Mental Health Bill [HL]

Committee (4th Day)

16:40:00

Schedule 2: Nominated Persons

Amendment 68

Moved by

68: Schedule 2, page 71, line 22, at end insert— “30AA Overruling a nominated person(1) The appropriate tribunal may, on application made in accordance with this provision, make an order overruling a decision of a nominated person.(2) An order under this section may be made on the application of—(a) the patient,(b) an approved mental health professional,(c) any person engaged in caring for the patient or interested in the patient’s welfare, or(d) any person with parental responsibility for the patient.(3) An application for an order under this provision may only be made on the grounds that—(a) the nominated person unreasonably objects to the making of an application for admission for treatment or a guardianship application in respect of the patient,(b) the nominated person has, without due regard to the welfare of the patient or the interests of the public, exercised the power to discharge the patient under this Act or is likely to do so, or(c) the nominated person unreasonably objects to the making of a community treatment order in respect of the patient.(4) In this section “patient” includes any person by or for whom a nominated person is appointed.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would give the Mental Health First-Tier Tribunal the power to overrule decisions of a nominated person.

My Lords, I shall also speak briefly to the other amendments in this group. I warn those who are planning to speak after me that I will be brief, because this amendment is self-evident and set out in our papers. I begin by reflecting on the fact that I think there is universal welcome for the creation of the nominated person situation. This is a good step forward and widely welcomed. What your Lordships’ Committee is trying to do is perhaps to fulfil its traditional role to make sure that it is set up in as watertight, practical, useful and effective way as possible. This amendment did not originate with me; it originated with the Law Society. It provides for a mental health First-tier Tribunal to overrule the power of the nominated person. I note that the next amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, suggests not the county court but the Court of Protection. I do not have any particular position on any of these things. It is useful for us in Committee to discuss this in detail. People far more expert than me will outline that, so I shall not go on at length. I will note for the Committee’s understanding that my Amendment 71 was withdrawn, because it was doubled up with someone else’s but was put in a different place. It was just one of those technical juggles that happens. With that very brief introduction, I beg to move.

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 69, which would replace the reference in the Bill to the county court with reference to use of the Court of Protection to deal with applications to terminate appointments of nominated persons. The single reference to the county court, currently in Schedule 2, is the only place where the county court is given jurisdiction to do anything in this legislation, which I suggest makes it something of an anomaly as well as an anachronism. The reference to the county court simply carries forward the use of the county court from the 1959 and 1983 Acts, which provided for that court to deal with applications to displace nearest relatives. When I was first appointed a judge, I well remember being presented with an urgent application to displace the nearest relative, of which I then had no experience and in which I had never had any training. In the days before judicial computers, I had no access to anything but out-of-date and very limited books in the small court, no longer in existence, where I was then sitting for a few weeks and without help from any legal representatives. Few learning curves have been more rapid. Since then, I would like to think I developed some expertise, but my later experience of those applications has led me to question whether the modern equivalent in this Bill concerning nominated persons would be better dealt with elsewhere. Such applications can involve detailed understanding of psychiatric reports and of the family dynamics for the patient concerned, particularly if the nominated person is unco-operative or disengaged. At the time when the earlier legislation stipulated the use of the county court, there was neither a separate family court nor the Court of Protection, which was created by the Mental Capacity Act 2005. Of course, I do not suggest that county court judges could not deal with these applications—my life with my present and former judicial colleagues would probably not be worth living if I did so. A judge has to be prepared to turn his or her hand to whatever comes their way. However, I do suggest that the Court of Protection is now better equipped to deal with these applications with its specialist expertise and specifically nominated judiciary.

16:45:00

I would like to reinforce that point by mentioning the new inquiry to be undertaken by the Justice Committee in another place, announced last week, because of the persistent concerns about the capacity and resources of the county court and the effects on those who rely on the functioning of that court, which has suffered from considerable delays.

I briefly mention Amendments 77 and 84 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, which propose the use of the mental health tribunal rather than the county court. My preference would still be the use of the Court of Protection as the correct venue; we certainly cannot have both. However, I do not want to anticipate what the noble Baroness is likely to say or, indeed, what the Minister will want to say in reply.

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 77, 82 and 84 in this group. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for mentioning my amendments in advance. I am adding the other choice for His Majesty’s Government, which is the mental health tribunal, on the basis that the Court of Protection deals with the Mental Capacity Act and, obviously, at the moment, the mental health tribunal deals with claims under the Mental Health Act. However, there are one or two points of clarification on the process on which it would be useful to hear from the Minister. As I understand it, for the county court to take an application to displace the nearest relative involves means-tested legal aid, whereas the mental health tribunal, I believe, has Legal Services Commission funding—I am talking in old money here—so it is non-means-tested. I am not aware of what the situation is with the Court of Protection. However, an important concern of people making these applications is whether their legal representation is funded. I expect they are in a situation similar to that outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, when he spoke of getting one of these applications for the first time; for many people making these applications, it will be their first time not only making such an application but being in front of any kind of court or tribunal, and at a time of great distress with a relative detained under the Mental Health Act. Given that the policy document disclosed last week references this process as the solution to certain situations, could the Minister please outline, either today or in a letter, how many county court applications there are, how long people wait for such applications and what the rate of success is? How many of those who go to the county court currently get legal aid? Is the Minister satisfied that the county court can act swiftly enough to remove a nominated person who is a risk to the patient? An example given, I think either in the review or in the response to the White Paper, is that, if you have a coercive, controlling boyfriend of a 17 year-old girl as the nominated person, or someone who is suspected of having trafficked that young person to the UK, then time is of the essence for practitioners to have that person removed—on evidence, obviously—from having such powers as, for instance, to apply to discharge the patient from hospital. At this stage, it might also be appropriate to ask the Minister what is meant in the policy document by the concept of “temporary” nominated persons? We had interim nominated persons in the review, but there is no concept that I have seen in the Bill of temporary nominated persons. Finally, Amendment 82, although it may be in the wrong group, talks about parental responsibility. We have had other discussions in Committee about this, and I think it was in the review; we must make sure, at the very least, that appropriate people with parental responsibility have the relevant information. That is a baseline. Whether we go on to consultation or being able to apply to remove a nominated person, I would submit—and Amendment 82 outlines this—that they should have all the relevant information. I have exempted the person with residual parental responsibility under a special guardianship order. This reveals some of the complications of the Children Act. In this type of situation, the child has been removed to live with someone else; it is similar to a care order, in that the people with parental responsibility remain there, unless there is an adoption order. One has to be careful even about the rights to information, and who with parental responsibility receives that.

My Lords, if I may, I shall start with the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Meston. I agree with almost everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has said. I will talk first about which court it should be in. I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, had said. Oddly, the county court was one of the only courts in which I did not sit, but I have never heard a circuit judge who was very keen on dealing with these particular applications. Judges of the Family Division sit in the Court of Protection. As I would hope noble Lords would agree, they are somewhat expert in family law, and they do a great deal of mental care and medical cases. As president of the Family Division, I spent probably 50% of my time doing one sort of medical case or other, quite a lot of them mental health cases. The Court of Protection is probably the best court to deal with this. I do not feel very strongly against the mental health tribunal—I just do not think it would be quite as good. Legal aid is an issue, and I assume that it probably would not be automatic in the Court of Protection. I turn to my Amendment 70. I entirely share what the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has just said. The law is that, until the age of 18, one is a child, regardless of the Gillick case, regardless of being 17 and very nearly grown up. Until a person is 18 they remain, technically, in law, a child. I am very concerned about a child of any age, living at home with parents, who has a mental health problem sufficiently serious to require attention and a nominated person, who is at odds with the parents or guardian and chooses somebody who is totally unsuitable. The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, pointed out that this could be someone who might be trafficking, or an unsuitable boyfriend. The one group of people not included in new Section 30B(2) in Part 1 of Schedule 2 where it says that, to discharge a nominated person, “An order under this section may be made on the application of…” is anybody who has parental responsibility for the child. This means that when a child who is at odds with their parents goes into hospital, when those parents know the boyfriend and that he is unsuitable, those parents have no voice whatever in saying that he is not suitable to be a nominated person. Subject to the important points that the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, has made, it seems that there are certain cases where, in what used to be called a custody order or a special guardianship, the parental responsibility of the natural parents is limited. I would have hoped that the Government would see that, however much they want to empower children, including children under the age of 16, they cannot take away 100% the responsibilities of parents. Under Section 2 or 3 of the Children Act, parental responsibility is defined as having rights as well as responsibilities. I am really talking about the responsibility whereby parents may really want to be able to tell someone, “Look who my daughter is going out with”, but under the Bill they have no right do so, and as far as I am concerned that is utterly wrong.

My Lords, perhaps I may quote from our report on the draft Mental Health Bill on this point, while agreeing 100% with both previous speakers. During our evidence sessions, we heard from a number of people who had real concerns about the issue of nominated persons for young people. We heard “that choosing a Nominated Person outside of the family can put pressure on family relationships. Respondents also noted the importance of ensuring that the families and carer are still given a voice in a patient’s treatment even if they are not chosen as the Nominated Person. This is particularly important for children and young people. Additionally, one respondent who identified as a carer of someone with a mental health condition expressed their concern that not all nominated people may know the patient well enough to assist in making decisions in their best interest … Another respondent noted that, for those under 18, there may be overlap between the rights of those with parental authority and those of the Nominated Person”. Our belief during that whole process was that this all seriously needs to be clarified, either in law or in the code of practice. I remember that one respondent was very concerned that young people would assume that a nominated person could be a friend and that the friend would really understand their role, but in some cases that just was not happening.

My Lords, I hope I may be forgiven for getting up again, because I completely forgot to refer to Amendment 76. It would come in under paragraph 3(2) in Part 1 of new Schedule A1, where the parents and any person with parental responsibility are not even consulted on the appointment. That is exactly the same point as I made earlier.

My Lords, with this group of amendments, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, my noble friend Lady Berridge, the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, have exposed a crucial set of issues: in my judgment, one of the two or three most important issues that we shall be dealing with during our debates on the Bill. At their heart, I suggest, is the conflict, or perhaps I should say the high risk of a conflict if nothing is done, between the arrangements that the Bill seeks to put in place for the creation of nominated persons on the one hand and, on the other, the law of the land as set out in the Children Act 1989. Both this group of amendments and those in the next group in the name of my noble friend Lady Berridge focus on matters of the highest significance for child protection and child safety in all its aspects. The assumption inherent in the Bill’s provisions for nominated persons is that the process for appointing a nominated person is rigorous enough to ensure that someone unfit to be appointed to that role will not in practice be appointed, or that, if they are, the system will find them out. I believe that it is evident from what we have heard in this debate that that assumption is a highly dangerous one. A nominated person will be someone in a position of considerable power. They will be able to exercise all the functions exercised currently by a nearest relative, as well as availing of additional powers as set out in the Bill. Children and young people under 18 will be able to appoint a nominated person. That person will be someone of their own choosing. It could be a parent or someone other than a parent, but the principal qualification for such a person is that they must have the child’s best interests at heart.

17:00:00

In many, if not most, cases, the child’s choice of person will give rise to no concerns. The danger lies in a situation in which, through misplaced loyalty, naivety, or subtle psychological manipulation, the wrong person is appointed—at worst, an abuser who is intent on continuing that abuse. Members of this Committee have posed the question: what are the safeguards to prevent such a person exercising their powers to control the child’s care without effective challenge? There are two points in the patient journey where I suggest that question most matters. One is at the time of the nominated person’s appointment; the other is when the child enters a clinical setting as an inpatient.

My Amendment 72 is designed as an invitation to the Minister to explain how, at the time of appointment, the necessary due diligence on the suitability of the nominated person can be carried out. Reading the provisions set down in Schedule 2, it is clear that a lot is expected of the witness who puts their name to the patient’s nomination statement. Will the entire due diligence process fall on to the shoulders of that witness? Given the need to establish that there are no court orders or police investigations about the nominee, and the requirement to rule out fraud or undue pressure, is that not a very big ask of the witness—especially if they are, say, a social worker or a practice nurse?

Amendment 73 proposes that, at the clinical level, there should be an established process to require a clinician to ask appropriate questions of fact to satisfy themselves that there is no cause for doubt about the good intentions of the nominated person or their relationship with the child. That process will be especially relevant when the nominated person is someone other than a parent. However, it is also relevant in the opposite situation, where the nominated person is a parent but the behaviour of either the child or parent gives rise to doubts or suspicions in the clinician’s mind. Will the Minister consider commissioning some appropriate guidance for the use of clinicians in secure mental health settings?

I urge the Minister to see what can be done to ensure that the provisions of this Bill relating to the appointment and role of nominated persons can be made fully compatible with the provisions of the Children Act, and, most especially, the best interests test that that Act lays down as the iron principle governing this entire field of law.

