in that circumstance where someone is so distressed and they do not have that diagnosis in the 28 days, where is the law? We are not talking about the practicalities here. Where is the law? In any event, the Mental Capacity Act does not apply to under-16s. So the risk would be an increased use of what we now know as High Court DoLS. These are not DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act. They are DoLS under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. They are a most unsatisfactory way of restraining the liberty of under-16s. Only two or three weeks ago, the Children’s Commissioner issued a report outlining the problem, and outlining that, already, some children with learning disabilities and autism are under a High Court DoLS. It is a matter that your Lordships’ House needs to consider. Nearly a thousand children are detained under a High Court DoLS. Obviously, the Mental Capacity Act would have applied to 16 and 17 year-olds and adults so where does that leave those vulnerable adults? Where is there a power to detain them? The Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act will both have gone. If clinicians are in that circumstance where there is no co-occurring mental health disorder, there is a vacuum which may end up being filled by the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court using vulnerable adults. We will have created another little bucket of people. I accept the criticism made by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, about DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act. They are supposed to be replaced by protection of liberty safeguards, but those are not in force yet. If we accept Amendment 5, are we going to create more work for the High Court with clinicians in that situation because the law will not have provided any means for them to detain? I recognise and repeat that the practicality will probably be a co-occurring mental health disorder but, as far as I understand it, that is where the law will be left if Amendment 5 is accepted. Although the Mental Capacity Act is far from ideal, I hope the Minister can help us understand what the situation would be if we were to accept the amendment. As I say, for the under-16s it would be more cases under High Court DoLS, as far I understand it.

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group but I want to speak particularly to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for her good sense. I agree with every word she has said. I had earlier tabled amendments to Clause 3 and Schedule 1 to give effect to opposing any change in the definition of mental disorder for the meaning of the Act in the same way as Sir Simon Wessely’s committee recommended and I withdrew them in favour of a compromise amendment because I was not sure, to be honest, that I would get here at all today. I have. I am not quite sure how many more I will be able to get to but for the moment I am here so I will speak to this one. I want to make it clear right from the start that if we had changed our legislation to be a hybrid Bill that was a fusion of a mental capacity and a mental health Bill we would not be in this pickle because we would have capacity-based legislation and therefore we could have proceeded without any of these silly criteria for what is this diagnosis and what is another. As the legislation is at the moment, I believe the move to remove autism and learning disabilities from what is a mental disorder is frankly bizarre, akin to having Parliament establish that for the purposes of legislation, the earth is flat and the sun goes round the earth. Galileo had the same problem. I want to ensure that Hansard will record that not everyone is in agreement with the notion that autism and learning disabilities are somehow separate and different from other mental disorders. Neurodiversity, which, of course, exists, is the term used to describe statistical outliers from the norm and, of course, as for many other mental states, there can be many positive and interesting aspects of alternative ways of thinking about and responding emotionally to the world that enrich society. I understand that many people with autism and learning disabilities do just that and that is where neurodiversity has been so supported by people who want to ensure that they are recognised as individuals and citizens just as the rest of us are. But that does not change the fundamentals. I know noble Lords know that I was a professor of psychiatry for many years at the University of London but I ought to mention at this point that I also have a special interest in mental health legislation because I was for six years vice-chair of the Mental Health Act Commission. I co-authored this now much revered code of practice for the 1983 Act. It is actually my only bestseller—if only it did not say Secretary of State on it—and I know first-hand how the Acts and codes are used. That is why I do not get involved in the principles of where this should be. The code does have statutory effect, by the way—I am sorry that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has left, because I can reassure her it does have statutory force. I was also UK advisor to the WHO on mental health and older people and was exposed to the developments in mental health legislation in other jurisdictions, not only in the UK, with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Acts as they were being developed, but in the Republic of Ireland when it introduced its new Act, and abroad in English-speaking legislatures.

17:30:00

I can see that, at this point, we are in real danger of distinctions being made between mental disorder and psychiatric disorder. Not only is it inappropriate to refer to disorder by reference to the medical speciality that treats it—as far as I can tell, that has never been done before in legislation—but it is inconsistent with the internationally accepted definitions of mental disorder and psychiatric disorder, which include explicitly all forms of neurodevelopmental disorder, including autism spectrum disorders and learning disabilities.

In fact, in what I call DSM-5—the diagnostic and statistical manual used in international research in the majority of English-speaking countries—mental disorders, including neurodevelopmental disorders, come first. They are at the top of the list in that classification of mental disorders. Similarly in ICD-11, the international classification of diseases used by the World Health Organization and for coding and global health monitoring, to which the UK subscribes, all forms of neurodevelopmental disorder, including autism and its spectrum, are at the top of the list of mental disorders. We have some difficulty here: the Bill before us has changed these definitions to separate them off.

The issues surrounding the diagnostic criteria were thought through carefully during the development of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and, most recently, looked at again during the passage of the Autism Act 2009. It was felt to be unfeasible to change the definitions because of the national and international implications. It would be very sad if this Bill were to diverge the direction of travel in English and Welsh legislation away from the international trend. It is also true in any case that many mental disorders are now treated not by psychiatrists but by psychologists, neurologists and clinical psychiatric nurse specialists, so calling something a psychiatric disorder rather than a mental disorder really does not make much sense.

This leads to the very difficult distinction between the application of Part II civil sections and the criteria for Part III, concerned with patients with criminal proceedings, where mental disorders are, extraordinarily, referred to as “relevant” disorders. I do not think that I have ever met anyone diagnosed as suffering from a relevant disorder. It means that Part II criteria are now different from those in Part III. Clearly, I understand that that is necessary if Section 3 in Part II of the Act is to exclude people with these two categories of neurodevelopmental disorders, but these unfortunate people will not be able to benefit.

I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, how she would think of an autistic meltdown. I know that she must have experienced them and they are very distressing. They are mental disorders; autism is a mental disorder. Let us have none of this trying to be sophisticated. Psychiatrists will carry on treating people with a wide range of mental disorders, including neurodevelopmental disorders, and it is utter nonsense to try to exclude them.

The noble Baroness asked me a question. Was it rhetorical? I wonder whether she could accept that autism is different. From the time that Kanner first identified autism, which is what a lot of psychiatric bases are based on—we then had Asperger and others, and the very good, more recent documentation from Lorna Wing, with whom I am sure she is familiar—autism has been different. If people doubt that, it is important to note that, apart from the Mental Health Act, the only other condition, however you label it, to have its own Act of Parliament is autism. In the Autism Act 2009, this Parliament unanimously agreed—in both Houses—that autism is different and deserved its own Act of Parliament.

I would say that all mental disorders are different but that they cannot all have their own Acts of Parliament. I do not accept that autism is different. Of course, it is different in the way that it manifests—

I will make a slightly cheeky intervention, if I may, on the noble Baroness. I am not weighing into the debate that is taking place but simply make this point. Does she accept that the fact that a condition is listed in the DSM or the ICD is not itself definitive? Until 1973, homosexuality was listed as a psychiatric condition in the DSM and until 1990 it was, I believe, included as a psychiatric diagnosis in the ICD. Therefore, that is not the strongest evidential basis for her claims.

I agree with the noble Lord, but the reality is that we use DSM-3 and ICD-11 in the international classification of disorders. If we in Britain are to go outside that, for reasons of our own, then we had better have some pretty good ideas why that should be. I am not so sure that we have them. The Wessely review rejected the notion because, as the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, said, it carried serious risks that individuals would be extruded and neglected, the opposite of what is intended. Similar anxieties were expressed in the development and creation of other Acts—I am sorry that I am going to go on longer than the advisory—so as not to exclude anybody from this group, because we want mental disorder to be an inclusive thing and not to exclude whole groups of people. Their protections are gone if we exclude them. I accept that almost all the developments for autism and learning disabilities in the Bill are very positive. They will really improve the way that people think about autism and will have an extremely beneficial effect on trying to develop services and improve training, but there is no evidence that changing the criteria under the Act will do anything to improve it. Getting money into services and service design is what we need and not a change in the legislation for criteria. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ group of specialists in learning disabilities have pointed out, the vast majority of them do not want this change in legislation. We should think very carefully before we submit people to something when we do not know what will be unleashed as a result.

