Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]

Commons Amendments

16:03:00

Motion on Amendment 1

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1.

1: Clause 4, page 6, line 25, after “recipient” insert “in relation to business data”

My Lords, I will speak to some of the amendments made in the other place, starting with Amendments 1 to 31. These will ensure that smart data schemes can function optimally and that Part 1 is as clear as possible. Similarly, Amendments 35 to 42 from the other place reflect discussions on the national underground asset register with the devolved Governments. Finally, Amendments 70 to 79 make necessary consequential updates to the final provisions of the Bill and some updates to Schedules 11 and 15. I will now speak to the amendments tabled by noble Lords, starting with those relating to sex data. Motion 32A disagrees with the amendment to remove Clause 28(3) and (4), and instead proposes changes to the initial drafting of those subsections. These would require the Secretary of State, when preparing the trust framework, to assess whether the 15 specified public authorities can reliably ascertain the data they collect, record and share. Amendment 32B limits this assessment to sex data, as defined through Amendment 32C; that definition limits sex to biological sex only and provides a definition of acquired gender. It is also relevant to speak now to Motion 52A, which disagrees with the amendment to remove Clause 140 and, instead, suggests changes to the drafting. Clause 140, as amended by Amendment 52B, seeks to, through a regulation-making power, give the Secretary of State the ability to define sex as being only biological sex in certain areas or across public sector data processing more widely. Let me be clear that this Government accept the recent Supreme Court judgment on the definition of sex for the purposes of equality legislation. We need to work through the effects of this ruling holistically and with care, sensitivity and—dare I say it—kindness. In line with the law, we need to take care not to inappropriately extend its reach. This is not best done by giving the Secretary of State the power to define sex as biological in all cases through secondary legislation without appropriate scrutiny, given the potential impact on people’s human rights, privacy and dignity, and the potential to create legal uncertainty. Likewise, giving the Secretary of State a role in reviewing how other public authorities process sex data in all circumstances based on that definition would be inappropriate and disproportionate, and I note that the Supreme Court’s ruling relates specifically to the meaning of sex in equalities legislation. The driver behind these amendments has been the importance of sex data being accurate when processed by public authorities. I strongly agree with that aim: accurate data is essential. This Government take data accuracy—including the existing legislation that requires personal data to be accurate—and data standards seriously. That is why we are addressing the question of sex information in public sector data. First, the EHRC is updating its statutory code of practice to support service providers in light of the Supreme Court judgment. Secondly, the Data Standards Authority is developing data standards on the monitoring of diversity information, including sex and gender data, and the effect of the Supreme Court judgment will be considered as part of that work. Thirdly, the Office for Statistics Regulation published updated guidance on collecting and reporting data and statistics about sex and gender identity data last year. Fourthly, the Office for National Statistics published a work plan in December 2024 for developing harmonised standards on data more generally. Finally, the department is currently considering the implementation of the Sullivan review, published this year, which I welcome. On digital verification services, I reassure noble Lords that these measures do not change the evidence that individuals rely on to prove things about themselves. The measures simply enable that to be done digitally. This Government are clear that data must be accurate for the purpose for which it is being used and must not be misleading. It should be clear to digital verification services what the information public authorities are sharing with them means. I will give an important example. If an organisation needs to know a person’s biological sex, this Government are clear that a check cannot be made against passport data, as it does not capture biological sex. DVS could only verify biological sex using data that records that attribute specifically, not data that records sex or gender more widely. I know this is a concern of the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and I hope this provides some reassurance. The data accuracy principle of GDPR is part of existing law. That includes where data is misleading—this is a point I will return to. I hope that noble Lords find this commitment reassuring and, as such, will agree with Commons Amendment 32. Motion 34A on Amendments 34B and 34C address the security of the national underground asset register. Security has always been at the heart of the national underground asset register. We have therefore listened to the well-thought-through concerns that prompted the amendment previously tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, regarding cybersecurity. Following consideration, the Government are instead proposing an amendment we have drafted with support of colleagues in the security services. We believe this addresses the intention of ensuring the security of the national underground asset register data, with three key improvements. First, it broadens the scope from cybersecurity only to the general security of information kept in or obtained from the national underground asset register. This will ensure that front-end users have guidance on a range of measures for security good practice—for example, personnel vetting, which should be considered for implementation—while avoiding the need to publish NUAR-specific cybersecurity features that should not be in the public domain. Secondly, it specifies the audience for this guidance; namely, users accessing NUAR. Finally, it broadens the scope of the amendment to include Northern Ireland alongside England and Wales, consistent with the NUAR measures overall. Clearly, it remains the case that access to NUAR data can be approved for purposes only by eligible users, with all access controlled and auditable. As such, I hope that noble Lords will be content to support government Motion 34A and Amendments 34B and 34C. Commons Amendment 43, made in the other place, on scientific research removes the public interest test inserted in the definition of scientific research by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. While recognising the concern the noble Lord raises, I want to be clear that anything that does not count as scientific research now would not do so under the Bill. Indeed, we have tightened the requirement and added a reasonableness test. The Bill contains strong safeguards. Adding precise definitions in the Bill would not strengthen these protections but impose a significant, new legal obligation on our research community at a time when, in line with the good work of the previous Government, we are trying to reduce bureaucracy for researchers, not increase it with new processes. The test proposed will lead to burgeoning bureaucracy and damage our world-leading research. This disproportionate step would chill basic and curiosity-driven research, and is not one we can support. I beg to move that the House agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1. I have spoken to the other amendments.

My Lords, I first thank the Minister for his—as ever—clear and compelling remarks. I thank all noble Lords who have been working in a collegiate, collaborative fashion to find a way forward on the few but important remaining points of disagreement with the Government. Before I come to the issue of accurate recording of personal data, I also thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for tabling the government amendments on the national underground asset register and her constructive engagement throughout the progress of the Bill. As noble Lords will recall, I set out our case for stronger statutory measures to require the Secretary of State to provide guidance to relevant stakeholders on the cybersecurity measures that should be in place before they receive information from the national underground asset register. I am of course delighted that the Government have responded to the arguments that we and others made and have now tabled their own version of my amendment which would require the Secretary of State to provide guidance on the security of this data. We are happy to support them in that. I turn to Motions 32A and 52A standing in my name, which seek to ensure that data is recorded accurately. They amend the original amendment, which my noble friends Lord Lucas and Lord Arbuthnot took through your Lordships’ House. My noble friend Lord Lucas is sadly unable to attend the House today, but I am delighted to bring these Motions forward from the Opposition Front Bench. In the other place, the Conservative Front Bench tabled new Clause 21, which would, we feel, have delivered a conclusive resolution to the problem. Sadly, the Government resisted that amendment, and we are now limited by the scope of the amendments of my noble friend Lord Lucas, so we were unable to retable the, in my view, excellent amendment in your Lordships’ House.

16:15:00

As several noble Lords said when we discussed this issue on Report, we absolutely must have clarity on the recording of sex and gender, and I was pleased to hear the Minister attest to this position as well. The amendments that I have tabled build on the amendment of my noble friend Lord Lucas in the light of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court. It is now very clear that we need accurate sex data recorded for a whole host of reasons, including for medical research and the protection of same-sex spaces. There is no reason why gender may not also be recorded in a separate field, and it is important that gender data is accurate too.

The Minister was kind enough to meet me this morning to set out his case that the Bill as it stands addresses our concerns. Even if it does so going forward, the Sullivan report warns us that the data as currently held by public bodies may not be reliable. In fact, it is almost certainly not reliable in many cases. Whatever the rules imposed on DBS, it may be passing on inaccuracies already present in the sex and gender data and, as was observed in an earlier debate, when it comes to databases, it is a case of garbage in, garbage out.

I know that noble Lords on the Benches to my left were satisfied by the Minister’s previous assurances that work is already ongoing in this area, but today I think that we have the opportunity to take a step forward on this. I hope that all noble Lords will take that opportunity to deliver the accurate data recording that we need, not least to protect same-sex spaces.

Finally, I turn to Motion 43A from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. He has worked tirelessly on this issue. We understand the argument that he is making and we supported his amendment on Report. The amendment that he has brought forward today is an altered version which is intended to tighten up this definition. I of course appreciate and recognise the Government’s concerns to avoid burdening researchers with unnecessary admin. I am not yet satisfied that we have the right balance here between regulatory burden and public good. We still feel that it is crucial that Ministers resolve this, and we will therefore support the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, in the Lobbies if he chooses to test the opinion of the House. Meanwhile, I intend to test the opinion of the House when Motions 32A and 52A are called.

My Lords, the Minister is right that it is essential that data collected needs to be accurate and that that applies to data on sex as well as on gender. He is also right that the passport does not contain reliable data on sex, and I am grateful to him for making that clear. I am also grateful to him for the discussions that he has had with me and for the discussion that the Secretary of State had with Sex Matters and me, but what is the solution to this? In the absence of any reliable document, how is a care home to ensure that a person who is to provide intimate care for an elderly woman, who has understandably demanded that such care be provided by a woman, will actually be provided by a woman? In the absence of anything else, I suspect a care home will have to fall back on the passport, which, as we have all agreed, is unreliable. My noble friend’s amendment goes some way towards answering this, and I shall support it. It may have flaws. The Minister said in one of our meetings that it would invalidate our existing passports. I am not sure about that but, if it is right, can the Minister propose a minor amendment to my noble friend’s amendment to sort out that problem?

My Lords, I too will speak to Motion 32A. I thank my noble friend the Minister for his confirmation of the Government’s welcome of the Supreme Court ruling and his welcome of the Sullivan report. I also very much welcome the words that he has used today and thank him for the discussions that we have been able to have. Can he confirm that where the Equality Act allows for a women-only space, any digital IT system used for that purpose would refer to biological sex as the relevant information? With regard to public authorities, I assume that organisations such as Sport England and the GMC are counted as public authorities because they are statutory. At the moment the GMC does not record the biological sex of doctors, only the gender. When that also goes digital, will it be confined to biological sex so that, again, patients can know the sex of their physician, assuming that it will be digital? I think that the Minister understands the questions I am posing and that his wording does give that reassurance, but any clarity would be welcome.

My Lords, I stand in support of my Motion 43A. I welcome so much of this Bill. I want this country to be a champion of technology and hope that it becomes a tech powerhouse, attracting hundreds of millions of pounds-worth of investment in the development of AI. I understand the concerns expressed by the Minister, but I am still pressing ahead with this amendment because I want the people of this country to have control of their data and how it is used. This amendment is a push-back against the way the AI companies have been abusing the use of people’s data in training their AI models. Last year, Meta reused data from Instagram users without their consent to train up its Llama AI model. Once this was discovered, there was a huge outcry from the owners of the data and an appeal to the ICO. As a result, Meta stopped the processing and the ICO said, “it is crucial that the public can trust that their privacy rights will be respected from the outset”. I want to make sure that when the Bill becomes law, it reassures the people of this country that they can trust the new technology. The battle to stop the abuse of data is a central concern of my indomitable noble friend Lady Kidron, who is sitting beside me and whose amendment is in the next group. It responds to the theft of copyright belonging to millions of creatives, including authors and artists, by AI companies. As it stands, Clause 67 gives a powerful exemption, allowing AI companies to reuse data without consent if they can show that their work aligns with the definition of “scientific research” set out in the Bill. I fear that this definition is so widely drawn that it will allow AI models to reuse data without consent, claiming that they are carrying out scientific research when in fact they are using it for product development and their own profit. I thank the Ada Lovelace Institute for its constant support throughout the lengthy progress of this Bill. I expressed my concern in Committee and on Report. Chi Onwurah, the very respected chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee in the other place, tabled a similar amendment. However, despite meetings with Ministers, they have offered nothing to assuage our concerns, which has forced me to push this amendment at this stage. Proposed new paragraph 2A inserted by this amendment would tighten the definition of what counts as scientific research. It is taken from the Frascati manual, developed by the OECD in order to compare R&D efforts made by different companies and identify what key features underpin them. The Government support the Frascati definition. In Committee, the Minister said the research test set out in the Bill “will not operate alone”, and will “be in the context of the Frascati definition and the ICO’s guidance”.—[Official Report, 21/1/25; col. 1637.] He said that the Frascati definitions are merely guidance and that codification would bring burdens on scientific researchers, but this is not a new requirement: it is simply a codification of an existing standard set up by the ICO. The central feature of this part of the amendment is that scientific research should increase the stock of human knowledge. The Minister has told your Lordships that not all scientific research will be new knowledge, that scientific research is often refuted or confirms previous findings, and that some scientific research will fail. But if there is refutation or confirmation of an experiment, that is an extension of human knowledge. Even if research fails, the researcher will know that the experiment does not work, and that is new knowledge. The requirement for scientific research to increase the stock of knowledge is a sensible precaution to preserve our data from abuse, and it will weed out the tech companies piggybacking on the clause for their own profit. The purpose of this amendment is not just to tighten the definition. It is also to make sure that researchers have to consider it when they start to deploy the exemption for the reuse of data. The Minister has said it will lead to undue burden on scientists and stop research going ahead, but this definition is already being used by the ICO. The problem for a person whose data is being abused is that at the moment, if they want to appeal against its use without consent, they have to go to the ICO, which then has to apply the Frascati definition. The ICO’s latest statistics show that only 12% of data protection complaints are dealt with within 90 days, compared with the target of 80%. Surely that means it is too late for the appeal against reuse of data without consent. The data will already have been absorbed into the AI training model and, as we have been continually told, it is hard for AI researchers to identify data once it is included in part of the model. Proposed new paragraph 2A inserted by this amendment would stop this happening. By our putting a definition in the Bill, the AI researchers would have to consider it before reusing the data for their model, therefore saving data subjects having to appeal to the ICO if they are concerned about abuse. Proposed new paragraph 2B inserted by this amendment responds to the Government’s claim that the “reasonably described” test in this clause is a tightening of the definition of scientific research. Over 14 of our leading law companies have looked at the Government’s test as set out in the Bill and described it variously as loosening, expanding or broadening the definition. However, Clause 67 asks the question whether the research can be reasonably described as scientific. The ICO or the courts will have to consider whether it is irrational to call this scientific research, but it is very hard to prove irrationality; it is a high bar. I hope noble Lords will agree that the use of the usual reasonableness test asks, “Would a reasonable person conducting scientific research perform this activity in this manner?”. This test evaluates actual conduct against an objective standard of what constitutes proper scientific research. The amendment seeks to realise what is already a requirement: that such research be conducted in line with standards based on the UK Research and Innovation Code of Practice for Research. It would ensure transparency for the use of scientific research. I am sure that during the course of the debate we will hear from scientists who will say that this debate will stifle research and stop new researchers undertaking work. However, this requirement is minimal, and the information required is that which researchers should already have to hand. What I ask your Lordships to bear in mind when voting is that this amendment would give transparency into how people’s data is being reused. The new tests laid out in my amendment would be a powerful weapon in the fight against the abuse of people’s data. I want the new technologies to be successful, but they will be successful only if they have the trust of the people of the country. If people think that the Government have caved in to tech companies and allowed them to pillage our data for their own financial gain rather than for the progress of human knowledge, most will be outraged. I ask the Minister to assuage these fears and ensure that the Bill provides data in the people’s interests. Meanwhile, I will ask the opinion of the House at the end of this debate.

16:30:00

My Lords, I am a latecomer to this debate; I have not participated heretofore. I am doing so only because of conversations I had over the weekend. They related to the amendment from my noble friend under Motion 32A. I am not going to oppose my noble friend’s amendment—it may well be right—but I do want to express my anxieties because they were anxieties expressed by my friend who came to see me. On the judgment of the Supreme Court, I am pretty much in favour of it. I think it was wholly right and I am very glad that the Government are accepting its finality, but it raises problems which I do not think have yet been fully considered, and that is what makes me reluctant to support my noble friend. The friend who came to see me is someone who I have known for a number of years and was born a male. In fact, she married and had a child, and she then transitioned—and transitioned fully—to the female gender and she is fully certificated. We discussed the implications of the judgement for her, and although I strongly support the judgment of the Supreme Court, a number of the points that she made were very troubling, most particularly as regards people who have not fully transitioned and how they are going to be dealt with; for example, in prisons, in hospital wards and so forth. She then came to a very specific point—which has been touched on by a number of your Lordships—regarding passports. This is a woman whom I have known for 10 or so years. In every material respect, she passes as a woman and that is what I have always treated her as being; she is a friend of mine. Her passport at the moment shows “female”, but where there is the requirement “sex”, she is deeply concerned that the passport may have to be altered to state “male” because that is her natal gender. She raises the question very clearly as to what happens when she goes to immigration control or passport control, either in this country or somewhere else, where there will be a manifest divergence of appearance. On the one hand, there is the passport, which says that she is male; on the other hand, there is what she appears for all purposes. The point that I took away from that is that there are still lots of things that we are going to have to address. My suggestion to your Lordships’ House is that we should set up a Select Committee in due time—and this House is well versed to do that—to consider what the implications of the Supreme Court judgment are across a broad spectrum of consideration. Therefore, returning to Motion 32A, if my noble friend will forgive me, I am not going to support him today, not because I think he is wrong but because I think it is premature to come to statutory interventions when there is still a lot to be considered. I would be fearful that, if this House accepted my noble friend’s amendments—and they may be right—they would be treated as a precedent that it is at least conceivable we would come to regret.

My Lords, I wonder if I could go back to the wording proposed under Motion 52A. The whole purpose of it is limited. From a very practical and basic point of view, once the Supreme Court has told us that biological sex is to rule, the points that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, makes, which I entirely understand and sympathise with, really do not arise in this issue. If we are to have data, the data must be accurate. The only point that I am asking your Lordships’ House to consider—this is what the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, is asking—is: “For the purposes of this section, sex data must be collected in accordance with the following category terms and definitions”. That seems eminently sensible. If we do not have it, I see real problems of a different sort from those that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has raised.

