UK-Mauritius Agreement on the Chagos Archipelago

Motion to Resolve

15:21:00

Moved by

That this House resolves, in accordance with section 20 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and in the light of concerns about the cost of the agreement, the absence of any legal requirement to conclude such an agreement, its impact on international security, and the lack of meaningful consultation of the Chagossian people, and recognising the right of Chagossians to be registered as British Overseas Territory citizens under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, that His Majesty’s Government should not ratify the Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Mauritius concerning the Chagos Archipelago including Diego Garcia, laid before the House on 22 May. Relevant document: 9th Report from the International Agreements Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument)

My Lords, let me start by saying how much I am looking forward to hearing the maiden speech of my noble and learned friend Lady Prentis of Banbury and, more with sadness, the valedictory speech of my noble friend Lord Boswell of Aynho. Before I speak to the Motion, it is worth reflecting for a moment on the fairly remarkable fact that this debate is the only opportunity that Parliament will have to express its view on this treaty, under the procedure established by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act—or CRaG. While that Act placed Parliament’s role in treaty ratification on the statute book, by convention Parliament has had a role in the ratification of treaties for over century. Under the Ponsonby rule, the House of Commons should be given the opportunity to debate a substantive Motion on a treaty when it is laid before Parliament where there is a formal request in the usual channels. This precedent was confirmed by the right honourable Chris Bryant MP, who was the Minister taking what is now the CRaG Act through the House of Commons in 2010. During Committee, on 19 January, he confirmed that: “The Government would always make sure that where a debate and vote were requested, they would be made available within the allotted time—or if they were not, we would extend the time in order to allow that provision”.—[Official Report, Commons, 19/1/10; col. 218.] Like so many of our conventions, this is yet another that has been chucked in the dustbin by this Government, who have in fact refused to allow time for a substantive Motion in the other place on this very important treaty. If it is such a good deal, one wonders why the Government are so reluctant to allow MPs to even discuss it? It is therefore only this House which will be able to send a message to the Government on this treaty. I know that noble Lords rightly think long and hard before disagreeing with the other place, but it looks as though we do not need to concern ourselves with such precedents on this occasion. What we are discussing today is, frankly, an astonishing act of national self-harm. Let us be under no illusion: the deal that the Government have agreed to is a strategic capitulation. We are preparing to hand over sovereign British territory which has been under continuous British control for over two centuries and—as if that were not embarrassing enough—the British taxpayer is being asked to pay £30 billion for the privilege. The British Indian Ocean Territory, and in particular Diego Garcia, is of immense geopolitical importance. It is key to our defence and intelligence interests in a region increasingly contested by authoritarian powers. Astonishingly, the Government are now preparing to cede sovereignty to Mauritius. The island of Mauritius is 2,000 kilometres away from the Chagos Islands and it has never exercised any jurisdiction over the territory. It now stands to gain significant influence in our vital defence and foreign security policies. This is not pragmatic foreign policy; it is a surrender, orchestrated by international lawyers and signed off by a Prime Minister who seems to be incapable of acting in the true interests of Britain abroad. The Government’s approach to the Chagos Archipelago is not rooted in strategic calculation, nor in genuine concern for the long-term stability of the region. It seems to be driven by a relentless desire to virtue signal on the world stage at the behest of activist lawyers who have no intention of putting Britain’s interests first. The Government’s motivations are ideologically driven, and the Prime Minister, in my view, has been strategically reckless. Ministers have tried to make a case that this agreement is somehow legally necessary, but it now becomes increasingly clear, not least through some of the evidence given to your Lordships’ International Agreements Committee, that there are in fact a range of views from senior lawyers on this matter. I know that my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar will address more of the legal aspects in his speech later. For now, I will merely say that this Government seem to almost constantly hide behind legal advice, but at some point Ministers must take responsibility for the political choices that they have made. We should stand firm, and we should defend our territory, our interests and, ultimately, our credibility on the international stage. In trying to justify this treaty, Labour Ministers have consistently tried to claim that they were merely completing a process begun by the last Government. This is simply not the case. After initial discussions between officials, in December 2023, when my noble friend Lord Cameron was Foreign Secretary, talks on this matter were put on hold after it was concluded that this would not be a deal in which British national interests would be served. Indeed, my noble friend Lord Cameron told the Foreign Affairs Select Committee at the time: “We face a very insecure and dangerous world and there is a need to maintain our security and strengthen our alliances to protect ourselves, and we should think of Diego Garcia in that context”. That was our approach: pragmatism, realism and responsibility, not the current Government’s programme of virtue signalling and posturing. I know that my noble friend Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon was very close to this issue as a Minister in the FCDO and I am pleased that he will be contributing to our debate later today. One of the most astonishing things about this deal is the fact that British taxpayers are paying for it—paying to surrender sovereignty and to embarrass ourselves on the international stage. Given the state of the public finances, I should have thought that this alone would be a red line for this Government, particularly given their recent difficulties convincing their Back-Benchers to cut any sort of spending at all. The Chancellor keeps insisting that we do not have enough money to pay for disability benefits and, until their latest U-turn, not enough money for winter fuel payments to pensioners, but the Government have somehow found the means to shell out £30 billion for the pleasure of giving away British territory. In currency that noble Lords opposite will recognise, this is the equivalent of one and a half black holes and could finance 5,500 more nurses a year, every year. The Mauritian Finance Minister has helpfully told us what Mauritius is going to do with its fortunate windfall. Mauritius is apparently going to cut taxes and pay off the national debt—and good luck to it. We know that some of the cash is being taken from Ministry of Defence funds, but some of it is coming from the already severely reduced ODA budget—although, so far, the Government have refused to tell us exactly how much. Last week, during Oral Questions, Members from all parts of the House expressed their concerns about the effect of reductions in ODA on things such as infant vaccinations. This indeed is another one of the “tough choices” that the Government keep telling us they are having to make. The Exchequer is making cuts in the UK to fund tax reductions in Mauritius. The long-suffering taxpayer should not suffer the consequences of Labour’s dramatically bad negotiating skills. The fact that this territory is being ceded is, frankly, obscene; the fact that we are paying for it makes it a farce. I am sure that the Minister will say in his concluding remarks that we are being the Opposition for the sake of being the Opposition. Before he finishes scribbling down his response, I remind him that this agreement is just as unpopular on his own Benches. The greatly respected noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, who is sadly not in his place, has rightly and powerfully criticised the Government for their decision to cede our territory in this way. He said: “For reasons that are difficult to fathom, the Government risks jeopardising both of these assets as it apparently remains determined to cede sovereignty of the Chagos Islands—the home of our vital Diego Garcia military base—to Mauritius … surrendering sovereignty over the Chagos Islands would be an irresponsible act, which would put our strategic interests—and the interests of our closest allies—in danger”. I could not have put it better myself. I am surprised that the Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary have not paid greater heed to the words of the former First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff, not least because he is a member of their own party. Indeed, this underscores that this is not simply a party-political matter but a national one, and many people agree that it is a national disgrace. We cannot overlook the fact that, in a deal so roundly criticised, some of the very few words of welcome have come from China. In contrast to what the PM told the House of Commons, this is hardly a surprise. One of the so-called judges who produced the original ICJ advisory opinion is a Chinese communist supporter of the Russian invasion of Ukraine—such is his love of international law. Huang Shifang, China’s ambassador to Mauritius, told guests at the Chinese embassy at the end of May that her Government offered “massive congratulations” on the deal and that China “fully supports” Mauritius’s attempts to “safeguard national sovereignty”. She also confirmed that Mauritius would soon join Beijing’s belt and road initiative—of course it will. We are bending over backwards to appease a Chinese communist ICJ judge when we know that China itself pays no heed whatever to any judgments on its policy in the South China Sea or over Hong Kong. When China starts welcoming British defence and foreign policy, does this not suggest that, somehow, something in that policy is perhaps not quite in our national interest? We cannot ignore the growing threat the Chinese Communist Party poses to our national security, to global stability and, in many cases, to its own people. From industrial-scale cyber espionage and economic coercion abroad, to the systematic repression of Uyghurs and the dismantling of freedoms in Hong Kong and at home, China’s actions increasingly defy the norms of a rules-based international order. Its deepening partnerships with autocratic regimes and its hostility to democratic values only compound these risks. It is this regime that has been one of the few to support the British Government’s decision on this matter. In this context, is it not just ill-advised but actively against our national interest to cede control, even indirectly, of sovereign British territory to any arrangement that could open the door to increased Chinese influence? We should not be blind to the geopolitical consequences of our decisions in this matter. One of the many concerning aspects of this treaty is the second part of Annexe 1, which requires the UK “to expeditiously inform Mauritius of any armed attack on a third State directly emanating from the Base on Diego Garcia”. Lawyers are already debating whether this means that we must inform Mauritius in advance of any attack. I wonder how this would have worked last week, if the US had wished to use Diego Garcia for its actions in Iran—perhaps that is why the question was not asked. How would any notification be kept confidential if the Mauritian Government disagreed? At the very least, I suspect that this interpretation of that part of the annexe will provide plenty more lucrative work for their international lawyer cheerleaders. Under another part of the annexe, we also have to provide notification to Mauritius of any “access, basing and overflight for non-United Kingdom and non-United States of America aircraft and vessels”. That provision states that we can give permission only “upon notification to Mauritius”. Again, that can be interpreted as needing to get permission in advance. Have the Government given any thought whatever as to how these provisions will work in a potentially fast-moving international crisis? I suspect that they have not. There is another group I have not spoken about so far, but their views are one of the most important factors that the Government should take into account: the Chagossian people, who have been treated disgracefully in this long-going saga. I am pleased that a number of them are in our Public Gallery today to view the debate, and they are very welcome in our House. Although the Government may have closed their ears to the Chagossian people, your Lordships’ House has the opportunity to say today that we, at least, are listening to them. When the Minister responds to our debate, I hope he will be able to tell us what consultation the Government have actually had with them. I understand that the Foreign Secretary had never met any of them until after the treaty was concluded; therefore, will the Government consider holding a referendum of the Chagossian people before ratifying the treaty? Finally, among many other concerning aspects of the treaty there is the issue of the current marine protected area. This currently includes no catch for fish and is one of the largest and most important in the world, at over 640,000 square kilometres. It a blue jewel in our crown, as it were. We have no idea what will happen to that in the future. We do, however, have the words of the Mauritian Fisheries Minister, who said earlier this year: “What stops me tomorrow to say that I am going to give fishing licences for any fishing trawler company or any fishing vessel to go to any part of Chagos; to fish and to bring the catch to be landed at our port? We have the authority, the moral authority, legal authority, legitimate authority to fish in our exclusive economic zone”. There will be a tremendous economic incentive for a relatively poor country such as Mauritius to exploit the fishing opportunities in those areas. What is before us today is not a strategic rebalancing nor a moral reckoning; it is a self-inflicted blow to Britain’s global standing. This agreement amounts to a retreat: a surrender of sovereign territory that serves as a linchpin of our defence architecture at a time when authoritarian threats are rising and alliances matter more than ever. Handing control to a Government who align themselves ever more closely with Beijing—a regime that actively undermines international norms and our national interests—is not only unwise; it is positively dangerous. To compound the error, the British taxpayer is being made to foot the Bill. This whole affair has been a gross folly. There is no strategic gain here, no credible guarantee for the future of Diego Garcia and no reassurance for our allies. Instead, we send a message to adversaries and allies alike that British sovereignty is indeed negotiable. It is capitulation and we must reject it.

15:37:00

My Lords, I have a Motion in my name in the debate. I thank the Minister for the open way in which we have had discussions since the agreement was laid before Parliament and put on record my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, for her willingness to host briefings in the department. I commend the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee of this House for their work and the extremely helpful findings and recommendations they have made. So far they have not been referred to, but we will doubtless hear more about them in the next contribution. I reiterate what I have said on many previous occasions: that the clerks, in particular of the International Agreements Committee, serve Parliament with distinction. They carry out a vital role for this House and for Parliament as a whole. I look forward to the contributions from my noble friends Lady Ludford and Lord Alderdice, with the experience and perspective they bring, and thank my noble friends on the respective committees for their consideration. I too am looking forward to the maiden speech of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, and thank the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, for his many years of very distinguished service, in particular as chair of the House’s European Union Committee. I congratulate them both on securing the family handover with such elegant precision today. If the usual channels failed in one thing, they have succeeded in another for this debate. I want to consider three main areas: first, the circumstances that led us to this debate; secondly, the treaty itself, the issues it raises and why there needs to be further consideration of some of them; and thirdly, what we as a House should do going forward, including why the Motion in my name has been tabled and should, I hope, be supported. We are here today because of the decision by the previous Conservative Government on 3 November 2022 to “begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory … /Chagos Archipelago”. That Statement by Foreign Secretary James Cleverly, repeated here by the noble Lord, Lord Goldsmith—the other one—specifically referred to “taking into account relevant legal proceedings” and the “intention to secure an agreement on the basis of international law to resolve all outstanding issues, including those relating to the former inhabitants of the Chagos Archipelago”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 354WS.] That Statement, which apparently is now “obscene”, “dangerous”, “self-harm” and “a surrender”, was made by the noble Lord Callanan’s Government. This was a major change of policy. If the Benches on my right are in any doubt about that, it was a change of policy because the position was, to quote from a Written Answer from the previous Government made on 20 April 2021: “There are no current plans for discussions with the Government of Mauritius on the future of the Chagos Islands”. In March 2022, just weeks before the policy change, the Government said: “The UK has no doubt about its sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory”, and on Mauritius, that “we do not recognise its claim. However, we stand by our commitment, first made in 1965, to cede sovereignty of the territory to Mauritius when it is no longer needed for defence purposes”. So, since the Government—the Conservative Government—still needed it for defence purposes but made the decision in November that year to open negotiations to cede sovereignty, the change of policy was significant. The treaty is a consequence of now completing the previous Conservative Government’s policy. Some who agreed with it then disagree with it now, but that does not change the fact that the Conservatives made a major policy choice to cede sovereignty and to do it under the context of the International Court of Justice decisions. This was also a major legal decision, as, up to the change of policy in 2022 to cede sovereignty, the Government relied on their previous argument that the 1965 agreement to separate the archipelago was held to be legally binding by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea arbitral tribunal in 2015. This was therefore reversed, and the relevant legal proceedings referred to was the process of the ICJ, which had responded to the request by the United Nations General Assembly for a determination on the lawfulness of decolonisation and had reported its advisory opinion in 2019. We know that it was found in the opinion that decolonisation was not completed lawfully, and the General Assembly responded to the advisory opinion by adopting resolution 73/295 on 22 May 2019. In this debate, some noble Lords may well delve deeper into previous history, and may challenge the ICJ opinion—which am sure all noble Lords have read fully. It gives a clear factual history, and some of it, I have to be frank, makes very uncomfortable reading. Others may opine on the ICJ mechanisms and the significance of the opinion and the associated General Assembly resolutions—it is their right to do so. But none of that will change the fact of the November 2022 decision of the Conservative Government. So, we have established that the previous Government decided to recognise in principle the case for the exercise of sovereignty by Mauritius over the archipelago, and they pursued this over many rounds of discussions on the terms of bilateral relations going forward on how our defence and security interests would be maintained. We may hear in the debate that, after 11 attempts, there was no agreement. But that was not changing the view of the principle of ceding sovereignty; it was no agreement on the actual terms. There is a difference. As we have settled that, we can now turn to the terms before considering the position we should take on them. The question is: does a deal with deficiencies negate the principle of Mauritian sovereignty? The answer is no, as James Cleverly’s Statement is recognised in principle internationally. The issues are the implications of it, its application and the protection of Chagossian rights under it. One implication presented is whether this treaty raises questions on other overseas territories. The IAC addressed this in paragraph 26, saying that “the Agreement would not have any direct read-across”. Another implication is the question of whether this limits our security or defence. Questions have been raised so far in the debate. The committee concluded that none of the witnesses it heard contested the Government’s view that the treaty will not, for so long as it remains in force, materially change the ability of the UK and US to operate the base at Diego Garcia. We now know that the United States agrees. Maintaining protection of marine biodiversity has also been raised. In 2010, the UK declared 640,000 square kilometres of marine protected area around the territory. It has some of the most biodiverse waters on the planet and I noted that the committee welcomed the Government’s assurance that they will work closely with the Mauritian Government to establish a well-resourced and patrolled marine protected area. The committee added: “We consider it vital that an appropriate portion of the annual development grant funding is allocated towards projects to support the new MPA”. I hope that the Government agree with that. The committee makes the case for more financial scrutiny, and I agree. It is worth, for colleagues on my right, putting on record, because the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, forgot to, that when he was a Minister, his department was the largest disburser of UK overseas aid to Mauritius—we thank him for his work. It is also the case that these financial provisions are of a larger scale, and it is necessary to have further clarity and details on this commitment. The Government should have been, and should now be, more transparent, including on the basis for establishing the funds in Article 11, but a critical part now is the recognition and restoration of rights to the diverse Chagossian community. I note the 11 June call from the Human Rights Council for the agreement to be renegotiated because it does not respect the rights of the Chagossians. I also note that the committee’s conclusion was that the UK should not be bound by this, but feels that we should all acknowledge the years—in fact, the generations—during which the community has been denied rights, from forced removal in the 1970s to the denial of resettlement in the 2000s. We owe that community both an apology and restoration of rights. As both communities noted in a round-table event held by the IRDC in December 2024, representatives from members of the community based in the UK and Mauritius expressed unanimous dissatisfaction with the consultation on the part of both the UK and the Mauritian Governments, and were frustrated by their exclusion from the negotiations. Paragraph 46 of the report concluded with a regrettable perception that, it said, had some basis in reality: that, over many years, the interests of the Chagossians had been subordinated to the national security interests of the UK and its allies. It went on to say that it agreed with some witnesses that more could have been done, including in relation to employment at the base, and that the agreement does not provide a clear route to the resettlement of Chagossians in the Chagos Archipelago. It called on the Government to engage with Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement of the islands, including for members of the community currently based in the UK. Paragraph 49 called on the Government to clarify what oversight and accountability mechanisms would be put in place to ensure transparency and the equitable and effective allocation of funds. In particular, it sought clarification of how Chagossians would be consulted in the administration of the trust fund and whether those based in the UK will benefit. I agree with all of those points; indeed, I agree with the committee’s letter to the Foreign Secretary: “More meaningful engagement would have helped rebuild trust and lend greater legitimacy to the final arrangements”. My Motion, therefore, would require the Government to fulfil recommendations of the IRC and also the requests in points 4, 5, and 6 in the IRDC letter to the Foreign Secretary to enhance Chagossian engagement by establishing a formal consultation mechanism and meaningful inclusion in decision-making: and how resettlement “will” be provided for, not just “may” be provided for. It would address the request for transparency and accountability. I hope that both the Government and, indeed, the Conservative Opposition will support this Motion. If this is our last opportunity in this House to speak on this treaty, I hope that we can at least agree for further protections of the community to be outlined before the Government ratify. We have therefore established that the previous Government agreed in principle to cede the exercise of sovereignty in a manner consistent with international law. We have also seen that there are areas where, under this Government, more information and scrutiny are needed on their terms for the conclusion of that ceding. The question now is how we proceed. We heard plenty of fire and brimstone from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, who seemed rather incensed. He sought to give the impression that all routes for the Conservatives to secure a debate in the House of Commons under CRaG had been exhausted, blaming the failure of the usual channels and the Government’s intransigence. That is not entirely true, because the Conservatives had two opportunities during this scrutiny period to secure time in the House of Commons; we know through the Library Note guidance on CRaG that if the Government do not provide time, it can be done in opposition time. Yes, there were coat-tails to hide behind when it came to the Government not providing time, but I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, must have had a meeting with his Commons colleagues when they said that this was not important enough to use their time during the scrutiny period in the House of Commons. I think that we must all have sympathy with the noble Lord. I can imagine that he was not too happy when they said that it would be for the unelected House to take this up. Students of political history will know that this would have been an impossible course of action. The Conservatives would never use the unelected House to limit the prerogative power to make treaties and to refuse ratification. Do not take my word for it; take theirs. In the debate on the Rwanda treaty, we debated the Motion in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for conditions on ratification. The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, whose contribution we look forward to later on, sought to give me and everybody else very respectful and lengthy legal advice as to why we definitely should not have a Motion to delay ratification of a treaty. I look forward to his altered legal advice later. Winding that debate, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, called the Motion from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, constitutionally “unnecessary and misguided”. Presumably, this far wider Motion by his colleague is necessary and well informed. Setting aside the amnesia epidemic sweeping the Benches on my right, and in all seriousness, I thank them for the announcement made on 3 June in this House by the noble Earl, Lord Minto, that a fatal Motion had been laid and that they would press it to a vote. I can only commend him and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, on being brave. They have reversed generations of Conservative policy never to have fatal Motions in this House. They have reversed generations of policy not to seek to interfere with the prerogative powers, and this major constitutional moment today has not gone unnoticed. We have an opportunity to restore some of the rights that have been denied a community, which we should all be ashamed of. We have the ability to honour a commitment given by James Cleverly in November 2022 that we would abide by international law and would cede sovereignty. We also have an opportunity to ensure that, at this stage, we do it right. We should therefore honour our commitments, ensure rights and provide clarity, and we hope that the Government can do this before ratification.