My Lords, I wish to speak on this group; I have tabled two amendments, Amendments 38 and 40. I declare an interest as a vice-president of the Local Government Association. I also wish to share an interest which is similar to that of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning. I used to have two nephews who had learning disabilities and autism. One of them, sadly, has died—there is a statistic that people with learning disabilities and autism die, on average, at 20 years below people without them. I still have a loving, warm, neurodiverse and very proudly different nephew, who I love. I see his behaviours and the way that many people do not understand him and deal with him differently. I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and was going to make the exact point that, as a gay person, before 1973 I would have been defined as having a mental illness. The discussion among psychiatrists and the mental health professions at the moment is not as robust as the noble Baroness made out. Many people within the profession say that those with learning disabilities and autism are not on the mental health spectrum and should not be treated as having a psychiatric illness. We are in a difficult position. My amendments are probing amendments to try to preclude Sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Capacity Act being used to detain people who do not meet the Mental Health Act detention criteria. It is fascinating that, in some cases where people are detained at the moment, it is not because there is a therapeutic benefit but because there are no community facilities—this is completely at odds with the code of practice. Professionals are using a lack of facility to detain people. Let us be clear: these people are detained for 4.8 years on average, in solitary confinement, and this has a lifelong detriment. They are scarred for life. Many probing amendments in this group are trying to tease out exactly what will happen and to ensure that the Mental Capacity Act is not used to detain people because provision in this country does not exist. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out, there are places, such as Trieste, where this issue has been dealt with starting from a different view: starting from what is needed, rather than this power being required because things are needed. That is the fundamental change that we need to make because, if not—I am glad the Government are moving down this path—we will continue to see people detained when they have not a mental illness or a psychiatric disorder but a development issue, which is not a psychiatric disorder. There are many papers on learning disabilities and autism by professionals who would argue that that is the case. We are all probing to try to work out what will happen. I fully support the change to the detention criteria for autistic people and people with learning disabilities, and I believe it is key to reducing the number of autistic people and people with learning disabilities detained in mental health hospitals. But to achieve this policy intent, the Government need to make sure that a backdoor to detention is not opened through the inappropriate use of the Mental Capacity Act—detention in a mental health hospital under the deprivation of liberty safeguards instead. Without further guidance on the use of the Mental Capacity Act, the Government’s intent to reduce the number of autistic people and those with learning disabilities in mental health hospitals may be undermined. I am concerned that the Mental Capacity Act may not be generally appropriate for use in deciding on treatment in a mental health hospital, as its primary intention is to help decide issues relating to people’s overall care and living arrangements. I am also concerned that somebody detained under the Mental Capacity Act would not benefit from procedural safeguards and access to the mental health tribunal if required. Amendment 35 from the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, would mean that people with a learning disability or autism could be held for six months. There could be a six-month period of detention but only in exceptional circumstances, which are not defined but are to be defined and put in the code of practice. Again, as we know, people can divert from the code of practice, so it is not the safeguard that the noble Baroness would suggest. Exceptional circumstances in a code of practice could be diverted from. Furthermore, based on the noble Baroness’s amendment, there could be a further six months for a tribunal to decide. Nowhere in here is there anything about therapeutic benefit and how that detention would be to the benefit of the individual rather than of society. So I am not clear how therapeutic benefit would be determined under the noble Baroness’s amendment.

17:45:00

I accept that there is a gap, but I do not believe it is best filled by detaining people or assuming that detention is the first step. I look forward to the Minister exploring with the Committee exactly what the Government’s intention will be if this provision in the Bill is enacted and what provision will be put in place to ensure that there is not a backdoor and that people with learning disabilities and autism who are clearly at the end of the 28 days would have appropriate provision for their needs to be met. It is absolutely vital to understand this in Committee to determine exactly how we go forward without detention being the automatic assumption of what is required when this gap needs to be filled.

What does the noble Lord think will happen to the people in the gap?

As I said, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out what happens internationally, in Trieste in Italy, for example, and I therefore suggest that good international comparisons and practice could be enacted in legislation to ensure that the needs of as many people as possible are met in the community, rather than them being held in detention because the provision is not there. That is exactly what will happen unless this gap is dealt with by looking at what is required rather than looking at the gap and continuing detention.

My Lords, I apologise that I did not speak at Second Reading, but I have been listening to this interesting debate and it seems to me that Clause 5 is introducing the concept of detention in extreme cases, where there is a risk of serious harm to the health or safety of the patient or another person unless the patient is detained. That is the reason for the detention: to protect the patient from serious harm to himself or herself, or to protect others from serious harm. As I read the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, it simply seeks to suggest, or to put on the statute book, that someone suffering from autism or a learning disability would not satisfy the test in Clause 5. But the amendment permits the admission to hospital of someone with a learning disability for the purpose of assessing whether he or she has a mental disorder. I am not sure that this amendment by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, would result in people slipping through the net.

I wrote the amendment in a terrible hurry as a compromise amendment when I could not table the amendment that I really wished to table, which was seeking to get back to having clarity about the diagnostic criteria. I apologise if that was not the provision that the noble Lord wanted in the Bill—I am not sure that I want it very much either. I do not have any great devotion to the proposed new clause; it was just a way of trying to address this leaving of the gap. We used to do that, by the way. After the 1983 Act, noble Lords will remember that we dropped alcohol addictions and drug misuse from the Act, saying that we could not detain people for those reasons alone. What happened was that there was total neglect for the next 20 years until voluntary organisations and local authorities got moving and said, “This won’t do—we must do something”. Noble Lords should remember that that is what happens. If you leave somebody out of protective legislation, they will not be included; they will be neglected and they will end up in prison. That is what Sir Simon Wessely thought and it is what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has been talking about. I can guarantee that nobody will be interested in autistic meltdowns if there is no way in which to intervene to save a family from having that person with them, seven days a week and 24 hours a day, during the period of this terrible disturbance. Community services are great. I urge noble Lords to visit Trieste, as it has brilliant services in a tiny area; it is one of the very few in Italy, and it continues to work very well. It is cited all over the world, and that is very good. But this is Britain, with 80 million people and massively underfunded services, and it ain’t going to happen. I want to know what will happen to those people noble Lords would like to see neglected until such time as the Government produce some alternative provision.

I do not think that I or anybody else who has a different opinion from the noble Baroness wants to see those people being neglected. We have a different view. The issue I have with her stance is that the evidence is that putting people with learning disabilities and autism in a psychiatric hospital—and that is where they will go if there is no provision, because that is where they go at present—is damaging. It is not the correct provision. I believe that what she is arguing for—to continue the neglect of provision by putting them somewhere—is significantly not in their best interests and causes damage.

Perhaps I can clarify. I think that the noble Baroness’s amendment is to some extent based on the spirit of the Joint Committee’s report, which was about providing some kind of mechanism, after the 28 days—I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, nodding. There would be a specialist tribunal, and we said that it should be composed of people with experience of learning disabilities and autism, so that there was not a get-out for clinicians that they had not done the assessments properly. There would have to be grounded reasons to go beyond the 28 days and, in exceptional circumstances, you could authorise the detention, to make sure that the law covered that gap or group of people. No one wanted to see people detained for the reason that there was no community provision—that is ridiculous. I accept that the reality is probably going to be that clinicians will find a mental disorder diagnosis to use the powers under Part II to do what is in the best interests of that person and their family at the time. But the law should also cover that situation and not force clinicians into those diagnoses—hence the need for accurate data, so that we can track what is happening when the law is enacted.

