UK Strategy Towards the Arctic (International Relations and Defence Committee Report)

Motion to Take Note

15:36:00

Moved by

That this House takes note of the Report from the International Relations and Defence Committee Our friends in the North: UK strategy towards the Arctic (1st Report, Session 2023–24, HL Paper 8).

My Lords, I am very pleased to be able to introduce this debate on the report of the International Relations and Defence Committee, Our Friends in the North: UK Strategy towards the Arctic. I had the very enjoyable privilege of chairing the committee for this inquiry, and I start by thanking the members of the committee for their tolerance, the current chair, my noble friend Lord De Mauley, for allowing me to introduce this debate, and the staff of the committee for their excellent work, especially the clerk, Jennifer Martin-Kohlmorgen, together with Alex Nice and Rob Jones. We also received great help from FCDO officials for our visit to Norway and Finland, for which we are very grateful. Way back in 2023—and it seems a long time ago—the committee set out to hold an inquiry into the Arctic, given the unprecedented geopolitical and environmental changes impacting the region. Some people might ask why it matters to us. The answer is that the Arctic may be remote, but what happens there has a direct impact on us in the UK. We heard time and again that what happens in the Arctic does not stay in Arctic. As the Arctic’s closest neighbour—and let us not forget that parts of Scotland are closer to the Arctic than they are to London—developments in the region have a significant impact on our national, environmental and energy security, and implications for our foreign and defence policy. Our report is just over a year old, but its conclusions are still—if not more—relevant today, and it is a good thing that we are able to highlight them. I am grateful to the Government Chief Whip to allowing us time to debate the report today. As we all know, the Arctic is undergoing a profound transformation. Climate change is accelerating at an unprecedented rate, with parts of the region warming four times faster than the global average. That has far-reaching consequences, from the melting of the sea ice and permafrost to the impacts on indigenous communities and global climate patterns. Despite their importance, we did not investigate the science of Arctic climate change or ecological pressures on the flora and fauna, including endangered species—although I must say, as an endangered species myself in your Lordships’ House, I feel even more sympathy for them now than I did during the inquiry. Our inquiry revealed that the Arctic is not only a region of ecological importance but an area of growing economic and geopolitical significance—and that is what we concentrated on. Melting sea ice is opening up new shipping routes, and the region’s vast natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals, rare earth metals and fish stocks, are going to become only more accessible. This has sparked a new era of competition that includes both Arctic and non-Arctic states, with Russia and the US leading the charge but China and others vying for influence and control. As we might expect, China is taking a long-term approach to the region. Its strategy for the Arctic is to make it international, in which it, as a leading world power, can influence the rules on how the resources I just mentioned should be distributed. While its footprint is currently limited, this is likely to change. For example, China is easily the largest consumer of fish in the world and has the largest distance water fishing fleet. If the central Arctic Ocean, which is part of the high seas and therefore accessible to all, becomes ice-free for considerable periods, this could lead to overfishing and the depletion of local fish stocks. The UK has a direct interest in the sustainable management of fish stocks, not least because around 10% of the fish that make it to our fish and chip shops comes from the Arctic. For now, China has subscribed to a fishing moratorium via the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, but we heard that it could allow that to lapse in 2037 when the moratorium is up for renewal and as the protective ice caps start to recede. To enable us to continue to advocate effectively for the prevention of unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean, we need to rejoin the agreement on the prevention of unregulated fishing in the central Arctic Ocean that we had to leave because of Brexit. What steps are the new Government taking to rejoin the agreement? Until then, will we announce that we will voluntarily abide by its provisions? As Russia, weakened by the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions, turns eastward, this could provide China with an opportunity to increase its influence. Since we published our report, China’s coastguard entered the waters of the Arctic Ocean for the first time, in a joint patrol with Russia, and last summer, the Chinese air force conducted a joint air patrol with Russia off the coast of Alaska. In themselves, these are not hugely significant developments, but they point to a deepening co-operation with Russia. The Government will therefore need to pay very close attention to Chinese ambitions in the Arctic and the developing Sino-Russian relationship. Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has been a major catalyst for change in the region. Not only is it drawing China and Russia closer together but it led to the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. These two nations bring a wealth of expertise and experience to the alliance, including their ability to operate in cold weather conditions and a long experience in managing Russian pressure. NATO enlargement provides an opportunity for the UK to deepen its already extensive defensive co-operation with the Nordic countries. Finland’s accession also doubled NATO’s border with Russia, and the UK has an important role to play in supporting deterrence in the High North. I am pleased to note that our Armed Forces have increased the scale and frequency of cold weather training and exercises in the region. The establishment of a new Arctic operations base in Camp Viking in northern Norway is a welcome development, and the Royal Marines are experienced and well placed to operate in the region. We are one of the few non-Arctic states that has the military capability to operate in the High North and we are valued, in particular, for our role in antisubmarine and air policing. However, our report also raised concerns about the limits of our capacity to operate in the Arctic. Our fleet of P-8A maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft is small and our single dedicated ice patrol ship, HMS “Protector”, is stretched impossibly thin, covering both polar regions. The Arctic is a priority for the UK, where it can add real value, but as a mid-sized power with global ambitions, the UK’s Armed Forces face a perennial risk of overstretch. The UK needs to do more to articulate clearly its priorities and the hard choices that are required in the face of competing pressures on resources. The strategic defence review, led by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, who was a member of the committee throughout our inquiry, provides an opportunity to do so, and we trust that the Minister will take the lessons of our and his report into consideration. Fears that NATO enlargement could result in an increase in Russian hybrid activity appear to be materialising. The commander of the Finnish armed forces raised the alarm about GPS jamming and other disruptive activities last May. Here, we heard from the director-general of MI5 that agents of Russia’s military intelligence agency are conducting arson attacks, sabotage and other dangerous actions with increasing recklessness. As recently as Christmas Day—just over two weeks ago—the Estlink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia was cut and four telecoms cables were damaged. We must therefore work to bolster our national preparedness and resilience to such attacks through a whole-of-society approach. Our report sets out that we can learn from the Nordic concept of total defence, which integrates civilians into national security efforts. The Arctic Council is the region’s premier governance body. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have put it under significant strain and led to a steep drop in co-operation between Russia, on the one hand, and all the other seven Arctic states on the other. Cautious re-engagement with Russia at official level is taking place to attempt to ensure that vital scientific co-operation can resume. This kind of low-level co-operation is not universally welcomed. But we considered it desirable, not only for scientific purposes, but also as a bridge to foster mutual understanding and, crucially, to reduce the risk of escalation in the event of a crisis. The probability of an incident or mishap swiftly turning into a major crisis is greatly increased by the growth in maritime activity in the Arctic and Russia’s remilitarisation of the area. While the Arctic Council does not formally deal with security matters, we think it is important that the channels that could be used for deconfliction purposes are retained. The UK’s existing Arctic strategy addresses many of the points raised, but the committee was concerned that the Arctic is not receiving in the ministerial attention it deserves outside the security sphere. Recent UK Ministers have rarely attended multilateral fora on Arctic affairs. This sends the wrong message about the importance of the Arctic to the UK. We also recommended the appointment of an Arctic ambassador, in line with many other non-Arctic states. This recommendation was rebuffed by the previous Government. Could the Minister confirm whether this is something that the new Government will consider and whether ministerial involvement will increase? Are there any areas where their strategy towards the Arctic may differ from that of the previous Government? The Arctic is not a distant concern but a region of immediate and profound strategic importance to the UK. Although we are not an Arctic country, we can exert influence, not just through military means but through soft power. During our visit to Norway and Finland, everyone we spoke to was full of praise for the UK’s contributions to polar research. Our world-class scientific research provides a strong platform for legitimising our involvement and exerting soft power in the region. Our overall strategy towards the Arctic must be at once nuanced and comprehensive, balancing diplomatic engagement with strategic preparedness. I hope the Government will take our report’s findings into consideration and ensure that the UK stands ready to support our friends in the north in the years to come. I beg to move.

15:48:00

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to participate in today’s proceedings and to have the opportunity to contribute to the debate on this report. Given the distinguished membership of the committee that produced it—not least the chair the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, whom I thank for his excellent introductory speech—the report’s thoroughness and forensic analysis are perhaps unsurprising, but valuable none the less. Even the most cursory glance at the report’s structure demonstrates the breadth of its scope. It asks us to consider the UK’s role—historic and future—in respect of the Arctic. It points up the future of the Arctic as a sphere of potential great power contestation and analyses the implications of growing economic activity, consequent in part on the effects of climate change. Mindful of the limited time I have available, and of the priority that should be accorded to the members of the committee which produced this report, my contribution will focus on a relatively small number of points, the first of which, and its effect, have to a degree already been diluted by some of the introductory remarks by the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde. The Arctic Circle is only 380 miles north of British waters, which is only 64 miles less than the distance by road between my home in the west of Scotland and London. As the report reminds us, although the Arctic is a byword for remoteness, it is in fact extraordinarily close to our country, in terms of both geography and, much more importantly, our strategic interests. I saw no inherent flaw in the previous Government’s expressed desire to give our foreign policy an Indo-Pacific tilt. Noble Lords will need no reminder from me that the sinews of diplomacy in that area are very often subject to strain, nor will they need to be reminded of the importance of that region in economic, political and military terms. But the report we are debating today, as well as the evidence session of 11 July 2023 in which the committee took evidence from the then Minister for the Armed Forces, James Heappey, makes it clear that there are real challenges of capacity if the UK is to maintain and increase its relationships operability in the High North. In short, there are choices to be made. In that evidence session, Mr Heappey summed up this environment of choice very effectively, saying that: “It is important not to specify ships”— I say this with some trepidation in the current environment— “to be extraordinarily capable in one environment to the exclusion of their capability in another. If we specify them to be extraordinarily capable in both environments, we will only be able to afford one, not six. There is always a balance to strike”. That is as succinct a summary of the constraints and contextual challenges of defence spending as I have seen. Pierre Mendès-France, during his time as Prime Minister of France, repeated in speech after speech the mantra “to govern is to choose”. As part of the strategic defence review, currently in progress under the aegis of my noble friend Lord Robertson, we will be faced with just such choices: the allocation of finite resources to meet a multiplicity of threats across different spheres. Given the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO membership, we have new obligations in the Arctic and the High North. As paragraph 105 of the report makes clear, we are now in the position of applying our NATO security guarantees under Article 5 to a new landmass of significant size. While I think interoperability between the Finnish, Swedish and NATO forces should be pretty straightforward, a capacity issue remains. Here, we have a challenge significantly greater, in some senses, than any other NATO allies because of our near unique capabilities and the demands of our geographical position. As the report identifies, only the UK and US have the capability to conduct nuclear submarine patrols under the ice cap. Russia has made substantial investments into its northern fleet and we know, for instance, that, in 2019, 10 Russian submarines ran a drill of a size unprecedented since the Cold War, testing their ability to breach the GIUK gap without detection. We know too that Russia’s latest maritime doctrine places the Arctic above both the Pacific and Atlantic as the highest priority region. It is unfortunately clear that, in the medium term at least, it seems unlikely that we will be able to return to our classic post-Cold War aspiration of the Arctic as an area of “high co-operation and low tension”. Indeed, the best way to abate the tension—or at least to mitigate its possible consequences—is to ensure maximal co-operation between the UK and its allies in the region. It seems clear that this will only be possible if we assign this theatre an importance that corresponds with the new risks present within it. I have only been able to touch on the breadth of those risks, but among the other factors I do not have time to enumerate in any depth, I would mention President Xi’s openly expressed ambition to make China a “polar great power” and the see-sawing asymmetrical relationship between China and Russia that may allow the former to use the latter as a proxy for its own ambitions. Complicating all these strategic calculations is the insidious threat of climate change, the effects of which are manifesting themselves in the Arctic at several times the average global rate. The Arctic states and the UK will need to consider their response to an Arctic that presents new commercial opportunities, as well as a different range of security threats. Most topically, we have seen the President-elect insist that he should be allowed to buy Greenland for national security purposes. Though, as ever, there is a shadow of farce hanging over this pronouncement, it is clear that the incoming US Administration will be placing greater emphasis on strategy in the High North. Although I concur with the report in thinking it unlikely that the Arctic will become a theatre of military conflict, it describes in compelling terms the opportunities that the changing character of the Arctic affords to our strategic adversaries who wish to operate in the grey zone of hostility.

