Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords]

14:47:00

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time. The Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill will enhance the UK’s resolution regime by giving the Bank of England a more flexible toolkit to respond to bank failures. The Bill creates a recapitalisation mechanism that ensures that certain costs of managing the failure of banking institutions do not fall to the taxpayer. It strengthens protections for public funds and financial stability, while supporting the competitiveness and growth of the UK financial sector by avoiding placing new up-front costs on the banking sector. It is therefore an important Bill that underpins this Government’s vision to promote growth and economic stability. The policy in the Bill builds on the proposals set out in consultation by the previous Government. I thank the previous Government—I do not always do that, by the way—for the work they did with the Bank of England on the consultation and on the resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK, back in March 2023. The Bill provides the Bank of England with greater flexibility to manage the failure of small banks, and thereby embeds lessons learned from the volatility in the UK banking sector in 2023, notably that arising from the failure of SVB UK. I hope, given their origins, that these proposals will be welcomed by hon. Members from across the House. The resolution regime was created by the Banking Act 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis. It provides the Bank of England with a set of tools to manage the failure of financial institutions in a way that limits risks to financial stability, public funds and the UK economy. The regime was introduced in recognition of the global consensus that reforms were needed to end “too big to fail” and to ensure that, where necessary, financial institutions can be supported to fail in an orderly fashion. This regime has been developed and steadily added to by a series of successive governments over the past decade. That work has given the UK a robust regime that reflects relevant international standards and supports the UK’s role and reputation as a leader in financial regulation, enhancing confidence in our financial system and making the UK a more secure and attractive place in which to invest. The resolution regime was last used to resolve Silicon Valley Bank UK, the UK subsidiary of the US firm that collapsed in March 2023. The Bank of England used its transfer powers under the Banking Act 2009 to effect the sale of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC. That delivered good outcomes for financial stability, customers and taxpayers. All the bank’s customers were able to continue accessing their bank accounts and other facilities, and all deposits remained safe, secure and accessible. The Bank of England achieved the continuity of banking services, and maintained public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system. The case of Silicon Valley Bank UK demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the resolution regime. However, as would be appropriate following any bank failure, the Treasury, the Bank of England and their international counterparts reflected carefully following this period of banking sector volatility, and following that reflection, the Government concluded that there was a case for a targeted enhancement to give the Bank of England greater flexibility to manage the failure of smaller banks such as Silicon Valley Bank UK. At this point, I should explain that the Bank of England generally expects to place failing small banks into insolvency under the bank insolvency procedure, because their failures are not generally expected to meet the conditions that must be satisfied for the Bank of England to exercise its resolution powers. One of those conditions is that winding up the bank would not achieve the resolution objectives to the same extent as they would be achieved through the use of the resolution powers. Those objectives include protecting UK financial stability, covered depositors and public funds. When a failing firm enters insolvency, its eligible depositors are paid out up to £85,000 each within seven days by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, with higher limits for temporary high balances. This compensation is funded initially through a levy on the banking sector, and then, to the extent possible, recovered from the estate of the failed firm. As was seen in the case of the Silicon Valley Bank, it is the Government’s view that in some cases of small bank failure, the public interest and resolution objectives are better served by the use of the resolution powers than by placing the firm into insolvency. Smaller banks are not required to hold additional funds and liabilities that could be bailed in during a resolution, so in a case in which a small bank does need to be resolved, additional capital may be required to support a successful resolution. For example, funds may be required for the bank in resolution to meet the minimum capital requirements for authorisation, or to sustain market confidence. At present, these recapitalisation costs have to be borne by public funds. The Government believe that that situation should be avoided to protect taxpayers from bearing those costs, and I hope that the Opposition agree; we shall see very shortly. To that end, the Bill aims to strengthen the protections for public funds when a small bank is placed into resolution. Overall, this is a prudent set of reforms to ensure that the resolution regime continues to effectively limit risks to financial stability and, indeed, to taxpayers. The Bill does not make widespread changes to a regime that is working well, and it is important to emphasise that the bank insolvency procedure will continue to play an important role in managing the failure of small banks. That said, the Bill reflects the Government’s belief that a targeted set of changes is needed to ensure that, if necessary, existing resolution powers can be applied to small banks to achieve good outcomes for financial stability, while also protecting taxpayers. It achieves that by introducing a new recapitalisation mechanism, which allows the Bank of England to use funds provided by the banking sector to cover certain costs associated with resolving a failing banking institution. The Bill does four main things. First, it expands the statutory functions of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, giving the Bank of England the power to require the FSCS to provide it with funds to be used to support the resolution of a failing bank. Secondly, it allows the FSCS to recover the funds provided to the Bank by charging levies on the banking sector. This mirrors the arrangements for funding payouts to covered depositors in insolvency, with the exception of the treatment of credit unions, to which I will return. Thirdly, the Bill gives the Bank of England an express ability to require a bank in resolution to issue new shares, facilitating the use of industry funds to meet a failing bank’s recapitalisation costs. Finally, following constructive debate in the other place, the Bill sets out a number of accountability measures that apply when the Bank of England uses the recapitalisation mechanism. The Bill consists of eight clauses to deliver those key components. Clause 1 inserts a new section into the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which introduces the new mechanism. It allows the Bank of England to require the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to