Once again, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke to this group of amendments. The purpose of today’s Committee is to probe the Government, but it is interesting that we find noble Lords probing each other—though I have learned a huge amount from these discussions. They say that discourse leads not only to liberty but to an increase in knowledge. I add my words to those of the Minister and offer my condolences to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who is not in her place today. I recall a debate in 2021 led by the noble Baroness—one of my first as Health Minister—in which she highlighted that people with learning difficulties and autism were being detained in secure settings, even when an assessment had recommended that they should live in the community. This goes back to the words of my noble friend Lady Berridge, who talked about how we can deal with the world as it is and not with the ideal world that we want to live in. I was shocked at the time by what the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, told the House about some of the findings from the oversight panel for the independent care (education) and treatment reviews. I bear in mind what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, said, when she gave some examples of other countries with much shorter detentions, but I will never forget the story that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, told about a Mr W, who had been detained in hospital for more than 20 years, spending most of his time in what amounted to solitary confinement. At the time of the debate, Mr W had been living in his own home for nearly three years, near his family, with his home environment and care being built around his needs. That is something that all noble Lords are trying to push for in this group of amendments. It was not only a heart-warming story but the point was made that, financially, it cost no more to support Mr W living in his own home than it did to detain him in hospital. More importantly, the noble Baroness shared the happy ending that, despite the trauma of being in the wrong environment for so many years, Mr W was, we hope, going to live happily ever after. That highlights the reasons for the amendments in this group. I should add that I recall the noble Baroness who is now the Minister pushing the Government from these Benches on ending detention. I am sorry—I am going to be a little naughty here, but she can do it if we ever get back into government. She told the House that the average length of stay for people with a learning disability and/or autism in in-patient units was 5.4 years, saying: “That is 5.4 years that no person will ever get back”.—[Official Report, 28/10/2021; col. GC 231.] She asked how that could be justifiable when the cost of living in the community was the same as the cost of detention. I know that she is naturally sympathetic to ending these detentions. The detention of those with autism and learning disabilities was one of the central issues addressed by the Wessely review. I was interested in Amendment 4, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, arguing the definition of “mental disorder” under the Bill. While I am sympathetic to the amendment, can the Minister confirm whether my understanding is correct that the World Health Organization defines a mental disorder as “a clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotional regulation, or behaviour”, and whether the WHO includes neurodevelopmental disorders, which includes autism? If so, are the Government sympathetic to Amendment 4 and considering bringing forward their own amendment? How would they avoid running contrary to the definition accepted by the WHO and included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, particularly DSM-5? I understand the point that these things can change, as the noble Lords, Lord Stevens and Lord Scriven, have very importantly alluded to. Amendment 5, in the name of my noble friend Lady Browning, seeks to ensure that, if a person has autism or a learning difficulty but not a mental health condition, we should not be using deprivation of liberty safeguards to replace detention under the Mental Health Act. We fully support my noble friend’s amendment and the intention behind it. I am grateful to noble Lady, Baroness Murphy, who has tabled Amendment 35, for the time she has taken to share her experience and expertise with me and my noble friend Lord Howe. She addresses an issue that we should all be aware of with any legislation: that of unintended consequences. While most noble Lords here today would accept and support ending these detentions, for all the reasons that we have all given, and particularly after the harrowing stories that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, told all those years ago, how will the Government ensure that anyone with learning difficulties who could potentially pose a considerable risk in the community receive the required supervision? That is the challenge here, and it is the challenge to which my noble friend Lady Berridge referred when she reminded us that we have to talk about the world in which we live and not the ideal world that we all want. I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Berridge for sharing some of the deliberations of the pre-legislative Joint Committee, particularly on the issue of the High Court DoLS. Given that, and the point of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, if we are to have alternatives, how do we prevent detention by the back door or opening a massive loophole for detention? Amendment 39, from my noble friend Lady Browning, would ensure that detention was for needs associated with the degree of psychiatric disorder, along with Amendment 40. We are sympathetic to that, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

18:00:00

My Lords, I am most grateful to noble Lords across the Committee for their contributions. I will start by referring to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. A range of views has been expressed today on the matter of detention. The noble Lord asked what provision will be in place to ensure that we are not using some kind of backdoor, and that is a very good general question for us to hold in our heads. It is a very important matter, given the very poor outcomes we have seen for those with a learning disability and for autistic people under the current Act. I know this is something that has really exercised noble Lords—rightly so, in my view. The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, is quite right to remind me of comments I made from that Dispatch Box, which I still stand by. I have concerns, as I know he does too. The proposals here are intended to address the matter of improving outcomes. The debate today has been extremely helpful and will allow me to reflect on where we need to go in respect of these. I am also grateful for the range of wider topics raised in this group—for example, on the importance of the community sector—and I look forward to moving on to these when we come to subsequent groups later today. Let me first address Amendment 4 and the notice to oppose Schedule 1, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. Currently, a person with a learning disability can be detained for treatment under Part II, Section 3 of the Mental Health Act when their learning disability “is associated with abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct”. I heard what the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Berridge, said. The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, used the word “meltdown”, and she has spoken to me about this before. I know that not all noble Lords like that word, which is why I put it in quotes, but the point is well made and the noble Baroness has explained to me about understanding a person’s conduct. It is also the case that an autistic person can be detained under Section 3 on the basis of mental disorder. While the independent review found examples where use of the Act can deliver therapeutic benefit, it also found that hospital detention—a number of noble Lords spoke about this—can be detrimental for people with a learning disability and autistic people, due to exposure to environments or experiences that are completely insensitive to what I would call reasonable adjustments. This obviously causes stress and leads to behaviour considered to be challenging. We have heard that it is too often the case that people with a learning disability and autistic people are being inappropriately detained due to a crisis—which may be a better word in this instance—that has arisen due to a lack of community support, rather than for treatment of a mental health condition. That is unacceptable and the point has been extremely well made, both in the Chamber today and on earlier occasions. The Government are committed to ensuring that hospital detention happens only when an individual has a mental disorder that warrants hospital treatment that has a reasonable prospect of providing a therapeutic benefit. It should not be some form of punishment. Schedule 1 and Clause 3 will change how the Act applies to people with a learning disability and autistic people by introducing new definitions for “psychiatric disorder”, “learning disability” and “autism” in the Act, and making amendments using those definitions throughout the Act. These amendments remove, for the purposes of Part II of the Act, learning disability and autism from the scope of conditions for which a person can be detained for compulsory treatment under Section 3. I hope that will be of reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and other noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, argued that the Bill is non-compliant with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The measures in the Bill give patients greater choice, enhanced rights and support, and seek to ensure—I know that noble Lords want to probe this—that everyone is treated with dignity and respect throughout their treatment, and that the treatment is appropriate to the situation. It is the view of the Government that the Bill is compatible with the convention. Detention under the Act is not based merely on the existence of disability: that is something I really want to emphasise. Detention is risk-based. Detention and other compulsory measures are permitted only where they are justified by the risk posed by a person’s mental disorder and, through the Bill, I hope that we are very much strengthening the criteria for detention. We will come back to this later in Committee. Amendment 4, tabled by the noble Baroness, would leave out Clause 3 and put in a new definition of mental disorder to remove learning disability and autism from the scope of the Mental Health Act entirely. This would mean that a person could not be dealt with under any section of the Act on the grounds of learning disability or autism alone. We very much recognise the arguments for removing these conditions from the scope of the Act, but there could be unintended consequences in the removal of critical safeguards. I know that the noble Baroness does not wish to cause that effect. For example, the Bill retains the ability to detain people under Part II, Section 2, for a maximum of 28 days, for the purpose of assessment. That can be necessary both for the safety of the individual and the public, and for a clinician to understand fully whether a treatable mental health condition is the cause of the behaviour. I suggest that this is particularly important when considering conditions associated with high rates of co-occurring mental health conditions. Without these powers, there is a risk that the mental health needs of these groups of people are not identified or met appropriately, leading to further health inequalities for this group of people. I know that is not something that noble Lords would wish.

I have not spoken in this debate so far, but I have listened intently to everything that everybody has said, including the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. Members of the Select Committee will remember—they could not forget—the evidence given to us by particular witnesses who have autism and have been through the trauma of being detained. They made to us, unforgettably, the point that there are some people with autism and learning disabilities for whom detention is an aggravating factor. I happen not to agree completely with the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that there should be an end to all detention, although I have some sympathy with her arguments. I believe there are people for whom detention is necessary—both for them and for the safety of others—but they should be held in mental health facilities and not the criminal justice system. I listened intently to the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. I understand that it may be absolutely correct to define people with autism and learning disabilities as having a disorder, but we have moved on over 20 or 30 years to understanding that their manifestations and treatment are different from those of other mental health conditions. There is therefore a problem in having the diagnosis and treatment carried out by the same people. I hoped that she would explain, but she did not, why keeping people within the definition would improve their care.

Does the noble Baroness accept that, in talking about treatment, we are talking about care, education and training in social circumstances? Treatment is not about medication, which may be totally inappropriate, but about looking at the individual’s developmental needs as a whole, which include a whole raft of things. I agree that it is not just about psychiatrists or psychologists; it can be about teachers, people with a special understanding of speech and language, and so on. I would never deny that you have to encompass the whole thing—I would promote it.

I am sure that the noble Baroness would. Does she accept that for some people, particularly those with autism and learning disabilities, being held in conditions that are noisy, filled with light and full of people they do not know—in which they are made to feel completely powerless and do not know what will happen to them next—will be a contributory factor to their illness? I make that point to the noble Baroness, Lady Merron. She talks about choice, but what increased protections are there in this Bill for people with autism or learning disabilities who find themselves in detention, which is an aggravating factor causing them to be wrongly diagnosed?

I will be pleased to come back to that point. I think agreement broke out for a moment, which I would share, on the fact that detention takes many forms. It is about getting the right form and being sensitive to the needs of the individual, which is what the Bill is all about. I am grateful for those comments. To pick up my point about the expert consultation that has taken place, a decision was taken to retain the ability to divert people who are autistic or have a learning disability, who have committed a crime, from prison to hospital under Part III of the Act. Without this safeguard, the only alternative to detention in hospital is detention in prison. Noble Lords have referred in this group to how, often, this would be inappropriate in meeting those people’s needs and would exacerbate and manifest distress. On balance, we believe it is right to retain the ability to divert such patients to hospital, where they are much more likely to access the right kind of support and care that they need. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, raised concern about resourcing implications for local authorities. I refer her to the impact assessment, which sets out anticipated costs, including a breakdown of costs for councils. I assure her that we will do further work with MHCLG to assess any new burdens on local authorities created by the Bill. We are very alive to that situation.