My Lords, I wish to speak to Motions 32A and 52A which, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, appear eminently sensible. The Minister—to whom I am also grateful for the meeting that I was able to join—assured us that we can trust the digital verification services because they will be based on the data accuracy principle of the GDPR, but that principle has been in place for a decade during which, as Professor Alice Sullivan recounted in her important report that the Minister welcomed earlier, statistics have become utterly muddled and confused. That is particularly so in this area, because sex and gender identity have been collected and conflated in a single data field such that the meaning of sex has been obscured. I welcome the Minister’s support for the Supreme Court judgment, but, as he said, that judgment confirmed that sex in the Equality Act can only mean and has only ever meant biological sex. However, that has been the case for 15 years, during which all this muddle has taken place. The Minister tells us that we can trust the Government to respect the judgment and to reject the amendments but, before considering that, can he answer a few questions? First, why is it not appropriate to ensure that in this Bill, on data use and access and which specifically talks about a digital verification system, unreliable datasets are not used for digital verification? If it is not in this timely data legislation, then when? The Minister referred to the forthcoming Equality and Human Rights Commission guidance, but I suggest that we do not have to wait for that guidance in this area. We have this Bill, this vehicle, and it is surely appropriate to enshrine everything that the Minister said in this legislation. Secondly, have the Government considered how the digital verification system will work with regard to an estimated 100,000 people who have a different record for their sex across different public bodies—for example, the birth register, Passport Office, driving licence authority and NHS? How is that going to pan out? How will the Government ensure that this mixed data, such as so-called passport sex, is not relied on as an authoritative source to provide an answer to the sex question in the DVS? I respect the concerns that the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, rightly raised; my point is how we will ensure that the data verified for the sex field in the DVS, irrespective of any other field, is accurate and corresponds to biological sex. Will the Government publish clear guidance for data users so that they know which sources of sex data can be trusted and which remain conflated? How will they put technical measures in place to ensure that unreliable sources do not come through the information gateway? Is it impossible that a person who expresses themselves as gender fluid or non-binary could have two different digital verification services apps—one that shows them as female and the other as male, but both bearing the digital verification trust mark? That may not seem terribly common, but it is a possibility for which we need an answer. Finally, the Government have argued that it is very unlikely that digital verification services will be used for applications such as single-sex services. The point was well made about a woman who wants a woman healthcare provider and health screening—by the way, that is also important for trans people to make sure that they are appropriately treated in services such as health. If the aim of the DVS is to provide trusted, interoperable, reusable digital identities that people can use to prove facts about themselves, is it not likely that this will be used in the services spoken about in the Supreme Court judgment and which advised should legitimately be kept as single sex and based on biological sex? If the Government do not like these amendments from the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, but they agree with their aim, I cannot honestly see why the Minister should object to enshrining them in more than the data accuracy principle, which, as I have said, has been, in the last decade, respected more in the breach than in the reality. I am not yet reassured that his assurances, as much as I respect his personal sincerity and integrity, are enough for us to rely on, as opposed to having something on the statute book.

My Lords, I too will speak to Motions 32A and 52A. Just to follow on from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, I really appreciated that the Minister understood the concerns of those who moved these amendments. But, as the noble Baroness pointed out, reassurances have been given in this House, over many debates, that there was nothing to worry about in terms of confusion in relation to sex and gender. We have now ascertained via the Supreme Court that we needed some clarity and we have now got it. I do not want us to make the same mistake again. I ask the Minister to clarify one thing he said in his opening remarks: that it would be overreach to ask the Secretary of State to declare biological sex as a material reality in all instances. I think that is what he said. I point out that biological sex is a material reality in all instances. Despite the comments of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, in relation to his friend, it is not, to clarify, about passing or appearances; it is about biological material reality. In that instance, the Minister called on us to have kindness. Of course, we should all have kindness all the time, in every instance. However, nobody here is trying to be unkind; the intent is to clarify. I liked something the Minister said in the past when he stated that “we must have a single version of the truth on this. There needs to be a way to verify it consistently and there need to be rules”.—[Official Report, 21/1/25; col. 1620.] I agree. It is not about kindness or unkindness; it is about clarification. In addition to what has already been argued, this surely has to be about trust. I can tell the House that quite a lot of people I have spoken to are rather distrustful of digital ID of any sort. They are already cynical and anxious about what is going on with this data collection. I do not raise that point other than to say that the one thing you would want in order to counter such worries is that this particular measure should be trustworthy. Yet, to quote an article by Joan Smith in UnHerd, we are talking about “an officially sanctioned app” that will allow the falsification of sex, even if that is not its intent. It would be a form of self-ID that appears to be endorsed by a government TrustMark based on documents that could be based on gender identity rather than sex. A government TrustMark ought to be trustworthy. It is supposed to guarantee that the data it contains is accurate, and that includes sex. Something important happened with the Supreme Court’s clarification, but, of course, this is an ongoing discussion of the implications it has on a wide range of public policy. I understand that, but I fear that there are times when people suggest we should leave the Supreme Court to some kind of relativistic mishmash. People keep saying to me, “What’s your reading of it?” It is not about a reading; it is a clarification of the law. If this Bill inadvertently adds to that relativised muddle or is used as an excuse to dismiss the Supreme Court, that would be an unintended consequence of what the Government are doing. It could be simply sorted out by the Government themselves.

My Lords, I want briefly to add my voice to that of my noble friend Lord Colville, to say that in Committee I asked a number of times whether the science of conditioning—that is, the science of persuasive design that would extend the use of children—could be considered science under the current definition, and I never got an answer. So, although I am very sympathetic to the idea that science must be possible, whatever we do with the Bill, I would like to ensure that it is not, as the noble Viscount says, an excuse for any kind of commercial activity that could be perpetrated on the user.

16:45:00

My Lords, I sat through the Committee stage and did not speak, because I was so clear that the amendment tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, was really inappropriate. Indeed, it was the speech by my noble friend Lord Vallance that made me feel that speaking was unnecessary. I regret that, because I should have pointed out something very important. First, to come back to what the noble Baroness has just said, the definitions in the Bill are flawed to start with. Devising new applications of available knowledge is not the work of scientists; it is essentially the work of technologists—and there is a big difference between technology and science. Technology has all sorts of downsides that we do not expect. Science is simply knowledge and, as such, it does not have an ethical dimension. That has been stated by many distinguished philosophers in the past. I suggest to noble Lords that every invention and innovation that we make has a downside that we do not expect. I would challenge the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I have sat on a scientific committee with him and we have enjoyed each other’s company, but I would argue that there is not a single case where he could argue that there has not been an unexpected downside—as there is with every scientific invention. That, essentially, is why this is a flawed problem. There are three problems facing humanity and the world at the moment. One, clearly, is nuclear war; one, clearly, is climate change; and perhaps the most important one is the risk of antibiotic resistance. It turns out that all these risks were completely unseen when those technologies were started. Marie Curie, working on pitchblende and radium, had no idea that the X-rays she was producing would be dangerous to her and would, unfortunately, result in her death as a result of cancer. She certainly did not recognise that there might be such a thing as nuclear explosions. When it comes to, for example, climate change, it is obvious that we would not want to avoid having had the Industrial Revolution and all the things we got from it, just as we would not want to avoid having X-rays. But we must understand that the control has to come later. Lastly, the most important thing for me is the possibility that infection is one of the greatest problems that humanity faces on earth at the moment. The invention of antibiotics has actually made that worse, because we now have a rising number of infections that are due to resistance. Therefore, I beg the noble Viscount not to press his amendment. I believe that it is absolutely well-meaning, and I understand what he is trying to say, but I hope that the Opposition, when they listen to this, will consider at least abstaining from voting on it, because the risk is that it might bring the House of Lords into disrepute as it stands.

My Lords, I am authorised to speak on Motion 43A, as someone with regular day-to-day experience of scientific research. Since I started my PhD in 1981, I have had the privilege of spending more than half my working life doing scientific research in the UK—the last 20 years working with very sensitive patient data. Most of that research has been carried out in an academic setting, but some of it has been in collaboration with medtech, AI and pharmaceutical companies. This research has required me to become familiar with many three-letter and four-letter acronyms. Noble Lords will know about DBS, but they might not know about RSO, TRO, HRA, LREC, MREC, CAG, and IRAS, to name just a few. I have spent hundreds of hours working with clinical colleagues to fill in integrated research application system—IRAS—forms. IRAS is used to apply for Health Research Authority—HRA—approval for research projects involving the NHS, social care or the criminal justice system. I have appeared before not only medical research ethics committees, or MRECs, which test whether a research protocol is scientifically valid and ethical, but local research ethics committees, or LRECs, which consider the suitability of individual researchers and local issues. I was involved in a research project which reused data acquired from patients on a Covid isolation ward during the first two waves of the pandemic. That research project sought to understand how nurses interpreted continuous data from the clinical-grade wearables we used to monitor these high-risk patients during Covid. It took our research team more than 18 months to obtain the relevant permissions to reuse the data for our proposed analysis. Our application was reviewed by the Confidentiality Advisory Group—CAG—which provides independent expert advice on the use of confidential patient information without consent for research and non-research purposes. CAG already considers whether accessing the confidential data is justified by the public interest. Its advice is then used by the HRA and the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care to decide whether to grant access to the confidential data. The existing provisions in this country to allow access to data for research purposes are stringent, and it is entirely right that they should be. The UK is respected the world over for the checks and balances of its research governance. The relevant safeguards already exist in the current legislation. Adding a further public interest test will only increase the amount of bureaucracy that will inevitably be introduced by the research services offices, or RSOs, and the translational research offices, or TROs, of our universities, which are very good at doing this. The extra burden will fall on the researchers themselves, and some researchers may decide to concentrate their available time and energy elsewhere. This amendment, I am afraid, will have the unintended consequence of having a negative impact on research in this country, so I cannot support it.

My Lords, an onlooker might be forgiven for not perceiving a common theme in this group of amendments, but I thank the Minister for his introduction and the noble Viscounts for introducing their amendments so clearly. I acknowledge that Motion 32A and Amendments 32B and 32C and Motion 52A and Amendments 52B and 52C from the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, are considerably less prescriptive than the Spencer amendment in the House of Commons to introduce new Clause 21, which seemed to require public authorities to comb through every record to rectify data, went significantly further than the findings of the Supreme Court judgment, and potentially failed to account for the privacy afforded to GRC holders under the Gender Recognition Act. However, the Liberal Democrats will abstain from votes on the noble Viscount’s amendments for several key reasons. Our primary reason is the need to allow time for the EHRC’s guidance to be finalised. I thought the Minister made his case there. The EHRC is currently updating its code of practice, as we have heard, to reflect the implications of the Supreme Court judgment on the meaning of sex in the Equality Act, with the aim of providing it to the Government by the end of June. This guidance, as I understand it, is intended specifically to support service providers, public bodies and others in understanding their duties under the Equality Act and putting them into practice in the light of the judgment. The EHRC is undertaking a public consultation to understand how the practical implications can best be reflected. These amendments, in our view, are an attempt to jump the gun on, second-guess or at the least pre-empt the EHRC’s code of practice. On these Benches, we believe that any necessary changes or clarifications regarding data standards should be informed by the official guidance and implemented consistently in a coherent and workable manner. We should allow time for the EHRC’s guidance to be finalised, ensuring that any necessary changes or clarifications regarding data standards are informed by its advice and implemented consistently across public authorities in a coherent and workable manner. We have concerns about workability and clarity. Although the amendments proposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, are less prescriptive than previous similar proposals in the Commons tabled by Dr Spencer, we have concerns about their practical implementation. Questions arise about how public authorities would reliably ascertain biological sex if someone has a gender recognition certificate and has updated their birth certificate. I have long supported same-sex wards in the NHS, but I do not believe that these amendments are helpful in pursuing clarity following the Supreme Court judgment. We heard what the Minister had to say about passports. I welcome the clarity provided by the Supreme Court judgment, but there are clearly implications, both practical and legal, to be worked out, such as those mentioned by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. I thought he put his finger on many of those issues. I trust that the EHRC will deliver the right result. I agree that data needs to be accurate, and I welcome the Sullivan report, as did my noble friend. In summary, we will be abstaining. We believe that the EHRC process needs to conclude and provide comprehensive guidance, while also reflecting concerns about the workability and appropriateness of specific legislative interventions on data standards at this time. I move on to Amendment 43B, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. This amendment may not reinstate the precise wording “conducted in the public interest” that we previously inserted in this House, but it would introduce safeguards that seek to address the same fundamental concerns articulated during our debate on Report. It does two important things. First, it provides a definition of “scientific research”, clarifying it as “creative and systematic work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge”. This directly addresses the concerns raised on Report that the line between product development and scientific research is often blurred, with developers sometimes positing efforts to increase model capabilities or study risks as scientific research. Having a clear definition helps to distinguish genuine research from purely commercial activity cloaked as such. Secondly, and critically, Amendment 43B would require: “To meet the reasonableness test” already present in the Bill, “the activity being described as scientific research must be conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and professional frameworks, obligations and standards”. This requirement seeks to embed within the reasonableness test the principles that underpinned our arguments for the public interest requirement on Report and is the same as the amendment put forward by the chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee, Chi Onwurah MP, which ties the definition to the definition in the OECD’s Frascati Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and Experimental Development: “creative and systematic work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge—including knowledge of humankind, culture and society—and to devise new applications of available knowledge”. The Frascati framework is used worldwide by Governments, universities and research institutions to report R&D statistics, inform science policy and underpin R&D tax credit regimes, and it serves as a common language and reference point for international comparisons and policy decisions related to scientific research and innovation. These frameworks, obligations and standards are important because they serve the very purposes we previously identified for the public interest test: ensuring societal benefit, building public trust, preventing misuse for commercial ends, addressing harmful applications, and alignment with standards. Amendment 43B in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, is a thoughtful and necessary counter-proposal. It is Parliament’s opportunity to insist that the principles of public benefit, trust and responsible conduct, rooted in established frameworks, must remain central to the definition of scientific research that benefits from data re-use exceptions. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Winston, had to say in his very powerful speech, but I cannot see how the amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, cuts across all the things that he wants to see in the outcomes of research.

As the noble Lord has mentioned my name, I simply ask him this question: does he recall the situation only some 45 years ago when there was massive public outcry about in vitro fertilisation, when there were overwhelming votes against in vitro fertilisation in both Houses of Parliament on two occasions, and when, finally, a Private Member’s Bill was brought, which would have abolished IVF in this country? Had that happened, of course, an amendment such as this would have prevented the research happening in England and would have made a colossal difference not only to our knowledge of embryo growth, but our knowledge of development, ageing, the development of cancer and a whole range of things that we never expected from human embryology. I beg the noble Lord to consider that.

17:00:00

My Lords, I have had a misspent not-so-youth over the past 50 years. As a lawyer, when I read the wording in the amendment, I cannot see the outcome that he is suggesting. This wording does not cut across anything that he has had to say. I genuinely believe that. I understand how genuine he is in his belief that this is a threat, but I do not believe this wording is such a threat. I also understand entirely what the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, had to say, but an awful lot of that was about the frustration and some of the controls over health data. That does not apply in many other areas of scientific research. The Frascati formula is universal and well accepted. The noble Viscount made an extremely good case; we should be supporting him.

I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for his Motion 32A and Amendments 32B and 32C, and Motion 52A and Amendments 52B and 52C. I reiterate that this Government have been clear that we accept the Supreme Court judgment on the meaning of sex for equalities legislation. However, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, says, it is critically important that the Government work through the effect of this ruling with care, sensitivity and in line with the law. When it comes to public sector data, we must work through the impacts of this judgment properly. This would involve considering the scope of the judgment and the upcoming EHRC guidance. Critically, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has indicated that it will be updating its statutory code of practice for services, public functions and associations in light of this ruling, which will include some of the examples raised this afternoon, including by my noble friend Lady Hayter. Ministers will consider the proposals once the EHRC has submitted its updated draft. It is right that the Government and, indeed, Parliament fully consider this guidance alongside the judgment itself before amending the way that public authorities collect, hold and otherwise process data—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the EHRC ruling. I set out in my opening speech that this Government take the issue of data accuracy seriously. That is why, as I outlined, there are numerous existing work streams addressing the way in which sex and gender data are collected and otherwise processed across the public sector. The digital verification services amendments that we have discussed today are misplaced, because the Bill does not alter the evidence and does not seek to alter the content of data used by digital verification services. Instead, the Bill enables people to do digitally what they can do physically. It is for organisations to consider what specific information they need to verify their circumstances, and how they go about doing that. Any inconsistency between what they can do digitally and what they can do physically would cause further confusion. While this Government understand the intention behind the amendments, the concerns regarding the way in which public authorities process sex and gender data should be considered holistically, taking into account the effects of the Supreme Court ruling, the upcoming guidance from the equalities regulator and the specific requirements of public authorities. It is very unlikely that the digital verification services would be used for many of the cases specifically raised by or with many noble Lords. We expect DVS to be used primarily to prove things like one’s right to work or one’s age, address or professional educational qualifications. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, rightly highlights that the proposals have the potential to interfere with the right to respect for private and family life under the Human Rights Act by, in effect, indiscriminately and indirectly pushing public authorities to record sex as biological sex in cases where it is not necessary or proportionate in that particular circumstance. I raise the example that has been brought up several times, and again by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox: it is not relevant for the French passport officer to know your biological sex. That is not the purpose of the passport. We acknowledge, however, that there are safeguards that address the concerns raised by noble Lords, including those of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, regarding information being shared under Clause 45 but without presenting issues that could cut across existing or prospective legislation and guidance. I remind the House that the data accuracy principle is already included in law. The principle requires that only data accurate for the purpose for which it is held can be used. Again, there are workstreams looking at data use to answer the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, and indeed by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked why it was not accurate for 15 years and what that means about our reliance on this accuracy. I am afraid the fact is that it was accurate for 15 years because there was a muddle about what was being collected. There was no requirement to push for biological sex, but that is the case now. In response to the question of whether you could end up with two different sources of digital verification showing two different biological sexes, the answer is no.

I beg the House’s indulgence and indeed the Minister’s for my interrupting him. The fact is that the Supreme Court has confirmed what was always the law: that the Equality Act meant biological sex. It is therefore not true that the data accuracy principle has ensured that the law has been followed for the past 15 years. I am sorry, I find that answer a little dismissive. I do not think we can rely on that sort of assurance, and I apologise for saying that.