15:55:00

My Lords, almost a year ago I had the privilege of visiting Camp Viking, where our commandos and marines are absolutely superb in their Arctic training and their work. That was part of the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme, which I would recommend anybody to join, and I know that a number of Members here have done that. It was a great experience. As all Members would, I utterly compliment our forces there, although I was less impressed by some of the artillery pieces, which reminded me more of World War II than of the current cybertechnology we have today. I also congratulate the Government Whips’ Office on choosing this week for this subject. One of the great fears of this committee was that one of our NATO allies in the Arctic region would be threatened with military invasion, and that has happened this week. Of course, it was not from the beast of the east but from what we always aspire to be the best of the west—the future Trump Administration and Greenland. I mention this not to be jocular but to note that French Foreign Minister Barrot, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who was the President of the European Council, all made very positive comments to say that Denmark’s sovereignty had to be noted and respected. Yet, as I understand it, we in this country—this Government—have not done so. When he was challenged on this on the “Today” programme this morning, David Lammy did not say that Denmark’s sovereignty over Greenland must be respected. I challenge the Government and the Front Bench to make that comment. Like many of us, I believe that our relationship with the United States is absolutely paramount in terms of defence, but we have not to be meek. We have to show some backbone in pushing back and respecting the international order and law that we have promoted since World War II. I challenge the Government on that not least because we have a very close military relationship with Denmark. Whether in the Balkans, in Iraq or particularly in Afghanistan, we have trained, operated and fought with Danish forces. We owe it to that country—one of our closest NATO allies—to show it the respect of recognising its sovereignty over Greenland. On fisheries, the chair of the committee, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, has said this so well, but it is so important from an ecological point of view that we protect the high seas beyond EEZs in the Arctic Ocean. It is great news that the moratorium was signed in 2021 and lasts for 16 years, but following Brexit we are no longer a member of that agreement. I notice that in the Government’s response to our report they say they are working to become signatories of that agreement again as soon as possible. Like the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, I ask the Government when we will become part of that agreement again. Have we made a public declaration on supporting it? What are we doing with the scientific work that is also required as part of that treaty? It is important to note—exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, said—that the long-term threat there is the Chinese fishing fleet, which rapes and pillages many of our oceans with very little control at present. I see the UK ambassador recommendation as absolutely fundamental. As other Members of the House have said, Out Stack, the most northerly part of the Shetlands, is only 300-odd nautical miles from the Arctic Circle. We are the nearest non-Arctic state. That area is vital to us. It is a changing environment in terms of security, climate change and critical minerals. I am absolutely clear that we need to raise our game with our diplomatic activity. Why is it that Singapore, Poland, France and other nations have Arctic ambassadors, yet this country does not? We have not participated sufficiently in the Arctic Council. I am delighted to note that its chairmanship has now moved to Norway from Russia, which means that the body, which caused so much stability for so long, can now become rather more active, if not perfect, without Russia’s participation as chair. I am clear that we need an Arctic ambassador and to raise our game, and I hope that this Government will change that decision.

16:01:00

My Lords, it is a pleasure to participate in this debate, which was so ably introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, the excellent chair of the International Relations and Defence Committee during the period of the inquiry. It is also a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, who was the inspiration for the inquiry. In the considerable time since the report was published, the two underlying issues that have driven so many of the conclusions have not changed. Polar ice is continuing to melt and, partly as a consequence of that and partly because of wider international stresses, the Arctic has moved from being an area of co-operation to one of contest and, potentially, conflict. This has to be of fundamental concern to the UK. Our geographical location means that instability in the Arctic threatens the security and prosperity of these islands, and we should therefore devote the necessary care, time and resource to protecting ourselves in this regard. As the report makes clear, the Arctic is likely to see a dramatic increase in destination shipping over the coming years. There are two main reasons for that. The first is the increasingly accessible resources, particularly subsurface resources, in the area. The second is the geostrategic importance of the region, particularly to the nations that wish to reshape and then dominate the international order over the coming years. Both issues have attracted the attention of the Chinese Communist Party, which has declared China a “near-Arctic state”. Although in 2013 Russia was reluctant to grant China observer status in the Arctic Council, events have moved on considerably since then. Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has left it increasingly beholden to the Chinese for their support. There seems little doubt that over the coming years China will increasingly leverage that alliance into greater involvement in the Arctic. That involvement may be, at least initially, in pursuit of scientific and economic benefits, but it would bring China into NATO’s backyard, with all the scope for misunderstanding, accident or even direct competition that this would involve. Meanwhile, Russia, which owns some 50% of the Arctic littoral, retains a significant military presence in the region. The war in Ukraine has impacted its ground forces in the Arctic, but its maritime and aviation forces remain formidable. Of course, the accession to NATO of Finland and Sweden has added a new dimension to alliance challenges, as well as opportunities, in the Arctic. Competition for resources, tensions over environmental issues and the search by some for military advantage all create the conditions for instability and insecurity. While most witnesses to the inquiry asserted that neither Russia nor China was likely to initiate a conflict in the Arctic, unlikely is not the same as impossible, especially given the risk of miscalculation. That risk is exacerbated by the much higher likelihood of grey zone operations in the region. For example, greater access to Arctic waters is likely to mean a considerable growth in undersea infrastructure there. We have seen from the recent incident involving the “Eagle S” tanker how aggressively Russia is seeking to disrupt such infrastructure. The report highlights several other grey zone activities that are possible or even likely in the Arctic. These in themselves are a threat to our security, but they could easily escalate into something even more serious. A conflict involving NATO which started elsewhere could, and almost certainly would, spread to the Arctic. We have long had a close military relationship with our Norwegian partners. In my younger days I flew in many NATO exercises in the Arctic, guarding against a potential Soviet attack through the Finnmark gap. We also have newer but equally strong connections to Sweden and Finland. The Arctic is therefore not just an area of strategic importance to the UK but one where we have experience and expertise. This is reflected in our leadership of the Joint Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, our partners in that organisation are becoming concerned about the weight of effort and the priority that we are according to this crucial role. They look to us to set a strong example and they are not seeing it. The inquiry report also highlights the inadequacy of our air and maritime contributions to the High North, which is scarcely surprising given the small number of platforms available to the Navy and the Air Force and the many demands placed on them. These are all particularly serious consequences of our already inadequate military capabilities being spread too thinly. The security of the Arctic is crucial to the safety of the UK, so we have a vested interest in deterring conflict in the High North. To do so, we and our partners in the Joint Expeditionary Force need to demonstrate the capabilities and the will to counter Russian aggression effectively. We are failing seriously and falling short in that regard. We also need the capabilities and will to deal with grey zone operations in a way that protects our interests and guards against escalation. The recent announcement that the UK will lead Operation Nordic Warden in response to the threat to undersea infrastructure is welcome, but where are the necessary resources to be found? The forthcoming defence review needs to set out the unanswerable case for an increase in the defence budget to at least 3% of GDP, but it also needs to take a much more ruthless and realistic approach to priorities than its recent predecessors did. It must make clear that the security of the Arctic is of fundamental importance to the UK and should therefore be resourced accordingly.

16:07:00

My Lords, I rise as the current chairman of the International Relations and Defence Committee. I very much thank my predecessor, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, and the committee’s members for their work on this important report. Although I did not join the committee until it had completed this report, I hope noble Lords will bear with me if I take this opportunity to focus on the pressing matter of the security of our critical national infrastructure in the face of emerging threats, particularly those being manifested in and coming from the Arctic. The European Arctic has increasingly become an area of strategic importance. The rising tensions between NATO and Russia have created unprecedented security dynamics in the region. The Arctic and the Baltic regions are viewed as integral to Russia’s strategic interests. The Arctic’s difficult environment and related challenges for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance make that region particularly conducive to tactics which are difficult to detect. Russia has developed a range of capabilities to sabotage and disrupt critical infrastructure, including undersea data cables in the Arctic and further afield. These specialist capabilities for deep-sea maritime sabotage are based on the Kola peninsula, which borders the European Arctic. Recent hybrid attacks, including deliberate disruption of undersea cables—one as recent as Christmas Day, as the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, said—and heightened surveillance activities highlight the vulnerability. Our critical national infrastructure, particularly subsea telecommunications cables, energy infrastructure and maritime communication networks, is facing a growing number of risks. We are witnessing a troubling shift towards more aggressive tactics. NATO and western intelligence services have warned that Russia is behind a growing number of hostile activities across the Euro-Atlantic area. The interconnectedness of our modern world means that a single incident away from our shores can have far-reaching consequences. In January 2022, one of two subsea data cables connecting Norway’s Svalbard archipelago and the Norwegian mainland was damaged. Although it did not result in prolonged disruption, it clearly demonstrated the capabilities of a hostile actor and should serve as a wake-up call to the United Kingdom and our allies. Russian naval intelligence, under the guise of oceanographic research, operates vessels such as the “Admiral Vladimirsky”, which is designed, among other things, for maritime sabotage. Moreover, civilian ships, including fishing trawlers, are being used to survey and potentially attack infrastructure in shallower waters, such as those in the North Sea. In spring 2023, four Nordic broadcasting companies mapped suspicious trajectories of Russian fishing trawlers, research vessels and merchant ships travelling in the region and detected 50 ships that appeared to be collecting data along the seabed and monitoring military and other sensitive activities. In November 2022, the “Admiral Vladimirsky” was spotted loitering near the RAF’s maritime patrol base at Lossiemouth in the United Kingdom. It also passed suspiciously close to several UK offshore windfarms. Returning to the experience of our Arctic partners, Norway, now Europe’s primary gas supplier, has been the subject of increased Russian surveillance of its energy infrastructure. Any disruption to its energy production would pose a significant risk for Europe’s overall energy security. Since Sweden’s NATO accession, several Swedish organisations have fallen victim to cyberattacks carried out by groups of hackers suspected of having ties to Russia. In this context, international collaboration is essential. Also important is collaboration between Governments and industry, as private companies often possess extensive monitoring and surveillance capabilities. The Norwegian oil and gas sector alone, for example, has 600 remotely operated underwater surveillance vehicles. The committee heard during its inquiry that military-civilian partnerships could considerably enhance deterrence. When infrastructure is designated for both civilian and military use, adversaries could perceive that the risk of sabotage leading to escalation would increase. State collaboration with major tech companies will also be crucial for ensuring cyber resilience. As we confront the growing challenges to our critical national infrastructure, the role of our Reserve Forces becomes vital. Noble Lords may recall my interest in reservist service, as set out in the register. Our reservists, drawn from all parts of society, possess unique skill sets, linguistic capabilities, technical expertise and adaptable professional backgrounds that are invaluable. They can significantly enhance our capabilities and societal resilience in a way that is cost effective. However, in order fully to realise the potential of our Reserve Forces, we must ensure they are adequately funded, equipped and supported. This involves investing in their training and resources and recognising the invaluable contributions they make to our national security. The dismantling of mechanisms for mobilisation and civil defence after the Cold War has left us vulnerable. There is an urgent need for a whole-of-government effort to build resilience and improve protection of the UK’s critical national infrastructure. New Reserve Forces are needed to provide this protection. The UK is far from immune to the hybrid threats experienced by Russia’s neighbours in the European Arctic. The protection of our critical national infrastructure is a pressing concern that requires our immediate attention. Reserve Forces, with their unique skills and expertise, are essential in addressing this challenge. I call on the Government, through the SDR, to prioritise the development and support of our Reserve Forces and recognise the vital role they play in defending our nation’s interests.