18:15:00

The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, made interesting international comparisons, such as with New Zealand. Under our proposed reforms, people with a learning disability and autistic people, as I said, can be diverted from hospital to prison. It is about getting the right therapeutic environment. We are of course interested in international comparisons and experiences. We will look at them as we go further with the Bill.

Amendment 5 was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and Amendments 38 and 40 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. I appreciate the noble Lord speaking very personally about the experience of his family members, which always reminds us why we are discussing this Bill. I am grateful to him for sharing that. The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, raised understandable concerns about the length of time taken to implement the learning disability and autism reforms. I know that will come up with regard to the Bill more widely and I look forward to addressing those points as we go through Committee.

Amendments 5, 38 and 40 seek to prevent people being detained under the Mental Capacity Act as an alternative route to hospital detention if they do not meet the criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act. Amendment 5 would amend the Mental Capacity Act so that a person with a learning disability or an autistic person who does not have a psychiatric disorder could also not be detained in hospital under the deprivation of liberty safeguards or a Court of Protection order if they object to admission or treatment, or if someone objects on their behalf. Amendments 38 and 40 would amend the Mental Health Act so that the Mental Capacity Act could not be used to deprive people of their liberty who lack capacity and who do not meet the detention criteria under Part II, Section 3. This would include anyone who needs to be deprived of their liberty for physical treatment in a general hospital, in a care home or in the community. The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, spoke about not using the back door; I take these amendments in that spirit.

We strongly agree with the principle that people with a learning disability and autistic people who would no longer meet the proposed Section 3 detention criteria are instead detained under the Mental Capacity Act. We do not want this to be a loophole, back door or anything of that nature. We want the effect of the Bill to be that, wherever possible, these people are instead supported in the community when they do not have a need for hospital treatment for a psychiatric disorder.

The Minister will not be surprised to hear that I like what she just said. Is there no way she can put that in the Bill under a government amendment?

I am grateful for the invitation, as always. Government amendments will be considered as we progress through Committee, but I say that as a broad point, as I know the noble Baroness understands. The intention of the provisions in the Bill on registers and commissioning is that people with a learning disability and autistic people are not detained but supported in the right way. The proposed changes to Part II, Section 3 will be commenced only where there are strong community services in place.

I am aware of how much time the Minister has given and how generous she has been in allowing interventions. If she is minded on Amendment 5, can she outline whether she is proposing that there would be the special tribunal that the Joint Committee outlined? If so, how would she then deal with these issues for under-16s in respect of DoLS and for vulnerable adults? When there is no legal basis at all, it is then left for clinicians to detain anybody after the 28 days.

I became a little worried, listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, that perhaps I had been a bit too generous.

No.

I am sure that I have not been generous enough. I cannot give a commitment to government amendments on any of these areas. As noble Lords will be aware, that is the purpose of the kind of debate that we are having in Committee. However, we will certainly return to these matters. The Mental Capacity Act protects people subject to arrangements that may amount to a deprivation of liberty in hospitals, care homes and other settings, by allowing a deprivation of liberty only when it is necessary and proportionate. There are instances when it is important that the Mental Capacity Act can be used to protect and to safeguard people where appropriate, and we do not want to lose that aspect. The concern about the amendment is that it might have the effect of undermining decision-making, or of denying a specified group of people the right to protections under the Mental Capacity Act—although I know that this is not intended. I will give an example. Where a person lacks capacity but does not have a psychiatric disorder that requires treatment, there may be elements of that person’s care plan and arrangements that require deprivation of liberty safeguards to ensure that they can access the community safely and maintain a safe home environment. Similarly, certain specialist community placements are also registered hospitals, so the proposed amendment could unintentionally—I stress “unintentionally”—remove such provision as a viable community-based option, where the individual lacks capacity but would benefit from this placement as an alternative to in-patient care. The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, rightly made some comments about the statistics for LDA detention rates. I assure your Lordships that the data and statistics being referred to are absolutely key. They are collected and published, and they will continue to be monitored. If there are any matters where the noble Baroness or other noble Lords feel that we should go further, I would be very pleased to receive their comments. On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, about the use of High Court deprivation of liberty safeguards for children, I will refer to the action of the previous Government, which I hope will be seen as very helpful. In 2023, a task and finish group was established called “Improving cross-sector support for children in complex situations with multiple needs”. It was made up of a number of central government departments, operational local agencies and representative bodies, the NHSE and the Youth Custody Service to represent the voice of children and young people, as well as the Children’s Commissioner. This group has been developing a cross-sector response to help ensure that there is suitable provision in place for children and young people with complex needs who are at risk of being deprived of their liberty. To that point, I will take a particular interest in the task and finish group and its work, and we may come back to it.

I thank the Minister for giving way again. Listening to the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, set out and explain her amendments, it seems to me that they require the people making the decisions about whether to detain somebody to be clearer about which law they are using to decide to detain at a particular point for a particular person. As I understand it, they are not excluding or preventing the use of either bit of legislation for an individual; they seek just to have greater clarity about which legislation is being used and why, and therefore what protections the person will have. The Minister said that, if these amendments go through, some people will, somehow, be excluded from the correct treatment. Is there a particular group of patients or conditions that are at risk if the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, are implemented? Can the Minister give us some examples? Otherwise, I fail to see the logic of what she is saying, given the explanation that the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, gave the Committee.

I agree. The amendment seeks to strengthen and to clarify, rather than to make changes that would be completely different to what is intended in the Mental Capacity Act.

I am grateful for the noble Baronesses’ comments. I will come back with some examples before I sit down, because that is a very good suggestion. If I fail to do so, I will gladly provide them in writing. Amendment 35, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, intends to provide a route to detain people with a learning disability and autistic people who do not have a diagnosed psychiatric disorder. Detention could be authorised only with the approval of the tribunal in “exceptional circumstances”, with power to provide guidance on what those circumstances will be in the code of practice. The amendment seeks to address the needs of those with a learning disability and autistic people, with whom I know the noble Baroness is concerned, where a considerable risk is being posed in the community, but who do not also have a diagnosed psychiatric disorder warranting detention for treatment under Part II, Section 3. Our clear intent throughout the Bill is that people should be detained beyond Section 2 only when they have a psychiatric disorder that requires hospital treatment. It is our feeling that this amendment runs contrary to that intent. I am also grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hardie, for his comments on Amendment 35. We also have some concerns about the scope of the “exceptional circumstances”, which would potentially result in a position no different to the current effect of the Act. It is unclear, in advance of the code of practice being developed, how broadly this might be defined. There would be considerable scope for different, divergent approaches in comparable cases, which, again, I know is not the intent of noble Lords.

18:30:00

In addition, although I understand that this is not the intent, based on the noble Baroness’s explanatory statement to the amendment, and I know that she said that it is not quite what she would have chosen—I heard that but I am sure she understands that I have to look at what is before us—the drafting of the amendment is such that this might also create an alternative route to detain people with a learning disability and autistic people with a psychiatric disorder. As the Bill already retains Section 3 for those with a learning disability or autism and a psychiatric disorder, this is unnecessary.

Separately, there are also some reservations about involving the tribunal in what are arguably clinical decisions about the right length of detention in each case.

I will just refer to the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, in this regard, if I might take a moment to contemplate the matter. He asked: if the World Health Organization defines mental health as a clinically significant disturbance, would the Government be sympathetic to Amendment 4, and therefore how could they accept a definition contrary to that of the World Health Organization? I will consider the definition further and will be pleased to come back to the noble Lord.

The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked for some examples of particular groups. There are a few examples that I have referred to in my speech, but I can tell that they are not hitting the mark. Therefore, I will be pleased to write further to consider the challenge to me—although it is not a great challenge—which I will seek to meet.

Finally, Amendments 39 and 41, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, seek to ensure that people are detained under Section 3 only for treatment of a psychiatric disorder, not unmet needs relating to autism and/or a learning disability, and that the statement required to support an application for detention should include a statement that detention is necessary for treatment for a psychiatric disorder alone.

[Interruption.]

I am sure that the noble and learned Baroness’s yawn speaks for many.

I apologise.

There is no need to apologise. I am pleased to provide the reassurance that the proposed changes to the Section 3 detention criteria mean that it would no longer be possible to detain someone with a learning disability or an autistic person under Section 3, unless they have a psychiatric disorder. Additionally, the Act already requires a statement of rationale for detention and statutory forms. The registered medical practitioner will have to confirm that the patient meets the criteria for detention, including that they are suffering from a psychiatric disorder requiring hospital treatment and not just that the patient has a learning disability or is autistic. I hope that will be of reassurance to the noble Baroness. For the reasons I have set out in respect of all the amendments—I thank noble Lords for them—I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw hers.