I apologise to the noble Baroness if she found that dismissive. My point was to try to say that there is a clear imperative under the new situation to have biological sex verified as biological sex. As a result—though not in all cases; I have given an example where it would be inappropriate to have that information—where you need that, it would not be possible, to answer her second question, to have two different sources of verification that gave two different biological sexes. When information is shared through the gateway, it will be clear what that information represents, including in relation to sex and gender. In the light of the Supreme Court judgment, I further reassure Members by clarifying that, before the information gateway provision is commenced, the Government will carefully consider how and when biological sex may be relevant in the context of digital verification checks, and will take that into account when preparing the DVS code of practice. I hope that these commitments and the assurance about the EHRC will provide noble Lords with reassurances that their concerns will indeed be taken into account. The amendments proposed do not fully take into account the fact that the Gender Recognition Act gives those with gender recognition certificates a level of privacy and control over who has access to information about their gender history. It is essential that Government have the chance to fully assess the Supreme Court judgment and update guidance accordingly. Given the need to consider this area holistically to ensure alignment with existing legislation and upcoming EHRC guidance, the breadth of work already being carried out on public data standards and data harmonisation and statistics, and the specific reassurance on compliance with the accuracy principle under the UK GDPR, I hope the noble Viscount feels comfortable not pressing his amendments. I turn to Motion 43A from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. Scientific research is one of the UK’s great strengths. We are home to four of the top 10 universities in the world and are in the top three in scientific outputs. Today’s researchers depend on data, and the UK data protection framework contains certain accommodations for processing personal data for purposes that meet the definition of scientific research in Clause 67. I understand the noble Viscount’s intention to avoid misuse of these research provisions, but the Royal Society has said the reasonableness test in the Bill provides adequate protection against that. The Bill actually tightens the current position, with the ICO being able to use the reasonableness test. “Reasonable” does not mean the subjective opinion of an uninformed person; it refers to an objective, fair observer with good judgment and knowledge of the relevant facts. Such tests are well known to UK courts. The Bill does not extend and expand that definition. If something is not considered scientific research now, it will not be under the Bill. Similarly, the Bill does not provide any new permission for reusing data for other research purposes. Moreover, further safeguards are provided in Clause 86 and the wider UK GDPR, including the requirement that processing be fair. The Bill clarifies that all reuse of data must have a lawful basis, putting an end to previous confusion on the matter. Adding further specific conditions to the definition in law will be unnecessary and impose a disproportionate burden on researchers, who already say they spend too much time on red tape. The previous Government rightly started to tackle the pernicious creep of increased bureaucracy in research. We should not add more. At worst, this could have an unintended harmful consequence and exclude genuine researchers. The Frascati manual provides useful guidance; it is not, however, a legal definition. Requiring researchers to start complying with a new legal standard, and one that might change, would undoubtedly create more committees and more bureaucracy—the very thing that Max Perutz argued against in his guidelines on great research. My noble friend Lord Winston and the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, have given powerful examples. Let me give two examples of where the proposals might cause problems. Does requiring research to be creative hinder the essential task in science of testing or reproducing existing findings? Does the Frascati manual definition of “systematic”, which means “budgeted”, exclude unfunded, early research trying to get a foothold? Let us not dampen the UK’s world-leading research sector for a protection that is already included in the Bill. I sympathise with the intentions of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I assure him that the Bill also contains a power to add to the existing safeguards and narrow access to the research provisions if necessary. The Government would not hesitate to use that power if it ever became necessary to tackle misuse.

Motion on Amendment 1 agreed.

Moved by That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 2 to 31.

2: Clause 4, page 6, line 26, after “authority” insert “to do something with the business data”

3: Clause 4, page 6, line 30, at end insert— “(aa) make provision requiring a person who is a third party recipient in relation to business data (whether by virtue of those regulations or other data regulations), and who is appointed by a public authority to do something with the business data, to publish or provide business data as described in paragraph (a)(i) or (ii),”

4: Clause 4, page 6, line 31, leave out from “or” to “, make” in line 32 and insert “the appointed person referred to in paragraph (a) or (aa)”

5: Clause 4, page 6, line 37, after “authority” insert “or appointed person”

6: Clause 4, page 6, line 39, leave out “(a)(ii)” and insert “(a) or (aa), other than a customer described in paragraph (a)(i)”

7: Clause 8, page 12, line 5, leave out “and sections 9 and 10”

8: Clause 8, page 12, line 6, at end insert “(and see sections 9 and 10)”

9: Clause 8, page 12, line 18, leave out “imposed by a decision-maker” and insert “(referred to in sections 3(2) and 5(3))”

10: Clause 8, page 13, line 16, after second “specified” insert “documents or”

11: Clause 8, page 13, line 18, leave out “information about” and insert “documents or information relating to”

12: Clause 8, page 13, line 18, leave out “, either generally or in relation to a particular case”

13: Clause 8, page 13, line 20, leave out “information about” and insert “documents or information relating to”

14: Clause 10, page 16, line 8, at end insert— “(f) about what must or may be done with amounts paid as penalties.”

15: Clause 11, page 16, line 13, leave out “for the purpose of meeting expenses” and insert “in connection with activities”

16: Clause 11, page 16, line 24, leave out from beginning to “performing” in line 25 and insert “Those activities are”

17: Clause 11, page 16, line 34, leave out “in respect of which the fee is charged” and insert “in connection with which the fee is charged (and for the total amount of fees payable in connection with things to exceed the total cost)”

18: Clause 11, page 17, line 13, at end insert— “(9) The Secretary of State or the Treasury may by regulations make provision about whether a person listed in subsection (2), or a person acting on their behalf, who could require payment in connection with an activity described in subsection (3) otherwise than in reliance on regulations under subsection (1) may do so. (10) Where duties or powers are imposed or conferred— (a) on a person in their capacity as a third party recipient by or under regulations made under this Part, other than regulations made in reliance on section 4(4)(a), (aa) or (b), or (b) on a person in their capacity as a person described in section 4(4)(c) by or under regulations made under this Part, nothing in this section, or in regulations under subsection (1) or (9), prevents the person, or a person acting on their behalf, from requiring payment in connection with the performance or exercise of those duties or powers, or restricts their ability to do so, where the person could do so otherwise than in reliance on regulations under subsection (1). (11) Examples of requiring payment otherwise than in reliance on regulations under subsection (1) include doing so in reliance on other legislation or a contract or other arrangement (whenever entered into).”

19: Clause 14, page 19, line 3, at end insert— “(ba) requiring section 2(4) actors described in the regulations to use a prescribed interface, comply with prescribed interface standards or participate in Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL] 3 prescribed interface arrangements when taking, facilitating or doing other things in connection with relevant financial services action;”

20: Clause 14, page 19, line 14, leave out “or (b)” and insert “, (b) or (ba)”

21: Clause 14, page 20, line 11, at end insert— ““relevant financial services action” means action described in section 2(4) taken in relation to services or digital content provided or supplied by a financial services provider; “section 2(4) actor” means— (a) a person who, in reliance on regulations under subsection (4) of section 2, takes action described in that subsection; (b) a data holder or other person who facilitates or does other things in connection with such action.”

22: Clause 15, page 21, line 13, leave out third “to”

23: Clause 15, page 21, line 14, after “subsection,” insert “or to a person acting on behalf of such a body or person,”

24: Clause 15, page 21, line 14, leave out “for the purpose of meeting expenses” and insert “in connection with activities”

25: Clause 15, page 21, line 19, leave out subsection (8) and insert— “(8) Those activities are performing or exercising— (a) duties or powers imposed or conferred on the interface body or person listed in subsection (7) by FCA interface rules, and (b) other duties or powers imposed or conferred on that body or person by or under regulations made under this Part.”

26: Clause 15, page 21, line 27, leave out “in respect of which the fee is charged” and insert “in connection with which the fee is charged (and for the total amount of fees payable in connection with things to exceed the total cost)”

27: Clause 15, page 21, line 38, at end insert— “(da) may require or enable rules to make provision about what must or may be done with amounts paid as fees;”

28: Clause 15, page 21, line 41, at end insert— “(9A) Regulations under section 14 may enable FCA interface rules to make provision about whether an interface body or a person listed in subsection (7), or a person acting on behalf of such a body or person, who could require payment in connection with an activity described in subsection (8) otherwise than in reliance on FCA interface rules may do so. (9B) Examples of requiring payment otherwise than in reliance on FCA interface rules include doing so in reliance on other legislation or a contract or other arrangement (whenever entered into).”

29: Clause 21, page 26, line 6, after “sections” insert “11(9),”

30: Clause 23, page 27, line 15, at end insert— “(3A) For the purposes of determining whether subordinate legislation contains provision described in clauses 2(1) to (4) or 4(1) to (4), references in those sections to something specified are to be read as including something specified by or under any subordinate legislation.”

31: Clause 25, page 28, line 33, at end insert— “(4) In this Part, references to regulations made under subsection (3) of section 4 or any of sections 5 to 21 (and references which include such regulations) include regulations made under section 4(4)(b) or (c) which make provision that could be made under the other subsection or section.”

Moved by That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 32.

32: Clause 28, page 30, line 32, leave out subsections (3) and (4)

Moved by 32A: Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 32, and do propose Amendments 32B and 32C to the words so restored to the Bill—

32B: Clause 28, page 30, line 34, leave out “personal data attributes” and insert “sex data”

32C: Clause 28, page 30, line 34, at end insert—“(3A) For the purposes of subsection (3), sex data is reliably ascertained if it is collected in accordance with the following category terms and definitions—(a) “sex” meaning male or female only based on “sex at birth”, “natal sex” or “biological sex” (these terms carrying the same meaning and capable of being used interchangeably); and(b) in addition, where it is lawful to do so in accordance with data protection legislation and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, “acquired gender” meaning male or female only, as recorded on a gender recognition certificate issued in accordance with the Gender Recognition Act 2004.””

I thank the Minister for his very able summing up of his position, but I am afraid I cannot get past the question in my mind of how existing legacy data, even if it is managed by a DVS system going forward, will suddenly be of high quality when it is currently, as we know from the Sullivan report, in a muddle. As a result, for all his eloquence, I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.

1|17:14|200|183|Division on Motion 32A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 32)|Motion 32A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 32) agreed.||0|0

17:25:00

Motion on Amendment 33

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 33.

33: Clause 45, page 43, line 12, leave out subsection (6)

Motion on Amendment 33 agreed.

Motion on Amendment 34

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 34 and do propose Amendments 34B and 34C instead of the words so left out of the Bill—

34: Clause 56, page 54, line 1, leave out lines 1 to 3

34B: Clause 56, page 54, line 17, at end insert— “106CA Guidance (1) The Secretary of State must produce guidance for persons described in subsection (2) about how to protect information kept in, or obtained from, NUAR. (2) The persons are persons who, pursuant to regulations made under section 106C, are able to access information kept in NUAR. (3) The Secretary of State may revise or replace the guidance. (4) The Secretary of State must publish the guidance (and any revised or replacement guidance) in such manner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate for bringing it to the attention of persons described in subsection (2). (5) The same guidance may discharge the obligations of the Secretary of State under this section and under Article 45CA of the Street Works (Northern Ireland) Order 1995 (S.I. 1995/3210 (N.I. 19)).”

34C: Clause 58, page 64, line 37, at end insert— “45CA Guidance (1) The Secretary of State must produce guidance for persons described in paragraph (2) about how to protect information kept in, or obtained from, NUAR. (2) The persons are persons who, pursuant to regulations made under Article 45C, are able to access information kept in NUAR. (3) The Secretary of State may revise or replace the guidance. (4) The Secretary of State must publish the guidance (and any revised or replacement guidance) in such manner as the Secretary of State considers appropriate for bringing it to the attention of persons described in paragraph (2). (5) The same guidance may discharge the obligations of the Secretary of State under this Article and under section 106CA of the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991.”

Motion on Amendment 34 agreed.

Motion on Amendments 35 to 42

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 35 to 42.

35: Clause 56, page 58, leave out lines 10 and 11 and insert “obtain the consent of the Welsh Ministers in relation to any provision which would be within the legislative competence of Senedd Cymru if contained in an Act of the Senedd (ignoring any requirement for the consent of a Minister of the Crown imposed under Schedule 7B to the Government of Wales Act 2006).”

36: Clause 57, page 60, line 18, leave out “consult the Welsh Ministers” and insert “obtain the consent of the Welsh Ministers in relation to any provision that relates to apparatus in streets in Wales”

37: Clause 57, page 60, line 41, at end insert— “(4A) Before making regulations under this section the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the Welsh Ministers in relation to any provision that relates to apparatus in streets in Wales.”

38: Clause 57, page 61, leave out line 3

39: Clause 57, page 61, line 31, leave out subsections (8) and (9)

40: Clause 58, page 68, leave out lines 2 to 4 and insert— “(A1) Before making regulations under this Order the Secretary of State must obtain the consent of the Department for Infrastructure.”

41: Clause 59, page 70, leave out lines 12 and 13

42: Clause 59, page 70, leave out line 39

Motion on Amendments 35 to 42 agreed.

Motion on Amendment 43

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 43.

43: Clause 67, page 75, line 26, leave out “and that is conducted in the public interest”

Motion 43A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 43)

Moved by

43A: At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 43B instead of the words so left out of the Bill—

43B: Clause 67, page 75, line 28, at end insert— “2A. For the purposes of paragraph 2, “scientific research” means creative and systematic work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of humankind, culture and society, and to devise new applications of available knowledge. 2B. To meet the reasonableness test in paragraph 2, the activity being described as scientific research must be conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and professional frameworks, obligations and standards.””

My Lords, I listened carefully to the speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Winston and Lord Tarassenko, but I am not convinced that my amendment would stop the research as they suggested. However, it would protect users’ data as the technological revolution unfolds. I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.

2|17:28|289|168|Division on Motion 43A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 43)|Motion 43A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 32) agreed.||0|0

17:40:00

Motion on Amendment 44

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 44.

44: Clause 95, page 120, line 31, leave out subsection (1)

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will speak also to Amendments 45 to 51 and 78. There has, quite reasonably, been significant interest in the topic of AI and copyright. This is a hugely important issue, and a complex one. I hope that noble Lords will bear with me as I set out the Government’s position, which has been the subject of some misrepresentation in recent reporting. I make it clear that this Bill does not introduce any changes to copyright law or wider intellectual property regulation. It does not introduce an opt-out system, nor does it contain any delegated powers that would allow such a system to be implemented. All existing copyright rules continue to apply to the use of material for AI training in exactly the way it did before the Bill was introduced. This Government recognise the enormous economic and social value of our creative industries. We saw that just last week, as the nation came together to commemorate the anniversary of VE Day. Our creative sector entertains and informs us. It is the best of us as a nation. Our manifesto quite rightly pledged to work with the creative industries to unlock their potential after years of neglect. As noble Lords will know, the creative industries are worth £124 billion GVA and support 2.4 million jobs. Since 2010, they have grown at 1.5 times the rate of the rest of the economy. The creative industries are one of our eight priority strands within our industrial strategy. In January 2025, as a first step in delivering that strategy, we announced: first, that the British Business Bank will increase its support for creative industry businesses to help them access the finances they need to grow; secondly, that UKRI will strengthen support for the sector to drive R&D-led growth; thirdly, that shorter-duration apprenticeships as a first step towards a flexible growth and skills levy that meets creative industry employers' needs will be introduced; fourthly, a commitment to devolve funding to six priority mayoral strategic authorities to drive the growth of creative clusters; and, fifthly, a £19 million package of funding for programmes including the UK Games Fund, the UK Global Screen Fund, music export growth schemes and create growth programmes. The Government will build on this support through the upcoming creative industry sector plan, which we publish very soon. Our manifesto also recognises both the opportunities and the risks of AI. We pledged to take early action, and one part of this was the launch of a detailed consultation on the future of copyright reform to ensure that protections are fit for purpose as technology evolves and its use becomes more widespread. That consultation closed earlier this year, and we are now analysing a large volume of responses—something in the region of 11,500—and assessing the evidence that we have received. Our proposals will be based on that evidence and what works, rather than any preferred option. This will take time to do properly and, as such, the Government did not and do not believe that this Bill is the right vehicle to make any substantial changes to the law on this issue. Yes, we must act quickly, but we must also continue our thinking and engagement to ensure that the policy outcome is the one that best balances the potential of AI and the need to support rights holders. Although we do not believe that this Bill is the right vehicle for wholesale change to copyright law, we understand the need to demonstrate that this Government, unlike others, want to follow best practice, engage meaningfully with all sides and come to the right conclusions. This is why the elected House took the decision to remove the relevant amendments passed during Lords stages and insert new provisions to demonstrate our commitment to legislate on AI in a fair, evidence-based way. Of course we agree that there should be greater transparency about the use of protected material to train AI models. We agree that there should be more work done to identify the technical solutions that will empower rights holders to decide whether and how their material is used. We must continue to talk to all sides and to ensure that a reformed copyright regime is carefully thought through, effectively and robustly supported by the evidence. As our amendments set out, we will report on four substantive areas within 12 months. These will clearly signpost what we want to deliver and how we propose to do so. We will also carry out an economic impact assessment of the proposed changes once we have come to a settled view.

17:45:00

I applaud the strong support and dedicated advocacy for the creative industries in your Lordships’ House. I welcome the tireless campaigning from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and thank her for her engagement throughout the passage of this Bill. I also thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for his amendment and engagement.

To deal with their amendments in order, the text tabled by the noble Viscount would add extra elements to the Government’s report, including a plan to reduce barriers to market entry for AI developers, the impact on UK copyright holders of extraterritorial uses of their work and technological standards for machine-readable watermarks. The amendments also further define which web crawlers and AI systems might be considered in scope. These amendments are designed to be constructive, and I thank the noble Viscount for the thought that he has put into them. I do, however, suggest that, in the main, they are already covered by the government amendment. He is a passionate advocate for a global digital watermarking scheme, and, as my noble friend Lord Vallance has said on previous occasions, there is certainly merit in those discussions taking place. However, as the noble Viscount would readily admit, this would need to be a global effort, and it would therefore not be for the UK Government to take unilateral action.

Motion 49A, tabled by the noble Lady Baroness, Lady Kidron, would insert Amendment 49B. While well-intentioned, the amendment is limited in focus and would leap straight to implementing an outcome without affording time to properly develop the policy. It would require substantial policy change in just one of the areas identified in the Government’s amendments to be implemented in the form of secondary legislation. Noble Lords may find it refreshing for a Minister to say these words from the Dispatch Box, but in our view this would not be an appropriate delegation of power. We consulted for a reason, and while we will act as quickly as possible, we must legislate properly. Arbitrary statutory deadlines will not create better policy outcomes. The Government recognise the strength of feeling across your Lordships’ House, and we agree wholeheartedly that there needs to be greater transparency and control over the use of creative works to train AI.