16:14:00

My Lords, as a member of the committee, I had the privilege of visiting the Arctic as part of our inquiry. I will confine my contribution to the issues we identified and received evidence on in relation to the indigenous communities of the Arctic. More than 40 indigenous communities are spread across all eight Arctic states, speaking many different languages, and their status varies considerably. For example, the Samis in the Nordic countries enjoy a similar health and economic status to the general population, whereas the Inuits in Canada, Greenland and Alaska experience limited access to healthcare, high unemployment and poor housing. The committee heard very troubling evidence about how Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has severely compromised the rights of the Sami and other indigenous groups to cross-border co-operation and contacts. The Russian Samis are closely controlled by the Russian Government and are reported to have been effectively coerced into declaring their support for the invasion of Ukraine. One witness told us that they were terrified that if there were a conflict between Russia and NATO, the Sami would have to fight each other. From indigenous groups outside Russia, we heard of concerns that their interests are being overlooked when it comes to defence and security, economic development, and climate change. The good news is that the strongest guarantee that their voices will be heard is the structure of the Arctic Council, which includes the permanent representation of six participants from indigenous groups. This is an innovative, inclusive model, which has found a pragmatic way of continuing its work and dialogue, despite the formal suspension of Russia at ministerial level since the invasion of Ukraine. Every effort should be made, including by the UK as an observer state, to make sure it does continue. Nevertheless, one of our recommendations was that the UK should prepare for the possibility that the Arctic Council may cease to function or diminish in importance, and that if a new governance structure were to emerge, we should advocate for indigenous representation that is at least equivalent to the status currently held. HMG’s official response to that recommendation was only partially to agree, though I am not sure it was clear which part was not agreed, so I would be grateful for the Minister’s clarification on this point, including whether the current Government are still committed to funding UK-based research to strengthen engagement with the Arctic Council’s working groups. Specifically, can the Minister update the House on the support we are providing for a UK and indigenous initiative on scientific research, modelled on the Canada-Inuit programme, for the study and protection of Arctic indigenous languages, and for social science research to improve our understanding of the impact that climate, development and geopolitical changes are having on indigenous people? I want briefly to mention two other issues. First, there is a fear that further militarisation of the region, as a result of geopolitical tensions and the enlargement of NATO, could have an adverse impact on indigenous ways of life and security—for example, through forced displacement to make way for new military bases, or from the damaging effects of leaked radioactive material. Can the Minister say whether, and if so how, these concerns are being taken into account by HMG and NATO? Given that security and military issues are excluded from the remit of the Arctic Council, the UK’s influence could be significant in this regard. Secondly, there is widespread concern that while global warming is damaging traditional lifestyles by reducing the amount of grazing land for reindeer herds, economic investment in Sami lands—including so-called “green investment” to support the transition to a low-carbon economy—is being conducted without sufficient consultation with indigenous groups. Indeed, the green transition has been called the “green colonisation”. We heard of plans to develop a large onshore windfarm near traditional reindeer lands, which the Norwegian Supreme Court ruled would violate the human rights of the Sami people but on which the Norwegian Government have not yet taken any remedial action. Another conflict of interest is over the development of deep sea mining by Norway of rare and battery minerals, which some indigenous groups believe will harm or diminish their access to fish, depriving them of both economic activity and a food source. Could the Minister update the House on the agreement between the UK and Norway on the development of a green industrial partnership, which was referred to in the then Government’s response to this report, and say how it will reconcile these apparently conflicting interests and what its priorities will be? We recommended that HMG should promote a sustainable approach to UK investment in the Arctic, including by directing potential investors to the Ruggie principles and the Arctic investment protocol. Could the Minister also confirm that the current Government stand by the response to this recommendation on the importance of justice and remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses, and of businesses conducting due diligence with respect to human rights? I end by quoting one of the Greenlandic Inuit parliamentarians we met, who said quite simply that there should be “nothing about us without us”.

16:20:00

My Lords, I welcome this excellent and timely report. It confirms an urgent reality: the Arctic is no longer a frozen wilderness; it is the new frontier where climate change meets great power competition. Melting ice is reshaping trade routes, exposing vast reserves of oil, gas and rare earth metals essential to modern industry. According to scientists, in 1987, planet earth experienced a global climate shift of unprecedented scale—a major step change or regime shift in earth’s biophysical systems, from the upper atmosphere to the depths of the ocean and from the Arctic to Antarctica. That very year, and with this unbeknown to him, Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking in Murmansk, envisioned the Arctic as a “zone of peace and co-operation”. Yet, under Vladimir Putin, the Arctic has become central to Russia’s quest to reclaim superpower status. Today, Russia dominates the region, with its fleet of icebreakers, military bases and infrastructure along the Northern Sea Route. This route is not only economically vital to Moscow but geopolitically significant, enabling the rapid movement of its naval fleets and offering a platform for cyberattacks, disinformation and sabotage. We were recently made aware and reminded of Russian efforts and continuous attempts to sow discord across Europe, which is a stark warning of the risks posed by Russia’s Arctic pre-eminence. Equally concerning is China’s growing interest in the Arctic. Although over 800 nautical miles from the Arctic Circle, Beijing now calls itself a “near-Arctic state”. By this logic, half of Europe, including the United Kingdom, could claim the same title, but China is far more than a passive observer. Between January 2022 and June 2023, 234 Chinese-owned firms registered in the Russian-controlled Arctic. China has built docks, railway lines and infrastructure in key Arctic ports, working hand in hand with Russia to consolidate control over energy supplies and resources. This partnership underscores the deepening Sino-Russian alignment in the Arctic—a development that we cannot ignore. I will not comment on the US President-elect’s aspirations when it comes to Canada or Greenland, but we can be grateful that what Mr Trump is saying is not being uttered by Mr Putin, as I imagine there would be much chatter about Article 5 today. The strategic significance of the Arctic is clear; our collective response ought to be too. Although the UK is geographically distant, it is strategically intertwined with the High North. Securing NATO’s northern flank, ensuring freedom of navigation and maintaining vital energy imports from Norway all depend on our active engagement in this region. I therefore welcome the report’s recommendations, in particular on partnering with businesses managing critical infrastructure, such as subsea cables and pipelines, to protect against emerging threats; on preventing unregulated fishing and supporting the creation of marine protected areas; and on its call to appoint an Arctic envoy or ambassador, and strengthen co-operation with other observer states on the Arctic Council while respecting the leadership of Arctic nations. The rules-based international order must shape the future of the Arctic, and I also welcome calls for a new international polar code to establish clear guidelines. I also note the recommendation to engage with China on scientific research and climate change. Although it is important to engage with China on these issues, we must approach this cautiously, with a clear-eyed understanding of the challenges posed by the evolving partnership between Russia and China. Part of this is a matter of our military capability. While our Armed Forces are not short of tasks, they are short of capability. They rely on a single polar-capable vessel, HMS “Protector”, which is regularly deployed between the Arctic and the Antarctic and has faced technical challenges. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, will be aware of this, and I hope the Minister agrees that we must make sure that his recommendations, made in the SDR, are not constrained by defence spending commitments or the lack of them. Defence spending is not a luxury; it is a necessity. Without investment, in this case in polar assets, we cannot safeguard our interests or support our allies. As we rightly focus on the Arctic, we must do everything to strengthen existing transit routes, ensuring their stability and security, as the best way of improving the stability and security of global shipping. It is astonishing that a non-state terrorist group can disrupt global shipping in the Red Sea, and the same can be said about piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Strait of Malacca. Moreover, closer to home, shifting global shipping from the Suez Canal to the Northern Sea Route would carry serious geopolitical risks. Increased reliance on this route could deepen Europe’s dependence on Russia, in the same way that gas dependence has, limiting our collective ability to counter Moscow’s choices. The Arctic is not someone else’s problem; it is ours too. Climate change, great power competition and emerging threats in this region will define global security in the years to come. The United Kingdom must remain not only present but relevant, to safeguard NATO’s northern flank and to protect our own national security. This demands proactive engagement, investment in polar capabilities and support for our allies.

16:26:00

My Lords, this is the second time in recent years that this House has reported on and debated Britain’s overall Arctic policy, this second debate having been excellently introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde. That is to this House’s credit, because that dimension of our external policies, often overlooked, presents plenty of challenges, and even threats. The comparison between the reports produced demonstrates how quickly those challenges are changing, while some, such as those from the climate, have become more intense. Britain may not be an Arctic state itself but it is a close neighbour to the Arctic, and a friend and ally in NATO of several states which are, and an adversary to one, Russia, which is waging an illegal war of aggression in Europe against Ukraine. The scale of these changes is not altogether surprising. However, it requires policy responses from us, not just words. What has not changed is the rapid melting of the Greenland ice cap and the other Arctic ice caps in Russia, Finland, Norway, Canada and the US, and the consequent rise worldwide of sea levels. This demonstrates beyond peradventure that global climate change policies are not yet sufficient, all the more so as the Arctic ice melt is occurring more rapidly than elsewhere for a number of technical and scientifically demonstrated reasons. It is all the more shocking, therefore, that in 10 days’ time the incoming President of the US may decide to withdraw again from global efforts to brake and reverse climate change. What will our response be to that? Is the incoming President aware of our regret at any such move if it were to be made? Surely we will not be tempted to throw in the towel and simply accept that the sea rise, which will damage not only us but many developing countries around the world, should continue unchecked. A second development, which has not changed, is the enlargement of the high seas areas in the Arctic potentially now available to fishing and the depletion of already threatened fish stocks, on which most countries, including ourselves, are for good and justified reasons supporting a moratorium, although we are no longer a legal part of it. If there is to be fishing in the future in these waters, it must surely be effectively regulated internationally and enforced. What is our policy in that respect? When we first debated the Arctic, the opening up of the northern trade route from the Far East to Europe and elsewhere was more a matter of speculation than reality. We were inclined to treat that, and the competitive threats to routes using the Suez Canal, with what has turned out to be an excessive degree of complacency. The illegal actions of the Houthis in Yemen and the consequent damage to the Suez Canal route mean that such complacency can no longer be sustained or defended—the northern route, one should add, being vulnerable to Russian interference, perhaps supported by China. What is the Government’s medium and long-term response beyond the so far relatively unavailing action against Houthi attacks? This is a major threat to freedom of navigation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which affects all nations. The biggest change since the report by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, arises in the field of security and defence, which the scope of the Arctic Council does not cover—a council that in any case is in suspension since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. What is the UK and the NATO response to that sharply increased threat? Will this aspect be fully covered in the strategic defence review of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, due to be presented in a few months’ time? In the report by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, the case was made for the appointment of a UK special representative for the Arctic. That proposal has received considerable further support during this debate. The case was summarily rejected by the then Government, but, as has been seen, much has changed since then, in particular the threat in the Arctic from defence and security issues and the multipolar nature of the challenges facing us in the Arctic—quite different from the essential and valuable work being done in the Antarctic by the FCDO’s polar regions unit. I welcome the present report’s reiteration of the need for strengthened UK diplomatic input in the Arctic. Is it not now time to look again at the case for a UK special representative for the Arctic, perhaps in the light of the increased prominence there of security issues? Such a post could be based jointly in the Ministry of Defence and the FCDO. Can the Minister respond to that suggestion when he replies to this debate? Finally, a word about the sovereignty of Greenland. It is surely the height of irresponsibility to have raised that issue again, one which belongs more to the 19th century than the 21st century. In this way it has complicated and distorted the work that needs to be done to face the global challenges that are posed for us and others in the Arctic and which we need to face up to. I hope we will have nothing to do with the raising of that issue in recent days.

