Crime and Policing Bill (Twelfth sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Sir Roger Gale, Mark Pritchard, † Emma Lewell, Dr Rosena Allin-Khan

† Barros-Curtis, Mr Alex (Cardiff West) (Lab)

Bishop, Matt (Forest of Dean) (Lab)

† Burton-Sampson, David (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)

† Cross, Harriet (Gordon and Buchan) (Con)

† Davies-Jones, Alex (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice)

† Johnson, Dame Diana (Minister for Policing and Crime Prevention)

† Jones, Louise (North East Derbyshire) (Lab)

† Mather, Keir (Selby) (Lab)

Phillips, Jess (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department)

† Platt, Jo (Leigh and Atherton) (Lab/Co-op)

† Rankin, Jack (Windsor) (Con)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

† Sabine, Anna (Frome and East Somerset) (LD)

Sullivan, Dr Lauren (Gravesham) (Lab)

† Taylor, David (Hemel Hempstead) (Lab)

† Taylor, Luke (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)

† Vickers, Matt (Stockton West) (Con)

Robert Cope, Claire Cozens, Adam Evans, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

(Afternoon)

[Emma Lewell in the Chair]

Crime and Policing Bill

Clause 102

Confiscation

14:00:00

Question (this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following: Schedules 14 and 15. Clause 103 stand part.

When the Committee adjourned this morning, I had just started to set out that the Home Office had consulted extensively on the reform of confiscation orders in clause 102. Not only did we consult extensively on those new measures, which were recommended by the Law Commission, but we had the benefit of over 20 years of operational insight. The reforms will support the delivery of key objectives endorsed by the Government in the economic crime plan 2 to reduce money laundering and increase asset recovery returns, to ensure that criminals are deprived of their benefits from crime. The wide-ranging reforms are introduced across 12 parts in schedule 14 in relation to England and Wales. The provisions in schedule 15 largely replicate the reforms for Northern Ireland, with appropriate modifications. I do not propose to go through the whole of schedule 14 part by part because much of it contains necessarily very technical provisions, but I am happy to explain particular provisions if any hon. Member would find that helpful. Clause 103 introduces cost protections for enforcement authorities in the High Court, and the Court of Session in Scotland, in civil recovery proceedings under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The Government are concerned that the current rules that govern how costs are awarded in civil recovery cases expose enforcement authorities to the risk of excessive strains on their budgets, particularly in cases against wealthy individuals who use very expensive legal teams. Even if a law enforcement agency applies for a civil recovery order in good faith and in the public interest, losing a case exposes enforcement agencies to paying substantial legal and court fees. Enforcement authorities work to make decisions in the public interest, and it is detrimental to the protection of the public if authorities are deterred from pursuing an investigation for fear that, if any resulting legal action is unsuccessful, they would face adverse costs and expensive litigation. Clause 103 therefore amends the so-called “loser pays” principle to ensure that the court does not make an order for costs against an enforcement authority unless the authority has acted “unreasonably”, “dishonestly” or “improperly” during the course of proceedings or it would be “just and reasonable to make such an order” against them considering all the facts of the case. Cost protections will provide a positive step forward for the UK’s broader goal of recovering criminal assets and disrupting criminal activity, and I commend the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 102 reforms the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, aiming to clarify and strengthen the confiscation regime for proceeds of crime in England and Wales. Schedule 14 outlines several significant amendments with the primary goal of improving the effectiveness and fairness of confiscation proceedings. One key change introduced by schedule 14 is the insertion of section 5A into the 2002 Act. The new section provides an overarching principal objective, which has been lacking, for the confiscation powers under part 2. The principal aim as defined in section 5A(2) is “to deprive the defendant of the defendant’s benefit from criminal conduct, so far as within the defendant’s means.” That will help to ensure that confiscation powers are used proportionately and in line with the objectives of the law, addressing gaps in case law and providing a clear framework for the court. Paragraph 2 of schedule 14 now allows the prosecutor to decide whether to pursue a criminal lifestyle assessment rather than automatically applying it. That change allows for more flexibility in the application of these provisions, enabling prosecutors to allocate resources more efficiently and only pursue the criminal lifestyle route where appropriate. Paragraph 4 introduces a change to the test for determining whether an offence constitutes part of a defendant’s criminal lifestyle. Previously, the law required at least three offences to qualify, but this change reduces that threshold to two offences. That will also apply if the defendant has benefited or intended to benefit from the criminal conduct involved in the offence, making the test easier to meet and broadening the scope of the confiscation regime. A significant reform is found in paragraph 6, which amends section 7 of POCA to clarify how the value of the recoverable amount should be calculated. Currently, certain categories of property are ignored when calculating the value of a defendant’s benefit from crime, including property that has been forfeited or is subject to a recovery order. The proposed amendment extends that to further categories of property, such as property seized under any rule of law and property returned to victims. That ensures that the confiscation amount reflects only the actual benefit derived from crime and prevents double counting of assets that have already been returned or forfeited. In the light of the changes introduced in clause 102 and schedule 14 on criminal lifestyle provisions, can the Minister clarify how the new flexibility in prosecutorial discretion will ensure that limited resources are effectively allocated, while safeguarding the fairness of confiscation proceedings for defendants who may not meet the criteria for a criminal lifestyle? Clause 103(1) inserts new section 288A into part 5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. This provision aims to protect the enforcement authorities from being ordered to pay costs in civil recovery proceedings conducted in the High Court. The court is prohibited from making such orders unless the enforcement authority acted unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during the proceedings. Proposed new section 288A(1)(c) of the 2002 Act introduces a discretionary power for the court to determine if, in unforeseen circumstances, it would be just and reasonable for an enforcement authority to pay costs. This provision acknowledges that civil recovery orders, which result in the permanent deprivation of a person’s property, engage the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. It ensures that the enforcement process complies with the right to access to a court, as guaranteed by article 6 of the European convention on human rights. I would be grateful if the Minister would tell us what mechanisms would ensure that enforcement authorities could be held accountable if acting unreasonably, dishonestly or improperly during civil recovery proceedings.