We also share the wish of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to see more licensing of content so that our creative industries share in the value created by those new technologies. We must also ensure that AI companies are able to access the data they need to build leading models in a legal and efficient way. The British public and economy should be able to adopt and benefit from the most capable models available. We cannot pull up the shutters around our island, leaving AI development to take place overseas, outside the influence of British rights holders and legislators.

This is not an easy problem to solve. This is why we must use the best economic data and evidence that we can gather and follow a proper policy process to determine the best way forward. We will get to the right outcomes, and we will get those outcomes as quickly as we can. We want to work with noble Lords across the Chamber to get there. However, despite the good intentions on display in these amendments, the Government cannot support them. I beg to move.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for setting out the Government’s case so clearly. I will speak to my Amendment 46A, which seeks to improve the report that the Government brought forward in the other place. This issue is causing real concern for copyright owners and so many others in the creative industries. Let us remind ourselves that the creative industries contributed £124 billion in gross value added to the UK economy in 2023 and outperformed the UK economy between 2010 and 2023 in terms of growth. The Government are, wisely and rightly, prioritising growth over other concerns, and the creative industries will have to be an essential part of this—but only to the extent that they have a trusted and efficient marketplace for intellectual property. Our amendment would improve the Government’s proposed report by adding consideration of extra territorial use of creators’ copyright works by operators of web crawlers and AI systems, as well as consideration of establishing a digital watermark for the purposes of identifying licensed content. I very much take on board the Minister’s point that this must be international to work, but few countries, if any, would have better or greater convening power to initiate the process of creating such digital standards. I urge the Government to pursue that avenue. I pay tribute to all noble Lords who have raised the issue of copyright during the passage of this Bill. I am sure that I will be joining many others in thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has led such a powerful and successful campaign on this issue. Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have recognised the serious concerns raised by the creative sector and, on Report, we tabled an amendment seeking to create a digital watermark to identify this content and to protect copyright owners. I am very pleased that the Government have taken the first step by amending the Bill in the other place to put a report in it. That being said, the report needs to go further. If the Government are unwilling to accept our changes, I will test the opinion of the House when my amendment is called. I turn briefly to Motion 49A, I the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I once again pay tribute to the work that she has done to make progress on this. While we had concerns about the drafting of her amendment on Report, I am very pleased that she has tabled her Amendment 49B today. With the additional parts of it targeted at supporting small businesses and micro-entities, we are delighted to support it. It is increasingly clear that the Government must do the right thing for our creative industries, and we are delighted to offer our support to Motoin 49A. I intend to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 46A when it is called.

My Lords, I will speak to my Motion 49A and offer my support to Amendment 46A in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose. It is a sensible amendment and I hope that the Government find a way to accept it without challenge. I start by rebutting three assertions that have been circling over the past few weeks. First, I reject the notion that those of us who have raised our voices against government plans are against technology. I quote the Secretary of State, Peter Kyle, who I am delighted to see is below Bar this afternoon. He said to the FT that: “Just as in every other time there is change in society, there will be some people who will either resist change or try to make change too difficult to deliver”. Well, creative people are early adopters of technology. Their minds are curious and their practices innovative. In my former career as a film director, I watched the UK film industry transform from working on celluloid to being a world-leading centre of digital production. For the past five years at Oxford’s Institute for Ethics in AI, where I am an advisor, I have been delighted to watch the leaps and bounds of AI development. Those at the frontier of AI development are creative thinkers, and creative people are natural innovators. The Government’s attempt to divide us is wrong. The transformational impact of technology is something that all the signatories of this weekend’s letter to the Prime Minister understand. Creators do not deny the creative and economic value of AI, but we do deny the assertion that we should have to build AI for free with our work and then rent it back from those who stole it. Ours is not an argument about progress but about value. The AI companies fiercely defend their own IP but deny the value of our work. Not everything new is progress, not everything that already exists is without value, but we, the creative industries, embody both change and tradition, and we reject the assertion that we are standing in the way of change. We are merely asserting our right to continue to exist and play our part in the UK’s future growth. Secondly, there is no confusion about copyright law in relation to AI, nor does the phenomenal number of submissions to the consultation prove anything other than the widespread outrage of the creative industries that the Government sought to redefine theft rather than uphold their property rights. In our last debate, my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss made an unequivocal statement to that effect which has been widely supported by other legal opinion. The Government’s spokesman, who has greeted every press inquiry of the last few weeks by saying that the Government are consulting to sort out the confusion in copyright in relation to AI is, at best, misinformed. Let me be clear: the amendment would not change copyright. We do not need to change copyright law. We need transparency so that we can enforce copyright law, because what you cannot see you cannot enforce. Thirdly, I rebut the idea that this is the wrong Bill and the wrong time. AI did not exist in the public realm until the early 2020s. The speed and scale at which copyright works are being stolen is eye-watering. Property that people have invested in, have created, have traded and that they rely on for their livelihood is being stolen at all parts of the value chain. It is an assault on the British economy, happening at scale to a sector worth £120 billion to the UK, an industry that is central to the industrial strategy and of enormous cultural import. It is happening now, and we have not even begun to catch up with the devastating consequences. The Government have taken our amendments out of the Bill and replaced them with a couple of toothless reports. Whatever these reports bring forward and whatever the consultation offers, we need the amendment in front of us today now. If this Bill does not protect copyright then, by the time that the Government work out their policy, there will be little to save. The language of AI—scraping, training, data modules, LLMs—does not evoke the full picture of what is being done. AI corporations, many of which are seeking to entrench their existing information monopolies, are not stealing nameless data. They are stealing some of the UK’s most valuable cultural and economic assets—Harry Potter, the entire back catalogue of every music publisher in the UK, the voice of Hugh Grant, the design of an iconic handbag and the IP of our universities, great museums and library collections. Even the news is stolen in real time, all without payment, with economic benefits being taken offshore. It costs UK corporations and individuals their hard-earned wealth and the Treasury much needed revenue. It also denudes the opportunities of the next generation because, whether you are a corporation or an individual, if work is stolen at every turn, you cannot survive. The time is now, and this Bill is the vehicle. Motion 49A replaces the previous package of Lords amendments. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, who wishes he could be with us; the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and his colleagues, who have been uncompromising in their support; and my noble friend Lord Freyberg, who were all co-sponsors of the original amendment. Amendment 49B would simply provide that a copyright holder be able to see who took their work, what was taken, when and why, allowing them a reasonable route to assert their moral right to determine whether they wish to have their work used, and if so, on what terms. It is a slimmer version of the previous package of amendments, but it covers the same ground and, importantly, it puts a timeline of 12 months on bringing forward these provisions and makes specific provision for SMEs and micro-entities and for UK-headquartered AI companies.

18:00:00

There are two terrible tragedies unfolding: first, the Government are undermining one of our greatest industrial sectors; secondly, they may be on a path to squandering for all time the UK’s opportunity to take its rightful place in the new world of AI as a global leader in the AI supply chain. Generative AI depends on three things: skill, energy for compute and high-quality data. We punch above our weight on skills, but are no match for the US and China. Without lowering our energy costs fivefold, the natural choice will be for AI firms to train elsewhere. However, the UK has a disproportionate amount of quality data, a huge proportion of which is the intellectual property owned by our powerhouse creative industries.

We should be creating market conditions that ensure our creators can continue to contribute to the culture, soft power and long-term sustainable growth of our four nations. The economic argument is overwhelming: it is a crucial part of our nation’s assets and the foundation of its future in the AI economy, which cannot be replaced by a handful of data centres. The moral argument is also unassailable: creators’ work is the result of their labour; it is their property, and it is for them to determine what they do with it.

I therefore ask the Minister: how do the Government justify turning their back while offshore companies steal UK property? How can the Government stand tall in the light of pre-election promises to put creativity back in the DNA of the country when their best offer is a review on an infinite timeline? Why are the Government not protecting UK growth when we know that the monopoly power of US and Chinese tech giants means that the benefits will accrue disproportionately offline?

Finally, I have been inundated by people who are materially affected by this issue, many of whom are watching our proceedings. I therefore just finish with some thanks: to the hundreds of creators who have emailed, written, spoken and campaigned in support of this amendment; to the UKAI trade group, which has shown that the grassroots UK tech industry and broader AI ecosystem, unlike the proxies of big tech, want to work with, not steal from, creators; to the UK businesses who put billions of pounds into building iconic brands and warn that this policy puts their investments at risk; to the security community, incredulous that opaque scraping may be carelessly legitimised in a period where cybersecurity is of paramount importance; to the financial sector, both here and in the US, which has made clear to me that diminishing copyright does not, as Ministers suggest, open the US market to the UK, but instead opens the UK market to anyone who wants to take our data offshore; to the news media that have put aside their differences in the interests of protecting the future of news with their Make It Fair campaign; to the Creative Rights in AI Coalition that has demonstrated the complete uniformity of sentiment across the sector, from the biggest record label to the freelance photographer just starting out; to those in both Houses, on all sides of the political spectrum, who have chosen to stand with the creative industries, sometimes against the wish of their Whip; and, finally, to the young people who have contacted me, furious that the Government Ministers who so recently were given the privilege of fulfilling their own ambitions are carelessly throwing away the possibility that the next generation of creators fulfil theirs.

Whatever noble Lords’ party allegiance, I ask them to make clear to the 2.4 million people who make up the creative industries and their dependants, to the would-be creators of the future, and to the citizens of the UK who enjoy and benefit from their creativity, that their property, their labour, is worthy of our protection—apart from anything else, it is not ours to give away.

My Lords, I declare my interests as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group and chairman of the Royal College of Music. It is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron; I strongly support Motion 49A in her name. All who value the creative life of our country owe her an enormous debt of gratitude for her doughty campaigning, and I agree with everything that she said in thanking all those who have taken part. At the heart of this debate there are—the Minister made that point—two complex policy issues: the rapid development and regulation of AI and the operation of copyright law. Both can seem a bit daunting to those not directly involved. AI is scary, copyright law is highly complex and many would be forgiven simply for wanting to steer clear. But not one of us can turn our back today with impunity on this issue. We all have a responsibility because, if we strip this debate back to its basics, there are three very simple principles at stake that affect all our lives and are central to everything that this House stands for. The first is the defence of property. For centuries, since the copyright Act of 1709, when an individual has created something—a book, a film, some music—they have retained ownership of it and earned a living from its use. It is their property and the law protects them. That centuries-old right is under threat for the first time because the Government refuse properly to apply the law to artificial intelligence, allowing it simply to plunder someone else’s work and profit from it. They are putting AI beyond the scope of the law by failing to give creators the transparency they need to inform it. At heart, this is dead simple. Unless this Bill is amended, it is the equivalent of saying to a homeowner that, once they have bought a house and filled it with their possessions, the Government want them to leave the front door wide open, invite anonymous passers-by to come in, take anything they want for free and allow them to go away and sell it for their own profit, while the homeowner has no protection at all in law. It is legalising theft. This amendment simply seeks to allow those who create content in an age of rapacious AI to put a lock on their door and protect their property by letting them know when theft is taking place and giving them a form of redress. If this House stands for anything, it must stand for the protection of property. The second is the nurturing of human creativity. It was Beethoven—the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, will correct me if I have got this wrong—who once said that there is a “divine spark”, a creative genius, in all of us. Whether we paint a picture, take a photograph or write a piece of music, we all have something in us that allows us to express ourselves and enrich the lives of others in doing so. It is copyright that protects our ability to do that. That is why the creative life of the UK has always been so vibrant, so colourful, so entertaining and so powerful. It is why our creative industries flourish and play such a vital role in economic growth. If you take away copyright protection, you snuff out that divine spark and endanger the livelihoods of those who depend on their own creative ability for their living. If this House stands for anything, it must stand for nurturing creativity and the divine spark. Finally, and most importantly, there is the defence of democracy itself. If it has been said once in this House, it has been said a thousand times: democracy depends on the existence of a free, independent press, empowering the electorate with reliable information and scrutinising those in power. That role is even more important in an age of disinformation and unverified, unregulated, AI-generated content, with editorial judgment and oversight overtaken by algorithms and the tyranny of recycled, distorted, circular information. But the provision of independent and verified regulated news will be among the very first victims of AI if this amendment is not passed and we do not act very soon. I do not say this lightly; having spent almost my whole career in the media, I am choosing my words very carefully, but I have to give the House this warning. AI has the capacity utterly to destroy independent news organisations, because it feasts off millions of articles written by journalists without any attribution or payment, destroying the business model that makes the free press possible. Without action this day, news will die in the cold darkness of cyberspace, where no legal framework exists: the advertising which supports it taken by the platforms, its content stolen by AI. There will be only a husk left. The answer is this amendment, which will turbocharge an embryonic licensing market to ensure fair payment for creators and access to high-quality information for AI models. If the AI developers are forced to declare whose content they are taking, they will know they will end up in the courts if they do not negotiate a licence. The term “existential threat” is bandied around too much, but this is not crying wolf. Unless we introduce transparency, control over content and fair remuneration within in a dynamic licensing market, the threat to free media is genuinely existential. As a consequence, the threat to democracy itself is also genuinely existential. If this House stands for anything, it must stand for democracy. We have to act now. The Bill’s laissez-faire approach to copyright protection, in craven obeisance to the platforms, means that we will not get any action on transparency until well-nigh the end of this Parliament. For many publications, however, by that point, the end will already have come, and, once lost, there will be no way of recreating the plural, competitive media that has sustained parliamentary democracy for centuries. It is game over. That may sound alarmist, but it is absolutely what is at stake here. To any noble Lord considering voting against this amendment, I say this: it is already five minutes to midnight for our free press and our democracy. Unless we back this amendment today, history will damn this House with its most deadly words: “Too late”.

My noble Lords, friends and those of a creative disposition, lend me your ears. Even though I have come late to this Bill, I wonder what Shakespeare would have had to say about Al. Last night, I presented the special BAFTA award to ITV for commissioning the landmark drama “Mr Bates vs The Post Office”, which is British television at its best. I wondered whether AI would have had the intuitive instinct to create such an important drama, which brought about societal change. That is why I rise to strongly support my intrepid friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on her Motion 49A and declare an interest as per the register. As this Bill has shown, we stand at a fascinating—and perhaps unsettling—crossroads in the world of creativity. The rise of artificial intelligence is no longer a futuristic fantasy. It is a tangible force, reshaping the very fabric of our creative industry and potentially stealing livelihoods and, most of all, our children’s future. Do the Government really want that to be part of their legacy? For centuries, the essence of acting or singing has been a unique connection between a human performer and an audience. We pour our emotions, experiences and understanding of the human condition into convincing characters, telling stories that emotionally connect. Now, however, AI is stepping on to our stage, offering digital doubles, synthesised voices and the potential of entirely AI-generated programmes, including animated children’s programmes. The immediate impacts are already being felt. AI tools can now replicate an actor’s likeness and voice, raising concerns about the unauthorised use of identities, both living and deceased. The ability to create digital doubles or stunts—or even entire scenes—will reduce the demand for human actors. Some argue that AI will be a tool to enhance our craft, aiding in voice training, accent work or even music and scriptwriting; but the underlying anxiety about job displacement is real and valid.

18:15:00

Our ability to connect with an audience on an emotional level to bring authenticity and vulnerability to a role remains a uniquely human attribute. Many thousands and thousands of people tell me I did just that when they watched me almost 50 years ago on “Play School”. It had a lasting emotional effect on them right through to their adulthood because, as I always say, childhood lasts a lifetime.

It terrifies me to think that future generations of children may never experience a human being connecting with them—with their souls—either on screen or on stage, or inspiring them to pursue a career in the creative industry. No Government should have that on their conscience. It requires us to legislate for ethical guidelines and for regulations and transparency, and to protect our copyrights and intellectual property, our professions and our creativity for the sake of our children. It is our responsibility to do just that.

Without doubt we must collaborate with these new technologies in ways that enhance, rather than replace, the human element of creativity. Let us not shy away from this challenge that may inadvertently affect our children’s future, but rather confront it with open eyes and united voices, ensuring that the art of creativity in all its human richness can continue to thrive in this evolving world. For these reasons, I wholeheartedly support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and urge others to do the same.

My Lords, this is my first contribution on this Bill, although I have sat in every debate on this issue going back to Committee. I do not have a creative nerve in my body—I have nothing to declare—but my life and those of hundreds of millions of others have been enhanced by writers, actors and music-makers across the world. It is sad in a way—and this is not a criticism of anybody personally who is around at the present time—that the nature of Labour in Parliament has changed. When I arrived in the Commons 51 years ago, on the Labour Benches was Maurice Edelman, 30 years there from 1945, a writer of fiction and non-fiction of note. My near neighbour, parliamentary-wise, was Andrew Faulds, who was already in; he played Jet Morgan in “Journey into Space” and Carver Doon in the series of “Lorna Doon”. In fact, I have been wondering in the last couple of days, knowing I was going to refer to him, how the little people—the little helpers for the Prime Minister in the Whips’ Office in the other place—would cope with Andrew today. He was a formidable character who could scare the life out of his friends. Thirty years after that, I joined this place. Ruth Rendell was on the Benches. David Puttnam, the world-renowned producer, joined some years later, and we have my noble friend Lord Cashman. I make this personal. I do not speak for any of them and have not spoken to anybody about what I was going to say, although I indicated my view to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, at the weekend. But I am being asked to deliver wholesale—I have to say that I have a bit of criticism about delivery—the work of these people to big tech. I am not doing it. I have not the slightest intention of doing it, which is why I shall vote for this amendment.

I too support the noble Baroness. As I said at the previous stage of this Bill, it surely goes without saying that our United Kingdom copyright law has to counter the increasing theft of intellectual property by artificial intelligence companies. As the noble Baroness’s present amendment illustrates, we should provide transparency criteria that would allow copyright holders to identify when and from where their work has been taken. I am sure that all your Lordships will agree with that aim, as well as being well aware of the strong human rights back-up support to us from the 46 states’ affiliation of the Council of Europe, of which the United Kingdom remains a prominent member and of whose education committee I am a recent chairman. As many of your Lordships know, first and foremost, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to privacy, including of personal data. Article 1 of its initial protocol protects property rights, including intellectual property rights and copyright. Secondly, Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime prohibits system interference by, for example, the transmission of computer data, while its Article 10 stipulates “Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights”. Thirdly, Article 11 of the 2024 Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law safeguards privacy and personal data. Regarding copyright protection in recent centuries, and as emphasised at an earlier stage of our discussions on this Bill, we can be justly proud of our own United Kingdom record, beginning, as is well known, with the Statute of Anne 1710, which granted legal protection to publishers of books. In the interests of those both here and abroad, we must now uphold the high standards of that tradition. The United Kingdom should guide the good practice. Here, today, supporting the noble Baroness’s amendment is a clear example of our ability so to do.