15:53:00

My Lords, the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper invites the House to take note of the recent report of the International Agreements Committee, which I have the honour of chairing. I too look forward to the maiden speech of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, and to the valedictory address of my good friend, if I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho. The International Agreements Committee examined this agreement as thoroughly as time allowed. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, in his opening observations, made the point that there are deficiencies in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. I agree with him on that; there are deficiencies. A review by my committee is in place at the moment to look at those deficiencies and, ultimately, to invite the House to help cure them. One of those is the time that is allowed for the committee to consider the treaty, which is 21 sitting days. We asked the Foreign Office for an extension to the statutory 21 sitting days that we are allocated to scrutinise this agreement in view of the significant national interest involved. This request was denied without explanation. This raises an issue in relation to the operation of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. We will come back to that. To some extent, the time problem was mitigated by the International Relations and Defence Committee opening its own inquiry. By agreement, we co-operated in the holding of evidence sessions. I thank that committee, its chair, members and clerk for their co-operation. I also very much thank members of the International Agreements Committee, a number of whom are slated to speak today, for their co-operation, insights and wisdom. I turn to our key takeaways. The House will know that the Chagos Archipelago is located in the middle of the Indian Ocean and consists of more than 1,000 small islands. On the largest of them, Diego Garcia, the UK operates with the United States a joint military base that is a vital strategic UK asset. When Mauritius was a colony of the United Kingdom, the islands were administered by the UK as part of Mauritius. They were separated from Mauritius prior to its independence in the mid-1960s. That separation is the crux of the legal dispute about sovereignty between Mauritius and the UK, which has been running for many years. As a direct result of the Mauritian campaign, the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion in 2019 which found that the UK’s assertion of sovereignty over the Chagos Islands was unlawful. The agreement that we are considering intends to resolve the sovereignty dispute once and for all and secure the long-term future of the military base. Our report supports the contention of the Government that the agreement secures UK and US operations at the base at Diego Garcia, but the arrangements by which the UK is authorised to operate the base are time limited. Our committee also concluded that while the agreement is not perfect—I will speak to some of the limitations in a moment—if an agreement were not reached, Mauritius would likely resume its campaign to obtain a legally binding judgment on sovereignty against the United Kingdom. We heard expert evidence from Sir Christopher Greenwood, one of the UK’s pre-eminent practitioners of international law and a former judge of the International Court of Justice, nominated by the United Kingdom to that court. In his opinion, any international court examining the sovereignty dispute would likely find in favour of Mauritius. Such an outcome would clearly represent a risk to the future of the military base and thus UK national interests and security. I will briefly discuss the committee’s view on the justification for the agreement, taking into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 2019. After this discussion, I will outline the report’s findings on the interests of the Chagossian people, rightly referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, and others; the protection of the marine environment; and the financial arrangements under the treaty—all issues that have been raised and are touched on in the committee’s report. First, on the Government’s justification for the agreement, particularly in view of the national security interests that the UK has in the base at Diego Garcia, Sir Christopher Greenwood told our committee that while the 2019 ICJ opinion was only advisory, it is “a very authoritative guide to the legal position. In reality, it would be very difficult for any state just to ignore an almost unanimous opinion of the international court”. The consequences of this ruling have already been seen in the rulings of international tribunals and the actions of international bodies. Members who have read our report will have noted the copy of the UN official world map on page 11, which shows the Chagos Islands as the territory of Mauritius. Similarly, a 2021 ruling of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea decided that, following the ICJ advisory opinion, it had jurisdiction to determine the maritime boundary between Mauritius and the Maldives on the basis that Mauritius was sovereign over the Chagos Archipelago. We heard evidence that there were legal avenues by which Mauritius would be able to bring a sovereignty dispute before an international tribunal. There is therefore a clear risk that Mauritius could succeed in obtaining a legally binding judgment on sovereignty against the United Kingdom. The issue of whether the base on Diego Garcia is secure against litigation is an important one, given its centrality to the UK’s national security interests. I note the point about the possibility that it might even have been used last week in the US attacks on Iran. The base was described to us in evidence as a “vital” security asset. It sits at a strategic location in the centre of the Indian Ocean, which offers air cover into the Gulf, the Middle East, south Asia and east Africa, and thus protection for crucial shipping lanes in the region, among other security concerns. Nothing in our inquiry—we looked hard at this point, in so far as we could—contradicted the Government’s view that the agreement would prevent the UK or US retaining full control over operations from Diego Garcia; nothing in the agreement would prevent that. The US Government have also welcomed the agreement, a further sign that it will not constrain activities at the base. Our inquiry did consider the risk of China’s operations in the region and its relationship with Mauritius. Again, however, we did not hear of any credible threat to the stability of operations at the base that could come about as a result of the agreement. We do, however, note in our report that there is no guarantee that the agreement will be extended at the end of the 99-year term. I turn to the interests of the Chagossian people, which we looked at. The past treatment of the Chagossian people has left a “deeply regrettable legacy”; that is acknowledged in the preamble to the agreement. However, the agreement makes minimal provisions to support Chagossians. It states simply: “Mauritius will now be free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands of the Chagos Archipelago, other than Diego Garcia”. In fact, that does nothing to secure the right to return of the Chagossian community. At the December round-table event with members of the Chagossian community, our colleagues on the International Relations and Defence Committee heard unanimous concern that Chagossians had been excluded from the consultation process by the British and Mauritian Governments, and that any engagement had felt “tokenistic” and “superficial” and lacking in meaningful engagement or follow-up. The omission from the agreement of meaningful consultation with and provision for the Chagossian community is regrettable. We note the perception, which we believe has basis in reality, that, over many years, the interests of the Chagossians have been subordinated to the national security interests of the UK. Our committee is of the view that more should have been done to secure the rights of Chagossians in this process; for example, by prioritising Chagossians for employment at the base on Diego Garcia. Our report therefore calls on the Government to engage with Mauritius to establish a programme of resettlement on the islands, including for members of the Chagossian community based in the UK. I turn to another topic, which noble Lords have referred to, which is protection of the marine environment. We heard compelling evidence from Dr Bryan Wilson, the scientific adviser to the Chagos Conservation Trust and a research fellow in biology at the University of Oxford, about the importance and uniqueness of the marine environment around the Chagos Archipelago. He told us it is “the most important reef wilderness on the planet”. To date, the UK has been conserving and protecting this area with its own marine protected area. This is the first such marine protected area to change sovereignty. The UK experience has demonstrated that maintaining and enforcing a protected area of this size is challenging. Mauritius has an enormous task ahead of it. As such, our report welcomes the Government’s assurance that they will work closely with Mauritius to establish a well-protected marine environment, including by apportioning an appropriate amount from the annual development fund established under the agreement to support these activities. That leads me to the financial terms. We have heard that the burden to the taxpayer of the financial payments under this agreement is high. These costs amount to a total of £3.4 billion over the lifespan of the agreement. In addition to the annual cost of leasing the base, the figure includes a one-off payment to capitalise a trust fund for the benefit of the Chagossian community, and an annual development fund to contribute to projects to support the welfare and development of the Mauritian people. There is little detail in the agreement as to how these latter two funds will be administered or audited, or if there exist criteria for their allocation. Greater clarity on this is needed. Our report calls on the Government to clarify what oversight and accountability mechanisms will be put in place to ensure transparency and the equitable and effective allocation of those funds. In particular, we would like clarification on how Chagossians will be consulted in the administration of the trust fund, and we would further like to know whether Chagossians based in the UK would benefit from this fund. The summary of our committee’s work is that we agree with the Government that securing the long-term use of the base on Diego Garcia is of the highest importance. I strongly suspect that that is the view of everybody in this House. We heard nothing to undermine the Government’s contention that this agreement achieves that goal, for as long as it remains in force. Taking account of the agreement’s limitations, to which we draw attention, our report concludes that, if the agreement is not ratified and if a future Government attempted to go on resisting international pressure to transfer sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, there is a risk that Mauritius will obtain a legally binding judgment on sovereignty against the United Kingdom. In these circumstances, despite its imperfections, we considered that the agreement was the safest way to secure the UK’s operation of the base on Diego Garcia.

16:06:00

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. This is a timely and important debate, and we have already heard a variety of views. I also look forward to the speeches from my noble and learned friend Lady Prentis and the noble Lord—also, I am sure, a noble father—Lord Boswell. I will look at this deal through the prism of defence and security and address these issues. You cannot live, as I do, across the Clyde from Faslane, which houses our nuclear deterrent, and not have a sharply honed understanding of the importance of sovereignty. Indeed, one of the most salient arguments for me in the Scottish independence debate, favouring the union, was how independence would create a vulnerable Scotland, stripped of influence on the geopolitical stage and with a skeletal—some would say risible—defence capability. Having sovereign control over that UK defence capability gives strength and authority, and signals to adversaries, “You do not meddle with us, because you cannot meddle with us”. That is what sovereignty means: that unique strength and protection underpin everything that we do in defence. When I was a Defence Minister, I was clear that, whatever was being discussed about Diego Garcia, and for whatever reasons, our defence and security interests must remain paramount. The admiral, the noble Lord, Lord West, the former First Sea Lord and the Chief of Naval Staff, warned in a Policy Exchange report that “ceding the Chagos Islands to Mauritius would be an irresponsible act, which would put our strategic interests—and the interests of our closest allies—in danger”. These are powerful words and since the previous Government commenced exploratory discussions, global tensions have increased and the geopolitical situation has deteriorated. It is now unprecedentedly unpredictable. My noble friend Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, as the then Foreign Secretary, made his concerns clear to the Select Committee in the other place in early 2024. The previous Government did not sign off a deal; the risk was too high. Two committees of this House—the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee—have published very informative reports on this deal. They certainly deserve our thanks. This agreement still needs to clear Parliament and I hope this debate will help the Government better understand why, in relation to defence and security, red lights are flashing all over the place. It is regrettable, as has already been mentioned, that the request that the International Agreements Committee made to the Foreign Secretary for more time for parliamentary scrutiny was refused without reasons being given. For an issue of such primary importance as our global defence and security in this turbulent world, that is weak. Why were the Government so afraid of scrutiny? Perhaps the answer can be found within the two reports to which I referred. Both confirm that there was a difference of legal opinion about whether the UK Government were under any obligation to act. The International Relations and Defence Committee cut to the chase; the chairman’s letter to the Foreign Secretary stated: “While we heard differing legal interpretations of whether the UK was required to transfer sovereignty, both the preceding and current governments were involved in negotiations with Mauritius, and the decision to proceed was ultimately political”. So there we have it—it was political, not a legally based decision. This Government are not obliged to transfer sovereignty and were not required to sign a deal. Our essential interests can still be protected by opposing this treaty. Why does this matter? Let me quote again from the letter, at annexe A, paragraph 4: “Witnesses were unanimous in their view that Diego Garcia holds a pivotal strategic role for the UK and US and that it is critical for broader Western security strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Dr Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow on US strategy in Asia at the American Enterprise Institute, described Diego Garcia as the ‘pivot point’ between the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, underpinning critical US naval and air operations”. Which country is dominant in the Indian Ocean? China. Which country appears to be the new best friend of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean? Again, it is China. Are there any countries that explicitly approve of this deal? Yes, Russia and China. This is a dangerous deal and should be ditched, because the most carefully drafted text in the world cannot substitute for sovereignty. Even the wisdom of Solomon cannot achieve that. I conclude by observing what my noble friend Lord Callanan already referred to. The cost of this will be met largely by an already-stretched defence budget, with the Government scraping around to find every penny they can. Defence is being asked to pay for the gravely weakened defence and security position the Government have created. I support the Motion in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan.

16:11:00

My Lords, I look forward to the maiden speech of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, and the valedictory speech of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho. As a resident of Fringford, a small village not far away from either Banbury or Aynho, I have a personal interest in the handing on of the baton of parliamentary responsibility. I express my personal appreciation of both noble Lords. Turning to the Motions before us, as a member of your Lordships’ Select Committee on International Relations and Defence, I have spent some considerable time with my committee colleagues trying to understand the background to the issues, the process of negotiation by the previous Conservative Government and the current Labour Government, and the implementation of the agreement reached with the Government of Mauritius, which the international community has agreed shall be the sovereign Government. In the short time available to me, I will try to deal with the key issues raised by the International Relations and Defence Committee in its letter to the Foreign Secretary. First, on defence, I ask the Minister whether each time the Diego Garcia base is used, particularly by our US colleagues, as a base for an aggressive military operation, will we as the leaseholder be asked for permission? How will the Government deal with requests for such military attacks on others if we are not happy with those requests, considering that our agreement may well be regarded by those attacked as our participation in such a military adventure? The same applies, in a slightly different way, to the Government of Mauritius. It would be extremely helpful if the Minister could say what he thinks about that. Other noble Lords have observed the enormous importance of the precious marine environment in which the Chagos Islands sit. I wish to be somewhat further reassured by the Minister that His Majesty’s Government will be intimately involved in the monitoring of the conduct of the marine environment there in collaboration with the Government of Mauritius. However, my main focus is and has to be on the Chagossian people. They have not been well treated over the years by the United Kingdom. It is not at all clear to me that it was necessary to remove them all from the whole of the archipelago in the first place. Can I be assured that His Majesty’s Government will explore the possibility of employing at least some Chagossians to access employment opportunities at the joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia? It has been the case in other parts of the world with British bases; why not here? If it is not possible, the Government must surely provide a detailed written justification for their exclusion from resettlement in their own home islands and also contribute to their welfare and well-being as a community. I say “as a community”, but the Chagossians, as we know, are not all of one view about their future. That is a challenge in terms of assessing what they want, but it is not a reason why there should not be a formal consultative mechanism with the various groups in the Chagossian community, as well as a facility to monitor, collaboratively with them, the implementation of the agreement and to ensure their meaningful inclusion in decision-making about the future of their islands. I ask the Minister to give the most sympathetic consideration to the Motion so ably proposed by my noble friend Lord Purvis of Tweed, which gives His Majesty’s Government a route to fulfilling their moral obligations and responsibilities to the Chagossian people. Finally, it has been suggested that the Government are paying to cede sovereignty, but surely this is not the situation. The Government have said that they have agreed to cede sovereignty, but once that is done, there will be no further rights. It seems to me that the Government have been trying to negotiate, as the previous Conservative Government tried to negotiate, a leasehold for the continued use of the islets for military purposes. One question about that funding is its amount, but perhaps the most important question is whether there is properly thought-through and objective oversight of the considerable funding that is being made available to provide for the future of the Chagossian people. It should not simply be left to the Government of Mauritius to decide that. We need to try to ensure that the Chagossian people also have a say about that money.

16:17:00

My Lords, today’s debate is odd for two reasons, and that is the one point on which I think I agree with the introductory remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. First, had the outcome of last July’s general election been different, it is highly possible that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, or one of his colleagues would have been standing at the Dispatch Box defending an agreement similar to the one we are debating now. How else can one construe the 11 rounds of negotiations that the Government of which he was a member conducted with the Government of Mauritius before that election following the ruling of the International Court of Justice and the overwhelming vote in the UN General Assembly that the UK should negotiate in this sense? Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, put down the wrecking Motion he has introduced calling for the agreement not to be ratified even though neither of the two committees examining the agreement—the International Agreements Committee, of which I have the honour to be a member, and the International Relations and Defence Committee—had even begun to take evidence on the text of the agreement, let alone put such evidence in the public domain. The reports of these two committees are now available to the House and they provide no—I repeat, no—justification for the Motion that the noble Lord has put before us. That surely demonstrates a contempt for the two committees, which is deplorable. Some will say, “Well, that’s just politics”, but it should not be so if the work of our committees is to be taken seriously by the House. Now, that lacuna has been filled and our report and the evidence on which it is based have been published and are available to the House, as is the extremely valuable letter from the International Relations Committee. That it should have become available so late in the day is a matter for profound apology, but given the 21 working days we had to conduct our inquiry of quite a complex agreement, it was inevitable once the Government had already, at an earlier stage, turned down our request for an extension. The committees heard the evidence of three distinguished international lawyers. While this evidence was not unanimous, two out of the three—Philippe Sands and Sir Christopher Greenwood—were very clear that the agreement reached was necessary if the UK was to avoid a legally binding finding at some point in the future in addition to the advisory opinion already rendered by the ICJ. It was also particularly striking that Sir Christopher was so clear that it would be incompatible—I repeat, incompatible—with the policy expressed so frequently at the Dispatch Box by both the outgoing Government and the incoming one that the UK supports the rules-based international order, if the UK should then find it inconvenient to do so on this occasion. For what it is worth, that is my own opinion too. At a time when the rules-based order is under such severe attack, it would be especially damaging if one of its principal supporters were to choose opportunism over principle. None of the evidence we received supported the view that has been expressed that this agreement is in any way analogous with, or undermines the legal basis for, the UK’s sovereignty over Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands and the sovereign base areas of Cyprus. In conclusion, I would urge Members to vote against the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and to take note of the report from the International Relations Committee, which clears the way for ratification of the agreement reported on. That is the course consistent with our national security interests and with our respect for international law. Before concluding, I want to say how sorry I am to be speaking before the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, as I would have wished to congratulate her on her maiden speech. I am sorry also to be speaking before the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho. He was my boss on the European Union Committee for many years and a completely outstanding chairman of that committee, for whose work we should all express great gratitude today.

