Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Committee (1st Day)

15:45:00

My Lords, if there is a Division in the Chamber while we are sitting, this Committee will adjourn as soon as the Division bells are rung and resume after 10 minutes. Clause 1: Customer data and business data Amendment 1

Moved by

1: Clause 1, page 2, leave out lines 34 to 37 Member's explanatory statement This is a probing amendment to ascertain why this new term is necessary.

My Lords, I start by reflecting on the strangeness of the situation—to me, anyway. Here we all are again, in slightly different seats but with a largely similar Bill. As I said at Second Reading, we welcome this important Bill; it is absolutely crucial to get our data economy right. We have a number of amendments to the Bill, a great many of which are probing. The overall theme of our amendments is how to make the Bill maximally effective at the important job that it sets out to do. The terminology of data law is well understood. Lawmakers, lawyers, businesses and data subjects are all to some extent familiar with the terminology. A “controller” means “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data”. A “processor” means “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller”. We are all familiar with those terms. In this Bill, new terms are introduced, named “data holder” and “trader”. A data holder, in relation to customer data or business data of a trader is the trader, or “a person who, in the course of a business, processes the data”. How is that materially different from a processor? A trader is described as a person who supplies or provides “goods, services or digital content” in the course of business, whether personally, through someone acting in the trader’s name, or on the trader’s behalf. Again, I ask how that is different from a controller. While I grant that this may seem a very small point in a very large Bill, already data regulations are relatively poorly understood and difficult to follow. Therefore, surely there is no real need to make them more complex by introducing overlapping terms just for this one section of the Bill. As I explained in our explanatory note, this is a probing amendment, and I hope the Minister will be able to explain why these terms are materially different from the existing terms, why they are necessary and so on. If so, I would of course be happy to withdraw my amendment. I beg to move.

Just to follow on from that, I very much support my noble friend’s words. The only reason I can see why you would introduce new definitions is that there are new responsibilities that are different, and you would want people to be aware of the new rules that have been placed on them. I will be interested to hear the Minister’s answer. If that is the case, we can set that out and understand whether the differences are so big that you need a whole new category, as my noble friend said. Having run lots of small businesses myself, I am aware that, with every new definition that you add, you add a whole new set of rules and complications. As a business owner, how am I going to find out what applies to me and how I am to be responsible? The terms trader, controller, data holder and processor all sound fairly similar, so how will I understand what applies to me and what does not? To the other point that my noble friend made, the more confusing it gets, the less likelihood there is that people will understand the process.

My Lords, I am not sure whether I should open by saying that it is a pleasure to take part in the passage of the third iteration of this Bill, but, as I said at Second Reading, this is an improvement. Nevertheless, there are aspects of the Bill that need close scrutiny. The noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, explained his approach to this Bill. Our approach is that we very much support the use of data for public benefit but, at the same time, we want to make sure that this Bill does not water down individual data rights and that they are, where necessary, strengthened. In that spirit, I wish to ask the Minister about the general nature of Clause 1, rather than following up on the amendments tabled by the noble Viscount. The definition of “business data” seems quite general. A report that came out yesterday, Data On Our Minds: Affective Computing At Work, highlighted the kinds of data that are now being collected in the workplace. It is a piece of work sponsored by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Trust for London and the Institute for the Future of Work. They are concerned about the definition of “business data”. The Minister probably will not have an answer on this matter at this stage but it would be useful if she could write in due course to say whether the definition of excludes emotional data and neurosurveillance data collected from employees. This is very much a workplace question rather than a question about the customer; I could ask the same question about the customer, I suppose, except the report is about workplace data collection. I thought I would opportunistically take advantage of the rather heavy de-grouping that has taken place and ask the Minister a question.

First, let me say what a pleasure it is to be back on this old ground again, although with slightly different functions this time round. I very much support what the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, said. We want to get the wording of this Bill right and to have a robust Bill; that is absolutely in our interests. We are on the same territory here. I thank the noble Viscount and other noble Lords for expressing their interest. On Amendments 1 and 2, the Government consider the terms used in Part 1, as outlined in Clause 1, necessary to frame the persons and the data to which a scheme will apply. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, mentioned the powers. I assure him that the powers in Part 1 sit on top of the Data Protection Act. They are not there instead of it; they are another layer on top of it, and they provide additional rights over and above what already exists. In relation to the specific questions from the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham, smart data schemes require suppliers or providers of goods, services or digital content to provide data. They are referred to as “traders” in accordance with recent consumer legislation, including the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The term “data holder” ensures that the requirements may also be imposed on any third party that might hold the data on the trader’s behalf. That is why these additional terminologies have been included: it is based on existing good legislation. I hope noble Lords will recognise why this is necessary and that this explains the rationale for these terms. These terms are independent of terms in data protection legislation; they have a different scope and that is why separate terms are necessary. I hope that, on that basis, the noble Viscount will withdraw his amendment.

I thank the Minister for that explanation. I see the point she makes that, in existing legislation, these terms are used. I wonder whether there is anything we can do better to explain the terms. There seems to be significant overlap between processors, holders, owners and traders. The more we can do to clarify absolutely, with great rigour, what those terms mean, the more we will bring clarity and simplicity to this necessarily complex body of law. I thank the Minister for explaining the rationale. I am satisfied that, although it may not be the most elegant outcome, for the time being, in the absence of a change to the 2015 Act that she references, we will probably have to grin and bear it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Amendment 2 not moved.

Clause 1 agreed.

Clause 2: Power to make provision in connection with customer data

Amendment 3

Moved by

3: Clause 2, page 3, line 23, leave out “Secretary of State or the” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment seeks to probe the role of the Secretary of State and HM Treasury in these provisions.

My Lords, Amendments 3, 4 and 20 seek to probe the Government’s position on the roles of the Secretary of State and the Treasury. Amendment 6 seeks to probe whether the Treasury or the Secretary of State shall have precedence when making regulations under this Bill. Clarity over decision-making powers is critical to good governance, in particular over who has final decision rights and in what circumstances. Throughout Part 1 of the Bill, the Secretary of State and the Treasury are both given regulation-making powers, often on the same matter. Our concern is that having two separate Ministers and two departments responsible for making the same regulations is likely to cause problems. What happens if and when the departments have a difference of opinion on what these regulations should contain or achieve? Who is the senior partner in the relationship? When it comes to putting statute on paper, who has the final say, the Secretary of State or the Treasury? All the amendments are probing and, at this point, simply seek greater clarification from the Government. If the Minister can explain why two departments are jointly responsible for the same regulations, why this is necessary and a good idea, and what provisions will be in place to avoid legislative confusion, I will be happy not to press the amendments.

The amendments in group 2 cover smart data and relate to the Secretary of State and the Treasury. Apart from the financial services sector clauses, most of the powers in Part 1, as well as the statutory spending authority in Clause 13, are imposed on the Secretary of State and the Treasury. That is the point that the noble Viscount made. These allow the relevant government departments to make smart data regulations. Powers are conferred on the Treasury as the department responsible for financial services, given the Government’s commitment to open banking and open financing. There is no precedence between the Secretary of State or the Treasury when using these powers, as regulations are likely to be made by the department responsible for the sector to which the smart data scheme applies, following, as with other regulations, the appropriate cross-government write-round and collective agreement procedures. I add that interdepartmental discussions are overseen by the Smart Data Council, which will give advice on this issue. The noble Viscount raises concerns relating to Clause 13. Just as regulations may be made by the relevant government department, it is most appropriate for financial assistance to be provided by the government department responsible for the smart data scheme in question. Clause 13 is intended to provide statutory authority for that assistance, as a matter of regularity. It is for these reasons that I urge the noble Viscount not to press these amendments. These are standard procedures where the Treasury is involved and that is why more than one department is referenced.

I thank the Minister for that explanation. I am pleased to hear that these are standard procedures. Will she put that in writing, in a letter to me, explaining and setting it out so that we have it on the record? It is really important to understand where the decisions break down and to have a single point of accountability for all such decisions and, if it cannot be in the Bill, it could at least be explained elsewhere. Otherwise, I am happy to proceed with the explanation that she has kindly given.

16:00:00

I confirm that I am happy to write.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

Amendment 4 not moved.

My Lords, Amendment 5 is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, whom I do not see with us. Would the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, like to move it on his behalf?

I am grateful. I do not know about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, but I wonder whether I might speak to Amendments 34 and 48.

Would the noble Lord be prepared to move Amendment 5 first? He need not necessarily speak to it at any length. That said, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is now with us, so the problem is solved. Amendment 5

Moved by

5: Clause 2, page 3, line 28, at end insert— “(1A) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision requiring a data holder to communicate (to the extent that they have the data required to do this) in a specified manner with all or a subset of the customers for whom they hold data.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment is to enable communication with customers to ascertain, for instance, whether regulations have been complied with or, for example in the case of the Student Loans Company, to enable research into the outcomes of courses that they have funded.

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee for having not expected things to go quite as fast as they did. In moving Amendment 5, I will also speak to Amendments 200 and 202 in this group. Amendment 5 is very much to do, in my mind, with the Office for Students and the Student Loans Company, but it is about a problem of more generality, in that public bodies that hold a great deal of customer data find that they are unable to use that access and understanding for the greater public good. In the particular instance of the Student Loans Company, it is in active touch with most British young people who have been through university and is in an excellent position to help us understand the quality of the university courses that they have been through and looked back on a few years later so that we can get data and information that will enable universities to improve those courses for future students. That is important feedback that we ought to have in our university system. Otherwise, universities just concentrate on students who are there now; the moment those students leave, the universities are not interested any more, until they are old enough to get donations out of. We should have a much better and more self-improving system, which could be driven through the Student Loans Company. I have in the past asked the company whether it would feel able to participate in such a thing, and it said no, it would not be permitted by data protection regulations to communicate in this way with the students it looks after. We should give ourselves the power to consider that in this Bill, so that we can look at how we could use that data to make life better for future generations of students. There are other examples of where the public realm has gathered data and contact information on people to do with a particular set of transactions but feels unable to communicate with them again to do something slightly wider than that, so I suggest to the Government that something along the lines of Amendment 5 would open some very interesting doors to improving the performance of the public realm. Amendment 200 is on a completely different subject: how we properly define the data we are collecting so that across the public realm a particular dataset means the same thing. The instance I choose to illustrate this is sex. One would have thought that sex means male or female and, in fact, properly construed, there are only two sexes, and I hope the Supreme Court will agree in due course. Gender can be as wide as you like, but sex has two possible values, male or female. If we are collecting data on that in the National Health Service, the police service and other aspects of life to see whether we are treating men and women equally, it is very important that that data item should mean the same thing, but the police now routinely record rapes as being committed by women because the person convicted of rape chooses to identify as a woman because they think they will then get better treatment thereafter. If you are recording gender, it can be what you want, but if you are recording sex, it should be male or female. It is really important within the National Health Service that we always mean male or female because male and female physiology differs, and if someone is a candidate for a particular treatment, it may well depend on their sex. For instance, in blood transfusions, it is important to know whether the donation came from a man or a woman, because people may react in different ways to the blood. Having a data dictionary within government that defines particular terms for use in government statistics so that statistics collected across different departments are comparable and mean the same thing, so that you can work with them knowing exactly what they mean, ought to be part of the way we run government. Certainly, whenever I have been involved in collecting data within a largish business, data dictionaries have been common. Lastly, I turn to a third entirely different subject, which is schools admissions data. There is provision in legislation for schools admissions authorities to publish admissions data. This, when it started, was quite useful. Local authorities would publish booklets and you could pick up a booklet for your local authority and see what the admissions rules were for all the schools in that local authority and what the outcomes of those rules had been in previous years. With a little work, you could understand which schools your child had a chance of getting into. That would then form the basis of the investigations you would do about which school you should be using. Over time, the quality of this data has degraded, mostly because the concept of an admissions authority has moved far beyond local authorities, which is where it used to be. Many individual schools and school groups are now their own admissions authority, and they do not share data with the local authority, which means that there is now—certainly in the local authorities I have looked at recently—no consolidated source of schools admissions information, either on the rules prospective pupils are subject to or on the outcomes in previous years. That makes it a much longer and harder business to establish which schools your child has a right to go to, and the result is that it is only the socially advantaged who can find out what their options are. Anyone short of time or data literacy finds it difficult to know anything beyond which their nearest school is and to see all the other options that might be available to them. That is something which we should turn around, and the way to do so is to make all admissions authorities drop their data into a common database. That is not difficult—it might take someone of medium talent about a day to design—and all schools have this data in a form that is easy to drop into a database, because that data is subject to a data dictionary. Terms are defined, and you know what they mean because they have to be interpreted in a consistent way by parents. It is a really easy thing to create. Once the data is all in one place, it would be much easier for parents to establish which schools they could send their children to. It would be an opportunity for businesses of all sorts to help parents to make that easier. We ought to be putting ourselves in a position where we are making sure that we do not disadvantage people because they are disadvantaged. We should look after people who find it difficult to deal with differently arranged and differently stated sets of admissions criteria. We should not be disadvantaging people like that; we ought to—it is really quite simple—put them in a position where they are on a level footing with everyone else. I beg to move.

My Lords, I am pleased that my noble friend Lord Lucas managed to make it, because I found him extremely persuasive and I agree with what he said. I shall return to the issue that his second amendment dealt with—namely, the issue of sex. I thank the organisation Sex Matters for its briefing on Amendments 34 and 48. I am not sure why there are no explanatory notes to these but I referred to the point in my speech at Second Reading, and I hope I will be able to explain it adequately now. The core aim of the digital verification system that we are legislating for is to enable people to prove who they are and to provide information about themselves. The reason this system of digital identity can be trusted with our data, our safety and our personal and economic lives is that the information it contains comes from authoritative sources. It draws on information in my passport or my driving licence, which itself comes from information on my birth certificate, which itself is a certified copy of the entry on the birth register, which before that came from the information recorded at the hospital where I was born. Actually, I was born at home; nevertheless, the issue remains true. However, if the chain of integrity of data is broken, the system of digital verification is no longer trustworthy. The Bill contains provision to secure the reliability of digital verification services by means of a carefully constructed framework, a register of providers, an information gateway and a trust mark, but there is a flaw, which my noble friend has referred to, and it has been pointed out by the human rights charity Sex Matters. The digital verification system that has recently been published in its gamma edition, after several years of development, assumes that government sources are reliable and accurate, but, when it comes to the attribute of sex—whether someone is male or female—we know that those records are not accurate or reliable.

16:15:00

Here I am going to descend into controversy. I believe that sex is an intrinsic feature of every person, which is determined at conception and observed at birth. I do not believe that it can change over a person’s lifetime. My digital record shows that I am male. This also appears on my passport and is encoded into my driver’s licence. But neither the Passport Office nor the driving licence authority can reliably attest that I really am male. This is because, over the past decades, these agencies have allowed people to change their recorded sex.

This practice goes back at least as far as the 1950s. We know, for example, from the case of Corbett v Corbett, that in 1961, at the request of Arthur Corbett, the 3rd Baron Rowallan, the Passport Office provided a female passport to a young man who had changed his name to April Ashley and was seeking to live as a woman. Changes to these official government records were done without legislation as a humanitarian accommodation to address the difficulty for someone who wanted to live and travel with documentation that did not appear to match their sex or way of life. It was done informally for what at the time was thought to be a tiny number of people.