provide the Bank with funds when using its resolution powers to transfer a failing firm to a private sector purchaser or bridge bank. It sets out what these funds can be used for, namely to cover the costs of recapitalising the firm and the expenses of the Bank of England or “relevant persons” in taking the resolution action. “Relevant persons”, for this purpose, means the Treasury, or a bridge bank or asset management vehicle operated by the Bank of England. The clause also allows the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to recover the funds provided through levies. Clause 2 sets out the reporting requirements for the Bank of England when it uses the recapitalisation mechanism, added to the Bill by the Government in the other place. The Bank must report to the Chancellor on the use of the recapitalisation mechanism and the stabilisation option that it was used in connection with. The Treasury can specify the content and timing of these reports, although if a final report is not produced within three months, the Bank of England must produce an interim report within that three-month period. The Chancellor must lay all reports before Parliament, although the clause allows discretion to omit any information that it would not be in the public interest to publish. Clause 3, added by the Government in the other place, requires the Bank of England to notify the Chairs of the relevant parliamentary Committees in this House and the other place—the Treasury Committee in the House of Commons, and the Financial Services Regulations Committee in the House of Lords—as soon as reasonably practicable after using the mechanism. Clause 4 requires the Bank of England to reimburse the Financial Services Compensation Scheme for any funds it provides that were not needed. Clause 5, also added by the Government in the other place, states that the Treasury must include guidance on the contents of reports on use of the mechanism in the code of practice, a statutory document that the Treasury must publish and to which the Bank of England must have regard, which explains how the resolution regime is intended to work in practice. Clauses 6 and 7 make several consequential amendments to reflect the introduction of the new mechanism. Clause 6 primarily ensures that existing provisions relating to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme apply to the new mechanism in the same way. The most substantive provision specifies that the FSCS cannot levy credit unions to recoup funds provided under this mechanism, and was added to the Bill before its introduction to Parliament in response to valid concerns raised by industry. In clause 7, which contains mostly technical consequential amendments, the most substantive change gives the Bank of England the power to require a failing firm to issue new shares. That will make it easier for the Bank of England to use the funds provided by the FSCS to recapitalise the firm, by using the funds to buy the new shares. Clause 8 deals with procedural matters, including the provision that the Treasury may make regulations to commence the provisions in the Bill. I am grateful to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury for shepherding the Bill through its successful passage in the other place. As I have mentioned, the Government made a number of amendments to the Bill in the other place following constructive debate, feedback and engagement. They include the insertion of the requirements for the Bank of England to report to the Treasury and notify parliamentary committees. The Government also amended the Bill to ensure that there was clarity over whose expenses could be covered by funds provided through the mechanism. In addition, the Government published a number of important documents during the early stages of the Bill’s passage, including a draft update to their code of practice setting out how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice. There remains one area of the Bill that will require the attention of this House, namely the question of the scope of the mechanism—that is, which firms the Bank of England can use the mechanism on to support their failure. This was heavily debated in the other place, and reflects concerns about the risk of the mechanism being used on a wide range of firms, with the potential for large levies as a consequence. Those concerns led to an amendment to the Bill, intended to exclude from the scope of the mechanism those banks that already hold the full set of equity and debt resources—the so-called MREL, or minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities—necessary to manage their own failure. The intent was to limit the scope to banks that are not required to hold additional capital resources, or banks that have not yet raised the full amount of additional resources to fully support their own failure. As I have alluded to, the Government note and appreciate the concerns being raised on this point, but as the Financial Secretary to the Treasury made clear during the Bill’s passage in the other place, the Government are clear that this Bill is primarily intended for smaller banks. My predecessor made a written statement to the House on 15 October to reiterate this policy position. However, after careful reflection, the Government continue to believe that some flexibility should remain in the legislation on this point, in order to avoid constraining the Bank of England’s ability to use the mechanism in a highly uncertain crisis scenario. Narrowing the scope would constrain the Bank of England’s optionality, particularly where it might be necessary to supplement the bail-in of a firm’s own resources with additional capital resources. I note that this is considered an unlikely outcome, rather than a central case. Nevertheless, the Government consider it important to avoid constraining that optionality, given that the alternative may be to use public funds. Ultimately, we want to protect the taxpayer. The Government will therefore table an amendment in Committee to remove the constraint on the scope of the application of the new mechanism. More broadly, I want to express my gratitude to the banking sector, with which the Government have engaged proactively and constructively both before and since the Bill was introduced. The Government appreciate the feedback from industry, and we have reflected on it carefully to ensure that the Bill delivers a proportionate reform. As alluded to earlier, in response to feedback from industry, the Government carved out credit unions from levy contributions to recoup funds provided by the financial services compensation scheme under the recapitalisation mechanism. That was deemed appropriate because credit unions are out of scope of the resolution powers. It would therefore be disproportionate to require them to contribute towards costs under the mechanism. The Government have also sought to provide reassurances to industry on the impact of this Bill. For example, by modelling the mechanism on the existing funding framework for depositor payouts, industry will be liable to pay levies only after the point of failure, avoiding new up-front costs to firms. Alongside the Bill, the Government also published a cost-benefit analysis that sets out our general expectation that lifetime costs for levy payers will generally be lower under the mechanism outlined in the Bill, compared with insolvency. I note again the draft updates to the code of practice, which the Government have published to provide additional transparency to industry and Parliament on how the mechanism is expected to be used in practice.

