Russian Maritime Activity and UK Response

12:56:00

With permission, I wish to make a statement on the UK’s response to recent Russian maritime activity. [Interruption.] I am glad that the House waited for this statement. A foreign vessel, Yantar, is in the North sea, having passed through British waters. Let me be clear: it is a Russian spy ship, used for gathering intelligence and mapping the UK’s critical underwater infrastructure. Yantar entered the UK exclusive economic zone about 45 miles off the British coast on Monday. For the past two days, the Royal Navy has deployed HMS Somerset and HMS Tyne to monitor the vessel, every minute, in our waters, and I have changed the Royal Navy’s rules of engagement so that our warships can get closer and better track Yantar. So far, the ship has complied with international rules of navigation, but this is the second time that Yantar has entered our waters in recent months. In November, the ship was also closely watched, and was detected loitering over UK critical undersea infrastructure. To deter any potential threat, I took measured steps at that time as part of a clear, direct response to the Russian vessel. Royal Air Force maritime patrol aircraft, alongside HMS Cattistock, HMS Tyne and Royal Fleet Auxiliary Proteus, were deployed to shadow Yantar’s every movement. Today, I also confirm to the House that I authorised a Royal Navy submarine to surface close to Yantar—strictly as a deterrent measure—to make it clear that we had been covertly monitoring its every move. The ship then left UK waters without further loitering, and sailed down to the Mediterranean. As colleagues will understand, I will not comment further for reasons of operational security. However, I thank all the personnel involved for their dedication and professionalism. I also want President Putin to hear this message: we see you, we know what you are doing, and we will not shy away from robust action to protect this country. With our NATO allies, we are strengthening our response to ensure that Russian ships and aircraft cannot operate in secrecy near the UK or near NATO territory. This activity is another example of growing Russian aggression, targeting our allies abroad and us at home. The heads of MI6 and the CIA recently made a joint statement, saying that Russia is waging a “reckless campaign” of sabotage across Europe. We are seeing periodic incursions of Russian military aircraft into airspace for which we are responsible, and on Christmas day the EstLink 2 undersea cable between Finland and Estonia was damaged. Many analysts believe that that was caused by a vessel in Russia’s shadow fleet. Russia is dangerous but fundamentally weak. In Ukraine, it has suffered devastatingly high rates of casualties over three years in a war it thought it would win in a week. Compounding the humiliation, Putin has been forced to turn to North Korea to reinforce its frontline fighters. While the strategic defeat in Syria has exposed Russia’s diminishing power on the global stage, at home the Russian economy faces crippling strains. Nevertheless, Russia remains the most pressing and immediate threat to Britain, and I want to assure the House and the British people that any threat will be met with strength and resolve. First, we are delivering on the foundation of security in our plan for change by making Britain secure at home. Yantar has now passed through the Dover strait and is in Dutch waters. In September, RAF Typhoons scrambled to intercept two Russian Bear F aircraft operating near the UK. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service is also playing an indispensable role in safeguarding offshore infrastructure with its multi-role ocean surveillance ship, RFA Proteus. Secondly, we are making Britain strong abroad, working with NATO and joint expeditionary force allies. The UK activated Nordic Warden with JEF partners after the EstLink 2 cable damage. The operation is tracking potential threats to undersea infrastructure, monitoring the movements of the Russian shadow fleet and sending out real-time warnings of suspicious activity to JEF allies and to NATO. Today, I can confirm that the RAF will provide P-8 Poseidon and Rivet Joint surveillance aircraft to join the new Baltic Sentry NATO deployment to protect critical infrastructure in the Baltic sea. Thirdly, with allies we are piling the pressure on Putin. This year, the UK will provide more financial aid in military support to Ukraine than at any time since the full-scale invasion began: £4.5 billion to deliver military support, enhance training and strengthen industrial collaboration. The UK is also leading the way in finding ways to put pressure on the Russian economy, including sanctioning more than 100 ships in the Russian shadow fleet, which is more than any other nation; working with other countries to stop the Russian military acquiring the goods, equipment and technologies it requires to continue its fight and war against Ukraine; and with allies, exposing the activities of the Russian intelligence services, expelling Russian intelligence officers and sanctioning individuals responsible for hostile activity against the UK. Russian aggression will not be tolerated at home or in Ukraine. That is why one of the first acts of this Government was for the Prime Minister to launch the strategic defence review, why the Government have increased defence spending next year by almost £3 billion, and why we will set a path to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP in the spring. This new era of threat demands a new era for defence. Change is essential, not optional, and the Government are determined to meet the challenge and determined to deliver for defence. We will protect the homeland and our critical national infrastructure and we will make Britain secure at home and strong abroad.