Since then, thousands of records have been altered. Recent freedom of information requests showed that, over the past five years, at least 3,188 passport sex records have been changed to show a sex different from that on the birth certificate. Over the past six years, at least 15,481 driving licence sex records have been changed to show a different sex. This can be done on request—sometimes, but not always, with a doctor’s note stating that the person wishes to live permanently as if they were of the opposite sex. The organisation Sex Matters has told me that some people have one sex on their passport and another on their driver’s licence.

As I said at Second Reading, we do not want to have biological males working in women’s rape crisis centres. We do not want biological males being sent to female prisons. Yet if we do not have accurate records, how can we prevent that? Changing government records to enable people who identify as transgender to live, work and travel as a different gender was a humane solution to an issue, but it has rendered those records inaccurate.

A digital solution would keep everyone’s personal information accurate but allow anyone to keep any piece of personal information private in any situation or transaction, as I can do with my name and date of birth using an age-verification app. Amendment 34 would require the Secretary of State to ensure that the DVS system assesses whether key public authorities, such as the Passport Office, can reliably ascertain and verify the key facts of each individual’s date of birth, place of birth and sex.

Amendment 48 to Clause 45 would create a quality assurance requirement for public authorities to ensure that they do not provide information about an individual via the information gateway that does not meet the basic expectation of integrity—that is, that it is accurate, at least at the time that it was recorded, has not been tampered with, and is accompanied by clear metadata that describes the data so that its meaning cannot be misconstrued. These are the same requirements that private sector providers certified under the trust frame- work must meet, and it seems right that public bodies should give a similar level of assurance of the integrity of the data that they provide. As I have said, public bodies have been modifying data with the best of intentions but, none the less, causing a problem for data integrity.

This amendment requires not only that public bodies provide accurate data but that it is supported by clear metadata. Metadata is information that describes and explains what kind of information a particular data bucket holds. For example, the piece of data “Christian” might be attached to an individual, but is it their first name, their middle name, their surname, their religion or the name of the street where they live? The data itself is not self-explanatory; you have to know what data bucket it has been stored in, and you have to be confident that the buckets could not have been muddled up.

Similarly, clear metadata is needed for the attribute of sex. The importance of metadata means that it is not enough that my digital identity contains the information “male”. This data must be recorded in a field that makes clear that it is accurate and could not have been tampered with, modified or confused with the idea of gender identity—which, as my noble friend said, is a completely different issue. This is the heart of verification.

At Second Reading, the Minister gave me the impression that she did not recognise the problem of inaccurate and unreliable sex data provided by public authorities such as the Passport Office. Will she ask the Information Commissioner’s Office whether data controllers that do not accurately and reliably collect and store sex data are breaching data protection principles? Will she agree to meet me and the organisation Sex Matters to discuss these matters?

My Lords, I would like to say a few things about this. The first is that Amendment 5, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is very sensible; sometimes the GDPR has gone too far in trying to block what you can use things for. It was originally thought of when so much spamming was going on, with people gathering data from adverts and all sorts of other things and then misusing it for other purposes. People got fed up with the level of spam. This is not about that sort of thing; it is about having useful data that would help people in the future, and which they would not mind being used for other purposes. As long as it is done properly and seriously, and not for marketing, advertising and all those other things, and for something which is useful to people, I cannot see what the problem is. An overzealous use of GDPR, which has happened from time to time, has made it very difficult to use something perfectly sensible, which people would not mind having other people know about when it is being useful. The next matter is sex, which is an interesting issue. The noble Lord is absolutely correct that biological or genetic sex is vital when applying medicines and various other things. You have to know that you are administering certain drugs properly. As we get more and more new drugs coming on, it will matter how a person’s body will react to them, which will depend on the genetic material, effectively. Therefore, it is essential to know what the biological sex is. The answer is that we need another category—probably “current gender”—alongside “sex at birth”. Someone can then decide to use “current gender” for certain purposes, including for such things as passports and driving licences, where people do not want to be asked questions—“Oh, do you mean you’re not?”—because they look completely different. I remember meeting April Ashley in her restaurant. I would not, in my innocence—I was quite young—have guessed that she was not a woman, except that someone said that her hands were very big. It never worried us in those days. I am not worried about people using a different gender, but the basic underlying truth is essential. It comes into the issue of sport. If you have grown up and developed physically as a biological male, your bone structure and strength are likely to be different from that of a female. There are huge issues with that, and we need to know both; people can decide which to use at certain points. Having both would give you the flexibility to do that. That also applies to Amendment 200, from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, which is exactly the same concept. I thoroughly agree with those amendments and think we should push them forward.

My Lords, I too am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, came in to move his amendment. He is the expert in that whole area of education data; like the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, I found what he said extremely persuasive. I need to declare an interest as chair of the council of Queen Mary, University of London, in the context of Amendment 5 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. I must say, if use were made of that data, it would benefit not only students but universities. I am sure that the Minister will take that seriously but, on the face of it, like the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, I cannot see any reason why this amendment should not be adopted. I very much support Amendments 34 and 48 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot. I too have read the briefing from Sex Matters. The noble Lord’s pursuit of accuracy for the records that will be part of the wallet, if you like, to be created for these digital verification services is a matter of considerable importance. In reading the Sex Matters briefing, I was quite surprised. I had not realised that it is possible to change your stated sex on your passport in the way that has taken place. The noble Lord referred to the more than 3,000 cases of this; for driving licences, there have been more than 15,000. I agree with Sex Matters when it says that this could lead to a loss of trust in the system. However, I also agree with the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, that this is not an either/or. It could be both. It is perfectly feasible to have both on your passport, if you so choose. I do not see this as a great divide as long as the statement about sex is accurate because, for a great many reasons—not least in healthcare—it is of considerable importance that the statement about one’s sex is accurate. I looked back at what the Minister said at Second Reading. I admit that I did not find it too clear but I hope that, even if she cannot accept these amendments, she will be able to give an assurance that, under this scheme—after all, it is pretty skeletal; we will come on to some amendments that try to flesh it out somewhat—the information on which it will be based is accurate. That must be a fundamental underlying principle. We should thank the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, for tabling these two important amendments in that respect.

My Lords, I want to come in on Amendment 5. Although I am very much in favour of the intent of what we are trying to do—making more use of the sharing of data—I have to remember my old Health Minister’s hat in talking about all the different terms and speaking to the different angles that we are all coming from. Noble Lords have heard me speak many a time about the value of our health data and the tremendous possibilities that it offers for drug discovery and all the associated benefits. At the same time, I was very aware of loads of companies purporting to own it. There are GP data companies, which do the systems for GPs and, naturally, hold all the patient data in them. In terms of their business plans, some have been bought for vast sums of money because of the data that they hold. My concern is that, although it is well intended to say that the use of health data should be allowed for the general good, at the same time, I do not believe that GP companies own that data. We have been quite clear on that. I want to make it clear that it is actually the NHS that will benefit from the pulling together of all this, if that happens in those sorts of formats. Similarly on student loans data—I shall not pretend that this is a subject I know a lot about—I can see a lot of good causes for the student loans, but I can also see that it would be very useful for financial services companies to understand customers’ creditworthiness. In all these cases, although the intent is right, we need to find a way to be clear about what they can and cannot use it for, and there lies a lot of complexity.

16:30:00

I thank my noble friends Lord Lucas and Lord Arbuthnot for their Amendments 5, 34, 48, 200 and 202. They and other noble Lords who have spoken have powerfully raised some crucial issues in these amendments. Amendment 5 addresses a key gap, and I take on board what my noble friend Lord Markham said, in how we manage and use customer data in specific contexts. At its heart, it seeks to enable effective communication between organisations holding customer data and customers themselves. The ability to communicate directly with individuals in a specified manner is vital for various practical reasons, from regulatory compliance to research purposes. One clear example of where this amendment would be crucial is in the context of the Student Loans Company. Through this amendment, the Secretary of State could require the SLC to communicate with students for important purposes, such as conducting research into the outcomes of courses funded by loans. For instance, by reaching out to students who have completed their courses, the SLC could gather valuable insights into how those qualifications have impacted on their employment prospects, income levels or career trajectories. This is the kind of research that could help shape future educational policies, ensuring that loan schemes are working as intended and that the investments made in students’ education are yielding tangible benefits. This, in turn, would allow for better decision-making on future student loans funding and educational opportunities. Amendment 34 from my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot proposes a welcome addition to the existing clause, specifically aiming to ensure that public authorities responsible for ascertaining key personal information about individuals are reliable in their verification processes and provide clear, accurate metadata on that information. This amendment addresses the essential issue of trust and reliability in the digital verification process. We increasingly rely on digital systems to confirm identity, and for these systems to be effective, we have to make sure that the core information they are verifying is accurate and consistent. If individuals’ key identifying details—date of birth, place of birth and, as we heard very powerfully, sex at birth—are not consistently or accurately recorded across various official databases, it undermines the integrity of the digital verification process. It is important that we have consistency across the public authorities listed in this amendment. By assessing whether these bodies are accurately verifying and maintaining this data, we can ensure uniformity in the information they provide. This consistency is essential for establishing a reliable foundation for digital verification. When we consider the range of public services that rely on personal identification information, from the NHS and His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to the Home Office, they are all responsible for verifying identity in some capacity. The amendment would ensure that the data they are using is robust, accurate and standardised, creating smoother interactions for individuals seeking public services. It reduces the likelihood of discrepancies that delay or prevent access to public services. Amendment 48 would introduce important protections for the privacy and integrity of personal information disclosed by public authorities. In our increasingly digital world, data privacy has become one of the most pressing concerns for individuals and for society. By requiring public authorities to attest to the accuracy, integrity and clarity of the data they disclose, the amendment would help to protect the privacy of individuals and ensure that their personal information was handled with the proper care and respect. My noble friend Lord Lucas’s Amendment 200 would introduce a data dictionary. It would allow the Secretary of State to establish regulations defining key terms used in digital verification services, birth and death registers, and public data more generally. I heard clearly the powerful arguments about sex and gender, but I come at the issue of data dictionaries from the angle of the efficiency, effectiveness and reusability of the data that these systems generate. The more that we have a data dictionary defining the metadata, the more we will benefit from the data used, whichever of these bodies generates the data itself. I am supportive of the requirement to use a data dictionary to provide standardised definitions in order to avoid confusion and ensure that data used in government services is accurate, reliable and consistent. The use of the negative resolution procedure would ensure that Parliament had oversight while allowing for the efficient implementation of these definitions. Amendment 202 would create a national register for school admissions rules and outcomes in England. This would be a crucial step towards increasing transparency and ensuring fairness in the school admissions process, which affects the lives of millions of families every year. We want to ensure that navigating the school admissions system is not overly opaque and too complex a process for many parents. With different schools following different rules, criteria and procedures, it can, as my noble friend, Lord Lucas, pointed out, be difficult for families to know what to expect or how best to make informed decisions. The uncertainty can be especially challenging for those who are new to the system, those who face language barriers or those in areas where the school’s rules are not readily accessible or clear. For many parents, particularly those in areas with complex school systems or scarce school places, access to clear, consistent information can make all the difference. This amendment would allow parents to see exactly how the school admissions process works and whether they were likely to secure a place at their preferred school. By laying out the rules in advance, the system would ensure that parents could make better informed decisions about which schools to apply to, based on criteria such as proximity, siblings or academic performance. We want to ensure that parents understand how decisions are made and whether schools are adhering to the rules fairly. By requiring all schools to publish their admissions rules and the outcomes of their admissions process, the amendment would introduce a level of accountability. I join other noble Lords in strongly supporting this amendment, as it would create a more effective and efficient school admissions system that works for everyone.

My Lords, we have had a good and wide-ranging discussion on all this. I will try to deal with the issues as they were raised. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for the proposed Amendment 5 to Clause 2. I am pleased to confirm that the powers under Clauses 2 and 4 can already be used to provide customer data to customers or third parties authorised by them, and for the publication or disclosure of wider data about the goods or services that the supplier provides. The powers provide flexibility as to when and how the data may be provided or published, which was in part the point that the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, was making. The powers may also be used to require the collection and retention of specific data, including to require new data to be gathered by data holders so that this data may be made available to customers and third parties specified by regulations. I note in particular the noble Lord’s interest in the potential uses of these powers for the Student Loans Company. It would be for the Department for Education to consider whether the use of the smart data powers in Part 1 of the Bill may be beneficial in the context of providing information about student loans and to consult appropriately if so, rather than to specify it at this stage in the Bill. I hope the noble Lord will consider those points and how it can best be pursued with that department in mind. On Amendments 34, 48 and 200, the Government believe that recording, storing and sharing accurate data is essential to deliver services that meet citizens’ needs. Public sector data about sex and gender is collected based on user needs for data and any applicable legislation. As noble Lords have said, definitions and concepts of sex and gender differ. Amendment 48 would require that any information shared must be accurate, trusted and accompanied by meta data. Depending on the noble Lord’s intentions here, this could either duplicate existing protections under data protection legislation or, potentially, conflict with them and other legal obligations. The measures in Part 2 of the Bill are intended to secure the reliability of the process by which citizens verify their data. It is not intended to create new ways to determine a person’s sex or gender but rather to allow people to digitally verify the facts about themselves based on documents that already exist. It worries me that, if noble Lords pursued their arguments, we could end up with a passport saying one thing and a digital record saying something different. We have to go back to the original source documents, such as passports and birth certificates, and rely on them for accuracy, which would then feed into the digital record—otherwise, as I say, we could end up pointing in two different directions. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, that my colleague, Minister Clark, is due to meet Sex Matters this week to discuss digital verification services. Obviously, I am happy to encourage that discussion. However, to prescribe where public authorities can usefully verify “sex at birth”, as noble Lords now propose, extends well beyond the scope of the measures in the Bill, so I ask them to reflect on that and whether this is the right place to pursue those issues. In addition, the Government recently received the final report of the Sullivan review of data, statistics and research on sex and gender, which explores some of these matters in detail. These matters are more appropriately considered holistically—for example, in the context of that report—rather than by a piecemeal approach, which is what is being proposed here. We are currently considering our response to that report. I hope noble Lords will consider that point as they consider their amendments; this is already being debated and considered elsewhere. Amendment 202 seeks to create a national register of individual school admissions arrangements and outcomes, which can be used to provide information to parents to help them understand their chances of securing a place at their local school. I agree with the noble Lord that choosing a school for their child is one of the most important decisions that a parent can make. That is why admissions authorities are required to publish admission arrangements on their schools’ websites. They must also provide information to enable local authorities to publish an annual admissions prospectus for parents, including admissions arrangements and outcomes for all state schools in their area. I refer the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, to the School Information (England) Regulations 2008, which require admission authorities and local authorities to publish prescribed information relating to admissions. Those protections are already built into the legislation, and if a local authority is not complying with that, there are ways of pursuing it. We believe that the existing approach is proportionate, reflects the diversity of admissions arrangements and local circumstances, and is not overly burdensome on schools or local authorities, while still enabling parents to have the information they need about their local schools. I hope that, for all the reasons I have outlined, noble Lords will be prepared not to press their amendments.