Hear, hear.

16:21:00

My Lords, it is an honour to follow the noble Lord. I begin by thanking the staff, officials and, indeed, Members across this House, who have welcomed me so kindly to my place. I thank my sponsors: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, who has supported me since I was his pupil 30 years ago, and my noble friend Lord Cameron of Chipping Norton, my constituency neighbour, whose call during a radio interview in 2014 for more professional women to stand as MPs was heard by me loud and clear while I was washing up in my kitchen at home. I confess that I have long loved this end of the building. In my first job as a government lawyer, I was frequently sent with heavy bundles of documents, copied 10 times and bound in white ribbon, for the Law Lords. My kinsman, the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, enjoyed in many ways the most fulfilling time of his career here as chairman of the European Union Committee through the Brexit years. I spent a great deal of my time as a Minister engaging—sometimes productively but always pleasantly—with noble Lords who, it transpires, take a great interest in agricultural and legal policy. I am in many ways my father’s daughter. As many noble Lords know, we farm in Aynho near Banbury, and my sisters and I have stayed within a few miles of home and brought up our own daughters there. The Cherwell Valley has formed the backdrop to my life as, kindly, my husband, himself a proud Yorkshireman, was also prepared to make it his home. I was very pleased to serve as Minister for Farming, and I had hoped that the schemes we put in place to support environmentally friendly food production would be the legacy I looked back on. I am concerned by the situation now. Possibly because my home life is so geographically settled and bound by the rhythms of the rural and Church year, I have always worked away. My work life has been centred on public and international law, almost all in the Government Legal Department. Government lawyers are a committed and able band, and it was an honour to oversee their work as Attorney-General. As a family, we enjoy learning languages, and our eldest daughter was doing just that in Ukraine before the full-scale invasion. Luckily, we got her home. We also brought over a young woman from Kherson, who came to live with us and is now a much-loved part of our family. After the election last summer, I knew that I wanted to continue the work I had been doing in government to support Ukraine, so I have been training Ukraine’s lawyers in the law relating to war crimes. The Ukrainians have over 170,000 open files of crimes alleged to have been committed by Russian soldiers. That they are carrying out these prosecutions during an active war is unprecedented, as is the enthusiasm with which they have taken steps to ensure fairness in proceedings. I have in fact spent over half my time training those who are conducting the defence of the Russian soldiers. They are spinning what they describe as a web of accountability with thought and precision, and I will of course continue to help where I can. They want our help. They see us in the UK for what we are: historical leaders in the field of international law and lucky, far more than we realise, to have judges we can trust. They value our dedication to proper process and individual rights, and so should we. International law should not be seen as a threat to our national interest. In fact, particularly in the environmental space, it regulates the interactions between nations pretty well. Of course we must abide by whatever rules we have agreed to adhere to, but, if we really feel that our national interest is not being served, we are free to walk away. These decisions should be seen as what they are: fundamentally political rather than legal. Although domestic law changes and evolves over time, treaty law is rather different. Treaties must be precise and clear if they are to be useful. If the Government wish to persuade this House that this treaty represents a good deal for the UK, not to mention value for money, we will need greater transparency. We will need to know how and why the figures were arrived at. We will need assurances that the various legal regimes—including an undefined international law, Mauritian environmental law and the termination clause definition of “serious threat” to Mauritian national interests—can all work together. We will need to know how all this is to be enforced. We will need assurances that the Chagossians are to be consulted about their future. We will need to be sure that the precious marine protection area is cared for in the longer term. Most importantly, we need to be certain, in an ever more dangerous world, that the base can continue to be used for its primary purpose, which is, of course, to keep us safe. I am very grateful for noble Lords indulgence for the piece of family history playing out before them. I am thrilled to be here.

16:27:00

My Lords, I am delighted to participate in this debate and thus to play my final set. I would like in particular to congratulate my noble kinswoman on the maiden speech she has just delivered for its perception, skill and elegance. For full disclosure, I ought myself to declare to the House that she is my daughter. Although our careers have not always taken the same path—Oxford against Cambridge, for example—we tend to take similar positions, and our relationship casts an interesting and somewhat varied slant on debates to come shortly on qualification by inheritance in this House. I shall not dilate on that further, not least because I am minded of the wisdom of the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, who once remarked that valedictories should be shorter than inaugurals. I say at the beginning of the substance of my speech that I have grown increasingly attracted to the traditions attached to this House and Parliament in general. This is not out of antiquarian reverence— although I happen to be a fellow of that learned society—but because they counterbalance short-term political pressures and media activity. My own first political memory was as a very small child meeting Lord Addison, who served on an agricultural board with my father, had been a Cabinet Minister in the First World War and led this House during the post-1945 Government. Later, as a schoolboy, I went to the Gallery of another place, and I was privileged to spot Churchill, then in his last term, at about my current age, take his seat and listen in. More widely, I am a child of the television age, as my family were very early adopters, and I remember highlights of the London Olympics of 1948. The post-war decade was also identified with the development of nuclear weapons, and I took a rather precocious interest in civil defence and emergency planning. Our wartime generation grew up during the long withdrawal from empire, of which a remaining fragment is the subject of today’s debate. Our record as a nation in this process over the last 80 years, while wholesome, has not been wholly blameless, and it is right to be as rigorous and transparent as we can in analysing it. I want now to thank all those professionals who have guided me on my way, including, initially, the civil servants who were colleagues of mine when I was approached on the farm by my noble friend Lord Jopling and drafted in—as, I hope, a respectable spad—to help invent the system of milk quotas, and then other officials who served me when I went on into ministerial posts. In particular, in relation to parliamentary staff, I single out those involved with the Committee Office here. As has been mentioned, I found myself chairing the European Union Committee for a seven-year stretch, nearly bisected by the Brexit referendum. Here, I was greatly assisted not merely by the staff but, of course, by the expertise and collegiality of my colleagues from all parts of the House. Now it is fashionable to follow conspiracy theories and to assume that whoever politicians have in their sights at the moment are to blame for our current ills, when the reality is that we are wrestling, as a nation, with the pressures of demography at the expense of growth. More widely, we should reflect on the perils of political “othering” and the wilful selection of enemies, whether it is on a class, regional, ethnic or demographic basis, because I still think that we have to work through disagreements together, as one nation. We should also be aware that constant pressure to regulate more may reflect indirectly the lost agency we have ourselves to some extent wilfully surrendered. Whatever we can do to empower local initiatives, interests and communities behind issues facing us as a nation, and a world, should be actively considered. I conclude with two final points. The first springs from my term of service to the European committee. I recognise that there is little inclination to rerun Brexit, but I welcome efforts being made to re-establish closer relations. Our committee broke much fresh ground after the vote in drawing attention to outstanding problems, not merely on the trade side but also involving constitutional matters, including the problem of the Irish land border, the status of the Crown dependencies and, of course, the British Overseas Territories. Now, almost five years since the implementation of the withdrawal agreement, I notice that mutual residence issues, to mention one, are about to recur. To judge by the experience of Switzerland, closer association with the EU will involve virtually continuous renegotiation. I add here that it is important to maintain an emphasis on the teaching of modern foreign languages, not confined to Europe. To be in a negotiating room, of which I have a little experience, or equally or more importantly, in the margins of that negotiating room, and to drop the occasional well-judged phrase into the mix engenders a certain empathy or at least wary respect. To be completely au fait, as our diplomats are, is of course very consequential. I also think that we should sometimes lift our horizon from bare texts and competence to wider issues and passions worldwide. To mention two sports in which I have always taken an interest, Formula 1 and the Premiership have a wide popular domestic and international appeal, and as a nation we are rather good at them. In conclusion, I will say a word about the rule of law. I defer to my noble kinswoman’s expertise in this area, and that of other noble Lords. We should not allow this debate to become polarised or a proxy for other political debates. We need to get stuck in to achieve negotiated improvements when circumstances change, and we need to make use of the margin of appreciation when we must. We need to put more attention—as a legislature and as government—on the subject. However, there are continuing merits in the rules-based international order, because those who break the rules—or merely threaten to do so—may one day find that they have suddenly excluded themselves from the order which underpins their growth and continuing prosperity.

16:36:00

My Lords, I have been here quite a long time, but it is a first for me to find myself following both a maiden speech and a valedictory speech by father and daughter. If I were to do justice to the two speeches, I would use up most of the time allocated for me to talk about the Chagos Islands. It is very easy to say that the contribution from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, was easy on the ear—which is not always the case with lawyers. It was fluent and persuasive. It is easy to say to her, as I do, that we look forward to further contributions from her. As far as the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, is concerned, again, it is very easy to pay tribute to his long career here. We have overlapped from time to time. In both Houses and on both sides of both Houses, he has been highly respected: he is modest, understated, thorough and fluent. He has a political career of which he can be proud, and while we will miss him not being there, my word, he has earned his retirement. Now, to the Chagos Islands. The central proposition in today’s debate—namely, that sovereignty of the Chagos Islands should be transferred from the UK to Mauritius—is one that I strongly support. It should have been done years ago, back in the 1960s, when no fewer than 11 countries in Africa achieved their independence. It is strange that the remarks by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, sounded as though we were doing people a favour by giving them their independence, as though we were still good old Britain ruling the waves. Each year of delay in the transfer of sovereignty has made the problem of the Chagos Islands and the base ever more complex and I congratulate the Government on finally dealing with the challenge. I particularly welcome the fact that the treaty in its preamble acknowledges the importance of “Recognising the wrongs of the past”. It goes on to say that we should be “Conscious that past treatment of Chagossians has left a deeply regrettable legacy”. In these few words there is contained a lot of human misery and, frankly, a shameful episode in British colonial history. I therefore make no apology for spending some moments reminding the House of the extent of the injustice that was perpetrated on the Chagossians and which is now acknowledged in the treaty. The context, as ever, is important. The 1960s were a period when the dangers of the Cold War were probably at their most acute—it was, after all, the decade of the Cuban missile crisis. So it is perhaps not surprising that, in 1966, the UK and the US signed an agreement to develop a base on the strategically valuable island of Diego Garcia. What happened next is barely believable. In short, the native Chagossians were expelled from their own country, never to return. The cruelty—there is no other word for it—began in 1967, when a number of Chagossians, who had left their island temporarily for holidays or medical treatment, were simply barred from returning home. By 1973, all 1,700 of them had been expelled and relocated. This was a profound injustice perpetrated by a British Government, not on some date back in the mists of time but in the lifetime of many of us here today. Although I am happy with what is in the treaty, I am sorry that it does not do more to right the wrongs of the past. The failure to do this is laid out clearly in Article 6, which says: “In the exercise of its sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, Mauritius is free to implement a programme of resettlement on the islands … other than Diego Garcia”. The message of Article 6 to the ousted people and their descendants who lived on Diego Garcia is this: you can go back to any of the islands but you cannot go back for a 100 years at least to the island from which you were so brutally expelled. While we all understand the importance of the base to our military and defence, can the Minister say if there is really no way at all for, say, a number of Chagossians who might wish to be employed on Diego Garcia to be allowed back to live there? I know it is not a perfect solution, but at least it would be a step in the right direction. It is a question I asked the Minister, my honourable friend Stephen Doughty, during the committee meeting two weeks ago. He said in reply: “It is a question I have often been asked, but it is impossible for that to take place on Diego Garcia operationally. It is not suitable or appropriate”. To say that a course of action is “not suitable or appropriate” is pretty thin gruel by way of answer to a question. I know, of course, that there are many good reasons for Ministers to be circumspect when it comes to matters of national security, but when my noble friend on the Front Bench replies, can he provide more information about why the base is not suitable or appropriate? Is it really not possible to provide some accommodation on part of Diego Garcia to enable those Chagossians—probably a small number—who wish to return home, perhaps to access civilian employment on the base, to do so? If we are told that it is not suitable for security reasons for civilians to live close to a sensitive military installation, the answer is surely that it happens in Britain and in many parts of the world—all over the world, in fact—that civilians and the military live in close proximity, to their mutual advantage and with no problems whatever. I welcome that the issue of sovereignty is at last being addressed, but it is surely possible for more to be done to go some way towards compensating for the injustices of the past in the way that I have suggested, much of which is contained in a long letter to the Foreign Secretary from the International Relations and Defence Committee. At the very least, given that we will be involved with these islands for at least 99 more years, I hope that a continuous dialogue can take place with the Chagossians, for their benefit and for ours.

16:43:00

My Lords, I add my formal warm welcome to my noble and learned friend Lady Prentis and congratulate her on an excellent maiden speech. The poignancy of the moment was made even greater by the speech of my noble friend Lord Boswell, who we shall miss not only for his contributions to your Lordships’ House but, on a personal note, for the valuable advice and insights he provided to me when I joined in 2011, which seems like a long time ago now. I note the concerns outlined by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in his speech—I have been before him as a Minister in the committee, and I know the scrutiny that the committee provides under quite challenging timescales—and those of my noble and learned friend Lady Prentis, about the need for added scrutiny and transparency around this treaty. I want to focus on my own insights and experiences, not just as the OTs Minister—I served in that capacity for only two years—but as, at times, the troubleshooter for successive Governments and Prime Ministers in meeting with key Prime Ministers. Prime Minister Jugnauth of Mauritius was one such individual, and I will come on to that in a moment. I want to touch on the legal context briefly. The ICJ advisory opinion of February 2019 was not binding. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that I for one read the opinion; I spent a whole weekend and a half—and more—poring over the detail. I was there at the General Assembly in New York when that vote was taken. It was not pleasant seeing the votes as they were totted up, but, again, the General Assembly vote was not binding. Finally, the ITLOS decision between Mauritius and the Maldives equally was not binding on the UK. Indeed, Article 296 of the UNCLOS treaty itself confirms this to be the case. We have heard repeatedly that this deal was necessary at times to avert binding legal action. Therefore, in the light of the context I have provided, can the Minister tell me what court Mauritius would have gone to if the UK had not agreed this deal? Furthermore, could the Minister confirm that any non-compliance within the courts related to the United Nations or to the implementation of international treaties under a tribunal would ultimately—as is my understanding—go before the UN Security Council? In that instance, the UK would retain a veto option. As such, as my noble friend Lady Goldie stated, this is a “political decision”, a view shared by the Lords International Relations and Defence Committee. Turning to security guarantees, I remember my last meeting with Prime Minister Jugnauth, the former Prime Minister of Mauritius. The final line I asked him was whether he could provide the security assurances that I need. I refer to them now. What specific obligations have been assured on preventing Mauritius taking forward a separate agreement with a third country on the outer islands, or indeed installations beyond the agreed exclusion waters? Will this be seen as a breach of the treaty? Secondly, on the issue of renewal, the treaty seems to lack a mechanism or procedure for the extension of 40 years. What specific provisions in the treaty provide the guarantee of a continued lease? Turning to the agreement, paragraph 1 in annex 1 refers to “unrestricted access” for the UK and US in relation to Diego Garcia, including flights and maritime. We welcome this, but it also states that Mauritius must be notified if third country access is required. Paragraph 1(b)(viii) reads: “Unrestricted ability to … permit access … for non-United Kingdom and non-United States aircraft and vessels, upon”— that is a crucial word— “notification to Mauritius”. What about our obligations to our NATO partners or planned joint exercises with our key Five Eyes partners—for example, Australia? The words “upon notification” suggest—to me certainly—that this means in advance. Surely this needs the Government, in Lords language, to think again. Beyond Diego Garcia, paragraph 3(a) in annex 1, on undersea or overflight access, says that that requires notification to Mauritius. Again, is this before or after the event? This requirement for notification, also in paragraph 3(b), applies to new locations or upgrades to equipment. Again, how does this satisfy security issues for the UK? I get what the Government are doing. I assure the Minister, as I have assured the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that when discussions took place with previous Governments, they were done in good faith but without prejudice. We wanted to ensure the long-term security of our interests, and I know the Government have that in mind. However, it is important that we not only have this debate but that some of the questions I have asked, and that other noble Lords will ask subsequently, are answered. We owe it to the Chagossian people and to our interests, not just in the Indian Ocean but in the world as a whole. Security matters, and we must put security first.

16:48:00

My Lords, I join with others in the very best wishes to what might be called the Boswell team. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, has shown by her speech that she has a thoroughly professional mind and training, which will bring great value to our counsels, and we are very lucky to have her here. I have known the noble Lord, Lord Boswell—I call him Tim Boswell—for years in and out of government. I always found that he was a rock of common sense, particularly in the Brexit quagmire, where a great deal of nonsense is talked. I shall be sad that he is going. All I say to him is that I hope he enjoys retirement and does not spend time trying—dare I say it—to write a Life of Samuel Johnson.

Oh!