I am enjoying listening to the Minister’s speech, and I am learning quite a lot. Will she do me and the House a favour by sharing her thoughts on how I can best describe the benefits of this Bill to the people of Newcastle-under-Lyme when I go home tonight? I am sure she knows far better than me.

My hon. Friend flatters me. It is not that easy to explain in simple terms, but I will do my best. Essentially, if a small bank is in trouble, it is better for it not to go into insolvency but instead to go through resolution to protect its depositors. In the case of SVB, only 14% of deposits were covered by the financial services compensation scheme, because the scheme only covers deposits up to the £85,000 threshold. Had public funds been required to facilitate the sale of SVB to another purchaser—in this case it was HSBC, but it could have been another institution—it would have had recourse to public funds. We are seeking to avoid a situation in which taxpayers in all our constituencies are on the hook for the failures of small banks. Where a bank has high-quality assets, which was the case for SVB, we can avoid the insolvency situation and pay out to depositors who have deposits above the £85,000 threshold. That resolution would be funded by the financial services compensation scheme and ultimately the banks, which contribute to the scheme through a levy. I hope that answer helps my hon. Friend—I am sorry that it was a bit long. Stability is at the heart of the Government’s agenda for economic growth, because when we do not have economic and financial stability, it is working people who pay the price. We have to bear in mind what we are seeking to do, which is ultimately to protect the interests of the taxpayer and to ensure that we do not have to have recourse to public funds.

I welcome this Bill, but can the Minister assure the House that, at all times, the aim of the Government is to minimise the liability of the taxpayer? Where losses have to be sustained, they should be borne first by the shareholders, secondly by the bondholders and perhaps thirdly, and regretfully, by the deposit holders. That should be the order in which losses are sustained.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman, who puts it very well. He will know that there was a different order in the case of Credit Suisse, but the then Government said at the time that that would not be their order of priority. We are seeking to protect the taxpayer in this Bill, and he is right: had there been a cost associated with the transfer of SVB, it would have fallen first to those people before falling to the taxpayer. If we pass this legislation, for which I hope there is cross-party support, we will avoid that eventuality, because if we follow the order of priority and get to the financial services compensation scheme, the cost will be paid through a levy on the banks in that scheme. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. The resolution regime is a critical source of stability when banks fail, because it ensures that public funds and taxpayer money are protected. This Bill delivers a proportionate and targeted enhancement to the resolution regime to ensure that it continues to provide that important stability. As I said at the start of this debate, it is therefore an important Bill that underpins the Government’s vision for economic growth, and I commend it to the House.

I call the shadow Minister.

