Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited Compensation Scheme Order 2024

Considered in Grand Committee

17:08:00

Moved by

That the Grand Committee do consider the Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited Compensation Scheme Order 2024.

My Lords, I beg to move that the Committee do consider this order, which is related to the 2023 resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited. This order confirms that the former shareholder of SVB UK is not entitled to compensation following the transfer of the bank’s shares to HSBC UK Bank plc. As noble Lords know, in early March 2023, SVB UK experienced severe financial distress, resulting in rapid deposit outflows. This crisis, originating from its US parent entity, quickly spread to its UK subsidiary. By Friday 10 March, the Bank of England, acting as the resolution authority, declared its intention to place SVB UK into a bank insolvency procedure, absent any meaningful new information. Over the subsequent weekend, a private sector purchaser was identified. On Monday 13 March, the Bank of England exercised its power under the Banking Act 2009 to transfer the shares of SVB UK to HSBC UK Bank plc. This action was taken following consultation, with the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Treasury and the Bank of England reaching the judgment that the resolution conditions set out in the Banking Act had been met. The Banking Act requires the Treasury to make a compensation scheme order when the private sector purchaser power is exercised. This order is a mechanism to establish in law what compensation, if any, is due to former shareholders of the resolved firm. The Bank of England undertook a provisional valuation when placing SVB UK into resolution. That valuation found that SVB UK’s shareholder would not have made any recoveries had the firm been placed into a bank insolvency procedure, and therefore no compensation is due to SVB UK’s former shareholder. The Bank of England then commissioned an independent valuation of SVB UK, which confirmed that no compensation is due to the previous shareholder of SVB UK. The order before us today confirms in law the findings of these valuations: that the former shareholder of SVB UK is not due any compensation. The compensation scheme order for SVB UK is a necessary step to formalise and conclude the resolution process and confirm that no compensation is due to the former shareholder. This decision is based on thorough valuations and adheres to the legal framework established by the Banking Act 2009. I beg to move.

My Lords, the Minister may be pleased to hear that I have very little to say on this SI. It makes sense to me. The Bank of England report on the transfer of Silicon Valley Bank UK to HSBC argues clearly and logically that, in any reasonable scenario, SVB’s UK tier 1 and tier 2 capital would have been wiped out, so there are no grounds to compensate the former US parent. However, the fact that this SI is needed raises a question. The resolution of large banks that fail would require wiping out shareholders and calling in bail-in bonds under the MREL procedures without compensation. Would those processes all require a report and an SI to be laid in order for action by the Bank of England to be legal? If that is what the legislation currently says, is there a flaw in the resolution legislation? If there is a flaw, does it need to be rectified? In other words, it seems extraordinary that we need an SI under these circumstances at all.

I also welcome the draft Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited Compensation Scheme Order 2024. It rightly confirms in law that no compensation is due to shareholders of Silicon Valley Bank UK Ltd on the transfer of shares to HSBC UK Bank plc in March 2023, when, as the Minister explained, the former experienced rapid deposit outflows. The swift action that the last Government took to facilitate the sale averted a potential catastrophe for tech start-ups and small businesses dependent on that bank—precisely the kind of enterprises that can help to drive Britain’s growth and innovation in the decades to come. The special resolution regime reinforced trust in the financial system while reminding us that stability is the foundation upon which innovation thrives. Although I welcome this order, can the Minister clarify how the lessons learned from this well-handled crisis will inform future regulation of mid-sized banks? Further, can he elaborate on how the scheme aligns with our wider growth agenda? To my mind, the tech sector is critical to Britain’s global competitiveness, and maintaining its trust in the financial system is key to sustaining our position as a world-leading hub for innovation—an ambition that is under some challenge, as I mentioned earlier. But I am very happy with this order.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Neville-Rolfe, for their support for the compensation scheme order. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked whether this SI was genuinely needed. In terms of the specifics, I can assure her that I would not be standing here if it was not, but I will write to her about the hypothetical that she raises. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for the points that she made. I agree very much with what she said about the importance of the action that was taken. She asked whether we have learned the lessons from that for future regulation. I point to the bank resolution Bill that I have just taken through the House. It is absolutely informed by the experience of the Silicon Valley Bank episode and directly flows from it. The noble Baroness also asked how this order relates to the growth agenda. As I always say, stability is the first pillar of the growth agenda. Financial stability is as important as economic stability and I believe that this order will help to ensure financial stability as that platform for growth. With that, I commend it to the Committee.

Motion agreed.

Committee adjourned at 5.15 pm.