16:32:00

My Lords, I have a personal reason for engaging in this debate. When I was a Member of the other place, it was my constituent, Commander Eddie Grenfell, who served on the Arctic convoys, who led the campaign for the Arctic Star, which he then received in 2013. Some 20,000 veterans have now received the Arctic Star, and that campaign was a reminder of the heroism of our Armed Forces in those treacherous waters. My second reason for intervening in this debate involves wearing my hat as chair of the UK Space Agency. I hope to persuade noble Lords that space is a crucial domain for thinking about defence and security. The Arctic theatre is a vivid example of that, as I will briefly explain. Traditionally, satellites were great big objects, 30,000 kilometres away, in geostationary orbit, always looking at the same part of the globe, with very little coverage of the polar regions because they were receding from view—but that did not matter because not much was happening there. Now we are moving to low-earth orbit constellations of much smaller satellites, a few hundred kilometres up, most of them in a polar orbit, with the earth revolving underneath them. That means that the data they collect and transmit is collected most efficiently in the Arctic regions. That is where the density of satellite coverage for LEO constellations is greatest. That is why Svalbard is now one of the most active centres for the collection of satellite data anywhere in the world and an intense scene of strategic competition. Those satellites collect earth observation data. They are also probably the best single fallback we have if we lose the cable transmission of data. As well as the change in the orbits of satellites, we have as a result a change in launch. Historically, to get great big satellites into orbit, you had a launch site near the equator and used the power of the earth’s rotation to push them up into high orbit. Now, when you want to get small satellites into polar orbit, it is very sensible to launch northwards close to the pole, so the new competition is who is going to win the strategically significant northern launch sites. It so happens that we have at SaxaVord one of the best candidates for a strategic polar space launch capability. It is currently the only UK CAA licensed spaceport. It is at 60 degrees latitude. The RAF, having closed its defence radar systems there about 15 years ago, is reopening them because it is a great location for a ground station. We expect the first space launch from SaxaVord to happen this year. Of course, there are other opportunities. We are in competition with Norway and Sweden, but thanks to the legislative process in which this place played a significant role, we are ahead of them in the legislative framework. The US has Alaska. However, its sites in Alaska are very hard to reach, whereas at SaxaVord we can use the infrastructure created around North Sea oil installations. Also, the Americans are very worried that their Alaskan sites are too close to Russia. It is therefore true to say that the US DOD is far more interested in SaxaVord and UK space launch capabilities than the UK MoD, which I greatly regret. The challenge now is to ensure that as the space domain becomes so significant in the Arctic region, Britain plays its part. I therefore have three requests for the Minister. I welcome his presence in the Chamber. First, it was excellent that last October the Defence Secretary signed up to the NATO initiative STARLIFT, which is about boosting space launch capabilities. It is undoubtedly thinking about polar launch. Will the Minister commit that the British Government will play an active role in promoting STARLIFT and will consider SaxaVord as a UK contribution to this NATO effort? Secondly, regrettably, the UK Government did not sign up to Northlink at the same NATO ministerial summit. It is a NATO system providing satellite communications in the Arctic. Is this something that the Government will reconsider? Thirdly and finally, overall, will the Government recognise SaxaVord as a UK strategic asset and consider space and the space domain as part of their future planning on defence and international strategic issues?

16:38:00

My Lords, I welcome this opportunity to debate this excellent report regarding the UK’s strategy towards the Arctic. I share the view that this has been a somewhat neglected area and is now of increasing strategic importance, as the report clearly lays out. Obviously, the report was completed and published under the previous Government and was not intended to inform the current ongoing strategic defence review. However, it is more in the context of that review that I want to offer some observations, and I do so because since the publication of this report the strategic context has moved on. Regardless of the specifics of how the situation in Ukraine is resolved, my view is that the position of Russia looks weaker. It is facing the reality of its own military limitations. By contrast, the relative strengths of European NATO are becoming more apparent, particularly given the additional membership of Finland and Sweden and the upward trend in defence spending of many NATO countries. Moreover, the advent of a Trump presidency looks set—I would say, wholly justifiably—to coerce all of NATO in Europe, including the UK, into assuming an ever greater responsibility for its own security. I am not suggesting that the threat from Russia has gone away. I am suggesting that it is now increasingly likely to manifest itself as malevolent activity below the threshold of formalised warfare, the human and material costs of which are huge. In this changing context, there may be considerable good sense in the UK reimagining its commitment within NATO, and doing so in ways that play to our natural military strengths and permit the necessary enhancements to national resilience, doing so in a manner that might just be affordable within a defence budget of 3% of GDP. The SDR will undoubtedly confirm that some of our defence expenditure is non-discretionary: most obviously, the deterrent. We must also now recognise our vulnerability to the threat of ballistic missiles, a threat to which events in both Israel and Ukraine have now sensitised public awareness. We obviously need to invest in those areas which give us a technological edge, especially where automation and autonomy relieve the pressure on physical numbers. But, more fundamentally, a strategic choice needs to be made in respect of where, within a newly configured and energised NATO, we should develop and focus the more conventional elements of our force structure. In deciding this, we need to better evaluate the balance between conventional deterrence and the active interdiction of sub-threshold threats. We need to do this in a way that is orchestrated on a NATO-wide basis. To me, although it pains an infantryman to say it, logic and geography suggest that we should consider focusing on a leadership role in the maritime and air domains of NATO’s northern flank—a flank which should be envisaged as including the Baltic, High North, Arctic and north Atlantic. We should adopt an operational posture that is a combination of conventional deterrence and the active interdiction of sub-threshold—particularly subsea and airborne—threats. We should build on the innate dependencies and mutual trust born of our leadership of the Joint Expeditionary Force, which now needs to be renamed, and we should build on this in respect of capability development and procurement. Because cost pressures will dictate, we should probably worry much less about mustering a significant high-readiness land commitment to central Europe, a contingency which, in societal terms, we seem, on a national basis, either disinclined to or incapable of embracing, and for which many continental partners display far greater national urgency due to geographic realities. This does not mean that we do not need an Army: far from it. The combination of national resilience, national regeneration and constitution, and what I would call focused lethality, which I use as a term for a more technically enhanced set of specialised forces, will more than justify a significant force structure. But I simply cannot see how, in the changing strategic environment and with the cost pressures that seem set to remain, we can continue to delude ourselves that we are much more than a regional power, albeit one that more than delivers its fair share of regional security, particularly when the nuclear deterrent is costed in. I appreciate that these remarks fall well outside a more disciplined commentary on our strategy towards the Arctic but, to me, the true excellence of the report lay less in what it specifically said and much more in what it teasingly forebode; namely, that the security dynamics of the Arctic and northern Europe are now more interconnected and that the Arctic itself is potentially far more contested. The report offers the strategic defence review much food for thought regarding our national strategic options.

16:43:00

My Lords, I was privileged to be a member of the committee under the able chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde. The debate on this report has provided a forum for exposing a great deal of expertise already in the House. The report itself illustrates the dynamic nature of changes in the Arctic and the importance to our interests, including security, environment and energy supply. It asks key questions about our geopolitical priorities. It is called Our Friends in the North but obviously touches on those who are not our friends, including Russia and China in particular. I hope the report will be the basis for continued serious debate about the Arctic and our role in it—particularly, of course, a key role for our friends in Norway. I begin with the usual complaint about the delays in bringing this report to the House for debate. The inquiry was launched in March 2023, the report was published in November that year and the Government response was a year ago, in January 2024. Surely, procedurally, we can do better as a House. It is fair to say that there have been no dramatic changes in the context since the report was published, but there has been an intensification of trends, including, for example, the effect of sanctions on Russian activities. I think particularly of the abandonment—or at least mothballing—by Russia of that LNG facility in Murmansk, and the effect on the supply of spare parts for ships to Novatek and the Russian commercial fleet. The old assumptions about the Arctic being an area of low tension and high co-operation have been undermined, perhaps most dramatically in the role of the Arctic Council. It is right that the ministerial meetings following the Ukraine invasion have been stilled, but I fear that Russia will increasingly try to use the wedge of expert co-operation to normalise relations with the Arctic Council, and we must be very wary of that. How do the Government see the future of the Arctic Council today? Obviously, climate change is fundamental to changes in the area, including the development of the Northern Sea Route. For example, there will be a reduction of almost two weeks in the journey from Tokyo to Hamburg, and potential effects on the Suez Canal. There will be many advantages for Russia from the opening of the Northern Sea Route—pilotage and so on. Tensions between Russia and the West are unlikely to ease. The committee stressed the relevance of China, which is a provider of money for development. For example, we know that President Xi visited Moscow in March last year and promoted co-operation. In April, in Murmansk, China and Russia agreed on what is euphemistically called “maritime law enforcement”—whatever that may mean. We can surely confidently say that, if the report were written today, there would be much greater emphasis on threats to critical national infrastructure and the grey zone, including GPS jamming, military exercises, cyberattacks and information warfare. Most salient now is maritime sabotage. For example, we know that in November a Chinese vessel was stopped because of alleged damage to Swedish interests, and there was a very tepid response at the time. By contrast, when a Russian vessel was stopped on Christmas Day by Finland and spy matériel was found on it, there was a far more robust response by Finland—the vessel was impounded. Let us hope that is a precedent. I hope the Government will applaud the robust response of Finland and, if there is appropriate evidence, use that and say it should be a precedent. Although the time has been short, it would be interesting to know what stage the Finnish investigation is at. There are strong geopolitical implications of the Arctic changes. Of course, every case cannot be a priority, but surely recent events have exposed our vulnerability—ballistic missile defence, for example—and the critical importance of the Arctic to the UK and what the report calls “Our friends in the North”. Perhaps we should reconsider whether the tilt to the Indo-Pacific is still as justified. As the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, mentioned, our good colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, was a member of the committee and concurred with its recommendations. I assume that his membership will colour some of the recommendations that he will make in his review.