I call the shadow Secretary of State.

13:04:00

I thank the Secretary of State for early sight of his statement. I am particularly grateful to him for the greater level of transparency he has chosen to show to the House on the grey zone threat from Russia. We welcome that transparency, because it is critical for our war readiness as a nation that, as far as we are able and without compromising our national and operational security, we tell the British public the truth about the serious nature of the Russian threat and what that will inevitably mean for public expenditure on defence. I specifically welcome the change to the Royal Navy’s rules of engagement. That sends a powerful signal to Putin that we will not be intimidated and that if his aim is to keep pushing the boundaries of malign activity in our waters and those proximate to us, we will respond. I confirm that the Government will have the full backing of His Majesty’s Opposition in doing so. We stand shoulder to shoulder with the Government on Ukraine and we stand shoulder to shoulder with them on deterring the wider Russian threat that he has outlined today. I appreciate that it is unusual to go into such operational detail, including about the operational deployment of submarines. Equally, we appreciate that this is about sending the strongest possible signal to our adversaries about our clear intent to protect and defend our homeland. If I may, I have a number of specific questions about the statement and its particular contents. A key issue here is the safety and protection of critical undersea infrastructure. Beyond the operations the Secretary of State mentioned in his speech, such as Nordic Warden, will he confirm whether he is looking to widen the number of international partners proactively involved in addressing the threat to the North sea and the Baltic? What discussions is he having to drive an internationally co-ordinated response, including through NATO? Given our prominent role within NATO, we have a clear opportunity to lead the way in developing cutting-edge underwater technologies that address those threats directly. Will the Secretary of State confirm that he is prioritising development of underwater capabilities, such as uncrewed systems, through pillar 2 of AUKUS and also with European allies, and in particular that research and development investment into capabilities to protect critical infrastructure will be an urgent priority? Moreover, will he commit to doing everything possible to hinder the abilities of GRU operatives, including all possible action in concert with allies to restrict their ability to enter the United Kingdom? I am very grateful to the personnel of our Navy, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and our Air Force involved in addressing the threats. I sincerely thank them, as well as the crews of allied vessels who assisted in tracking the ship through their waters. I have one particularly important point. The Secretary of State said that “Russia is dangerous but fundamentally weak.” Does he nevertheless agree that Russia’s willingness to tolerate such enormous losses on the battlefield against Ukraine underlines that, in conventional military terms, it remains a formidable foe before one even considers its unconventional capabilities? In my view, Russia remains a critical threat to the United Kingdom. For that reason, I very much welcome the Secretary of State’s clear decision to be more open with the country about the threat we face. I urge him to ensure that, from the heart of Government, we have a serious grip on communicating and planning for the fact that we face the most serious nation-on-nation military threat to our homeland for generations. In turn, that means that the strategic defence review needs to be fundamentally threat-driven, prioritising homeland defence and putting the necessary resource in place. To conclude, does the fact that we have seen the RFA, the Royal Navy, submarines, helicopters, P-8 aircraft and other assets involved in tracking Russian activity not show the full extent of the work needed to defend our island and deter our adversaries, and ultimately why we need to increase defence spending as soon as possible? The Secretary of State said in his statement, as he did at oral questions—I welcome that—that the SDR will report in the spring. I urge him to ensure that that is in March, at the very earliest opportunity, and that we will achieve at least 2.5% spending on defence this Parliament.