16:45:00

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her reply and to my noble friends and others for their interventions before that. I am delighted that she considers that Clause 2(3)(a) covers my Amendment 5. If I have any further concerns about that when I have reread her reply in Hansard, I will write to her. I am sure that we need to do something about data integrity across the piece. I will very much take into account what the Minister has said about the Sullivan review and how sex data is or might be recorded in the future. However, it is a considerable problem that there is no reliable source of it, particularly when it comes to deciding how to treat people medically but also in other circumstances, as my noble friend has said, such as prisons and sports. We have to think through how to have a reliable source of it, which is clearly not passports, while for those with a gender recognition certificate, birth certificates are not a reliable source of information. There are obviously other aspects of life, too, where one wants to know that the data being collected is accurate. So far as schools’ admissions regulations are concerned, I am afraid the state of the matter is that local authorities are no longer publishing the data that they ought to. The previous Government, who had plenty of time to enforce it, did not and this Government have not yet picked up on that. I will read what the Minister has said and pursue her colleagues in the Department for Education to see if we can get some improvement on the current state of affairs. With thanks to the Minister, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

Amendment 6 not moved.

Clause 2 agreed.

Clause 3: Customer data: supplementary

Amendment 7

Moved by

7: Clause 3, page 5, line 28, at end insert— (f) provision requiring that third party recipients of customer data publish regular statements on their cyber resilience against specified standards and outcomes.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would give the Secretary of State or the Treasury scope to introduce requirements on third party recipients of customer data to publish regular statements on their cyber resilience against specified standards and outcomes.

My Lords, Amendment 7, the first in this group is a probing amendment and I am extremely grateful to ISACA, an international professional association focused on IT governance, for drafting it. This amendment “would give the Secretary of State or the Treasury scope to introduce requirements on third party recipients of customer data to publish regular statements on their cyber resilience against specified standards and outcomes”. Third parties play a vital role in the modern digital ecosystem, providing businesses with advanced technology, specialised expertise and a wide range of services, but integrating third parties into business operations comes with cyber risks. Their access to critical networks and all the rest of it can create vulnerabilities that cyber- criminals exploit. Third parties are often seen as easier targets, with weaker security measures or indirect connections serving as gateways to larger organisations. Further consideration is to be given to the most effective means of driving the required improvements in cyber risk management, including, in my suggestion, making certain guidance statutory. This is not about regulating and imposing additional cost burdens, but rather creating the environment for digital trust and growth in the UK economy, as well as creating the right conditions for the sustainable use of emerging technologies that will benefit us all. This is something that leading associations and groups such as ISACA have been arguing for. The Cyber Governance Code of Practice, which the previous Administration introduced, marks an important step towards improving how organisations approach cybersecurity. Its primary goal is to ensure that boards of directors should take their proper responsibility in mitigating cyber risks. While that code is a positive development, compliance is not legally required, which leaves organisations to decide whether to put their priorities elsewhere. As a result, the code’s effectiveness in driving widespread improvements in cyber resilience will largely depend on their organisation’s willingness to recognise its importance. The amendment would require businesses regularly to review and update their cybersecurity strategies and controls, and to stay responsive to evolving threats and technologies, thereby fostering a culture of continuous improvement. In addition, by mandating ongoing assessments of internal controls and risk-management processes, organisations will be better able to anticipate emerging threats and enhance their ability to detect, prevent and respond to cyber incidents. I beg to move.

My Lords, this is a fairly disparate group of amendments. I am speaking to Amendments 8, 9, 10, 24, 30, 31 and 32. In the first instance, Amendments 8, 9, 10 and 30 relate to the question that I asked at Second Reading: where is the ambition to use the Bill to encourage data sharing to support net zero? The clean heat market mechanism, designed to create a market incentive to grow the number of heat pumps installed in existing premises each year, is set to be introduced after being delayed a year due to backlash from the boiler industry. If government departments and partners had access to sales data of heating appliances, there would be a more transparent and open process for setting effective and realistic targets. I have been briefed by Ambient, a not-for-profit organisation in this field. It says that low visibility of high power-consuming assets makes it challenging to maintain grid stability in a clean-power world. Low visibility and influence over future installations of high power-consuming assets make it difficult to plan for grid updates. Inability to shift peak electricity demand leads to higher capacity requirements with associated time and cost implications. Giving the Government and associated bodies access to utility-flexible tariff data would enable the Government and utilities to work together to increase availability and uptake of tariffs, leading to lower peak electricity demand requirements. Knowing which homes have the oldest and least efficient boilers, and giving public sector and partners access to the Gas Safe Register and CORGI data on boiler age at household level, would mean that they could identify and target households and regions, ensuring that available funds go to those most in need. Lack of clarity on future clean heating demand makes it challenging for the industry to scale and create jobs, and to assess workforce needs for growing electricity demand. Better demand forecasting through access to sales data on low-carbon heating appliances would signal when and where electrification was creating need for workforce expansion in grid management and upgrade, as well as identify regional demand for installers and technicians. The provisions of Part 1 of the Bill contain powers for the Secretary of State to require the sharing of business data to customers and other people of specified description. It does not indicate, however, that persons of specified description could include actors such as government departments, public bodies such as NISO and GB Energy, and Ministers. An expanded list of suggested recipients could overcome this issue, as stated in Amendment 9 in my name. It makes no provision for the format of information sharing—hence, my Amendments 8 and 10. In summary, my questions to the Minister are therefore on: whether it has been considered how the primary legislation outlined in the Bill could be exercised to accelerate progress towards clean power by 2030; whether climate missions such as clean power by 2030 or achieving net zero are purposes “of a public nature” in relation to the outline provisions for public bodies; and whether specifying the format of shared business data would enable more efficient and collaborative use of data for research and planning purposes. Coming on to Amendments 24, 31 and 32, the Bill expands the potential use of smart data to additional public and private sector entities, but it lacks safeguards for sensitive information regularly used in court. It makes specific provision for legal privilege earlier in the Bill, but this is not extended in provisions relating to smart data. I very much hope that the Government will commit to consult with legal professions before extending smart data to courts. Many of us support open banking, but open banking is being used, as designed, by landlords to keep watching tenant bank accounts for months after approving their tenancy. Open banking was set up to enhance inter- operability between finance providers, with the most obvious example being the recent new ability of the iPhone wallet app to display balances and recent transactions from various bank accounts. Open banking approval normally lasts six months. While individual landlords may not choose this access, if given a free choice, the service industry providing the tenant-checking service to landlords is strongly incentivised to maximise such access, otherwise their competitors have a selling point. If open banking is to be added to the statute book, the Bill should mandate that the default time be reduced to no more than 24 hours in the first instance, and reconfirmed much more often. For most one-off approval processes, these access times may be as short as minutes and the regulations should account for that. Coming on to Amendment 31, consumers have mixed feelings about the potential benefits to them of smart data schemes, as shown in polling such as that carried out a couple of years ago by Deltapoll with the CDEI, now the Responsible Technology Adoption Unit, as regards the perceived potential risks versus the benefits. Approximately one-quarter of respondents in each case were unsure about this trade-off. Perhaps unsurprisingly, individuals who said that they trusted banks and financial institutions or telecommunications providers were more likely to support open finance and open communications, and customers who had previous experience of switching services more frequently reported believing that the benefits of smart data outweighed the risks. Is it therefore the Government’s expectation that people should be compelled to use these services? Open banking and imitators can do a great deal of good but can also give easy access to highly sensitive data for long periods. The new clause introduced by Amendment 31 would make it the same criminal offence to compel unnecessary access under these new provisions as it already is to compel data provision via subject access requests under the existing Data Protection Act. Amendment 32 is a probing amendment as to the Government’s intentions regarding these new smart data provisions. In the Minister’s letter of 27 November, she said: “The Government is working closely to identify areas where smart data schemes might be able to bring benefits. We want to build on the lessons learned from open banking and establish smart data schemes in other markets for goods and services.” I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give us a little taste of what she thinks these powers are going to be used for, and in what sectors the Government believe that business can take advantage of these provisions.

My Lords, I support Amendment 7 introduced by my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot, for the reasons that he gave. The amendment was designed to have the effect of increasing the reliability and handling of information inside any system. If, as I would certainly support, we want to see information and data in digital form circulated more readily, more freely and more often, it is very important that people should trust the system within which it happens. That is where the need to assure the cybersecurity of the system becomes very important and is a companion note to this Bill.

17:00:00

Earlier this year, DSIT conducted a survey which indicated that while 75% of senior managers said that cybersecurity is high-risk, very important and a high priority, the evidence showed that they had not really translated that perception into responsibility in the firm for taking on the risk and managing it. As my noble friend said, the time has come: we must have something which is more than just guidance and becomes a statutory obligation to make proper assessments of companies’ levels, and tolerance, of risk.

This amendment would give the Government the power—they would exercise it, I hope—to require third- party recipients of customer data to publish regular statements on their cyber resilience against some external specified standards. Of course, people will say that the Financial Reporting Council is due to issue a revised code of corporate governance. That will come into effect, but not for a whole year yet. The difficulty is that it is not compulsory and in no real sense are the standards specified.

We need to move to something more demanding, such as one sees happening in the United States; it is not known for being overly regulatory, but it certainly sees the importance of companies being able to assure their clients and customers in this area. It would be very helpful if the Government could give us some assurance that they will take the necessary measures to introduce a degree of compulsion into the disclosure of the state of companies’ cybersecurity in relation to specified standards.

My Lords, I am delighted that the Government have chosen to take forward the smart data schemes from the DPDI Bill. The ability seamlessly to harness and use data is worth billions to the UK economy. However, data sharing and the profit that it generates must be balanced against proper oversight. Let me start by offering strong support to my noble friend Lord Arbuthnot’s Amendment 7. Personally, I would greatly welcome a more sophisticated and widespread insurance market for cyber protections. Such a market would be based on openly shared data; the widespread publication of that data, as set out in the amendment, could help to bring this about. I also support in principle Amendments 8 and 10 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, because, as I set out on the previous group, there is real and inherent value in interoperability. However, I wonder whether the noble Lord might reconsider the term “machine readable” and change it to something— I do not think that I have solved it—a bit more like “digitally interoperable”. I just worry that, in practice, everything is machine-readable today and the term might become obsolete. I am keen to hear the Minister’s response to his very interesting Amendment 31 on the compulsion of any person to provide data. I turn to the amendments in my name. Amendment 16 would insert an appeals mechanism by which a person is charged a fee under subsection (1). It is quite reasonable that persons listed under subsection (2)—that is, data holders, decision-makers, interface bodies, enforcers and others with duties or powers under these regulations —may charge a fee for the purposes of meeting the expenses they incur, performing duties or exercising powers imposed by regulations made under this part. However, there should be an appeals mechanism so that, in the event that a person is charged an unreasonable fee, they have a means of recourse. Amendment 17 is a probing amendment intended to explore the rate at which interest accrues on money owed to specific public authorities for unpaid levies. Given that this interest will be mandated by law, do the Government intend to monitor the levels and, if so, how? Amendment 18 is a probing amendment designed to explore how the Government intend to deal with a situation when a person listed under subsection (2) of this clause believes they have been charged a levy wrongly. Again, it is reasonable that an appeals mechanism be created, and this would ensure that those who considered themselves to have been wrongly charged have a means of recourse. Amendment 19 is looking for clarification on how the Government envisage unpaid levies being recovered. I would be grateful if the Minister could set out some further detail on that matter. Amendment 21 is a probing amendment. I am curious to know the maximum value of financial assistance that the Government would allow the Secretary of State or the Treasury to give to persons under Clause 13. I do not think it would be prudent for the Government to become a financial backstop for participants in smart data schemes, so on what basis is that maximum going to be calculated? Amendment 22 follows on from those concerns and looks to ensure that there is parliamentary oversight of any assistance provided. I am most curious to hear the Minister’s comments on this matter. Amendment 23 is a straightforward—I think—amendment to the wording. I feel that the phrase “reasonably possible” seems to open the door to almost limitless endeavours and therefore suggest replacing it with “reasonably practicable”. On Amendment 25, easy access to the FCA’s policy regarding penalties and levies is important. That would allow oversight, not only parliamentary but by those who are directly or indirectly affected by decisions taken under this policy. I therefore believe the amendment is necessary, as a website is the most accessible location for that information. Furthermore, regular review is necessary to ensure that the policy is functioning and serving its purpose. Amendments 26 and 27 return to the matter of an appeals process. I will not repeat myself too much, but it is important to be able to appeal penalties and to create a route by which individuals understand how they can go about doing so. Amendment 28 would ensure that, when the Secretary of State and the Treasury review the regulations made under Part 1 of the Bill, they do so concurrently. This amendment would prevent separate reviews being conducted that may contradict each other or be published at different times; it would force the relevant departments to produce one review and to produce it together. This would be prudent. It would prevent the Government doing the same work twice, unnecessarily spending public money, and would prevent contradicting reviews, which may cause confusion and financial costs in the smart data scheme industry. Lastly, Amendment 29, which would ensure that Section 10 of this part was subject to the affirmative procedure, would allow for parliamentary oversight of regulations made under this clause. We are pleased that the Government have chosen to bring smart data schemes forward, but I hope the Minister can take my concerns on board and share with us some of the detail in her response.

My Lords, we have had a detailed discussion, and it may be that I will not be able to pick up all the points that noble Lords have raised. If I do not, I guarantee to write to people. First, I want to pick up the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, about cybersecurity and cyber resilience. This Government, like previous Governments, take this issue hugely seriously. It is built into all our thinking. The noble Lord, and the noble Baroness in particular, will know that the advice we get on all these issues is top class. The Government are already committed to producing a cybersecurity and resilience Bill within this Parliament. We have all these things in hand, and that will underpin a lot of the protections that we are going to have in this Bill and others. I agree with noble Lords that this is a hugely important issue. I am pleased to confirm that Clause 3(7) allows the regulations to impose requirements on third-party recipients in relation to the processing of data, which will include security-related requirements. So it is already in the Bill, but I assure noble Lords that it will be underpinned, as I say, by other legislation that we are bringing forward. In relation to Amendments 8 and 10, I am pleased to confirm that Clause 5(4) clarifies that regulations may make provision about the providing or publishing of business data and the format in which that must be provided. That may include relevant energy-related data. The noble Lord gave some very good examples about how useful those connections and that data could be; he was quite right to raise those issues. Regarding Amendment 9, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I am pleased to confirm that there is nothing to prevent regulations requiring the provision of business data to government departments, publicly owned bodies and local and regional authorities. This is possible through Clause 4(1)(b), which allows regulations to require provision of business data to a person of a specified description. I hope the noble Lord will look at those cross-references and be satisfied by them. Noble Lords spoke about the importance of sensitive information in future smart data schemes. A smart data scheme about legal services is not currently under consideration. Having said that, the Government would have regard to the appropriateness of such a scheme and the nature of any data involved and would consult the sector and any other appropriate stakeholders if that was being considered. It is not at the top of our list of priorities, but the noble Lord might be able to persuade us that it would have some merit, and we could start a consultation based on that. Amendments 16 to 22 consider fees and the safeguards applying to them, which were raised by the noble Viscount. Fees and levies, enabled by Clauses 11 and 12, are an essential mechanism to fund a smart data scheme. The Government consider that appropriate and proportionate statutory safeguards are already built in. For example, requirements in Clause 11(3) and Clause 12(2) circumscribe the expenses in relation to which fees or the levy may be charged, and the persons on whom they may be charged. Capping the interest rate for unpaid money, which is one of the noble Viscount’s proposals, would leave a significant risk of circumstances in which it might be financially advantageous to pay the levy late. The Government anticipate that regulations would provide an appropriate mechanism to ensure payment of an amount that is reasonable in the context of a late payment that is proposed. Just as regulations may be made by the relevant government department, it is most appropriate for financial assistance to be provided by the government department responsible for the smart data scheme in question. Clause 13 is intended to provide statutory authority for that assistance as a matter of regularity. Amendments 23 to 27 deal with the clauses relating to the FCA. Clause 15(3) is drafted to be consistent with the wording of established legislation which confers powers on the FCA, most notably the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Section 1B of that Act uses the same formulation, using the phrase “so far as is reasonably possible” in relation to the FCA’s general duties. This wording is established and well understood by both the FCA and the financial services sector as it applies to the FCA’s strategic and operational objectives. Any deviation from it could create uncertainty and inconsistency. Amendment 24 would cause significant disruption to current data-sharing arrangements and fintech businesses. Reauthenticating this frequently with every data holder would add considerable friction to open banking services and greatly reduce the user experience—which was the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. For example, it is in the customer’s interest to give ongoing consent to a fintech app to provide them with real-time financial advice that might adapt to daily changes in their finances. Many SMEs provide ongoing access to their bank accounts in order to receive efficient cloud accounting services. If they had to re-register frequently, that would undermine the basis and operability of some of those services. It could inhibit the adoption and viability of open banking, which would defeat one of the main purposes of the Bill.