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for an extremely helpful debate. I want to say how much I understand the concerns around the nominated person regarding children and parents, and the great need to get this right in the way that noble Lords have rightly unpicked today. It is very important that parents are involved in a child or young person’s care. I say to noble Lords, as this has come up before, that we do not intend or wish to undermine the rights or responsibilities of parents. In the vast majority of cases, the nominated person for a child or young person will be their parent or whoever has parental responsibility, either because they have decided that themselves, with the relevant competence or capacity, or because they are appointed by the approved mental health professional. For under-16s the Bill sets out that if they lack competence to make this decision, the approved mental health professional must appoint a parent, or a person or local authority with parental responsibility. The Bill aligns with the Mental Capacity Act on decision-making capability, with young people aged 16 and over considered to have the capacity to make relevant decisions. We think it is important, as I know noble Lords do, that children and young people have the right to choose a nominated person, and I understand the need to get the nominated person right. Some 67% of over 1,200 respondents to the White Paper consultation supported extending this right to under-16s. We must have the right processes and safeguards for all patients, and additional protections for children and young people. These safeguards will cover the nomination process and the ability to overrule the nominated person or remove someone from the role if they are not acting in the patient’s best interests. The noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Berridge, and the noble Lord, Lord Meston, have all put forward amendments to give responsibility to the tribunal or the Court of Protection in these matters. The county court already has a role in displacing the nearest relative. We believe that it has the expertise, procedural tools and legal framework to handle sensitive disputes involving external parties, such as conflicts of interest or allegations of abuse. I emphasise the word “sensitive”. I believe that the debate today has acknowledged that we are in very sensitive territory and that we need to get this right. The noble Lord, Lord Meston, mentioned the training of judges. I can confirm that we will be working with the county court to ensure that it is aware of and can fulfil the requirements of the new provision. The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, asked for figures on county court applications, and I will be very glad to write to her and answer her fully. Similarly, I will be very pleased to write to her in detail on the matter of legal aid. The Act and the Bill allow for someone who is not acting in the interests of the patient to be overruled or removed from this role. On Amendment 68 specifically, the Bill enables the responsible clinician to overrule the nominated person on the grounds included the amendment, so I am grateful for its being brought before us today. This will be quicker and will avoid burdens on the tribunal. On Amendment 69, transferring the role of the nominated person to the Court of Protection would expand the court’s remit to under-16s. Currently, the court can deal only with the financial affairs of under-16s. The Court of Protection makes decisions for those lacking capacity, but patients need to have capacity to have appointed their own nominated person. Where they lack capacity or competence, the approved mental health professional will appoint, and the Bill sets out the grounds for them to terminate the appointment. On Amendments 77 and 84, the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, asked about the concept of a temporary nominated person. This is in recognition that such an appointment by an approved mental health professional is only until the person concerned has the relevant capacity or competence to choose their own—that is what is meant by the word “temporary” here. The First-tier Tribunal (Mental Health) in England and the Mental Health Review Tribunal for Wales are focused on reviewing detention under the Mental Health Act. The provisions of the amendments would add additional burden on that tribunal. My concern is that it would risk undermining its core function and delay detention reviews, which I know is not something that noble Lords would wish. Amendment 70, tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, would specify that parents, guardians and anyone with parental responsibility can apply to the court to displace a nominated person. The Bill already allows anyone involved in the patient’s care or welfare to apply to the county court to terminate the appointment of a nominated person. This includes parents, guardians and anyone with parental responsibility, as her amendment seeks. On Amendments 72 and 73, in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, I wholeheartedly agree that the law has to prevent exploitation and manipulation. The nomination process is indeed intended to ensure that the decision is the patient’s own. I recognise the circumstances that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and other noble Lords described as possibilities. We have to consider all the potential scenarios, which are very real challenges to us. A health or social care professional, or an advocate, must witness the nomination and confirm in writing that the nominated person is suitable and that there has been no fraud or undue pressure. On the point the noble Earl raised, the code of practice will include guidance on how to determine this. Amendment 76 was tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. We understand the desire to involve parents in the decision, and for the vast majority this will be appropriate. We are concerned that the amendment’s requirement to consult a parent, guardian or someone with parental responsibility could risk undermining the principle of giving children and young people a choice. It could also, in a different way, pressure the child into choosing the parent, in circumstances that might be far from desirable. Although we do not think that we should require consultation with the parents in all circumstances, we would expect the witness to discuss the nomination with parents and others with interest in the welfare of the child as part of the assessment of suitability. We will consult on guidance in the code on how practitioners should encourage the child or young person to involve their parents, even if they are not the nominated person, unless it is inappropriate. On Amendment 82, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, I agree that parents and carers are to be given information about the care and treatment of their child. If a child nominates a person other than their parent as their nominated person, their parents retain legal rights under parental responsibility. These rights include the right to be consulted on certain decisions and to receive information about the child’s care. The Bill also introduces a duty on the responsible clinician to consult with people involved in the child’s welfare on care and treatment planning, which includes parents and carers. With those comments in mind, I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her careful and detailed response to an important group of amendments. It may affect only a small number of cases, but they are cases where we really need to get this right. Those two adjectives apply very well to this whole debate. I will make a couple of comments in response. We have had three suggestions about where the applications to remove the nominated person should be. Personally, I do not have a strong view. I thought the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, about legal aid was important. Justice unfunded is justice denied, so it really is important that there is that full and necessary support, wherever they end up. With that, I pick up the important point made by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about the witness being such an important person to ensure that this process goes well. The noble Earl talked about making sure the guidance is right. I add that we have to make sure that the resources are there, thinking about our overstretched mental health services. We need to ensure that the person who will be the witness has the time to put in the resources to ensure that they can properly be a witness. It may not be a subject of law, but it certainly needs to be thought about.

17:15:00

I agree with the points made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on Amendment 70: that the parents or person with parental responsibility should have the right to take a case if they think the wrong thing is happening. However, I disagree with Amendment 76: that they should be consulted before the nominated person is appointed. There are cases between the situation raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, in Amendment 75—where there is a protection order—and ones where the parent is the ideal person to be nominated; there is a middle ground where involving a parent at that point might make the situation worse, not better. We have to think about that.

Finally, inevitably in this debate, we have been focusing on where the nominated person goes wrong. There are lots of good people who may not be parents who could be the nominated person, whether this be grandparents, an aunt or uncle, an older sibling, or even a youth group leader or respected teacher. In focusing on where it could all go wrong, it is important that we do not lose sight of the fact that there are many other appropriate people who could be the nominated person.

We may well come back to where the overruling might happen on Report. I will leave it to other people in this group who have far more expertise than I do to decide which way they might take it. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 68 withdrawn.

Amendments 69 and 70 not moved.

Amendment 71 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.

Amendments 72 and 73 not moved.

Amendment 74

Moved by

74: Schedule 2, page 73, line 21, at end insert— “(3) Regardless of whether a person is appointed as a nominated person, if they have parental responsibility that person must be given appropriate and relevant information about care and treatment of a relevant patient.(4) Subsection (3) does not apply to persons with residual parental responsibility for the relevant patient when the patient is subject to a special guardianship order under section 14A of the Children Act 1989.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment, along with another amendment in the name of Baroness Berridge, seeks to ensure that regardless of whether persons with parental responsibility are appointed as the nominated person, they should have access to the appropriate and relevant information about care and treatment of the relevant patient (unless a Special Guardianship Order has been made).

My Lords, Amendment 74 properly sits alongside Amendment 82 in the previous group, so I rise to speak predominantly to Amendments 75, 78 and 79A to 81. This group seeks to ensure that the expansion of choice and autonomy for children and young people under the Bill sits consistently with the child protection law of the Children Act, which I believe the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, was involved in creating. This is not a new issue. The independent review way back in December 2018 stated: “There needs to be careful consideration of how the powers and rights of the NP”— the nominated person— “will interact with other areas of the system, including care orders, guardianship and child arrangement orders, where the overlap with parental responsibility is particularly important”. Parental responsibility has been dealt with in a series of amendments by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, so I will not address that. It is regrettable that over six and a half years later, we still have not sorted this matter and there is no draft code of practice for noble Lords to refer to. However, I am grateful for the meetings the Minister has had with colleagues, and for the policy document disclosed last week, which made small steps. I hope the Minister can confirm that she has met the Minister for Children and Families and DfE officials regarding this matter, as they hold responsibility for the Children Act. I am also grateful that the Children’s Commissioner has now stated her concerns in this aspect, as well as for the excellent work of the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Coalition. To avoid this being dry law, I will give two quick examples that illustrate the conflict remaining between the proposed reforms and the protections under the Children Act. First, a 15 year-old child is Gillick competent but still does not quite understand why she has not had any contact with dad. However, there are days of evidence in the family court showing that dad is violent, controlling and coercive; a child arrangements order was made, giving him only what is called letterbox contact. The child appoints dad as the nominated person, and dad of course now has contact. Cannily—these people are canny—on the Thursday before a bank holiday weekend, he applies to have the child discharged. The 72 hours to bar this application pass by the locum’s staff, et cetera—we can all imagine the inquiry—and dad has now taken the child and disappeared. I leave it to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, to outline what mum, who has parental responsibility under this Bill, knows is going on. Children and young people should of course be given choice and autonomy—my amendments do not seek to undermine either that or Gillick competency—but surely we must consider circumscribing that when the family courts have, for child protection reasons, restricted the role of adults who should normally care for and love that child or young person. I turn to the second scenario. A 17 year-old lacks the capacity to appoint so the AMHP is making the decision to appoint the nominated person. However, the 17 year-old is under a special guardship order—maybe they ran away from the special guardian—and was picked up by the police while trying to find dad, whose address they had on them. Dad still has parental responsibility, of course, so the AMHP contacts him and appoints him as the nominated person. Again, he applies for discharge. The child tries to return to the special guardian, who has no idea that the child is about to return home, so no one is there to receive them. The child leaves in distress and harms themselves. The AMHP can be forgiven for thinking that child special guardianship orders end at 16 years old, as I cannot find them mentioned at all in the Bill. The same scenario would apply to a child in care as paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 to the Bill is blissfully unaware that 16 and 17 year-olds can be under a care order. The AMHP, according to the Bill, is under no duty to appoint the local authority for a 16 and 17 year-old under a care order or a special guardianship order in this scenario. The solution to the second scenario is in Amendments 79A and 80A; I am grateful that the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, has added her name to the latter. Where any person under the age of 18 is being detained—that is about one-third of young people—the AMHP is given a list of people who must be the nominated person, not just those with parental responsibility and the local authority in relation to care orders, as in the Bill and as outlined in the policy document. Dominic Marley, the co-chair of the AMHP Leads Network, has written to me. He says that he “fully supports the amendment … In its current form, the Bill conflicts with other legislation affecting children, such as the Children Act 1989. The Bill fails to consider the various orders relating to parental responsibility as outlined in the Children Act 1989”. He goes on to say: “This is a deeply concerning omission and is likely to give rise to confusion and uncertainty in practice. We believe the amendments you have tabled will provide clarity in this regard, clarity which should be provided by primary legislation”. My final point on this second scenario is that the Minister’s policy document states that, for under-16s who lack competence, as in this scenario, the AMHP will appoint the special guardian as the temporary nominated person. Can the Minister explain why the Bill says that the AMHP must choose the local authority if there is a care order in place, but not if there is a special guardian? I repeat the point made in the previous day in Committee: the mental health code cannot create a “must” unless it is included in the Bill or secondary legislation. The solution to my first scenario is more difficult, and I accept that it is less likely to occur in practice. Most of the one-third of young people who are detained under the Act will lack capacity by the time they are detained but, if we want to maintain as much of a child’s or young person’s choice and autonomy when they have capacity, we must act when they have capacity. Amendments 75, 78, 80 and 81 disqualify certain people, such as the no-contact parent under a child arrangements order or the residual person with parental responsibility when a special guardianship order has been made. The amendments also mandate certain people who have to be chosen, such as special guardians. I accept that that is a very clunky way of doing it. Another option is for His Majesty’s Government to forbid certain people rather than mandating anyone. Another option would be to give the job of disqualifying people to the family court by amending the Children Act. Therefore, the court, on making a care order, a child arrangements order, or a special guardianship order—for which it often hears evidence—would name certain people as being disqualified from acting as a nominated person. So I hope the Minister can clarify her policy document, as it includes the child-in-care scenario where the nominated person is a parent—usually where the child resides—who has their parental responsibility limited. It states that the witness—the person involved in the process— “would assess the appointment of such an individual as unsuitable due to the potential risks to the child and therefore prevent this”. Is that mandatory language? If it is, why not use “must” and put it in the Bill? Are the Government actually giving the AMHP, the young person or that witness the ability to go behind the care order of the family court? If the Mental Health Act code says that the witness just has to document that, if it is “should” rather than “must”, do we really want to enable that? The policy document then immediately says: “We will set out in the Code of Practice considerations for the witness to make beyond those set out in legislation”— I am not sure that makes sense— “including how to make these judgements”. That now seems to be truly discretionary language. I again outline the three categories from the code: “must”, “should” and “may”. Which one is this? If this is “should” then, as I say, the child can go behind the family court order as long as the witness writes down the reasons. I expect the Minister to be very clear in her response, if we are undermining the authority of the family court. Amendment 79 is a quick clarification of whether the child or AMHP can appoint more than one person as the nominated person. Amendment 85 adds the grounds of “not acting in the best interests” so that the AMHP can remove the nominated person—for instance, if they discover that they have trafficked the child to the UK. That is not just for children and young people but for all patients. I return to the risks to children and young people in both the scenarios I have outlined. These are not triggered by the AMHPs, and they will not be triggered by poor training, a lack of resources or levels of staffing—nor triggered by those who the family court said could pose a risk to the child or young person. These would be triggered by how His Majesty’s Government currently propose to change the law. In the worst-case, but sadly foreseeable, scenario where a child dies at the hands of a nominated person who had already been known to be a risk, as outlined by the family court, I expect that the Chief Coroner would need informing of your Lordships’ debate. Otherwise, professional and other staff might take all the blame. Also, would the Secretary of State for Education in fact still be able to do a serious case review of the death of that child, or would she not be conflicted? A dangerous person got access to a child because the nominated person process was a backdoor to the Children Act. So can the Minister outline whether the nominated persons part of the Act will be enforced before the consultation on the code of practice she is so often relying on? Finally, I quote from the policy document again: “We appreciate that there are complications inherent in the complexity of modern family structures, (e.g. separated parents) in addition to the existing system around children’s legislation (e.g. special guardianships, child arrangement orders). These are not complications which have been created by the Nominated Person policy and they exist in the context of Nearest Relative as well”. Yes, of course the current situation is complex, but this view in the policy document is not shared by the independent review, by the response to His Majesty’s Government’s White Paper—where these concerns were also raised—or by the Joint Committee, civil society or the Children’s Commissioner. The Minister is alone in this view. I know that, in your Lordships’ House, we are not entitled to see legal advice that His Majesty’s Government obtain, but I hope the Minister can assure the Committee that Treasury counsel with specialisms in the Children Act and mental health have been asked to give an opinion. The child protections that the Children Act has upheld for decades are so vital. I hope we will come back to this on Report, when I hope the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care and the Secretary of State for Education will lay the necessary government amendments. I beg to move.