I thank the shadow Defence Secretary for welcoming the statement and the Government’s greater transparency. He, like me, has confirmed that he sees Russia as the most critical threat to the UK. He has been a Defence Minister and he understands, as he acknowledges, the importance of sending the strongest possible signals to our adversaries. That is the underlying reason for the decision I have taken to make this statement today. The shadow Secretary of State argues that our response provides the UK with an opportunity to demonstrate leadership within NATO. I think we have already done that, not by asserting our argument but by our actions: launching and leading through the JEF 10 nations the Nordic Warden response to the attack on EstLink 2 and now by confirming that we will play a leading role in the new NATO deployment in the Baltic, which is linked to the work that we are doing through Nordic Warden. The shadow Secretary of State asks about the priority for our undersea cables for our homeland infrastructure. These cables are not simply a technical network. They are the infrastructure for the things on which we depend for our daily lives: the operation of the internet; the supply of energy; and communications with other parts of the world. He will therefore have seen and noted in the terms of reference of the strategic defence review, launched by the Prime Minister within two weeks of the Government being elected in July, that defending and reinforcing the homeland defence of Britain is foremost in those terms of reference. We will, as I have said, report on the strategic defence review in the spring.

Members are bobbing who were not in the Chamber at the start of the debate. We have made a note of all their names and the time that they arrived and they will not be called to speak. If they do not know whether that means them, they should speak to their Whip. I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

I thank my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for advance sight of his statement. It is very apt that he should be making this statement, because during our Defence Committee visit to RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland last week, we discussed this very issue. Clearly, there is greater need for wider availability and capacity for Royal Navy and other maritime capability to meet the rising Russian activity in waters surrounding the UK. I refer, for example, to the threats to critical undersea infrastructure. I have two questions for the Secretary of State. First, what lessons have the Government learned from the Finnish investigation into Eagle S, which was accused of damaging the undersea infrastructure between Finland and Estonia? Secondly, what measures are available to the Government to stop vessels from traversing UK waters, to build on the recent insurance checks that were put in place in October? Is sanctioning vessels our only option?

I thank the Chair and the members of the Defence Committee not just for the work that they are doing, but for the work that they are willing to do outside this House. I thank them for the visit that they paid to Lossiemouth to see for themselves some of the essential work that our forces personnel and civilians are doing in defending this country. He asks about the Finnish investigation into the EstLink 2 cable damage. That is for the Finns to complete and to confirm the findings of their investigation. It will be at that point that we can draw out and discuss any lessons that there might be for the UK. We defend more fiercely than perhaps any other nation in the world the freedom of navigation in our seas. Ships of all states may navigate through our territorial waters. They are subject to the right of innocent passage, and so some of the steps that the Chair of the Defence Committee might urge the Government to take are simply not available to us under the United Nations law of the open seas. It is for that reason that we take the steps and actions that I have reported to the House—to make sure that we monitor, we watch and we track, so that those who might enter our waters with malign intent, or try to undertake any malign activity, know that we see them and know that they will face the strongest possible response.

It is also important for Front Benchers to arrive on time to hear the opening statement—I believe that the Liberal Democrat spokesperson was four minutes late—and it is important for them to know that they may not be called in the future, but, on this occasion, I do invite the hon. Lady to speak.