My Lords, I will speak briefly on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I will be brief partly because it is such a simple amendment: it would just put the principle of the transparency of these models in the Bill. We need to know what goes into these models for two reasons. The first is so that any form of copyright can be prosecuted. At the moment, how can we know that even our current copyright rules have been broken if we do not know what goes into these models? It does not matter whether the Government are thinking about changing the copyright rules. Whatever copyright rules we have, we need to know what is being used in the models. The second reason is the outputs of these models. We need to know on what they were trained in order to know their strengths and weaknesses. The noble Lord, Lord Vallance, himself said this in answer to a question from my noble friend Lady Coussins during Oral Questions on Tuesday: if the data that has gone into the model is not transparent, we cannot ascertain its strengths and weaknesses without extensive proxy measurements and probing. On these two principles, it is vital that this simple amendment goes through today. That it has some added benefits from being able to legislate separately for small and medium-sized enterprises, micro-businesses and UK businesses just adds to the fact that this amendment has been carefully crafted to give us exactly what we need in the Bill today.

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, posed an appropriate question: what would Shakespeare make of AI? The answer is rather like the proverbial million monkeys on their typewriter: so far they have failed to produce a credible version of Shakespeare, but they have produced several improved versions of The Art of the Deal, as far as I can ascertain. I too will speak to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the government amendments that came back from the House of Commons. I thank the Minister for her engagement on this and the briefing that she gave earlier today to noble friends, other colleagues and noble Peers across the House, and my very good personal friend Minister Chris Bryant, whose charismatic presence I felt around us earlier—almost as if he was observing our proceedings. I also thank the Secretary of State for having confirmed, via a third party in last weekend’s press, that the Government have changed their position on having the opt-out in the consultation as their preferred position. It would be helpful if the Minister could confirm that on the Floor of the House today, because I believe that is an accurate position and an accurate assessment, even though it was delivered via a spokesperson rather than directly by the Secretary of State. It is a very helpful change, and I welcome the movement the Government have made in the amendments they put forward. I note that it is part of Motion 49A that we accept the government amendments to produce the reports that were mentioned. I declare that I am a member of the Ivors Academy and the Musicians’ Union, and draw attention to my entry in the register. Creative remuneration was one of the central issues that I worked on as a parliamentarian for the 23 years I was in the House of Commons, certainly while I was on the Front Bench in opposition, as a member of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, as it was then, and as the sponsor of a Private Member’s Bill in the Commons. Although it did not get into law, the Copyright (Rights and Remuneration of Musicians, Etc.) Bill had a significant influence and led, for example, to the creation of the remuneration committee, which is currently sitting within the offices of the Intellectual Property Office. Strong efforts are being made, with very strong engagement from Minister Chris Bryant, to hold to account everyone concerned in the music industry to improve remuneration for creators, and particularly for musicians, which is my interest. This is not just about rights holders. I have never understood why anybody in the creative industries could, for example, start off with a love of music and creativity but become an executive in the creative industries and think that they are worthy of being paid more than the people who actually create the wonderful content that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, was speaking about earlier. How can a music industry executive reward themselves with a greater remuneration than the entire remuneration of every songwriter in this country? There is only one explanation: by the personal attrition of their soul—but that is another matter altogether. The Bill is an opportunity. The key point is that obviously the elected House should have its way—I strongly believe that, as a former Member—but it is important that this House has its say along the way and that transparency is key. We cannot enforce copyright and rights holders cannot enforce their rights unless there is transparency. This Bill, this bus, is an opportunity that the Government should be getting on rather than waiting for another bus several years down the road, in the form of some future primary legislation. I hope that there is an opportunity for a compromise and that, should we send these amendments back to the other place, the Government look for a way to give a commitment towards ensuring that, through the Bill, they can take powers to regulate on transparency in the near future. I was fortunate enough last week to accompany—this is an absolutely blatant name-drop—Björn Ulvaeus of Abba.

Oh no!

I note that the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, objects. He would never do such a thing himself. I am glad he introduced me to the founder of Motown Records on one occasion in these Corridors, so he would never do something similar himself. As I showed him the Royal Gallery, he took particular interest in one of the frescoes and asked me, “Who is that in that fresco speaking to the Duke of Wellington?” I said, “Well, that’s Marshal Blücher, of course, the head of the Prussian army at—”, and suddenly the penny dropped. I said to him, “Somebody should write a song about that”, and he said, “Yes, that’s a great idea. It could be a metaphor for a love affair”. I said, “I’m surprised no one’s thought of that before”—and we never mentioned the word “Waterloo” once.

18:30:00

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Black, mentioned Beethoven. In declaring my interests as a composer, I should also mention that I have acted as an expert witness in cases of musical copyright. While doing that, I was asked by one of my learned friends, “What constitutes something that’s worthy of copyright?” I said, “Ba ba ba bom”. Why? Because that, in terms of the law, is a substantial idea. Just think what has been made of it ever since. The whole notion of copyright comes down to something valuable; it does not matter how long or how short it is. Creativity in the UK is already, I am afraid, in a somewhat parlous state and any erosion of copyright will add yet another cut to an already wounded body. The Minister mentioned technology and, of course, we all use technology. We all want to use technology. The famous composers—wonderful songwriters, including Paul McCartney, Elton John and Sting—who have headed the letter to the Prime Minister, have all used technology to great effect. With the greatest respect, it is slightly insulting to say to them that we are pulling the shutters down because we want to know who is using our music. That cannot be something, intellectually, that holds water. People need to know how their music is being used. They have a right to know. Why is this an important factor? Let me give the example, which I have mentioned once before in your Lordships’ House, of what happened with streaming. In other words, we have been bitten once already. In a way, I welcome opening music and the arts to the whole world through the internet, and streaming certainly does that, but what did it do? A very well-known musician, a top 10 artist, said to me the other day, “Where does all this money go? It doesn’t go to us”. If you ask Paul McCartney, Elton John or Sting how their royalties have changed over the years, they will tell you that they have gone down massively. This is not just about famous musicians. Paul McCartney, Elton John and Sting would be the first to say that this is also about the little-known songwriters who at the moment make a pittance but are hoping to make something. Obviously, those famous names attract attention. It is quite right that they do and I am grateful for their support. However, there is also a whole other section, the contemporary classical music section, which I know supports the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, as do writers, theatre directors and filmmakers. This is a very dangerous Bill if we cannot curtail this. I am glad the Minister is listening and wants to help and wants to find a way through. If we do not make improvements to this, we could be short-changing something that brings an absolute fortune into the Treasury: not just a fortune in money but a fortune in joy. I have mentioned Paul McCartney, Elton John and Sting—think about what they have brought into people’s lives. Although my section, the contemporary classical section, may be less famous and less well known, those musicians too have a right to be heard. Their view is that, if you allow, for example, training—it is suggested that it might be okay to allow people to use our products in training—that is the thin end of the wedge. When streaming came in, the record industry virtually disappeared. I know the manager of a classical record company who said to me, “Why would we want to record this piece? It’s already out there on the internet”. You have to think about what follows on from opening this world up. I think the Government are listening, and many noble Lords have pointed out exactly what the dangers are. I certainly will support my noble friend Lady Kidron. She has done sterling work. We are not making a fuss about nothing. This is the thin end of the wedge and we have to try to curtail it now for the future of music—and indeed all the other arts—in this country.

I welcome the government additions made to the Bill in the Commons and endorse my noble friend Lord Camrose’s amendments, especially those relating to removing barriers to entry. It is vital that AI does not end up controlled by the same tech firms that dominate cloud, search and social media. This important new technology presents an opportunity for challenger firms and new markets to emerge, including affordable access to quality copyrighted data. Much of what I will say in a moment is very much with them in mind. As to the amendment on transparency from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, she is right, in the context of copyright, to prioritise transparency. As I have argued before, whatever kind of solution is eventually adopted, opt out or opt in, transparency will be necessary for that solution to work. The noble Baroness is also right to press the urgency of this. Content creators cannot afford to wait, so she has my support and my vote. Indeed, with the support of both the Conservative and Lib Dem Benches today, the Government could well be defeated. That would be most welcome. I am sure the Minister does not like me saying that, but that is my view. That said, there are some aspects of the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, that may, at this juncture, be a little bit too prescriptive for primary legislation ahead of a policy decision on the solution for how to uphold copyright. I will focus briefly on what happens next if the Government are defeated tonight. I strongly urge the Government not to do what they can: remove the clause that the noble Baroness would add to the Bill once it got back down the other end. Instead, what I urge the Government to do what they should: bring back an amendment in lieu. We all want a future for AI, where the creative industries and the tech sector—big and little tech—can be confident that the playing field for competition is fair and, when it comes to the use of copyrighted content, that they can strike mutually beneficial deals. We may be a little way off from achieving that way forward, as is reflected in the Government’s additions to the Bill and the work they have promised over the next 12 months, but that work should not preclude the Government taking a power in the Bill to bring back secondary legislation to address transparency as soon as they have finished the work outlined in their Amendment 46. As other noble Lords have already argued, transparency is needed now and, as I have said, it will be relevant to whatever policy solution the Government decide on. So, a requirement on them to act in this area is not unreasonable. From the perspective of content creators, who, it has to be said, may well be immensely powerful in ensuring that they get publicity and coverage of their cause, the future looks highly uncertain. So, a binding commitment with a deadline to bring forward transparency regulations at this juncture, while the Bill is going through Parliament, is reasonable if such a new clause is not overly prescriptive. That is what I would advise the Government to do next, assuming they are defeated tonight.

My Lords, I rise to speak as the founder of two AI spin-outs, and I draw the House’s attention to my registered interests as the founder-director of Oxehealth, a University of Oxford spin-out that uses AI for healthcare applications. I am also the author of three copyrighted books. Since these amendments were last debated in the House of Lords, there has been a lot of high-profile comment but very few attempts, if any, to bring AI developers and creators together in the same room. During the same period, however, more businesses from the creative industries and the publishing sector have agreed content-licensing deals. That is because access to curated, high-quality content to fine-tune large language models—the step after pre-training which provides high-accuracy responses—is increasingly being monetised. Even the Guardian Media Group, a strong supporter of the creative industries, announced in February a strategic partnership with Open AI to ensure compensation for the use of its high-quality journalism. This shows that it is possible, without any change in the law, for the creative industries and the big tech companies to come to licensing agreements. The main technological development since our last debate has been the demonstration that training LLMs no longer requires the massive computer facilities and huge data centres of the big tech companies in the US. Since the beginning of the year, the Chinese company DeepSeek has released open-source LLMs hundreds of times smaller than hyperscale models such as GPT-4, Gemini or Claude Sonnet. These models, typically with, say, 10 billion weights, have been developed through the process of distillation, and they achieve almost the same level of performance as the hyperscale models with 1 trillion weights. Why is that important? It means that users of LLMs no longer have to send queries to those hyperscale models which are then processed by OpenAI, Google or Anthropic using their huge compute facilities with thousands of GPUs in their data centres. Instead, any AI developer can now train and run distilled versions of those LLMs locally on their laptops. DeepSeek was the first AI company to show how powerful the process of distillation is in the context of LLMs. Other big tech companies are now jumping on the bandwagon. In early March, Google released a brand-new LLM called Gemma 3, a lightweight, state-of-the-art open-source model that can be run anywhere from smartphones to laptops, and has the ability to handle text, images, and short videos. These open-source distilled LLMs are now being used by thousands of AI developers, in the UK and elsewhere, who are training and fine-tuning them using content, some of which may be copyrighted, publicly available on the web. Training an LLM on a laptop using data from the open web will become as commonplace as searching the web. This is already happening both within computer science departments in UK universities and in the rich ecosystem of AI start-ups and university spin-outs in the UK. A survey of 500 developers and investors in the UK AI ecosystem, carried out by JL Partners last month, had 94% of them reporting that their work relied on AI models built using publicly available data from the web, and 66% reported that if the data laws in the UK were more restrictive than elsewhere, projects would move to other countries. We need to consider the impact on the UK’s AI industry of these transparency provisions, and of the requirement to provide copyright owners with information regarding the text and data used in the pre-training, training and fine-tuning of general-purpose AI. The use of content from behind paywalls or from pirated databases such as Books3 or LibGen, which is known to have been done by Meta to train its LLM, is clearly illegal. However, for data publicly available on the open web, I would like to do a simple thought experiment to show that the transparency requirements in Motion 49A are at present unworkable. In the UK, unlike in the US, there is no copyright database. Usually, the copyright rests with the author of the work, but there are exceptions, such as when a work is created by an employee in the course of their job, and copyright may also be assigned or transferred to a third party. If we assume, generously, that it might take just one second, on average, to ascertain the copyright status of an article, book, image, or audio or video recording, on the web, it would require 31 years and eight months to check the copyright status of the 1 billion data points in a typical LLM training set—never mind thinking about setting up licensing deals with the millions of rights holders. For the distilled models that are now, as I explained, being trained or fine-tuned by UK developers, which are 100 times smaller, the copyright status check would still require one-third of a year—still an entirely unworkable proposition.

18:45:00

The DSIT and DCMS task force, which the Government committed in last week’s debate in the other place to set up, should work with international bodies such as the Internet Engineering Task Force—the IETF—to investigate methods that will provide rights information in a machine-readable way, using formats such as the Creative Commons Rights Expression Language, for example. That is one suggestion for how copyright protection could be implemented in the age of AI. There are also bound to be many other helpful suggestions among the 11,500 submissions to the Copyright and AI consultation, which closed at the end of February.

Entrepreneurs within the UK’s AI industry do not understand why this amendment is being tabled now. Some of them are among those who put in a submission to the consultation. As one of the signatories of a letter to the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, published today, said to me, “Why have a consultation if restrictive legislation is going to be introduced before we know about the response to the consultation?”

Motion 49A would not prevent UK content creators from having their content scraped by web crawlers operating in other jurisdictions. However, it would harm the development and use of AI in the UK. It would make it very difficult, if not impossible, for a UK AI start-up to develop a software product to, for example, optimise cancer treatment using LLMs trained and fine-tuned on the combination of our sovereign NHS dataset and the last two decades of oncology textbooks and research papers, most of which are copyrighted material.

I agree that subsection (7) of the new clause suggested in Motion 49A, about applying the regulations in modified form proportionately to small companies, and differently to UK-registered companies, is attractive—but there are difficulties. For example, what would have happened when DeepMind, a UK company, was acquired by Google?

I do not believe that Motion 49A would have much of an impact on the US-based big tech companies, which will continue to train their models outside the UK, but it is very likely to inflict serious damage on the UK’s AI start-up and spin-out ecosystem. We should wait for the outcome of the Copyright and AI consultation, engage with the joint DCMS and DSIT task force, and come up with more appropriate ways of helping both our AI and our creative industries to thrive.

My Lords, I was IP Minister for nearly three years and I am a long-standing member of the APPG on IP. It is a great pleasure to speak from the Back Benches and to support the Motion in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and my noble friend Lord Camrose’s amendment. What concerns me is that we are witnessing an assault on a sector worth £160 billion to the UK, as we have heard. Actually, I suspect that may be an underestimate, because IP and copyright are to be found in the nooks and crannies of so much of our life and our industry. There has been a lot of mention of music and media. Nobody has mentioned breeding and performance data on racehorses, information on art and antiques, or—close to my heart—the design, by young graduates, of gorgeous new clothing and fancy footwear of the kind that I wear. It is the small operators that are most at risk. That is why I am speaking today. We are going too slowly. Amendments have been knocked back. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has been trying her hardest, with a great deal of support from right across Britain. As time goes by, AI and LLMs are stealing more of our creativity, hitting UK growth. I believe that the Government must get on. It is not easy, but it is a challenge they have to rise to, and very quickly.

My Lords, I support Motion 49A from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I will also address claims that we have heard repeatedly in these debates: that transparency for AI data is technically unfeasible. This claim, forcefully pushed by technology giants such as Google, is not only unsupported by evidence but deliberately misleading. As someone with a long-standing background in the visual arts, and as a member of DACS—the Design and Artists Copyright Society—I have witnessed first-hand how creators’ works are being exploited without consent or compensation. I have listened carefully to the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, in both his email to colleagues today and the letter from entrepreneurs to the Secretary of State. Although I deeply respect their expertise and commitment to innovation, I must firmly reject their assessment, which echoes the talking points of trillion-dollar tech corporations. The claims by tech companies that transparency requirements are technically unfeasible have been thoroughly debunked. The LAION dataset already meticulously documents over 5 billion images, with granular detail. Companies operate crawler services on this dataset to identify images belonging to specific rights holders. This irrefutably demonstrates that transparency at scale is not only possible but already practised when it suits corporate interests. Let us be clear about what is happening: AI companies are systematically ingesting billions of copyrighted works without permission or payment, then claiming it would be too difficult to tell creators which works have been taken. This is theft on an industrial scale, dressed up as inevitable technological progress. The claim from the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, that these amendments would damage UK AI start-ups while sparing US technology giants is entirely backwards. Transparency would actually level the playing field by benefiting innovative British companies while preventing larger firms exploiting creative works without permission. I must respectfully suggest that concerns about potential harm to AI start-ups should be balanced against the devastating impact on our creative industries, thousands of small businesses and individual creators whose livelihoods depend on proper recognition and compensation for their work. Their continued viability depends fundamentally on protecting intellectual property rights. Without transparency, how can creators even begin to enforce these rights? The question answers itself. This is not about choosing between technology and creativity; it is about ensuring that both sectors can thrive through fair collaboration based on consent and compensation. Transparency is not an obstacle to innovation; it is the foundation on which responsible, sustainable innovation is built. Google’s preferred approach would reverse the fundamental basis of UK copyright law by placing an unreasonable burden on rights holders to opt out of having their work stolen. This approach is unworkable and would, effectively, legalise mass copyright theft to benefit primarily American technology corporations. Rather than waiting for a consultation outcome that may take years, while creative works continue to be misappropriated, Motion 49A offers a practical step forward that would benefit both sectors while upholding existing law. I urge the House to support it.