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 80A, to which my name has been added. I did not intervene in the first group but I share the general view expressed, which is relevant to this group of amendments, that not enough thought has been given to the interaction between the Mental Health Bill and other key legislation, particularly the Children Act 1989. That concerns me, because that is where really key and important child protection sits. That is a general concern I have.

17:30:00

I will not go through all the quite technical but important arguments that we have already heard. I added my name to this amendment because I think there is real concern that the Bill does not consider: when an approved mental health practitioner is required to appoint a nominated person, how will they choose between the differing people who may have parental responsibility as outlined in the 1989 Act? I feel that as things stand there is scope for confusion and uncertainty in practice, which is never good, particularly in something as important as child protection. Although I cannot pretend that I have spoken to all the AMHPs concerned, I know that those with whom I have had any dealings or correspondence are expressing concerns about how this whole area will be managed.

Like others, I should make it absolutely clear that I welcome the changes in the rights of children and young people, so that they have autonomy about who they choose—that is important and we certainly do not want to go backwards. But it is just not clear how this will operate for under-18s, particularly as regards parental responsibility. I know that this concern was shared by the Joint Committee that scrutinised the Bill, which, as we have heard, recommended that the Government consult on how the nominated person provision will apply to under-18s in relation to any potential conflicts with other legislation, particularly the Children Act. I also know that the committee also called on the Government to come forward with some new proposals in this area.

I want to ask the Minister about a document that was circulated from her office last week in this general area. I was not quite clear of its status and whether it was—how can I put it?—the precursor to the formal consultation or just trying to set out what policy is in an admittedly rather complicated area.

In conclusion, this ambiguity, which is really unhelpful, will put approved mental health professionals in a difficult situation, particularly when appointing a nominated person for a care-experienced child or young person. There is just more work to do in this area.

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. Indeed, we should be grateful to her for exposing the complexity and variety of situations which may arise and of which mental health professionals must be made aware, so that the decisions they have to make are properly informed by knowledge of the operative orders and the terms of any orders made by the family court. That seems absolutely fundamental. It reinforces the point I wanted to make at the end of the last group before I was very properly curtailed. It applies not only to the county courts if they are to retain some jurisdiction in this area but to the family court. Some serious thought must now be given to judicial training. Has the Minister considered an approach to the Judicial College with a view to ensuring that both county court and indeed family court judges will be properly trained with regard to the obligations that will arise under this new legislation?

My Lords, for the reasons that have been given I also support the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. Just to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, I respectfully point out to the Minister that if she does get in touch with the Judicial College, which I think would be a very sensible move, she should also let the President of the Family Division know.

My Lords, in this group of amendments my noble friend Lady Berridge has raised an armada of issues which I think it is clear to all of us cannot be ducked. These issues, as she said, were examined at length both during the independent review and by the Joint Committee, but it has to be said that in both instances it proved too much of a challenge to identify a satisfactory resolution to them. For that reason, as we observed in our debate on the previous group, the weight of these matters now rests on the shoulders of this Committee and of the Government. In summary, we need arrangements that are robust enough to ensure that a nominated person’s appointment can be effectively challenged, and that, in certain circumstances, where necessary, the exercise of their powers can be legally contested and blocked. Without those measures, we shall leave an unacceptable lacuna in the law and, more pertinently, run a high risk of exposing children to personal danger. My noble friend is to be thanked for assisting this Committee’s deliberations with the clear way in which she has set out the challenge, and I hope and trust that the Minister will wish to grip the challenge with her usual vigour.

My Lords, like the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, for introducing an appropriately wide range of scenarios, questions and testing. That is important for the Committee but also for our ongoing work. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said, to describe this area as complex is to use too small a word, and I think we are all wrestling with that to get it in the right place. I know that noble Lords are aware that the work is ongoing, and I thank them for their engagement and interest in this issue. As I said previously, I very much understand the need for a robust process to keep children and young people safe and ensure that only appropriate individuals can take on the role of nominated person, while giving children and young people that right to choose. I will respond collectively to the amendments put forward in this group. As I set out earlier, we agree that in the vast majority of cases there is an expectation that a parent or whoever has parental responsibility would take on this role, and that would include consideration of special guardians and child arrangement orders. We also agree that, where parental responsibility has been removed due to care proceedings, in the vast majority of cases it is unlikely to be appropriate for such a person to take up this role. My reference to this being a complicated area—

My Lords—

Perhaps the noble Baroness will let me make a bit of progress.

I think I need to clarify a point of law—I am looking to the noble Lord, Lord Meston. In care proceedings, is parental responsibility removed? I do not believe it is; it remains with the parents. That is very important.

It certainly is not removed.

It is shared.

I thank noble Lords for that exchange, which brings me to my repeated point about the complicated area in which we are treading. As was highlighted by the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, we will set out our expectations in the code of practice as to whom approved mental health professionals would appoint, or the witness would confirm suitability of, in a range of circumstances, including in the more and most complex cases. We will consult on this to ensure that we cover as many scenarios as we can. I can confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, that we are working with NHS England, the Department for Education, the Association of Directors of Children’s Services and others to ensure that our policy and guidance reflect what can be a very complex arrangement for some children under the Children Act. The Bill is clear that where an approved mental health professional is appointing a nominated person for an under-16 they must appoint someone who has parental responsibility, and the amendments extend this approach to all under-18s. As I said previously, we are allowing more flexibility for 16 and 17 year-olds rather than prescribing in legislation who this must be. While the amendments put forward a wide range of circumstances, we all know—and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, demonstrated this—that there will be nuanced and complex cases, especially for 16 and 17 year-olds. Someone outside the proposed list, such as a step-parent, may be the most appropriate person, or a kinship care arrangement may be in place. These amendments propose regulatory powers in recognition of this but we feel that updating statutory guidance will allow us to keep this up to date and in review as new policy is implemented. The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, asked about differences between special guardian orders and special care orders. The Bill says that the approved mental health professional must appoint the local authority or anyone else with parental responsibility as the nominated person. The special guardian, as someone with parental responsibility, would be appointed if a special guardianship order was in place. In relation to the proposal for two people to take on this role, as the nominated person exercises specific statutory functions under the Mental Health Act, we feel it is right that only one person has these limited powers, to avoid the potential for disagreement and confusion about who can exercise the relevant power. We recognise that there will usually be more than one person with parental responsibility and that the approved mental health professional will need to determine who should be the nominated person. Under the current system, this would be the older parent, which we do not think is necessarily appropriate. We will provide guidance for approved mental health professionals in the code of practice. This may include which of the parents is recorded as the child’s next of kin, who the child lives with and who is accompanying the child. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, helpfully inquired about the status of the nominated persons paper that was sent out in an attempt to be helpful. It was developed very much to support the debate, which it certainly has done, and we intend to develop it further. I very much welcome the further engagement from Peers and we will continue to formally consult as part of the code of practice so that it is an aid to the considerations of noble Lords. I hope it is doing that. In the current nearest relative provision, only one parent will hold this role. As I mentioned in the previous debate, this will not exclude the other parent from being involved in their child’s care. Whether or not they are the nominated person, parents and carers should be given information about the care and treatment of their child, unless it is inappropriate. This is reflected in the Bill. We absolutely agree that someone should be removed as the nominated person if they are not acting in the interest of the patient. Criteria are included in the Bill for when an approved mental health professional may terminate an appointment, one of which is when the person is “otherwise not a suitable person to act as a nominated person”. On the points made by a number of noble Lords, suitability includes whether there is any risk to the patient. This may include if the person is behaving in a way that indicates they are unsuitable for the role; for example, if they are exercising their powers without due regard to the welfare of the person.

17:45:00

The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, raised some concerns about inappropriate discharge by the nominated person, a point that I understand. As the noble Baroness is aware, the nominated person has the power to discharge from detention under the Act. I can say in initial response that the responsible clinician can overrule the request to discharge from detention under the Mental Health Act. The parent or other person who the patient lives with would be involved in the decision to discharge from hospital, and this is a separate decision. The responsible person should consult those people concerned for the patient’s welfare, including the family, where relevant, on the patient’s care and treatment plan. That includes the discharge plan, which is set out clearly in the Bill.

Reflecting on what the Minister has just said, would that close the Bournewood gap, which we tried to close in earlier legislation, where a professional carer cared for an autistic man who was not able to articulate for himself, but was overruled by the clinician? I am just trying to get my head round what she has just said because that was the Bournewood gap and, as the Minister will know, it ended up in the European Court before it was resolved.

We need to be considering that as one of the scenarios and I would certainly be very glad to give the noble Baroness and noble Lords a more considered response to the very important point that has just been raised. Under this policy, an approved mental health professional would terminate their appointment if the nominated person is not acting in line with the patient’s interests. I really wish to emphasise this. For all these reasons and the responses I have given, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken and for the considered nature of the response and the clarification regarding the special guardianship. However, as we have outlined, other people remain having parental responsibility and it seems that under the Bill, as it is only one person, it could be that the residual person still has parental responsibility. It could just be that person under the Bill and not, in that situation, who is appointed. I am concerned, not only by the outline at the beginning in relation to parental responsibility being removed. I just feel that there is a lack of understanding—with all due respect to the Minister’s diligence, thoroughness and engagement with colleagues—about the depth of the issue that we have here. She mentioned “would” appoint. That seems something that can be under the Mental Health Act code—“would” seems to be that as long as you document your reasons for that, you can move. It seems that from the situation I have outlined, in which the 16 or 17 year-old has been removed from the dad’s care because he has been shown to be, and proven by the family court to be, a danger, he could be appointed as the nominated person. Then we are relying on a speedy process in the county court—which we are not sure we always get legal aid for—to remove him. I am concerned by phrases such as “more flexibility for 16 and 17 year-olds”. Does that include the 16 and 17 year-olds who are under special guardianship or where there is a care order? It seems that there is a conflict, based on what the co-leader of the AMHPs is saying, what the review has said and what the response says. We have a conflict between two pieces of legislation that we must continue to grapple with. On phrases such as “working with the DfE”, I asked specifically whether there had been a meeting with the Minister for Children and Families. The responsibility for a serious case review sits with that department. If we are to some extent right, this risk to children will manifest itself in an imperfect system. Obviously, there are professionals and clinicians, but we all know of cases that have gone wrong and ended up in inquiries. I remain concerned by the lack of clarification on legal advice. Legally, in some ways this is fascinating—but it is not fascinating because it involves child protection. I welcome the engagement and I am sure that we will meet again in regard to this, but the severity of the risks that we are exposing, and allowing young people and AMHPs to go behind findings of fact in the family courts made under the Children Act is an incredibly serious issue. I hope that the Minister will be furnished with that kind of geeky legal advice, because for the children’s sake we need that. However, I am grateful for the manner of her engagement and of course beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 74 withdrawn.

Amendments 75 to 85A not moved.

Schedule 2 agreed.