15:06:00

I welcome the new Minister to her place. I think this is her first Bill that she has taken through as Economic Secretary and, interestingly, she is absolutely right. This is one of the frequent occasions on which we will agree on pretty much everything. This Bill was obviously written by the previous Government who, I think we all agree, delivered 14 years of strong and stable government. Broadly speaking, we will not disagree on this Bill. As the Minister set out in her opening speech, this legislation was born out of the learnings of the failure of Silicon Valley Bank. The failure came out of the US parent company, with a contagion that quickly spread to its UK subsidiary. Although the Bank of England had initially planned to use insolvency procedures, HSBC emerged as a buyer thanks to the tireless work over the course of a weekend in March 2023, and much credit must be given to the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Jeremy Hunt), and the former Economic Secretary to the Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs (Andrew Griffith). They secured an outcome that has not cost the taxpayer any money at all, and which protected millions of pounds’ worth of customer deposits, primarily in the tech sector. The bank’s customers would face an uncertain financial future were it not for that intervention, so I am sure that the House will join me in commending the action that was taken by the previous Government. The failure and subsequent transfer of Silicon Valley Bank UK shows how robust our post-2009 banking reforms have become. The Bank of England has used its resolution powers only three times since 2009, and this was the first time since the Southsea Mortgage and Investment Company failed in 2011. It is fair to say that the process worked absolutely as it should have done: the transfer of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC was done in an orderly manner, there was no wider contagion in the banking sector, and withdrawals and panic did not spread to other banks. In short, it demonstrated why the UK is such a financial centre of excellence, and we must continue to champion that point. However, we can continue to uphold our world-leading reputation only if we review and learn from when the system is stressed in real life. In some ways, we were very fortunate. HSBC was the only credible bidder for Silicon Valley Bank that did not require financial support or guarantees from the Government or the Bank of England. In addition, HSBC’s level of capital and liquidity resources greatly reduced the risk to public funds, delivered stability and boosted market confidence. However, had HSBC not come forward, the only option for the Bank of England was the bank insolvency procedure. This Bill comes out of the subsequent root-and-branch review, and it went for industry consultation under the previous Government. I thank the current Government for supporting it. The Opposition recognise that some banks may fail due to issues outside their control and should have pathways to continue as a going concern if transferred to another entity, and it is right that the Bank of England has more tools in its arsenal to support the financial system. We are therefore delighted to support the Bill—it is one that we started. As it made progress in the other House, it benefited from considerable scrutiny from noble peers. The successful amendments and new clauses enhanced the Bill and will significantly improve transparency. This was a point addressed by my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) during the Delegated Legislation Committee on Monday, which finalised the transfer of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC with no compensation to shareholders. He rightly raised some of the unanswered questions on what changed the Bank of England’s decision between announcing that the Silicon Valley Bank UK was going into insolvency procedures on the Friday and being transferred under resolution by the Monday. These additional transparency arrangements will ensure that colleagues in this House remain confident in the independence of the Bank of England. Will the Minister confirm that the Government intend to support those amendments in this House? I would be amazed if he said no, actually. I will move on to what could be the crux of any potential disagreement. When this Bill was introduced in the other place, there was no limit to the scope of this regime. We can safely categorise our banks into three different groups. First, there are the large-scale institutional banks that have reached the end-state minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities, or MREL, as it is known. Secondly, there are the challenger banks such as Monzo and Starling that are working towards end-state MREL. Finally, there are the smaller banks that do not meet the threshold for MREL, such as Silicon Valley Bank. The Banking Act 2009 provides a robust framework for dealing with banks that have achieved end-state MREL status, and while there is a sensible argument for saying the new mechanism could provide top-up funding for banks working towards end-state MREL, it is not fair or reasonable to expect the mechanism to be used for the largest banks. The consequences of such a decision could be extremely costly for banks and their customers, and if an institutional bank failed and this mechanism were used to facilitate a transfer, our fear is that there could be a recapitalisation requirement that was many times the annual cap of the financial services compensation scheme. The only decision left to the FSCS would therefore be to borrow from the national loans fund via the Treasury. The ex-post levy set out in this legislation would therefore be charged not only in the year in which the levy was first implemented but potentially for many years thereafter. MREL requirements should ensure the safety of our largest institutions. Bank directors should be ensuring sound compliance of MREL, not taking comfort in the fact that they can fall back on to an ex-post levy of the banking sector in times of trouble. The Opposition took reassurance from a policy statement that the mechanism would be used for the largest banks only in exceptional circumstances. However, this still left the key question as to why the legislation allowed large-scale banks to trigger the mechanism. In her opening speech, the Minister referred exactly to this. Baroness Vere’s amendment makes it clear that this mechanism cannot be used on the largest banks—those that have achieved end-state MREL. That amendment was opposed by the Government in the other place. I was hoping that the Minister would update the House today on the Government position and she has done that, but we may want to talk about this at greater length. Concerns were also rightly raised by peers that this mechanism, and using resolution to transfer failing banks, should not become the default position of the Bank of England, which is important. Ultimately, banks are businesses. They have shareholders that bear the responsibility and the burden of risk, and we should not create a system where banks can always expect to fall back on industry-funded life support. The code of practice, alongside this Bill, rightly states that using the insolvency procedure should be the default position. I would welcome the Minister’s comments on whether there could be further need for that to be strengthened in the legislation. The introduction of this mechanism is another example of a banking industry in strong health. In 2007, it was the taxpayer bailing out the banks. Now we have a system whereby the industry is expected to cover the cost of a failing bank. This raises questions as to whether the Government need to review how we can make the UK banking sector more internationally competitive—we have had an informal chat about this. Let us take the bank levy as an example. It was introduced for three main reasons. First, it was introduced to help repay the cost of the banking bail-out, and it has raised something in the region of £25 billion since it was first introduced. Second, the bank levy acted as a kind of insurance premium in case the post-financial crisis stability of the banking sector were to falter and fall and there needed to be another bail-out. Finally, it was almost a quasi-punishment to the banking system for the failures that led to the financial crisis. It was there to reassure unhappy shareholders that there were consequences for a sector in which there was bad practice. If we add up the total cost to the UK taxpayer of the financial crisis, it was £137 billion, according to the House of Commons Library, as of 2023. That has been reduced to £33 billion now, so there still is some outstanding cost. On top of the bank levy, other post-2009 reforms include much more stringent ringfencing and capital requirements. That might not be a subject for this debate, and I am not calling for the bank levy to be abolished, but I would certainly welcome the Minister’s comments on whether there could be scope to review the international competitiveness of the banking sector alongside the Chancellor’s growth agenda. The international competitiveness of the City of London should be an absolute priority for this Government—I believe that it is—yet according to UK Finance’s 2024 banking sector tax report, produced by PwC, UK banks face the highest tax contribution since the study started a decade ago. In terms of international competitiveness, according to PwC, the total tax burden of a model bank operating in the UK is currently 45.8%. That is significantly higher than our competitors in Frankfurt at 38.6%, in New York at 27.9%, or in Dublin at 28.8%. The City, as I am sure Ministers and the whole House will agree, is an extraordinary asset for this country. For a Government who are seeking a growth agenda, the City is the oil in the engine of that economic growth. Banks do a very important job, and it is a job of significant social and economic importance. Banks take money from where it has accumulated and distribute it to where it is needed for investment. This is crucial to fairness across our economy and delivering growth. They transfer overnight deposits into 25-year mortgages that provide hope and opportunity for people to bring up their families in safety. So we should not demonise banks, and we must remember that shareholder returns on bank investments are as important as shareholder liability in the event of a failure. We must ensure that there is a good return, given the fact that bank shareholders bear the ultimate risk of losing everything. This Bill is a shining example of the fact that the banks and regulators are now in a position to keep their industry in order. As I said at the start of this speech, I believe that there is cross-party support for the Bill, and I look forward to working with the Government as these reforms progress through the House. They are magnificent, because of course they came from the previous Government, but I thank the Ministers for continuing with them in the spirit with which they were intended.