I thank the shadow Minister; he went into some detail about how schedule 14 operates. I want to refer to the issue of criminal lifestyle offences in schedule 2 to POCA, which is about what the court utilises to determine whether a defendant has a criminal lifestyle. This is about the changes that we are adding. I refer in particular to the two environmental offences: “depositing…certain waste, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit” and “operating a regulated facility, or causing or knowingly permitting a water discharge activity or groundwater activity, otherwise than in accordance with an environmental permit.” The third offence that we are adding is the keeping of a brothel for prostitution. I want to make clear that those offences are being added. The shadow Minister asked how this would be kept under review and whether unreasonable measures will be introduced. The legislation will set that out, but it is my understanding that the court will still have a role to play in any measures that are deemed to be unreasonable and forming a view about that. This part of the schedule is very technical, so I am happy to put in writing to the shadow Minister any further information that I have not been able to provide, but I think the general view is that it is implementing the recommendations from the Law Commission. As I understand it, it is very similar to what the previous Government were going to support. On that basis, I commend the provisions to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 102 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedules 14 and 15 agreed to. Clause 103 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 104 Extension of polygraph condition to certain offenders Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair this afternoon, Ms Lewell. Clause 104 seeks to build on existing polygraph testing powers by making an express provision to enable the Secretary of State to impose mandatory polygraph testing as a licence condition for the most serious offenders who commit historic offences connected to terrorism, or who pose a risk of sexual offending. Polygraph tests are used to monitor compliance with licence conditions. The information obtained from a test is used by probation practitioners to refine and strengthen risk management plans, thereby providing probation practitioners with additional risk-related information that they otherwise would not have known. Without this clause, these serious offenders would remain excluded from polygraph testing while on licence. Polygraph tests have been successfully used by the Probation Service in the management of sexual offenders since January 2014. Initially, it was as a successful pilot and later, a national programme. More recently, it was extended to terrorist offenders by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. Subsection (3) of the clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It also extends to those who are serving multiple sentences alongside a sentence for a sex offence, to make sure that they can be polygraph tested for the duration of their licence.A gap in existing powers means that currently, for example, someone can be polygraph tested on licence when they have been convicted of rape, but if they have raped and murdered the victim, they are unlikely to be able to be polygraph tested because the sentence for rape is likely to have ended prior to their release on licence. Subsections (4) to (8) of the clause extend polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who committed a non-terrorism offence, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered terrorist connected, but their offence was committed before the relevant legislation came into force enabling the court to make a formal determination of a terrorist connection.We refer to this cohort as historic terrorism-connected offenders. Following the changes introduced, where it is determined by the Secretary of State that an offence was an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or was committed for the purposes of terrorism, individuals will become eligible to have the polygraph condition applied to their licence, subject to meeting the relevant policy criteria. The polygraph testing licence condition is a vital tool for probation practitioners who are managing individuals who have been convicted of terrorism offences, yet it cannot currently be applied to historic terrorism-connected offenders. That means that polygraph is not available as a tool to manage the risk posed by this cohort, whereas it is available for an individual who commits the same offence today. The clause will therefore fill the gap in legislation and contribute to the consistent and effective risk management of historic terrorism-connected offenders in the community, seeking to close those small but significant operational gaps. Taken as a whole, clause 104 will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who committed historic terrorism-related offences, and those who pose a risk of sexual offending.