16:50:00

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Ashton of Hyde for his excellent introduction and chairmanship of the International Relations and Defence Committee. Unfortunately, I was not a member of the committee for this important inquiry as I joined just after it had been completed, but I welcome it and hope that the report’s findings will be taken note of. Many noble Lords have already noted, as the report does, that parts of Scotland are closer to the Arctic Circle than to London. I hope to be on my way to the frozen north in Scotland, if your Lordships keep to time, on the last flight. I am keeping my hopes high. The High North is witnessing a change in its security environment for political, economic and environmental reasons, and thus represents a key area of interest for the UK. Former Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said: “The UK is the closest neighbour to the Arctic states. In addition to preserving UK interests we have a responsibility to support our Arctic allies … to preserve the security and stability of the region”. Without territorial possessions in the region, the UK’s support will always be primarily focused on the naval aspect of the Arctic, as it is inherently a maritime domain. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, for his work on securing the Arctic Star. My uncle was killed in the Arctic convoys, and it was one of the great pleasures of his younger brother, my father, to receive the Arctic Star medal—so I thank him for highlighting that. It is inherently an incredibly hard and difficult maritime domain. Our Royal Navy has led multinational task groups of warships and aircraft into the High North to demonstrate freedom of navigation above the Arctic Circle, to further develop joint working and to assert our joint commitment to upholding peace in the region. But this report highlights long-standing concerns as to whether there are sufficient resources to meet aspirations for a meaningful security presence in the High North. I am sure the Minister will point to the essential role of our Astute class submarines and to Camp Viking, which has been mentioned, but the Royal Navy has only one ice-capable patrol ship. Whether military or commercial, maritime activity in the Arctic is growing significantly, increasing the risk of accidents, conflicts and pollution. Logistics are a frequently neglected aspect of strategic operational activity—but are not being neglected by China and Russia, as my noble friend Lady Helic has just highlighted. Logistics have to be prioritised in the Arctic. Whether dealing with extreme cold weather or terrain, the environmental effects on personnel, equipment and supplies force new solutions to be found to extend operational reach and enable freedom of action. Cold weather injuries, resupply operations, equipment capability shortfalls and maintenance must all be taken into account when planning logistics operations in the Arctic. Our US allies have realised this and are actively training and working on solutions. In 2022, RFA “Tidesurge” joined NATO’s Exercise Cold Response, providing important logistical and refuelling support, highlighting the vital role of support ships and their well-trained crew in the region. Yet decreasing ship numbers in the Royal Navy have meant that the RFA fleet has been filling in capability gaps, even though the RFA itself has seen a drastic reduction in ship numbers—around 50% since 2003. The RFA is losing crews, either to the Merchant Navy or to those leaving seafaring professions altogether. In addition, the number of recruits is down as many opt for other careers or shipping lines. Deployments have become longer, with the number of ships laid up due to a lack of crews also increasing. The RFA is in crisis. Its vital role in logistics and supply is in danger of being forgotten by both the public and our politicians. Ongoing industrial action has already affected operational capability, and I was relieved to see that the RFA voted only yesterday to end its current pay dispute. However, the fleet remains at a low ebb. While the current settlement may be enough to stop those currently serving leaving prematurely, it may not be enough to persuade significant numbers to choose to join the RFA instead of taking commercial jobs. Recruitment is difficult, as there is a global shortage of mariners and young people wanting to start careers at sea. In a Written Answer to me in November, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to the Royal Navy’s RFA35 programme to determine the long-term future of the RFA, defining its purpose, size, function and optimal crewing model to meet future requirements. I have yet to find any further information on the progress of the RFA35. Can the Minister update the House? I urge the Government to ensure that the essential and increasing role played by the RFA in national defence, not only in the Arctic but across the world’s seas, is recognised and supported. The UK cannot claim to be a leading maritime nation and capitalise on the opportunity to play an influential convening and leadership role in the Arctic, particularly in Arctic security, as this report recommends, without strong logistical support. As this excellent report outlines, developments in the Arctic are of critical importance to the UK’s security, environment and energy, but without a functioning RFA, large-scale operations will simply struggle to maintain momentum over extended periods.

16:56:00

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, a fellow Glaswegian and therefore inured to Arctic weather, and to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, on this admirable report and his splendid introduction of it. I have only two criticisms of his report, and one of them is totally unfair, so I will start with the other one. The report says that we have “insufficient key military assets, such as submarines, maritime patrol or airborne early warning aircraft, to support this increased focus on the Arctic”— which we should have— “alongside the UK’s growing interest in other regions such as the Indo-Pacific”. That is obviously true, but it is also a huge understatement. It is not just the posturing about the Pacific that creates the credibility gap. I believe that, as with the Joint Expeditionary Force, on which the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, spoke, which we are supposed to lead but our role is disappointing our partners, we lack the deployable assets to play the part we should be playing, and NATO expects us to play, in the High North. We still talk a good game, but our firepower does not match the rhetoric. In this, as in so many other ways, we need to learn from our front-line friends, the Finns, with their 1 million trained reserves and their society alive to the threat that Putin poses. The unfair criticism of the report is that it nowhere discusses the largest immediate risk to the High North remaining an area of international co-operation and low tension, the risk to which the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, drew attention, which is that America grabs Greenland. The report’s authors might reasonably reply that when they completed the report, 13 months ago, no one saw Trump back in the White House, but, in 11 days’ time, he will be back, and he has this week refused to rule out taking Greenland by force. He said on Monday that if the Danes declined to let him buy it, he would put punitive tariffs on their trade. On Tuesday, he explained that the US needs Greenland for its national security and said: “People really don’t even know if Denmark has any legal right to it”. This last point is one known in diplomatic terminology—I apologise for using a technical term—as cobblers. Danish sovereignty over Greenland has been unchallenged since the Treaty of Kiel 1814 and was formally accepted and acknowledged by the United States and the United Kingdom in 1916. However, I do not think Mr Trump is joking. He has form. He has to be taken seriously and, in this case, probably literally. Five years ago, he ordered the National Security Council under John Bolton to arrange the purchase of Greenland. Fiona Hill, who is now assisting the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, in his review, was personally involved in discussions with the Danish Government, who demurred. When the row went public in August 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo was able to calm things down, but the President was so cross, he cancelled a state visit to Copenhagen. I suspect that he has learned nothing and forgotten nothing. This time, he will not have Fiona Hill or Mike Pompeo to rein him in. Whatever his motive, I think Mr Trump is not talking about military issues when he says that the US needs to have Greenland for national security; I think he is thinking in commercial or economic terms. If he was interested in making greater military use of Greenland, he could renegotiate the 1951 defence agreement, which is already strikingly permissive. The United States pays no rent and does not have to seek permission for any overflights or landings. I suspect that what he is after are the rare earths and the uranium, or the oil and gas, which are all now becoming much easier to exploit as the ice melts. I suspect that he is thinking also about China. China already has the biggest outside investment in Greenland, and Greenland exports more to China than to anyone else other than mainland Denmark. The noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, rightly drew our attention to growing Chinese interest in the High North. Whatever his motive, I agree with President Macron, Chancellor Scholz and President Tusk that the forced transfer of sovereignty is no way to treat an ally. Like the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, I hope that our Government will find a way of making the same point that they have made. We owe it to the Danes to show them that we stand with them. On 18 October, a UK Minister, Mr Doughty, told the Arctic Circle Assembly that the UK “will not tolerate attempts to wreck regional stability” in the High North. He probably had Russia in mind, but sauce for the goose. NATO Secretary-General Rutte has a big job on his hands in the next four years, with a dominant ally likely to interpret the concept of alliance rather eccentrically. Fortunately, we have an ex-Secretary-General, the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, calling on the help of Fiona Hill, with her close-up experience of eccentricity, to advise us now on how we should best cope with it and its consequences as we reassess our priorities. I hope we build our shrunken forces.

17:02:00

My Lords, I feel honoured and privileged to sit on the International Relations and Defence Committee. I am privileged to have sat under the enlightened and skilful chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Ashton of Hyde, from whom I have learned a great deal. It is now a pleasure to sit under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord De Mauley. I join in acknowledging the exceptional work of the committee’s staff, who are brilliant, patient and a genuine pleasure to work with. Having said all that, my noble friend and others have shot all my foxes, so I will make only a few points. Before I do, let me say how much I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, about the RFA, and with my noble friend Lord Willets about the importance of the space agency. I will put into context again the matter already expressed by my noble friends and many others: that parts of Scotland are closer to the Arctic than they are to London. Therefore, this is a region in which we must of necessity take a profound and carefully worked through interest, since as my noble friend said, developments in the region have a significant impact on our national, environmental and energy security, and have very serious implications for our foreign and defence policy. We argued in the report that it was highly unlikely that the United Kingdom’s long-term goal to return the Arctic to a state of low tension was achievable. We concluded that the United Kingdom policy had to reflect the new reality that the region was becoming an area of competition and potential confrontation. Indeed, we were being pretty restrained in what we said. I believe that it is likely that the Arctic is going to become a fulcrum of increasing contention, especially in the grey zone of operations. The fact remains that Russia already exercises a significant, malign and growing threat, including GPS jamming, military exercises which simulate attacks on its neighbours, maritime sabotage, cyberattacks and information warfare. In the report, we call for the United Kingdom Government and their allies to prepare, with urgency, contingency plans to detect, deter and respond—and let me say how strongly I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. Because of the nature of the theatre, we assess that close co-operation between the state and the private sector, which already operates most of the subsea cables and pipelines, is key, and that the Government need to establish partnerships with businesses to combat threats to critical infrastructure—I know my noble friend Lord De Mauley made this plain in his speech. Frankly, we need to do much the same at home. In contemplating these threats, we were concerned that in this theatre, as in all the others in which we have an interest, our country has insufficient key military assets, including submarines and maritime patrol or airborne early-warning aircraft to support the new realities of the Arctic. Of the first importance would be that we should continue to train sufficiently and regularly with our NATO and magnificent Nordic allies, an operation now made less easy by the ill-advised removal of the two commando carriers from service. My noble friend has dealt thoroughly with the problem of China’s activities in the Arctic. I would emphasise that these are increasing, but they are only possible thanks to Russia’s facilitation. Indeed, a commercially viable shipping route along Russia’s Arctic coast could soon become a reality, which would be economically beneficial for both Moscow and Beijing. Beijing will clearly seek to ensure that the northern sea route remains free of western interference through its co-operation with Russia. I think that two developments are possible. If tensions between Russia and the West remain high, due in particular to the ongoing war in Ukraine, it is likely in my judgment that Russia’s joint ventures with China in the Artic, by China, will expand dramatically. If the Trump Administration encourage Ukraine to cede land to Russia and continue to interfere with Greenland, as they say they are going to, and return confiscated Russian assets, then perhaps American and European companies would begin to engage with Russian Arctic projects again, although this of course will take time. In conclusion, as the report spells out very well, the Arctic holds the most extraordinary abundance of natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals and fish, with its untapped oil and gas reserves estimated to comprise about 25% of the world’s undiscovered resources. The British Government need to maintain the highest degree of alertness possible as these developments play out. It is likely we will see this pristine wilderness turn into something quite different.