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and apologies for my lateness. I thank the Minister for advance sight of the statement. It goes without saying that we stand shoulder to shoulder with the Government in our support for their actions against the Russian threat. We also thank all the service personnel involved in dealing with this threat. The Liberal Democrats believe that our defence policy and conventional forces should be focused on defending British territory and playing a leading role in our immediate European neighbourhood. As such, we welcome the Government’s announcement that the Royal Airforce will provide P-8 Poseidon and Rivet Joint maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft to join Baltic Sentry under NATO command. Action to defend the realm is particularly pressing in light of recent escalations of hybrid threats from Russia. The suspected sabotage of undersea cables, including the damage to Estlink-2 on Christmas day, underscores the urgency of this moment. Such cables are the life blood of international connectivity and commerce and any attack on them is an attack on the collective stability of Europe. The events involving the tanker Eagle S and its links to sanctioned entities supporting Putin’s war machine are deeply alarming. This is not an isolated incident, but part of a broader pattern of aggression that demands robust and co-ordinated action. This Government must rebuild trust with our European neighbours. The UK’s national interest and security have always been inextricably tied to that of Europe. From the second world war through to the cold war and the current war in Ukraine, our shared defence has been vital. To that end, we urge the Government to work hand in glove with NATO countries to support Ukraine during the war and the rebuilding afterwards, including finding lawful ways to use the $300 billion of frozen Russian state assets as reparations; sign a comprehensive security treaty with the European Union to strengthen collaborative defence; and collaborate on developing cutting-edge defence technologies and ensure inter-operability with NATO allies to respond effectively in times of crisis. We also face serious national vulnerabilities. The UK lacks land-based anti-ballistic missile systems to protect critical national infrastructure. Questions remain about the ability to secure the Greenland-UK gap. We welcome the Government’s commitment to spending 2.5% of GDP on defence, but when will they outline a clear timeline for achieving that? This is not the time for complacency. The threats are clear, and the response must be decisive.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I have some sympathy with the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire). Perhaps she, like I, thought that there would be more interest in this House in the operation of the Competition and Markets Authority than the length of the urgent question proved was the case. It may just be that I can run a little faster than her.

It gives a whole new meaning to “running to the defence”.

But Madam Deputy Speaker, I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for her support for the UK contribution to the Baltic Sentry NATO operation. We play a leading role in NATO and we will play a leading role in this operation in the Baltic. It reinforces our allies, and by doing that we reinforce our own defences and strengthen collectively the deterrence that we can, as NATO nations, offer to any future aggression and aggressive intent from President Putin. The hon. Lady urges us to work hand in glove with allies over the support for Ukraine, which is what we are committed to do. It is why the Prime Minister was in Kyiv last week, when he confirmed the record level of funding for this year to support military aid to Ukraine and when he signed a 100-year partnership with Ukraine. Finally, he made the commitment that I think the hon. Lady is looking for, when he said that, whatever happens next, our job is to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position both on the battlefield and at any negotiating table. That is what I, as Defence Secretary, am determined to do for this country.

Putin and his autocratic friends mistake our freedom and openness for weakness, so may I enthusiastically welcome the strength of the response to the Russian activity? The Secretary of State will be aware of the reports in Newsweek in recent days about patents that have been filed in China for specific cable-cutting technology, presumably for military use by the Chinese. Can he reassure the House that, as well as being active in deterring Putin, the Government are taking a similarly robust stance on any attempts by China to cut the cables?

I reassure my hon. Friend that I am aware of what he cites, and of the pace of development of many aspects of Chinese technology and equipment. Much of it may be for civilian use, but I assure him that we, with allies, are keeping a very close eye on what China is developing.

I thank the Secretary of State for the action that he has taken, and all the work of our servicemen to combat this threat. The Yantar has been a well-known threat for quite a long time, but Russia has also been very capable of using private and commercial vessels to map cables and undermine our security. The reality is that we need more resources in our Royal Navy and other services. What assurance can he give the House that a bid has been put together to ensure that the Treasury properly resources him and our servicemen to do a job that we all depend on?

Our UK servicemen and women will appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s thanks. I can give him that assurance. Most importantly, I can give him the commitment that we made to the British people at the election that the Government will increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP—a level that Britain has not spent on defence since 2010.

Over recent years, we have seen a large increase in Russian activity of this type, and it is clear that the need for subsurface protection is critical and increasing. The UK sub fleet is built at BAE Systems in my constituency, and we play a vital role in countering this threat. Will the Secretary of State comment on the support that the Government will continue to provide to ensure that the submarine fleet continues to play this central role in the defence of our nation?

I can indeed. I, too, am intensely proud of everything that is done, designed and developed at the Barrow shipyard. It is central to our UK security, and has been for decades. Like me, she will be proud that the Royal Navy submarine that surfaced close to the Yantar in November, which led to the Yantar heading directly off to the Mediterranean, was built in that Barrow shipyard.