Clauses 24 to 29 agreed.

Clause 30: References to tribunal

Amendment 86 not moved.

Clause 30 agreed.

Clause 31: References to tribunal for patients concerned in criminal proceedings etc

Amendments 87 to 93

Moved by

87: Clause 31, page 42, line 37, leave out paragraph (a) Member’s explanatory statement This amendment, my other amendments to Clause 31 and my new clause inserted after Clause 31 would provide for commencement two months after Royal Assent of provisions about tribunal reviews concerning patients subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty.

88: Clause 31, page 43, line 37, leave out from beginning to end of line 5 on page 44 Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.

89: Clause 31, page 44, line 18, leave out “(2B) or” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.

90: Clause 31, page 44, line 22, after “discharged” insert “, is subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.

91: Clause 31, page 44, line 28, leave out “(2B),” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.

92: Clause 31, page 44, line 34, leave out “(2B),” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.

93: Clause 31, page 44, line 42, leave out “(2B),” Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.

Amendments 87 to 93 agreed.

Clause 31, as amended, agreed.

Amendment 94

Moved by

94: After Clause 31, insert the following new Clause— “References: restricted patients not subject to deprivation of liberty conditions(1) The Mental Health Act 1983 is amended as follows.(2) In section 71 (references by Secretary of State concerning restricted patients), for subsection (2) substitute—“(2) The Secretary of State must refer to the appropriate tribunal the case of any restricted patient detained in a hospital if—(a) the patient’s case has not been considered by the appropriate tribunal within the last 12 months, whether on the patient’s own application or otherwise, and(b) there is no pending application or reference to the appropriate tribunal in relation to the patient’s case.” (3) In section 75 (applications and references concerning conditionally discharged restricted patients)—(a) before subsection (2C) (as inserted bysection 31(3)(a)of this Act) insert—“(2B) Where a restricted patient has been conditionally discharged, is not subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty and has not been recalled to hospital, the Secretary of State must refer the patient’s case to the appropriate tribunal on the expiry of—(a) the period of two years beginning—(i) in the case of a patient who has previously been subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty, with the date on which the patient most recently ceased to be subject to such conditions, and(ii) in any other case, with the date on which the patient was conditionally discharged, and(b) each subsequent period of four years.”;(b) in subsection (2D), after “subsection” insert “(2B) or”;(c) in subsection (2E) omit “, is subject to conditions amounting to a deprivation of liberty”;(d) in subsection (2F), after “subsection” insert “(2B),”;(e) in subsection (2H), after “subsection” insert “(2B),”;(f) in subsection (3), after “subsection”, in the second place it occurs, insert “(2B),”.(4) The amendments made by this section apply in relation to any person who is a restricted patient within the meaning given by subsection (1) of section 79 of the Mental Health Act 1983, or is treated as a restricted patient as a result of that subsection, whether the person became such a patient (or treated as such a patient) before or after the coming into force of this section.”Member’s explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 31, page 42, line 37.

Amendment 94 agreed.

Clause 32 agreed.

Amendment 95 not moved.

Clause 33 agreed.

Clause 34: Transfers of prisoners and others to hospital: conditions

Amendment 96

Moved by

96: Clause 34, page 47, line 13, leave out subsection (2) Member’s explanatory statement The purpose of the amendment is to query the necessity of expanding on “appropriate medical treatment”.

My Lords, noble Lords will be pleased to know that this is a very small, probing amendment, on a matter that was brought to my notice by some forensic psychiatrists. One of their responsibilities is to train young psychiatrists in the use of the Mental Health Act as it relates to patients who have been engaged in criminal proceedings. In this group of amendments, we are talking about transfers between hospitals and prisons and the use of Sections 47 and 48. Amendment 96 concerns Section 47 removals from prisons to hospitals. The original Act was very straightforward, stating that “the said person is suffering from mental disorder; and that the mental disorder from which that person is suffering is of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment; and that appropriate medical treatment is available for him”. The new version expands the clause by stating that “treatment can be given for the relevant disorder from which the person is suffering”. This is repeated in Clause 34(3). My immediate thought on reading this was, “What else can an appropriate treatment be except one for the relevant disorder from which the patient is suffering?” Also, why is it necessary to expand this clause at all, on the basis that we should be as straightforward as we possibly can, particularly with people who are using this on a day-to-day basis? If the patient is suffering from another disorder, or the patient is not suffering, how could the treatment possibly be “appropriate”? I understand from the Explanatory Notes, and from what Ben Coffman, special adviser to the Minister, told me about what the Bill team is trying to achieve, that Sections 47 and 48 are generally interpreted to mean that hospital managers are not formally required to provide evidence that a hospital place is available. If an order is made, the hospital specified is under a duty to admit the patient. However, there was an immigration case, R (ASK) v SSHD, in which the Court of Appeal ruled that, because specialised provision is required for restricted patients, a physical hospital place must be identified for the detention criteria to be met. This did not reflect the government position at the time, which was that “available treatment” should be interpreted to be the same for all Part II and Part III patients. Therefore, the Government are now changing the wording of this to ensure that a physical hospital bed does not need to be identified. This is how “available” treatment is currently interpreted for the detention criteria across the rest of the Act. With these few words, therefore, Clause 34 aims to correct the divergence in the detention criteria, as opposed to creating one. Well, I must say that I still do not understand why these few words change the detention criteria. They just add more complexity to the wording. I do not understand why they have the effect that the Explanatory Note says they do. I am asking for greater guidance, because I just do not get it. I wrote to my colleagues saying, “This is the answer I’ve got, so maybe this doesn’t need to be asked”. I got a single line back, saying “What?” They simply did not understand the response. So I am asking again. Those are all my questions on Sections 47 and 48, relating to Clause 34. There are other amendments in this group to which I will say something, in the interests of not having to bob up again. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, has two important amendments on the reciprocal nature of transfers between prison and hospital. If what is good for the goose is good for the gander, and if we are going to make it a lot easier to transfer people from prison to hospital, which I very much hope we will, we must be able to transfer people back in the other direction. I know that this was an issue very close to the heard of the noble Baroness, Lady Watkins, who is not able to be in her place today. She has run wards where that very frustrating situation arises where you have somebody desperate to come into the ward from a prison who has been identified by the consultant, but no space can be made available because somebody is blocking that place. I will therefore be giving my support to the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, on those amendments. I beg to move.

18:00:00

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 96A to 96C and 163A in my name in this group. They deal with the transfer of prisoners from prison to hospital in a specified timeframe of 28 days. I am obviously pleased that this has been included in the Bill under Clause 35, but I briefly give some background. I first recognised a need to incorporate a time limit in legislation in my independent report to government in 2009. At that time, the Department of Health had piloted a 14-day waiting limit with strong support from stakeholders to roll this out nationally, and I recommended this in my report. Although it was accepted in principle, it was not implemented. However, Sir Simon Wessely’s review picked it up again with a more realistic 28-day time limit, which was then included in the draft Bill and now in this Bill, ensuring a statutory requirement rather than relying on good practice guidance. My amendments are therefore probing amendments to understand how the 28 days will work in practice—essentially, when does the clock start? First, Amendment 96A would replace the words “As soon as practicable” with “No later than two days”. HM Inspectorate of Prisons found that one factor contributing to delay was confusion around when the 28-day transfer period starts, with 34% of patients not referred on day zero of the 28 days. This amendment would ensure that the referral notice is made no later than two days after an initial request, therefore clarifying on what day counting begins. Secondly, Amendment 96B would change “must seek to ensure” to “must ensure”. The scrutiny committee, of which I was a member, heard that “seek to ensure” is quite vague and open, and therefore recommended this amendment. I believe, as do many organisations such as the Prison Reform Trust, that the inclusion of “seek to” in the current wording of the Bill implies only an attempt to successfully transfer within the 28-day time limit, rather than it being the guaranteed outcome, save for exceptional circumstances. It would provide a clearer, more definitive commitment to adhere to a 28-day time limit for referral. Amendment 96C would require that a specified, accountable person be appointed by the relevant referring body to ensure that the specified 28-day transfer period is met. While there are many agencies involved in arranging prison transfers, I am concerned that there should be a person to whom accountability is assigned. As it stands, the Bill lists in new Section 48A(3) the persons to whom the referral notice must be given—the notified authorities—but there is no person, agency or authority assigned, either with overall accountability or accountability for each part of the process. I believe that there is significant merit in creating a single role to help increase and assure accountability—for example, a dedicated official whose primary function would be to ensure efficient transfers with the ability and power to liaise and intervene at the most senior level where necessary. The amendment would clarify accountability and support the desire expressed in the impact assessment to increase, “accountability for all agencies involved in the transfer process to meet” the deadline. This was supported by Sir Simon Wessely’s independent review, which stated that it would help “unblock the institutional barriers and … give … the teeth it needs to push the transfer through”. I absolutely agree with this, and I hope that the Minister will too in his conclusion to this debate. Finally, Amendment 163A would require the Government to publish guidance on what counts as “exceptional circumstances” specified in new Section 48A(4) and (5), as inserted by Clause 35. That provision provides for a 28-day transfer period for acutely mentally ill patients held in prison to be transferred to hospital. Examples are given in new subsection (5) of what exceptional circumstances are not, for example: “a shortage of hospital accommodation” or “a shortage of hospital staff; unless occurring as a result of other exceptional circumstances”. This amendment would provide an opportunity to clarify what does constitute exceptional circumstances. This would help to avoid doubt, confusion and subjective judgment over what may or may not be an exceptional circumstance and to help ensure smooth and efficient transfer. Again, I hope the Minister will be able to respond positively to that, perhaps with examples of what are exceptional circumstances. Finally, I just note that, for transfers to be successfully completed in the 28-day time limit, the Government must ensure that appropriate bed provision in psychiatric intensive care units and secure care settings in every geographical area of the country is developed, together with a skilled workforce. I am sure that we will return to this topic at a later stage in our debates. In conclusion, as I mentioned earlier, it is 16 years since I made my proposals on transfers, and I hope that that they are now coming to fruition. I am grateful to the Government for that and for not trying my patience any longer.

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, I too support the aim behind Clause 35, which is to ensure the speedy access to specialist mental health support for people in prison. Like the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, I also think that there is great merit in his Amendment 163A, which seeks to ensure that the Secretary of State produce statutory guidance on the definition of what will count as exceptional circumstances for the reasons that the noble Lord has given. The Explanatory Notes give examples of what might count as an exceptional circumstance where the 28-day standard would not apply: prison riots, hospital floods or exceptional clinical reasons. Those are three examples, but it would be good to see more precision on this question because, as the Government’s Delegated Powers Memorandum says, the meanings of these words will be litigated. They will show up in judicial review and private law action. Therefore, the clearer the Government are prospectively, the less frictional cost and time there will be through the justice system and health system in giving effect to the new standards that are set out here in what hopefully will become the Act. However, having supported the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, on that amendment, I will disappoint him now by just injecting a note of caution on his Amendment 96B. As we have just heard, it would leave out “seek to” in respect of delivering on the 28-day standard; excising those words, as he said, would in effect make it an overarching requirement—a “must”—even if there is a shortage of hospital accommodation or no staff available. If the thought behind this is that the principal drivers of delays are essentially administrative processes then a “must” on 28 days can, in a sense, be given effect without a downside. But I wonder whether we actually have sufficient evidence to know that that is the root cause of such delays as occur. As I understand it, about four-fifths of the transfers from prisons to our specialist mental health facilities in the first half of the current financial year were to psychiatric medium-secure units and psychiatric intensive care, both of which are in very high demand and incredibly expensive resources, with highly constrained supply. The impact assessment rather glosses over this question. When describing whether this new standard for transfers to hospital from prisons might introduce additional cost, it says at paragraph 169: “Costs for the measure have not been monetised because they are principally driven by wider systematic changes which are supported by the legislation”— that is, it is administrative friction. It goes on to say something which I do not quite understand. I would be grateful if the Minister could interpret for us what the department meant when it wrote that an additional reason the costs were not being monetised was because “resources are available to achieve transfers within the time limit in a greater proportion of cases”. What are these “resources available to achieve transfers”? Are they additional or substitute resources? What is the scale of them? What was meant in the drafting of that paragraph? My hypothesis is that this is not just about administrative friction. It is actually due to constraints on the supply in expensive and specialised mental health services, and therefore the unintended consequence of mandating, through excising “seek to” and making 28 days a trump card for people coming from prisons, would be one of three consequences. Prisoners with severe mental health needs would find themselves in unsafe and poorly staffed facilities; or, by virtue of being in prison, you would displace a non-prison-based mental health patient who might have higher needs, as that is what the statute requires; or, under the Clause 49 powers, you would, effectively, see the Department of Health using the Henry VIII power, which it has in this Bill, to quickly rewrite 28 days and make it 180—or something else—because, as the delegated powers memo said, it might do so in that circumstance “where insufficient beds are available to meet demand over a sustained period of time”. For all those reasons, there may be unintended consequences of Amendment 96B which require further scrutiny. However, in the spirit of wanting to make this work practically, I have laid down Amendments 97 and 98, which, essentially, as the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, said, look to reciprocate the 28-day requirement. If you are aiming to get prisoners transferred to mental health facilities in 28 days, similarly, when their treatment is complete, one should expect that the Prison Service or Immigration Service will ensure the return the prison estate to free up those scarce and specialist beds for other prisoners or patients who require treatment. In a way, my amendment is a very gentle one. All I suggest is that if there are people stuck in specialist mental health beds who ought to be being returned to prison, that would constitute an exceptional reason for being unable to accept new intakes of prisoners being transferred. The reason this is such a gentle amendment is, of course, that the Government pray in aid the June 2021 best practice guidance for the transfers, which says that, although it should be a 28-day standard for moving from prison to mental health facility, it should be 14 days if moving back the other way to free up the bed. I have not proposed a 14-day requirement on the Prison Service, just the reciprocal 28 days, so, in that spirit of joint working, I hope these amendments will find wide support.