17:09:00

My Lords, given that this magisterial report includes recommendations on shipping and search and rescue services, I declare my interest as chair of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, along with a personal interest over many years in the Arctic. I do not know whether other Members of your Lordships’ House here today have, like me, had the opportunity to visit the North Pole on an icebreaker or to sail in the Barents Sea into Svalbard. However, anybody who cares about the Arctic—and that is everybody here today—knows that, although it is only 3% of the planet’s ocean surface, it exercises an outsized impact on climate security. This includes the ice cap reflecting heat and the unique hydrography of the Arctic, where we find warmer water beneath a surface layer of colder water that then interacts with the Atlantic in the Denmark overflow. This has as yet not completely understood impacts on the currents that transit, including producing shifts of excess heat from the equatorial regions to the polar regions with impacts on our own climate. It is, therefore, incredibly disturbing to learn in a paper published in Nature Communications last month that it is now modelled that there is at least a distinct possibility that we may see the first largely ice-free day in the Arctic summer by the end of this decade, not by 2050 as we had complacently previously told ourselves. It would therefore be not only ironic but potentially tragic if the very fact of the melting of the ice means that we as humanity collectively use that as an opportunity to exploit more hydrocarbons and accelerate this cycle in the Arctic. Given that four fifths of the unexploited hydrocarbons in the Arctic lie within individual countries’ exclusive economic zones, we must clearly have the humility to recognise that they have the right to exploit those hydrocarbons if they so choose. My first question to the Minister is: given that this report is titled Our Friends in the North, many of these countries that might so do are our friends, so what action can the UK Government take to try and persuade others not to take the apparently easy option of exploiting these hydrocarbons in a way that will be further detrimental to the planet? Relatedly, it is worth drawing attention to one of the other recommendations of the report, at paragraph 244, which notes that there is still the opportunity to prevent further exploitation of the seabed in the central Arctic outside of the EEZs and potentially the continental shelf claims that have been lodged by a number of Arctic nations. One way in which the UK can play our part there is to get on and ratify the so-called BBNJ treaty, the Agreement on Marine Biodiversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction. Can the Minister tell us today, at the prompting of this report, when Parliament will see a Bill that will enable the ratification of that important agreement? At paragraph 290, the report says that the UK should continue to “work with its partners to uphold the rules and obligations set out in UNCLOS”. That is clearly right. Can the Minister also use this opportunity to put on record the UK’s repudiation of Russia’s distorted interpretation of international maritime law as it applies in the Arctic? In particular, can he confirm that the northern sea route is not covered by a “legal regime of inland seawaters”, as claimed by the 2022 Russian maritime doctrine? Instead, will the Minister confirm that these seas are subject to freedom of navigation and the same right of innocent passage that Russian vessels and warships use when they transit the English Channel and UK territorial waters? Will he also confirm that nor is Russia entitled to misapply Article 234 of UNCLOS, the so-called “ice clause”, to apply discriminatory requirements on foreign-flagged vessels such as tolls, prior permission requirements and the mandatory use of the Rosatom icebreaker fleet? We might argue that these do not matter for the time being, certainly for merchant shipping, but they will over time. As a number of noble Lords have pointed out, strategically it is obvious that Russia cannot be allowed to assert control over the Arctic and the sea lines of communication, including the approaches to the Bering Sea, the Barents Sea and other sensitive areas, such as the Kara Strait, the Laptev Strait and the Sannikov Strait. For all those reasons and the points that were made, but which I will not repeat, by a number of distinguished noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, the noble and gallant Lords, Lord Stirrup and Lord Houghton, and others, it is quite obvious that the UK, through the SDR, will have to step up its capabilities in the High North. Like several other noble Lords, I have had the opportunity to spend time with the Royal Marines in Bardufoss at Camp Viking. As has been described, they were highly impressive, but nevertheless, without going into detail publicly, there are obviously some equipment and capability gaps that the SDR would be wise to address. On that basis, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, for the magisterial introduction he gave to this excellent report, the conclusions of which I fully concur with.

17:15:00

My Lords, it is a privilege to speak in this debate and a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham. I congratulate my noble friend Lord Ashton of Hyde and the International Relations and Defence Committee on their fascinating report on the UK’s strategy towards the Arctic. I congratulate my noble friend on his excellent introductory speech. I admit that I was not very well informed on this matter before I read the report, and I found it very illuminating. I have always had a fascination with the Arctic because, when I first lived in Japan in the 1980s, we flew over it and refuelled at Anchorage. From the mid-1990s we would fly over Russia, but in recent years we have reverted to flying over the North Pole. It is always a little surprising to see just how close eastern Siberia is to Alaska. We are so used to looking at a Mercator projection view of the planet, but a globe gives a much better perspective of proximity and shows the significance of the Arctic. It also shows that, of the eight members of the Arctic Council, Russia possesses almost half of the shoreline of the Arctic Ocean. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has paralysed the work of the Arctic Council. Given the close alliance between Russia and China, the remaining members of the “Arctic seven” are increasingly cautious about Chinese strategic investments in the region. It may be true that China has, so far, sought to work within the Arctic’s existing governance framework; however, it is clear that China is now intent on challenging the existing world order so that is very likely to change. As the report finds: “Concerns regarding Chinese strategic investment in the Arctic and its long-term intentions in the region are legitimate”. It suggests: “One region where the deepening partnership” between Russia and China “may manifest itself is the Arctic”. This presents a particular problem for India, which continues to sit on the fence. The committee’s witness, Captain Bisen, acknowledged that India has “an interest in preventing a strong Sino-Russian partnership”. The report welcomes the FCDO’s decision to resume working group level projects of the Arctic Council, including Russia, whereas it remains committed to excluding Russia from co-operation at a ministerial level. I wonder whether such an ambiguous policy will be viable for long. The report rightly states: “Russia must not be allowed to take advantage of its participation in working group activities to undermine the steps taken by the UK and others to isolate Russia diplomatically in response to the war in Ukraine”. I cannot see that there is any possibility of Russia not seeking to take advantage. Does the Minister think that our ambivalent position can be maintained? The report strikes the right tone in suggesting that “the UK’s influence in the Arctic depends on strong diplomacy and coalition-building”. Those with whom we should work in coalition include Japan and South Korea. I am a little puzzled that the report identified a significant difference between the positions of those two countries. I believe that the Japanese general trading companies, to speak only of one sector, are just as interested in the development of Arctic maritime routes as the South Korean private sector. It is essential that Japan and Korea, which face similar security risks in the western Pacific Ocean, should work more closely together in the defence and security sphere and in collaboration with other Arctic observer nations. The United Kingdom, which enjoys closer defence and security relations with both nations, can play a key role here. The committee’s report identified that the UK, as the nearest neighbour to the Arctic Council states, co-operates actively with them on search and rescue missions in the High North. As noble Lords are aware, the scrapping of the RAF’s Nimrod fleet in 2011 before it was commissioned was a very controversial decision that left the RAF without any maritime reconnaissance capacity for some years, until the commissioning of the Poseidon P8 aircraft based at Lossiemouth. It is no surprise to read that questions are being raised as to whether the current fleet of nine aircraft is enough to meet our commitments, especially given the deteriorating geopolitical situation in the north Atlantic and in the Indo-Pacific region. Last week, newspaper reports covered recent statements by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, that defence spending should go up to 3% immediately and that the Government’s current strategy of waiting until after the strategic defence review and then doing it in the June financial statement is ludicrous. The noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, have both said that we need to spend 3.5% to maintain our existing military capabilities and commitments to NATO. Does the Minister agree with his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord West, that the Government’s approach to defence spending is ludicrous? As honorary air commodore of 600 (City of London) Squadron in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, I entirely endorse what my noble friend Lord De Mauley said about the contribution of the Reserve Forces to the resilience of the defence of the United Kingdom. Again, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Ashton and other noble Lords on an excellent report and excellent speeches, but regret that the report is already a year old. Debates on recently published work tend to be livelier and receive more media interest.

17:22:00

My Lords, I congratulate the chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, and all the committee on a first class report. This is a very important region, set only to increase in importance given the current geopolitical situation and outlook. As the Minister for the Polar Regions, Stephen Doughty, said in a speech late last year: “There is no global security without Arctic security”. As noted in the report, the UK is the closest neighbour to the region, and of the eight Arctic countries, seven are now NATO allies. All can be numbered among the UK’s very closest friends. In fact, with the exception of some Commonwealth countries—other than Canada, which was already included—there are not so many other countries that would be added to that list. The UK shares values and long trading histories with Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. An important additional tie, as noted by other speakers, is Norway’s key position as leading energy supplier to the UK. Of course, our links with Canada and the USA, while different and more recent, are profoundly strong. The report is admirable—stellar—in its comprehensiveness. There is so much that is rightly highlighted. I will not go through that, in the interests of brevity, but in the time available I will elaborate on some of the questions raised and pose a few of my own. My career and background have been in maritime. The report notes that reduced ice coverage and the richness of the region in energy and rare minerals are both likely to lead to an increase in maritime activity and resource extraction. In the meantime, Russia regards the Northern Sea Route as its seaway. As noted by the noble Lord, Lord Soames, it wishes to treat this as a domestic channel, which is a very serious matter for us all. There are numerous challenges to safe navigation, including sea ice, limited availability of meteorological data, of charts and of other navigational aids, and, at times, restricted visibility. It is worth taking a moment to consider the difficulty of locating and assisting casualties, be that ships or aircraft. Dealing with pollution is also particularly challenging. The ice moves and oil can then shift under the ice, making it very difficult to locate and harder to disperse. With seaborne movements of oil from Alaska, there are arrangements in place to locate specially equipped planes there quickly in the event of an oil spill. The Norwegians also have arrangements in place. In those latitudes, the distances are sometimes not great. However, in the event of a spill off Russia, in current geopolitical circumstances one has to question the prospects for any immediate co-operation. Without going into specifics, is the Minister satisfied that the UK is adequately supporting capacity for search and rescue, perhaps as well as anti-pollution measures? Will the UK Government support calls for a review of the governing polar code? The report asks more than once whether the UK is devoting adequate resources and training to meet possible future needs, protect UK interests and meet NATO obligations. A specific point made in the report and highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, is that the UK has one ice class patrol ship. The ship, HMS “Protector”, will be 25 years old this year. In the meantime, she is required to perform duties in both the Arctic and the Antarctic. Early ordering of a second ice class patrol ship would do much to boost operational security and demonstrate UK commitment. More widely, the Minister will not be surprised if I add my voice to the calls to increase defence expenditure. Very many outside government acknowledge the need for defence expenditure to rise to a minimum level of 3% of GNP at the earliest opportunity. I know it is easy to say it standing in this Chamber, and we all know the pressures on the Government, but with the greatest respect, the defence of the nation and its interests has to be the number one priority of any Government. The report notes the importance of contributing to the fullest extent possible to discussions with the Arctic states, be that with the seven friendly members of the Arctic Council or through other fora. The report pressed for ministerial as well as cross-government engagement. From what I have gathered, there has been some progress on the cross-government aspect since the report was published, and it is pleasing on one level to see UK ministerial engagement upgraded from a junior Minister in the last Government to Minister of State level in the new Government in the shape of Minister Doughty. However, the Minister’s responsibilities include Europe, including Gibraltar; central Asia; the US and Canada, which are both very demanding briefs at this time; the overseas territories, including the polar regions; NATO and Euro-Atlantic security; sanctions—another big file at this time—and more. The Minister is of course part of a team headed by the Secretary of State and supported by other Ministers but, with the best will in the world, he would appear to have a very heavy workload. Is there a case for the appointment of a junior Minister to support the Minister of State on polar matters? I have some other questions for the Minister. What level of China-Russia co-operation do the Government expect to see in the region? Can he enlighten us in any way? Are the Government seeking to identify business opportunities for the UK in the Arctic? How committed are the Government to ensuring that we take advantage of business opportunities, and how can the business opportunities be exploited in a responsible manner? Finally on business, what scope is there to enhance government co-operation with business so as to optimise Britain’s efforts, contributions and success in the Arctic? There may be lessons to be learned from Norway, especially in the area of protecting critical infrastructure. What plans are in place to co-ordinate with our allies to combat Russian grey zone activity in the Arctic? Is the Minister able to enlighten us on this? In conclusion, this is a critical region for Britain and the world. It is an area where, once again, the rules-based order may be expected to come under pressure. Can the Government gear up Britain’s contribution? We are widely viewed as a significant and benign actor in the Arctic; I make a plea that we do not let our position ebb away.