I thank the Minister for her rich and full response, and indeed all noble Lords who have taken part in this important debate. It has been long but that has been quite necessary. I thank the Minister particularly for responding directly to my question about the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. I do not agree with her response but I appreciate that she engaged fully with it, so I thank her for that. I will not go through and summarise all the contributions, but I just want to make two points, which are perhaps specifically directed to the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, and the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy. A phrase which has been missing from our whole debate is the “social model of disability”. That is the idea that society is discriminatory, and that people are disabled by the barriers in society, not by their difference. That position was endorsed by the Government Equalities Office in 2014, and so far as I know, that still holds, and it is preferred by most disability charities. I invite noble Lords to consider another phrase in this healthcare space, which is “parity of esteem”. I think that when we come to the social model of disability and physical disabilities, most people have now accepted that if there are only steps and not a ramp, that is a failure of society, not the failure of the person in the wheelchair. However, we have not heard in this debate an acknowledgement of the same parity of esteem—the same approach to mental disability as we have accepted towards physical disability—and we should consider and think about that. In that context, just to pick up a couple of points from the Minister, she talked about how people with autism or learning difficulties can be detained for aggressive or irresponsible conduct. The Trieste model—if I can call it that—which is being adopted by many countries around the world, asks: “Can we intervene before that point and ask what has provoked that person? Can we intervene before we need to detain someone?” That needs to be very carefully considered. The other point that the Minister addressed, which I confronted myself with, asking why I did not table the broader amendment that I might have done, is what happens when people get to the point of being a danger to themselves or—I stress that this is extraordinarily rare—a danger to others as a result of a mental disorder. Again, how did people get to that point, and should there not be services and support and community wraparound in the Trieste style? I do not think that any nation or area is saying that it has totally got to that point, but surely we should be aiming at that.

The noble Baroness referred to the Trieste model, and I thought that led to quite a deal of interest from noble Lords across the House. Could she share some details on the Trieste model with other noble Lords but especially the Minister and the department, so we can all start learning those lessons?

I should absolutely stress at this point that I am not an expert, but I will certainly do my best to secure as much information as possible and share it with all noble Lords. The Minister may also have access to resources that may not be available to me. Reflecting on the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, perhaps we could even arrange some kind of discussion—it might be useful—and perhaps even hear some testimony, because that would really inform our consideration of the Bill. But in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

Clause 3 agreed.

Amendment 5 not moved.

Schedule 1 agreed.

Clause 4: People with autism or learning disability

Amendment 6

Moved by

6: Clause 4, page 4, line 41, at end insert— “(iv) housing”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment ensures that housing needs are considered as part of care, education and treatment review meetings.

My Lords, since this is the first time during our proceedings that I propose something, I declare an interest as a member of an advisory panel for Rethink Mental Illness in an unpaid capacity. I apologise if I risk sounding like a broken record; it is just that I have been here discussing these issues so many times in the past, as indeed have many other Members of your Lordships’ House. I will not apologise for taking a long-term view of things or for saying that there have been areas of change and areas of progress. But I also do not apologise for explaining to your Lordships the amount of effort and discussion that it has taken to bring about change and movement, not least against some of the entrenched views of the professions, which over the years have put up quite a deal of resistance to change. It is also our job to look at the proposals that have come forward from patients’ groups and say that some of them are valid and some of them are not. We are in a unique and very privileged position in this House where we get to take a long-term and wide perspective, and we should use it wisely. I say that because we have debated care and treatment plans time and again. Mental health institutions up and down the country are littered with files of care and treatment plans, many of which have sat on shelves and never been implemented. With this legislation, we are moving to the position we need to get to where everybody who is subject to mental health treatment has a care and treatment plan, the decision-making behind that plan is open to scrutiny, and the people responsible for delivering it are held accountable. I cannot imagine what it must be like to sit day after day in a place where I know I am supposed to be given treatment that will enable me to get better and get out, and to receive nothing. I imagine the temptation to sit there and think about that all day long is in itself is a gravely depressing factor. That is the sort of thing that we have listened to over the years from people—particularly young people—who have been subject to mental health treatment and care plans and never had them delivered, so how pleased we are to have moved forward to this point. I am also very pleased that Members are trying to take this opportunity to beef these plans up, in particular the accountability around the delivery or failure to deliver them. I want to include housing in the Bill. You do not have to have a mental health condition to be severely worried about housing these days. Any young person in this country can have real concern about availability of housing, tenure and all the rest of it. If you have a mental health condition and are likely to be detained for an indefinite period, and therefore very likely to lose your tenancy or whatever, that must be a huge aggravating factor. One reason why I was prompted to table this amendment was because I was on the pre-legislative scrutiny committee for the then Bill back in 2006. Somewhere there is an unwritten law that, when mental health legislation is coming up, Members of this place will be sent to the South London and Maudsley. There is no way out; you have to go. But it is always good to go to SLaM to talk to the staff, who are immensely generous with their time. You cannot go on one of those visits and walk out unchanged from the experience. I remember, in particular, a bunch of your Lordships going to talk to one of the best teams that I have seen in practice. Back in those days they were called an assertive outreach team; I do not know what they are called these days. They were absolutely brilliant, dedicated individuals. Their job was to work with people out in the community, to know them all and to predict the problems that would arise. One thing I remember them telling us was that they would frequently go to the local authority or to landlords when they had somebody whose particular crisis was that they had got into arrears. They would head it off by negotiating and de-escalating the situation so that the person did not get turfed out and therefore end up in acute care. Similarly, we know that discharge is a lottery for anybody who goes into any acute hospital for any reason at all. Discharge from the NHS is one of those things that when it goes brilliantly, it goes brilliantly. When it does not, it is an absolute and utter disaster, and the person at the centre of it has absolutely no control over it at all—even less, I would suggest, when they are being discharged from mental health treatment.

18:45:00

I am very pleased to say that all the organisations that have been lobbying us on this have stressed to us the importance of including housing in care and treatment reviews. One day, we will have not just legislation that is focused almost entirely on people who are detained or in acute hospitals but a mental health service that really is integrated between community services and acute services, and which is designed to stop people going into acute services, get them out as quickly as possible and return them. That is a long way off, but I hope to live to see it—I really do.

In the meantime, until then, one small step would be to include housing in the Bill and thereby put a joint responsibility on providers of health services to take into consideration people’s housing needs. By that, I do not mean lumping the responsibility on to local authorities while the resources stay in the health service, because that is the usual pattern of how we do things around here and it does not work.

That is the intention behind my amendments. I look forward to hearing the debate on the rest of the amendments in this group, because it is high time that we improved care and treatment plans, particularly the accountability around them. I beg to move.

My Lords, I shall speak my Amendments 8, 11, 15, 18, 19 and 20 in this group. They are to do what my noble friend Lady Barker said: to try to beef up the care (education) and treatment reviews, because something is amiss. As my noble friend said, too many of them are sitting on stuffy and dusty shelves, and not enough people get access to them to be able to advocate for and follow through on them. Amendments 8 and 15 are important regarding the people who are legally entitled to receive a copy of the care (education) and treatment review. I support the amendment from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, to add the parent and guardian, which was an omission. Currently, the Bill provides for a copy to be sent only to the responsible commissioner, the patient’s responsible clinician, the ICB and the local authority. To ensure that the patient and their family, carer and advocates are fully aware and informed of the decisions being made around their care, can hold services to account and can follow up on the care and treatment plan recommendations, it is essential that they too receive a copy of the report. These amendments would ensure that the patient, the patient’s nominated person and the patient’s independent mental health advocate receive a copy of the care and treatment report. I note that the Minister has tabled an amendment setting out that a copy of the report “may” be given to other persons, but this does not place a strong enough duty to involve the patient and significant others to ensure that adequate oversight of the care and treatment review reports is available to them. Amendments 11 and 18 reduce the maximum time between the reviews from 12 months to six months for adults and children. This is in line with the recommendation of the Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill. According to NHSE data, 24% of autistic people and people with learning disabilities detained in mental health hospitals have been waiting for more than one year for a CETR or have no CETR at all, and 31% have had the date of their next scheduled CETR pass or have no scheduled CETR at all. We know that autistic people and people with learning disabilities face lengthy stays. There must be a drive to discharge these people. The idea that we would have a CETR only every 12 months to help prevent a lengthy stay shows how worryingly normalised long lengths of stays have become for these individuals. In many cases, a maximum interval of 12 months may be too long and mean that autistic people and people with learning disabilities face delays to their discharge planning. The current frequency of CETRs in the Bill is not in line with NHS England’s policy, which states that, for adults, CETRs should be held at a maximum frequency of six months. Amendments 19 and 20 seek to ensure that the recommendations of CETRs are followed through. This is essential to ensuring that the needs of individuals are being met and that steps are being taken to prepare for their discharge. Often, the recommendations arising from CETRs are constructive, and those attending may leave with the impression that the right steps are being taken. However, the frequent failure to carry out the recommendations arising from these reports undermines faith in the process and can lead to unnecessary delays in an individual’s needs being met and in their discharge. CETRs, which are essential to providing safeguards for autistic people and people with learning disabilities under the Bill, are important. Their being undermined cannot be allowed. The current language in the Bill for the responsible clinicians, commissioners, integrated care boards and local authorities says that they must “have regard” to the recommendations. I believe that this is too weak. Legally, the definition of “regard” is that a public body must consider something and, once it has been considered, has discretion to carry out or ignore it. A duty in law is an obligation and must be followed, and the reason why it has been followed must be given. These amendments would substitute “regard”—the weaker definition—for “a duty” to carry out these actions unless a compelling reason is provided for why this is not possible. This follows a similar recommendation from the Joint Committee on the Mental Health Bill, which stated that ICBs and local authorities should be required to “follow” recommendations in reports—that is, have a duty.