I am glad that some noble Lords got the joke. I will use my four and a half minutes to discuss the security aspects of the whole project, which are by far the most important in the present state of the world. The position of the Chagos Islanders has been strongly debated and is covered in our very thorough International Agreements Committee report, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, so excellently chaired and introduced today. I had the honour of being on that committee, like the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. I am sorry that, for legal reasons that I do not fully understand, the Chagossians have had—once again—virtually no say in their future. I understand that the last place into which many of them want to be subsumed is Mauritius, which is 2,200 kilometres away. An association or tie-up with Australia was much preferred by some, but it is too late for a more imaginative solution; that was not put on the table at all. On security, in this very dangerous time the issue comes down, in hard terms, to leasehold or freehold. Are we safer hanging on to the freehold, which will be constantly challenged by various courts of various qualities around the world, with the prospect of continuous rulings against us? Or are we better off with a long lease, which in theory should be safe but can of course be abrogated or have new conditions applied or other changes made to it? Look at what happened in the case of Hong Kong—we should never forget that. That does not even put the whole question in balance, because with the lease option comes the most enormous bill. I would like the Minister to explain just what that bill is. The Explanatory Memorandum talks about £3.5 billion in today’s money through the so-called Green Book methodology. When my noble friend Lord Callanan rightly and robustly questioned these issues, he mentioned £30 billion—so one side is almost 10 times the size of the other. I have never known a debate like this before; I have been in these two Houses for 59 years, and I have never heard such a cavalier approach by a Government to cost. It is essential that, if they are to ask for approval of any kind from this House or any other body, Ministers make clear just what the monetary implications are. The sums are vast—think what we could do with them here at home. No doubt, Mauritius will make good use of these colossal sums of money; perhaps it might even lend us some back, as we need it. This certainly needs clarifying; we cannot stand in the complicated situation into which we have now been put. The immediate security considerations are much clearer and more pressing. The immediate area we are discussing is either side of the 52nd meridian line, which roughly bisects the Indian Ocean and is teeming with activity by hostile powers—the so-called counteraligned nations, notably China. Most of our sea-borne trade, and 80% of all world sea-borne trade, has to cross that meridian line. The Chagos Archipelago is just about plumb in the middle of it. China is building ports all around, such as currently in Kenya. Chinese closeness to Mauritius is a fact, not an exaggeration, as one witness to our committee implied. Disruption of sea trade would be devastating for all of Europe but especially for us; it has been christened as Europe’s nightmare. Remember that the Red Sea and its mouth at Bab el-Mandeb are virtually closed already, and shutting the mouth of the Persian Gulf at the Strait of Hormuz is also on the table. Benjamin Disraeli and other great statesmen of the past must be turning in their graves. This is all the more urgent when land routes are blocked and overflight western air routes to Asia are already shut off. Yet Asia is where all the growth comes from and where we must be. The Government seem set on this change of status at what has become the cross-routes of the world. Let us pray and hope that it proves worth it and makes us stronger, not weaker, in the storms ahead.

16:54:00

My Lords, I echo the words of those who have said, and will no doubt go on to say, what a pleasure it was to be in the Chamber to bear witness to a most delightful maiden speech and an equally thoughtful valedictory one. The treaty relating to the Chagos Islands and the potential transfer of the sovereignty of those islands to Mauritius has received much parliamentary scrutiny in committees over the past three months. That scrutiny has thrown up multiple issues that many people are justifiably passionate about—the plight of the Chagossians, the protection of the marine environment, and concern about a superficially bizarre treaty that will cost us a lot of money to surrender the benefits of sovereignty. My principal interest, however, is the one that I deem the overridingly important one: the role that Diego Garcia plays in our strategic relationship with the United States of America. On a personal level, I am very familiar with the UK base on Diego Garcia. It was part of my overseas command responsibilities when I was Chief of Joint Operations. I have visited the base and know from my time as Chief of the Defence Staff the critical role it plays in exercising UK sovereignty and therefore justifying the UK’s position as part of the legal chain that authorises the forward deployed forces of the United States the freedoms they need to prosecute offensive operations. It is not an overstatement to say that our role as the sovereign power enabling the United States the freedoms it needs to use the base in accordance with international humanitarian law represents an enormous contribution to the defence element of the special relationship. My primary concern, therefore, is to help ensure that the treaty, if ratified, represents the best way of preserving those freedoms. Superficially, I am reassured. After all, the treaty has been subject to detailed scrutiny by both the UK and US Governments and enjoys the support of our Five Eyes partners and many other interested parties—yet I have some lingering doubts that I at least want to place on the record. My doubts emanate from two concerns that relate to the relatively, though not entirely, novel forms of warfare. One is political warfare and the other is a form of legal warfare that most now simply refer to as lawfare. Political warfare is best described as non-military efforts to coerce or intimidate a country or an individual into actions that benefit the perpetrator. The form of political warfare I envisage as relevant to this treaty are actions by a hostile power to coerce or intimidate key individuals in the international criminal justice system or individuals in key positions in relevant Governments. Lawfare refers to the strategic use of legal proceedings to achieve a political or military objective, effectively using the law as a weapon. A number of witnesses to the International Relations and Defence Committee proffered the view that the need to enter into this treaty in the first place was primarily prompted by successful lawfare, which culminated in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that has been referred to already. My worry therefore emanates from the concern that this treaty might, in the relatively near future, fall foul of future political and legal warfare acting in concert. In this context, I have two principal concerns. The first relates to the worry that the transfer of sovereignty of Diego Garcia to Mauritius will bring it under the provisions of the African nuclear weapons-free zone treaty, designed to keep the area free of nuclear-powered or armed submarines. Currently, Diego Garcia sits outside the treaty provisions, but is there not a significant danger that this exemption will come under legal scrutiny and challenge as soon as this treaty is ratified? My second concern is perhaps more substantive. It relates to the issue of sovereign responsibility. To me, the treaty as currently drafted masks an incompatibility. It clearly states that on treaty ratification the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands passes to Mauritius. But it also implies that the administrative authority to agree the United States the freedom to operate the Diego Garcia base for military operations is retained by the United Kingdom. My concern here, although I am not a lawyer, is that a country cannot abrogate, alienate or transfer its sovereign responsibilities under international humanitarian law. So, will not the prosecutors of lawfare simply start to exploit the view that international humanitarian law negates a bilateral agreement and that the UK is no longer the relevant administrative authority when it comes to agreeing military action by our principal ally? I sincerely hope that my concerns are either ill-judged or misplaced, but I would like the Minister to reassure the House that these concerns have been fully considered. A final and completely unrelated concern, which my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig separately thought should be raised, although the risk may be small, is potentially the greatest existential threat to the Diego Garcia base, and it is not from hostile activity but from rising seawater, tsunamis or earthquake. The airfield at the base is barely a metre above sea level. Does the treaty allow for early termination in the event that natural causes render the base inoperable? A hundred years is a long time to be paying for something that cannot be used. The Minister’s assurance on this would be welcome.

17:01:00

My Lords, I was sorry to hear the valedictory speech of my noble friend the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, magnificent though it was. I had the privilege of serving with him in the Commons for all his 23 years there and as Chief Whip, and he was the careful, thoughtful, intellectual and caring politician then that we have all seen in this House since 2010. But what a unique day—a valedictory speech from dad but the Boswell lineage continues in this House with a superb maiden speech from one of his daughters, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury. I did not know her in the Commons, but I knew of her excellent legal qualifications and her time as Attorney-General, and her fight for our hard-pressed farmers. Also, of incredible importance to me, she had the common sense to oppose HS2, and she and others will be proved right as this shambles continues to stagger out of control. I look forward to hearing more of her contributions in this House. This is an appalling deal: an agreement that sells out the United Kingdom, the Chagossians and our wonderful marine protected areas, and we are paying a fortune to a country with no legitimate or legal interest in it. The Government say that they had to do a deal with Mauritius, since the UK would soon have been forced to surrender the Chagos Islands to Mauritius, if the International Court of Justice ruled against us in a binding agreement. But that is simply not the case. Mauritius cannot secure a judgment establishing that it is sovereign over the Chagos Islands: the UK is not required to consent to its dispute with Mauritius being adjudicated. The International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the sovereignty dispute between the UK and Mauritius and its 2019 advisory opinion did not establish that Mauritius was sovereign. The Government fear that the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, which has no jurisdiction in questions of sovereignty over territory, will “presuppose” or “assume” that the 2019 advisory opinion has settled that Mauritius is sovereign rather than the UK. It is typical of the FCO to anticipate and plan for failure. The framing of Article 1 is incompatible with the position in UK law, which is that the UK has been sovereign over the Chagos Islands since 1814, including from 1965. Yes, the last Government were negotiating with Mauritius, but we did 11 rounds without agreement, and I am certain that, if we were still in government, we would do another 11 rounds and still not sign off on this appalling deal. We all know how this comes about with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: it has a long history of selling out our overseas assets. It gave up Aden and South Yemen in 1967, where the Houthis are now in charge. In 1980, the FCO was secretly negotiating to give the Falkland Islands to Argentina, which led directly to the Falklands War. In 2001, the FCO had secret talks with Spain over the sovereignty of Gibraltar, until Gibraltar stopped it with a referendum in 2002 in which 99% of the population voted to remain British. What will be next? When will we give up Cyprus, like we gave up Malta in 1979? Why did the Foreign Secretary do it? I can hear the Sir Humphrey of the Foreign Office saying, “Foreign Secretary, the last Government were endlessly negotiating, but failed to close a deal. This is a great opportunity for you. The International Court of Justice is bound to demand that we hand them over, so we can avoid being in default by doing a deal now. Of course, we will have to make a small payment in order to keep Diego Garcia. That will be a small price to pay for pulling off a remarkable foreign policy achievement”. I can imagine that being said, and, in 30 years’ time, we will no doubt get the record to prove it. With a brand new Foreign Secretary, it was easy for FCDO officials to con him into selling out the Chagos Islands. I bet they did not explain to him that we have to tell Mauritius at any time that the US wants to undertake a combat mission from Diego Garcia. Unlike most of my noble friends, I am not worried about the security situation, because the United States will certainly never tell us well in advance if it is going to use Diego Garcia for any foreign operation. It gave us one hour’s warning about bombing Iran because it simply does not trust us, and it will certainly not trust us in any operations from Diego Garcia, because it knows that the islands’ Chinese friends will be told within seconds. Nor did the Foreign Secretary’s advisers tell him that the Chagos Islands’ marine protected area of 640,000 square kilometres, one of the largest in the world, is rich in vulnerable species, with 66,000 square kilometres of the finest coral reefs in the world. Under British control, there is a complete ban on all fishing, but we know that, as soon as the Chinese fishing fleets get in there, which they will, they will be stripped bare within five to 10 years, because that is what the Chinese do with every fishing ground: they invade and destroy. In conclusion, we are paying Mauritius billions to jeopardise our security and destroy one of the finest marine protected areas in the world: a brilliant Foreign Office deal, the best sell-out yet.

17:06:00

My Lords, first, I join everybody else in congratulating both the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, and her kinsman—or father, whichever term she would rather have—on their speeches, because I think it is a great occasion. We shall miss the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, for whom I have even spoken, and he still spoke to me after I had spoken for him at his constituency. I should say that I find this issue very depressing. We are seeing our country and our country’s interests being undermined by human rights lawyers. Obviously, we have the Prime Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, and Philippe Sands. I think—somebody will correct me if I am wrong—they all served in the same Chambers at the Bar. I must say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for whom I have a very high regard—he was a very good chairman of the committee when I was on it—that to use Philippe Sands as an interviewee is slightly strange, since he was a paid counsel of the Mauritian Government. I think that is right—noble Lords can correct me if I am wrong—so it seems to me that he is slightly party pris. We heard from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, about lawfare, and I think that this really is lawfare. I will quote Sir Christopher Greenwood, who I do not know at all. He said, according to the International Agreements Committee report, that the consequence of not ratifying the agreement is that “it completely undermines our position that we are a state that wishes to promote the rule of law in international affairs”. I am sure that Christopher Greenwood is a quite excellent lawyer, but he had, of course, been with the court for a dozen years or so, which does sometimes make you slightly think in a particular way. Any court—the International Court of Justice is one—is actually the servant of the members of the court. I think I am right in saying that, of the 15 members, one was Somali, one was Russian and one was Chinese. Somebody can correct me if that is wrong. I shall also share a quote, because I think it is rather important, about the security of the UK, which we heard about from my noble friend Lord Howell at some stage. Last week, we had the delayed report of the national security strategy issued by this Government. I think it was the Foreign Secretary who said that we want to make the UK “a harder target for our enemies.” He also said that we have to have “clear-eyed view of how we engage with major powers such as China in order to protect our national security and promote our economic interests”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/6/25; col. 975.] If anybody is under any illusions about this, the report states: “Instances of China’s espionage, interference in our democracy and the undermining of our economic security have increased in recent years. Our national security response will therefore continue to be threat-driven”. I do not consider China an enemy, but it is certainly not an ally. We have to be open-eyed about this. For instance, we might consider the treaty that we had with China over Hong Kong and how well it has stuck to the details of that. We heard the most extraordinary attack on the Conservative Government by the spokesman for the Liberal Democrats. I was sitting next to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, not a moment ago; I quoted to him what the spokesman said, and he said that that was absolutely not the case. Let us not just tick through the details; let us talk to people such as the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, who were there.

I refer the noble Lord back to Hansard for the Statement from James Cleverly, and I am afraid that he should withdraw his comment that I was incorrect. I quoted the Written Ministerial Statement from the Foreign Secretary.

I heard the noble Lord; earlier, we heard the noble Lords, Lord Ahmad and Lord Cameron, say entirely different things. On the marine protected area, environmental matters are extremely important to the whole world. Can the Minister tell us in summing up how Mauritius will protect the reefs? We do not have enough boats to do it, and what boats does it have? Finally, on the treaty, I have mentioned the treaty on Hong Kong. How about international law in the case of the Budapest memorandum, where Russia agreed to respect the treaties with Ukraine? Treaties are marvellous, but not always held to by the people who sign them.

17:11:00

My Lords, I apologise for not rising to speak in the right place on the list. Diego Garcia is exceptionally important to western security and the UK, and the US are right to want to continue to have access to it, but the importance of that base rests on the ability of those Governments to operate without hindrance. Sovereignty becomes important if the parties to the agreement fail to agree on its implementation. That is where real-world worries arise. I will devote a moment or two to how the agreement is likely to pan out. Other noble Lords have commented that the agreement has many shortcomings—so many that it is hard to see that the implementation will be smooth. There are areas where there is insufficient detail and areas where there will clearly be disagreement. Already, the Mauritian Government show signs of going back on some of the central provisions, such as the rent to be paid and the basic purpose of the marine protected area. One begins to ask whether we have a good-faith partner. I wonder. Others have remarked on the shameful treatment of the British Chagossians. That is a whole separate area of problems where something better can still be done. The most worrying provisions of the agreement are those that impinge on the operation of the base. The opening is given by the agreement to the Mauritian Government entering into dispute over or interfering with decisions on things such as the equipment to be based there. Frankly, it is naive to think that an obligation to inform the Mauritian Government about certain operations, whether before or after the event—that is not the issue, although before the event would be extraordinary—does not affect the security of those operations. It is quite obvious that that increases the level of insecurity. The Government say that the Americans support the deal. I wonder whether they have decided that it is not worth arguing at this stage. It is not clear to me that this agreement—I do not mean any agreement; I am talking about this agreement—puts us in a good position for the long term. I wonder whether, as technology and international politics move on, we may find that, far from being an important part of our general armoury, Diego Garcia becomes a very expensive white elephant.

17:15:00

My Lords, at times this afternoon, I was beginning to think that I had turned into my namesake, Alice Liddell, walking through the looking glass. The speech that began this debate was from a noble Lord who had been a Minister in the previous Government. His attempts to knock back everything that had been achieved were quite remarkable. I take this opportunity to compliment the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, and the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, on their historic speeches, one entering the House and the other leaving it. I will miss the noble Lord, Lord Boswell. He kept me out of trouble when I first became a Member of this House by keeping me on the straight and narrow in the Truro Room of the Library. I did not focus much on Diego Garcia until I joined the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I had to be brought up to speed very quickly on how critically important that involvement in Diego Garcia was as we looked forward to the challenges and problems that may lie ahead. I went to Australia, and the Australians certainly understood the critical nature of the base and how important it had become. It had always been important for the countries of the southern hemisphere, but it was important to many other countries as well. That US-UK amalgamation on the island has brought great benefits to the security of this country, because the operation there is unique and gives extra clout whenever there are challenges to our peace. Our allies, not just the Five Eyes communities of the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand—along with ourselves—but India, Japan and South Korea, strongly support the deal. The former Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd, now the Australian ambassador to Washington and an expert on China, has said that this is a good outcome for Mauritius, for Australia, for the UK and for our collective security interests. India called the agreement on Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, “a milestone achievement and a positive development for the region”. Had there been any further delay after the 11 meetings that the previous Government had, we could have lost this critical asset. Patience was wearing thin in Mauritius. It took just two further meetings to resolve the issue, and if the Mauritians had finally lost patience, we could have lost this vital asset. We got a conclusion that was positively welcomed by Gibraltar, which has similar concerns about its future role. That is a very important way of summing it up. The Chief Minister said: “I am very clear that there is no aspect of this decision, the Advisory Opinion or the Treaty … which has any negative read across to Gibraltar” I take very much on board the criticism there has been of how the Chagossians have been treated. It is a very good idea of the Government’s to finance a new trust fund for Mauritius to use in support of the Chagossian community, even down to supporting visits by Chagossians to the archipelago, including Diego Garcia. It is sensible, and it is caring. We cannot redo what happened in the past, but we can express our understanding of the pain and suffering that many Chagossians went through. The Government want to build a positive relationship with the Chagossian community, built on respect and an acknowledgement of the wrongs of the past. The Mauritian PM has also reconfirmed his commitment to supporting the creation of a marine protected area around the archipelago—that is quite a commitment. Diego Garcia is not like the Isle of Man, close to the coast of the UK; it is 1,250 miles from Mauritius, so it is good that we have that commitment. Had we not moved when we did—and this was mentioned by some of our distinguished legal colleagues—courts were already making decisions that could have undermined our goals, and we could have faced legally binding provisions affecting the waters around Diego Garcia, much to the delight of our enemies. The unique capabilities we have built on Diego Garcia could have been lost, and we would have had no way of preventing potential enemies setting up installations on nearby islands or carrying out joint exercises. That is one of the key things that have come out of this arrangement, and I commend it to the House.

17:21:00

My Lords, the most damaging blow to any country’s international reputation is a justified charge of hypocrisy. The United Kingdom stands for the rule of law in all circumstances. We lose credibility when we seek exceptions to this principle for ourselves. Opponents of the Chagos agreement claim that the International Court of Justice has no jurisdiction, so the UK can safely ignore its rulings. They point out that, in February 2019, the ICJ handed down merely an advisory opinion. However, although we might choose to ignore it, other bodies of the United Nations cannot: they are bound by it. We have already seen that with the ITLOS judgment of 2021. As we weigh the merits of the agreement, we need also to take account of the history of the archipelago, which came to the UK with the rest of the colony of Mauritius in the Treaty of Paris 1814. Although Mauritius and Chagos are about 2,000 miles apart, the historic link is strong, perpetuated by the UK as colonial power. Administratively, it suited our predecessors to treat all British possessions in the Indian Ocean as one colony. At the start of the era of decolonisation, the UN set out the rules of the road. In December 1960, the General Assembly decided that the colonial power could not break up a colony as it was leaving. We ignored that ruling when we decided in 1965 that Chagos would be detached from the rest of Mauritius at independence, which happened in 1968. Over the next five decades, we did all we could to avoid a case going to the ICJ, but we lost the key vote in the General Assembly in 2017 by 94 votes to 15. Once we were in the arbitration, we could not, in my view, ignore the outcome. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that trying to invoke protections we had written into the rules decades before persuaded nobody but ourselves. Opponents dislike the expense of the deal; well, we are paying the going rate as a tenant for a base in the wider Indian Ocean—somewhat more than the French in Djibouti, but we are getting more for more. Diego Garcia is the best defensive real estate in the whole Indian Ocean. Even though £101 million per year is a lot, it is a lot less than the Americans pay to run the base. It is a joint base, and we are paying our way in the joint effort. Next, opponents claim that the agreement boosts China’s presence in the Indian Ocean. The reverse is true: Mauritius is one of only two of the 55 members of the African Union not to be part of China’s belt and road initiative. While 3% of Mauritius’s population is ethnically Chinese, 67% is ethnically Indian. Our partner in Delhi looms much larger in Mauritian calculations than our challenger in Beijing. Opponents and supporters agree on one thing: more needs to be done to alleviate the plight of the Chagossians. Over generations, they have been treated monstrously: forcibly transplanted to the archipelago to tend copra plantations, mostly in the 20th century, then forcibly removed in the 1960s and 1970s to make way for the base. We must make amends. The agreement goes partway to doing that and, for the first time, it allows Mauritius to resettle the outer islands. Confronted with a charge of double standards, some opponents of this agreement shrug their shoulders; they think that they can get away with it and tough it out, but that is what the powerful and unprincipled do. That is what Russia does. Neither the Biden nor Trump Administrations endorsed such a cavalier approach. In effect, they both told us that we had a problem and asked us to solve it. This agreement does precisely that. It gives the UK and our American allies a secure presence in the archipelago for the next 140 years. It enhances our security and restores our reputation as a country that respects international law, even when it is inconvenient and costly. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, chair of my committee, the International Agreements Committee: the agreement deserves the support of your Lordships’ House.