17:28:00

My Lords, it is a pleasure to wind from these Benches in what has been a fascinating debate. I very much thank the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, for opening the debate in a magnificent way that really drew out so many key issues about the Arctic: the importance of the Arctic for the United Kingdom, for our security and more generally. It is commonplace to say, “This has been an excellent debate”, but this afternoon we have heard not just from people who have worked on the International Relations and Defence Committee on this report but from people with a genuine interest in the Arctic. I suspect few of us can match the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, in having been to the North Pole. If I were in my normal environment of a university classroom, I would be asking people to put their hands up. It is not the custom or practice in your Lordships’ House to do that, but I am not getting a great sense of noble Lords saying, “Yes, I have been to the North Pole”. Like several noble Lords, I have been to Bardufoss, to the cold weather training with the Royal Marines. I declare my interests as a member of the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme and as a trustee of the Armed Forces Parliamentary Trust, under the auspices of which several noble Lords, and in particular Members of the other place, have had the opportunity of engaging in cold weather training with our colleagues in Norway. The Dutch were there as well. In particular, I am very grateful to the Norwegians because they gave me a pair of army boots that were much more comfortable than the NATO-issue army boots. That really was co-operation in practice in a practical sense. Clearly, there are very serious issues at stake with the Arctic. I was slightly taken aback by the Library’s opening line in its briefing for today’s debate, which reminds us that there is not really a technical definition of what constitutes the Arctic or what the region is. The Arctic Circle is very clear, but what do we count as Arctic? Clearly, we take eight countries as being Arctic states, and the closest neighbour then, after the seven NATO Arctic countries and Russia, is the United Kingdom. We genuinely have a claim to be a near neighbour—unlike China, whose geographical relationship is rather more distant. Yet in 2017 Russia and China were already talking about a polar silk road. Just days before the Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2022, they carried on discussions of a polar silk road. The Russia-China relationship—in particular relating to the Arctic—has significant ramifications for the region. That includes the United Kingdom. As the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, reminded us, we might now be a medium-sized state that may have global aspirations, but we are a state that has very long-standing and deep commitments to the North Atlantic area and to the High North. Their security and ours are closely linked, which we discovered, if anyone had forgotten, in the last few days, with former President and President-elect Trump’s view that Greenland is so important. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Teverson and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, for talking at some length about the views of the United States—or at least the views of President-elect Trump, because I doubt that they are the views of the United States. I suspect that there is not, in the rust belt, a sense of people saying: “We’ve got to take Greenland; Greenland is so vital for our security and economic interests”. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, pointed out, this is not the first time that Donald Trump has talked about wanting to buy Greenland or to have Greenland. Yet, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, pointed out, it is the height of irresponsibility to raise the status of Greenland. It is very easy to assume—or it was during the last Trump presidency—that this is just being said in jest and that it is not a serious suggestion. But this time around it is very clear that Donald Trump has an interest in Greenland that goes beyond simply his son, Donald Trump Jr, visiting Greenland and putting on social media—on a platform that I shall not name, owned by somebody who does not need any more airtime than he has had in recent times—that “Greenland is beautiful”. For those Members of your Lordships’ House who have not had the opportunity of visiting Greenland, I strongly recommend it. Greenland is indeed beautiful. Visit Greenland uses as its slogan “Colourful Nuuk”—that is the capital. It has also just been investing in an international airport to make tourism easier. I raise tourism, which has not come up today, because it is one of the aspects of climate change and changes to global interdependence and co-operation that comes to the fore when we think about both the Antarctic and the Arctic. It is not just the freeing up of shipping lanes for commercial trade that has become increasingly important, but a sense among many people that they want to engage in tourism to the South Pole—or, more likely, somewhere in Antarctica—or the Arctic, which is in easier range for many. For Greenlanders who want to expand their economy in a way that looks sustainable—without getting into the discussion about rare earths—tourism might seem attractive. But the more tourists they attract, the more in danger are the UNESCO sites in Greenland. The reason for visiting Greenland is precisely the beauty that comes from it being part of the frozen Nordic area, but the more visits there are, the faster climate change will be. So it is vital that we think about not just a general discussion of climate change, but local issues for our Nordic partners. There is a significant question about the sovereignty of Greenland, which needs to be considered. This report, like His Majesty’s Government’s previous strategic defence reviews and policy on the Arctic, thinks about China and Russia as threats. While I am in no way suggesting that the United States is a threat to the United Kingdom or to any of our NATO allies, the suggestion that one sovereign NATO state has an interest in buying part of another NATO state raises some questions about our alliances and how we work with our partners. I join others in asking the Minister whether he, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, will join the voices from France, Germany and the European Union in reminding President Trump that, actually, Greenland is not for sale and that this is not the way we work with our partners in NATO. Beyond that, there are clearly questions about the UK’s role in the Arctic and our military contributions in particular. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, and others about the lack or inadequacy of military capabilities. I am not, on this occasion, talking about the size of the defence budget, but I ask the Minister—if he is actually listening at the moment—whether he feels that the equipment and capabilities that we are currently able to deploy in the Arctic region and in the NATO area are adequate and fit for purpose. Is there a case for talking to the Treasury to stress the need to bring forward major defence procurements, such as an icebreaker or other ships and patrol vehicles that would be of benefit to our security as well as that of the Arctic? This has been an important debate which has raised many timely questions. While I would normally agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, that a debate should take place as soon as possible after a report has been written, on this occasion this debate is timely. It is a perfect opportunity for us to ask His Majesty’s Government whether they will reiterate our commitments to the Arctic and whether their position changes from that of the previous Government in any way.

17:39:00

My Lords, it is a pleasure to participate in today’s debate on this excellent report from the International Relations and Defence Committee. It was ably introduced by the committee chairman, my noble friend Lord Ashton of Hyde—of our very own endangered species, as he reminded us. He was the Chief Whip in the Government in which I served as a Minister; in the tragic event of him becoming extinct, he will be greatly missed in the same way as we miss the sabre-toothed tiger. As many speakers have observed, we live in an increasingly dangerous world and it is vital that we get this Arctic strategy right, with threats from Russia and China increasing in this and other areas. On these Benches, we take the security of the Arctic region as an utmost priority. That is why the previous Government commissioned an integrated review in 2021. That review recognised that the UK, as many other noble Lords have reminded us, is the nearest neighbour to the Arctic region, and it committed the Government at the time to contribute to maintaining the region as one of high co-operation and low tension. I am not sure we succeeded in that, but the Government stated that they would do this by “working with our partners to ensure that increasing access to the region and its resources is managed” as safely as possible. When he summarises the debate, can the Minister update the House on what work the current Government are doing to take forward that work, to ensure that the Arctic’s resources are being safely and responsibly managed? In addition, in March 2022, the Ministry of Defence published a policy paper titled The UK’s Defence Contribution in the High North, which set out the then Government’s aim to preserve the stability and security of the Arctic region. It set out four key objectives: “Protect our Critical National Infrastructure and our other national interests, and those of our Allies … Ensure our freedom to navigate and operate across the wider region … Reinforce the rules-based international system, particularly UNCLOS … Contest malign and destabilising behaviours”. Could the Minister outline whether those objectives are still shared and being prioritised by our new Government? If so, what progress is being made on achieving those goals? In February 2023, the previous Government published the policy paper Looking North: The UK and the Arctic, which recognised that the Arctic is critical for UK interests, most notably in respect of our future climate and security. The paper maintained the three key principles established in the UK Government’s Arctic policy framework of 2013: respect, co-operation and appropriate leadership. The 2023 integrated review refresh reaffirmed the UK’s commitment to the priorities set out in Looking North: The UK and the Arctic, while also committing the UK to continue its work in the Arctic with the Arctic Council, the Joint Expeditionary Force and NATO. Could the Minister outline what conversations the Government have had with the Arctic Council, the JEF and NATO on these matters? The previous Government took active steps to ensure a safer Arctic region, which, of course, benefits the United Kingdom as a whole. Worryingly, we have not heard much yet from the current Government to suggest that the Arctic region is still a priority for them. Since entering office, the current Foreign Secretary has given the Arctic only a brief mention, during his Kew lecture in September last year: “In the Arctic and Antarctic, global warming is driving geopolitical competition over the resources lying beneath the ice”. I looked in vain for any further references. Again, could the Minister expand on what specific actions the Government are taking to address the many geopolitical challenges posed by Russia’s increased militarisation in the Arctic? How do the Government intend to safeguard the UK’s national interests in the High North, particularly on these matters? Although security is paramount, and has featured in so many speeches today, we must also acknowledge that the Arctic plays a crucial role in the global climate system. The melting of Arctic ice is not only a warning sign of accelerating climate change but a trigger for geopolitical tensions as nations vie for newly accessible resources. That is why the Government’s approach must integrate environmental responsibility with strategic security. The 2021 review set out the UK’s commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic, and the 2023 review refresh reaffirmed that stance. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government continue to align their Arctic strategy with the principles of environmental stewardship and international collaboration, as outlined in both those reviews? The UK’s presence in the Arctic is enhanced through our alliances. Our membership of NATO and of the Joint Expeditionary Force enables us to contribute meaningfully to regional stability. Our observer status in the Arctic Council provides, as many have remarked, an avenue to influence policies that help shape that vital region’s future. Will the Minister provide an update on how the UK is trying to leverage those partnerships to ensure that the Arctic remains a region of peace and co-operation? Have the Government engaged with Arctic nations such as Norway and Denmark to help us strengthen those bilateral defence and environmental agreements? Of course, we commend our ally Denmark for increasing spending on Greenland’s defence at this vital time. I find myself agreeing with the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and, slightly surprisingly for me, with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that it would be nice to see some UK ministerial pushback to President-elect Trump’s frankly ridiculous threats against Greenland. I read them with great interest and there are frightening parallels with what Putin had to say about Ukraine and what President Xi has said about Taiwan. Although the UK is proud to have the US as our closest international ally, we should condemn any attempt to redraw national borders by force from wherever those threats come. The Arctic is an area of immense strategic importance, not only for our security but for our environmental and economic future. The previous Government laid, in my view, a strong foundation through these integrated reviews, the defence contributions and our international partnership. I hope the current Government will help to build upon those relationships, especially at a time when the region is becoming a focal point for global power struggles. We all understand that resources in this area are limited but I hope the Minister will be able to provide some clear assurances that the Arctic remains a priority for this Government and to outline how they plan to uphold the UK’s vital interest in this critical region.

