Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Amendment) (Provision of Information) Order 2025

Considered in Grand Committee

17:01:00

Moved by

That the Grand Committee do consider the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Amendment) (Provision of Information) Order 2025. Relevant document: 14th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (special attention drawn to the instrument).

My Lords, I beg to move that the Committee has considered the order, which amends the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 in order to give the Disclosure and Barring Service, the DBS, an express power to share its barred list information with UK non-territorial police forces and the Crown dependency police forces of Guernsey, Jersey and the Isle of Man. I hope this will be a relatively straightforward Motion for the Committee because, as well as issuing criminal record certificates, commonly known as DBS checks, the DBS also maintains two lists—one of people that the DBS has barred from working in regulated activity with children, and one of those it has barred from working in regulated activity with adults. Regulated activity for the purposes of this includes sensitive roles such as work in schools, health and social care. The DBS bars people from such work if their criminal history or other information held by the police, or their behaviour in the workplace, indicates that they pose a high risk to either or both of those groups. The DBS itself updates the police national database, PND, on a weekly basis with the names of individuals who have been barred. If the police then look up a named individual on the police national database—for example, for the purposes of criminal investigation or police officer vetting—the police will be able to see if that person is on one or other of the DBS barred lists. An express power to share such information with the police is provided to the DBS by Section 50A of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. This gives the DBS the power to provide any information it has to a chief officer of police for the purposes specified in the Act, and it confirms that a chief officer of police includes the Police Service of Northern Ireland and Police Scotland. However—and this is the nub of the order before the Committee—it does not make express reference to the non-territorial police forces or the Crown dependency police forces. Following an extensive review, which includes arrangements for accessing the police national database, the DBS has decided on a precautionary basis that there should be express statutory ground for sharing its barred list data with these forces. It therefore took steps in March 2024 to prevent them accessing the barred status of individuals, pending resolution of the legislative position. This means that, at the moment, non-territorial forces and the Crown dependency police forces cannot currently access an individual’s barred list status. We therefore intend, through this order, to make it clear that the definition of “chief officer of police” in Section 50A also includes the chief officers of the UK non-territorial, and Crown dependency police forces. Those non-territorial forces are the British Transport Police, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Ministry of Defence Police, the Royal Navy Police, the Royal Air Force Police, the Royal Military Police, the National Crime Agency and the tri-service serious crime unit. The Crown dependency forces, for the purposes of this order, are the States of Jersey police force, the salaried police force of the Isle of Guernsey and the Isle of Man Constabulary. This order effectively gives the Disclosure and Barring Service the certainty it seeks to provide all forces with access to information that indicates that someone is considered to pose a risk to children and vulnerable adults. In conclusion, the DBS’s barred list exists to help protect the most vulnerable in our society from those who pose a high risk of harm to them. That information is important to decisions made by police forces, whether related to police officer vetting or related to the prevention and investigation of crime. This order’s purpose is to give the DBS the statutory power, beyond any doubt, to share this information with all forces, including the non-territorial and Crown dependency forces. I commend it to the Committee.

My Lords, just before I contribute, are we not doing both SIs together?

That is not what my brief indicates, but of course, if the noble Lord wishes to do that, he can propose it.

I apologise. The first reading of this brief regulation and the Explanatory Memorandum is misleading. It appears to be a minor correction to ensure that access to DBS barred list details will now include non-territorial and specialist police officers. Nothing to see here—or is that the case? Once again, I thank the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for its 14th report of this Session, in which it set out the real background to this SI and the previous history of errors in law by this department being corrected by regulations—but with Explanatory Memorandums lacking in information to inform those parliamentarians wishing to scrutinise regulations. It points out at least 10 SIs for this period since July 2024 that have been unsatisfactorily presented to your Lordships’ House—referenced by the committee in its third, fourth, eighth and 10th reports. This SI now needs to be added to that list. The reality of this SI is that highly confidential information under the DBS legislation had been passed on to police bodies even though they were not permitted to receive it. The original Act, passed in 2006 under the previous Labour Government—nearly 20 years ago now—has clearly not been reviewed in detail since then. One must commend the new Government for dealing with not just this issue but the other ones as well. However, it is a real shame that the somewhat underhand tactics of the Explanatory Memorandum, designed to elicit confidence in the reader, are misleading as to be against the spirit of the relationship between a Government and the Parliament that is there to ensure that it can hold that Government to account. Can the Minister say whether the systems have been changed in the Home Office to ensure that this type of obfuscatory approach is now ended and that all such legislation that needs to be updated has been updated? On the SI itself, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee raises the issue that the implication of the draft order is that unlawful sharing of data may have happened, even if it did not concern very many people. Individuals on the list may have been affected by being denied a job or made the subject of a protection order. So can the Minister tell the Grand Committee how many individuals—even if the number is small—may have been affected by the unlawful activity, and, perhaps even more importantly, whether those individuals have been told?