I am sure that the Secretary of State agrees that our Royal Navy and RFA are the best in the world. They need to be equipped with the vessels and crew to do their job and address threats such as those I am grateful to him for articulating. He will know that Portsmouth harbour, which Gosport sits opposite, is home to the six Type 45s that were commissioned without adequate propulsion units. Could he update us on the T-45 power improvement programme? Will it be sufficient for T-45s to be allowed to deploy with the upcoming carrier strike group? More broadly, what is he doing as part of the SDR to ensure that a significant and sufficient proportion of our naval personnel have seagoing liability?

I am so pleased that, alongside the Royal Navy, the hon. Lady cites the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, which plays an essential part in our maritime defence and operations. I give her that assurance on the Type 45s’ participation in the carrier strike group. If she would like me to write to her in more detail about the progress on the engine upgrade programme, I will happily do so.

I thank the Secretary of State for such a strong statement, which makes it clear to Vladimir Putin that this aggression will not be tolerated. Recently, Ministers were kind enough to answer a series of written questions from me on quick reaction alert, subsea cables and defence of the high north, all pointing to additional threats from Russian forces and the need for a strong response. With the strategic defence review well under way, how is the Secretary of State ensuring that it is flexible in dealing with those changing and evolving threats, and that we learn from Ukraine, and from the recent example of the Finnish ship in the Baltic sea?

My hon. Friend is one of the strongest voices recognising that the high north will become strategically much more essential. Degrees of conflict and contest are likely to grow there, particularly as climate change leads to the opening up of the northern passage. If he looks at the terms of reference of the strategic defence review, and the work of the review and challenge groups, which have been an essential part of the external leadership of it, he will see that the concerns that he raises are central to the SDR’s work. When it is published, I am sure that he will find evidence that the caution he gives to the House is taken very seriously by the Government.

The activities of the Yantar may be an escalation, but this is not the first instance of such activity; it is almost two years since I first raised concerns about the activities of Russian vessels in the waters around Shetland. Events in Finland at Christmas show that Russia is prepared to go further, and we must show that we are determined to meet any challenge of that sort. This is a strategic threat for the United Kingdom as a whole, but it is particularly acute for our island communities, which rely on cables for digital and energy connectivity, quite apart from the pipelines serving the oil and gas industry. Will the Secretary of State speak to the energy companies and his colleagues in the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, and ensure that our island communities are not left as a soft target for the next escalation in this business?

The right hon. Gentleman is right that this is not the first instance; indeed, the total loss of digital connection that his constituency suffered in 2022 vividly demonstrated the dependency of such communities on this critical infrastructure in their everyday life, and their vulnerability to damage or sabotage. I give him the assurance that he seeks. In the consideration of the strategic defence review, and certainly in its implementation, that is exactly the sort of question and challenge that we will meet.

I thank the Secretary of State for his clear statement, and for spelling out why it is so important that we protect these deep-sea cables. Something like 95% of all international data goes through them. They are the backbone of the internet. Given those facts, can he assure us that the protection of that critical infrastructure will be at the forefront of the minds of everybody completing the strategic defence review?

My hon. Friend makes a powerful case. I certainly give him that assurance.

I welcome the Secretary of State’s candour. It is important that the country understands the threats to the nation. It is estimated that the economy would lose tens of millions of pounds per hour if there were a data loss. These cables are strategically central to our national wellbeing. With that in mind, the Government have to explain to the public why we have to keep increasing defence spending, given what the consequences would be if we did not do so. If we move above 2.5% to 3% or 3.5%, it will not be because President Trump is pushing that narrative, as many Presidents have done before him; it will be because that is the strategic requirement of Europe and NATO to head off clear acts of aggression—close to a declaration of hybrid war on NATO. It is vital that the public understand why defence spending is so important at this time.