My Lords, briefly, I am with the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, as opposed to the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, on the “seek to” question. When I read Clause 35, I was very excited about what it promised; I thought that, at last, this was being taken seriously. I talked to a range of people who worked in criminal justice, and they said: “Oh, it is not going to happen; what are you excited about?”—they just did not believe it. At Second Reading, I cited Richard Garside from the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies saying that Clause 35 “while welcome, feels aspirational rather than practically implementable in the current system”.”.—[Official Report, 25/11/24; col. 549.] I started to look at it again and thought that the danger for those of us who are following this debate is that we get bought off by this aspiration, and that, in practical terms, it will not mean what we all thought it was meant to. I am quite keen that we toughen up the statutory requirements.

18:15:00

If you actually read chief inspector Charlie Taylor’s graphic description of seriously mentally ill people in prisons, it is like something horrible from Victorian nightmares. Anyone who works in prisons will tell you that one of the hardest and most difficult things is the danger that those people pose—in terms of either self-harm or psychosis—to themselves, other prisoners and staff. They need hospital treatment, yet the same inspectors note the dire state of healthcare provision in prisons, with an emphasis on staff shortages, particularly in relation to mental health. That strikes me as being one reason to make sure that we change that situation and ensure people get the healthcare that they need.

Having said that, I will come back to the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, because I do not want to appear to be overly idealistic. If somebody is transferred to a mental health hospital—getting, I hope, very good care so that they are then well, or well enough—my concern is that if they return to a prison situation, where they will still need some medical support, they will not get it. Guess what will happen then? There will be a constant back and forth.

In general, we have to take the mental health problems among the prison population very seriously or they will put a strain on general mental health provision, as well as an already crumbling and falling apart prison situation. From the public’s point of view, the issue of mentally ill or psychotic prisoners is one that they are looking at closely, one way or another, because of a number of high-profile cases. It is very important that the Bill gets it right and does not just tick a box.

My Lords, I will just add a couple of brief points. This is a really important set of amendments and the issue of making it easier to transfer people between prisons and hospitals is critical. If you like, it is at the heart of some of the reforms that we are looking at. I have a lot of sympathy for the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Bradley. I am also aware that he has waited a very long time. Did he say that it was 28 years?

Sixteen.

Just the 16. Anyway, it is a long time to wait. The amendments aiming to make it clear, as the noble Lord said, when the clock starts ticking are really important, so that there is real accountability injected into the system. Often, when things go wrong it is where no one really feels responsible for something, so it does not happen. I will also be interested to hear what the “exceptional circumstances” do and do not include—I hope we will get some examples—because if they include just things such as shortage of staff or beds, we will not get very far at all, given the current state of mental health beds. I understand the rationale behind the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens; the reciprocity is a really important point to make. I just have slight concerns that we might be saying that this cannot happen in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, wanted to see, because we know that we have not got the scarce and specialist beds. They are just not available; it is very important to be practical about it. It comes to the heart of the matter of this whole Bill: we know that, unless proper resource is put into the implementation of the Bill, it is not going to work at all. We know that, with mental health provision, particularly a secure unit, particularly with the state of the estate, the shortage of staff and all of that, there has to be wholesale investment in it for these things to work. I think the time has come. I simply add my voice to others to say that I hope the noble Lord practises patience—but I think he has waited long enough so I hope his patience will not be tested any longer.

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke to the amendments. I also thank the Government for allowing the Minister for Prisons, Probation and Reducing Reoffending to reply to this group. That is very much welcomed by the Committee. I think it was the noble Lord’s father who once said, “Kindness is good for business”. In this case, he might find that kindness is good for his noble friend the Minister. Given how hard she has been working on the Bill, I think she deserves some respite, so I am sure that that is very welcome. So far, we have debated the importance of limiting detentions for those with autism or learning disabilities without co-occurring mental disorders. We have also debated the community treatment orders. But until now, we have not covered the provisions of the Bill relating to this new statutory 28-day time-limited period for transfers from prisons to hospitals. As the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, has said, he has been very patient. Therefore, the Government enshrining this target in law is welcome. Unfortunately, progress towards the goal of 28 days, as set out in the 2021 guidance and the White Paper, has been slower than anticipated. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, in its 2024 report The Long Wait—I am sure the noble Lord is aware of this—said that “people linger in prison for weeks, often months and even, in the worst cases, for more than a year waiting for their transfer to be completed”. Unfortunately, even though the 28-day guidance was there from 2022-23, only 15% of patients in that period were transferred to hospital within that timeframe. Sadly, the average wait was 85 days, and one prisoner was identified as waiting 462 days for transfer to hospital. These Benches welcome the 28-day limit being put on a statutory footing, but, as other noble Lords have said—not only on this group of amendments but on others—once again, there is an issue of implementation here. Just because it is in legislation does not mean it will deliver the improvements that are necessary. The noble Lord’s colleague—the noble Baroness, Lady Merron—has been very candid with noble Lords, saying that not everything in the Bill will be delivered now, and that there is a 10-year timetable for implementation. Given that, will the Minister say, at this stage, whether the 28-day limit is an aspiration or something that could be delivered immediately? If, at this stage, it is an aspiration and—understandably so—awaiting future spending reviews, is he able to give an indicative timeframe? Is the hope for the next 12 months, the next five years or, perhaps, up to 10 years? That information would be very welcome to noble Lords. Many noble Lords have been asking this throughout this debate. We understand that not everything is going to be solved overnight, but it would be good if we could have as much information as possible on the Government’s intentions and aspirations, including indicative timetables, where they are possible. We also understand that not everything is going to be clearly tagged at this stage. Another finding from the prison inspectorate’s report was that there were serious flaws with the data held on patients who were awaiting transfer. I understand that there is no publicly available data describing the access and waiting times for beds. The Minister might be able to correct me on that. Some of the data on the numbers of prisoners awaiting transfer obtained from providers had significant gaps, due to a lack of consistent and accurate reporting, and some data contained errors and unreliability. This might also impact on Amendments 97 and 98 from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens. The noble Baroness, Lady Merron, may well tire of hearing me repeat the importance of collecting accurate and complete data, but, as I and many other noble Lords have said on many occasions, we really cannot solve many of the problems we face without data that is as accurate and timely as possible. Therefore, I urge both Ministers to take up the issue of data reporting for patients awaiting transfer from prison to hospital with their respective departments. Turning to Amendment 96C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, which creates an accountable person who will be appointed to oversee the transfer process and ensure that the statutory 28-day limit is completed, I think this, once again, speaks to the point of implementation. This could be a sensible way of holding providers to account and working with them to address the shortcomings in patient transfers. Given the Government’s 10-year timeframe for implementation, noble Lords have raised the importance of oversight and accountability. Therefore, in the remarks from the Minister and in any subsequent letter, I hope that the Government will be able to address the issue of implementation and to give an indicative timetable. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

My Lords, this is the first time that I have helped take a Bill through Committee, so I am grateful to noble Lords for bearing with me while I acquaint myself with the procedures. I appreciate the questions and suggestions from noble Lords because this is a subject that is very close to my heart, as someone who has recruited many of the people whom we are talking about, over many years. I have always thought it was very sad when colleagues whom I had recruited often had to leave because of their mental health problems and other complexities that they then found themselves in within the system. Amendment 96, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, would remove the change to the detention criteria in Clause 34, provided for prisoners who become mentally disordered in prison and require transfer to hospital. This would mean that a physical hospital place must be identified before the detention criteria are met for transfer from prison to hospital under the Act. This differs from how “available” treatment is interpreted across the rest of the Act, and therefore risks delaying access to treatment. It would also affect the implementation of the statutory time limit in Clause 35, as the Secretary of State would not be able to issue a transfer warrant until a bed is identified, regardless of the patient’s needs. Clause 34 aims to correct a divergence in the detention criteria, as opposed to creating one. I appreciate that the noble Baroness is seeking further clarity on how Clause 34 will operate and the intention of the wording. My officials would be happy to hold a teach-in with the noble Baroness on this. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. I turn to Amendments 96A to 96C, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bradley. We have known each other for nearly 10 years, six years after the important topic came on to his radar. Amendment 96A would place a legislative time limit on the referring body to issue a referral notice within two days of receiving a request for an initial medical report to assess whether an individual meets the criteria for transfer. The timing of the statutory referral notice being issued will not impact when the time limit begins. This starts from the day that the healthcare team requests the assessment, referred to in the Bill as “the initial request”. This amendment would therefore not benefit transfer timeliness. Additionally, placing a statutory time limit on the healthcare team in a detention setting to issue a referral notice would not be operationally viable, because not all services operate seven days a week. The current wording of “as soon as practicable” accounts for this and encourages the referral notice to be issued at the earliest point for each case. Amendment 96B would place a duty on all relevant agencies to ensure, as opposed to “seek to ensure”, that the transfer is completed within 28 days. Due to the multiagency co-ordination required in the transfer process, there is no one body that could ensure punctual transfers. This is why we softened the duty, so that those in receipt of a referral notice must seek to ensure that the patient was transferred within 28 days. Having consulted with relevant agencies, we are confident that this is appropriate, given the complexities in the transfer process. Amendment 96C, also mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Kamall and Lord Bradley, would introduce a “specified accountable person”, appointed by the healthcare provider for the relevant place of detention, who would be responsible for ensuring that people are transferred within the 28-day time limit in Clause 35.

18:30:00

The previous Government ran a public consultation seeking views on the most effective way to establish this role, which did not reach a consensus. A cross-agency working group was established further to scope out the role. Work continues between health and justice partners on this. A non-statutory approach will ensure that the interests of patients are considered while providing the flexibility required, given the complexity of the process. I hope this provides reassurance. I urge my noble friend not to move his amendments, and I am happy to meet him to discuss this in further detail.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, quite rightly raised how mental health problems are so very profound within prisons. This is especially so in women’s prisons. I reassure noble Lords that when I have been to Ashworth Hospital the level of care received by patients is extraordinary. The point about the transfer from there back to prison is one we should be very aware of because there is often a big jump between being in a secure hospital to being within a prison environment.

Amendments 97 and 98, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, would create an exceptional circumstance to the 28-day time limit where the delay is due to a bed shortage caused by patients waiting longer than 28 days to be remitted to prison. Creating an exceptional circumstance solely for patients awaiting return to prison could risk the remissions process being rushed unnecessarily, causing perverse outcomes. There is also limited evidence to suggest that remissions are causing bed blockages. Where there are complex remissions that exceed the best practice time limit of 14 days, we are developing guidance to ensure that prison staff can meet the needs of people in their care. I therefore urge the noble Lord not to move these amendments.

Amendment 163A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Bradley, would ensure that Clause 35 is commenced only when the Secretary of State has clarified the meaning of “exceptional circumstances” and guidance on that definition is laid before both Houses. If we were legislatively to define exceptional circumstances, it would severely restrict our flexibility to update the definition based on an ever-evolving array of patient needs, which would be likely to delay implementation of the 28-day statutory transfer time limit while the definition is coined. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, pointed out, cross-agency work to support the implementation of this provision has led to a greater understanding of the barriers to meeting the 28-day timeframe. It has revealed the systematic barriers and the scale of the challenges, which include workforce, bed capacity and estates, which is why we intend to commence this provision after 18 to 24 months and are seeking additional funding to support this ambition. I hope this provides reassurance, and I urge the noble Lord—

Can I just make sure I heard the Minister correctly? I think he said the that one of the reasons it would not be appropriate to do as the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, suggested—that is, to set out a statutory definition—was because it would take too long to do it and would delay implementation of the 28-day standard. I think he now just said it is intended that that will come into force in 18 to 24 months, the implication being that he thinks it would take 18 to 24 months to produce a piece of statutory guidance about what constitutes an exceptional circumstance. Is that correct?

Having been in discussions with colleagues over the past couple of weeks on this point, I tested with them the processes involved in making sure that we can make this as robust as possible. One of the issues surrounding exceptional circumstances is the need for flexibility so that some of our professionals do not unwittingly break the law in exceptional circumstances. I am happy to write to the noble Lord with further details.

