My Lords, may I say how sorry I am to have to deal with Lord Etherton’s amendments after his sad passing? I did not have a long time to get to know him, but during my time in this House, I truly appreciated both his engagement and his wisdom on this Bill and his courtesy and kindness. I know that he will be greatly missed by the House and I add to what other noble Lords have said in sending my condolences to his husband and his close friends and family. I understand that his wonderful legal brain will be a sad loss to this House, and we will all miss him. I am very sorry that he is not here today to complete the work that he started on the Bill. As the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, said, may his memory be a blessing to all those who knew him.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, for speaking on behalf of Lord Etherton in this debate on the amendments on financial penalties, and also the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for her comments on these. I will make the declaration up front that I am not a lawyer either, so I rely on others for legal advice on this part of the Bill.
Starting with the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, Amendment 145 would replace the criminal standard of proof with the civil standard of proof for breaches of the tenancy requirements which are not criminal offences. These breaches can, by virtue of continuing or being repeated, form part of a criminal offence. We consider that it is necessary, therefore, for the criminal standard of proof to apply.
Amendment 152 would reduce the standard of proof from “beyond reasonable doubt” to “on the balance of probabilities”, where local authorities are imposing civil penalties as an alternative to prosecution for tenancy offences. Where civil penalties are imposed as an alternative to criminal prosecution, it is necessary for the same criminal standard, “beyond reasonable doubt”, to apply. That is already the case, for example, for civil penalties imposed as an alternative to prosecution for offences under the Housing Act 2004, such as failure to comply with an improvement notice. For these reasons, I ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.
I now turn to the amendments tabled by Lord Etherton, and spoken to on his behalf today by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. Amendments 197 and 200 would, conversely, require local authorities to meet the criminal, rather than civil, standard of proof when imposing civil penalties for rental discrimination and rental bidding breaches.
The standard of proof is lower than that which applies to the imposition of financial penalties for breaches of other requirements introduced by the Bill. This is because, unlike those other breaches, rental discrimination and rental bidding breaches cannot lead to a criminal offence if the conduct is repeated or continued. As such, rental discrimination and rental bidding cannot result in the landlord being prosecuted or given a £40,000 civil penalty, and are subject only to the lower £7,000 penalty. We therefore think it appropriate that local authorities need to prove these breaches to the civil standard, “on the balance of probabilities”, rather than the criminal standard, “beyond reasonable doubt”.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, raised the issue of resources, and I will answer that with two points. One is that the Government have committed to assess the financial impact of this on local authorities, and have committed to new burdens funding. Secondly, those fines will be available for local authority use for this purpose, or other purposes, if they wish to use them in that way.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked about appeals. Local authorities can consider evidence and decide whether, for example, the individual concerned was aware that the information they provided might be false or misleading, and if so, whether it was reasonable for them to submit it, or if they took an unjustified risk in doing so; that is the point about recklessness.
The legislation also provides safeguards. In the case of prosecution it would be for the court, not the local authority, to decide whether the accused had been reckless. In the case of a financial penalty, the landlord has the right to make representations before a penalty is imposed, and a right of appeal against the imposition or the amount of the penalty.
Amendment 148 would narrow the offence of misusing a ground for possession to evict a tenant when possession would not be obtained on that ground. It would do so by removing the element of recklessness from the offence. Amendment 242 would narrow the offence of providing information to the database operator that is false or misleading in a material respect in the same way.
To commit the first of these offences, a landlord, or person acting or purporting to act on their behalf, would need to know that the landlord would not be able to obtain possession on that ground. If a landlord, or person acting or purporting to act on their behalf, was simply being reckless as to whether the landlord would be able to do so, it would not amount to an offence.
I do not think that limiting the offence in this way is necessary or helpful. Clearly, landlords should not be penalised for minor mistakes, but recklessness goes beyond making a mistake. It entails taking an unjustified risk, and landlords should not take an unjustified risk when their action may result in someone losing their home. It is, of course, the case that the offence is committed only if the tenant actually surrenders possession. Making enforcement in every case dependent on being satisfied to the criminal standard that the landlord, or those acting or purporting to act on their behalf, knew that the landlord would not be able to obtain possession using a ground for possession, would make it too easy for unscrupulous landlords and agents to escape enforcement.
Similar arguments apply in relation to the database offence. To require knowledge to be proved in every case would make it too easy for unscrupulous landlords to submit false or misleading information in purported compliance with database requirements.
It is well-established in legislation for offences relating to the provision of false or misleading information to include the mental element of recklessness, including in housing legislation. It is used, for example, in relation to the provision of false and misleading information to local authorities in connection with their functions under the Housing Act 2004—an offence that is prosecuted by local authorities.
In short, we consider that the mental state of recklessness is appropriate to apply to these serious offences, so I kindly ask that the noble Baroness considers withdrawing her amendment.