My Lords, I should like to speak to Amendment 9, following on from the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, on Amendment 8. We are dealing with the responsible commissioner making arrangements for the care (education) and treatment review meetings and the report. I do not know whether I am a lone voice speaking in this House but I am a mother and a grandmother, and there is not a single word in any part of this Bill about parents or guardians—not a word. I could find references to parental responsibility only in new Schedule A1 and Schedule 2, although I may be wrong. Can I just suggest something to noble Lords? Where you have a child—here, I am dealing specifically with a child—with autism or physical or mental disabilities, it is quite probable, if not most likely, that that person will be living with their family and their parents. I must say, my experience as a family judge led me to believe that only about 5% to 10% of parents who came through the courts were not suitable to look after their children full time. But according to Clause 4—which inserts new Section 125A—the one group of people who will not be told what the future care (education) and treatment review given to their child will be includes the people with whom that child has been living for all their life. I cannot understand why this Bill seems to think that parents, guardians and other people with parental responsibility do not matter. That is why I have raised this issue. I feel intensely strongly about it, as a mother and a grandmother.

My Lords, I shall speak very briefly, having attached my name to Amendments 19 and 20. I support all of the previous amendments, which are in essence about people knowing about care and treatment review plans. I particularly wanted to sign these two amendments because of the clause identified by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. It states that integrated care boards and local authorities “must have regard to” the plan—as the noble Lord outlined, that is a very weak, weaselly form of words—rather than having a duty to deliver the plan that has been established for the well-being and health of a person. The phrase in the Bill now really is not adequate. I want to share something with noble Lords. On Friday night, I was in Chorley, in Greater Manchester, at a meeting with the local Green Party and NHS campaigners. One of the things I heard there was a huge amount of distrust and concern about integrated care boards and the restructuring arrangements that have happened with the NHS. I am not going to get into those issues now but, with the words “must have regard to”, we are leaving an open door and a door to distrust. Surely the right thing is for this Bill to say that the ICB has a duty to deliver a care plan. On Amendment 20, we will undoubtedly talk endlessly about resources, but that there must be a compelling reason is the right terminology to have in the Bill; it really has to be justified. I believe that both of these amendments should be in the Bill.

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 13 in my name in this group, but wish to add my support to the amendments that have already been talked about: those in the names of my noble friends Lady Barker and Lord Scriven, and the very important amendment in the name of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I have experience in my wider family of someone with autism, so I know full well the importance of having the parents and the wider family involved in review meetings. Frankly, it would be very difficult indeed if they were not there for those review meetings to express the wishes and preferences of the individual concerned. I guess that that is quite a helpful link to my amendment, which is about communication needs. I know that we explored this issue pretty thoroughly in our debate on the first group—you could argue that my amendment could have been in either the first grouping or this grouping, but it is in this grouping. I will keep it short, because we have talked about this quite a lot. In essence, the amendment is designed to ensure that communication needs being met is included on the list of the subject matter that must be considered and on which recommendations must be made during the care (education) and treatment review meetings. It is clearly vital, as we have all acknowledged, that every effort is made to ensure that autistic people and people with learning disabilities are involved in their own care and treatment decisions and are able—this is the critical point—to express their preferences and needs. To ensure that this is the case, their communication needs must be understood, considered and met; the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, made that point powerfully in our debate on the first group. Often, this needs to include understanding a person’s communications preferences; having the right sort of environment; making sure that the environment is supportive; or, sometimes, using very specific communication tools, which do exist. This can also include—this refers to the amendments from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—the involvement of a person who knows and understands the patient well, quite often a family member or advocate. That can be key to meeting someone’s communications needs. I am sure we all agree that care and treatment reviews need to be designed to ensure that the person affected is central to the decisions being made about their care and treatment. It is therefore absolutely self-evident that communications needs should be considered and discussed at the beginning of those meeting to ensure that the person concerned is able to express their thoughts, wishes, feelings and preferences, so that everyone involved in the care and treatment of individuals is equipped to meet those moving forward. I am very supportive of the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Scriven which would lengthen the time between reviews from 12 months to six months. I think 12 months is just too long. An awful lot can happen in that period and circumstances can change. I know that we have a subsequent group on care and treatment plans, but on the point made by my noble friend Lady Barker, it is important to think of the individual in a fully joined-up way, looking at housing needs as well. I know that we are going to return to it in a subsequent group, but it vitally needs to include things such as money matters, debt advice, ensuring that the individual does not fall into financial exclusion and all of that. I have put my name to an amendment on that in a later group.

19:00:00

Doing this could set a really important precedent. It could be of wider benefit to people who may not be covered by this legislation but who, for example, have had strokes, who struggle to express themselves, who may be in a care home. I have personal experience of this, ensuring that my late mother’s communication needs were properly addressed during care plan review meetings in her care home when she had had a stroke. It was very difficult for her to express her views. I was a central part of that, and it would not have happened without me being there. It should be a guiding principle for all people being looked after in all care settings of whatever nature, but it would be great to get this precedent established in this Bill.

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, with relation to housing. I do not want to go back 20 years for any reason except to say that, when we were closing the vast majority of mental health in-patient beds, the main aim of many of us doing those change programmes was to ensure that people had somewhere to live when they had been living in hospital for 10, 20 or, in some cases, 30 years, and that the housing had to be appropriate to their level of ability. Spending 30 years in a hospital does not exactly teach you self-reliance. There are some real challenges about that, so housing must be considered in any discharge planning. On Amendments 19 and 20, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has sent me a copy of her speeches in her absence. Like others, I think that it shows her commitment to this House that at this point in her life she is trying to make sure that her voice is heard. I add my condolences to those of others in the Committee. Her point is that you would not discharge people from acute hospital without some proper care and treatment plan. I want to use my own words rather than hers, but when you say that somebody needs dialysis or that they need regular checking of their heart monitor, we automatically do it. Elective care is still getting a huge amount of focus, but elective care in this country is defined as acute hospital care, not elective care for mental health patients and people with learning disabilities. I want to rest it there, but that is why I support Amendments 19 and 20 so strongly.

I too am supportive of the spirit and intention behind Amendments 19 and 20, but I want to raise two textual questions relating to whether they would give effect as was intended. In respect of Amendment 19, I am not sure that the explanatory statement accurately characterises what the amendment proposes. It says that the amendment ensures that ICBs and local authorities would “have a duty to carry out”, whereas at the point at which those words would be inserted it appears that the duty would also then fall to the patient’s responsible clinician. Amendment 19 by itself would essentially see CETRs overriding the judgment of the responsible clinician, which I think is quite a significant step to take. In any event, I wonder whether Amendment 20 undoes any of the good work that Amendment 19 proposes in the first place. It says that you can ignore the exhortations of Amendment 19 if there is a “compelling reason” to do so. My question to the drafters of Amendment 20 would be: what statutory interpretation should be placed on “compelling reason” and how might the courts be expected to adjudicate in the event of judicial review?

I support and have added my name to Amendment 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, around communication issues. As she rightly pointed out, this could have been linked to Amendment 2, which has already been debated at some length. I will not repeat the same arguments, but they apply to this amendment, which is why I support it. I also very strongly support the amendment on housing tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. I am chair of NHS England’s health and justice advisory board and have worked on the development of RECONNECT, the service to support people coming out of prison back into the community, which is very much a health-based initiative. Unless their housing needs are met at that point, their treatment, their support and their care plan can fall apart very quickly. Consequently, they are very quickly back in the criminal justice system. The same comparison can be made with this amendment. I strongly support housing being at the core of all issues relating to health and social care.