As a leading member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the right hon. Gentleman understands better than most in this House the concerns and perspectives of other NATO nations, and he demonstrates that this morning. On the question of the commitment to increase defence spending, everyone agrees that defence spending must rise. The commitment that my party made going into the election well predated the result of the US election. It is a commitment that we are determined to honour. If it is the case that everyone agrees defence spending must rise to meet the increasing threats, there is certainly a lead responsibility for Government and Ministers to help explain that to the public, but I would hope that everyone who believes defence spending must rise can and will play a part in conveying that to the public as well.

Although out of sight, our offshore infrastructure is absolutely vital to the smooth running of the economy, and any disruption would have a huge impact on my constituents in North East Derbyshire—it would be truly catastrophic. Can the Secretary of State assure me that we will not take the security of that infrastructure for granted and that we will take the necessary steps to provide that security as part of the SDR?

I very much welcome my hon. Friend’s voice from landlocked North East Derbyshire recognising the fact that this is not simply a concern of maritime communities or islands, but of the whole country and for all of us in our everyday lives. High up, and with specific focus, the strategic defence review’s terms of reference, point to the need to review and reinforce the defence of our British homeland. Central to that consideration, in the light of our experience in recent months, will be the rising Russian aggression and the increase in such incidents.

I thank the Secretary of State for his profoundly important statement, which is immensely reassuring, but may I ask about pre-emption? We all know that Russia is no respecter of international law, and an over-zealous and overcautious interpretation of the legal constraints on the UK armed forces could be very destructive. Are the Government refusing to rule out pre-emptive action against a hostile ship threatening critical national infrastructure, albeit if it lies under international waters, and will he agree that an open mind on pre-emption is a stronger deterrent than ruling it out?

The right hon. Gentleman has huge experience in this field, so he will recognise that I simply will not and cannot get into responding to hypotheticals. He urges me not to allow undue constraint of perhaps established practices or rules where there is a good case for flexibility. I hope he will take as a signal of the serious intent that I will bring, with the approach and return of the Yantar to UK waters, my readiness, as I have reported, to alter the permissions that the Royal Navy was using so that, should the captains of the warships that we deployed to watch and track the Yantar require it, they could go closer, see better and determine more carefully what exactly the Yantar was up to. Like the surfacing of the submarine in November, that was a move to deter and discourage the sort of activity that we simply do not want to see in our waters.

Keeping ourselves safer at home means ensuring that Putin loses abroad, because when Putin is finished in Ukraine—whenever that may be—he will come for more. Defeating him means showing him that we have the resolve and the resource to defeat him in the future. Can the Secretary of State assure me that, as part of the SDR, we will have a way to combat, prevent and protect ourselves from Russia?

I hope the content of my statement—the assertion that the most immediate and concerning threat to the UK comes from Russia—and the action I have taken in response to the Russian spy ship, Yantar, being in our waters again, will reassure my hon. Friend that, exactly as he urges and as the shadow Defence Secretary the hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) has recognised, Russia is a serious menace. In Ukraine, it is fighting the first full-scale war in Europe since the second world war, but as the shadow Defence Secretary said, its aggression particularly in the grey zone—warned about by the heads of the CIA and M16—tells us that this is a regime intent on disruption and on disrupting our way of life. My hon. Friend is right to start by saying that the defence of the UK starts in Ukraine. If Putin prevails in Ukraine, he simply will not stop in Ukraine.

I welcome the Secretary of State’s statement and the actions it details to intervene in Russian activity in the waters around these islands. I also commend the diligence and professionalism of those men and women in uniform in the Royal Navy, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the RAF. He said in his statement, though, that the UK will “continue to lead the way” on sanctions against Russia’s shadow fleet, but the UK is not leading the way on sanctions, is it? A Sky News investigation last week found out that the Government have no record of how many investigations they are carrying out into breaches of Russian sanctions. That follows a previous investigation showing that goods, including luxury cars, fossil fuels and items that can be weapons—or whose components can be converted into weaponry—have been flowing between the UK and Russia since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Surely the Secretary of State must be concerned that inaction elsewhere in Whitehall is potentially putting men and women in uniform in the UK’s armed forces at risk from Russia’s malign aggression.