15:17:00

I would like to start by welcoming both the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Emma Reynolds), and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea West (Torsten Bell), to their new positions. My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea West and I go way back, and I am enjoying now being able to address him as a Minister in His Majesty’s Government. I congratulate both of them. I did not quite agree with the shadow Minister’s description of the previous Government as “strong and stable”, but it was certainly worth a try—I mean that in all good spirit, honestly! I thank the Minister for her speech and for her thorough but accessible explanation of the reach of the Bill. I shall look forward to talking about it with the people of Newcastle-under-Lyme tomorrow on the doorsteps of Town ward, where there is a by-election, which I look forward to the Labour candidate, Sheelagh Casey-Hulme, winning. I will make sure that I share the benefits of this Bill with the voters in my constituency when I knock on their doors tomorrow. This Bill has the good fortune of being supported by both sides of the House. We have heard that from the shadow Minister, so I want to reassure all colleagues that I shall speak very briefly indeed. I have never received an invitation for a prawn cocktail in the City—although all good things come to those who wait—but the Bill and the issues contained in it are important and I am pleased to be here to speak in favour of them today. I have just a couple of points that I would like the Minister to touch on in his winding-up speech. Could he set out in greater detail how the payslips of workers in Newcastle-under-Lyme will be protected by the contents of the Bill? My constituents’ finances and livelihoods are obviously my focus, so I welcome anything and everything this Government do to protect and enhance their lives, or to promote growth across the economy. I would welcome anything the Minister can do to provide reassurance both on the growth agenda generally and on the specific benefits of the Bill. Ahead of this debate, like all keen newbies, I read the Hansard report of the debate in the other place, and I hope Ministers have ensured that the legitimate points raised by the noble Lords were taken on board. I agree with the noble Lord who noted that small banks play a big role in our economy, and I thank the Economic Secretary and the shadow Minister for acknowledging that. I echo the shadow Minister’s point about the importance of the City, which is an engine of growth that reflects the success of our country and the strength of our economy. However, my focus as the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme is on ensuring that the growth, benefit and skill of that powerful engine reach up the M6 to junction 15, so that my constituents in God’s own county of Staffordshire can benefit from all that the City does. This is a technical but important Bill, and I am pleased to be here today to give it my support.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