Before my noble friend completes his summing up, I welcome him to his first Committee session. He kindly offered to meet me to discuss the accountable person for the process of transfer. Can he assure me that that meeting will take place well before Report?

I will very happily meet as soon as possible and well before the next stage.

I appreciate that this is this Minister’s first time, but I would like to speak to his team in the department through him. I find it very difficult to understand why the Minister’s team thinks it is necessary or, indeed, appropriate to invite my noble friend Lady Murphy for a “teach-in”. Does the Minister really mean that? It seems to me utterly inappropriate, and my noble friend could not say it.

I thank the noble and learned Baroness for her comments. I hope the noble Baroness accepts my apology for the way it was phrased. As this is my first Committee, I have been getting a number of messages from officials, and I was trying to work out what I said at which point. I apologise. I will very happily meet the noble Baroness.

At the risk of giving the Minister a rather hard time on his first outing in Committee, on the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, about people saying that it will not happen, is he not fearful, as I am, that, given the way life is, if we do not rid ourselves of words such as “as soon as practicable” and “seek to”, as suggested in Amendments 96A and 96B, in practice it really will not happen?

I thank the noble Baroness for the question. One of the questions that I have been asking colleagues is on exactly this point around whether this will happen. I have been reassured by asking policy colleagues many probing questions that the points in the Bill make it as tight as possible without conflicting professionals in the way they are going about their role.

I welcome the Minister to his first Committee. Clearly, a lot of work has been done on this to work out within 18 months what is required. Will the Minister let the Committee know what the gap is between existing provision and what would be required in terms of beds and staffing for this 28-day provision to come into force? That is an important piece of information that the Committee needs to understand to see whether it is just an aspiration or there are the resources needed to make it real.

I will ask officials to get me that information and to pass it on.

My Lords, it is my great pleasure to respond to the Minister. I will keep it brief. I have been using this Act for 40 years since 1983, and I assure the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, that this is the only clause which is interpreted, before the amendment, as somebody can apply for transfer and you have to find a bed. It is only the very new immigration Act that has led to this extraordinary transfer of information that has enabled somebody to put in these extra words, but they do not relate in any way to the immigration Act on which the amendment is based; in other words, it seems to me that we should just stick with what we have. I was trying to say that in as easy a way as I possibly could. It just seems to me that it is making it complex at a time when we need to be simple. There is a lot to learn in this Bill. There is a lot to be done. Nevertheless, if the Minister would like to give me a “teach-in”, I shall be delighted. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 96 withdrawn.

Clause 34 agreed.

Clause 35: Transfers of prisoners and others to hospital: time limits

Amendments 96A to 98 not moved.

Clause 35 agreed.

Clauses 36 and 37 agreed.

Amendment 99

Moved by

99: After Clause 37, insert the following new Clause— “Duty to record patients not in the criminal justice system escorted to hospital by police(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision to require the police and hospital trusts to record the number of patients who are not in the criminal justice system but are escorted to accident and emergency departments in hospitals by the police for treatment for mental disorder.(2) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 99 in my name and to speak to my further Amendment 137; both are also in the name of my noble friend Lord Howe. Our Amendment 99 places a duty on the police and on hospital trusts to record the number of patients not in the criminal justice system who are escorted to accident and emergency departments by the police for treatment for a mental disorder. The reason behind this amendment is that a number of people are taken into accident and emergency by the police because they exhibit behaviour that is a cause for concern, resulting from a diagnosed, or even an undiagnosed, mental disorder or learning disability. These patients are not necessarily placed under arrest, since they may not have committed any crime, but they are escorted to hospital by police. Once in A&E, it is quite common that they could wait for six, 12 or even more hours before they see a clinician. This is obviously not an efficient use of police time; I know that my noble friend Lady May spoke to this earlier in Committee. More importantly, a police officer escorting a patient who is demonstrating challenging behaviour could exacerbate the problem. Also, a patient who arrives with or without a police officer may behave in a way that is seen as threatening by other patients, which could lead to their being arrested, as they are seen as at risk of harming themselves or others. The patient then finds themselves in the criminal justice system. To avoid situations such as this, we are probing the Government to try to understand how often the police take patients into hospital for treatment for a possible mental disorder when they are not under arrest. This data should help us to understand how much police time is being spent accompanying these patients. This is not to take a particular view one way or the other; rather, it is to say that we need to have this information available so that we can fully assess the situation. Our Amendment 137 states that the Care Quality Commission “must publish a report on the efficacy of systems designed to prevent the introduction of illegal drugs into mental health units”. Hospitals are entitled to prohibit patients from misusing drugs or alcohol on their wards, but what they can do to enforce those requirements is less clear, especially with detained patients. We accept that informally admitted patients can be asked to leave by hospital managers or even escorted off-site by security if they do not abide by a hospital’s rules on illegal drug use. However, patients detained under the Mental Health Act cannot be forced off premises for violating these rules. The risks of illegal drugs being used in mental health units are obvious and severe. There is a possibility of those drugs interfering with prescribed medication, which could make that medication ineffective or even harmful to a patient’s physical or mental health. Further risks include the effects—such as psychosis or aggravating effects—of certain drugs, which could potentially lead patients to become more violent and cause harm to themselves or to staff. Whatever the result, the use of illicit drugs in mental health hospitals does not contribute to the treatment or therapeutic benefit of patients; I suspect that is a British understatement. Much of the information and literature on substance misuse in in-patient mental health settings seems to be out of date. The major studies that we looked at were conducted in the early 2000s; these included a paper published by the Psychiatric Bulletin in 2000. I am happy to be corrected if there is more up-to-date data, but it seems that we do not have enough adequate and up-to-date data available concerning the prevalence of illegal drugs in mental health units. Can the Minister tell us whether the department has up-to-date figures? If not, does it have any intention of collecting these figures? Once again, this would help us to understand the scale of the problem. Whether or not we are fully aware of the prevalence of illegal drugs in mental health units, there must be adequate safeguards in place to ensure that their use is as limited as possible. This amendment probes the Government for some answers on how they are trying to achieve this. By requiring the CQC to publish an annual report on this matter, we hope that a fuller picture could emerge, which would, we hope, inform the development of procedures and processes to reduce the harms related to illicit drug use. I beg to move.

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 151 in this group, which is in my name. It is a slightly diverse group, in that the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, has just set out his two amendments, which are very focused on specific areas, while mine is a very general one. However, they fall under the grouping as provided to us by the Whips; they are about monitoring and reporting, so there is some kind of sense here. I start with the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, who in the previous group said that, without proper resources, this Bill is not going to work at all. That is what this amendment aims to address. I think the reason why it was regarded as within the scope of the Bill without any wrestling from me is that, specifically, the aim of this Bill is to have fewer people sectioned and fewer people under compulsory treatment orders. It aims to reshape and have earlier interventions, so that we do not see problems get so bad that we get to that point.

18:45:00

To make that happen, resources in the community will be essential. On day 1 of Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Kamal, gave me a task to go off and put out a briefing about the Trieste model, which is probably the world-leading place where this approach to community resources is best known. I am still working on that. We will get there eventually; we are not quite there yet.

The amendment proposes that Parliament should get a continuous assessment, initially two years after the Act and then every three years thereafter. We have heard from many stages of debate in this Committee that the most important thing is to have a report and assessment democratically heard by Parliament, with government forced on a regular basis to make an assessment of what level of resources are available in the community. That is what this review amendment seeks to achieve.

The Guardian reported on a useful survey from IPSOS from last year under the headline:

“Mental health overtakes cancer and obesity as Britons’ biggest health worry”.

This is a now a great concern; mental health in general is more concerning to British people than are cancer or obesity. We think about that and we think about the phrase “parity of esteem” and how far we are from that, in respect of both community services and other high-level services, when it comes to mental health versus physical health. I think that is worth saying. This amendment aims to get an assessment that people can see, hear, listen to and look at, all the way along.

I have a couple more points to make, as I think this is an important amendment. I draw attention to the Local Government Association briefing and declare my position as vice-president of the Local Government Association. It notes:

“The Bill Impact Assessment does not identify any increase in demand of community mental health services, aside from advocacy”.

Nothing is in the impact statement about actual services. The LGA says:

“To achieve this reform successfully, it will require investment in both Voluntary Community and Social Enterprise … and council commissioned community mental health services”.

It notes:

“This is particularly important as statutory local authority adult mental health services and much VCSE mental health provision is funded from the social care budget”.

We all know what pressure that social care budget is under.

I have just one or two other brief things to say. We have just been talking a great deal about children and young people, and I note that the briefing from Mind, in partnership with the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Coalition, states that

“waiting times and thresholds for mental health support for children and young people across early intervention, targeted support and clinical access services are worryingly high”.

As it says, too many children are now being left to get to crisis point, when we are aiming to achieve the absolute opposite; that is the whole purpose of this Bill.

I will cite two final statistics, which were widely reported last week. The number of young people admitted to general hospital wards in England with a mental health concern is up 65% in the past 10 years. So, we have mental health problems, but people are ending up in general wards, which often simply do not have the services or provision, to meet their needs.

Finally, an area that I think deserves a great deal more attention is perinatal mental health assistance for mothers. The last figures, running up to November of last year, are that, across England, 62,700 people were provided with perinatal mental health assistance. That was a 16% increase on the preceding year and 30% up on 2021-22.

We need these services in the community, across so many areas and in so many aspects. If we are going to deliver this Bill, those services have to be there. Surely, Parliament should be able to make a regular assessment of what provision there is, and the Government should have to account for that.

My Lords, this is an interesting collection of amendments. I suggest that they are all slightly flawed but with good intent behind them. In relation to Amendment 99 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, as members of the scrutiny committee will know, we spent a long time talking about what happens in A&E departments. Our committee was very lucky to have Rosena Allin-Khan as a member; she is not just the MP for Tooting but a practising A&E doctor at St George’s Hospital. When we were wandering off into theoreticals, she managed to drag us right back to what actually happens. The key issue that we returned to, as a committee, was that no matter what the police’s formal position is about their involvement in mental health crisis treatment, they will be there. First, people will go to A&E because the lights are on and, secondly, some of them will be very distressed, so members of the public and members of staff will expect the engagement of police officers. A lot has been said about the particular legal status of somebody who is detained in hospital. They are not technically detained, because they are not in a mental health facility. Yet we know that there is a need for spaces within A&E that are properly built and staffed as safe havens for a time, so that somebody who arrives in a state of distress can be in an appropriate place where they can become calm and, therefore, not be taken off inappropriately into the criminal justice system. I can see what the noble Lord’s amendment is getting at. It deals with it in a very partial way. Following our discussions, and the discussion we had the other day with the noble Baroness, Lady May, on her amendment about police involvement in crisis moments for people with mental health problems, I hope that we might be able to come up with an amendment which is a bit fuller than the one which the noble Lord has put forward. Amendment 137, the second in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, is about monitoring what is being done about the use of illegal drugs and substances in mental health services. I listened carefully to what he said. Does he think that this does not happen already? I have been to a number of acute mental health services in London. It is clear that staff have to deal with very difficult situations. This cannot be an issue that does not happen; it must be part of the daily risk assessment of anybody working there. Does the noble Lord think that it is extensive enough to warrant this kind of reporting and is this another legal duty that we want to put on staff? Is it the best use of their time, compared to other things? I am in no way against getting good data out to solve problems, if that is the best way to do it, but I am not entirely sure that his amendment does that. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, is absolutely right to focus us again on a question that we have never had answered since 1983, about which resources go into acute services and which into community services. When we have a legal change, as we did in 2006 with the move to community treatment orders, what happens to the flow of resources? Crucially, what is the impact? We just do not have the answer. We have a health system which is very good at delivering itemised care. I suggest that it does not actually deliver that many care pathways. Even when it does, I have never seen any clear evidence that patient information and money flows are sufficiently sophisticated to explain to us whether any of the policy intents that we want to see—that all noble Lords who have ever spoken on mental health in this place have wanted to see—will come about. Her amendment may not be perfect either, but I certainly support the noble Baroness and her intent.

My Lords, I also support Amendment 151 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Whether such reporting should be specifically confined to community mental health services or be more expansive than that is obviously for debate. Whether it should be bi-annual or more frequently, or once a Parliament, does not really matter. The point is to try to continue to put a spotlight on the gap between need and availability in mental health when, for all the reasons that we have talked about, there is sometimes a tendency to downplay that aspect of health and what the health service does. As the noble Baroness said, if we cast our minds back to last Wednesday when we had that debate about whether the apparent increase in demand for children and young people’s mental health services was real or not, it was paradoxical that, later that evening, the embargo dropped on the Lancet Child & Adolescent Health paper on mental health. It showed that there had been a genuine and unparalleled increase, particularly in younger women’s needs for specialist eating disorder services. Having young people who are severely ill is not an artefact of culture. Having those kinds of data brought together in one place and published with the imprimatur of the Government would be helpful, rather than as a sort of periodic post-election exercise of the sort that the noble Lord, Lord Darzi, provided. He, of course, also drew attention to the gap that exists between need and the availability of mental health services. I think he used a figure from April 2024 to point out there were more than a million people waiting for mental health, learning disability and/or autism services, of whom 345,000 referrals had waited longer than a year and 109,000 of those were for children and young people under the age of 18. There is a real gap here and a need to continue to put the spotlight on it, to mobilise attention and resource. I welcome the spirit behind Amendment 151.