My Lords, I rise to support the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on Amendment 9. I know that there are other amendments in relation to the inclusion of parents and guardians. I raise just two small points in relation to this. When one looks at where this amendment is inserted in the list, the last of the persons currently listed who would receive the report is “the local authority in whose area the patient is ordinarily resident”. That potentially will not always be the local authority where there is a care order. Therefore, in those circumstances, the local authority is caught with an “other person who has parental responsibility”. However, that is not how this is drafted in other parts of the Bill, where an “other person who has parental responsibilities” means guardians et cetera. For consistency of drafting, we need to look at that. I know that the Minister has been very generous in the time that we have had with her and her officials, but we need a consistent phraseology within the Bill because with this amendment, if there was a special guardian the report would also go to the person with what is informally known as residual parental responsibility. Normally they are informed only, for instance, of the change of name of the child or if the child is going to leave the jurisdiction. We need to look at everybody with parental responsibility and have some consistent phraseology within the Bill when we are meaning the local authority when there is a care order and parental responsibility, to include all the different circumstances in which a child may have their status changed from the ordinary situation of living at home with parents when a court order is in place.

My Lords, this group of amendments aim to strengthen provisions for care (education) and treatment reviews—CETRs, as we have heard—for individuals with autism or a learning disability. These amendments collectively aim to address gaps in the current drafting and ensure that the needs and rights of these individuals are fully considered and respected. This reflects the dignity, respect and patient-centred care principles that strengthen the Bill. Amendments 6 and 12, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, highlight the importance of considering housing needs during care (education) and treatment review meetings. A stable, safe and appropriate home environment is a critical determinant of mental health and well-being. Failure to address housing can undermine the effectiveness of care plans, leading to avoidable crises, as the Minister put it earlier, and setbacks that can risk damaging the long-term success of these care plans. Can the Minister please clarify how housing needs will be integrated into the CETRs under the current provisions of the Bill? Amendments 8 to 10 and 15 to 17 focus on ensuring that the CETR process is inclusive and transparent. These amendments expand the list of those who should receive CETR reports to include the patient, their nominated person, independent mental health advocates and, where relevant, their parent or guardian. These measures should help foster trust and collaboration in the care process and create a more holistic approach to care planning by ensuring that all key individuals are kept informed. Can the Minister please confirm whether the current drafting of Clause 4 sufficiently addresses these inclusivity concerns or whether these amendments are necessary to achieve that goal? Amendments 19 and 20 address the issue of ensuring that recommendations from CETRs are acted upon. It is not enough for reviews to generate reports and recommendations: there must be a clear and enforceable duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to act on them. Amendment 19 would strengthen this by replacing the current requirement to “have regard to” recommendations with a “duty” to carry them out; while Amendment 20 ensures that “a compelling reason” must justify any deviation from these recommendations. These amendments reflect the frustration often experienced by patients and families when well-intentioned recommendations are not implemented. A stronger duty to implement recommendations would not only improve outcomes but restore trust in the system. Can the Minister outline how the Government intend to ensure that recommendations from CETRs are indeed implemented effectively? Amendment 13 highlights the importance of addressing communication needs during the CETR meetings. It is highly welcome that the issue of communication and language has been addressed by so many noble Lords. Effective communication is essential for patient-centred care, ensuring that patients can meaningfully participate in that very care. Ensuring that individuals’ additional or alternative communication needs are met is not merely a courtesy, it is a necessity and a must-have. This group of amendments highlights the importance of a holistic, inclusive and accountable approach to care and treatment reviews. They seek to ensure that the needs of patients, including those related to housing, communication or support networks, are fully recognised and addressed. They also emphasise the need for timely reviews and actionable recommendations backed by clear accountability mechanisms. His Majesty’s Official Opposition are broadly supportive of the aims of these amendments, and we look forward to the response from the Minister.

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments and contributions today. It seems a while ago that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, originally spoke, but I put on record that I hear her frustration about having been here before. I certainly acknowledge that; and I am grateful for the contribution and time that noble Lords have given to this really important matter, so that perhaps, finally, we will not have to keep going where we have been before.

19:15:00

Amendments 6 and 12, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, seek to ensure that care and treatment review meetings, and care (education) and treatment review meetings for children and young people, also identify the needs of the person concerned for housing—something also spoken to by my noble friend Lord Bradley and the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins—and that the review makes recommendations about whether and how these needs can be met. I absolutely agree that housing needs are crucial to supporting people well in their community; but, as has been discussed today, they can equally be a barrier to discharge for some patients and affect how they fare into the future.

However, there is already provision in the clause which makes it clear that the reviews can make recommendations about the patient’s discharge from hospital and in relation to how social care needs can be met. It is our intention that this would cover any relevant points and potential barriers, including housing, based on the needs of the individual, so the point is extremely well made. To assist the responsible commissioner, statutory guidance will help them determine who to involve in review meetings and which factors should be covered. This will include where the involvement of other partners, such as housing departments and housing organisations, is strongly sought.

We believe that statutory guidance is the most appropriate in this case to ensure that information on who should attend in different circumstances can be updated in line with best practice. Furthermore, placing a broad requirement to consider the housing needs of a patient in every case would mean that the commissioner and relevant professionals must consider the housing needs of all relevant patients, irrespective of whether it is a barrier to their discharge. This could have an unintended consequence of diverting the focus of these important reviews from their primary aim, which is to ensure that the patient is safe and receiving effective treatment while they are in hospital and active discharge planning is taking place.

I turn to Amendments 8 and 15, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and Amendments 9 and 16, tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and spoken to by the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett, Lady Watkins and Lady Berridge. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has spoken, not just today, very strongly—along with the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge—to press this point home about why parents are barely referred to. I know that the noble and learned Baroness knows that there is no intent to undermine the role of parents—in fact, far from it; perhaps I will address the general point and see where we get to. Of course, it is crucial to involve parents, guardians and those with parental responsibility in decisions around care and treatment. In the Bill there are multiple references to the need to involve any

“person who cares for the relevant patient or is interested in the relevant patient’s welfare”.

For the majority of children and young people, this will mean parents, guardians or those with parental responsibility. However, the terminology is deliberately broad to include carers and other family members, including step-parents and those with informal kinship arrangements in place. This is accepted terminology in the Care Act and the Mental Capacity Act. The other point about a broader category is that it ensures that parents are kept involved in their child’s care where appropriate and practicable, while the Bill remains inclusive of what I might call modern-day family arrangements. The noble and learned Baroness’s point is extremely well made, and I hope that she will consider my comments.

I entirely understand what the Minister has just said, although I do not agree with her, but the point she made about other persons is not contained in the clause that I was complaining about.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness for making that point, and I will gladly review this in the light of it. To return to the specific amendments, they would ensure that the patient, the patient’s nominated person, the independent mental health advocate and the parent, guardian or other person with parental responsibility receive in all cases a copy of the report following a care and treatment review meeting—or a care (education) and treatment review meeting for children and young people. The current drafting of the Bill is intended to make clear that a copy of the review report must be provided to those who have a legal duty to have regard to the review recommendations, so that any recommendations are implemented as appropriate. We recognise that there may be individual circumstances that mean it is appropriate for the report to be provided to other people, including the patient themselves. For children and young people, this report is most likely to be shared with a parent, guardian or other person with parental responsibility, but it is important that the legislation does not inadvertently create a legal requirement that must be complied with, which would not be appropriate for every person. A longer list of people with whom the report must be shared, in every case, may increase the chance of an individual withdrawing the consent for a review to be held if they do not wish for some or all the people to see the report. There may also be circumstances in which the report should reasonably be shared with other people in addition to those set out in the amendments—for example, a family member who has been part of the review process with the patient’s consent but is not the patient’s nominated person or someone with parental responsibility. We have tabled a government amendment to make it clear that the arrangements may include provision authorising or requiring a copy of the report to be given to other persons, so that the patient may also ask that a copy be provided to others or decide to provide it to others. Statutory guidance will help assist the responsible commissioner when exercising its functions, including when considering other persons who are to receive the report. We wish to allow flexibility for this, so that individual circumstances can be taken into account based on the needs of the patient and their wishes, rather than by providing a prescriptive list of people to whom the report is to be sent in every circumstance.

For clarification, is the Minister therefore saying that the Government’s amendment will lead to some statutory instrument, or will it be just at the discretion of the Minister to determine a list and change it without any scrutiny?

I am approaching this without going down the amendments’ route of having a fully prescriptive list, which might have unintended consequences.

I really need to understand the intent of the Minister’s Amendment 17 “authorising … a copy of the report to be given to other persons”. How do the Government intend to draw up that list, to change it and to make it public, so that people know that they are appropriate persons and might be able to get the report?