15:20:00

All of our constituents are still feeling the cost of living crisis very acutely, and mortgage holders are still suffering from the misery of the mini-Budget, so the very last thing that taxpayers want to worry about is whether public money will be used to bail out banks that have gone bust. That is why we Liberal Democrats are broadly supportive of the Bill, which we hope will make sure that taxpayers do not have to do so. A number of improvements were made to the Bill in the other place, as the Economic Secretary alluded to, and we welcome the improved requirements on reporting and accountability. However, as she and the shadow Minister acknowledged, there was a point of contention on the Bill’s scope. Liberal Democrats in the other place supported the successful Opposition amendment to prevent the Bank of England from using this mechanism, which is meant for smaller banks, to support bigger banks that are signed up to a different scheme. The Economic Secretary said that an updated code of practice has been produced, but it is disappointing to hear that Ministers intend to table an amendment in Committee to try to delete the Lords amendment from the Bill. The Economic Secretary suggested that the purpose of keeping it in the code of practice, rather than on the face of the Bill, is to ensure flexibility in a time of crisis. I invite the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury, the hon. Member for Swansea West (Torsten Bell), to say a word or two about that in summing up, because it strikes me that if this is not on the face of the Bill, it could create uncertainty rather than provide flexibility in a time of crisis. There is a danger that even the suggestion that this mechanism could be used to support a bigger bank could cause chaos, confusion and instability. I encourage Ministers to think again and to ensure that the restriction on the Bill’s scope remains on the face of the Bill. The Liberal Democrats tabled a further amendment in the other place that sought to create a secondary objective for the Bank of England to consider the competitiveness and growth of the market before directing the recapitalisation of failing small banks through this levy. In effect, the amendment was designed to protect against unintended consequences. Obviously, it could be a catastrophe if the Bank of England were required to rescue one small bank, even if that act may put others in jeopardy. The intention behind the amendment was to protect against the systemic collapse of the banking system. Will the Minister set out the Government’s objections to that amendment? Can the Government provide assurances about alternative protections that could be put in place to achieve the same goal of protecting against unintended consequences?

15:24:00

I draw attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I have no desire to detain the House for long, but I have some questions that I hope the Economic Secretary can address, continuing our conversation in the Delegated Legislation Committee earlier this week. The Economic Secretary and I are both alumni of TheCityUK, so she will know that what financial services want most of all is certainty of regulation and decision making. They need to know that the playing field is level and predictable. While we are all patting ourselves on the back about Silicon Valley Bank, the consensus that everyone did a good job makes me slightly suspicious. The Bank of England effectively made three decisions during the unravelling of Silicon Valley Bank that I want to put on the Economic Secretary’s desk for her to consider. Is more certainty required from the Bank of England on the triggering of those decisions? First, the Bank of England denied Silicon Valley Bank short-term funding. SVB UK was solvent, as it would have to be as a UK subsidiary regulated by the Bank of England. It applied for £1.8 billion of short-term funding when it became clear that its parent company was in trouble. That funding was denied by the Bank of England, and I do not think there has ever been any significant examination of why the Bank took that decision. Obviously, there was a run on Silicon Valley Bank, with depositors seeking to pull out their money, and the bank was unable to honour those withdrawals, which is why it applied for short-term funding. A possible alternative route could have been a temporary freeze on withdrawals and/or the provision of short-term funding, which could have allowed the bank to remain solvent in the UK. Understanding what triggered that decision, and how other banks in similar circumstances might be handled by the Bank of England in future, is key. Secondly, as the shadow Minister said, the Bank of England initially decided to put Silicon Valley Bank UK into insolvency and rely on the £85,000 depositor guarantee and the £170,000 joint depositor guarantee. We do not know why the Bank changed its mind.

I can tell I am going to enjoy discussing these matters with the right hon. Gentleman. I have looked into this since our exchange on Monday, and I want to clarify what happened on the Friday before the Monday in March 2023. The Bank of England issued a statement on the Friday evening saying that it intended to apply to the court to place SVB UK Ltd into a bank insolvency procedure, absent any meaningful further information. However, a buyer came forward over the weekend, which is what changed between the Friday and the Monday. It was judged to be both in the public interest and in the interest of SVB UK customers that this resolution on the Monday morning was preferable to the insolvency procedure that had been announced on the Friday.