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the detail and rationale for this order. I make no comment on the on the observations just made by the noble Baroness and seek to address only the substance of the order. As the Minister said, this statutory instrument seeks to grant explicit statutory authority for the DBS to share information with a range of non-territorial and specialist police forces. Although the need for this clarification is important and of course understandable, there are several questions about how this change will affect safeguarding practices more widely. The order seeks to address a gap in the legal framework and expand the list of forces with access to the DBS. These were listed by the Minister, and I do not seek to repeat them. Given the critical role that these forces play in safeguarding vulnerable people, it is vital that they have access to all the relevant data that could indicate a risk to public safety. If properly implemented, the changes discussed today should enable the relevant forces to access that information and enhance protection. I will probe the Minister on a couple of points. Is he confident that the forces now granted access to DBS data are fully equipped—in terms of both training and technology—to handle and act upon this sensitive information effectively? Safeguarding data is of the utmost sensitivity, and the risks of misuse or failure to act on such information are significant. What specific protections are in place to ensure that qualified authorised personnel within these forces can access and use the data properly? Further, the SI allows the sharing of data on individuals barred from working with children or vulnerable adults. There is obviously an expectation that that data will be actively used to prevent harm. Therefore, are any guidelines or protocols in place to govern how this information will be used by the additional range of forces? Finally, it is important to understand how these new regulations will fit into the broader safeguarding landscape. While recognising the need to protect and secure sensitive personal data for a host of reasons, I ask: does that preclude a more integrated approach to data sharing in general, not just among police forces but perhaps with agencies such as social services and healthcare providers? The Opposition see this a positive step toward improving safeguarding. Plainly, it is important that its utility is measured and evaluated. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s responses.

I am grateful for the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. I first address a point that the noble Baroness made about the Explanatory Memoranda for Home Office SIs. I am going to be honest with her: there has not been a been a good performance by the Home Office for a long period of time. The Home Office has recognised that. I am responsible for what has happened since 4 July last year. A number of SIs criticised by the statutory instrument committee were lacking in information and assessments from the previous Government. I am not going to pick a fight with the previous Government for that; that can happen. On entering office in July, my job was to recognise that concern from the statutory instruments committee and to ensure that we try to address it. In addressing it, I did two things: I met the then chair of the statutory instruments committee—the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—and I have since had discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Watson, who has subsequently taken over that position. We will continue to liaise with him on that and we will examine that with him. I initially gave the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, the assurance that we will try to improve performance on SIs. I am committed to ensuring that SI legislation is delivered to the highest standard. We are in a transitionary period. We are still in only the seventh or eighth month of this current Government. Therefore, we, the Home Office, are working hard to drive improvements in explanatory materials where there have been deficiencies. That includes organising refreshment training and guidance for members of staff. I have personally met with officials who deal with the statutory instrument guidance across the board. They are fully aware that not only I but the Leader of this House and the Leader of the House of Commons are very keen to ensure that SIs and Explanatory Memoranda are at a better standard than they were. I give that assurance to the noble Baroness today. It is starting to yield results, with the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee having commended the department recently for its explanatory materials provided in support of several of the latest Home Office instruments. I assure the noble Baroness that that will get better over time, all being well.

17:15:00

There were valid questions from both Front-Bench spokespeople with regard to the assessment. I will first take the question of legal risk, which was party to both of their contributions. To go back to first base: the DBS was, until March 2024, sharing this information with the authorities that are in this order. It was sharing it with Guernsey, Jersey and the other police forces that I mentioned, therefore, to go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, it had confidence that those organisations were capable, efficient and able to use that information in a proper and effective way.

What it did not have was what it perceived to be full legal cover, so it was worried about the potential for legal challenge. That issue led to the proposal in March 2024 —again, before I came into office—saying, “Can we review this procedure to give it full legal status?” In a sense, we are making sure that what happens now, which happened before March 2024, is on a fully legal basis so that it does not have the type of challenge that the noble Lord indicated and which I think the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, also mentioned.

Most of those who are barred by the DBS will have been barred because of a conviction for a serious offence or because police information disclosed on an enhanced DBS check led to the DBS considering them for barring. That is information which is currently in the police computer. When these forces search for information on their systems, they will find the criminality and police information to which they already had access, as well as the barred list status of the individual.

What we are looking at now is in relation to the small number of individuals—again, this goes to the nub of the points made by both Front-Bench speakers—who are on the barred list for reasons other than a relevant criminal conviction or other police information. It is still possible that the police may have information on those individuals on their systems via, for example, a criminal investigation. That leaves a small potential cohort on the barred list where the barred status, which can be accessed only with DBS permission, would be the only information available on police systems. In those cases, the number in this small group is reduced further as it concerns only those being looked into by those forces added by this order which, by definition, are a minority of police forces. The assessment we have made is that there is a minimal risk to the public from that change.

The noble Baroness mentioned the potential for individuals to know whether they are on a barred list. If they have a criminal conviction or other things that I mentioned previously, they will know that they are on it. What they will not necessarily know is when someone accesses that information. I hope that the concerns that she has mentioned are not founded, but I am happy to reflect on what she said when I read the Hansard transcript. If need be, I will write to her accordingly.

I hope that I have answered the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, because on capability, guidelines and protocol, that was all happening before March 2024. The DBS, the police national computer and the agencies receiving that information were content, but the DBS itself said, “We think we potentially don’t have the legal cover to do that”, so this order is to ensure that that legal cover is there. The jurisdiction in Guernsey, Jersey and other places is a matter for them but we are now sharing that information on the same basis that we were pre-March 2024, subject to this order, but given that legal certainty on top. With those comments, I hope that I have answered the points—

I thank the Minister very much for his very helpful answer. I was asking about individuals because if this tiny group do not know that they are on the barred list but are having jobs denied them, we are going back to the system that used to operate 30 years ago when I was chair of education in a county council. It was essentially a secret list then. The point about those who have criminal records is that the individuals concerned know. It may be only a small number but I am very concerned about that group.

I think I said—but I will check Hansard again—that all individuals will know that they are barred. Having reflected on this matter, I can confirm that all individuals will know that they are barred. Again, this is, in a sense, a process matter to ensure that there is legal certainty for the agencies that share that information.

What about the individuals?

The individuals know that they are barred because of the reasons they have. So there is legal certainty about that. I hope I have answered the noble Baroness, but, if she wishes to intervene again, I am obviously happy to reply. If she does not, I commend this instrument to the Grand Committee.

Motion agreed.