My Lords, I have spoken a lot about the dangers of medicalising ordinary life and giving it a mental health label. The contribution I made in the previous Committee day on ADHD managed to get picked up by newspapers and generally cited as, “Cruel Baroness hates everybody that says they have ADHD”, so I have become even more infamous. I welcome the call by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for a review, because the more information and data we have about what is available in the community, the better. My only word of caution is that we should also recognise that, although we need more data, sometimes that data can be used as part of an advocacy for more resources and that data can be unreliable. My only caveat is that whatever the review does, it should not just take superficial headlines or self-diagnosis and self-ID as the truth, and that we should have some scepticism in that regard. We are going to have to understand the implications of this Bill when it is enacted for community care and provision. Therefore, I would welcome any attempt at getting to grips with the reality of that.

My Lords, I briefly want to support Amendment 151 in the context of the delays experienced by CAMHS—delays in obtaining appointments and assessments, and in getting treatment. When I last had to look at this, only recently, those delays were still very serious. They are distressing for the children concerned and for their parents. They are also frustrating for local authorities, social workers and the courts, which need to make informed decisions but are unable to do so because they are still waiting to understand what CAMHS have to say about a particular child’s problems.

19:00:00

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their amendments and considerations, including the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for her observations on the group before us. On Amendment 99, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, services already capture data on instances of police using relevant powers to take patients to emergency departments. The Home Office collects national policing data on detentions under Section 136 of the Act and removal to a place of safety, including the number of times that A&E has been used. NHS England’s emergency care dataset includes data on mental health, including how patients are referred to hospital and their conveyance methods. I understand the points that the noble Lord was seeking to probe, but we feel that it is not necessary to create a new legislative requirement. My response to Amendment 137, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, will focus on the position in England, because I imagine that that is what the noble Lord is particularly interested in, and of course different arrangements apply in Wales. We recognise the importance of preventing illegal drug use in mental health units and take the issue extremely seriously. All units must have robust policies in place to prevent the introduction of illegal drugs. To pick up the point that the noble Lord put to me about the recording of drug-related incidents, I assure him that such incidents would be recorded as a patient safety incident. While published data does not break down the nature of an incident to get an aggregate view at national level, details of incidents will nevertheless be shared with NHSE and the CQC to allow appropriate action then to be taken. As I have referred to, providers must inform the CQC of certain events affecting their services. Inspectors review all reported concerns, as I have said, and that is important to determine the necessary follow-up actions. Issues that relate to the introduction and use of illegal drugs in an in-patient setting would be reflected in the CQC’s regulatory inspection findings where concerns have been identified, with potential consequences for ratings and for regulatory sanctions. We believe that there are already processes in place for the CQC in England to receive information about drug-related incidents. We feel that this is a better use of the capacity—which is not infinite, as the noble Lord knows—of the regulator, rather than having a national report on the overall efficacy of the systems that are in place. Amendment 151 was tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and spoken to by a number of noble Lords, and I am grateful for their input. A number of other amendments have called for statutory reports on current community services. As I have said previously in response to those debates, we recognise that reducing detentions cannot be achieved by legislation alone, and will absolutely depend on the right services in the community. The CQC publishes an annual survey on community mental health support, and we will be publishing a 10-year plan for the NHS later this year. Progress in community mental health services is already being made. In the last 12 months, more than 400,000 adults have received help through new models of care, which aim to give people with severe mental illness greater choice and control over their care. However, we recognise that more needs to be done. I want to pick out a particular focus on innovation in this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to the fact that the impact assessment does not include costs for community services. That is not quite the case. There are significant costs associated with the changes to learning disability and autism, which are included in the impact assessment. I agree that wider reforms in community mental health services are needed for the reforms to achieve their intended benefits in full, but they are not a direct consequence of this Bill. That is why they are not costed in the impact assessment. I hope that will be a useful clarification for the noble Baroness. As I mentioned last Monday, NHS England is already piloting the 24/7 neighbourhood mental health centre model in England, building on learning from international exemplars, some of which have been brought to the attention of your Lordships’ House by various noble Lords, and I have welcomed that. Six early implementers are bringing together their community crisis and in-patient functions into one open-access neighbourhood team that is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. That means that people with mental health needs can walk in, or self-refer, as can their loved ones or concerned professionals. We are currently commissioning an evaluation of these welcome pilots, which is due to report in June 2026. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, referred to reports last week of an increase in the number of young people admitted to general hospital wards with mental health concerns. NHS England is in the process of developing a new model for specialised children’s and young people’s mental health services, supported by a new service specification and quality standards. That new model would support the delivery of specialist services in the community and in-patient settings to ensure that children and young people are treated in age-appropriate in-patient environments, as well as the least restrictive environment close to the child’s or young person’s family and home. The noble Baroness’s point is well made, and I hope that will be helpful.

I welcome what the Minister has said about the pilots and the significant changes being made to existing mental health services. Short of someone putting down an Oral Question or securing a debate, how will Parliament be able to monitor that? We know that, in the health service and more broadly, successful pilots happen but then disappear without trace and never get implemented. How will Parliament be able to assess progress from the pilot stage to implementation, along with broader changes? What mechanisms are there?

The noble Baroness makes a fair point, and that is something I shall return to later in Committee. I am keen, as I hope noble Lords know, to speak in your Lordships’ House about progress that is and is not made, and I will continue to do that. Overall on this group, given the amount of plans and reporting already in place, we do not think that additional statutory review, particularly in relation to Amendment 151, is necessary. For all the reasons that I have put to the Committee, I hope noble Lords will be good enough not to press their amendments.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this group. I should have also mentioned that I am very sympathetic to the intention behind Amendment 151 from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. Noble Lords throughout this debate have been speaking about community resources and accountability for those resources; indeed, I have a related amendment in the seventh group. In some ways, the Minister has partly answered that probing amendment. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and will reflect on the points she made. As the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said previously, this was a probing amendment to see what data was being collected. Noble Lords will understand that, if we want to improve a situation, we need to collect data. It may not be perfect, and perhaps we can have some conversations between now and Report about that. I am very grateful that the Minister said that this data is collected. I wonder if she could write to us with links to where it can be found. That could address some of the concerns raised by stakeholders who wrote to us, which led to this amendment being tabled. I remember that, when I read the work of the pre-legislative scrutiny committee, the Metropolitan Police service’s submission said that, in 2021, for the first time more patients were conveyed to a health setting in a police vehicle than in an ambulance. I wonder if that is still true or if that situation has been reversed. The purpose of these amendments was to seek what data was available, so that we can address the problems that Amendment 99 and 137 sought to address. With those comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 99 withdrawn.

Clause 38: Independent mental health advocates

Amendments 100 and 101 not moved.

Clause 38 agreed.

Schedule 3: Independent mental health advocates

Amendment 102 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.

Amendments 103 to 111 not moved.

Schedule 3 agreed.

Clause 39: Information about complaints for detained patients

Amendment 112 not moved.

Clause 39 agreed.

Clause 40: Information about complaints for community patients

Amendment 113 not moved.

Clause 40 agreed.

Clause 41: Information for conditionally discharged patients

Amendment 114 not moved.

Clause 41 agreed.

Clause 42: Advance choice documents

Amendment 115

Moved by

115: Clause 42, page 54, leave out lines 9 to 15 and insert— “(1) An eligible patient shall have a right to create an advance choice document.(1A) For the purposes of this section, an “eligible patient” is a patient who—(a) has previously been detained under Part 2 or Part 3 of this Act, or(b) has been diagnosed with a mental disorder which may lead to the possibility they will be detained under this Act in the future.(1B) NHS England and each integrated care board must make such arrangements as it considers appropriate for—(a) ensuring that all eligible patients for whom it is responsible for the purposes of this section are informed of their right to create an advance choice document, and(b) helping an eligible patient to create an advance choice document.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment gives all eligible patients the statutory right to create an advance choice document if they so wish.

My Lords, Amendment 115 takes us to one of the features of this Bill which has been universally welcomed: the creation of advance choice documents or ACDs. An ACD is a means by which a person can record in writing their decisions, wishes and feelings about their treatment, should they be admitted to a hospital or a mental health unit as an in-patient, whether informally or detained compulsorily. On that account, ACDs are a major component part of one of the Bill’s key strands, which is to give mental health patients better control over their own care—which, of itself, carries a therapeutic value. Giving that element of extra control also reduces the risk of discrimination creeping into any decisions about care and treatment. The Explanatory Notes say that the people most likely to benefit from an ACD are those who may be detained in a mental health unit or who are likely to be hospitalised at some point in the future. This is because research has shown that ACDs have the potential to reduce time spent in hospital and, significantly, to reduce compulsory detention rates by up to 25%. So the creation of ACDs carries enormous potential. Clause 42 sets out the duties of NHS England and integrated care boards in making the necessary arrangements for facilitating ACDs. Each of them is required to make information about ACDs available to the people for whom it is responsible, as defined in the clause, and to help such of those people as it considers appropriate to create advance choice documents.

19:15:00

I very much welcome these provisions. I would, however, propose to the Government that they should go somewhat further. The concern I have is that Clause 42 creates what amounts to a duty on the authorities to advertise the existence of ACDs, not a guarantee to make people aware of their right to create one. The duty on NHS England and ICBs to make information available does not amount to the same thing as ensuring that those who are eligible to create an ACD are informed of their right to do so and how best they can do it.

This is a lacuna, and I say that because with ACDs we have entered the realm of patient rights, rather than just duties on public bodies. The independent review of the Mental Health Act suggested that the Government should consider a requirement to offer ACDs to those defined as eligible—the operative words here being “a requirement to offer”.

In support of that, it has also been pointed out that the introduction of ACDs engages Article 8 of the ECHR, which requires the state and public bodies to respect the right to personal autonomy, dignity and physical and psychological integrity. Can we really say that a notice on a hospital notice board or a page on a website advertising the existence of ACDs would go far enough to satisfy those ECHR requirements in the fullest sense? I suggest that what we have in the Bill is not quite enough.

As the Minister knows, we have spoken about this issue privately and I am grateful for the conversation we had. Will she agree to consider making a change to Clause 42 along the lines I have proposed? I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendments 117 and 125 in this group are in my name. I tabled them in part to reflect what happened during the work of the scrutiny committee. We had long discussions about the benefits of ACDs, which were originally brought in under the Mental Capacity Act. I speak as the person who spent an awful long time trying to get them into that Act. They were brought in in the face of some resistance from practitioners. In fact, they have worked extremely well. It has been helpful to both patients and practitioners to know in advance, particularly for people who may have fluctuating illnesses, what it is that they want to do. I point out yet again to the Committee that often, these are referred to as a decision to refuse treatment, but they are not always that. In the case of some advance choice decisions, people may say to their healthcare providers, “At the moment I am well. I know that, when I am ill, I may try to refuse treatment, but I want you to override that; I want you to carry on the continuity of my care”. My amendment reflects something we were told. It will be no surprise to people that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, drew attention to the work that has been done in palliative care not only to make sure that people are aware of their right to make an advance choice decision about what they may wish to happen to them as their care continues, but to make it electronically. That was found to be one of the biggest barriers for practitioners, who would say, “We were in a crisis, and we couldn’t see it”. A lot of work has been done within the palliative care world to bring in new standard ways of doing things electronically. There is a pilot going on with the assistance of a private company, Thalamos—I think King’s has been trialling it—and it has so far been found to be extremely successful. On a very prosaic level, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, is absolutely right that the more that patients feel empowered, particularly in mental health care, the better they do. There are also rather simple things: it takes a lot less time on the part of staff to read the stuff and not to be for ever filling in endless bits of paper. There are time and money efficiencies that can be put into front-line care. All I ask is that, in addition to what the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said, we go one stage forward. Let us be honest: some mental health patients can have quite chaotic lives and they might not be the most tech savvy, but they need the same opportunities as anybody else to get on to a system that we know works and which needs to become the default position for all practitioners, rather than, as it is at the moment, an aspiration.