My Lords, it has been a privilege to listen to today’s debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, really has opened the floodgates to expressions of support for human creativity. I thank her for tabling her Motion. I also thank the Minister for setting out the Government’s position and their support for the creative industries. I suppose I straddle the world of AI and creativity as much as anybody in this House. I co-founded the All-Party Group on Artificial Intelligence and I have been a member of the All-Party Group on Intellectual Property for many years. That is reflected in my interests, both as an advisor to DLA Piper on AI policy and regulation, and as the newly appointed chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society. I declare those interests, which are more than merely formal. The subject matter of the amendments in this group is of profound importance for the future of our creative industries and the development of AI in the UK: the critical intersection of AI training and copyright law, and, specifically, the urgent need for transparency. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, described, the rapid development of AI, particularly large language models, relies heavily on vast volumes of data for training. This has brought into sharp focus the way copyright law applies to such activity. It was impossible to miss the letter over the weekend from 400 really important creatives, and media and creative business leaders urging support for her Motion 49A. Rights holders, from musicians and authors to journalists and visual artists, are rightly concerned about the use of their copyrighted material to train AI models, often without permission or remuneration, as we have heard. They seek greater control over their content and remuneration when it is used for this purpose, alongside greater transparency. Like others, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has brilliantly championed the cause of creators and the creative industries throughout the passage of this Bill in her tabling of a series of crucial amendments. Her original amendments on Report, passed in this House but deleted by the Government in the Commons and then retabled in the Commons on Report by my honourable friends, aimed to make existing UK copyright law enforceable in the age of generative AI. The core argument behind Amendment 49B, which encapsulates the essence of the previous amendments, is that innovation in the AI field should not come at the expense of the individuals and industry creating original content. The central plank of the noble Baroness’s proposals, and one these Benches strongly support, is the requirement for transparency from AI developers regarding the copyrighted material used in their training data. Her Amendment 49B specifically requires the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out strict transparency requirements for web crawlers and general-purpose AI models. This would include disclosing the identity and purpose of the crawlers used, identifying their owners and, crucially, keeping records of where and when copyrighted material is gathered. This transparency is vital for ensuring accountability and enabling copyright holders to identify potential infringements and enforce their rights. The Minister described the process in the consultation on AI and copyright, published last December. That consultation proposed a text and data mining exception that would allow AI developers to train on material unless the rights holder expressly reserved their rights or opted out. The arguments against this proposed opt-out mechanism are compelling; they have been made by many noble Lords today and have been voiced by many outside, as we have heard. This mechanism shifts the burden on to creators to police the use of their work and actively opt out, placing an undue responsibility on them. This approach undermines the fundamental principles of copyright, effectively rewarding the widespread harvesting or scraping of copyrighted material that has occurred without permission or fair remuneration. The Government’s proposed text and data-mining exception, which it appears that they are no longer proposing—as the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, asked, perhaps the Minister can clarify the Government’s position and confirm that that is indeed the case—risks harming creative sectors for minimal gain to a small group of global tech companies and could erode public trust in the AI sector. As the noble Baroness observed, this approach is selling the creative industries down the river. Voluntary measures for transparency proposed by the Government are insufficient. Clear legal obligations are needed.

19:00:00

Some point out that innovative AI developers already demonstrate business models based on licensing datasets from creators, and the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, pointed that out. Those licenses are available, but I am afraid the noble Lord misunderstands the way collecting societies operate. Those models are available, and collecting societies could administer them perfectly well. I can testify to that. This proves that opt-out is not the only viable path. It is notable that organisations such as UKAI do not support the Government’s opt-out position. Tim Flagg, its CEO, said that UKAI concludes that existing copyright law is adequate and should not be changed to an opt-out model:

“The proposed opt-out model would significantly harm the creative sectors to achieve a minimal gain for a small group of global tech companies”.

Changing the copyright law

“will erode public trust in the nascent AI sector and create unnecessary conflict. In the long term, this will undermine economic growth more than any benefits the opt-out could deliver”.

That is the view of UKAI, which represents a very large group of AI developers.

However, we have seen some positive developments, and I welcome the amendments that the Government have tabled which require the Secretary of State to prepare and publish a report on the use of copyright works in AI development and an economic impact assessment. These are overdue and should have been offered at the very beginning of the AI and copyright consultation, but they do not go far enough. Commitments along these lines do not provide the necessary legal framework or the immediate transparency needed to protect creators.

The amendments proposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, to the Government’s report requirements seek to ensure that the report considers aspects such the impact on UK copyright holders of extraterritorial uses of their works and identifies barriers to market entry for developers. We welcome them and, indeed, the change of position by the Conservative Front Bench generally on the absolute need for transparency, which I am sure is very welcome on the Benches behind him. These amendments would strengthen the Government’s proposed reporting, but they remain additions to the reporting requirement, not the substantive legal change that is required. What is needed is substantive provision within the Bill that mandates transparency. This is precisely what the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and supported strongly on these Benches throughout the passage of this Bill aim to achieve. They seek to inject transparency in what has been described as a clandestine black box, making it technically feasible and easy for rights holders to understand when and how their work being used. I very much like the phraseology used by the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, so I say to the Government, “Get on the bus”.

I shall make a very brief speech. I stood up when the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, stood up, but unfortunately, as so often in my life, he completely ignored me, so I will just slip in after him and just before our Front Bench. I declare my interest in the register as an adviser to ProRata.ai, which is a company that seeks to pay royalties to creatives for the use of their content in AI models. It was good to see not only the Secretary of State, Peter Kyle, standing at the Bar, but also the Creative Industries Minister, Chris Bryant, which shows that something is up. They were very clearly wanting to be seen by the 400 or so creatives who wrote to the newspapers over the weekend expressing their concerns about the Government’s AI legislation and also to seek, as we all do, to curry favour with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who has led so well on so many of these issues. As she was speaking and making the point that creatives and technologists are not apart at all, but are together, it reminded me that I became the Technology Minister in the Cameron Government because I was the Creative Industries Minister, and the reason I became the Technology Minister was because I was the only Minister in the Cameron Government in 2010 meeting the technology companies. The reason I was meeting the technology companies was because the technology companies were busily ripping off the intellectual property of the creative industries. At that time, in 2010, you would sit down with Google and say, “Anyone can search for any material on your website, come up with it illegally, stream it and download it without paying the creators of that material. What are you going to do about it?” Of course, they said, “We’re going to do absolutely nothing because you are just a little British Minister, and we only do what the White House tells us to do”. The Labour Government had passed legislation that was concluded in the wash-up in 2010 that effectively criminalised, to coin a phrase, the teenager in their bedroom downloading music, just as perhaps some of us as teenagers might have taped music off the radio in the past. I knew when I became a Minister that that legislation was completely unworkable. It was pointless to be prosecuting teenagers when you should be taking on big tech. Actually, the music industry found a solution by using the Fraud Act and began to take action in the courts against websites that were completely ripping off IP. It allowed courts to order those websites to be blocked. I also knew that there would be no solution until there was a commercial solution. In fact, that commercial solution has come about. In 2010, people were predicting the entire death of intellectual property, the death of the music industry, the death of the film industry and the death of television. They have never been healthier: there are commercial models because more people are prepared to pay a subscription to Spotify, Netflix or Amazon Prime to get great content for a reasonable price, so a commercial solution is possible when people work together. It was interesting to hear the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, talking about the opt-out model because it implies that you can have a conversation between big tech and creatives. The creatives can either opt out or opt in. We referred earlier to licensing deals. If anyone reads FT Weekend—in fact, everyone in this Chamber obviously reads FT Weekend as it is the Bible of the chattering classes—Sam Altman from OpenAI was featured in “Lunch with the FT”, an honour he shares with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. In fact, I texted her when she was in “Lunch with the FT” and said that it is better than a peerage. At the beginning of that lunch, it says that the FT has a licensing deal with OpenAI, so it is possible to have licensing deals. What I think none of us can really stand is the utter hypocrisy of people saying that, for the national interest, we have to rip off intellectual property. It is completely hypocritical and nonsensical. You would not find a single tech chief saying, “I think it is fine if people take our patents because that is how you get economic growth. Just take my patent”. In fact, you will not find a CEO saying that. You will see them saying in court, “He’s ripped off my patent, and I want my money back”. That is intellectual property that big tech is prepared to fight for, yet big tech is still prepared to tell us, just as they told us 15 years ago, that they can grow only by ripping off the IP of the creative industries. Let us face it: there may be AI start-ups that need open source. I totally accept that. It is a complicated landscape, but we are still talking about big tech. We are talking about Microsoft, OpenAI, xAI and Meta. We are talking about the role of the United States. Donald Trump wants to make Hollywood great again. This is where he could start.

My Lords, I first thank all noble Lords from across the House for their many eloquent and well-made speeches. The Government share the passion displayed today. We all care about the creative sector and want to see it flourish. We all want to find ways to make that a reality. We are talking here about the practicalities of how we can do that in a proper way; that is what we are addressing today. Nobody doubts the fantastic contribution that the creative sector makes to the UK. I thought I had set out some of that in my opening speech, but I am very happy to confirm it again. On the practicalities, the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, sets out wide-ranging obligations on businesses that make AI models available in the UK and would require the Secretary of State to nominate a body to enforce them. I agree with the noble Baroness that the creative sector has always been an early adopter of technology, and that the creative and AI sectors go hand in hand. A number of noble Lords made that point, and made it well. I also completely recognise the value generated by the creators—again a point well made by a number of noble Lords—and their great cultural and economic contributions to society. The noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Berkeley, my noble friend Lord Brennan and many other speakers spoke about that. It is the Government’s view—and, moreover, morally right—that creators should license and be paid for the use of their content. The Government have always been clear that we want to see more licensing by the AI sector. The obligations in the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, however, would affect a wide range of businesses and require detailed disclosure of information. This would include a mechanism to identify individual works, but it is very uncertain whether it would be possible to meet that requirement when a significant proportion of material on the internet does not have clear metadata to facilitate this. The scale of the impact on those businesses is unknown but, without a proper impact assessment, there is a real risk that the obligations could lead to AI innovators, including many home-grown British companies, thinking twice about whether they wish to develop and provide their services in the UK. We agree that, if transparency obligations are to be created in this way, there will need to be provision for their oversight and enforcement, but that is not something that can be dropped on the first regulator that comes to mind. There is currently no body with the skills and resources to perform this function. We need a proper discussion about funding, clarity over what enforcement powers are required, and answers to a whole range of other questions. It should also be noted that one of the main issues that creative industries are struggling with is enforcement of their rights under the current rules. As was said earlier—and I am happy to reiterate—we are not saying that the copyright laws are broken; at the heart of this is the question of enforcement. Transparency would help with knowing what is being used, but that alone will not be a silver bullet for small creators and businesses seeking redress through our legal system. As many noble Lords will know, there are live court cases in train in the UK and other key jurisdictions. The Government, and I, recognise the urgency of the problem, as so fantastically put by the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin. This is why DCMS and DSIT Ministers are prioritising meetings with creative and AI stakeholders to discuss potential solutions as a top priority. Indeed, they held meetings and discussions with both sectors last September. We have moved quickly to consult, having hosted round tables and bilateral meetings with creatives and their representatives. These have been of great value and we will continue to hold those meetings. However, all these moving parts mean that something needs to be developed as a full working approach. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, does not offer an instant solution, instead asking the Government to come up with regulations in 12 months. We cannot make such significant interventions without properly understanding the impact. This is why our position is to report on four substantive issues within 12 months and set out our proposals in that time. As I said in my opening speech, our proposals will be based on the evidence from the 11,500 responses and, indeed, will concentrate on what works rather than any preferred option. As the noble Lord, Lord Tarassenko, said, the solution must indeed involve creators and AI developers being in the same room, and this is what we will endeavour to do. I further agree with the noble Lord that AI should not become a way to whitewash copyright piracy. The Government support strong action against copyright piracy and we will continue to do so. I also agree that it is important to support transparency. I cannot say this strongly enough. Noble Lords have seemed to suggest that we are not taking that issue seriously. Of course we are. The Government fully support and are encouraged by the work of the IETF and other fora developing new standards to help identify metadata, which will make this easier.

19:15:00

I would add that there has been some misinformation on the Government’s position. Let me be clear that, as I said, there are no proposed changes to copyright in the Bill, no opt-out system has been put into the Bill, and copyright continues to apply to the use of materials for AI training, as it did before the Bill was introduced. What we are looking at, as I said, is an issue of enforcement.

I turn to Amendments 46A and 46B in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose. These would add extra elements to the Government’s report, including a plan to

“reduce … barriers to market entry”

for AI developers, as well as proposals concerning

“the impact on United Kingdom copyright holders of extra-territorial uses of their … works”

and

“technological standards for a machine-readable … watermark”.

The amendments would also further define which web crawlers or AI systems might be considered in scope.

I recognise that these amendments are constructive and I thank the noble Lord for the thought that he has put into them, although I suggest that they are in the main already covered by the Government’s Motion. In the case of watermarking, as I said, that may not be possible for the Government to meet.

Amendment 46A would require the Government to publish a

“plan to reduce … barriers to market entry”

relating to copyright and data access, but that is already the main focus of subsection (3)(b). Any report under that subsection would naturally include a consideration of what steps could be taken to improve the situation.

Amendment 46B adds to the issues to be reported on, with proposed new subsection (e) looking at the impact of extraterritorial activity on UK copyright holders. This is already implicitly within the scope of the report but, if it is useful, I am happy to state on the record that the report should include consideration of these sorts of international effects.

The other element of Amendment 46B is to require the Government to report on

“technological standards for a machine-readable … watermark … identifying licensed content”,

including the publication of the proposed standard.

We agree wholeheartedly that technological standards and measures that support copyright holders’ control of their content, including access to that content and its licensing, are very important. This is why the Government have committed to reporting on the technological measures and standards in Amendment 46(3)(a). This commitment will include consideration of watermarks and their use to identify content and relevant licensing information.

However, as I have said, and as the noble Viscount acknowledged, the proposal for the Government to publish a standard in this area may be unworkable. We are encouraged by standards emerging in this space, but these are rightly being developed by industry. The Government may indeed want to recommend the adoption of one or more industry standards and implement measures to support this, but a government standard may well not be the right approach.

Our reporting commitment will allow us to consider this and other ways to achieve the objectives of this amendment, and will make recommendations on technological standards. In the light of this, I request that the noble Viscount does not press his amendments, but I would very much welcome a conversation with him about the material he would like to see included in those reports before officials are tasked to produce them.

To finish, I reiterate that the Government are not making any changes to copyright as part of the Bill. We are committed instead to a proper, robust and transparent approach to determine the right policy that will deliver the best outcome for all parties and allow us to support both the AI and creative industry sectors together. We will not be developing the policy in isolation. As my honourable friend the Minister stated in the other place, we have a task force of several departments working hard on this, and we will be engaging with experts from the relevant sectors through working groups that are being set up, as well as talking to international partners.

There are lots of voices in this debate and we want to make sure that we have heard all of them before we act. To be clear, this is not a case of picking a side or pitting AI developers against creators. These sectors are already working together and have the potential to really supercharge each other. We want to support them both in a way that is fair to everyone involved. So I hope noble Lords will consider not pressing their amendments and give us the space and time to bring all those forces together to find a real, proper, workable solution to the challenges that we have been debating today.

Motion on Amendment 44 agreed.

Motion on Amendment 45

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 45.

45: After Clause 134, insert the following Clause— “Economic impact assessment (1) The Secretary of State must, before the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed— (a) prepare and publish an assessment of the economic impact in the United Kingdom of each of the four policy options described in section B.4 of the Copyright and AI Consultation Paper, read with relevant parts of section C of that Paper (policy options about copyright law and the training of artificial intelligence models using copyright works), and (b) lay a document containing the assessment before Parliament. Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL] 7 (2) The document may include an assessment of the economic impact in the United Kingdom of policy options which are alternatives to the options described in subsection (1)(a). (3) An assessment included in the document must, among other things, include assessment of the economic impact of each option on— (a) copyright owners, and (b) persons who develop or use AI systems, including the impact on copyright owners, developers and users who are individuals, micro businesses, small businesses or medium-sized businesses. (4) In this section— “AI system” means a machine-based system that, from the input it receives, can infer how to— (a) generate predictions, digital content, recommendations, decisions or other similar outputs, or (b) influence a physical or virtual environment, with a view to achieving an explicit or implicit objective; “the Copyright and AI Consultation Paper” means the command paper “Copyright and AI: Consultation”, numbered CP1205, published on 17 December 2024; “copyright owner” has the same meaning as in Part 1 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988; “develop” an AI system means carry on an activity involved in producing the system, such as (for example) designing, programming, training or testing the system (and related terms are to be interpreted accordingly); “digital content” means data which is produced and supplied in digital form; “medium-sized business” means a business with at least 50 but fewer than 250 staff; “micro business” means a business with fewer than 10 staff; “small business” means a business with at least 10 but fewer than 50 staff; “use” an AI system means instruct an AI system to generate outputs or to influence an environment (and related terms are to be interpreted accordingly).”

Motion on Amendment 45 agreed.

Motion on Amendment 46

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 46.

46: After Clause 134, insert the following Clause— “Report on the use of copyright works in the development of AI systems (1) The Secretary of State must, before the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed— (a) prepare and publish a report on the use of copyright works in the development of AI systems, and (b) lay the report before Parliament. (2) The report must consider— (a) the four policy options described in section B.4 of the Copyright and AI Consultation Paper, read with relevant parts of section C of that Paper (policy options about copyright law and the training of artificial intelligence models using copyright works), and (b) such alternative options as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. (3) The report must consider, and make proposals in relation to, each of the following— (a) technical measures and standards (for example, measures and standards concerned with metadata) that may be used to control— (i) the use of copyright works to develop AI systems, and (ii) the accessing of copyright works for that purpose (for example, by web crawlers); (b) the effect of copyright on access to, and use of, data by developers of AI systems (for example, on text and data mining), including the effect on developers who are individuals, micro businesses, small businesses or medium-sized businesses; (c) the disclosure of information by developers of AI systems about— (i) their use of copyright works to develop AI systems, and (ii) how they access copyright works for that purpose (for example, by means of web crawlers); (d) the granting of licences to developers of AI systems to do acts restricted by copyright, including the granting of licences by and to individuals, micro businesses, small businesses and medium-sized businesses. (4) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must consider the likely effect of proposals, in the United Kingdom, on— (a) copyright owners, and (b) persons who develop or use AI systems, including the likely effect on copyright owners, developers and users who are individuals, micro businesses, small businesses or medium-sized businesses. (5) In preparing the report, the Secretary of State must have regard to, among other things, the Consultation Paper responses. (6) The Secretary of State may comply with this section by preparing and publishing two or more reports which, taken together, satisfy the requirements in this section. (7) In this section— “Consultation Paper responses” means responses to the Copyright and AI Consultation Paper received by the Secretary of State on or before 25 February 2025; “copyright” means the property right which subsists in accordance with Part 1 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988; “copyright work” has the same meaning as in Part 1 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988; “web crawler” means a computer program that obtains data from websites in accordance with instructions and that can autonomously determine which websites to visit. (8) Terms used in this section and in section (Economic impact assessment) have the same meaning in this section as they have in that section.”