17:26:00

My Lords, the speakers’ list appears to be almost as fictional as the agreement that we are discussing, so your Lordships will forgive me for jumping up earlier. The international court’s advisory opinion is clearly based on its conclusion that the sovereignty of Mauritius and the Chagos Islands is indivisible; hence they must now be returned to Mauritius. The noble Lord, Lord McDonald, just gave us a little history on that. But my reading of it is slightly different: the Chagos Islands were never part of Mauritius, although they were jointly administered from Mauritius and, in part, directly from London from when they came under British control in 1814 to 1965. However, joint administration is not the same thing as collective sovereignty. While no two examples are ever the same, there are some other similar examples. The Turks and Caicos Islands were annexed to Jamaica in 1873 and administered as a Jamaican dependency until 1962, when Jamaica was granted independence, at which point the Turks and Caicos became a Crown colony administered from the Bahamas, in exactly the same way that the Chagos Islands were administered from Mauritius. When the Bahamas gained independence in 1973, no one suggested that the Turks and Caicos were part of Jamaica or the Bahamas, and they remained a Crown colony until they attained full independence. The Cayman Islands have a similar history. They were uninhabited until occupied by Europeans and they came under British control from 1670. They were administered as a Crown colony of Jamaica until Jamaican independence in 1962, when they became a separate Crown colony. At no point did either Jamaica or anybody else attempt to argue that either the Turks and Caicos or the Cayman Islands were part of Jamaica. Whatever the International Court of Justice may say, it is very difficult not to conclude that its opinion is based on a misunderstanding of the facts. Mauritius has never had sovereignty over the Chagos Islands; while they may have been jointly administered, they have always been completely separate entities. That the Chagos Islands are of great strategic importance to the United Kingdom and, to an even greater extent, to the United States, is agreed by all parties. They are clearly valued; beautiful and environmentally valuable though they undoubtedly are, they have little or no economic value. It is therefore as a base from which to conduct naval and air operations, and as a communication hub, that they must be valued. For some pretty uninhabitable islands in the middle of the Indian Ocean, they do seem to be quite valuable. The ICJ’s opinion is that the UK should return them to Mauritius—although, as I said, Mauritius has never actually owned them—but it says nothing about the UK giving Mauritius eye-watering sums of money. Of course, in return for giving eye-watering sums of money, we are buying a lease. Much has been made of President Trump’s apparent approval of this deal, which is not at all surprising. The UK has bought a very expensive lease, to which the United States does not seem to be contributing, to acquire an airbase largely for American use. It is a great deal for the United States but less so for us. There is, of course, a better way of doing this but, unsurprisingly, this commercially ignorant Government do not seem to have thought of it. The British and Mauritian Governments have agreed that a 99-year lease of Diego Garcia is apparently worth £3.4 billion; everyone else thinks the real figure is £30 billion. As my noble friend Lord Howell said, we need a bit of clarity, because that is an extraordinary stretch of figures. Let us assume that the Government’s figure was reached using Rachel from accounts’ wonky pocket calculator. Either way, it is going to make the black hole inherited by the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, a great deal blacker. Governing, like everything else in life, is always a question of priorities. In this case, the Government have decided that obeying the edicts of an international court and paying a great deal of money to do it is the priority. The Prime Minister and the Attorney-General—both lawyers but of demonstrably poor political judgment—have decided that settling a legal dispute in a far-away court between people of whom we know nothing, takes priority over the interests of the British people, for whom this is not a good deal. They have got their priorities wrong. Surely a better solution is to sell the Chagos Islands to Mauritius for whatever the market deems a fair price for the freehold, which will obviously be rather greater than the leasehold value. If the Americans want their base, let them negotiate a new lease with the Mauritian Government, who will in any case be looking for a big mortgage to fund their freehold purchase. Is President Trump, with his lifetime of expertise in property, not the ideal man to do that deal? Thus, Mauritius will get the Chagos Islands, the international court’s opinion will be adhered to, the Americans will get to keep Diego Garcia, and the British taxpayer will not get fleeced again and may even make a buck or two, which would be a nice change. That way, everyone is a winner.

17:32:00

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lord Mancroft. The issue of the need for and legal underpinning of the Chagos treaty has been the subject of numerous excellent monographs written by a team of authors led by Professor Ekins, professor of law and constitutional government at Oxford, and published by Policy Exchange. My noble friend Lord Robathan referred to the country as having been undermined by human rights lawyers; I can say to my noble friend, “Not all of them”—including, of course, both Professor Ekins and me. It is clear to my mind that the risk of an adverse judgment and the real risk to the operation of the UK-US airfield at Diego Garcia are overplayed by those who favour this treaty. Mauritius cannot as a matter of international law secure a binding judgment before an international tribunal establishing that it is sovereign over the Chagos Islands, because the United Kingdom is not required to consent to this dispute being adjudicated by the International Court of Justice. Accordingly, the Government explain their position by saying that they anticipate that another tribunal, specifically the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which has no jurisdiction over questions of sovereignty over territory, will “presuppose” that the ICJ’s 2019 advisory opinion has settled that Mauritius is sovereign and will thus proceed to exercise its jurisdiction in relation to disputes about the law of the sea on the premise that Mauritius, rather than the UK, is sovereign. But there is not a word about sovereignty over the Chagos Islands in that advisory opinion of the ICJ. Moreover, the elements of the opinion that are adverse to the UK’s administration of the islands are, as advisory, not capable of binding the UK to change its position that it had uninterrupted sovereignty over the archipelago for more than 200 years. Hence, any such presupposition by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea will be erroneous in fact and law. So, the fabled rules-based international order, lauded by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, does not in fact require this treaty in the form that it is put before Parliament. I can greatly shorten my remarks by otherwise adopting the remarks we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I share his concerns regarding the obligations that he has set out. I also share the concerns in respect of the Treaty of Pelindaba, in relation to the positioning of nuclear weapons on African soil, raised by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton. The Government have thus far flippantly dismissed that concern without explaining why. Can the Minister set out in detail why Mauritius will not be in breach of its obligations under that treaty if there are nuclear weapons positioned in the Diego Garcia base? The noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, became very excited and suggested that my noble friend Lord Callanan had tabled a fatal Motion. If only that were so—unfortunately, even if the House is minded to pass my noble friend’s Motion this evening, it would, pursuant to Section 20 of the CRAG Act 2010, merely require the Minister or another Minister of the Crown to make “a statement indicating that the Minister is of the opinion that the treaty should nevertheless be ratified and explaining why”.

The noble Lord is a stickler for accuracy. I quoted Hansard from 3 June when the noble Earl, Lord Minto, said that the Conservatives had tabled a fatal Motion.

It is an interesting point as to whether my noble friend Lord Minto was correct—

Oh!

But the reality is that even if this Motion is passed, it will not, sadly, kill this dreadful treaty. Finally, can the Minister confirm whether it is correct that, as set out in the Explanatory Notes, in accordance with convention, given that this is a treaty to cede territory and following, most recently, the example of the concession of Hong Kong and Hong Kong Island in 1997, he will repeat the assertion expressed in the Explanatory Notes, that ratification of this treaty will await the completion of the passage of the proposed Bill to implement the measures in the treaty?

17:37:00

My Lords, I support the Motion in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith and thank him for his distinguished chairmanship of the committee of which I happen to be a member. I also thank the secretariat to that committee for all the hard work they put into producing this report under very challenging circumstances with regard to time. They are to be congratulated and the whole House owes them a debt of gratitude. The noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, disputes the sovereignty of Mauritius. He is entitled to do that. I happen to disagree with him. But I wonder on what basis he asserts the sovereignty of the United Kingdom other than by force of arms—the same force of arms that is, as we speak, being utilised against the people of Ukraine by Russia. We have to be very careful—

Does the noble Lord agree that our claim to sovereignty stems from the treaty that we agreed in 1814?

A treaty signed under duress. Let us be very clear: these islands are African islands. These islands are inhabited by African people brought there as slaves in the economic interest of Britain and France. So, it ill behoves the noble Lord or any of us to assume a position of moral or ethical superiority when it comes to the Chagos Islands. It must also be said, and I say so with great reluctance, to the noble Lord, Lord Mancroft, for whom I have the utmost respect, that he described the Chagossians as a people about whom we know nothing. They are a people about whom we—

I was not referring to the Chagossians.

I am much obliged to the noble Lord, because we know a great deal about the Chagossians. We know that they have been the victims of abuse and deceit over many years. We know that they have been lied to. We know that they have been consistently mistreated, and, as the committee report makes very clear, we accept that there is some basis in reality that, over many years, the interests of the Chagossians have been subordinated to the national security interests of the United Kingdom and its allies. That is an undisputed fact. I had the pleasure, as we all had, of listening to the valedictory speech of the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, who many of us know. I entered the other place at the same time as he did. His has been a period of service dedicated to the notion of humanity and decency. That is what we all try to uphold in this place, do we not? As we consider this treaty, we have a duty to uphold those values of humanity and decency when it comes to the people of the Chagos Islands. I am bound to say to the Minister, who has done so much for this country and its reputation in Africa and the wider world, that we need a greater degree of certainty that the Chagossians are, in fact, going to be treated better now than they have been in the past, because they have been promised compensation in the past and they have not had it. We want to know that any procedures, any committees, any trust fund established under this treaty will be supervised in a way that ensures that the Chagossians benefit from it because, in the past, others in Mauritius have benefited, but the Chagossians have not. Certainly, the Chagossians in this country and the Seychelles have all too often been left out of consideration altogether. I hope the Minister will give us that assurance. If he does, we can welcome this treaty as an end to a period of colonial rule that has not always done this nation any credit. On the contrary, it has devalued our commitment to humanity and decency, and the people of the Chagos Islands are entitled to some redress for that.

17:43:00

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, and to agree with pretty well everything he said, particularly his last comments about Britain’s historical record and what a stain this is on it. I was astonished that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, spoke about Diego Garcia being under British control for two centuries as though that fact should be a reason to continue to hold the last British colony in Africa. The island slipped more or less accidentally—the duress that the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, referred to was worldwide—into British hands under the Treaty of Paris of 1814, remaining so after the great-great-great-grandfather of the noble Duke, the Duke of Wellington, won the Battle of Waterloo. As a continuous length of historical accident, it takes some beating. There is no reason for Britain to continue to hold land some 9,400 km, as the albatross flies, from London. The age of colonialism is, or at least should be, long over. If Britain is to find a respected place in a newly multilateral world and show respect for the rule of law and the principles of human rights, abandoning claims to sovereignty is a step in the right direction. I am going to focus on two points. Echoing the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, about the brutal and cruel removal of the people of the Chagos Islands and their continuing betrayal by Britain, I stress to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, as I offer Green support for his Motion, that there is no amnesia epidemic on this seat to his right. I am proud that the Green Party has a long tradition of standing up for the Chagossians. A quick search on the internet finds many examples, but I will note just one: Caroline Lucas, formerly my honourable friend in the other place, in 2017 backed an Early Day Motion which demanded “that the Government fulfil its humanitarian and human rights obligations and allow the Chagossians to return home”. This demand needs to be continued. My second focus is environmental. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, said in his comprehensive speech, and as the excellent committee report references, citing an expert academic voice, this is one of the most important reef environments on the planet. We as a human species have done terrible damage to the oceans and seas that cover 72% of the surface. As we discussed in the Oral Question earlier today, with the threat of illegal US deep-sea mining looming, we could be doing even more indefensible damage to essential ecosystems on which our life depends, but of which we know little. One of the things worth saying about this huge area of relatively untouched environment is that it is not just important in its own right but is one of the last places where researchers can study a coral reef system unbroken by human hands. It provides the benchmark, so that when we look at other, damaged places, we can say that that is what it should look like. We cannot afford to lose that. We know that Mauritius has promised to maintain environmental protections—

No it has not.

Well, it has given verbal pledges, but verbal pledges do not stop illegal fishing fleets. They do not override economic pressures that might come in future. This is one of the world’s largest marine zones, twice the size of the UK; we need to stress that point. It is also worth noting that even under UK jurisdiction and with all the existing and potential force associated with Diego Garcia, enforcement has not been foolproof. Trawlers have been caught operating illegally in Chagos waters and have often evaded prosecution. I now come to two direct questions to the Minister. The US military base is a threat in terms of oil spillages, other environmental contamination and the sheer impact of human existence there. Can the Minister comment in any way on how the Government are going to ensure that the continuing base and our continuing place there is not going to do damage? My final question to the Minister is on media access to Diego Garcia. Last year, the BBC’s Alice Cuddy noted in a report of her visit that to enter the island you need a permit granted only to people with connections to the military facility or the British authority that runs the territory. Journalists have historically been barred. The BBC had to push extremely hard to get into Diego Garcia for one special case. What is the intended future policy of openness and transparency?

17:48:00

I thank the Minister for listening so carefully and attentively to this wide-ranging debate, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for his report. Both reports are carefully written and carefully judged, even if many of us disagree with the conclusions the Government have reached; but they are carefully presented. Both reports indicate that the Government had discretion over this treaty. The International Agreements Committee uses the word “compromise”, which is a good way of looking at it, and the International Relations and Defence Committee uses the expression “a political choice”. The discretion is very wide in a situation like this, such that the Government could give territory without money or money without territory. Indeed, we might look at this from a financial standpoint in the context of many other situations where we choose to make financial transfers—for development, for defence, for friendship, and for other reasons. In this case, concerning the economic agreement with the Republic of Mauritius, the generosity that this Government are showing towards Mauritius might come as a surprise to many citizens of this country. Mauritius is not a poor country; its GDP per capita is comparable to that of Brazil and Mexico. In relation to other Commonwealth islands such as Saint Vincent, Jamaica and Fiji—beautiful islands with beautiful beaches, which we know are interesting to lawyers from this country—Mauritius is quite a bit richer. Mauritius benefits from a low tax rate. It has a tax-to-GDP ratio of around 20%; we are well past 30% in this country. That is good news for the citizens of Mauritius as well as for UK non-doms and non-resident Indians who choose to make their tax residency in Mauritius. With a low tax rate, Mauritius is running a deficit, but the useful thing for Mauritius is that just the initial payments in this remarkable agreement cover the Mauritius deficit in full. And it gets better because, depending on how the calculation is made for the overall cost of this agreement, depending on how a future Government choose to settle out that cost—maybe capitalise it, pay it off, or however they meet it—and depending on how the future cost is calculated and settled, Mauritius may be able to repay some or all of its national debt. Regardless of the merits of giving away territory, which we have heard about in this debate, the Government should not be making payments of this kind. That is because we are deficit-financing our own public expenditure. The money that we are going to be paying to Mauritius will not come from our taxpayers. Our taxpayers are not even able to fund the Government as they are currently spending within this country. The money we will pass to Mauritius will be borrowed. It will be borrowed from people who are lending to the British Government—savers and pension funds. The people who lend money might be surprised that the money they are lending to His Majesty’s Treasury is going to be passed to the Republic of Mauritius. Maybe we should be a little clearer with them about what is going on. We could ask the Government to name one of the upcoming issues made by the British Government a Chagos bond. Then, when it comes up for repayment at redemption, in 2049 or 2053, we will all be able to remember what it was about. We were borrowing money to pass to Mauritius. The Government have at any one time a variety of contingent financial liabilities: items that we would prefer to defer, items that should not be paid for now. A good one to compare this to would be the decommissioning of North Sea oil—that is about removing all the equipment in the North Sea. It will be extremely expensive; it is well worth not paying for it any time soon. But the difference is that, when we come to do that decommissioning, the money will be spent within the United Kingdom. It will create thousands of jobs. It will create a degree of economic demand within the UK. That is not the case when we pass money to Mauritius. It is specifically not the case because, within the agreement, we even prioritise economic activity for the benefit of Mauritian contracts and Mauritian employees in the military base, so the priority of this economic agreement is favoured the other way around. This whole agreement speaks to a weakness in financial control for the Government and for His Majesty’s Treasury. We need better guardrails and better supervision of financial decisions of this type in Parliament.