I certainly do not share the hon. Gentleman’s assertion. I simply say to him that I made the argument that the UK is leading the way with allies in action to deal with the Russian shadow fleet, and I confirm that we have sanctioned 100 ships—more than any other nation—that compose that loosely networked Russian shadow fleet.

I thank the Secretary of State for his statement about Russia’s activities, which are concerning but not surprising. I am chair of the all-party parliamentary group on Nordic countries. Does he agree that close co-operation with our Nordic allies is important in dealing with this threat? Building on the comments of the shadow Secretary of State, my hon. Friend the Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge), and the broader discussion about transparency and information sharing with the United Kingdom, before Christmas every Swedish household received the pamphlet, “Om krisen eller kriget kommer”, meaning, “In case of crisis or war”. Sweden does that regularly. Is it time for us to look into that?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the work he does on chairing the all-party group on Nordic countries in this House. One of the benefits of all Nordic countries now being part of NATO, and of the very close defence and security relationships we have with those countries, is that we can indeed learn from each other. It is not just the new approach taken before Christmas by the Swedish, but the sense that a country is stronger if its society is resilient and if societies recognise they may be under threat and are ready to respond if required. There are certainly some lessons for us in the UK as we consider the future and consider the rising level and complexity of threats we may face in the years ahead.

Last week, alongside other hon. Members and peers in the armed forces parliamentary scheme, I visited the nation’s flagship Prince of Wales aircraft carrier. The commanding officer Captain Will Blackett and his team showed us the ship’s capability, and we witnessed an incredible demonstration of how they can respond. But when we asked about how they would respond to ballistic missiles, or how this place and other institutions are protected from hostile states, it was a terrifying response. I realise the strategic defence review is ongoing and that there is a commitment to get to 2.5%, but with President Trump threatening to pull out of NATO, that is not enough. What plans does the Secretary of State have to go faster and to put our military retention and recruitment on a stronger footing, so that our country and infrastructure are properly protected?

Captain Blackett and his crew were delighted that the hon. Lady and other members of the armed forces parliamentary scheme were able to go on board to be briefed and look at what an extraordinary piece of British military kit we have. The strategic defence review is set up to examine exactly the sort of points that she raises. It is designed to look at the threats we may face, the capabilities we may need, the resources available, and, in particular, the accelerated way in which the nature of warfare is changing and the central role of accelerating technology development in the changing natures both of the threat and of the capabilities that we must develop with allies to meet that threat.

If Putin’s Russia is the greatest threat to peace in Europe, the second greatest threat must be any American decision to turn their back on NATO. Can the Secretary of State assure us that he will do everything in his power to convince his new counterparts in the United States Administration of the seriousness of the threat that Russia poses?

I do not expect the new Administration to require any coaching on the threats from Russia or other parts of the world. I expect that Administration to be one who take defence and security seriously, and who recognise that a secure, free and openly trading Europe is in America’s very best interests.

The Secretary of State said in his statement that we are strengthening our response to ensure that Russian ships cannot operate in secrecy near UK territory. He will be aware of an occasion just over a year ago when a Russian submarine was chased from the harbour in Cork by the British Navy, because the Irish navy does not have the sonar equipment to detect potential underwater threats. Those threats affect about 97% of the world’s communication and internet traffic. What communication or interaction has the Secretary of State had with the Irish Government and the Irish armed forces to strengthen our co-operation with them and ensure that the west coast of these British Isles is protected?

We do not and will not comment on specific operational details like that. Needless to say, however, we work very closely with the Irish Government on such matters. Recently, our Chief of the Defence Staff met his counterpart from Ireland.

I commend the Defence Secretary for his statement and for the actions that he has taken—particularly to change the rules of engagement to allow for the closer inspection of that vessel. However, he does not control all the maritime assets of this country. In December, the Transport Secretary told me that there had been no instances of the UK using its agencies to board and inspect bits of the Russian black and grey fleet. Will he speak to his colleagues across Government to ensure that we use all the arms of government and its agencies to interdict unlicensed, unregistered threats to our security?