Amendment 46A (to Amendment 46)

Tabled by

46A: In inserted subsection (3)(b), at the end insert “, and a plan to reduce related barriers to market entry for those developers;”

I thank the Minister for her full and detailed answer. Having heard the tone of the debate, I think it is clear that the focus and energy of the House are more on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, but I am happy to take up the Minister’s offer of a further meeting.

Amendment 46A (to Amendment 46) not moved.

Amendment 46B (to Amendment 46) not moved.

Motion on Amendment 46 agreed.

Motion on Amendments 47 and 48

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 47 and 48.

47: Page 170, line 2, leave out Clause 135

48: Page 170, line 23, leave out Clause 136

Motion on Amendments 47 and 48 agreed.

Motion on Amendment 49

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 49.

49: Page 171, line 15, leave out Clause 137

Motion 49A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 49)

Moved by

49A: At end insert “, and do propose Amendment 49B instead of the words so left out of the Bill—

49B: Before Clause 138, insert the following new Clause— “Requirement to make provision in relation to transparency of business data used in relation to AI models (1) The Secretary of State or the Treasury must by regulations make provision as set out in this section in relation to a trader which operates a service which— (a) includes the making available of an artificial intelligence (AI) model, and (b) has links with the United Kingdom within the meaning of subsection (2), and in relation to a data holder for the business data of such a trader. (2) The service has links with the United Kingdom if— (a) it has a significant number of United Kingdom users, or (b) United Kingdom users form one of the target markets for the service (or the only target market). (3) A “data holder” for the business data of such a trader means— (a) the trader, or (b) a person who, in the course of a business, processes that data. (4) The regulations must require specified business data to be published by the trader or the data holder so as to provide copyright owners with information regarding the text and data used in the pre-training, training, fine-tuning and retrieval-augmented generation in the AI model, or any other data input to the AI model. (5) The regulations must require the business data to be published by the trader or the data holder in such form, at such intervals and in such manner as the regulations may prescribe, in particular so as to ensure that it is accessible to copyright owners upon request. (6) The regulations must require the trader or the data holder, when publishing the business data as required under subsections (4) and (5), to provide an effective mechanism to allow copyright owners to identify all individual works that they own that are used in the pre-training, training, fine-tuning and retrieval-augmented generation in the AI model, or any other data input to the AI model. (7) The regulations may provide that the regulations apply in modified form in order that they apply proportionately to small companies and micro-entities within the meaning of the Companies Act 2006, or apply differently to UK-registered companies within the meaning of the Companies Act 2006 as opposed to companies which are not UK-registered. (8) The regulations must require the trader, if bots are used in the making available of its AI model, to disclose information regarding the identity of such bots used by them or by third parties on their behalf, including but not limited to— (a) the name of the bot, (b) the legal entity responsible for the bot, and (c) the specific purposes for which each bot is used. (9) In this section “bot” means an autonomous software application that can interact with systems or users (including crawlers and fetchers) and which obtains data from websites in accordance with instructions. (10) The regulations must make provision for enforcement of the regulations made under this section in accordance with sections 8 (enforcement of regulations under this Part), 9 (restrictions on powers of investigation etc) and 10 (financial penalties) of this Act as if this section were in Part 1 of this Act. (11) The Secretary of State or the Treasury must lay before Parliament a draft of the statutory instrument containing regulations under this section within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed and the regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure.””

My Lords, I thank everyone for their fantastic contributions from all sides of the House. I say simply to the Government: I understand that they are trying to collect evidence, but the evidence is in front of their eyes that the wholesale stealing of UK copyright has gone on, is going on and will go on until we take action. I am afraid that a task force, a consultation, a review and listening is not adequate to the moment. I will just push back on one thing: the Government did pick a side. They have forgotten that they had a preferred option for many months until this House spoke. So I ask all noble Lords, please, on whatever side of the House they sit, to show the creative industries that this House has their back. I wish to divide the House.

3|19:24|272|125|Division on Motion 49A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 49)|Motion 49A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 49) agreed.||0|0

19:36:00

Motion on Amendments 50 and 51

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 50 and 51.

50: Page 171, line 37, leave out Clause 138

51: Page 173, line 1, leave out Clause 139

Motion on Amendments 50 and 51 agreed.

Motion on Amendment 52

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 52.

52: Page 173, line 13, leave out Clause 140

Motion 52A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 52)

Moved by

52A: Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 52, and do propose Amendments 52B and 52C to the words so restored to the Bill—

52B: Clause 140, page 173, line 15, leave out “core personal data attributes” and insert “sex data”

52C: Clause 140, page 173, line 21, at end insert— “(3) For the purposes of this section, sex data must be collected in accordance with the following category terms and definitions— (a) “sex” meaning male or female only based on “sex at birth”, “natal sex” or “biological sex” (these terms carrying the same meaning and capable of being used interchangeably), and (b) in addition, where it is lawful to do so in accordance with data protection legislation and the Gender Recognition Act 2004, “acquired gender” meaning male or female only, as recorded on a gender recognition certificate issued in accordance with the Gender Recognition Act 2004.””

A little time has elapsed since the original debate, but I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.

4|19:37|164|152|Division on Motion 52A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 52)|Motion 52A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 52) agreed.||0|0

19:48:00

Motion on Amendment 53

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 53.

53: Clause 141, page 173, line 27, leave out “or soliciting the creation of”

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will also speak to Amendments 54 to 74 and 79. We all agree that tackling the abuse of intimate image deepfakes is incredibly important. I am delighted that these provisions are returning to this House, having been strengthened in the other place, enabling us once again to discuss this key issue. I extend my heartfelt thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, for her dedication on this issue. I am also grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Pannick—who unfortunately is not in his place—and Lord Clement-Jones, and others who have generously given much of their time to discussing this issue with me. Their engagement with me and my ministerial colleagues has been instrumental as we have refined our approach to this important topic. It has been a fantastic example of parliamentarians working across the House to get policy in the strongest possible position. At Third Reading I committed that the Government would bring forward further amendments in the Commons, including on solicitation and time limits. We have delivered on those commitments. I will begin with Commons Amendment 56, which introduces the requesting offence. This addresses the commitment made on solicitation. It replaces, but builds on and delivers the same intent as, the amendment that your Lordships made to the Bill. It comprehensively criminalises asking someone to create a deepfake intimate image for you without the consent of the person in the image or the reasonable belief in their consent. This is an offence regardless of where the person you are asking is based or whether the image was in fact created. I turn to the commitment on time limits. Commons Amendment 63 was passed to extend the statutory time limit so that prosecutions can be brought at any date that is both within six months of when sufficient evidence comes to the prosecutor’s knowledge and within three years of when the offence was committed. This means that perpetrators will not get away with creating or requesting the creation of a deepfake just because no one knew about it at the time. A further change was made in the Commons through Commons Amendment 55, to add a defence of reasonable excuse to both the creating and requesting offences. I know that this is likely to be the subject of much debate today, so I will spend some time setting out the Government’s position. First, I want to reassure the House that the Government’s priority is to create comprehensive, robust defences which ensure that perpetrators cannot evade justice. It is not our intention that the defences provide defendants with a get-out clause, and we do not believe that they do so. This is especially important to stress for the creation of sexual deepfakes, which are so extraordinarily harmful. In our view, it is extremely unlikely that there will ever be a situation where someone creating a sexually explicit deepfake will be able to prove that they had a reasonable excuse. Indeed, we anticipate that the defences would apply only in an extremely narrow set of circumstances, such as for covert law enforcement operations. It is also our view that, for a very small minority of cases, such as the creation of genuinely satirical images that are not sexually explicit, the defence to the creating offence is legally necessary for it to be compatible with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Without the “reasonable excuse” defence, we consider that the creating offence will not be legally robust, and that any legal challenge to its compatibility with Article 10 is likely to be successful. This will not provide the best protection for the victims. Let me labour this very important point: our intention is to create comprehensive, robust offences that will ensure that those who create or request intimate deepfake images without consent, particularly sexual deepfake images, face grave consequences. I also want to stress that abusers will not be able to evade justice by using spurious excuses. The defendant must provide enough evidence to prove that the creation, or that particular request, without consent was reasonable. They cannot just say it is art or satire without sufficient compelling evidence. It will be for the court, not the defendant, to decide whether something is in fact art or satire. From my many years as a magistrate, I can also reassure the House that it is simply not the case that a defendant can offer up any excuse and assert that it is reasonable. The CPS will challenge spurious arguments, and the courts are extremely well equipped and used to dealing with such arguments quickly. The Government share the House’s desire to ensure that criminal law, and these defences in particular, work as well as the Government intend. I therefore speak to support the noble Baroness’s Amendments 55E and 56B, which place a binding obligation on the Government to review the operation of the “reasonable excuse” defence, for both the creating and requesting offences, by putting it in the Bill. As part of this review, we will carry out targeted engagement with external stakeholders and subject matter experts to ensure that we make a broad and informed assessment of the defence. I hope this addresses the concerns about these defences. The best way to protect victims is to ensure that Parliament passes legally sound and robust offences that can bring perpetrators to justice. I urge the House to do that by supporting Motion 55C and Amendment 56B. I beg to move.

My Lords, I speak to my amendments in this group. In doing so, I declare my interest as a guest of Google at its AI policy conference. I start by thanking both the Minister and Minister Davies-Jones for taking the time to engage on this issue and for their endless patience. I know they have worked incredibly hard to secure progress on this and I am very grateful for their efforts. We are down to the issue of whether we believe a person can have a reasonable excuse to create content that looks like a photograph or film of another person without their consent. Noble Lords will recall that this House overwhelmingly indicated that we did not believe “reasonable excuse” should be included as a defence and highlighted concern that it may be misinterpreted or viewed too widely. I have concerns over the position the Government outlined in their letter from Minister Bryant to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Minister Bryant argues that the inclusion of “reasonable excuse” is necessary as, without it, the offence would breach the ECHR due to limiting a person’s freedom to create photorealistic satirical art of scenarios such as a person on the toilet or in boxer shorts. Additionally, the Government argued the need for tech companies to be able to red team against this offence. I share the Government’s strong desire that we do not want this Bill to have a memorandum on it warning that it may breach the ECHR, however precarious the arguments laid out may be. I do not want those who abuse women in this way to claim the prosecution may contravene their human rights. With this in mind, I turn to my first amendments, Amendments 55C and 56B, written in conjunction with the Government, which offer a review of the implementation of “reasonable excuse” for both the creation and requesting offences after two years. I am grateful to the Minister for the compromise. He will know the conflicts I feel about this issue and the great concern I have that, without guardrails, “reasonable excuse” may be used to allow those who abuse others in this sickening way to escape justice. I know the Minister will offer me reassurance that the courts will be used to hearing precarious excuses. However, my concern—as noble Lords know—is that image-based sexual abuse has been consistently misunderstood, with the Law Commission itself only arguing three years ago that the harm from creating non-consensual sexually explicit content was not serious enough to criminalise. In 2023, Refuge found that, despite steady year-on-year increases in recorded offences for image-based abuse, only 4% of offenders were charged. Even when a conviction was achieved, only 3% of cases resulted in the perpetrator being deprived of the images used for the offence. We have seen consistent failure by prosecutors to understand and tackle the issue. I therefore have a very real concern that, by allowing “reasonable excuse” to sit in this offence, we risk it being misunderstood and the offence being undermined. Further, while I am grateful for the offer of a review, I am worried that if after two years we find “reasonable excuse” is allowing perpetrators to evade justice, there will not be a legislative vehicle in which to correct the issue, and the time it takes to correct may be lengthy. I would be grateful if the Minister could offer me reassurance on this point. Additionally, I am concerned by the very premise of the argument that legislation without “reasonable excuse” would breach the ECHR. I have sought the legal counsel of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, KC—who apologises for not being here this evening—and he believes that the inclusion of “reasonable excuse” in the defence is not necessary in order to be compliant with the ECHR. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, advised, as the Joint Committee on Human Rights already highlighted in its letter, that “the Government has stated that prosecutorial discretion is sufficient to ensure that an offence that could violate a qualified right under the ECHR is nevertheless compliant with it”. Additionally, all legislation must, so far as possible, be read and given effect to in a manner that is compliant with the ECHR, according to Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. So, even if there were to be a prosecution in the sort of circumstances contemplated by the Government, the defendant could rely on their Article 10 rights, which means that an all-encompassing reasonable excuse is not necessary. Additionally, I would be grateful if the Minister could outline to the House the reasons why tech companies cannot red team by prompting with the images of people who do consent and, therefore, not requiring a reasonable excuse, should their model fail and end up creating the content that it is trying to avoid. I would go as far as to say that testing prompts on a model using the image of a person who does not consent would be deeply unethical. It is my belief—and the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—that such specific examples do not justify general reasonable excuse. To quote my friend and human rights advocate, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti: “Spurious ECHR arguments for weakening 21st century cyber sex offences do not help the cause of those seeking to defend human rights from its many detractors”.

20:00:00

I also remind noble Lords that we are talking about a disproportionately sexist form of abuse. It is of huge concern that the Government’s view that satire may be a reasonable excuse risks legitimising the continued abuse of women in the public eye by allowing the possibility that photorealistic images and videos may be created of them on the toilet or in their underwear—not a cartoon but a photorealistic image—in order not to breach the creator’s freedom of expression under the ECHR.

However, given the place we are in, I have tabled a further compromise amendment, under Motion 55A, that uses the examples laid out by the Government and that seeks to limit the scope of the reasonable excuse to only allow a narrow set of cases. It uses the definition of “intimate state” in the Sexual Offences Act to ensure that reasonable excuse cannot be used as a Trojan horse. It means that under no circumstances would anyone be allowed to use reasonable excuse if they had created content where a person was participating or engaging in an act that a reasonable person would consider to be a sexual act, or where the person was doing something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual.

However, my amendment would allow for the circumstances that the Government suggest are required to be compliant with the ECHR, such as images of people toileting or in boxer shorts. However, it puts guardrails around it to ensure that no content is created where a person has been given less coverage

“to the same or a greater extent than would typically be covered by underwear worn to cover the person’s genitals, buttocks or breasts, as the case may be”.

While I am unhappy that any reasonable excuse amendment is included, this seeks to put guardrails to prevent a Trojan horse sitting inside the offence. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify whether these guardrails would make the offence ECHR compliant.

My final amendment, Amendment 56A, removes reasonable excuse from the separate offence of requesting non-consensual sexually explicit content. Noble Lords will have heard me speak on multiple occasions about the sickeningly degrading nature of forums where this content is requested. I am very grateful for the way the Government have listened to get the amendment to this place. However, I cannot envisage any reasonable excuse for a person to request this content of another without their consent.

Jodie, the survivor who inspired this offence, had to endure degrading content of her being requested on online forums. She said:

“the inclusion of a ‘reasonable excuse’ defence undermines the very purpose of this offence. Survivors should not be forced to navigate yet another legal loophole that allows perpetrators to justify abuse. Prosecutorial discretion already exists to protect legitimate cases. This clause risks giving abusers cover and eroding trust in the law. The law must be clear, firm and survivor-focused”.

My understanding is that the Government do not believe that the removal of reasonable excuse in this separate offence would breach the ECHR. I would be very grateful if the Government would accept this amendment, to make this offence as comprehensive as possible and to ensure that no abuser slips through the net.

I conclude by asking the Minister to give his assurance that, were reasonable excuse to remain in these offences, no court in England and Wales would interpret reasonable excuse as a perpetrator claiming that they were creating the content for artistic purposes. The baseline should always be a woman’s consent; there is nothing more important.

My Lords, I will speak primarily to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge. We need to be crystal clear that we would not be here and we would not have come as far as we have—notwithstanding residual concerns—but for her work. Her entry into your Lordships’ House was greeted by the most shocking barrage of misogynistic innuendo and abuse, including from a septuagenarian, privileged veteran of progressive journalism who really ought to have known better. It was pretty ghastly to watch. However, it has been a joy of equal measure to witness the noble Baroness’s response to her critics, and this has been the best kind of response. With her campaign—backed by supporters across the House, including the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and supporters in civil society and the academy—she has made, in less than two years, a greater contribution to the most vital part of the legislative work of this House than many make in decades. Perhaps the young have something to teach their elders, after all, particularly about the new and all-too-lawless continent of the internet, which we have been discussing for some time today. After nearly 30 years at the interface between criminal policy and the ECHR, I share the analysis of the harm caused by this 21st-century cybersex offence that has been offered by the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. By contrast, I fear that Whitehall has displayed a breathtaking lack of empathy for the mostly women and girl victims of this conduct—a lack of empathy that, at times, verges on the obtuse. That has gone on for some years, as the noble Baroness indicated. It accounts for the time taken by the Government to agree to the offence being imprisonable, but I am glad that we finally got there. Now, at the 11th hour, I too fear the sheer breadth of the Government’s reasonable excuse defence, which might drive a coach and horses through the protection. This kind of degrading conduct is no light-hearted matter. The creation of deepfake intimate image without a person’s consent is capable of destroying their dignity, mental health and life. More broadly, it is capable of changing the whole flavour of our society: in the classroom, in the workplace and wherever men and women rub along together. That is what is at stake. “Reasonable excuse” defences are appropriate and necessary in the context of broad, strict liability offences capable of catching otherwise innocent behaviour. The classic example is the strict liability offence of being in possession of a blade in a public place. Without that “reasonable excuse” defence, any of us could be criminalised on the way back from the kitchen department at John Lewis, so there is an obvious reason for a reasonable excuse defence to that strict liability offence. I put it to the House that we would not dream of a “reasonable excuse” defence for sexual assault. The offence requires intention, action and the sexualised aspect. Once these are established, there simply is no reasonable excuse. I believe that the creation of a deepfake intimate image is equivalent to sexual assault if it is without consent. I learn that the Government are concerned about freedom of expression in the context of creating deepfake intimate images without someone’s consent. Let us please remember that freedom of expression is not an absolute; it must be balanced with proportionate interference to protect the rights of others, hence laws against breach of copyright, child pornography and so on all over the world, including in the United States—famously, the land of the First Amendment. I really must press my noble friend the Minister to explain in some detail—more than we have heard so far—why the tighter “reasonable excuse” defences from the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, of red teaming and political satire do not do the trick? In other words, what are these other reasonable excuses for pernicious conduct of this kind? Why should there be any reasonable excuse for the solicitation offence? Where is the freedom of expression in soliciting that someone else creates the deepfake image? I noticed the introduction of the concern about covert policing—I think my noble friend the Minister raised it—but surely he recalls the covert human intelligence Act, a very controversial Act of 2020 that I am still very concerned about, which allows the authorities to grant advanced immunity to people committing criminal conduct in the course of their covert surveillance. I am a bit concerned about that suddenly popping up as a reasonable excuse of government at the 11th hour on this offence. Without further specifics, I am really concerned about the impression that the Government just do not get it, that they do not totally understand what is being perpetrated online and that they are not properly taking the protection of women and girls sufficiently seriously. I would really regret that. This is the coalface of human rights at this moment in the 21st century. I really hope there is still time for the Government to listen further to the compelling arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, and think again.