17:53:00

My Lords, I happily join in congratulating the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, on a remarkable maiden speech, and I express sadness at seeing the departure of her father, who is a good friend; indeed, our late wives were very close friends in the Parliamentary Christian Fellowship. So it is with sadness that we bid goodbye to a remarkable parliamentarian in the noble Lord, Lord Boswell. No agreement is perfect and, of course, there are proper concerns about this agreement which have been expressed by many colleagues this evening, but there is no way in which the Opposition Front Bench can plausibly express those concerns. I join the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in saying that, after 11 rounds of negotiation and after the clear Statement made by Sir James Cleverly, it was as clear as possible that, had there not been a general election, the Conservative Government would have brought forward an agreement similar to the one that we now have, so it is opportunism on stilts for the Conservative Front Bench now to say that they oppose this commitment with such vehemence, just as they did with the agreement on Gibraltar as if knowing the interests of Gibraltar far better than the Chief Minister of Gibraltar. Having said that, we are told that the Government have abandoned sovereignty. Well, sovereignty was always contested in any event. Of course, that was emphasised by the overwhelming majorities against us: 13 to one in the ICC and 116 to six in the United Nations General Assembly. This shows that, increasingly, we would have lost out in international fora with respect to sovereignty. As it is, by reaching this agreement, we are on the right side of the rule of law, and that will stand us in good stead in the future. We cannot now be accused of hypocrisy. The Motion refers to the lack of consultation with the Chagossian community. In international law, self-determination means self-determination of the whole unit. We cannot somehow detach the islands from Mauritius for that purpose. It is true that the way the Chagossian community was treated from the late 1960s on is a major blot on our late colonial history, and one we should in every possible way now seek to remedy by, for example, promoting employment opportunities on Diego Garcia and pressing for settlements on the outer islands. The only hesitation I have in relation to the Chagossians is that many tell us now that they wish to return. Of course, very few of the original Chagossians remain. I fear that there is a sort of nostalgic romanticism about going back home. If they are not working on the base, which I hope a number will, they will somehow be living with very basic infrastructure on the outer islands, living on copra and fishing. Having tasted the good life in the West, I fear that if they do return, many will not stay there for long; many will return to the countries where they are now resident. On the environment, I share with a number of colleagues the concern about the capability of Mauritius to carry out the degree of protection of the environment that is necessary. I know that much has been said about national security. It is surely important that the United States, and its current President, is content that its interests are settled by the agreement that has been made. It is hardly surprising that China has been mentioned. The current Government of course accept the benefits that come from China, and there is a small Chinese community of long standing on the island. It is clear to those who know the island well that, from independence under the Prime Minister’s father, the great founder of the nation, all the Prime Ministers of Mauritius—with one exception, Bérenger, who was a Franco and who came to a deal with Jugnauth, the previous Prime Minister, on electoral sharing—have come from a relatively small part of India. Over two-thirds of the people currently in Mauritius are of Indian descent. So, if there were a choice to be made in future between China and India, I am as confident as can be that Mauritius would come down in favour of India. Clearly, Diego Garcia is of fundamental importance to us, as we saw in the SDR. There is clear evidence that the special relationship with the USA has been confirmed. I regret, in passing, this rather opportunist Motion. Yes, the deal has flaws, but it is basically in our national interest.

18:00:00

My Lords, I add my congratulations to the noble and learned Baroness on her maiden speech and welcome a formidable woman to your Lordships’ House. There have been some interesting speeches and I particularly enjoyed and agreed with the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Murray. It has been said by a number of people that relinquishing sovereignty over the Chagos Islands is not a legal but a political decision: the Government have decided to do this. I do not accept that the advisory ruling of the International Court of Justice should have led to what is basically a surrender of British territory. Much has been made of the fact that the Conservative Government started these negotiations, but of course it is not a Conservative Government who signed the treaty; it is a Labour Government. I am sure that, if a Conservative Government had signed a treaty a couple of years ago when they started to negotiate, exactly the same kind of amendment would have been put down by the then Opposition. The Government now say that, if we had defied the IFS, in the long term our hugely important occupation of Diego Garcia as a military base—I do not think anyone in this House does not think that it is hugely important—would have been threatened. Again, I do not accept that, because what are we really saying? Are we saying that we are going to allow somebody to tell us that we have to get out of the Chagos Islands? When are we going to stand up for our own country? When are we going to say, “Sorry, international law might be very important, but if it’s not in our national interest, we are not going to follow it”? I am getting rather fed up with all these international bodies that we are told we have to follow, when actually it is sometimes very much not in our interest. Then, of course, we are paying out millions of pounds to give away our own territory. It is rather mind-boggling and, once all the legal niceties, the legal words and the lawyers have finished, I think the public out there will realise that we are selling out part of our own territory—and for what benefit? I want to talk specifically about the Chagossians. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, mentioned very clearly our cruel treatment of them—not back in colonial times but in the mid-1960s, when most of us here were alive. What we did was absolutely cruel. One local Chagossian said to me very recently: “Now they are doing it again to us”. The treaty may say that it is recognising the wrongs of the past. Mauritius has made much of the plight of the Chagossians and, in justifying surrendering the islands to Mauritius, the UK Government have congratulated themselves on addressing the injustice done to the Chagossians. It is therefore quite astonishing that the treaty does not make any provision for Chagossians, other than a few who are based in Mauritius—they were the only few who were very vaguely involved in any kind of negotiations. The rest of the Chagossians were not involved in any negotiations. Article 6 provides for the possibility—it is only a possibility—of Mauritius implementing a programme of resettlement on the outlying islands. Incidentally, if we all cared so much about the Chagossians, why did none of our Governments say that they could go back to the other islands apart from Diego Garcia? We never did, even though it was raised many times in the House of Commons by a former leader of the Labour Party. Under Article 6, Mauritius is under no legal obligation to implement this programme of resettlement. As things stand, not a single Chagossian has the right to return to any of the islands unless Mauritius—which should be ashamed of its record in what it did to Chagossians in Mauritius—allows them to return. Yet we are paying £40 million into a trust fund, in trust for the Chagossians—which sounds very good. It is a tiny fraction of the overall sum to be paid to Mauritius, and Mauritius will work that. It will decide how it is spent; we are not responsible for it. It has a very bad track record of using money given to it. Originally, there was £650,000 back in 1972, and it took a long time for it to pass it on to the Chagossians—up to 1978. So there must be real doubt about the likelihood that this trust fund will be used. I ask the Minister in winding up to come back and tell us how we will ensure that that money will go to Chagossians and not just be spent on Mauritius. Finally, can the Minister say why we cannot have a referendum of the Chagossian people? Is it because we know the answer that would be given? They have no love for Mauritius and they do not want to go back to Mauritius. Of those who are in Mauritius, most are unhappy about this—there might be a few who have probably been paid off by the Mauritian Government not to say so. This is a shameful act of our Government and I am very sad that it is a Labour Government who are not doing anything to make up for what was done in the mid-1960s.

18:06:00

My Lords, I was pleased to take part earlier in a historic parliamentary and Boswell/Prentis family event. I warmly congratulate the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, on her maiden speech, and I sadly say au revoir, but not adieu, to her noble kinsman, the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho, who was indeed a splendid chairman of the European Union Committee. My perspective on Chagos is shaped by my membership of the Chagos all-party parliamentary group, founded nearly 20 years ago. I believe that His Majesty’s Opposition is being utterly disingenuous and dishonest in condemning this treaty. We know that negotiations began in autumn 2022 under the auspices of Prime Minister Liz Truss and Foreign Secretary James Cleverly. They continued for nearly two years under the Conservative Government of Rishi Sunak and were almost complete when Labour came to power. So how on earth can the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, claim that the treaty is a “strategic capitulation” and “surrender”? He says that Ministers must take responsibility for their choices—well, I think the Opposition must, too. It is pretty off-putting to see the Tories now adopting opposition to the treaty as a cause célèbre and deploying a range of false arguments. I believe that the International Agreements Committee, in its balanced and sensible report, is correct in its conclusions, including that the future of the base on Diego Garcia would be at greater risk in the likely event of a future legal judgment in favour of Mauritius. I will say a word on that base: I would want to be assured that the UK would not permit the United States to breach international law there, as the UK Government did in colluding in the use of Diego Garcia for extraordinary rendition after 9/11. I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, is not now in his place, because he and I corresponded on this matter when I was an MEP in 2006. The committee heard from Sir Christopher Greenwood, former judge of the International Court of Justice. He told the committee: “Following that opinion from the international court and the vote in the General Assembly on the resolution, I think that it would be in Britain’s interests to ratify this treaty. The consequences of not ratifying it are that, first of all, it completely undermines our position that we are a state that wishes to promote the rule of law in international affairs … Secondly, the risks of it being tested out in some other context are very troubling indeed and could lead to a result far less attractive than the one we have from this treaty. I would be in favour of the agreement”. He recognised that the ICJ opinion was advisory and not binding, but that it is “a very authoritative guide to the legal position. In reality, it would be very difficult for any state just to ignore an almost unanimous opinion of the international court”. I think we all agree that what a Labour Government did 60 years ago in displacing the Chagossians was disgraceful, and there has been a tangled web of deception ever since, under Governments of all parties. The Chagossians have been treated with shameful contempt and disdain. However, views among Chagossians now on the new treaty are far from unanimous. The majority support it, especially the Chagos Refugees Group, the largest single group, led by Olivier Bancoult, who I listened to about six weeks ago. It believes that the treaty is the only way Chagossians will be able to return for visits and resettlement. Sir Christopher Greenwood said: “Britain’s standing to argue that Mauritius should be required to resettle Chagossians on the other islands, frankly, is somewhat undermined by the fact that the United Kingdom has consistently refused any suggestion of resettlement on the other islands. That is a position that the UK Government have reaffirmed relatively recently”. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, replying in 2022 to a Written Question from the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, who is here this afternoon, wrote that, in November 2016—which was of course under a Conservative Government— “the UK Government announced that resettlement of Chagossians could not be supported on the grounds of feasibility, defence and security interests, and cost to the British taxpayer. There remains no right of abode in BIOT”. That was the Conservative position, so it is deeply irresponsible of the Opposition to try to suggest that the Chagos agreement has any legal impact on other British Overseas Territories, such as the Falklands and Gibraltar. As my noble friend Lord Purvis said, we seek more clarity, as does the committee, about the implementation of the agreement, including on funding and resettlement. It is important that, before we vote this evening, the Minister gives assurances on the points raised by my noble friend.

18:12:00

My Lords, I congratulate the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, on a fine and exhilarating maiden speech. She was my MP until regime change last year, so I personally welcome her to the House. We will certainly miss the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho. We will miss his consistent wisdom, especially, for me, on Brexit. I wish him all the best into the future. As a member of the International Relations and Defence Committee, I participated in our short inquiry into the transfer of sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius. Our committee had the pleasure of two meetings with members of the International Agreements Committee, chaired by my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith, on the treaty. At one, we heard evidence from Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State at the FCDO. Our inquiry centred on how the transfer of sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago could affect the UK’s strategic interests and obligations in four specific areas: the future of defence and security arrangements on Diego Garcia; the rights of the Chagossian people; the environmental protection of the archipelago, described by one of our witnesses as “possibly the most important reef wilderness on the planet”; and, finally, the cost of the agreement. Before asking my noble friend the Minister some questions on these areas of concern, let me say for clarity that I agree overall with this treaty and support the Government’s rationale in bringing it forward. That was not always the case. I started out as something of a sceptic, hawkish about, as I saw it, current Chinese influence on Mauritius and the region, and wondering if settling the sovereignty issue with Mauritius now might increase that influence in the future. However, the more my committee looked into the context of bringing the agreement forward, the more I realised that it was a question of balancing any possible long-term future risk with the growing present risk that not settling the sovereignty question would bring for the UK and its relations internationally. I take the point of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord McDonald, on the influence of India as far as Mauritius is concerned. I believe that the treaty resolves the risk that international law bodies such as the ICJ and the UN would increasingly find against the UK and in favour of Mauritius on the vexed question of sovereignty and post-colonial behaviour, therefore putting the base on Diego Garcia into a legal grey zone internationally. Diego Garcia was described by the Minister in his evidence as the UK’s vital contribution to the UK-US security relationship. It is vital. It could not have gone on operating on territory that was seen internationally as questionable legally. The last Conservative Government realised that this legal ambiguity needed fixing and entered into negotiations with Mauritius, as we have heard, holding 11 meetings, as I understand it, before the general election last year. The new Labour Government took on that work and the result is the treaty now awaiting ratification. Finally, I wish to question the Minister on our committee’s four areas of concern. On the future of defence and security arrangements on Diego Garcia, some of our witnesses raised concerns that the termination clause in the agreement could be exploited by a hostile power to pressure Mauritius into ending the agreement prematurely, before the end of the 99-year period. How does the Minister answer such concerns? What lessons can we learn from the historic and shameful abuse of the Chagossian people? What degree of transparency and accountability will there be in the use of ring-fenced funding for Chagossians administered by Mauritius going forward? The track record, as we have heard, of the Chagossian people benefiting from past funding has been abysmal, as far as we can tell. Can my noble friend the Minister give us some more detail on the way in which the development grant is going to support marine conservation? How can we be sure that it will be used for that purpose? On cost, what can the Minister say to those critics of the cost? Can he say how the overall cost of leasing Diego Garcia has been arrived at? None of us will be around in 99 years’ time to see how all this works out—except perhaps the Minister, who is of course for ever young. I am convinced that the future of the Chagossians and the base is more secure, not less, because of this treaty.

18:18:00

My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, who, although I do not always agree with her, was obviously very well briefed and is always wise and conscientious. I congratulate the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, on a superb maiden speech. Having worked with her in the other place, I welcome her presence here. Likewise, it is very sad to see that her father is now standing down after an incredibly illustrious career. Almost exactly to the day 15 years ago, I was appointed as the FCO Minister for Africa and the overseas territories, in succession to the very much missed Baroness Kinnock. The very first briefing I had on my first day was by the overseas territories directorate on the Chagos Islands. Although we discussed mainly a feasibility study to look at the possibility of Chagossians being resettled on the outer islands, we also looked at the marine protected area, which the previous Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, had signed in February 2010. I was also briefed on some of the legalities of the situation. One point that has not been mentioned is that when the original grant of sovereignty was made to Mauritius—at the time of the treaty which gave Mauritius independence—it was paid a significant sum of money, £1.5 million, to forgo any specific further claim on the Chagos Islands. That £1.5 million now would be worth £40 million to £50 million or so on the inflation index. I asked the officials what would happen if the UK was taken to the ICJ, the PCA or UNCLOS. I do not think I am in any way breaking the Official Secrets Act by repeating what was said. I was told that unless we agreed in advance to be bound by any decision, the decision would not be binding. If we do agree to be bound—and we could have agreed to this—then I would refer the Minister to Chapter XIV of the UN charter, which authorises the UN Security Council to enforce those court judgments. It is always subject to a veto, however, by the P5, so we could have vetoed it. I also refer the Minister to the 1986 case of Nicaragua v the United States. It was a discretionary and non-binding decision against the US. As a result of that, however, the US withdrew from the court except on an ad hoc basis—that, I gather, is still the case. There is another point that has not been mentioned. We ratified our membership of the UN in October 1945 and decolonisation started to get under way in the late 1950s to early 1960s. In 1960 we launched a protocol to the UN whereby we stated that we would not agree in future to be a party to any proceedings involving post-colonial disputes—what good advice that was from the officials at the time; how prescient of them to look at what future disputes might entail, including compensation from aggrieved individuals or boundary disputes. The advice I got at the time was that we had an incredibly strong moral and legal case and, in any event, if we agreed to be bound by a decision, we could always end up going down the veto route. Above all else, we did not have to agree to a case being binding on the UK. A lot of this was about discretion and putting our national interests first, and I feel very strongly that at the time we were in a position whereby national interests would always be put first by future Governments. I entirely accept that events have moved on, and a lot of people have talked about the 11 rounds of negotiations that were entered into by the previous Foreign Secretary and the one before him, James Cleverly. However, the very fact that we could not reach an agreement indicates that they had a bottom line. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, has made it very clear that his absolute bottom line was twofold: one was a role for the Chagossians as employees on the base and maybe looking again at a resettlement scheme, because we have heard from a number of noble Lords and Baronesses that they have been disgracefully treated over many years; the second was the question of why we did we not go for a sovereign base area. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, made it clear that without a sovereign base area in perpetuity, the UK Government would not have signed up to this. In the case of Cyprus, we signed up to a sovereign base area. If we had signed up for a 99-year lease in the case of Cyprus, in about 20 years’ time that would be reaching the end of its term; think of all the complications and difficulties that would arise from that. Finally, on the money, I certainly think that if I was a Labour MP in a marginal constituency, deeply concerned about austerity, cuts to welfare and the health service, I would be looking at the amount of money going into this; £3 million, using the inflation index, is around £25 million over the period. I would be deeply concerned about value for money. On the basis that we do not have a sovereign base area as a result of this treaty and the huge amount of money being spent on something we did not have to spend it on, I will be joining my noble friend in voting for his Motion.

18:24:00

My Lords, I am delighted to have listened to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, give an absolutely wonderful oration and to demonstrate how the one-in, one-out principle might usefully be applied on Wednesday. A deal is not a deal until it is done. Regardless of what happened before July, we need to understand that Labour had a political choice: either put Britain’s national, financial and security interests first, or hold on to that naive but mistaken high-minded soft power illusion which the Government thought they had bought last summer by paying to give away the Chagos Islands. How easy it must have seemed on those warm evenings last summer among the government opinion-formers, sipping prosecco and negronis in those north London townhouses—you know, the ones where they have knocked the breakfast room into the kitchen and put in American-style fridges and those step-free bifold doors out on to the terrace. After one too many, perhaps, they thought it was a rather good idea to pay to give up land and then ask for permission from our enemies to use it, having been kidded by their learned friends that international law required it, from a case in which the UK was not even a participant. They were craving approval from marine and maritime bodies that had no nexus over sovereignty and have no business pushing us around. What we see here, and I thank the Library for pointing it out so clearly, is that the legal basis for giving up the Chagos Islands is not a judgment but an “advisory opinion”. The Government are playing by absurd rules that defy logic or common sense and are not even rules anyway. I am not a property lawyer, but I know these simple truths: freehold is best; avoid restrictive covenants because the covenant holder can have you over a barrel; possession is only 9/10ths of the law; and when you transfer land to someone else, it is customary to be paid for it. In my career I have always ensured that lawyers are on hand but not on top. But not in this Government. Land and real estate are about selling a dream, but Labour’s lawyers have bought us a nightmare. We have benefited for centuries from strategic land—on both sides of the Suez Canal; in Cyprus, as my noble friend Lord Bellingham reminded us; and the Chagos Islands—that support our soft trade and hard power. Giving up one side of the Suez would always be unwise in any circumstance, but who would have anticipated the wrong-headedness that has been exposed so quickly as we contemplate the Middle East tinderbox? This deal generationally weakens us. It is an indefensible move from those in charge of our defences. Giving up land is bad enough; to not have been paid for it makes it worse. Worse still, this happened over the heads of the Chagossians; without their consent or consultation, their land has been taken and passed around as a chattel by a Prime Minister who claims to have their human rights as the golden thread that runs through his actions—what double standards. In times like this, as my noble friend reminded us, paying billions to give away land so that another country can pay off its debts when we do not have enough money to give our pensioners the winter fuel allowance beggars belief. Then there are the conditions and covenants. Sharing military secrets is bad enough, but the Library tells us that “activities related to the military base will comply with international law”— that old chestnut again. Can the Minister tell us when an “advisory opinion” became a statement of the international law, and who will determine the law when we do want to contemplate military actions at pace? When the facts change, you need to alter your position. Boy, have the facts changed in the Middle East in the last few months. We must not ratify this deal. Let us be clear: the Government are acting as an enemy within and acting for those who are prepared to trade a mere “advisory opinion” into a legally binding treaty that will tie our hands on the flimsy pretext that we might avoid criticism from the usual suspects, including our enemies. It gives me no pleasure to say it, but if this deal gets done, history will show it was at this moment that Labour showed even more how out of touch it is. In saloon bars up and down our nation, this is the moment when everybody will see that Labour’s values are not British values, because this deal weakens us—nationally, economically, financially and militarily—to please that nebulous cohort of judges and arbitrators in foreign lands who must think we have gone mad to swallow their advisory twaddle. The noble Baroness, Lady Liddell, says that it is a good deal for the Mauritians, and she is right there. Labour has made a choice: to prefer the views of the prosecco wing of the party over those of the pie-and-a-proper-pint, common-sense socialists, who know a dud when they see one—and this is a dud.