That is useful information about the Bank’s decision making. However, the Bank still decided to go for insolvency prior to a resolution mechanism. I find it hard to see that, within that 36-hour period, it had not canvassed whether there was a market for the bank. My point remains: if I were an investor or an overseas bank trying to establish and invest significant funds in a UK branch, I would like to understand why the Bank of England makes these decisions, and the criteria and parameters by which it is likely to make a decision either way. Then, of course, the final decision was taken to sell or transfer the bank to HSBC—for a minimal consideration, I think. I really want to understand what value was placed on that bank going to HSBC, as opposed to any of the other banks that might have been bidding for it. At the heart of this is my worry about competition. When a bank is put in this resolution position, obviously it needs to move to another bank that has significant assets and can fulfil the rightful demands of its depositors to withdraw their funds. That will naturally be a bigger bank, and there is a possibility—although hopefully this will not happen, as we will not use resolution very often—that small, higher-risk challenger banks will find themselves unable to obtain short-term funding from the Bank of England because of their size, and will therefore be gobbled up by the leviathans of the banking system. Over time, there might be a natural move back towards where we were prior to all these challenger banks appearing—to having four or five massive banks that dominate the system in an uncompetitive way. I am asking the Minister not necessarily to change the legislation, but to consider setting out in a code of conduct what consideration the Bank of England has to give to the competitive landscape when it is resolving a bank. When it transfers one small bank to another small bank as part of a resolution, for example, that wheel might be oiled with a bit of short-term funding, in the interests of maintaining that competitive landscape. The cost of that should not fall on the taxpayer; effectively, it should be a loan for repayment. One of the benefits, if you like, of the 2007-08 crash—one of the silver linings of that cloud—is that we have a much more diverse banking landscape than before. There was recognition that having these huge organisations that crash the entire global economy if they fail was dangerous for the western economy, and that a much more diverse landscape was therefore desirable. The problem with that, obviously, is that there is more inherent risk in those smaller banks. If there is more inherent risk, we are likely to see more resolution, and in time we may end up back where we were. I support the Bill. I think that resolution is exactly the right way to go, and we should obviate the risk to the taxpayer. There are also negatives to the system, though, so I hope that the Minister, who I am sure will do the job with aplomb, will think carefully about the impact on the world of the Bank of England’s decision making and predictability; about what the Bank can do to provide transparency, whether through a code of conduct or indicators of practice; and about the impact of resolution on competition.

I call the shadow Minister.

15:31:00

It gives me great pleasure to wind up this debate, with the leave of the House, on behalf of the Opposition. First, I thank the handful of Members present, who have made very helpful contributions. The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Adam Jogee) rightly asked questions on behalf of his constituents. He asked whether they will be under the cosh if a bank goes bust again—they should not be, under this legislation—and what banks will do to generate economic growth in his area. The Liberal Democrat spokesman, the hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper), rightly raised a point about the legislation being extended to and used for the larger banks, which is not its intention. As ever, my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire (Kit Malthouse) has brought an intelligent scepticism to the question of what could happen with this legislation, and has demonstrated why Parliament is such a brilliant place, with intelligent people like him scrutinising what goes on. I also welcome the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury. He has had a glittering career, and has done extraordinarily well in his meteoric rise to Minister in not one but two Government Departments in his first Parliament. He is double-hatting already; he is a clever chap. We have come across each other in the past. I will not take too much of the House’s time, as I was on my feet just a few minutes ago, but I would like to come back to three points that I hope the Minister will address. The first is the amendment to the Bill; the Economic Secretary to the Treasury made the point that the Government do not want to support that amendment. This may come up later, and we may have more conversations about it. Secondly, does the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury feel that the Bank of England’s code of practice provides enough reassurance that the bank insolvency procedure remains the default option for failing smaller banks? Finally, how does he weigh up continued use of the bank levy and regulation of our banking system against the Chancellor’s growth agenda? I appreciate, however, that that is beyond the scope of the Bill. As I said in my opening remarks, the Bill retains surprisingly strong cross-party support. It is a good thing for the Bank of England to have more tools at its disposal during periods of heightened stress, and the version of the Bill before us today—the version amended in the other place—is more robust than it started out. We look forward to getting clarity from the newly appointed shadow Minister. [Hon. Members: “The Minister.”] My apologies—it will be a few years before that. I congratulate the newly appointed Minister on his appointment.