17:15:00

Clause 16(3) already provides that regulations must require the FCA to publish a policy statement on financial penalties, as well as setting out other matters that the regulations may cover. The current drafting of the Bill already ensures that financial penalties imposed by the FCA will be subject to an appeals process, as will be the case for financial penalties issued by other enforcers under the Bill. Appropriate safeguards are put in place on the FCA’s ability to introduce a levy in order to meet the costs incurred in implementing a smart data scheme.

I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for his proposed Amendment 28. I am pleased to say that Clause 19 already allows for a review of regulations by both the Secretary of State and the Treasury, and government departments would, of course, liaise with each other as appropriate. I reassure noble Lords that the effect of Amendment 29 in requiring the affirmative resolution for regulations relating to financial penalties under Clause 10 is already achieved. These regulations are made under Clause 8 and are always subject to affirmative scrutiny.

On Amendment 30, the definition in Part 1 of “public authority” covers any person whose functions are or include those of a public nature. This definition reflects the definition of “public authority” in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones, for that amendment and for his Amendments 31 and 32.

Clause 20 confirms that regulations should not generally be read as authorising or requiring the processing of personal data that would contravene data protection legislation. As I said earlier, this Bill does not intend to displace the Data Protection Act 2018 but instead to build on existing data rights and protections, so data subjects will continue to be protected by the UK GDPR.

Smart data schemes require proper consultation and debate before implementation. By requiring publication within six months of Royal Assent to the Bill, Amendment 26 might lead Governments to commit to using powers in sectors where they may not finally be felt to be appropriate. It would also be difficult to predict at any specific point in time in what context smart data interventions might be required in the future.

Finally, I turn to whether Clause 13 should stand part of the Bill. Clause 13 enables the Secretary of State or the Treasury to give financial assistance to decision-makers or enforcers for the purpose of meeting any expenses in the exercise of their functions in smart data schemes. It is intended that smart data schemes will be self-financing through the fees and levies provided for by Clauses 11 and 12, but it is deemed appropriate for there to be a statutory spending authority as a backstop provision, if that is necessary. Any spending commitment of resources will be subject to the usual estimates process and to existing public sector spending controls and transparency requirements.

I hope that by going through the detail of the large number of amendments I have provided reassurance to noble Lords on these amendments, as well as on why we feel that the inclusion of Clause 13 is necessary. I therefore hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

Does the Minister have any thoughts about where smart data schemes might be introduced? I am sure that they are being introduced for a purpose. Is there a plan to issue a policy document or is it purely about consulting different sectors? Perhaps the Minister can give us a glimpse of the future.

The noble Lord is tempting me. What I would say is that, once this legislation is passed, it will encourage departments to look in detail at where they think smart data schemes can be applied and provide a useful service for customers and businesses alike. I know that one issue that has been talked about is providing citizens with greater information about their energy supplies—the way that is being used and whether they can use their energy differently or find a different supplier—but that is only one example, and I do not want people to get fixated on it. The potential is enormous; I feel that we need to encourage people to think creatively about how some of these provisions can be used when the Bill is finally agreed. There is a lot of cross-government thinking at the moment and a lot of considering how we can empower citizens more. I could say a lot off the top of my head but putting it on the record in Hansard would probably be a mistake, so I will not be tempted any more by the noble Lord. I am sure that he can write to me with some suggestions, if he has any.

My Lords, one problem with cybersecurity is the fact that, if one company is spending money on it but is worrying that its competitor companies are not, they might feel that an element of compulsion would be helpful. I just raise that with the Minister, who suggests that some of these things might be better in the cybersecurity and resilience Bill. My noble friend Lady Neville-Jones and I think she is right, so I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

Clause 3 agreed.

Clause 4: Power to make provision in connection with business data

Amendments 8 to 10 not moved.

Clause 4 agreed.

Clause 5 agreed.

Clause 6: Decision-makers

Amendment 11

Moved by

11: Clause 6, page 10, line 9, after “guidance” insert “on their website” Member's explanatory statement This amendment would require decision-makers to publish their guidance on their website to allow persons seeking authorisation to receive customer among other things.

My Lords, this sequence of amendments is concerned with the publication and availability of guidance. Decision-makers are individuals responsible for deciding if a person has satisfied the conditions for authorisation to receive customer or business data. They may publish guidance on how they intend to exercise their functions. Given the nature of these responsibilities, these individuals are deciding who can receive information pertaining to individuals and businesses. The guidelines which set out how decisions are taken should be easily accessible and the best place for this is on their websites. Following on from this point, Amendment 12 would require this guidance to be reviewed annually and any changes to be published, again on decision-makers’ websites, at least 28 days before coming into effect. This would ensure that the guidelines are fit for purpose and provide ample time for people affected by these changes to review them and act accordingly. Amendments 13 and 14 seek to create similar requirements for enforcers—that is, a public authority authorised to carry out monitoring or enforcement of regulations under this part. Again, given the nature of these responsibilities, the guidelines should be easily accessible on the enforcer’s website and reviewed annually, with any changes published, again on their website, at least 28 days before coming into effect. This will, once again, ensure that the guidelines are fit for purpose and provide ample time for people affected by these changes to review them and act accordingly. Finally, Amendment 15 would require the Secretary of State or the Treasury to provide guidance on who may be charged a fee under Clause 6(1) and to review it annually. Ensuring the regular review of guidelines will ensure their effectiveness, and the ready availability of guidelines will ensure that they are used and observed. I therefore believe that these amendments will be of benefit to the functioning of the Bill and should be given consideration by the Minister.

My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for those amendments. I will cover the final group of amendments to Part 1, dealing with smart data guidance. On Amendments 11, 12, 13 and 14, which relate to the publishing of the guidelines, I am pleased to confirm that Clause 5(4) clarifies that regulations may make provisions about the providing or publishing of business data. This includes the location where they should be published, including, as the noble Viscount suggests, the website of the responsible person. Furthermore, Clause 21 clarifies that regulation may make provision about the form and manner in which things must be done. That provision can be used to establish appropriate processes around the sharing of information and guidance, including its regular update, publication and sharing with the relevant person. Amendment 15 refers to the amount of fee charged and how it should be determined. The power is already broad enough to allow the information to be reviewed as and when necessary, but to mandate that the review must take place at least once a year may be a bit restrictive. For these reasons, I ask the noble Viscount not to press his amendments.

I thank the noble Lord for his answers. I understand what he says, although I would be grateful if either he or the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, could summarise those points in writing because I did not quite capture them all. If I understand correctly, all the concerns that we have raised are dealt with in other areas of the Bill, but if they could write to me then that would be great. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.

Amendment 12 not moved.

Clause 6 agreed.

Clause 7 agreed.

Clause 8: Enforcement of regulations under this Part

Amendments 13 to 14 not moved.

Clause 8 agreed.

Clauses 9 and 10 agreed.

Clause 11: Fees

Amendments 15 and 16 not moved.

Clause 11 agreed.

Clause 12: Levy

Amendments 17 to 19 not moved.

Clause 12 agreed.

Clause 13: Financial assistance

Amendments 20 to 22 not moved.

Clause 13 agreed.

Clause 14 agreed.

Clause 15: The FCA and financial services interfaces: supplementary

Amendments 23 and 24 not moved.

Clause 15 agreed.

Clause 16: The FCA and financial services interfaces: penalties and levies

Amendments 25 to 27 not moved.

Clause 16 agreed.

Clauses 17 and 18 agreed.

Clause 19: Duty to review regulations

Amendment 28 not moved.

Clause 19 agreed.

Clauses 20 and 21 agreed.

Clause 22: Regulations under this Part: Parliamentary procedure and consultation

Amendment 29 not moved.

Clause 22 agreed.

Clauses 23 and 24 agreed.

Clause 25: Other defined terms

Amendment 30 not moved.

Clause 25 agreed.

Clause 26 agreed.

Amendments 31 and 32 not moved.

Clause 27 agreed.

17:30:00

Clause 28: DVS trust framework

Amendment 33

Moved by

33: Clause 28, page 30, line 28, at end insert— “(2A) Those rules must include processes for ongoing monitoring of compliance, including but not limited to processes and procedures for monitoring and investigating compliance.(2B) The rules must contain mechanisms for redress for harms caused by compliance failures.(2C) The Secretary of State must establish an independent process for hearing appeals against the findings of compliance investigations.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment specifies additional rules for the trust framework.

My Lords, I almost have a full house in this group, apart from Amendment 35, so I will not read out the numbers of all the amendments in this group. I should just say that I very much support what the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has put forward in his Amendment 35. Many noble Lords will have read the ninth report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am sad to say that it holds exactly the same view about this Bill as it did about the previous Bill’s provisions regarding digital verification services. It said that “we remain of the view that the power conferred by clause 28 should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, with the affirmative procedure providing the appropriate level of scrutiny”. It is against that backdrop that I put forward a number of these amendments. I am concerned that, although the Secretary of State is made responsible for this framework, in reality, they cannot be accountable for delivering effective governance in any meaningful way. I have tried, through these amendments, to introduce at least some form of appropriate governance. Of course, these digital verification provisions are long-awaited—the Age Verification Providers Association is pleased to see them introduced—but we need much greater clarity. How is the Home Office compliant with Part 2 of the Bill as it is currently written? How will these digital verification services be managed by DSIT? How will they interoperate with the digital identity verification services being offered by DSIT in the UK Government’s One Login programme? Governance, accountability and effective, independent regulation are also missing. There is no mechanism for monitoring compliance, investigating malicious actors or taking enforcement action regarding these services. The Bill has no mechanism for ongoing monitoring or the investigation of compliance failures. The Government propose to rely on periodic certification being sufficient but I understand that, when pressed, DSIT officials say that they are talking to certification bodies and regulators about how they can do so. This is not really sufficient. I very much share the intention of both this Government and the previous one to create a market in digital verification services, but the many good players in this marketplace believe that high levels of trust in the sector depend on a high level of assurance and focus from the governance point of view. That is missing in this part of the Bill. Amendment 33 recognises the fact that the Bill has no mechanism for ongoing monitoring or the investigation of compliance failures. As we have seen from the Grenfell public inquiry, a failure of governance caused by not proactively monitoring, checking and challenging compliance has real, harmful consequences. Digital verification services rely on the trustworthiness of the governance model; what is proposed is not trustworthy but creates material risk for UK citizens and parties who rely on the system. There are perfectly decent examples of regulatory frameworks. PhonepayPlus provides one such example, with a panel of three experts supported by a secretariat; the panel can meet once a quarter to give its opinion. That has been dismissed as being too expensive, but I do not believe that any costings have been produced or that it has been considered how such a cost would weigh against the consequences of a failure in governance of the kind identified in recent public inquiries. Again, as regards Amendment 36, there is no mechanism in the Bill whereby accountability is clearly established in a meaningful way. Accountability is critical if relying parties and end-users are to have confidence that their interests are safeguarded. Amendment 38 is linked to Amendment 36. The review under Clause 31 must be meaningful in improving accountability and effective governance. The amendment proposes that the review must include performance, specifically against the five-year strategy and of the compliance, monitoring and investigating mechanisms. We would also like to see the Secretary of State held accountable by the Science and Technology Select Committee for the performance captured in the review. On Amendment 41, the Bill is silent on how the Secretary of State will determine that there is a compliance failure. It is critical to have some independence and professional rigour included here; the independent appeals process is really crucial. As regards Amendments 42 and 43, recent public inquiries serve to illustrate the importance of effective governance. Good practice for effective governance would require the involvement of an independent body in the determination of compliance decisions. There does not appear to be an investigatory resource or expertise within DSIT, and the Bill currently fails to include requirements for investigatory processes or appeals. In effect, there is no check on the authority of the Secretary of State in that context, as well as no requirement for the Secretary of State proactively to monitor and challenge stakeholders on compliance. As regards Amendment 44, there needs to be a process or procedure for that; fairness requires that there should be a due process of investigation, a review of evidence and a right of appeal to an independent body. I turn to Amendment 45 on effective governance. A decision by the appeals body that a compliance failure is so severe that removal from the register is a proportionate measure must be binding on the Secretary of State, otherwise there is a risk of lobbying and investment in compliance and service improvement being relegated below that of investment in lobbying. Malicious actors view weaknesses in enforcement as a green light and so adopt behaviours that both put at risk the safety and security of UK citizens and undermine the potential of trustworthy digital verification to drive economic growth. Amendment 39 would exclude powers in this part being used by government as part of GOV.UK’s One Login. I come on to something rather different in Amendment 46, which is very much supported by Big Brother Watch, the Digital Poverty Alliance and Age UK. Its theme was raised at Second Reading. A significant proportion of the UK’s population lacks internet access, with this issue disproportionately affecting older adults, children and those from low-income backgrounds. This form of digital exclusion presents challenges in an increasingly digital world, particularly concerning identity verification. Although digital identity verification can be beneficial, it poses difficulty for individuals who cannot or choose not to engage digitally. Mandating online identity verification can create barriers for digitally excluded groups. For example, the National Audit Office found that only 20% of universal credit applicants could verify their identity online, highlighting concerns for those with limited digital skills. The Lords Communications and Digital Select Committee emphasised the need for accessible, offline alternatives to ensure inclusivity in a connected world. The proponents of this amendment advocate the availability of offline options for essential public and private services, particularly those requiring identity verification. This is crucial as forcing digital engagement can negatively impact the well-being and societal participation of older people. This is the first time that I have prayed in aid what the Minister said during the passage of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill; this could be the first of a few such occasions. When we debated the DPDI Bill, she stressed the importance of a legal right to choose between digital and non-digital identity verification methods. I entirely agreed with her at the time. She said that this right is vital for individual liberty, equality and building trust in digital identity systems and that, ultimately, such systems should empower individuals with choices rather than enforce digital compliance. That is a fair summary of what she said at the time. I turn to Amendment 50. In the context of Clause 45 and the power of public authorities to disclose information, some of which may be the most sensitive information, it is important for the Secretary of State to be able to require the public authority to provide information on what data is being disclosed and where the data is going, as well as why the data is going there. This amendment will ensure that data is being disclosed for the right reasons, to the right places and in the right proportion. I beg to move.