18:29:00

My Lords, I join the joyful congratulations to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis, on her maiden speech, and perhaps sadder congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, on his valedictory speech. Much has been made in this debate of what the previous Government did, and what they might have done had they still been in government. While it was an interesting debating point, it misses the focus of why we are here, which is to determine whether this is a good deal. This is a bad deal for the United Kingdom and an even worse deal for the Chagossian people. We are relinquishing sovereign territory that we have held since 1814—to put that in context, it is prior to Waterloo and to 32 of the 50 states joining the United States—on the basis of an advisory opinion and the fear of what may come over the horizon, despite the fact that even in the International Agreements Committee there was divided opinion on the threat legally to the United Kingdom. To use a boxing analogy, we have thrown in the towel before the bell has even rung for the first round. Let us be in no doubt that this is a political decision rather than a legal imperative. We have relinquished sovereignty to Mauritius and, as others have indicated, it is “relinquished” rather than “returned”, because Mauritius has never had sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. We have given it to a country which is further away from the Chagos Islands than this Chamber is from Minsk in Belarus, one which is developing closer relations with Russia and has a strong and growing friendship with China. I have no doubt that, despite all the attempts at protections within this treaty, we will see a much greater level of Chinese influence in the Chagos Islands as infrastructure is put in, and as it works with Mauritius. One of the worst political insults that can be thrown at any Government is, undoubtedly, that they have sold out. To be fair, that is not an accusation that can be levelled at this Government. They have not sold out—they have not even given away the islands: they have paid Mauritius to take them off our hands. Whether or not you take the figure of £3.4 billion, or the cash figure of £13 billion, or the inflation estimate of £30 billion, the reality is the same: we are paying an extraordinary amount simply to hand over the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands to Mauritius. It is a circumstance in which this Government have finally achieved a tax cut; unfortunately, it is not for the people of the United Kingdom, but for the people of Mauritius. What is even worse is the position it has left the Chagossians themselves in. If there is perhaps one thing which has united us around this Chamber in this debate, it is an acceptance that historically, from the 1960s onwards, the United Kingdom has treated the Chagossian people very badly, but that is only exacerbated by this deal. I had the opportunity to meet with a delegation of Chagossians, which puts me at least on a par with the Foreign Secretary. I met them before the deal was done, which perhaps puts me in a superior position to the Foreign Secretary. The overwhelming view of Chagossians is undoubtedly sceptical of and hostile to this deal. No doubt the Government will say, as has been quoted in this debate, that not everyone connected with the Chagos Islands has an identical view, and I accept that. However, the voices are overwhelmingly against this deal. There is a very good way, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and others have said, to test Chagossian opinion: to properly give them a level of self-determination and a referendum, giving them a level of choice, rather than simply notifying them afterwards of what the deal is. A Chagossian said to me, “The UK Parliament is our Parliament”. It is time that, as a Parliament, we stand up for the rights of the Chagossian people that we have for so many years ignored. That is why it is right that we take a stand tonight, and why I will be supporting the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan.

18:35:00

My Lords, the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization, which has been a major driving force behind these legal attacks on the British Indian Ocean Territories, was founded in November 1961 and was dedicated to erasing the phenomenon of non-self-governing territories. It had important work to do in the 1960s and 1970s, the period of winds of change, when western colonial powers were decolonising much of the globe. However, the special committee has utterly failed to recognise that the world has changed, as has the nature of modern colonisation. “The process of decolonisation is not complete”, the special committee threatens on its website, saying that it is dedicated to “completing this mandate”. It then numbers the 17 territories that it has yet to force to decolonise, and these include the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, the Pitcairn Islands, St Helena, the British Virgin Islands, Monserrat, the Turks and Caicos, Anguilla, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands. The majority of the places in its sights are therefore British; indeed, English is the main language in 14 of them. Whether the overwhelming majority of people of those territories wish to remain British—which, in vote after vote in places such as Gibraltar and the Falklands, they remind us that they certainly do—is utterly immaterial in the eyes of the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, one of whose three vice-chairs is Cuban and another is from Indonesia, the country that occupies West Papua. There are 29 states represented on the special committee, including such bastions of democracy and human rights as China, Cuba, Iran, Russia, Syria and Venezuela. These are the countries that are denouncing Britain for colonialism in places such as the Chagos Islands, where for over half a century there has been no permanent civilian population. China, meanwhile, has blocked the classification of Hong Kong, Inner Mongolia, Macao, Tibet and Xinjiang as non-self-governing territories under the terms of reference of the United Nations special committee, even though, of course, they are all effectively run from Beijing. Russia has blocked no fewer than 26 territories, such as Crimea, from being put on the list. Why does Britain put up with this glaring farce? There is effectively an entire bureau of the United Nations dedicated entirely to eradicating British overseas territories such as the Chagos Islands. Once the Chagos are handed over to Mauritius, the special committee will simply justify its own existence by moving on to the next British territory. This is happening at a time when there are plenty of examples around the world of powers that have genuinely occupied and colonised other countries. I have mentioned Russia, China and Indonesia, but with varying degrees of legality and lethality, Turkey occupies Northern Cyprus, India occupies Kashmir, Armenia occupies parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, and so on. Yet none of these appears on the United Nations committee’s hit list. Imperialism was never solely a western pathology, any more than war or slavery are, yet the only powers that the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization accuses are western, except for Morocco in the Western Sahara. In 1965, the United Kingdom split the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius, which never owned it. So, what could be more imperialist today than handing over these islands, against the wishes of their exiled inhabitants, to a foreign power over 1,300 miles away that never ruled them in the past? Could anything be more ruthless and more contemptuous of the principle of self-determination, whatever the utterly egregious United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization might say? In a recent survey, only 19% of British people said that the British Government stuck up for our national interests. This is shocking, but hardly surprising if the present measure is anything to go by.

18:39:00

My Lords, I am pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to the debate today on the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, and to take the opportunity it affords to examine, insofar as five minutes allows me so to do, the principles that underpin opposition to this treaty. Before I do so, I congratulate, as others have, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, on an excellent maiden speech. Having heard the response to her father’s valedictory speech, which was also an excellent speech, it seems that I must have missed out in the 13 years I was in the other place and the 15 years I have been in your Lordships’ House, because I have never had the opportunity to be as close to him in working in this House as many other noble Lords have. However, I know of his reputation and I take this opportunity to thank him for his distinguished service to both Houses and wish him a long and happy retirement. The Opposition have left no stone unturned and certainly no thesaurus unconsulted in heaping execration on this agreement. It has been described as “shameful”, a “surrender treaty”, and a “sell-out”. All of this was built upon by the Leader of the Opposition, who went further, suggesting the terms of the agreement represented a series of “snivelling capitulations to left-wing activists who hate Britain and are ashamed of our history”. For someone purportedly animated by a detailed knowledge of our island story, she seems to have neglected some of the more recent chapters. It was of course a Conservative Government—one in which she served at Cabinet level—who conducted 11 rounds of negotiations with Mauritius to resolve the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. This whole process of course started with the Written Statement made on 3 November 2022. There has been toing and froing about what was actually in this Statement, so, with your Lordships’ permission, I will read it, because it reveals quite a lot. In its first paragraph, the Statement says: “Following the meeting between the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Norfolk, and Prime Minister Jugnauth at the UN General Assembly, the UK and Mauritius have decided to begin negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory … Chagos archipelago. Through negotiations, taking into account relevant legal proceedings, it is our intention to secure an agreement on the basis of international law to resolve all outstanding issues”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/11/22; col. 27WS.] If the issue of sovereignty was never on the table in these previous negotiations—something belied by the Statement from which I have just read—it is essential that the party opposite explains what its negotiating aims were. Of what did these negotiations consist if, as the Motion we are considering today implies, sovereignty and financial recompense were off the table? The question then arises, what was on the table beyond a union flag and a sheet of paper containing the single word “No”? Your Lordships’ House is being asked to believe, in defiance of the negotiating parameters publicly announced by the Foreign Secretary at the time, from which I have already quoted, that these 11 rounds of negotiation had produced an embryonic deal utterly unlike that which the Government have now laid before Parliament. If the then Government were so wedded to the status quo and felt that the principle of British sovereignty over the Chagos Islands was inviolable, as most of the Opposition appeared to, why did they initiate negotiations at all, let alone go through 11 successive rounds? As the report from the International Agreements Committee makes clear, a refusal to ratify this treaty and a further refusal to negotiate would represent a “greater risk” to the future of our base on Diego Garcia, given the vanishingly small possibility that an international court would find in our favour. I know that it has become fashionable in some quarters to see international law as an à la carte menu, but much of Britain’s influence and authority rests on our reputation—the damage of recent years notwithstanding—of adherence to these norms. As we think about the future of the base and our role in the Indo-Pacific, I should like to engage the question of Chinese influence. Those opposed to a deal over Diego Garcia have suggested that Mauritian sovereignty over the islands may represent a huge security risk if the Chinese bring their influence to bear. While we will need to exercise constant vigilance in this respect—particularly as we move towards the end of the initial 99-year lease—precedent suggests this risk can be managed. Kenya, where since 1964 we have also had a permanent military presence—the British Army Training Unit Kenya—has a far deeper economic relationship with China, including significant indebtedness and, as of April this year, has agreed to a new agreement creating a China-Kenya community. There are many more examples I can give—including Somalia and Djibouti—where a far more explicit degree of Chinese influence has not precluded the UK maintaining a strategically significant military presence. Mauritius is not a Chinese cat’s paw. According to the Rule of Law Project’s global ranking, its judiciary is the second most robust and independent in Africa. It has historically low levels of corruption and its principal trading partners include France, India and South Africa, as well as China. Try as I might, I can find no evidence that Mauritius and China are becoming best friends. What I can find are lots of places where it is asserted that this is being claimed—but there is no basis for it. Mauritius has strong diplomatic ties with several countries and my research supports the contention that its closest allies are the United Kingdom, France, India and South Africa. In closing, I return to the issue of negotiation. In the other place, the shadow Defence Secretary stigmatised this deal as representing a “complete and utter negotiating failure”.—[Official Report, Commons, 22/5/25; col. 1285.] I believe that this Motion and the Opposition’s motive in moving it represent their failure to negotiate with reality. The treaty negotiated by this Government ensures British control of Diego Garcia for the next century and beyond, it has been welcomed by the US Government with whom we work closely in this area, and we have an effective veto on developments on the Chagos Archipelago, together with a 24-nautical mile buffer zone. I will offer this agreement my full support in these and any other proceedings in your Lordships’ House.

18:47:00

I join the tributes to the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, whose chairing of the European Committee I greatly admired, and the tributes to an excellent maiden speech. Like father, like daughter. I also thank the two committees for their advice, but I am going to risk the wrath of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, by focusing my five minutes on only a couple of issues about which I know something—or used to. When I lived in Washington, I learned that it is very hard to exaggerate the importance the US attaches to the long runway, the deep-water wharf and particularly the electromagnetic spectrum control which Diego Garcia provides in a key strategic location. For the Pentagon and perhaps for the NSA, Diego Garcia may be the most important—certainly one of the most important—things we bring to the security partnership. So, we have to ask ourselves, what would America do if harassed by possibly legally binding provisional measures—the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, will correct me, but I believe they could be if the proceedings were taken under the Law of the Sea Convention—and then in due course by binding findings, we were to find ourselves in ever-increasing global isolation? What would America do? Well, I believe that the perceived need for security of tenure at DG would drive the US to fall in with the majority, recognise Mauritian sovereignty and do a deal on the base directly for Mauritius. The Americans would ditch us rather than risk Diego Garcia. Of course, they are delighted that we have done the business for them and produced the treaty; that is why they welcome it so much. Secondly, the American factor makes it particularly baffling that the Opposition should argue that the treaty opens the door for China. If it did, why would the Trump Administration welcome it? Thirdly, the same goes for India. The Indian Government regularly express concern that the Chinese might contrive to use their 99-year lease with the Sri Lankans on Hambantota to secure a deep-water Indian Ocean base. They would be very alarmed if they thought that China could get a better, ready-made one at Diego Garcia. But they are not alarmed; they too warmly welcome this treaty, because they think that it lays that fear to rest. Mauritius has particularly close relations with India, which is not altogether surprising, because two-thirds of Mauritians are of Indian descent. The noble Lord, Lord Callanan, speculated about the possibility of Mauritius joining the Chinese belt and road economic partnership. Surely the interesting fact is that it is one of only two African countries that have not joined the belt and road initiative. Why would the Mauritians enrage the Indians, with whom they are very close, by helping the Chinese, whom they distrust? One has to ask: what is it that the Opposition know that Washington, India and Mauritius do not know? The Opposition’s second point is about the money, which is also conceptually puzzling. If recognising Mauritian sovereignty is absolutely and unacceptably wrong—wrong for fundamental reasons of principle, as the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, argued—surely it would be just as wrong if we paid less money. One can take a principled position, or one can haggle about the price, but it is quite hard to do both at the same time. I recall from my Washington days that the US pays a very substantial contribution to the running costs of the Diego Garcia base. I cannot remember the numbers and I would not know what inflation factor to use, but I am jolly well sure that it is a great deal more than we are paying to Mauritius under the new treaty. Our payments are the same order of magnitude as the French are paying for Djibouti—a base that is 1/15th the size, less well placed and much harder to defend. The Opposition, when in office and trying to negotiate this deal, knew that the exchanges would entail substantial payments, so it is a little hypocritical now to pretend otherwise. They say that they would have played the hand better and haggled harder, but I wonder: would they really have found global isolation splendid? Would they really have been ready to see the US lose patience and do a direct deal with the Mauritians? I do not think so. I like the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and I think we all admired the way he introduced it. However, I hope that the House will reject the Opposition’s Motion; I am afraid that it is irresponsible. If we passed it, we would puzzle our friends—particularly in Washington, Delhi and Mauritius—and the rest of the world. To what purpose? I would like to see CRaG changed—it needs reform—but voting against the treaty tonight will not stop its ratification. Doing so would be bad for the country and bad for the House, demonstrating both irresponsibility and impotence.

18:53:00

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, although he will appreciate that I take a very different position in responding to this interesting and important debate. Before I turn to the more controversial points, let me start with a point on which there is unanimity. I welcome my noble and learned friend Lady Prentis of Banbury, who gave a truly magnificent maiden speech. As an Attorney-General, she was respected across the whole of the other place, and I am sure that her contributions here will be similarly listened to with great care across the whole of your Lordships’ House. In my tradition, when we finish the annual reading of the Pentateuch with the end of Deuteronomy, we immediately start again with the first chapter of Genesis. In that spirit of linking a beginning and an ending, I also take this opportunity to mark the valedictory speech of her father, the noble Lord, Lord Boswell of Aynho. I am sure that, as the noble Lord leaves this House, it must be an especial pleasure to see his noble kinswoman—as I believe she is known—make the first of what I hope will be many contributions to our work. This debate is required by statute before a treaty is ratified. Normally, with a treaty under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, we just have a debate. This is a different case. A treaty that cedes British sovereign territory to a foreign power cannot be ratified without an Act of Parliament. Professor Richard Ekins, in a Policy Exchange paper, has set out how every concession of British territory since 1890 has been enabled by primary legislation, the most recent example being the surrender of Hong Kong to China. In addition, since 1945, whenever a colony has achieved independence, either within or without the Commonwealth, primary legislation has been passed to renounce UK sovereignty under those territories. Indeed, FA Mann, a leading authority on foreign relations and the legally applicable principles, regarded this not just as a constitutional convention but as a legal principle. In the Explanatory Memorandum, the Government appear to confirm that this is the position. Can the Minister inform us when this primary legislation will be brought before Parliament? Can we have a clear assurance that the treaty will not be ratified unless and until that legislation has received Royal Assent? That is a problem with the Motion in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis of Tweed, and why, in preference, I will support my noble friend Lord Callanan’s Motion. The former Motion states that the Government should not ratify the treaty until various matters have taken place, but the noble Lord has not included passing an Act to permit the cessation of British territory. I do not know whether it is now Liberal Democrat policy that a Government can give away sovereign territory without an Act of Parliament. It is a little odd. Those Benches are always so keen for Parliament to have a say before we even act in our own self-defence or support militarily our allies, but, apparently, they are keen now for Parliament to have no say before we cede sovereign territory. In that respect, I regret the terms of Article 1 of the treaty, which states: “Mauritius is sovereign over the Chagos Archipelago in its entirety, including Diego Garcia”. That purports to accept that Mauritius is already the sovereign power. That is not the case in international law, as the UK has said repeatedly and consistently until this Government took office. It is also not the case in domestic law. Schedule 6 to the British Nationality Act 1981 includes the British Indian Ocean Territory as one of the British Overseas Territories—and that is also reflected elsewhere in the Act. All of that can be amended only by domestic legislation and an Act of Parliament. If the Act is not passed and the treaty is therefore not ratified, the effect in international law of the Government even agreeing a treaty in these terms will be to weaken our legal position over the Chagos Islands, even before the Bill has been laid before Parliament, which is to be regretted. Why are we here at all? We are here because Mauritius has claimed sovereignty since 1981, despite decades of Mauritian Governments saying that they did not make any such claim. As we have heard, an ICJ advisory opinion in 2019 opined against the UK’s administration of the islands. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, referred to that as a “ruling” in a rare, but perhaps Freudian, slip. I suggest that it is not a ruling at all; it did not, in terms, talk about the sovereignty of the islands at all. An advisory opinion is not a ruling, a judgment or a binding decision of any sort. The clue is in the name: it is an advisory opinion. The United Kingdom would have to agree for the International Court of Justice to deliver a binding opinion or judgment. We would have to agree to submit the question of jurisdiction to the ICJ. We have not. I would hope that, even under this Government, we would not. Without that, there would be no binding ruling from the ICJ. While I recognise the political force of advisory opinions, we need to be clear-eyed about them: they are not binding. We as a country have never accepted that we would always act in accordance with advisory opinions. Indeed, in 1996, an advisory opinion came within one vote of holding that the use of nuclear weapons would nearly always be illegal. Would we, if that vote had gone the other way, have unilaterally disarmed ourselves of all or most of our nuclear arsenal? Perhaps we would have done if this Government, with this Attorney-General advising them, were in charge; I just do not know. The Government appear to accept that the advisory opinion is not binding, but they say, “Oh, ITLOS—the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea—may assume that the advisory opinion is binding and that Mauritius is sovereign and exercise its own jurisdiction on that false premise”. But there are two problems with that: ITLOS has no jurisdiction to adjudicate a territorial dispute, nor can it properly take it that the question of sovereignty has been decided by an advisory opinion. To respond to a point from the noble Lord, Lord McDonald of Salford, the advisory opinion is not binding—to use the noble Lord’s words—on ITLOS. An advisory opinion, as is made clear on the website of the ICJ itself, is not even binding on the particular agency which has asked for the advisory opinion, so it is certainly not binding on ITLOS. Secondly and relatedly, the United Kingdom should not accept that its sovereign rights can be taken away from it by one tribunal, ITLOS, misreading and misunderstanding the advisory opinion from the ICJ. To pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, ITLOS has no jurisdiction in relation to this dispute and we should not accept any ruling that takes for granted that the ICJ has established authoritatively that Mauritius is sovereign, first, because it has not and, secondly, because we would not give our consent to any such judicial determination. We should not, I suggest, give up our sovereign territory because of a fear that ITLOS might wrongly issue some order for some vague protective or provisional measures against us at some future, indeterminate date. Of course I recognise that an advisory opinion gives the risk that future legal proceedings could be brought against us, but it is a terrible precedent, I suggest, for us to give up territory because we are worried that an international tribunal might in the future reach a conclusion which we regard as legally flawed. I have to say that, if British foreign policy is henceforth to be at the mercy of the vote of the United Nations General Assembly, then it really is game over. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, referred to the—excellent, if I may say so—report from his committee, which I enjoyed reading. In that report, there is a reference to the fact that if we were to stand in the face of an advisory opinion by the ICJ, we would somehow be in the same position as Russia is in relation to the invasion of Ukraine. I hasten to add that that is not the view of the committee, but it was the view ascribed in its report to evidence it took from Professor Sands. The notion that standing on our legal rights in the face of a non-binding advisory opinion makes us like Russia invading Ukraine is less a piece of considered legal analysis and more a piece of advocacy. My late father used to say about one partisan newspaper that it was difficult to see where the news ended and the comment began. When reading Professor Sands’ evidence to the committee, it was very difficult to see where the analysis ended and the advocacy began.