Where there are grounds for interdiction, the Government collectively will certainly be ready, with the appropriate agency, to take action. The right hon. Gentleman will know, having served as a distinguished Defence Minister for some years, that that sort of close co-ordination and collective action is a feature of the national security secretariat that we have at the very heart of our Government. It plays an important role and ensures that we can deal with any such threats or aggressive activity in the most appropriate way.

I thank the Defence Secretary, his team and the service personnel involved for their robust response—that is exactly the kind of thing we need when dealing with Russia. He is right when he says that the Russian army in Ukraine has nearly been destroyed, but of course the Russian navy—particularly the northern fleet, which we have to deal with in the UK—is still at strength. He has said a couple of times that Russia is the most pressing and immediate threat to the UK. In the light of those facts, does he still think it is the right decision to send the UK carrier group—which, given the Royal Navy’s size, is most of its deployable force—to the far east for five months this year?

Yes.

Undersea cables in the modern era are as vital to this country as the merchant navy convoys were in the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942, and they are equally vulnerable. Taking shape on the banks of the Clyde at the moment are the state-of-the-art Type 26 frigates, which have mission bays on board. The right hon. Gentleman is fleet of foot—as we have heard, he won a foot race today—but we are in an underwater arms race. Will he do all he can to ensure that, when those ships take to sea, their mission bays bristle with the necessary underwater equipment to take on that threat?

Those bays are designed to be interchangeable, and they will do exactly that.

It is clear that Putin is testing the west’s resolve. I welcome the rigour of the statement. The threat to our underground cables is an international issue. Does the Secretary of State agree that the United Nations response has been disappointing, and that its convention on the law of the sea is wholly inadequate to deal with such subversion and, indeed, is out of date? What steps are being taken internationally to get concerted action to protect the undersea cables on which every nation depends?

I think the problem is less with the basic rules of the sea and more with observance by states that wilfully test the limits or contravene them. That is why the actions that I have reported to the House, in the instance of the Yantar in British waters, are exactly the sort of steps that nations such as the UK will continue to take, working with allies—particularly close NATO allies.

I thank the Secretary of State very much for his statement. Nobody can be in any doubt whatsoever about the strength of his words on what it means for us in the United Kingdom to stand firm. We thank him for that determination and his strong voice, which we in this Chamber all support. When the naval crew of HMS Somerset were called back to their ship on Christmas day, the message was clear: the Russians do not take a holiday, but neither do our Royal Navy crews. Russia’s perpetual activity in pressing towards our boundaries outlines the need for the complete preparedness of our Navy. Will the Secretary of State outline whether greater support is needed to ensure that our Navy is at full strength, given that our service fleet is now smaller than those of France and Italy?

We are grateful to those service personnel—not just the crew of the HMS Somerset, who were, as the hon. Gentleman rightly says, mobilised on Christmas day to respond to the EstLink 2 damage, but the 10,000 servicemen and women who were deployed away from home at Christmas—for their service. We know that they do it to keep the rest of us safe, and we are very grateful.[Official Report, 28 January 2025; Vol. 761, c. 1WC.] (Correction)

That concludes proceedings on the statement. I will give the Secretary of State a moment so that he can walk out—not run, as he did earlier on. Bills Presented Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill Presentation and First Reading (Standing Order No. 57) Secretary Liz Kendall, supported by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Pat McFadden, Secretary Jonathan Reynolds and Georgia Gould, presented a Bill to make provision about the prevention of fraud against public authorities and the making of erroneous payments by public authorities; about the recovery of money paid by public authorities as a result of fraud or error; and for connected purposes. Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow, and to be printed (Bill 167) with explanatory notes (Bill 167-EN). Consular Assistance (Journalists) Bill Presentation and First Reading (Standing Order No. 57) Blair McDougall, supported by Mr Alex Barros-Curtis, Rachel Blake, Mr Connor Rand, Alex Sobel, Mr Alistair Carmichael, Phil Brickell, Chris Law, Sir Iain Duncan Smith, Tom Tugendhat and Ms Marie Rimmer, presented a Bill to make provision for a right to consular assistance for British journalists abroad who have been detained or held hostage; and for connected purposes. Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 7 March, and to be printed (Bill 168).