I strongly support the amendments in this group, particularly that in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. I share the concern, as I think I mentioned at Second Reading, that as currently drafted this proposition could amount to an unenforceable, verging on vacuous, set of requirements, be it noticeboards or helplines. I very much hope that, between now and Report, Ministers will look to adopt the alternative proposition that the noble Earl, Lord Howe, has put forward. If, for whatever reason, that is not the case, I hope that collectively we might return to the question. I have two small further points. I think I am right in interpreting the Bill as saying that guidance will be issued as part of a Section 118 code of practice which will give clarity on the duties of ICBs and NHS England in relation to the ACD part of the new Bill. I hope that that will, among other things, specify in more detail the categories of people who must be offered an ACD in accordance with the new statutory right which we will, I hope, have created; by whom the offer may be made; the fact that it should be recorded digitally, for the reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, has set out; and a number of other elements. Expecting individual ICBs to figure it out is a recipe for a subtherapeutic dose, shall we say. My third and final point is that early evidence suggests that if the benefits described in the impact assessment come to fruition in the real world then there will be a positive impact, including on reduced compulsory admissions. Admittedly these are small and non-UK studies, as the material makes clear, but there is nevertheless a case for getting on with ACDs at scale, if the benefits that are hypothesised might actually be obtainable. It is therefore surprising to see in Annex C III of the impact assessment the suggestion that ACDs will not actually come online until 2029-30. It will take relatively marginal additional staff costs and time to do this, for a relatively small number of people. The suggestion is that it will be a surprisingly precise 55,071 people who might get a new ACD in 2029-30 and about 8,000 people who will get an updated one. These are not huge volumes, and we may be under-egging the pudding, but if the benefits are potentially there to be had, why on earth should we assume that we do not get going on this until 2029-30? For all those reasons, I support the amendments in this group, particularly that from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Lord, Lord Kamall.

My Amendment 121 seeks to add financial circumstances to the advance choice documents. I spoke in the last session of the Committee about the importance of the link between financial problems and mental health problems. I draw attention again to work that has been undertaken by the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute, which suggested this amendment, and declare that I am a member of its advisory committee. It is very welcome to see, in Clause 40, that health commissioners will have a duty to ensure that services inform people about advance choice documents. I listened to the speeches of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about extending the reach of these documents. I very much look forward to the reply from my noble friend the Minister, because they sounded pretty convincing to me. Ensuring that everyone has access to an advance choice document is something that the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute has called for previously. We believe that this clause must go further to advance a specific prompt about people’s financial situation. It may seem a small matter, but for people who have been detained under the Mental Health Act, who are possibly too unwell to keep themselves safe, finances are understandably often the last thing on their mind. As I mentioned in a previous session, this does not stop bills needing to be paid, debts mounting and collections activities being escalated. Including a section on money in the document would help people have greater choice and control over their finances when they are in crisis. A person recalling their experience of receiving treatment for their mental health shared this comment with the Money and Mental Health Policy Institute: “I was never asked if there was anyone who was opening mail and keeping on top of my day-to-day living stuff … It’s always the same. I go in for treatment and come out to find my financial world is in a bigger mess than when I went in. The resultant terror, shame and guilt undoes all the work of the treatment and I am back in crisis again”. This section should include explicit prompts which encourage people to reflect on and stipulate their preferences around finances. That can include consideration of how priority bills will be paid; preferences around access to credit; and advance planning to identify and empower a third party to manage their finances on their behalf, such as a lasting power of attorney or third-party mandate. By including a systematic consideration of finances in ACDs and offering explicit prompts, people can be supported to have greater control and choice. It would better enable healthcare professionals, as well as the individual concerned, to put in place preventive measures to safeguard individuals from the financial harm that can be caused by, and exacerbate, mental health crises. As mentioned previously, this is not about requiring healthcare professionals to support people with financial advice, or to deal with issues they have neither the expertise nor the capacity to deal with. It is about empowering them to identify people in need and refer them to the appropriate existing support.

My Lords, Amendment 122 is in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Patel. When I read through the Bill initially, it concerned me that there was no mention of lasting power of attorney, which, of course, is a legal document under the Mental Capacity Act. A registered lasting power of attorney for health and welfare will appoint attorneys chosen by the patient—the donor—at a time when they had capacity, to speak and act on their behalf if they lose capacity. This is particularly important for people who may periodically lose capacity due to mental disorder. The attorneys, of course, could also provide information about the patient, which is essential in distinguishing behaviours that may be associated with autism or learning disability but are not mental disorders. This does not, of course, apply to children, who cannot make lasting powers of attorney, but it would be remiss of me not to raise it with the Committee, because I have become rather concerned.

19:30:00

Much as I support advance choice documents, at what point does somebody make a comparison between an advance choice document and an existing registered lasting power of attorney? They could well cover very important specific issues, but there could be conflict, particularly if the documents were written at different times. What would the process be, when an advance choice document is made, to ensure that there is awareness in that document that a lasting power of attorney for health and welfare exists? I do not think it is an easy question, frankly—I can see all sorts of conflicts arising—but it is something we must deal with in the Bill. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

I will also briefly speak to my Amendment 123, which follows on from the point that my noble friend Lord Howe made on awareness of the advance choice document. Who is responsible for making sure that the patient fills it in and at what point? We have had some discussion already about notices on hospital walls. I have to say, I have seen notices on hospital walls that have been totally ignored by what is actually going on in the hospital, so I would not want to rely just on handheld leaflets or notices up on hospital walls.

There is a point in this process where integrated care boards and NHS England should be involved, which is when the risk registers are created. At that critical point when a named person is listed in a risk register, they should surely be made aware of the need to produce an advance choice document and be invited to do so. That then puts the onus of making sure that that communication is made on to the NHS, but that is the critical point at which it should be made. It seems the right place: if you put somebody’s name on a risk register you should surely say at that point, “And we should really make sure they’re aware that this is something that they should be doing”.

Both those amendments—one on the role of the lasting power of attorney and where it fits into the grand scheme of things, and the other on the critical point at which there is more than just a few leaflets and notices to ensure that the patient has the opportunity to produce an advance choice document—are ones that we should include in the Bill.

My Lords, I will very briefly underline my very strong support for Amendment 121 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I remind noble Lords of my relevant interests in the register. The noble Lord set it out very clearly so I do not need to add to what he said, other than to say there is a great opportunity for us to ensure that, for the first time in legislation, finances are considered a key part of supporting recovery from a mental health crisis. I am aware of far too many stories of people suffering from severe mental health crises or who are detained whose finances go into complete and utter freefall. It is so difficult for them then to recover their finances. That often means, in turn, that they have further mental health problems. That is all I wanted to say. I support the noble Lord, Lord Davies, very strongly.

In the absence of the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, I will just say that I support all these amendments. I expressed concern about under-16s and those aged 16-18, but that does not stop me thinking that these advance choice documents are an excellent plan. However, I am concerned about the point that the noble Baroness makes with Amendment 120. An independent mental health advocate would be extremely helpful, because there may be quite a lot of people who really would not know how to make an advance choice document, would be very concerned about it and might write down some really not very sensible things, when they could have help as to what they really wanted. I strongly support the noble Baroness’s amendment.

My Lords, I am grateful for all the contributions in this group. I will start with Amendment 115, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Kamall. Under the Bill, services should not only offer individuals who are likely to benefit from making an ACD information and support to do so, they should proactively support such individuals. This is functionally equivalent to a right to request an advance choice document. The amendment applies to large groups. We have concerns that, for example, it may be practically challenging or sometimes inappropriate to contact people who were detained some time ago. We intend to identify groups in the code of practice that services should target; it can then be updated in response to changing best practice and emerging research. On the point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, and the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, about how advance choice document information is made available to patients, we will set out in the code of practice detailed guidance on how services should discharge their duties under the Bill to inform and support individuals to make an ACD. Any failure to implement the duty in this aspect of the code could ultimately be challenged in the courts. I hope that gives some indication of the strength of that provision in the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, raised the implementation timeline, as outlined in the impact assessment. We want to ensure that there is appropriate resource in the system before ACDs can be brought in. I am sure noble Lords understand that this is critical, for ACDs to have the right level of impact. For example, the effect of ACDs is dependent on the expansion of the second opinion appointed doctor service. In the meantime, services can, of course, progress with putting ACDs that deal with patient needs and wishes overall should they become detained. That would very much build on the work that South London and Maudsley, and others, have done. I turn to Amendments 117 and 125 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. I confirm that we are committed to mitigating the barriers that get in the way of creating an advance choice document. The code will make it clear that commissioners should provide accessible information in response to individual needs, with flexibility around how individuals make their preferences known—the point that the noble Baroness raised. We plan to create a standard advance choice document template for people to complete, with supporting guidance. That should prompt thoughts about the things that an individual may wish to consider and decide before they become unwell. I can assure noble Lords that the template will be available digitally as well as in hard copy. Our intention is that a digital version of the document will be created for easy access by professionals as needed. Amendment 120, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has the stated intention that mental health in-patients create an ACD. While the Bill does not prevent this, in most cases it will not be the best time, as patients may be very unwell and lack capacity. Insights from the South London and Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust with King’s College London suggest that encouraging people to create an advance choice document after discharge—when their health has improved and the support network can help—can be useful. The person’s community mental health team is best placed to provide support, rather than an independent mental health advocate whose role is to support people who are detained. The duty on commissioners in the Bill is intended to focus on the community and other contexts outside of hospital. We feel that this is more likely to increase the uptake of advance choice documents.

The crucial question that the noble Baroness is asking is around which staff can access this information and where. That means that the information in the ACD has to be always available to whoever is seeing the patient, wherever they happen to be. Does that mean that, as in palliative care, the ACD will become part of an electronic patient record, and that there will be an expectation that all practitioners, wherever they are, will refer to it all the time?

The noble Baroness makes a good point. I am sure she is aware that one of the main pillars of change as we move towards the 10-year plan is shifting from analogue to digital. I am sure that this will be part of those considerations. I now turn to Amendment 121, tabled by my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton and supported by the noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Neuberger. The noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, spoke to this very amendment. We know that financial problems can worsen or trigger mental illness. We agree that individuals should be encouraged to include in their ACD any care and support to help them manage their financial circumstances when unwell. The code of practice will include guidance from professionals on this point, while the template will prompt people to consider financial matters. On Amendment 122, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Patel, it is important for practitioners to be aware of, and, where applicable, to consult with, the person’s attorney. However, we do not agree with requiring people to include all of the information contained in the lasting power of attorney in their ACD. The document is owned by the individual, who should be free to include what matters to them. Some of the information in a person’s lasting power of attorney may not be relevant, and copying over its contents may introduce inaccuracies due to human error. We intend to encourage service users to include the existence of an LPA where applicable in their advance choice documents, and practitioners can then be made aware and take the relevant steps. On Amendment 123, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, we agree with the aim that is stated here. The code of practice will set out all of the groups which services should proactively target to make an advance choice document, including people on the dynamic support register. The code can be updated in line with emerging research and best practice, as I have said a number of times before, and can include detail and nuance that is not possible in primary legislation. With those remarks from me in mind, I hope that noble Lords will feel able not to press their amendments.

I have one very quick question. Throughout the whole of Committee, since day one, the Minister has referred to the code of practice being updated. Can she tell us the date by which it will have been updated? It is quite important for implementation and some dates that the Minister keeps referring to. If she cannot let us know now, she could write to the Committee.

19:45:00

I would be very glad to share the date if I could put a date on it. It will be after Royal Assent, and I will keep noble Lords updated.

My Lords, I very much appreciate the support from around the Committee for my Amendment 115. I support all the other amendments in this group, each of which is designed to bolster the rigour and thoroughness of the advance choice document process. It is good to hear from the Minister that the code of practice will include guidance on how information on ACDs will be made known to relevant would-be patients. I shall need to reflect on this, but I confess I retain a worry in this area. The CQC in its annual report of 2020-21 on monitoring the Mental Health Act reported that many patients do not have their rights explained to them during their treatment. This is despite the existing requirement in the Mental Health Act code of practice for hospital managers to provide information both orally and in writing. Clearly, if someone without an existing ACD is admitted to a mental health unit for treatment, it will be too late for them to execute a valid ACD during that episode of care. The time to be informed that an ACD could be an appropriate thing for them to draw up is once they are discharged, to cater for possible future contingencies. I suggest that the CQCs finding is still relevant, its point being that the NHS is not all that good at providing information to patients in a timely or appropriate way. Therefore, I think that creating a duty to do so would add value—perhaps not in the precise terms I have used in the amendment, but in similar language. That could, incidentally, be achieved quite easily if mental health patients were automatically invited to complete a debriefing report following discharge from hospital in the way that I suggested in an earlier amendment. The prize, let us remember, could be significant. I refer noble Lords back to remarks by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, in an earlier debate, where she indicated that independent advocates have been proved as central to the success of advance choice documents—a facilitator, in other words. She referred to a study in North Carolina that showed that providing a facilitator in the form of an independent advocate increased the number of people making a psychiatric advance directive from 3% to 60%. That is a very powerful set of figures. I hope the Minister will be open to further discussion on this and the other amendments in the group between now and Report. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 115.

Amendment 115 withdrawn.

Amendments 116 to 126 not moved.

Clause 42 agreed.

Clause 43: Tribunal power to recommend after-care

Amendment 127

Moved by

127: Clause 43, page 55, line 35, after “provided” insert “or arranged” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 4, page 5, line 20.

Amendment 127 agreed.

Clause 43, as amended, agreed.

Clauses 44 and 45 agreed.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.50 pm.