I am listening attentively to what the noble Lord is saying. If he has time, could he outline a little more of the background to the decision James Cleverly made in November 2022 to open negotiations on the exercise of sovereignty?

I am going to deal with the legal issues affecting this because the Government are saying to us, “We have no choice: we have to sign this because we have legal risk”. There is no point the noble Lord muttering from a sedentary position.

My Lords—

I will finish the point and give way. This Government are trying to dress up a political decision as a legal decision. Now, of course, I am happy to give way.

I just wanted to ask the noble Lord to address the testimony given to the committee by Sir Christopher Greenwood, rather than having a lot of fun at the expense of Mr Philippe Sands.

I have. Sir Christopher Greenwood made the point that we have legal risk. He is absolutely right: there is legal risk. But I am suggesting that we need to analyse that legal risk carefully. There has been very little reference in the debate so far to the other evidence taken by the committee from Professor Ekins. Indeed, it is a shame that we have not been able to hear from the noble Lord, Professor Lord Verdirame, this afternoon because I would be very interested to hear his view on this issue. Ultimately, the committee heard from three lawyers. There is a difference of legal opinion on this issue, and that is because, ultimately, this is a political and not a legal decision. Let me turn now to Article 4 of the treaty, which has not yet been raised. The premise of the agreement rests on the proposition that our interests will align with those of Mauritius for the next 99 years to the extent that there is no appreciable risk that Mauritius—and it has, of course, retained lawyers of the highest calibre—will seek to leverage the terms of the treaty for its own benefit. Merely to state that assumption is to show how unsafe it is. I say 99 years; I was very surprised that the noble Lord, Lord McDonald, referred to 140 years. The ability in the treaty to extend it for 40 years is really not worth the paper it is not written on. There is simply no legal right to extend. There is an ability to negotiate, and the idea that there will be an extension, absent perhaps another huge payment of money, really is for the birds. Article 4 provides: “Each Party agrees to ensure that in the implementation and application of this Agreement, including activities in relation to the Base, there shall be compliance with international law”. No court or body is appointed to deal with that issue. If Mauritius, advised by its eminent lawyers, took the view that UK or US operations out of Diego Garcia are not in accordance with international law, then it could allege the UK was in breach. That would not entitle Mauritius to terminate the treaty—the rights of termination are limited in Article 15—but it would entitle it to take countermeasures which would otherwise be prohibited under the treaty, such as allowing the presence of armed forces of other countries or constructing installations elsewhere on the islands that might adversely affect the security of Diego Gracia. Let us be clear: if Mauritius took that action, there would be nothing that we could do and we would not be entitled to stop paying the sums that we have promised to pay under the treaty. There is a similar legal risk under Annexe 1. It was mentioned earlier that we have to inform Mauritius about the use of force originating from the base at Diego Garcia “expeditiously”. I have three questions for the Minister in this regard. First, my understanding is that the UK’s position is that this provision requires notice only after an operation is launched. Is that correct? Secondly, assuming that it is only after an operation is launched, what do we consider “expeditiously” means? Does it mean that we have to inform Mauritius as soon as the planes take off, or can we deliberately decide to delay informing it, even though we could inform it, until the operation has been completed? Thirdly, whatever our interpretation of that word might be, have we agreed that interpretation with Mauritius? If we have not, I can give the Minister some free legal advice: all of this is very ripe for a further dispute, which would likely result in Mauritius not abiding by its obligations under the treaty.

Has the noble Lord considered the evidence given by Sir Christopher Greenwood, former judge at the International Court of Justice—in a sense, our former judge—who dealt with specifically that point, as well as other points that have been discussed?

I have; I read absolutely what Sir Christopher said about Article 4, but it did not find his way into the final report.

It did.

Well, it touched on it.

It is in the final report.

The point I have made about Article 4 is absolutely right. Mauritius can take measures in response. I will wrap up because of the time. My noble friend Lord Callanan reminded us of the price we will have to pay for this legal farrago. Thanks to the approach taken by the Attorney-General, whose advice, properly, cannot be disclosed, the ultimate position is that we are not just giving up the Chagos Islands to a country which never owned them and is thousands of miles away but are paying it handsomely for the privilege. I do not know whether my friend, the Attorney-General, is thinking about doing his bit to get our sluggish economy going by deciding to move home and increase transactions by putting his property on the market, but if he does, I hope that he might allow me to enter negotiations with him about the ownership of his house. I suspect that the result might be that I end up as the owner of his house having used his own money to pay for it. The truth is that this is a legally unnecessary and badly drafted treaty. It is a treaty with holes in, and which contains within it the seeds of further disputes. It is a treaty under which we are paying Mauritius to take our sovereign territory off our hands, and we are paying it very handsomely for that purpose. For those reasons, I urge the House to support the Motion in the name of my noble friend Lord Callanan.

19:12:00

My Lords, this has been a fascinating and interesting debate. Just to reflect the noble Lord’s recent comments, of course this is a political judgment that the Government have had to make, and certainly the previous Government also had to consider it. I personally think it is very sad that, instead of it being about a political judgment, it has become a partisan party-political issue. Some of the comments that have been made are very regrettable, because, as my noble friend Lady Liddell summed it up, the Government are absolutely committed to the security of this country—as were the previous Government—and that is what this agreement is about. Anyone who questions that is not doing a service to this House or to politics generally. I thank the International Agreements Committee for its report, which is a very thorough piece of work. But it acknowledges that the treaty should be ratified. Before I go into the substance of the debate, I also want to wish the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, a very happy retirement. I have known him for some time, from when I first came into the House. He and I have always worked together; whether we were on the opposition or government side, we were absolutely focused on that. I also congratulate the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Prentis of Banbury, on her excellent maiden speech. There was one common theme of both her father’s speech and her own, which was the importance of the international rules-based order and the rule of law, and that is fundamentally what this debate is about. I thank them for their contributions. I am really sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, is retiring, but he deserves it. However, I know that the noble and learned Baroness will make extremely important contributions to this House about the importance of law and the rule of law, and the importance of judges and the people who supervise those laws. I am very grateful for their contributions. On 22 May, the Prime Minister signed the landmark agreement with Mauritius to secure the future of the strategically critical UK-US military base on Diego Garcia. This is one of the most significant contributions to the transatlantic defence and security partnership to date. As noble Lords have stressed, key allies and international partners back the agreement, including the Five Eyes, India, Japan and South Korea; the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, also welcomed the deal, as did the Commonwealth and the African Union. This deal will protect the safety and security of the British people for generations, making sure that the United Kingdom retains the unique, important capabilities we need to deal with a range of threats in the months and years ahead. The treaty was laid in the House for scrutiny on the day of signature under the usual processes set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. I want to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson; he knows that I greatly admire his oratory, but before the treaty is ratified, the Government will bring forward primary legislation, which will be scrutinised and debated in the usual way. This was a difficult decision, and one we took after great consideration—because it matters. The military base on Diego Garcia is a strategic asset which underpins our national security, supporting operations that keep the British people safe, enabling the rapid deployment of operations and forces across the Middle East, east Africa and south Asia, and helping to combat some of the most challenging threats, including from terrorism and hostile states. Its unique strategic location creates real military advantage across the Indo-Pacific. Some of the base’s capabilities are rightly secret. They include airfield and deep-water port facilities. These support a wide range of air and sea operations, including berthing our nuclear-powered submarines and sensitive satellite communications. In recent years, the facility on Diego Garcia has helped to collect data used in counterterrorism operations against high-value Islamic State targets. This included information that was used to disrupt threats to our country and reduce the risk to coalition operations significantly. The base makes a core contribution to the United Kingdom’s important relationship with the United States, as we have heard in this debate. Our defence, security and intelligence relationships are deeply intertwined. Indeed, almost every operation from the base is in partnership with the United States. As your Lordships will know, the operation of the base on Diego Garcia has been under threat for decades. Under the previous Government, Mauritius secured a string of legal and political victories against the United Kingdom that created the immediate jeopardy facing the base: a comprehensive rejection of our arguments by 13 judges to one at the ICJ in 2019; the loss of the UN General Assembly votes by a margin of 116 to six; a maritime delimitation judgment handed down in 2021 by a special chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on the basis of Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago and not UK sovereignty; obligations placed on the British Indian Ocean Territory Administration by UN bodies to cease specific activities; and various procedural blockages at international organisations, including the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty organisations. Precedents were set. International political support fell away. I say to my friend the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, and to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, that it is highly likely that further litigation would have been brought quickly by Mauritius against the United Kingdom—which is why the previous Government committed to negotiate—in which we would have had no realistic prospect of defending our position on sovereignty. As the International Agreements Committee said in its report, the evidence it heard confirmed that any international court would be unlikely to find in favour of the United Kingdom. In that circumstance, the committee stated, “the future of the Base … would be at greater risk”. As a number of noble Lords have said, the evidence of the eminent judge Sir Christopher Greenwood KC bears repeating here. As he says, the advisory opinion is “a very authoritative guide to the legal position. In reality, it would be very difficult for any state just to ignore an almost unanimous opinion of the international court”. The serious consequences for the base operations cannot be overstated. Put simply, it would not be able to operate as it should, putting at risk our national security and prosperity, and the impact could be felt extremely quickly. Legally binding provisional measures could be issued within weeks of a case being brought, potentially affecting our ability to patrol the waters around the base and undermining the base. As the International Agreements Committee has confirmed, a binding judgment against UK sovereignty would very likely have followed. This would give rise to real impacts on the operation of the base and on the delivery of all its national security functions. These impacts could include our ability to protect the electromagnetic spectrum, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said, from interference and to ensure access to the base by air and by sea—in effect, to control the maritime area around the base. When this Government came to power, like the one before, they concluded that agreeing a treaty now, on our own terms, was the only way to secure the proper protections, including from malign influences, that would allow the base to operate as it has done well into the next century. We have negotiated robust security provisions to protect the United Kingdom and the base for decades to come. The International Agreements Committee agrees that the treaty is successful in protecting base operations—full control of Diego Garcia. This includes full control and management of the electromagnetic spectrum, which is key to our ability to counter hostile activities. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, that there is a 24 nautical mile buffer zone where nothing can be built or placed without UK consent, meaning that we can protect UK interests. That is a rigorous process to prevent any activities on the wider islands—some of which are over 100 nautical miles away—from disrupting base operations. This includes joint UK decision-making, meaning that there are no developments unless we agree; a strict ban on foreign security forces on the outer islands, whether civilian or military; and binding obligations to ensure that the base is never undermined. Protections within the treaty were designed and tested at the highest level of the US security establishment, including through interagency review processes under two US Administrations, both of whom supported the UK proceeding with the deal. There has been some inaccurate reporting, as we have heard in this debate, about the apparent requirement that the UK notify Mauritius in advance of military operations. Let me reassure the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, who raised this first, that this is a complete misunderstanding of the treaty. There is no such requirement. The UK has agreed to inform Mauritius of military action, as is standard practice in most international basing arrangements. This does not need to be in advance, and no sensitive details of military activities would ever be passed on. I am sure that noble Lords will have already noted that the International Agreements Committee tested this point in particular and agreed that the treaty did not oblige the UK to notify Mauritius in advance of operations. A noble Lord asked about the terms of termination of the agreement. I think the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, acknowledged that there are very limited conditions for termination—namely, if we do not pay or if we attack Mauritius. The costs of the treaty have been published in full and laid in the House. The noble Lords, Lord Callanan and Lord Howell, cited the figure of £30 billion to £35 billion. I believe that that figure is deliberately misleading, and I think noble Lords will understand this point. It is fundamentally wrong to present numbers that ignore the effects of inflation and the changing value of money on the real cost of a deal that lasts 99 years. The average cost per year in today’s money is £101 million, and the net present value of payments under the treaty is £3.4 billion. This compares well to other international basing agreements. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord McDonald of Salford, who first mentioned the fact that France recently announced an €85 million per year deal with Djibouti. Diego Garcia is 15 times larger, more capable and more strategically located, and can operate with complete operational freedom. That is before counting the waters surrounding the island and the additional buffer zone which I just mentioned, which cover a further 6,200 square kilometres of UK operational control, and the prohibition of hostile activity on the outer islands. The cost represents a fraction of a percentage of the total defence budget—less than 0.2%. This makes it possible for us to access, use and benefit from the most highly sophisticated and strategically important military facility in the world. It upholds our end of a defence and security partnership with our closest ally. That is at the foundation of how we keep our country safe. Many noble Lords have confirmed the strength of feeling about the impact of the treaty on the Chagossians. I am absolutely sympathetic to that point, and certainly to the concerns raised by both the committee and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, in his Motion. The Government have expressed deep regret for the way Chagossians were removed from the islands in the 1960s and 1970s, but the negotiations on this treaty were necessarily state to state. Our priority was to secure the full operation of the base on Diego Garcia, and this is what we have achieved. Nevertheless, we recognise the importance of the islands to the Chagossians and the different views within the Chagossian community, many of whom did welcome the deal. The deal meets many of the requests we have heard from Chagossians over recent years. For the first time since the 1960s, a programme of resettlement can begin on the islands, other than Diego Garcia. We will work with Mauritius to initiate a new programme of visits for Chagossians to the Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia. The UK will capitalise a trust fund for the benefit of Mauritius, in the region of £40 million. This is part of the financial package within the treaty. Separate to the agreement, we will also increase our support to Chagossians living in the United Kingdom through new and existing projects. I say to my noble friend Lord Grocott that, while there is no permanent residency on Diego Garcia for security reasons, there are no restrictions on applications by Chagossians to be employed on Diego Garcia and live on the island during that employment. Chagossians have previously worked in the military base. However, I fully understand the strength of feeling on this subject and the concerns highlighted in the report of the International Agreements Committee and the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. So let me be absolutely clear to the House: ahead of ratification, this Government will commit to making a ministerial Statement in both Houses providing a factual update on eligibility for resettlement and the modalities of the trust fund. This will enable further discussion in a proper manner, in line with the desire of the committee and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I hope that, in the light of this assurance, he will not feel it necessary to press his Motion to a vote. On the unique environment of the Chagos, both the United Kingdom and Mauritius have committed to protecting one of the world’s most important marine environments. At the United Nations Ocean Conference, this commitment was reaffirmed in a meeting between the Mauritian Prime Minister and the Environment Secretary. They discussed further co-operation on environmental protection across the archipelago and the Mauritian plans for the creation of a new marine protected area. Under the agreement, the United Kingdom will continue to manage environmental protection on Diego Garcia, which includes the important Ramsar wetland site. We have additionally agreed to support Mauritius in the establishment of marine protected areas, and officials have already begun discussions with their Mauritian counterparts on what this will involve and how environmental standards can be maintained. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton, made a point about the coastline of Diego Garcia. Like all small atoll islands, it is naturally dynamic and I will not speculate about future erosion. However, scientific surveys have concluded that the overall land area of the parts of the island not shaped by military construction has decreased by less than a single percent over the last 50 years. This has been a really important debate, because we have been absolutely focused on the security of this country. None of this has been particularly easy. This was a difficult decision—not one we took lightly, but one we had to make and handle carefully, for all of our sakes. So, lastly, I underline how important a role this landmark agreement has to play in our future, by securing the strategically critical UK-US military base on Diego Garcia well into the next century. It is important for stability in the Indian Ocean region and beyond, important for our defence and security partnership with our closest ally, the United States, and important for our national security here at home in the United Kingdom.

19:34:00

My Lords, I thank the Minister very much. The House will be pleased to know that I will not try its patience by going through the many points that have been made. There was much that I could disagree with—many points of error that I could pick up on and some factual statements that I think were wrong. However, if the Minister will permit, I would like clarification on one point that he made earlier. At the start of his remarks, he said that the Government would bring forward legislation before the treaty is ratified. To be absolutely precise, does he mean they would bring forward that legislation and that that legislation would be passed?

Well, the noble Lord could have interrupted me when I was giving my contribution. It is absolutely clear that we need primary legislation, which we will bring forward before ratification.

That legislation would have to be passed by Parliament before ratification.

I do not understand. The noble Lord has been here long enough. How does legislation get effected in this Parliament?

This is a simple question to the noble Lord. I am very well aware of the procedures. Is he saying that the Government will bring forward the legislation before the treaty is ratified or that the legislation would need to be passed by Parliament before it is ratified? In other words, he will not just bring it forward and then ratify the treaty before Parliament has approved it. It is a simple question, to which I would like a simple answer.

I have answered the point repeatedly. I said it in my opening contribution and I will not continue this up and down dialogue.

I think the House well understands that we did not get an answer to that question. There are many other points that I could make and many questions that have not been answered. He did not respond to any of the points from my noble friends Lord Ahmad or Lord Wolfson, so I hope he will be able to do so in writing. In the meantime, I would like to test the opinion of the House.

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