My Lords, I tabled Amendment 35 because I want to make the DVS trust framework as useful as possible. I support Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and Amendment 37 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose. The framework’s mandate is to define a set of rules and standards designed to establish trust in digital identity products in the UK. It is what I would hope for as a provision in this Bill. As the Minister told us at Second Reading, the establishment of digital ID services with a trust mark will increase faith in the digital market and reduce physical checks—not to mention reducing the time spent on a range of activities, from hiring new workers to moving house. I and many other noble Lords surely welcome the consequent reduction in red tape, which so often impedes the effectiveness of our public services. Clause 28(3) asks the Secretary of State to consult the Information Commissioner and such persons as they consider appropriate. However, in order to ensure that these digital ID services are used and recognised as widely as possible—and, more importantly, that they can be used by organisations beyond our borders— I suggest Amendment 35, which would include putting consultation with an international digital standards body in the Bill. This amendment is supported by the Open Data Institute. I am sure that the Minister will tell me that that amendment is unnecessary as we can leave it to the common sense of Ministers and civil servants in DSIT to consult such a body but, in my view, it is helpful to remind them that Parliament thinks the consultation of an international standards body is important. The international acceptance of DVS is crucial to its success. Just like an email, somebody’s digital identity should not be tied to a company or a sector. Imagine how frustrating it would be if we could only get Gmail in the UK and Outlook in the EU. Imagine if, in a world of national borders and jurisdictions, you could not send emails between the UK and the EU as a result. Although the DVS will work brilliantly to break down digital identity barriers in the UK, there is a risk that no international standards body might be consulted in the development of the DVS scheme. This amendment would be a reminder to the Secretary of State that there must be collaboration between this country, the EU and other nations, such as Commonwealth countries, that are in the process of developing similar schemes.

17:45:00

The benefits of adopting Amendment 35 are clear. Noble Lords can only imagine how frustrating it is at the moment for UK citizens who want to move to employment abroad. Take the example of a doctor who wants to work in the EU. At the moment, they need to take a traditional approach to getting access to their qualifications. Not only does this process have administrative costs, it opens the way for qualification fraud. A digital version of the doctor’s registration certificate would quickly confirm their UK credentials and speed them on the way to international employment.

I have suggested the Worldwide Web Consortium, which is known to the industry as W3C, as the best body to consult, but in the fast-changing digital world, I have left the amendment open for another body to be nominated for consultation by the Minister. W3C was established in 1994 to create the architecture to accommodate the rapid pace of change in web standards. It is the body that set standards for HTML and CSS, which is used to build websites. As its founder, Sir Tim Berners-Lee said recently, digital identity systems, like the DVS trust framework, have the potential to transform how we live and work, but only if they are built on interoperable, international standards. Just as the World Wide Web itself thrives on global collaboration and universal protocols, digital identity must not be constrained by borders or fragmented by conflicting systems. Without co-ordinated international effort, we risk creating isolated silos of identity that hinder mobility, innovation and trust across borders. W3C will ensure that the trust frameworks like that in the UK align with global standards.

This Bill is looking to the future when our country is a digital leader on international standards. A DVS-trusted scheme will allow that to happen. I urge the Minister to accept my Amendment 35.

It is also clear that Amendment 37 is needed. Surely noble Lords agree that this complicated and novel process should at least be laid before Parliament before it is finally agreed.

In an act that I hope he is going to repeat throughout, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has fully explained all the amendments that I want to support, so I put on record that I agree fully with all the points he made. I want to add just one or two other points. They are mainly in the form of questions for the Minister. Some users are more vulnerable to harms than others, so Amendment 33 would insert a new subsection 2B which mentions redress. What do the Government imagine for those who may be more vulnerable and how do they think they might use this system? Obviously, I am thinking about children, but there could be other categories of users, certainly the elderly. That led me to wonder what consideration has been given to vulnerable users more generally and how that is being worked through. That led to me to question exactly how this system is going to interact with the age-assurance work that the IC is doing as a result of the Online Safety Act and make sure that children are not forced into a position where they have to show their identity in order to prove their age or, indeed, cannot prove their identity because they have been deemed to have been dealt with elsewhere in another piece of legislation. Because, actually, children do open bank accounts and do have to have certain sorts of ID. That led me to ask what in the framework prevents service providers giving more information than is required. I have read the Bill; someone said earlier that it is skeletal. From what we know, you can separate pieces of information, attributes, from each other, but what is to prevent a service provider not doing so? This is absolutely crucial to the trust in and workings of this system, and it leads me to the inverse, Amendment 46, which asks how we can prevent this system being forced and thrust upon people. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, set out, we need to make sure that people have the right not to use the system as well as the right to use it. Finally, I absolutely agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the amendment in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose: something this fundamental must come back to Parliament. With that, I strongly associate myself with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on all his amendments.

I thank noble Lords for their comments and contributions in what has been an absolutely fascinating debate. I have a couple of points to make. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on his Amendment 33, on ongoing monitoring, and his Amendment 50. Where we part company, I think, is on his Amendment 36. I feel that we will never agree about the effectiveness or otherwise of five-year strategies, particularly in the digital space. I simply do not buy that his amendment will have the desirable effects that the noble Lord wants. I do not necessarily agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, that we should put extra burdens around the right to use non-digital methods. In my opinion, and I very much look forward to hearing from the Minister on this matter, the Act preserves that right quite well as it is. I look forward to the Government’s comments on that. I strongly support the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, on his very important point about international standards. I had intended to sign his amendment but I am afraid that, for some administrative reason, that did not happen. I apologise for that, but I will sign it because I think that it is so important. In my opinion, not much of the Bill works in the absence of effective international collaboration around these matters. This is so important. We are particularly going to run up against this issue when we start talking about ADM, AI and copyright issues. It is international standards that will allow us to enforce any of the provisions that we put in here, so they are so important. I am more agnostic on whether this will happen via W3C, the ITU or other international standards bodies, but we really must go forward with the principle that international standards are what will get us over the line here. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s confirmation of the importance, in the Government’s view, of such standards. Let me turn to the amendments listed in my name. Amendment 37 would ensure parliamentary oversight of the DVS trust framework. Given the volume of sensitive data that these services providers will be handling, it is so important that Parliament can keep an eye on how the framework operates. I thank noble Lords for supporting this amendment. Amendment 40 is a probing amendment. To that end, I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response. Accredited conformity assessment bodies are charged with assessing whether a service complies with the DVS framework. As such, they are giving a stamp of approval from which customers will draw a sense of security. Therefore, the independence of these accreditation bodies must be guaranteed. Failing to do so would allow the industry to regulate itself. Can the Minister set out how the Government will guarantee the independence of these accreditation bodies? Amendment 49 is also a probing amendment. It is designed to explore the cybersecurity measures that the Government expect of digital verification services. Given the large volume of data that these services will be handling, it is essential that the Government demand substantial cybersecurity measures. This is a theme that we are going to come back to again and again; we heard about it earlier, and I think that we will come on to more of this. As these services become more useful and more powerful, they present a bigger attack surface that we have to defend, and I look forward to hearing how we will do that.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Markham, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for raising these topics around digital verification services. As I explained at Second Reading, these digital verification services already exist. They are already out there making all sorts of claims for themselves. With the new trust framework, we are trying to provide some more statutory regulation of the way that they operate. It is important that we have this debate and that we get it right, but some of the things we are doing are still work in progress, which is why we do not always have all the detailed answers that noble Lords are searching for here and why some powers have been left to the Secretary of State. I shall go from the top through the points that have been raised. Amendments 33 and 43, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and Amendment 40 tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, would require the trust framework to include rules on monitoring compliance and redress mechanisms and would require the Secretary of State to ensure the independence of accredited conformity assessment bodies. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, asked questions akin to those regarding redress for the vulnerable, and I will write to her setting out a response to that in more detail. On the issue of redress mechanisms in the round, the scope of the trust framework document is solely focused on the rules that providers of digital verification services are required to follow. It does not include matters of governance. Compliance is ensured via a robust certification process where services are assessed against the trust framework rules. They are assessed by independent conformity assessment bodies accredited by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service, so some oversight is already being built into this model. The Bill contains powers for the Secretary of State to refuse applications to the DVS register or to remove providers where he is satisfied that the provider has failed to comply with the trust framework or if he considers it necessary in the interests of national security. These powers are intended as a safety net, for example, to account for situations where the Secretary of State might have access to intelligence sources that independent conformity assessment bodies cannot assess and therefore will not be able to react to, or it could be that a particular failure of the security of one of these trust marks comes to light very quickly, and we want to act very quickly against it. That is why the Secretary of State has those powers to be able to react quickly in what might be a national security situation or some other potential leak of important data and so on. In addition, conformity assessment bodies carry out annual surveillance audits and can choose to conduct spot audits on certified providers, and they have the power to withdraw certification where non-conformities are found. Adding rules on compliance would cut across that independent certification process and would be outside the scope of the trust framework. Those independent certification processes already exist. Amendments 33, 41, 42, 44 and 45 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would in effect require the creation of an independent appeals body to adjudicate on the refusal of an application to the DVS register and the implementation of an investigatory process applicable to refusal and removal from the DVS register. The powers of the Secretary of State in this regard are not without safeguards. They may be exercised only in limited circumstances after the completion of an investigatory process and are subject to public law principles, for example, reasonableness. They may also be challenged by judicial review. To go back to the point I was making, it might be something where we would need to move quickly. Rather than having a convoluted appeals process in the way that the noble Lord was talking about, I hope he understands the need sometimes for that flexibility. The creation and funding of an independent body to adjudicate such a limited power would therefore be inappropriate.

18:00:00

I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for Amendment 35, which would require an international standards body to be consulted in preparing the trust framework. The non-statutory published framework that already exists references the World Wide Web Consortium’s standards, along with other relevant international standards, in its body of rules. The Bill provides for the consultation of such bodies as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The Government are keen to focus the consultation on those bodies that are most appropriate at a given time. Although it is perfectly likely that the World Wide Web Consortium’s standards would be consulted, committing to one specific body could undermine this flexibility and it might be that we want to take broader soundings on the issues being considered.

It would be reassuring if the Minister could share with us some of the meetings that the Secretary of State or Ministers are having with those bodies on the subject of these internationally shared technical standards.

I might need to write to the noble Viscount, but I am pretty sure that that is happening at an official level on a fairly regular basis. The noble Viscount raises an important point. I reassure him that those discussions are ongoing, and we have huge respect for those international organisations. I will put the detail of that in writing to him. I turn to Amendment 37, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, which would require the DVS trust framework to be laid before Parliament. The trust framework contains auditable rules to be followed by registered providers of digital verification services. The rules, published in their third non-statutory iteration last week on GOV.UK, draw on and often signpost existing technical requirements, standards, best practice, guidance and legislation. It is a hugely technical document, and I am not sure that Parliament would make a great deal of sense of it if it was put forward in its current format. However, the Bill places consultation on a statutory footing, ensuring that it must take place when the trust framework is being prepared and reviewed. Amendments 36 and 38, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would create an obligation for the Secretary of State to reconsult and publish a five-year strategy on digital verification services. It is important to ensure that the Government have a coherent strategy for enabling the digital verification services market. That is why we have already consulted publicly on these measures, and we continue to work with experts. However, given the nascency of the digital identity market and the pace of those technological developments, as the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, said, forecasting five years into the future is not practical at this stage. We will welcome scrutiny through the publication of the annual report, which we are committed to publishing, as required by Clause 53. This report will support transparency through the provision of information, including performance data regarding the operation of Part 2. Amendment 39, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, proposes to exclude certified public bodies from registering to provide digital verification services. We believe that such an exclusion could lead to unnecessary restrictions on the UK’s young digital verification market. The noble Lord mentioned the GOV.UK One Login programme, which is aligned with the standards of the trust framework but is a separate government programme which gives people a single sign-on service to access public services. It uses different legal powers to operate its services from what is being proposed here. We do not accept that we need to exclude public bodies from the scrutiny that would otherwise take place. Amendment 46 seeks to create a duty for organisations that require verification and use digital verification for that purpose to offer, where reasonably practicable, a non-digital route and ensure that individuals are made aware of both options for verification. I should stress here that the provision in the Bill relates to the provision of digital verification services, not requirements on businesses in general about how they conduct verification checks. Ensuring digital inclusion is a priority for this Government, which is why we have set up the digital inclusion and skills unit within DSIT. Furthermore, there are already legislative protections in the Equality Act 2010 in respect of protected groups, and the Government will take action in the future if evidence emerges that people are being excluded from essential products and services by being unable to use digital routes for proving their identity or eligibility. The Government will publish a code of practice for disclosure of information, subject to parliamentary review, highlighting best practice and relevant information to be considered when sharing information. As for Amendment 49, the Government intend to update this code only when required, so an annual review process would not be necessary. I stress to the Committee that digital verification services are not going to be mandatory. It is entirely voluntary for businesses to use them, so it is up to individuals whether they use that service or not. I think people are feeling that it is going to be imposed on people, and I would push against that proposal. If the regulation-making power in Amendment 50 proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, was used, it would place obligations on the Information Commissioner to monitor the volume of verification checks being made, using the permissive powers to disclose information created in the clause. The role of the commissioner is to regulate data protection in the UK, which already includes monitoring and promoting responsible data-sharing by public authorities. For the reasons set out above, I hope that noble Lords will feel comfortable in not pressing their amendments.

Can I double-check that nothing was said about the interaction between the Bill and the OSA in all of that? I understood the Minister to say that she would perhaps write to me about vulnerable people, but my question about how this interacts was not answered. Perhaps she will write to me on that issue as well.

Was that a question on age assurance?

Yes, the ICO is undertaking work on age assurance under the OSA at the moment. My point was about how the two regimes intersect and how children get treated under each. Do they fall between?

I will, of course, write to the noble Baroness.

Was the Minister saying that in view of the current duties of the ICO, Amendment 50 is not needed because public authorities will have the duty to inform the ICO of the information that they have been passing across to these identity services?

Again, I will have to write to the noble Lord on that. I think we were saying that it is outside the current obligations of the ICO, but we will clarify the responsibility.