I hope it helps to advise that the responsible commissioner will be key to all that. I emphasise the need to design around the patient and their needs. If there are further points that I need to look at on this, I would be very pleased to. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising it. Amendments 10 and 17 are technical and minor government amendments that make it clear, for the avoidance of doubt, that the responsible commissioner may make arrangements for a care and treatment review report—or a care (education) and treatment review report for children and young people—to be provided to persons other than those listed in the clause. They could, for example, be those who have an interest in the recommendations because they are involved in the review process, such as an independent mental health advocate, a nominated person or a professional involved in the patient’s care and treatment. This would be subject to the patient’s consent. We believe that this is important to clarify, since the review process is likely to involve more people than those who are listed in the legislation, although this will vary according to the individual and their needs and circumstances. In addition, the Bill makes specific provision to clarify which persons and bodies are to receive the report in every case to ensure that they can comply with their duty to have regard to the review recommendations. I hope that these government amendments find favour with noble Lords. Amendments 11 and 18 were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, who raised the point that around a third of people have no CETR or CTR. My response is perhaps to provide the assurance that that is exactly why we are putting them on a statutory basis. It seems that Amendments 11 and 18 are intended to reduce the maximum amount of time between CTRs for adults and CETRs for children and young people from 12 months to six months following a patient’s initial review meeting. These amendments would apply to children and adults. I listened closely, as I have listened closely to all comments from noble Lords, but we believe that these amendments are somewhat unnecessary. Current drafting provides that review meetings take place at least once in a 12-month period, in line with the maximum timeframe within NHS England’s policy and guidance. This is in addition to the requirement that arrangements must be made for everyone to have a review promptly upon admission, within 14 days for children and 28 days for adults. Commissioners should use their judgment to determine the frequency of subsequent reviews, in line with the specific needs of the patient. Patients, their families and advocates can also request a review meeting at any point. There will be statutory guidance to provide commissioners with further information on factors to consider when determining whether more frequent reviews should take place. I understand the noble Lord’s point, but I hope that helps. For example, it is current practice that children under 18 have a review meeting every three months, and this would be articulated in the guidance. We consider it preferable to set out this information in statutory guidance, which can provide detailed case studies. That would not be possible if we set it out in the same way as primary legislation, not least because guidance can be readily updated in line with emerging best practice, including on frequency and considering particular circumstances.

19:30:00

Before I move away from the noble Lord’s amendments, I will go back to the point raised about whether the government amendment will lead to an SI. Let me say—I hope that this will be helpful—that it is appropriate for guidance on who should receive a review report to be covered in statutory guidance to allow flexibility for this to be shared with any relevant person. As I mentioned, that will be at the discretion of the responsible commissioner.

Yes, of course, I will give way—I have opened a can of worms, I see.

I have listened very carefully to the Minister about flexibility. Why is 12 months in the Bill? All I am trying to do is to change a statutory timeframe that the Government have put in the Bill to six months. That flexibility is not there because 12 months is in the Bill. I am trying to move that fixed point from 12 months to six months, regardless of what guidance says.

Yes, I understand the intention, but I refer back, perhaps usefully, to the point I made earlier that review meetings would take place at least once in a 12-month period; it is not a maximum—I think I have got it the right way round. It will be at least once in a 12-month period; it is not that it can be only once in a 12-month period. That is, as I said, in line with the maximum timeframe in NHS England’s policy and guidance. Amendment 13 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, relates to care and treatment reviews. The amendment seeks to ensure that a patient’s review makes recommendations about ensuring communication needs are met where there are additional or alternative communication needs. That is something we discussed very constructively in the first group and it was referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Effingham. We believe that current drafting already provides for that in the Bill. As set out in the clause, those meetings are to review any needs of the patient for social care or medical treatment and can make recommendations about whether and how those needs can be met. This should include recommendations about the patient’s communication needs, which may be important in ensuring that their treatment is effective and to support their discharge from hospital. As set out in the clause, a number of named persons and bodies are to have regard to the recommendations of the review. That will give them the appropriate legal weight to ensure that they are considered and that there must be clear reasons if they are not taken forward. The Bill also introduces statutory care and treatment plans for all patients detained under the Act, excluding those under short-term sections. We plan to set out the required contents of the statutory care and treatment plan in regulations. It is our intention that this includes information about communication needs to enable the treating clinician to consider the protected characteristics and individual needs of the patient, which speaks to the point I made in the first group to my noble friend Lady Whitaker, and to make reasonable adjustments. Regulations will also require that the report from a patient’s care (education) and treatment review is attached to the care and treatment plan so that recommendations are included as part of this. Finally, I turn to Amendments 19 and 20, tabled and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins and Lady Bennett. These amendments seek to ensure that there is a duty on integrated care boards and local authorities to carry out recommendations from a patient’s CTR, or CETR if the patient is a child or young person, unless there is a compelling reason provided for why a recommendation cannot be carried out. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, for their differing but nevertheless significant contributions. These review recommendations should be given the appropriate legal weight to ensure that they are given serious consideration. We have decided to include these provisions in the Bill to put the existing NHS England policy on a statutory footing. The duty to “have regard” is a well-established duty that clinicians, ICBs and other public bodies are used to applying and it already exists within the Act. The noble Earl, Lord Effingham, asked how the Government will ensure that these recommendations are implemented effectively. I hope that my comments will assist the noble Earl. Where effective care and treatment is the central aim, we would expect careful consideration of all recommendations. Where those bodies decide not to accept a relevant recommendation, we would expect them to have very good reasons for making that decision. It is an appropriate duty in this context because we do not intend to place an absolute duty on a body to follow recommendations in every case—that would be incompatible with understanding the individual needs and requirements of the person concerned. The legislation must not impose unreasonable duties on relevant bodies that they cannot fulfil or where it would be inappropriate for them to do so; for example, if a recommendation was made that was outside of their purview. The Bill already requires that certain named persons or bodies carefully consider the recommendations and give them appropriate weight. In view of all those comments, I thank noble Lords and ask that they do not press their amendments.

My Lords, I thank everybody who has taken part in the debate on this group of amendments. We were, in essence, trying to get answers to the following questions. Who is responsible for drawing up the care plans and for reviewing the care (education) and treatment reviews? Who is responsible for ensuring that what is in those plans is compliant with the law? Who is responsible for making sure that it actually happens? Who is responsible for finding out whether it has not happened? Who carries the can if it has not happened? At various points in the Minister’s answer, I was quite hopeful, then, towards the end, we went down the slope quite badly, because it turns out that, apparently, duties will not be put on people, and that is highly regrettable. The Minister does not need to explain to the Committee the difference between a statutory code of practice and a statutory instrument; the issue my noble friend was trying to get to is the extent to which Members of this House will see that these plans reflect what was intended in the law and what scope they will have to call it out if they do not. I am pleased that it will be a statutory code of practice. That is one step up from nothing—it is not great, but it is better. I am also glad that the Minister said that care and treatment plans will be put in regulations. Will those regulations be done under the affirmative or the negative procedure? That is quite important. In light of all our discussions, we in this House should have the chance to examine that at considerable length and, if it is not right, to have a second go at it. It is always salutary to sit and listen to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the subject on which she is quite rightly famous, not just in the House but outside it. I listened to her strong statement. She will know from other discussions that we have had on the wider subject of health that I have said many times, and I believe it to be true, that we have a health and social care system that is openly predicated on people’s families doing much of the work, and that is never more so than when it comes to discharge. She will have heard me bang on about this before, but I have a considerable degree of concern about what happens to people who do not have families or children. We have never done research on hospital discharge, but I suspect that, if people do not have a relative standing by the bed saying, “No. You are not discharging this person because they are not fit to go home”, they end up being discharged far too early, and I suspect they then go back into hospital as acute admissions a result of that. That said, I understand what the noble and learned Baroness says about the involvement of parents. However, in 10% of cases, the parent is not the right person. We have heard that in evidence before, which she may recall, where young people who have been subject to mental health treatment have talked about problems within their families. Similarly, people under the Mental Capacity Act have sometimes been the subject of overbearing, overprotective parenting that they have found to be detrimental to them. I am not being anti-parent or asking that parents be excluded. Nobody knows better than the noble and learned Baroness that families are complex, and, as the Minister said, we must make sure that there is the scope to do the right thing for a child.

The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is absolutely right. Any amendment I might put forward in future would have to allow for that, as there must be some parents who would not be suitable.

It is getting late, and people wish to have their dinner because they been here a long time. I think we have had a partial response from the Minister. I believe that care and treatment plans and reviewing them are sufficiently important that some of us will want to go away to see whether, on issues that we may not have got technically right, we can come back, perhaps in discussion with the Minister, to satisfy ourselves.

When I review all of the debates, particularly where there are areas where we need further discussion or information, I will be glad to pursue that. I give that assurance to the Committee.

I thank the Minister and welcome that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 6 withdrawn.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.25 pm.