15:34:00

I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to this debate, which were small in number but high in quality. I also thank those who contributed in the other place, or by responding to the consultation that brought the Bill forward. As today’s short debate has demonstrated, there is broad support, both political and industrial, for the Bill. I thank hon. Members on the Conservative Front Bench for their kind words and constructive approach, particularly, to echo the shadow Economic Secretary, previous Treasury Ministers, not least the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Jeremy Hunt), who brought us to where we are today. The enhancements to the UK’s resolution regime are relatively modest, targeted and proportionate. That regime was established in the wake of the global financial crisis, and its powers were put to the test when Silicon Valley Bank UK failed in March 2023. That episode demonstrated that the regime was broadly working as intended, but it is right to learn the lessons from that experience. The first of those lessons is that the implications of a firm’s failure cannot always be anticipated before the event, and sometimes it can be in the public interest to use resolution powers even on small firms that were not deemed systemic prior to their failure. That was the case with Silicon Valley Bank UK, and insolvency would have had implications for public confidence in the stability of the UK financial system. The second lesson is that there is a potential gap in the resolution framework when it comes to managing the failure of such firms. They do not hold the additional resources to absorb losses and facilitate recapitalisation in the event of their failure. Silicon Valley Bank was well capitalised, and it was possible to find a willing buyer in HSBC. However, such an outcome may not be possible for a small bank with a shortfall in capital. At present, such a shortfall would have to be met through the use of public funds, and there is cross-party support for reducing that risk. We also wish to increase the options available to the Bank of England for managing the failure of a small bank. The Bill does so without imposing any new up-front costs on the banking sector, or fundamentally altering the broader resolution framework, which has been shown to work well. It rightly does not alter the public interest test that underpins the Bank of England’s decision on whether to use its resolutions powers or place a firm into insolvency. I will return to that point shortly. The shadow Economic Secretary raised a number of points. I broadly agree with his description of the events around Silicon Valley Bank UK. It was a helpful summary of developments. I can confirm that the Government welcome the amendments made in the other place, with the one exception raised by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, which I know we will discuss further in Committee. We have been clear that the powers are to be used for smaller banks, but that does not mean that use of the powers will become the default. Insolvency for small banks remains the default approach. The shadow Economic Secretary also raised the wider question of banking taxation. I am sure we will discuss that in the months and probably even years to come. Our view is that banking taxation remains competitive, but his comments have been noted, and we will always keep that matter under review. The hon. Member for St Albans (Daisy Cooper) focused on the proposed size limits for banks. As I have mentioned, we do not think that what she suggested is the correct way forward, but we will continue to discuss it. The intention is that the powers will be used in the case of small banks, but the lesson of the last 20 years—not just in the UK, but around the world—is that flexibility is important when it comes to resolving bank failures. She asked whether a wider growth objective should be inserted for the Bank of England. This is a narrow Bill, and we do not think it is the right place to discuss wider issues about the Bank’s approach. The public interest test, which the Bank is already required to apply when it comes to resolution and questions of bank failure, provides much of the protection that she seeks. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Adam Jogee) asked about the impact on ordinary workers. That is a good question, and we always need to come back to it. Another lesson of the last two decades is that a stable and strong banking sector is an important underpinning for a strong economy, and for rising wages right across the country. I started my career in the Treasury in the years when the UK and other advanced economies were having to swiftly relearn that banks can, and do, fail, and that the consequences of them doing so in an unmanaged way are very big and very bad indeed. The lesson from that crisis was clear: a comprehensive resolution regime is important for protecting financial and economic stability and public finances in bad times, but also for underpinning confidence in the financial system at all times. This lesson is especially significant for the UK, as the financial services sector plays such a vital role in our economy—a point that was powerfully made during the debate. We have also learned that it is important for the Bank of England to have a range of tools available for managing firm failures, because those failures can be unpredictable. The best tool for managing the situation is not always apparent prior to the point of failure, as evidenced by the failure of Silicon Valley Bank UK. That is why, despite the UK’s resolution regime having worked well in practice, the Government believe that it is important to learn the lessons of the banking sector volatility of 2023. The targeted enhancements in the Bill provide the Bank of England with a more flexible toolkit for responding to the failure of smaller banks, while also protecting public funds. The Bill also supports the Government’s growth agenda. Although it is common to focus on the trade-offs between regulation and growth, confidence in and the stability of the banking sector are key to supporting long-term growth. I am glad to have heard this afternoon that there is broad support for this Bill in the House. Assuming that support continues for at least the next few minutes, the Government look forward to engaging further with hon. Members in Committee. I commend this Bill to the House. Question put and agreed to. Bill accordingly read a Second time. Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] (Programme) Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)), That the following provisions shall apply to the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords]: Committal (1) The Bill shall be committed to a Public Bill Committee. Proceedings in Public Bill Committee (2) Proceedings in the Public Bill Committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion on Thursday 13 February 2025. (3) The Public Bill Committee shall have leave to sit twice on the first day on which it meets. Proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading (4) Proceedings on Consideration shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on Consideration are commenced. (5) Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day. (6) Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings on Consideration and Third Reading. Other proceedings (7) Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Gen Kitchen.) Question agreed to. Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] (Money) King’s recommendation signified. Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)), That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords], it is expedient to authorise the payment out of the National Loans Fund of any sums payable out of the Fund by virtue of the Act.—(Emma Reynolds.) Question agreed to. Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords] (Ways and Means) Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 52(1)(a)), That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Bill [Lords], it is expedient to authorise the imposition of charges for the purpose of meeting expenses incurred by the scheme manager of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in connection with the recapitalisation of a financial institution.—(Emma Reynolds.) Question agreed to.