My Lords, I am not quite sure whether to be reassured or not because this is terra incognita. I am really struggling, given the Minister’s response. This is kind of saying, “Hands off, Parliament, we want the lightest touch on all of this, and the Secretary of State will decide”. I should first thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her support. I thought that the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, made an extremely good case for Amendment 35 because all of us want to make sure that we have that interoperability. One of the few areas where I was reassured by the Minister was on the consultations taking place. I am sure that the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, was right to ask what the consultations are. We need to be swimming in the right pool for our digital services to be interoperable. It is not as if we do not have contact with quite a number of these digital service providers. Some of them are extremely good and want a level of mandation for these international services. There is a worrying lack of detail here. We have devil and the deep blue sea. We have these rules on GOV.UK which are far too complicated for mere parliamentarians to comprehend. They are so detailed that we are going to get bogged down. On the other hand, we do not know what the Secretary of State is doing. This is the detailed trust framework, but what is the governance around it? At the beginning of her speech, the Minister said that governance is different from certification and the conformity assessment service. I would have thought that governance was all part of the same warp and weft. I do not really understand. The Secretary of State has the power to refuse accreditation, so we do not need an independent appeals body. It would be much more straightforward if we knew that there was a regulator and that it was going to be transparent in terms of how the system worked. I just feel that this is all rather half baked at the moment. We need a lot more information than we are getting. To that extent, that is the case for all the amendments in this group. The crucial amendment is Amendment 37 tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, because we absolutely need to bring all this into the light of day by parliamentary approval, whether or not it is a complicated document. Perhaps we could put it through an AI model and simplify it somewhat before we debate it. We have to get to grips with this. I have a feeling that we are going to want to return to this aspect on Report because no good reason has been given, not to the DPRRC either, about why we are not debating this in Parliament in terms of the scheme itself. It is a bit sad to have to say this because we all support the digital verification progress, if you like. Yet, we are all in a bit of a fog about how it is all going to work. I very much hope that the Minister can come back to us, perhaps with a must-write letter that sets it all out to a much more satisfactory extent. I hope she understands why we have had this fairly protracted debate on this group of amendments because this is an important aspect that the Bill is skeletal about. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 33 withdrawn.

Amendments 34 to 37 not moved.

Clause 28 agreed.

Clauses 29 to 30 agreed.

Clause 31: Review of DVS trust framework and supplementary codes

Amendment 38 not moved.

Clause 31 agreed.

Clause 32 agreed.

Clause 33: Registration in the DVS register

Amendments 39 and 40 not moved.

Clause 33 agreed.

Clause 34: Power to refuse registration in the DVS register

Amendments 41 to 43 not moved.

Clause 34 agreed.

Clauses 35 to 40 agreed.

Clause 41: Power to remove person from the DVS register

Amendments 44 and 45 not moved.

Clause 41 agreed.

Clauses 42 to 44 agreed.

Amendment 46 not moved.

18:15:00

Amendment 47

Moved by

47: After Clause 44, insert the following new Clause— “Cyber-security rules for DVS providers(1) The Secretary of State must prepare and publish a set of cyber-security rules for Digital Verification Service providers.(2) Rules under subsection (1) must be reviewed at least annually, and any updates to the rules must be published at least 28 days before they come into force.”Member’s explanatory statement This is a probing amendment on the cyber-security measures expected of Digital Verification Services providers.

My Lords, Amendment 47 is in another slightly peculiar group, but we will persevere. It aims to bolster the cybersecurity framework for digital verification services providers. Needless to say, as we continue to advance in the digital age, it is vital that our online systems, especially those handling sensitive information, are protected against ever-evolving cyberthreats. As DVSs gain in currency as they gain in usage, the incentive for cyberattackers to attack them and try to take advantage grows. They need to be protected. The proposed amendment therefore mandates the creation and regular review of cybersecurity rules for all DVS providers. These rules are designed to ensure that services involved in verifying identities and other critical data maintain the highest standards of protection, resilience and trustworthiness consonant with their importance and the sensitivity of any breaches of that data. We could hardly be more aware that we live in an increasingly digital world where almost every aspect of our lives is connected online. Digital verification services play a key role in this landscape, and that role is going to increase. They are used by individuals and organisations to confirm identities, authenticate transactions and verify data. These services underpin critical areas, such as banking, healthcare and public services, where security is paramount. However, as the cyberthreat landscape becomes more sophisticated, so does the need for robust security measures to protect these services. Hackers and malicious actors are continuously developing new ways to exploit vulnerabilities in digital systems. This puts personal data, business operations and even national security at risk. A security breach in a digital verification system could have devastating consequences not only for the immediate victims but for the reputation and integrity of the service providers. That is why we on these Benches feel that the proposed amendment is absolutely critical. It would ensure that all DVS providers are held to a high, standardised set of cybersecurity practices. This would not only reduce the risk of cyberthreats but build greater public trust in the safety and reliability of those services and, therefore, enhance their uptake. One of the key aspects of the amendment is the requirement for the cybersecurity rules to be reviewed annually. This is especially important in the context of the rapid evolution of the cyberthreats that we face. Technologies, attack methods and vulnerabilities are constantly changing, and what is secure today may not be secure tomorrow. By reviewing the cyber rules every year, we will ensure that they remain current and effective in protecting against the latest threats. I beg to move.

I support that. I completely agree with all the points that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made on the previous groupings, but the one that we all agree is absolutely vital is the one just brought up by my noble friend. Coming from the private sector, I am all in favour of a market—I think that it is the right way to go—but standards within that are equally vital. I come at this issue having had the misfortune of having to manage the cyberattack that we all recall happening against our diagnostic services in hospitals last summer. We found that the weakest link there was through the private sector supplier to that system, and it became clear that the health service—or cybersecurity, or whoever it was—had not done enough to make sure that those standards were set, published and adhered to effectively. With that in mind, and trying to learn the lessons from it, I think that this clause is vital in terms of its intent, but it will be valuable only if it is updated on a frequent basis. In terms of everything that we have spoken about today, and on this issue in particular, I feel that that point is probably the most important. Although everything that we are trying to do is a massive advance in terms of trying to get the data economy to work even better, I cannot emphasise enough how worrying that attack on our hospitals last summer was at the time.

I thank both noble Lords for raising this; I absolutely concur with them on how important it is. In fact, I remember going to see the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, when he was in his other role, to talk about exactly this issue: whether the digital verification services were going to be robust enough against cyberattacks. I pray in aid the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, who both felt that the new Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will provide some underpinning for all of this, because our Government take this issue very seriously. As the Committee can imagine, we get regular advice from the security services about what is going on and what we need to do to head it off. Yes, it is a difficult issue, but we are doing everything we can to make sure that our data is safe; that is fundamental. Amendment 47 would require the Secretary of State to prepare and publish rules on cybersecurity for providers to follow. The existing trust framework includes rules on cybersecurity, against which organisations will be certified. Specifically, providers will be able to prove either that they meet the internationally recognised information security standards or that they have a security management system that matches the criteria set out in the trust framework. I assure noble Lords that the Information Commissioner’s Office, the National Cyber Security Centre and other privacy stakeholders have contributed to the development of the trust framework. This includes meeting international best practice around encryption and cryptology techniques. I will happily write to noble Lords to reassure them further by detailing the range of protections already in place. Alternatively, if noble Lords here today would benefit from an official technical briefing on the trust framework, we would be delighted to set up such a meeting because it is important that we all feel content that this will be a robust system, for exactly the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Markham, explained. We are absolutely on your Lordships’ side and on the case on all this; if it would be helpful to have a meeting, we will certainly do that.

I thank the Minister and my noble friend Lord Markham for those comprehensive and welcome comments. I would certainly like to take up the Minister’s offer of a technical briefing on the trust framework; that really is extremely important. To go briefly off-piste, one sign that we are doing this properly will be the further development of an insurance marketplace for cybersecurity. It exists but is not very developed at the moment. As and when this information is regularly published and updated, we will see products becoming available that allow people to take insurance based on known risks around cybersecurity. As I say, I take comfort from the Minister’s words and look forward to attending the tech briefing. When it comes, the cyber Bill will also play a serious role in this space and I look forward to seeing how, specifically, it will interact with DVS and the other services that we have been discussing and will continue to discuss. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 47 withdrawn.

Clause 45: Power of public authority to disclose information to registered person

Amendment 48 not moved.

Clause 45 agreed.

Clauses 46 to 48 agreed.

Clause 49: Code of practice about the disclosure of information

Amendment 49 not moved.

Clause 49 agreed.

Amendment 50 not moved.

Clause 50: Trust mark for use by registered persons

Amendment 51

Moved by

51: Clause 50, page 46, line 19, at end insert— “(3A) A person who acts in contravention of subsection (3) commits an offence.(3B) A person who commits an offence under subsection (3A) is liable—(a) on summary conviction to a fine; or(b) on conviction on indictment to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 2 years or to a fine or both.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment makes it an offence for someone to use a trust mark when they have no permission to do so, aimed to weed out fraud.

My Lords, in moving Amendment 51, I will also speak to Amendments 52, 53, 54 and 209 in my name, which seek to create new criminal offences under the Bill. The first is the offence of using a trust mark without permission; the second is providing false information to the Secretary of State in response to an information notice; and the third is using a false digital identity document, which is really an alternative to digital identity theft. Clause 50 currently contains no real consequence for a person using a trust mark without permission. A trust mark, which has no specific definition in the Bill, may be used only by those who are in the DVS register. Clause 50(3) says: “A mark designated under this section may not be used by a person in the course of providing, or offering to provide, digital verification services unless the person is registered in the DVS register in respect of those digital verification services”. Clause 50(4) then says: “The Secretary of State may enforce subsection (3)” by civil injunction or interdict. This has no real teeth in circumstances where there are persistent and flagrant offenders, regardless of whether it is on a personal or commercial scale. Amendment 51 would give appropriate penalties, with a fine on summary conviction and two years’ imprisonment, or a fine on indictment. Amendment 52 would make provision so that a prosecution may not be brought unless by or with the consent of the appropriate chief prosecutor. Amendment 54 relates to providing false information to the Secretary of State. That is advanced on a similar basis, containing a power for the Secretary of State to require information. Of course, many regulators have this power. On the issue of false digital identities—identity theft —Amendment 53 is a refinement of the Amendment 289 which I tabled to the late, unlamented DPDI Bill in Committee. That amendment was entitled “Digital identity theft”. I have also retabled the original amendment, but in many ways Amendment 53 is preferable because it is much more closely aligned to the Identity Documents Act, which contains several offences that relate to the use of a person’s identity document. Currently, an identity document includes an immigration document—a passport or similar document—or a driving licence.

18:30:00

All these identity documents are physical documents; it therefore does not extend to digital documents. The Bill establishes a framework that could include all or some of these documents in digital verification services. DVS could further create new or similar identity documents. The Bill would not, as the law currently stands, make offences for an identity document created or verified by DVS to be misused or falsified in a way similar to how the Identity Documents Act 2010 makes it an offence for misuse or falsification of physical documents.

Amendment 53 proposes to extend to online the offences of misuse and falsifying identity documents, so far as they extend offline. I know that successive Governments have been keen to treat online the same as offline. Identity documents should not be falsified or misused, whether offline or online. Indeed, it should not matter whether it is offline or online for it to be an offence to misuse or falsify identity documents. The Identity Documents Act 2010 prescribes the penalties for the separate offences under that Act: 10 years for an offence under Sections 4 and 5 and two years on indictment of the relevant statutory maximum under Section 6.

In terms of digital identity, whichever amendment the Minister prefers, I hope that she will at least give a hearing to this new Amendment 53. It is the product of some thought about how best to protect those who use digital identity online and ensure that they have the same protection as they would otherwise have had in the physical world. I beg to move.

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I perhaps did not say it at the beginning of my remarks on this section, but I fully support the Government’s efforts to create a trust framework. I think I started with criticism rather than with the fact that this is really important. Trust is in the name and if we cannot trust it, it is not going to be a trust framework. It is important to anticipate and address the likelihood that some will seek to abuse it. If there are not sufficient consequences for abusing it, I do not understand quite how we can have the level of trust needed for this to have wide adoption. I particularly want to say that good systems cannot rely on good people. We know that and we see it. We are going to discuss it later in Committee, but good systems need checks and balances. In relation to this set of amendments, we need a disincentive for bad actors to mislead or give false information to government or the public. I am not going to rehearse each amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, explained so brilliantly. The briefing on the trust framework is a very important one for us all. The amount of support there is for the idea, and the number of questions about what it means and how it will work, mean that we will come back to this if we do not have a full enough explanation of the disincentives for a bad actor.

My Lords, I support these amendments and applaud the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his temerity and for offering a variety of choices, making it even more difficult for my noble friend to resist it. It has puzzled me for some time why the Government do not wish to see a firm line being taken about digital theft. Identity theft in any form must be the most heinous of crimes, particularly in today’s world. This question came up yesterday in an informal meeting about a Private Member’s Bill due up next Friday on the vexed question of the sharing of intimate images and how the Government are going to respond to it. We were sad to discover that there was no support among the Ministry of Justice officials who discussed the Bill with its promoter for seeing it progress any further. At the heart of that Bill is the same question about what happens when one’s identity is taken and one’s whole career and personality are destroyed by those who take one’s private information and distort it in such a way that those who see it regard it as being a different person or in some way involved in activities that the original person would never have been involved in. Yet we hear that the whole basis on which this digital network has been built up is a voluntary one, and the logic of that is that it would not be necessary to have the sort of amendments that are before us now. I urge the Government to think very hard about this. There must be a break point here. Maybe the meeting that has been promised will help us, but there is a fundamental point about whether in the digital world we can rely on the same protections that we have in the real world—and, if not, why not?

My Lords, I will address the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I have nothing but the deepest respect for their diligence, and indeed wisdom, in scrutinising all three flavours of the Bill as it has come out, and for their commitment to strengthening the legislative framework against fraud and other misuse of digital systems. However, I have serious reservations about the necessity and proportionality of the amendments under consideration, although I look forward to further debates and I am certainly open to being convinced. Amendments 51 and 52 would introduce criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, for the misuse of trust marks. While the protection of trust marks is vital for maintaining public confidence in digital systems, I am concerned that introducing custodial sentences for these offences risks overcriminalisation. The misuse of trust marks can and should be addressed through robust civil enforcement mechanisms. Turning every such transgression into a criminal matter would place unnecessary burdens on, frankly, an already strained justice system and risks disproportionately punishing individuals or small businesses for inadvertent breaches. Furthermore, the amendment’s stipulation that proceedings could be brought only by or with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Secretary of State is an important safeguard, yet it underscores the high level of discretion required to enforce these provisions effectively, highlighting the unsuitability of broad criminalisation in this context. Amendment 53 seeks to expand the definition of identity documents under the Identity Documents Act 2010 to include digital identity documents. While the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, makes a persuasive case, the proposal raises two concerns. First, it risks pre-emptively criminalising actions before a clear and universally understood framework for digital identity verification is in place. The technology and its standards are still evolving, and it might be premature to embed such a framework into criminal law. Secondly, there is a risk that this could have unintended consequences for innovation in the digital identity sector. Businesses and individuals navigating this nascent space could face disproportionate legal risks, which may hinder progress in a field critical to the UK’s digital economy. Amendment 54 would introduce an offence of knowingly or recklessly providing false information in response to notices under Clause 51. I fully support holding individuals accountable for deliberate deception, but the proposed measure’s scope could lead to serious ambiguities. What constitutes recklessness in this context? Are we inadvertently creating a chilling effect where individuals or businesses may refrain from engaging with the system for fear of misinterpretation or error? These are questions that need to be addressed before such provisions are enshrined in law. We must ensure that our legislative framework is fit for purpose, upholds the principles of justice and balances enforcement with fairness. The amendments proposed, while they clearly have exactly the right intentions, risk, I fear, undermining these principles. They introduce unnecessary criminal sanctions, create uncertainty in the digital identity space and could discourage good-faith engagement with the regulatory system. I therefore urge noble Lords to carefully consider the potential consequences of these amendments and, while expressing gratitude to the noble Lords for their work, I resist their inclusion in the Bill.