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has said everything I was going to say and more and better, so I want just to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Owen of Alderley Edge, and to say that I too have witnessed her forensic fight over the last few months. I hugely admire her for it, and I congratulate her on getting this far. I absolutely share all the concerns that both noble Baronesses have expressed. Just in case I do not have the opportunity again, I congratulate the noble Baroness on her extraordinary work and campaigning.

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the three noble Baronesses, and I too congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, on her magnificent and successful campaign to outlaw the making and requesting of non-consensual images, first with her Private Member’s Bill and then with amendments to this Bill. She has fought it with huge skill and determination, and, rightly, she has pushed it to the wire in wanting the most robust offence and tightest defences possible. I thank the Minister for his flexibility that he has shown so far—with the emphasis on “so far”. The amendments that the noble Baroness has put forward represent a compromise, given the strong and rather extraordinary opinion of the Attorney-General that the defence of “reasonable excuse” is needed for the defence to be compliant with the ECHR and that, therefore, the whole Bill risks being non-compliant if that is not contained in the defence for these offences. That is the equivalent of a legal brick wall, despite an excellent opinion from Professor Clare McGlynn, which in my view demolished the Attorney-General’s case, which seems to be based on ensuring the ability of big tech companies to red team their models on images used without consent. That is a rather peculiar basis. Why cannot the big tech companies use images with consent? They would then be red teaming in a rather different and more compliant way.

20:15:00

I therefore found the exchange of correspondence that the noble Baroness referred to rather baffling. She is entirely right to put forward her compromise and seek to limit the scope of “reasonable excuse” to only the narrow set of cases that the Government have outlined, especially given that the Government have previously stated that prosecutorial discretion is sufficient to ensure that an offence that could violate a qualified right under ECHR is nevertheless compliant with it. Of course, she is right to require a review of the way the defence operates.

As she said in her opening speech, her Motion 55A uses the definition of an intimate state in the Sexual Offences Act to ensure that reasonable excuse cannot be used as a Trojan horse. In principle, we also very much support her Amendment 56A. It is clear that the reasonable excuse is not required for the requesting offence to be compliant with the ECHR, so that should be deleted, and we agree with her.

There are, however, even given where we have got to so far, going to be many people who will be grateful for her efforts, given that an extraordinary one in 14 adults have experienced threats to share intimate images in England and Wales, rising to one in seven among young women. As we know, there is a clear link between gender-based violence and image-based abuse, and a great many women will feel safer as a result of the noble Baroness’s efforts.

My Lords, I happened to be in the House when the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, was taking her Private Member’s Bill through, and I remember very well the reply given by my noble friend to her Bill. Therefore, it is a great achievement that this has become part of government legislation, but it is not complete. We have just heard my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti argue, and I can only adopt her words entirely, because she has always been a much better advocate than me, to persuade a very reasonable Minister—my noble friend has always been a very reasonable Minister—to acquiesce to this argument, notwithstanding the advice of the Attorney-General.

My Lords, first, I declare my interest as a commissioner at the EHRC, and I have also been a lifelong campaigner for and defender of free speech, so I do not approach this subject lightly at all. I have some sympathy with the Government’s position that a reasonable excuse is required to be compatible with Article 10. However, I think the definition being as broad as it is reinforces the worries of my noble friend Lady Owen and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I was not really clear, and am concerned to know, as noble colleagues have already alluded to, on why the defence is drafted so widely. I was not sure whether this was coming from EU law and, if that were the case, I wanted to draw the House’s attention to the most recent EU directive on preventing violence against women and girls. If we look at that directive, in section 19, it has unequivocally decided that deepfakes should be criminalised and: “Such production, manipulation or altering should include the fabrication of ‘deepfakes’, where the material appreciably resembles an existing person, objects, places” and so on. I appreciate, of course, that we are no longer bound by EU law, but given that it will be applied by the ECHR, under which we still operate, it is interesting to note that in section 20 it has acknowledged the Article 10 obligation but has narrowly defined it. I draw attention to this and ask the Government to take it into account and reassure this House that they will urge guidance to be issued, if this defence has to go forward as it is currently drafted, so that any reasonable excuse defence maintained in this clause is clearly confined by guidance issued as soon as possible by the CPS.

My Lords, I rise to speak to the Motion standing in the name of my noble friend Lady Owen of Alderley Edge. Her amendments fall into two categories, and we support her in all of them. I start by joining the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others in paying tribute to her tenacity in pursuing this issue by standing up for women who should not have to live in the fear of becoming victims of sexually explicitly deepfakes. As mentioned, she has won the deep respect of this House and, at the same time won many, many friends from her action. The cross-party support that she has managed to gain from this shows this House at its best—a House of which I am proud to be a Member. First, my noble friend has tabled reviews to ensure that the offence that is being created as a result of her tireless campaigning is effective. We support her in her Motion and agree with her that we must do everything we can to ensure that the law is robust and effective in protecting women. Secondly, like many others, I have been puzzled by the ECHR reasonable excuse approach being used by the Government. It was very helpful, as ever, to have experts on hand in this matter and my noble friend Lady Cash to bring her expertise and agree with the basic position that, while we understand it, it is very widely drawn as it is currently set up. I think it is very sensible what my noble friend is trying to do in seeking to tighten those definitions of reasonable excuse and remove reasonable excuse in the case of requesting sexually explicit deepfakes in her Motion 55A and Amendment 56A. I completely understand why she has brought them, and, while they would appear to be instead of the reviews, which we also support, we feel that my noble friend is right to challenge the inclusion of reasonable excuse as a defence to these offences. On that, she has our complete support.

My Lords, I have listened carefully to the arguments, particularly those in favour of the noble Baroness’s Amendment 55, the creating offence, which seeks to replace the “reasonable excuse” defence with the creating offence, with a targeted defence for red-team software testing and reasonable political satire. We share the noble Baroness’s desire to ensure that any defence to the creating offence functions tightly and share her belief that only in narrow and limited circumstances would a person have a reasonable excuse for the creation of such images without consent. That is how our reasonable excuse defence will apply in practice, which is why the Government believe that the defence is the right way forward. However, we are unable to agree to these targeted defences that the noble Baroness proposes to the creating offence in place of a reasonable excuse defence. This is a novel offence, tackling behaviour that is changing rapidly along with the technology itself. We cannot anticipate all the ways in which people will use technology as it develops. A defence of reasonable excuse which, as I have said, we believe will be interpreted very carefully by the courts, will ensure that the offence can be used effectively to target culpable perpetrators, even as technology and its uses change. The targeted defences proposed by the noble Baroness would also, crucially, not eliminate the risk of successful legal challenge, which I explained in my opening speech. Even with such targeted defences, the creating offence risks successful challenge in the courts, leading to uncertainty and reduced protection for victims. I turn briefly to Amendment 56A on the requesting offence. As I have set out, the reasonable excuse defence to the requesting offence will only apply in an extremely narrow set of circumstances, such as covert law enforcement operations. The legal issue which applies to the creating offence does not apply to the requesting offence. However, we always aim for consistency and parity across similar offences and so urge this House not to pass Amendment 56A to the requesting offence. Also, without the defence that the Commons included for the requesting offence, law enforcement and intelligence officials may be unable to effectively carry out their functions. We made a manifesto commitment to ban the creation of sexually explicit deepfakes. This legislation, as amended in the Commons, does just that. For the first time, there will be protection for victims and punishment for the perpetrators who create, or ask other people to create, intimate deepfakes of adults without consent or a reasonable belief of consent. These provisions represent an important and necessary response to intimate image deepfakes. The Government are clear that these offenses are comprehensive and robust. While a defence of reasonable excuse to both offences is necessary, it does not provide a get-out clause for the many perpetrators creating intimate deepfakes, especially sexual deepfakes, without consent. We remain firmly of a view that this is the most effective way to protect victims from this appalling abuse. It is our duty to act decisively. For those reasons, I urge your Lordships to support, with confidence, Motion 55C, containing as amendments in lieu Amendments 55D and 55E, and Amendment 56B. I urge the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, to withdraw her Motion 55A and Amendment 56A. The noble Baroness asked about deprivation orders. We share her frustration with this. The ability for courts to apply deprivation orders has been in place but these have not been used as extensively as they could be, so the judges are looking at sentencing guidelines to see how that lack of implementation of deprivation orders can be remedied. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti asked whether offenders of the requesting offence would also be deprived of images by the court. Yes, they would be. We want to ensure parity across the creating and the requesting offence, so that includes their computers and any images that are stored anywhere. A number of noble Lords have expressed scepticism about whether the courts would adequately apply the reasonable excuse defence, which really is the nub of the issue which we are debating now. I have had this discussion many times with the noble Baroness, Lady Owen, in private. I must say, as a magistrate for nearly 20 years, that we often hear completely ridiculous defences. It is certainly not unusual in magistrates’ court—or, I am sure, in Crown Court—and magistrates and judges are well able to deal with those types of defences. I know that the noble Baroness is sceptical of that, which is one of the prime reasons why we have put the review in the Bill. She will know it is very unusual for Governments to commit in a Bill to have a review, but it is because we understand that this is a new area of law and that the way we are defining “reasonable excuse” is a politically contentious area. I urge her to continue to work with us, which I am sure she will do in any event, and I urge her not to move her amendments to a vote. I beg to move.

Motion on Amendment 53 agreed.

20:30:00

Motion on Amendment 54

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 54.

54: Clause 141, page 173, line 35, leave out from beginning to end of line 8 on page 174

Motion on Amendment 54 agreed.

Motion on Amendment 55

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 55.

55: Clause 141, page 174, line 26, at end insert— “(7A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for creating the purported intimate image.”

Motion 55A (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 55) not moved.

Motion 55C (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 55)

Moved by

55C: Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment 55, and do propose Amendments 55D and 55E in lieu—

55D: Clause 141, page 174, line 26, at end insert— “(7A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for creating the purported intimate image.”

55E: Clause 141, page 174, line 29, at end insert— “(9) The Secretary of State must— (a) review the operation of subsection (7A), (b) publish the outcome of the review in a report before the end of the period of two years beginning with the day on which this section comes into force, and (c) lay the report before Parliament.””

Motion 55C (Amendment to the Motion on Amendment 55) agreed.

Motion on Amendment 56

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 56.

56: Clause 141, page 174, line 29, at end insert— “66EA Requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult (1) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) A intentionally requests the creation of a purported intimate image of another person (B) (either in general or specific terms), (b) B does not consent to A requesting the creation of the purported intimate image, and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. (2) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) A intentionally requests that, if a purported intimate image of another person (B) is created, it includes or excludes something in particular (whether relating to B’s appearance, the intimate state in which B is shown or anything else), (b) B does not consent to A requesting the inclusion or exclusion of that thing, and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. (3) References in this section to making a request (however expressed) include doing an act which could reasonably be taken to be a request (such as, for example, indicating agreement in response to an offer or complying with conditions of an offer). (4) References in this section to making a request (however expressed) are references to— (a) making a request directed to a particular person or persons, or (b) making a request so that it is available to one or more persons (or people generally), without directing it to a particular person or persons. (5) References in this section to consent to a person requesting something are— (a) in a case described in subsection (4)(a), references to consent to a request being made that is directed to the particular person or persons, and (b) in a case described in subsection (4)(b), references to consent to a request being made so that it is available to the person or persons (or people generally), as appropriate. (6) An offence under this section is committed— (a) regardless of whether the purported intimate image is created, (b) regardless of whether the purported intimate image, or the particular thing to be included in or excluded from such an image, is also requested by another person, and (c) regardless of where in the world the person or persons mentioned in subsection (4)(a) and (b) is or are located. (7) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for making the request. (8) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the maximum term for summary offences or a fine (or both). (9) In this section, references to a purported intimate image, to creating such an image and to a person shown in an intimate state have the same meaning as in section 66E.”

Amendment 56A (to Amendment 56) not moved.

Amendment 56B (to Amendment 56)

Moved by

56B: After inserted subsection (9) insert— “(10) The Secretary of State must— (a) review the operation of subsection (7), (b) publish the outcome of the review in a report before the end of the period of two years beginning with the day on which this section comes into force, and (c) lay the report before Parliament.”

Amendment 56B (to Amendment 56) agreed.

Motion on Amendment 56, as amended, agreed.

Motion on Amendments 57 to 79

Moved by

That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 57 to 79.

57: Clause 141, page 174, line 30, leave out “soliciting” and insert “requesting”

58: Clause 141, page 174, line 32, leave out “section 66E” and insert “sections 66E and 66EA”

59: Clause 141, page 174, line 33, leave out “the creation of a purported intimate image” and insert “an act”

60: Clause 141, page 174, line 34, leave out “of creation”

61: Clause 141, page 174, line 35, at end insert “(and see also section 66EA(5))”

62: Clause 141, page 175, line 10, at end insert— “(8) The “maximum term for summary offences” means— (a) if the offence is committed before the time when section 281(5) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 comes into force, six months; (b) if the offence is committed after that time, 51 weeks.”

63: Clause 141, page 175, line 10, at end insert— “66G Creating, or requesting the creation of, purported intimate image of adult: time limit for prosecution (1) Notwithstanding section 127(1) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, a magistrates’ court may try an information or written charge relating to an offence under section 66E or 66EA if the information is laid or the charge is issued— (a) before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the day on which the offence was committed, and (b) before the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which evidence which the prosecutor thinks is sufficient to justify a prosecution comes to the prosecutor’s knowledge. (2) A certificate signed by or on behalf of a prosecutor stating the date on which evidence described in subsection (1)(b) came to the prosecutor’s knowledge is conclusive evidence of that fact.”

64: Clause 141, page 175, line 12, after “66E” insert “, 66EA”

65: Clause 141, page 175, line 12, at end insert— “(3A) In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 177D insert— “177DA Purported intimate images to be treated as used for purpose of certain offences (1) This section applies where a person commits an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence under section 66E of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (creating purported intimate image of adult). (2) The purported intimate image to which the offence relates, and anything containing it, is to be regarded for the purposes of section 177C(3) (and section 94A(3)(b)(ii)) as used for the purposes of committing the offence (including where it is committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring).””

66: Clause 141, page 175, line 12, at end insert— “(3B) In Part 2 of Schedule 3 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 (offences to be disregarded in reckoning whether an act is capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence: England and Wales), after paragraph 38 insert— “Sexual Offences Act 2003 38ZA An offence under section 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult).””

67: Clause 141, page 175, line 16, leave out “This section” and insert “Subsection (2)”

68: Clause 141, page 175, line 17, leave out “or soliciting the creation of”

69: Clause 141, page 175, line 23, at end insert— “(3) Subsection (4) applies where a person commits an offence under section 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (requesting the creation of purported intimate image of adult). (4) A purported intimate image which is connected with the offence, and anything containing it, is to be regarded for the purposes of section 153 (and section 157(3)(b)) as used for the purposes of committing the offence (including where it is committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring). (5) A purported intimate image is connected with an offence under section 66EA of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 if — (a) it appears to be of a person who was the subject of the request to which the offence relates (whether or not it is what was requested), and (b) it was in the offender’s possession, or under the offender’s control, as a result of that request.”

70: Clause 144, page 177, line 25, leave out “141” and insert “141(1) to (3) and (4)”

71: Clause 144, page 177, line 26, leave out “extends” and insert “extend”

72: Clause 144, page 177, line 26, at end insert— “(d) section 141(3A) (amendment of the Armed Forces Act 2006) extends to— (i) England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, (ii) the Isle of Man, and (iii) the British overseas territories, except Gibraltar;”

73: Clause 144, page 177, line 26, at end insert— “(d) section 141(3B) (amendment of the Serious Crime Act 2007) extends to England and Wales and Northern Ireland only.”

74: Clause 144, page 177, line 26, at end insert— “(5A) The powers conferred by section 384(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (powers to extend provisions to the Channel Islands and to make provisions apply with modifications as they extend to the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man and British overseas territories other than Gibraltar) may be exercised in relation to section 177DA of that Act (inserted by section 141(3A) of this Act).”

75: Clause 147, page 179, line 10, leave out subsection (2)

76: Schedule 11, page 227, line 13, at end insert— “21A In section 170(2)(a) (unlawful obtaining etc of personal data), after “preventing” insert “, investigating”. 21B(1) Section 171 (re-identification of de-identified personal data) is amended as follows. (2) In subsection (3)(a), after “preventing” insert “, investigating”. (3) In subsection (6)(a), after “preventing” insert “, investigating”.”

77: Schedule 15, page 255, line 35, at end insert— “(5) This section does not authorise the processing of information if the processing would contravene the data protection legislation (but in determining whether it would do so, take into account the power conferred by this section). (6) In this section, “the data protection legislation” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 2018 (see section 3 of that Act).”

78: Title, line 18, after “services;” insert “to make provision about works protected by copyright and the development of artificial intelligence systems;”

79: Title, line 18, leave out “and solicitation”

Motion on Amendments 57 to 79 agreed.