17:47:00

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, for securing this long-overdue debate and I congratulate him on his opening remarks, which set the right tone for a comprehensive debate. As everyone says, this is a challenging time for the Arctic. High co-operation and low tension remain this Government’s long-term objective. Yet there is no doubt that the region is at an inflection point. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has undermined the peaceful co-operation that has characterised the Arctic Council, including collaboration on science and research, since its inception in 1996. Climate change is impacting the region, warming places up to four times faster than the global average, fuelling mass wildfires, and melting ice. Greenland alone is losing 30 million tonnes of ice every hour, while growing global interest in the Arctic from state and non-state actors threatens a new era of competition for resources. All these things put the region’s stability, security and environment at risk and threaten to replace its reputation for co-operation with competition. These are, of course, huge issues for its 4 million inhabitants, and the wider ripple effect has profound implications for the United Kingdom as the nearest non-Arctic state. As noble Lords know, that includes impacts on our weather, climate, ecosystems, fish stocks and domestic resilience, along with wider threats to the United Kingdom’s regional and global security. This Government recognise the gravity of these issues and their significance for UK interests. As the Minister for the Polar Regions, my honourable friend Stephen Doughty, noted at the Arctic Circle Assembly in October, we are determined to navigate the challenges ahead in a spirit of co-operation and respect with our partners in Europe and elsewhere. We will put internationalism and multilateralism at the heart of our work and be guided by the Arctic policy framework, which we will continue to update and develop in the light of the science and the strategic challenges we face. Critical to this co-operation, as the committee’s report identifies, is the Arctic Council, which we consider the pre-eminent intergovernmental forum in the region. Following a pause in relations with Russia, the council has re-established collaboration at a technical level over the past 18 months, as noble Lords have mentioned. While challenging, such efforts have seen progress in science and research co-operation for the benefit of the region as a whole. We commend and support Norway’s work as chair of the council in bringing these developments about, because effective governance, characterised by co-operation and constructive dialogue under its auspices, is key to building a secure and peaceful region. To address the contribution by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and others in relation to some of the statements currently being made, we will offer our support to the Kingdom of Denmark when it takes the chair of the Arctic Council in May. Constructive progress in the council has been a welcome development, but our objective for an Arctic of high co-operation and low tension depends on more than that alone, and of course there are some who may seek to undermine that objective. That is why we have been clear that we will protect and, if necessary, assert our rights to support wider regional governance and security. This includes protecting the centrality and integrity of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which I addressed recently at the United Nations General Assembly, in the face of attempts to undermine stability, disrupt critical infrastructure and restrict freedom of navigation in the region. Alongside our resolute support for Ukraine, we are working tirelessly with partners, including the Nordic states and beyond, for peace, security and stability. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, that the UK’s commitment to NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Northern Group is ironclad, because while we recognise Russia’s rights and role as an Arctic state, we are not naive about the challenges we face in the High North or their importance for the UK. There can be no global security without Arctic security. The recent reports of damage to electricity and telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea connecting Finland, Estonia and Germany underline the importance of partners, including the United Kingdom, continuing to work together on these shared challenges. The Foreign Secretary made these issues a focus of his first 100 days in office with visits to Sweden and Norway, where he discussed Euro-Atlantic security, and the Prime Minister joined leaders of other Joint Expeditionary Force nations in Tallinn last month to discuss the security threats and challenges in the Baltic, north Atlantic and High North and reiterate our commitment to the security of the region. It is also clear, as we have heard in the debate, that climate and environmental change are exacerbating the growing geopolitical competition, including for the critical minerals necessary to power the green transition, while being critical issues in their own right. The committee’s report rightly identifies the United Kingdom as a world leader in polar science. The UK has invested over £135 million in Arctic research over the last decade, including through UK centres of expertise. The UK’s Royal Research Ship “Sir David Attenborough” paid its first visit to Greenland last summer. The Minister with responsibility for the polar regions, Stephen Doughty, took the opportunity to engage with many British and international polar scientists on his visit to Norway and Iceland in October. Additionally, the United Kingdom’s Advanced Research and Invention Agency recently launched an £81 million call for proposals for research around Greenland to explore the potential for an early warning system for climate tipping points of global importance. Given that this is the critical decade for climate action, and as we head towards the next International Polar Year, in 2032-33, our efforts and collaboration have never been more important. We will work closely with Arctic state partners, wider allies and, critically, indigenous people to better understand and assess climate and environmental change in the region and beyond. However, to address the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, while we expect other countries to deliver their climate commitments, we also respect their right to determine the routes they take to meeting these goals, including how they regulate the production and use of hydrocarbons. To address the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, the UK continues to actively encourage UK polar science. In addition to our bilateral Arctic science research partnerships, the Government have recently committed additional funding to support engagement of UK researchers with the Arctic Council working groups. In total, government support for this engagement now amounts to £710,000. On the other issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, raised, which I have just mentioned, I reassure her that Minister Doughty met a number of Arctic state representatives and representatives of indigenous people, among others, on his recent visit to the Arctic Circle Assembly. In respect of indigenous people, he conveyed that we are committed to better recognising the vital role that they play in the region and to working with them in genuine partnership to tackle the challenges we face. We have much to learn from their experience and knowledge. Noble Lords will understand that the committee’s report also highlights the need to give the Arctic sufficient attention, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, for his questions on this point. As I have sought to highlight, what happens in the Arctic has wide-reaching implications for the United Kingdom, thrown into ever sharper relief by the climatic, environmental and geopolitical challenges it faces. The Minister for the polar regions has established a cross-governmental ministerial group on those regions, involving Ministers from nine other departments. This will meet for the first time in February and play an important role in supporting the agreement and delivery of a strong and co-ordinated Arctic policy. This is how we can ensure that we are best placed to support the long-term peace, sustainability and prosperity of the region and protect the UK’s long-term interests. The group will also help to ensure that the Government tackle the issues of climate change, nature and security in a joined-up way across the polar regions. To address the point made by many Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Teverson and Lord Hannay, this is not something to be delivered just from the United Kingdom. As I have highlighted, FCDO Ministers are actively engaged in the region, with support from wider ministerial colleagues and at official level by the head of the polar regions department and the senior Arctic lead, part of whose role is to represent UK interests with partners in the region. With UK interests co-ordinated through a lead Minister for the polar regions, we consider this an effective way of co-ordinating and delivering our Arctic policy. That is a specific answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ashton. I am also grateful to the noble Lord for his further questions. I hope that I have already given a flavour of the Government’s position on key areas of Arctic policy, but let me highlight three key things. First, there is our desire to see strong collaboration under the auspices of the Arctic Council, as part of our commitment to multilateralism and deepening our relationships in Europe and beyond. We see the council as key to binding together the growing global interest in a region characterised by ever increasing economic competition. Secondly, there is our steadfast commitment to the security of the Arctic, including through NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Northern Group. Thirdly, there is the centrality of action on climate and nature to the Government’s work. There are few places where the impacts of climate and environmental change are more clearly seen than in the Arctic. We will continue to press for action to reduce emissions and build collaboration through the United Kingdom’s contribution to Arctic research, including with indigenous people. In relation to the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, we support the objectives of this agreement, which came into effect in 2021. It seeks to prevent unregulated high seas fishing in the central Arctic Ocean. As noble Lords have said, it places a moratorium on commercial fishing in the area covered by the agreement until 2037. We remain committed to joining the agreement at the earliest opportunity. This requires an invitation from existing parties. However, there is currently no formally established accession process. The United Kingdom recently attended the third CAOFA conference of the parties in the Republic of Korea in June 2024, where a discussion on the United Kingdom’s accession took place for the first time. All parties but one were supportive, but the parties agreed to discuss an accession process. In the meantime, we continue to engage as an observer. I turn to some of the other questions raised in the debate but that I have not addressed so far. Noble Lords particularly asked about my noble friend Lord Robertson’s strategic defence review. While the UK is not an Arctic state, our capabilities in the Arctic and the High North are being considered as part of the strategic defence review, the outcome of which is due to be published in the first half of this year. We have strong relationships as allies with seven of the eight Arctic states, with which we will co-operate to ensure the stability of the region. The SDR will help to determine the nature of that co-operation, but our commitment to our allies through NATO and the JEF will remain steadfast. That review will precisely address those priorities that noble Lords have raised in this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, raised a really important point in regard to space. We are supportive of the ambition to launch satellites from spaceports across the United Kingdom. Assured access to launch capability is important to the MoD, and we will seek to achieve the greatest value for money from providers which can meet this requirement. We are supporting our partners and allies, as the noble Lord said, as a participant in the STARLIFT programme, which will create a network of space launch capabilities across the alliance. He also asked about Northlink. We will continue to engage with NATO to understand the vision and concept of Northlink. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, asked about biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. The ratification of that agreement is in line with the Government’s determination to reinvigorate the United Kingdom’s wider international leadership on climate and nature, and we are completely committed to ratification. Precisely when is a question of parliamentary time, as he knows. There was a question about search and rescue in the Arctic, which of course rests with the Arctic states. We are ensuring that the rescue agreements allow for co-operation to ensure timely and effective response. HM Coastguard works closely with them in the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, as well as other multilateral research projects. Certainly, HM Coastguard also represents UK interests in search and rescue discussions in the Arctic Council. The noble Lord, Lord Mountevans, raised the issue of increased shipping across the Arctic, which, of course, is not risk-free. As such, the United Kingdom will continue to advocate for the highest possible shipping standards and adherence to the polar code. New technology will be required to regulate and predictably meet the challenges of operating in the Arctic. Despite the delay in considering the report in the Chamber, this has been a timely opportunity for us to consider all these challenges. I certainly welcome the attention that noble Lords have given to this at this critical time. The Government are committed to working together with partners and allies in a spirit of collaboration and co-operation to ensure effective governance, underpinned by a strong Arctic Council; to support regional security and, more importantly, uphold international law; and to strengthen our science and research collaboration to tackle and respond to climate and environmental change, for a more stable, secure and sustainable Arctic for the future.

18:07:00

My Lords, I will be brief because I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser—and every other noble Lord, I expect—is anxious to go home in this appropriately Arctic weather. It is not my role to defend the Government but, in fairness, I should acknowledge that we refused an earlier date because it was in the Moses Room. I also must own up and accept that we failed to predict President Trump’s views on Greenland 14 months in advance and before he was re-elected. That was obviously a failure, so, tomorrow, I will try to learn: I will search Hansard over the past year to read all the warnings of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on this subject. I thank the Minister for his detailed reply and all noble Lords who contributed to this excellent debate. What the contributions have in common is demonstrating the many reasons why the Arctic and High North are so important, directly affect the UK and require sustained government attention. We all look forward to the SDR from our former colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Robertson; military resources have been referred to by many noble Lords this evening. They are obviously vital, but this debate has shown that the Government need to consider and prioritise many other things, such as polar research, indigenous people, fish stocks, ecotourism, search and rescue, space, and so on. I promised to be brief, and I thank again all the contributors to this debate.

Motion agreed.

House adjourned at 6.09 pm.