My Lords, of course we want to take trust seriously. I could not agree more that the whole set of proposals is predicated on that. Noble Lords have all made the point, in different ways, that if there is not that level of trust then people simply will not use the services and we will not be able to make progress. We absolutely understand the vital importance of all that. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions on this and I recognise their desire to ensure that fraudulent use of the trust mark is taken seriously, as set out in Amendments 51 and 52. The trust mark is in the process of being registered as a trademark in the UK. As such, once that is done, the Secretary of State will be able to take appropriate legal action for misuse of it. Robust legal protections are also provided through Clause 50, through the trademark protections, and through other existing legislative provisions, such as the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. There is already legislation that underpins the use of that trust mark. Additionally, each trust mark will have a unique number that allows users to check that it is genuine. These amendments would duplicate those existing protections. In seeking to make the misuse of a digital identity a criminal offence, which Amendments 53 and 209 attempt to do, the noble Lord offered me several different ways of approaching this, so I will offer him some back. The behaviour he is targeting is already addressed in the Fraud Act 2006, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Data Protection Act 2018. We would argue that it is already by existing legislation. On the noble Lord’s point about the Identity Documents Act 2010, defining every instance of verification as an identity document within the scope of offences in that Act could create an unclear, complicated and duplicative process for the prosecution of digital identity theft. The provision of digital verification services does not always create one single comprehensive identity proof—I think this is the point that the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, was making. People use it in different ways. It might be a yes/no check to ensure that a person is over 18, or it might be a digital verification services provider providing several derived credentials that can be used in different combinations for different use cases. We have to be flexible enough to be able to deal with that and not just make one fraudulent act. It would not be appropriate to add digital identity to the list of documents set out in the Identity Documents Act. Amendment 54 would create an offence of supplying false information to the Secretary of State, but sanctions already exist in this situation, as the organisation can be removed from the DVS register via the power in Clause 41. Similarly, contractual arrangements between the Office for Digital Identities and Attributes and conformity assessment bodies require them to adhere to the principle of truthfulness and accuracy. To create a new offence would be disproportionate when safeguards already exist. I take on board the intent and aims of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, but argue that there are already sufficient protections in current law and in the way in which the Bill is drafted to provide the reassurance that he seeks. Therefore, I hope that he feels comfortable in not pressing his amendment.

18:45:00

My Lords, I thank the Minister. I was quite amused in listening to the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose. I thought about the halcyon days of listening to the language that he used when he was a Minister, with words like “premature”, “unintended consequences”, “disproportionate” and “ambiguity”. I thought, “Come back, Viscount Camrose”—but I appreciate that he took the trouble at least to analyse, from his point of view, where he saw the problems with some of the amendments. I go back to the physical identity verification aspect. I should have said that I very much hope that the Minister and I can discuss how the Equality Act 2010 has an impact. I am not entirely sure about the protected characteristics playing into this because, obviously, the Equality Act only references those. I think that there could be a greater cohort of people who may be disadvantaged by commercial operators insisting on digital verification, as opposed to physical verification, for instance; I may need to discuss that with the Minister. I am grateful to the Minister for having gone through where she thinks that there are safeguards and sanctions against using trust identity falsely; that was a very helpful run-through so I shall not go back to what she said. The really important area is this whole offline/online criminal aspect. I understand that it may not be perfect because the scheme is not in place—it may not need to be on all fours exactly with the 2010 Act—but I think that the Minister’s brief was incorrect in this respect. If the Bill team look back at the report from the committee that the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, chaired back in 2022, Fighting Fraud: Breaking the Chain, they will see that it clearly said: “Identity theft is often a predicate action to the criminal offence of fraud, as well as other offences including organised crime and terrorism, but it is not a criminal offence”. That is pretty clear. The committee went into this in considerable detail and said: “The Government should consult on the introduction of legislation to create a specific criminal offence of identity theft. Alternatively, the Sentencing Council should consider including identity theft as a serious aggravating factor in cases of fraud”. First, I am going to set the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, on the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, to persuade him of the wisdom of creating a new offence. I urge the Minister to think about the consequences of not having any criminal sanction for misuse of digital and identity theft. Whatever you might call it, there must be some way to protect people in these circumstances, if we are going to have public trust in the physical verification framework that we are setting up under this Bill. This will be rolled out—if only I had read GOV.UK, I would be far wiser. It was very interesting to hear the Minister start to unpack quite a lot of detail. We heard about the new regulator, the Office for Digital Identities and Attributes. That was the first reference to the new regulator, but what are its powers going to be? We need a parliamentary debate on this, clearly. Is this an office delegated by the Secretary of State? Presumably, it is non-statutory, in a sense, and will have powers that are at the will of the Secretary of State. It will be within DSIT, I assume—and so on. I am afraid that we are going round in circles here. We need to know a great deal more. I hope that we get much more protection for those who have the benefit of the service; otherwise, we will find ourselves in a situation that we are often in as regards the digital world, whereby there is a lack of trust and the public react against what they perceive as somebody taking something away from them. In the health service, for example, 3 million people have opted out from sharing their GP personal health data. I am only saying that we need to be careful in this area and to make sure that we have all the right protections in place. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 51 withdrawn.

Amendment 52 not moved.

Clause 50 agreed.

Amendment 53 not moved.

Clause 51: Power of Secretary of State to require information

Amendment 54 not moved.

Clause 51 agreed.

Clauses 52 to 55 agreed.

Clause 56: National Underground Asset Register: England and Wales

Amendment 55

Moved by

55: Clause 56, page 53, line 17, at end insert— “(2A) The Secretary of State must make regulations providing for the security measures which must be complied with before persons may receive information from NUAR.”Member’s explanatory statement This is a probing amendment to question whether stringent security measures will be put in place to protect critical infrastructure from criminal and terrorist threats.

My Lords, I am confident that, somewhere, there is a moral philosopher and legal scholar who can explain why this amendment is not part of the next group on NUAR but, in the meantime, my amendment addresses a fundamental issue. It would ensure that strict security measures are in place before any individual or organisation is allowed access to the sensitive information held on the National Underground Asset Register. The NUAR is a crucial tool for managing the UK’s underground infrastructure. It holds critical data about pipelines, cables and other assets that underpin vital services such as water, energy, telecommunications and transport. This information, while essential for managing and maintaining infrastructure, is also a potential target for misuse. As such, ensuring the security of this data is not just important but vital for the safety and security of our nation. The information contained in the NUAR is sensitive. Its misuse could have disastrous consequences. If this data were to fall into the wrong hands, whether through criminal activities, cyberattacks or terrorism, it could be exploited to disrupt or damage critical infrastructure. I know that the Government take these risks seriously but this amendment seeks to address them further by ensuring that only those with a legitimate need, who have been properly vetted and who have met specific security requirements can access this data. We must ensure that the people accessing this register are trusted individuals or organisations that understand the gravity of handling this sensitive information and are fully aware of the risks involved. The amendment would ensure that we have a framework for security—one that demands that the Secretary of State introduces clear, enforceable regulations specifying the security measures that must be in place before anyone can access the NUAR. These measures may include: background checks to ensure that those seeking access are trustworthy and legitimate; cybersecurity safeguards to prevent unauthorised digital access or breaches; physical security measures to protect the infrastructure where this information is stored; and clear guidelines on who should be allowed access and the conditions under which they can view this sensitive data. The potential threats posed by unsecured access to the NUAR cannot be overstated. Criminals could exploit this information to target and disrupt key infrastructure systems. Terrorist organisations could use it to plan attacks on essential services, endangering lives and causing mass disruption. The stakes are incredibly high; I am sure that I do not need to convince noble Lords of that. In an era where digital and physical infrastructure are increasingly interconnected, the risks associated with unsecured access to information of the kind held in the NUAR are growing every day. This amendment would address this concern head on by requiring that we implement safeguards that are both thorough and resilient to these evolving threats. Of course, the cyber Bill is coming, but I wonder whether we need something NUAR-specific and, if so, whether we need it in this Bill. I beg to move.

I thank the noble Viscount for raising the issue of the National Underground Asset Register’s cybersecurity. As he said, Amendment 55 seeks to require more detail on the security measures in the regulations that will be applied to the accessing of NUAR data. The noble Viscount is right: it is absolutely fundamental that NUAR data is protected, for all the reasons he outlined. It hosts extremely sensitive data. It is, of course, supported by a suite of sophisticated security measures, which ensure that the very prescribed users’ access to data is proportionate. I hope that the noble Viscount understands that we do not necessarily want to spell out what all those security measures are at this point; he will know well enough the sorts of discussions and provisions that go on behind the scenes. Security stakeholders, including the National Cyber Security Centre and the National Protective Security Authority, have been involved in NUAR’s development and are members of its security governance board, which is a specific governance board overseeing its protection. As I say, access to it occurs on a very tight basis. No one can just ask for access to the whole of the UK’s data on NUAR; it simply is not geared up to be operated in that way. We are concerned that the blanket provision proposed in the amendment would lead to the publication of detailed security postures, exposing arrangements that are not public knowledge. It could also curtail the Government’s ability to adapt security measures when needed and, with support from security stakeholders, to accommodate changing circumstances—or, indeed, changing threats—that we become aware of. We absolutely understand why the noble Viscount wants that reassurance. I can assure him that it is absolutely the best security system we could possibly provide, and that it will be regularly scrutinised and updated; I really hope that the noble Viscount can take that assurance and withdraw his amendment.

I thank the Minister for that answer. Of course, I take the point that to publish the security arrangements is somehow to advertise them, but I am somehow not yet altogether reassured. I wonder whether there is something that we can push further as part of a belt-and-braces approach to the NUAR security arrangements. We have talked about cybersecurity a lot this afternoon. All of these things tend to create additional incentives towards cyberattacks —if anything, NUAR does so the most.

If it helps a little, I would be very happy to write to the noble Viscount on this matter.

Yes, that would be great. I thank the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 55 withdrawn.

Clause 56 agreed.

Schedule 1 agreed.

Clauses 57 and 58 agreed.

Schedule 2 agreed.

Clauses 59 and 60 agreed.

Amendment 56

Moved by

56: After Clause 60, insert the following new Clause— “Private sector consultation regarding NUARThe Secretary of State must consult with relevant private sector organisations before implementing the provisions regarding the National Underground Asset Register.”Member’s explanatory statement This is a probing amendment to determine the level of Government consultation with the private sector regarding NUAR.

My Lords, successive Governments have demonstrated their enthusiasm for NUAR. It was quite interesting to hear the Minister’s enthusiasm for the digitisation of the map of the Underground, so to speak; she was no less enthusiastic than her predecessor. However, as the Minister knows, there are tensions between them—the new, bright, shiny NUAR—and LSBUD, or LinesearchbeforeUdig, which in some respects is the incumbent.

19:00:00

LSBUD believes that it has already achieved many of the aims of NUAR, and it is more cost effective. It has been in place for more than 20 years; it includes data from more than 150 asset owners and is used by 250,000 UK digging contractors and individuals. Its view is that the Government and NUAR are not currently working effectively with it and other industry actors and that, without aligning with proven industry best practice, NUAR poses a number of serious risks including open-ended costs and unclear benefits. It believes that, without a plan to work more closely with LSBUD, as the key industry representative, NUAR risks providing a poorer service than that currently on offer, potentially creating more accidental strikes of key network infrastructure.

LSBUD believes that its own system is working well and is popular with industry, but I do not think we can turn the clock back. Surely the Government must work in partnership with the safe digging organisations that have the experience and know-how to ensure that the benefits currently enjoyed from existing best practice are not lost, and to keep assets and digging workers safe. I very much hope that, even if the Government does not accept an amendment along these lines, they give an assurance that LSBUD is being properly consulted and is included in the plans of NUAR. Otherwise, it cannot be healthy to have two separately operating systems.

I come to my other amendments, which, for some unknown reason, are grouped with the ones on NUAR. They about NHS IT, so it must be infrastructure—I suppose that must be the common factor between them. I happen to have a speaking note on this. The whole intent of my Amendments 193 to 195 is to seek clarification on two critical aspects. First, these information standards should explicitly apply to IT providers involved in the processing of data within primary care as well as secondary care. Secondly, the standards must extend to existing contracts with IT providers, not just new agreements formed after the passage of this legislation.

The NHS operates on a complex ecosystem—I barely need to say that, standing next to the noble Lord, Lord Markham, given his previous occupation—and, in some cases, legacy systems, which are there in spades. Any effort to improve data interoperability must account for these realities. Without retroactive application of these information standards to existing contracts, there is a risk that entrenched barriers to effective data sharing will persist. These barriers would undermine the goals of the legislation, delaying improvements in patient care and operational efficiency. In addition, if the application of these information standards is to extend beyond the interoperability of operational NHS data and provide secure access to electronic health records that support the delivery of direct care, it is vital that we make explicit in this legislation its application to IT providers within the primary care estate. I beg to move.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for these amendments. Amendment 46 is about NUAR and the requirement to perform consultation first. I am not convinced that is necessary because it is already a requirement to consult under Clause 60 and, perhaps more pertinently, NUAR is an industry-led initiative. It came out of an industry meeting and has been led by them throughout. I am therefore not sure, even in spite of the requirement to consult, that much is going to come out of that consultation exercise. In respect of other providers out there, LSBUD among them, when we were going through this exact debate in DPDI days, the offer I made—and I ask the Minister if she would consider doing the same—was to arrange a demonstration of NUAR to anyone who had not seen it. I have absolutely unshakeable confidence that anybody who sees NUAR in action will not want anything else. I am not a betting man, but—

For the record, the noble Viscount is getting a vigorous nod from the Minister.

We will see, but such a demonstration would certainly ease any perfectly reasonable concerns that might emerge. To put it in a more colourful way, this is Netflix in the age of Blockbuster Video. The slightly different Amendments 193, 194 and 195 clarify that these information standards should explicitly apply to IT providers involved in the processing of data within primary as well as secondary care, and that the standards must extend to existing contracts with providers, not just new agreements formed after this Act. I understand the point of these amendments but I am slightly concerned about how the retroactivity would affect existing contractual agreements. I am also slightly concerned about the wish to hard-code certain conditions into rules that function best the more they are principles-based and the less they are specifically related to particular areas of technology. That said, I think I am persuadable on it, but I have not yet made that leap.

I am not going to say much except to try to persuade my noble friend. I am absolutely with the intent of what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is trying to do here and I understand the massive benefits that can be gained from it.

I am grateful to the noble Viscount for joining me in my enthusiasm for NUAR. He is right: having seen it in practice, I am a great enthusiast for it. If it is possible to demonstrate it to other people, I would be very happy to do so, because it is quite a compelling story when you see it in practice. Amendment 56, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would place a duty on the Secretary of State to consult relevant private sector organisations before implementing the NUAR provisions under the Bill. I want to make clear then that the Geospatial Commission, which oversees NUAR, has been engaging with stakeholders on NUAR since 2018. Since then, there have been extensive reviews of existing processes and data exchange services. That includes a call for evidence, a pilot project, public consultation and numerous workshops. A series of in-person focus groups were completed last week and officials have visited commercial companies with specific concerns, including LinesearchbeforeUdig, so there has been extensive consultation with them. I suppose one can understand why they feel slightly put out about NUAR appearing on the scene, but NUAR is a huge public asset that we should celebrate. We can potentially use it in other ways for other services in the future, once it is established, and we should celebrate the fact that we have managed to create it as a public asset. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that a further consultation on that basis would provide no additional benefit but would delay the realisation of the significant benefits that NUAR could deliver. Moving on to the noble Lord’s other amendments, Amendments 193, 194, and 195, he is absolutely right about the need for data interoperability in the health service. We can all think of examples of where that would be of benefit to patients and citizens. It is also true that we absolutely need to ensure that our health and care system is supported by robust information standards. Again, we go back to the issue of trust: people need to know that those protections are there. This is why we would ensure, through Clause 119 and Schedule 15, that suppliers of IT products and services used in the provision of health or adult social care in England are required to meet relevant information standards. In doing so, we can ensure that IT suppliers are held to account where information standards are not implemented. The application of information standards is independent of commercial organisations, and we would hold IT companies to them. Furthermore, the definition of healthcare as set out in the Health and Social Care Act 2012, as amended by the Health and Care Act 2022, already ensures that all forms of healthcare are within scope of information standards, which would include primary care. That was one of the other points that the noble Lord made. As an add-on to this whole discussion, the noble Lord will know that the Government are preparing the idea of a national data library, which would encourage further interoperability between government departments to make sure that we use it to improve services. Health and social care is the obvious one, but the members of the Committee can all think of all sorts of other ways where government departments, if they collaborated on an interoperable basis, could drive up standards and make life easier for a whole lot of citizens in different ways. We are on the case and are absolutely determined to deliver it. I hope that, on that basis, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but she has whetted our appetite about the national data library. It is not included in the Bill. We talked about it a little at Second Reading, but I wonder whether she can tell us a little more about what is planned. Is it to be set up on a statutory basis or is it a shadow thing? What substance will it actually have and how?

Well, details of it were in our manifesto, in as much as a manifesto is ever detailed. It is a commitment to deliver cross-departmental government services and create a means whereby some of the GDPR blockages that stop one department speaking to another can, where necessary, be freed up to make sure that people exchange data in a more positive way to improve services. There will be more details coming out. It is a work in progress at the moment and may well require some legislation to underpin it. There is an awful lot of work to be done in making sure that one dataset can talk to another before we can progress in any major way, but we are working at speed to try to get this new system up and running.

I thank the Minister for that, which was very interesting. We were talking about medical health IT and “GDPR blockages” almost has a medical quality to it. The embryonic national data library will obviously get some more mentions as we go through the Bill. It is a work in progress, so I hope that we will know more at the end of the Bill than we did at the beginning. The Minister talked about datasets talking to each other. We will have to get the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, to use other phrases, not just “Netflix in the age of Blockbuster” but something equally exciting about datasets talking to each other.

19:15:00

Clearly, there is a difference of perception around NUAR. I would be very happy to look at it, but that does not necessarily answer the question as to how we can settle the horses. I do not know whether it is purely commercial competition or whether it is a genuine feeling that there is a lack of safety if all the players are not involved, but there does seem to be something fundamental. LSBUD came back on the last Bill with very much the same points; several months have passed now, so there must be something which is concerning it. Will the Minister take that away and interrogate the system as to whether we can do better to ensure that there is consensus about how everybody goes forward?

I thank the Minister for the primary care point, which is extremely valuable and will be welcome to those who briefed me on these amendments. I do not think the question of retrospectivity was really dealt with. Some of the issues with legacy systems in the NHS are a real problem and the more pressure one can put to rectify some of those systems, the better. I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Markham, was around when people were talking about the number of fax machines used in the NHS and things of that sort—I do not think any of that has gone away either. I suspect that a bit of retrospectivity would not go amiss in the circumstances. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 56 withdrawn.

Clause 61: Form in which registers of births and deaths are to be kept

Amendment 57

Moved by

57: Clause 61, page 71, line 18, at end insert— “(2A) The Registrar General must make provision to ensure the security of the registers of live-births, still-births, and deaths.”Member’s explanatory statement This is a probing amendment intended to ensure that suitable cyber-security measures are put in place to secure the larger attack surface of digital registers of live-births, still-births, and deaths.

My Lords, there is a great deal to be gained from digitising the registers of births, stillbirths and deaths. Not only does it reduce the number of physical documents that need to be maintained and kept secure but it means that people do not have to physically sign the register of births or deaths in the presence of a registrar. This will make people’s lives a great deal easier during those stressful periods of their lives. However, digitising all this data—I am rather repeating arguments I made about NUAR and other things earlier—creates a much larger attack surface for people looking to steal personal data. This amendment explores how the Government will protect this data from malign actors. If the Minister could provide further detail on this, I would be most grateful. This is a probing amendment and has been tabled in a constructive spirit. I know that we all want to harness the power of data and tech in this space and use it to benefit people’s lives but, particularly with this most personal of data, we have to take appropriate steps to keep it secure. Should there be a data breach, hackers would have access to an enormous quantity of personal data. Therefore, I suggest that, regardless of how much thought the Government have given this point up to now, the digitisation of these registers should not occur until substantial cybersecurity measures are in place. I look forward to the Minister’s comments.

On Amendment 57, legislation is already in place to ensure the security of electronic registers. Articles 25 and 32 of the UK General Data Protection Regulation impose duties on controllers of personal data to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, including security measures, so this already applies. The electronic system has been in place for births and deaths since 2009, and all events have been registered electronically since that date, in parallel with the paper registers and with no loss of data. What is happening with this legislation is that people do not have to keep paper records anymore; it is about the existing electronic system. The noble Lord will remember that it is up to registrars even so, but I think that the idea is that they will no longer have to keep the paper registers as well, which everybody felt was an unnecessary administrative burden. Nevertheless, the system is subject to Home Office security regulations, and robust measures are in place to protect the data. There has been no loss of data or hacking of that data up to now. Obviously, we need to make sure that the security is kept up to date, but we think that it is a pretty robust system. It is the paper documents that are losing out here.

I thank the Minister. I take the point that this has been ongoing for a while and that, in fact, the security is better because there is less reliance on the paper documents. That said, I am encouraged by her answer and encouraged that the Government continue to anticipate this growing risk and act accordingly. On that basis, I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 57 withdrawn.

Clause 61 agreed.

Clauses 62 to 64 agreed.

Amendment 58

Moved by

58: After Clause 64, insert the following new Clause— “Review of notification of changes of circumstances legislation(1) The Secretary of State must commission a review of the operation of the Social Security (Notification of Changes of Circumstances) Regulations 2010.(2) In conducting the review, the designated reviewer must -(a) consider the current operation and effectiveness of the legislation (b) identify any gaps in its operations and provisions(c) consider and publish recommendations as to how the scope of the legislation could be expanded to include non-public sector, voluntary and private sector holders of personal data.(3) In undertaking the review, the reviewer must consult -(a) specialists in data sharing(b) people and organisations who campaign for the interests of people affected by, and use the legislation(c) any other persons and organisations the review considers appropriate.(4) The Secretary of State must lay a report of the review before each House of Parliament within six months of this Act coming into force.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment requires a review of the operation of the ‘Tell Us Once’ programme—which seeks to provide simpler mechanisms for citizens to pass information regarding births and deaths to government—and consider whether the pioneering progress of Tell Us Once could be extended to non-public sector holders of data.

My Lords, of course I welcome the fact that the Bill will enable people to register a death in person and online, which was a key recommendation from the UK Commission on Bereavement. I have been asked to table this amendment by Marie Curie; it is designed to achieve improvements to UK bereavement support services, highlighting the significant administrative burden faced by bereaved individuals. Marie Curie points to the need for a review of the existing Tell Us Once service and the creation of a universal priority service register to streamline death-related notifications across government and private sectors. It argued that the Bill presents an opportunity to address these issues through improved data-sharing and online death registration. Significant statistics illustrate the scale of the problem, showing a large percentage of bereaved people struggling with numerous administrative tasks. It urges the Government, as I do, to commit to implementing those changes to reduce the burden on bereaved families. Bereaved people face many practical and administrative responsibilities and tasks after a death, which are often both complex and time sensitive. This Bill presents an opportunity to improve the way in which information is shared between different public and private service providers, reducing the burden of death administration. When someone dies, the Tell Us Once service informs the various parts of national and local government that need to know. That means the local council stops charging council tax, the DVLA cancels the driving licence, the Passport Office cancels the passport, et cetera. Unfortunately, Tell Us Once is currently not working across all Government departments and does not apply to Northern Ireland. No updated equality impact assessment has ever been undertaken. While there are death notification services in the private sector, they are severely limited by not being a public service programme—and, as a result, there are user costs associated, adding to bereaved people’s financial burden and penalising the most struggling families. There is low public awareness and take-up among all these services, as well as variable and inconsistent provision by the different companies. The fact that there is not one service for all public and private sector notifications means that dealing with the deceased’s affairs is still a long and painful process. The Bill should be amended to require Ministers to carry out a review into the current operation and effectiveness of the Tell Us Once service, to identify any gaps in its operation and provisions and make recommendations as to how the scope of the service could be expanded. Priority service registers are voluntary schemes which utility companies create to ensure that extra help is available to certain vulnerable customers. The previous Government recognised that the current PSRs are disjointed, resource intensive and duplicative for companies, carrying risks of inconsistencies and can be “burdensome for customers”. That Government concluded that there is “significant opportunity to improve the efficiencies and delivery of these services”. The Bill is an opportunity for this Government to confirm their commitment to implementing a universal priority services register and delivering any legislative measures required to facilitate it. A universal PSR service must include the interests of bereaved people within its scope, and charitable voluntary organisations such as Marie Curie, which works to support bereaved people, should be consulted in its development. I have some questions to the Minister. First, what measures does this Bill introduce that will reduce the administrative burden on bereaved people after the death of a loved one? Secondly, the Tell Us Once service was implemented in 2010 and the original equality impact assessment envisaged that its operation should be kept under review to reflect the changing nature of how people engage with public services, but no review has ever happened. Will the Minister therefore commit the Government to undertake a review of Tell Us Once? Thirdly, the previous Government’s Smarter Regulation White Paper committed to taking forward a plan to create a “shared once” support register, which would bring together priority service registers. Will the Minister commit this Government to taking that work forward? I beg to move.

My Lords, it occurred to me when the noble Lord was speaking that we had lost a valuable member of our Committee. This could not be the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who was speaking to us just then. It must have been some form of miasma or technical imposition. Maybe his identity has been stolen and not been replaced. Normally, the noble Lord would have arrived with a short but punchy speech that set out in full how the new scheme was to be run, by whom, at what price, what its extent would be and the changes that would result. The Liberal future it may have been, but it was always delightful to listen to. I am sad that all the noble Lord has asked for here is a modest request, which I am sure the noble Baroness will want to jump to and accept, to carry out a review—as if we did not have enough of those. Seriously, I once used the service that we have been talking about when my father-in-law died, and I found it amazing. It was also one that I stumbled on and did not know about before it happened. Deaths did not happen often enough in my family to make me aware of it. But, like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I felt that it should have done much more than what it did, although it was valuable for what it did. It also occurred to me, as life moved on and we produced children, that there would be a good service when introducing a new person—a service to tell you once about that, because the number of tough issues one has to deal with when children are born is also extraordinary and can be annoying, if you miss out on one—particularly with the schooling issues, which are more common these days than they were when my children were being born. I endorse what was said, and regret that the amendment perhaps did not go further, but I hope that the Minister when she responds will have good news for us.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for raising this, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for raising the possibility that we are in the presence of a digital avatar of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. It is a scary thought, indeed. The amendment requires a review of the operation of the Tell Us Once programme, which seeks to provide a simpler mechanism for citizens to pass information regarding births and deaths to the Government. It considers whether the pioneering progress of Tell Us Once could be extended to non-public sector holders of data. When I read the amendment, I was more cynical than I am now, having heard what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, had to say. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s answers. I take the point from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that we do not necessarily need another review—but now that I have heard about it, it feels a better suggestion than I thought it was when reading about it. I worry that expanding this programme to non-public sector holders of data would be a substantial undertaking; it would surely require the Government to hold records of all the non-public sector organisations that have retained and processed an individual’s personal data. First, I am not sure that this would even be possible—or practicable, anyway. Secondly, I am not sure that it would end up being an acceptable level of state surveillance. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response but I am on the fence on this one.

19:30:00

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, explained very well how the Tell Us Once service works. It is a really important asset for bereaved citizens who would otherwise have to notify all sorts of different departments right across government of a death. It provides a lifesaver for those who are struggling with providing all that information; we should put on record our thanks to Marie Curie and others for helping to create it and promoting it so well. I think I have go on the record in the past—I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, was going to dig out another one of my previous speeches—on this issue. I seem to remember making a very positive speech on the importance of the Tell Us Once service when we debated the previous Bill.

I only come up with the really positive ones.

We support this service, of course—we can see the potential for expanding it further if we get this measure right—but I have to tell noble Lords that the current service is not in great shape in terms of its technology. It has suffered from insufficient investment over time and it needs to be improved before we can take it to the next stage of its potential. We consider that the best way to address this issue is, first, to upgrade its legacy technology, which is what we are operating at the moment. I realised that this is a problem only as I took over this brief; I had assumed that it would be more straightforward, but the problem seems to be that we are operating on ancient technology here. Work is already under way to try to bring it all up to date. We are looking to improve the current service and at the opportunities to extend it to more of government. Our initial task is to try to extend it to some of the government departments that do not recognise it at the moment. Doing that will inform us of the potential limitations and the opportunities should we wish to extend it to the private sector in future. I say to the noble Lord that this will have to be a stage process because of the technological challenges that we currently have. We are reluctant to commit to a review and further expansion of the service at this time but, once the service is updated, we would absolutely be happy to talk to noble Lords and revisit this issue, because we see the potential of it. The update is expected to be completed in the next two years; I hope that we will be able to come back and give a progress report to noble Lords at that time. However, I have to say, this is what we have inherited—bear with us, because we have a job to do in bringing it up to date. I hope that, on that basis, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment, albeit reluctantly.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that response, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson—at least, I think I do—for his contribution. I have clearly worked on far too many Bills in the past. I have to do better when I move amendments like this. I have to bring the full package, but we are allowed to speak for only a quarter of an hour, so we cannot bring everything to the table. All I can promise the noble Viscount is that my avatar will haunt him while he is sitting on the fence. I thank the Minister for giving a sympathetic response to this, but clearly there are barriers to rolling out anything beyond where we have got to. I was rather disappointed by two years because I was formulating a plan to bring back an Oral Question in about six months’ time. I am afraid that she may find that we are trying to hurry her along a little on this. I recognise that there are technology issues, but convening people and getting broader engagement with various players is something that could be done without the technology in the first instance, so the Minister can expect follow-up on this front rather earlier than two years’ time. She does not have the luxury of waiting around before we come back to her on it, but I thank her because this is a fantastic service. It is limited, but, as far as it goes, it is a godsend for the bereaved. We need to make sure that it improves and fulfils its potential across the private sector as well as the public sector. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 58 withdrawn.

Clause 65 agreed.

Schedule 3 agreed.

Clause 66 agreed.

Committee adjourned at 7.36 pm.