Clause 104 broadens the use of polygraph testing for offenders by amending the Offender Management Act 2007. It allows polygraph testing for individuals convicted of murder upon release if they pose a risk of committing a sexual offence, and are 18 or over. It also applies to offenders who have served time for a relevant sexual offence, provided they are 18 or older at release. Additionally, the definition of “relevant offence” is expanded to include terrorism-related offences, including those committed for terrorist purposes. The provision functions as a preventive safeguard. Polygraph testing can act as a deterrent, encouraging compliance with licence conditions or reminding offenders that their conduct and disclosures will be monitored. That is especially significant where there are concerns about future harmful behaviour, even if the original offence did not relate to sexual offending. The clause provides tools to manage individuals involved in terrorism-related offences, helping authorities gather intelligence and make informed decisions on their supervision. It also promotes consistency and supervision, as polygraph conditions are already used for sexual and terrorist offenders, ensuring a balanced approach to risk management across high-risk groups. What safeguards ensure that the Secretary of State’s discretion in determining risk is transparent and fair? Given that polygraph evidence is not admissible in trials, why is it being increasingly used as a post-sentence supervision condition? Will there be an independent review of its effectiveness in reducing reoffending among the newly included categories?

14:15:00

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. He asked me about the basis of the Secretary of State’s decision; if a Secretary of State decides that, for the purpose of extending polygraph testing, an offence was an act of terrorism or was committed for the purpose of terrorism, but a court does not reach the same decision, the Secretary of State will review their decision in the light of the court’s findings. That is an important backstop. Guidance will be produced on the process of the Secretary of State designating terrorist connections and for the court for the different management changes in the Bill. Polygraph testing is one of many tools available to the Probation Service when managing offenders in the community and when they are out on licence. It is not the only tool available in its arsenal to ensure the public are kept safe. Question put and agreed to. Clause 104 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 105 Duty of offender to notify details Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

This clause will create a new duty on offenders serving a sentence in the community and supervised by probation or a youth offending team, requiring them to inform the responsible officer if they change their name, use a different name or change their contact information. I thank my very good friend, my hon. Friend the Member for Newport West and Islwyn (Ruth Jones), for her work in the previous Parliament on this issue, and I am delighted to be bringing forward this proposal. The clause will improve the ability of probation and youth offending teams to monitor offenders in the community and will ensure that the public are protected. A significant number of offenders serve sentences in the community, and responsible officers must have the information that they need to keep tabs on those individuals, including if they change their name and contact information. The provisions in this clause are robust. Contact details can change for any reason, but the offender must report any difference from what is kept on file. The clause captures not just formal legal changes of name by deed poll but, for example, the use of an online alias. We have a separate youth justice system, but it is equally important that services are able to maintain contact with children and have the right information about them to do their jobs. This policy therefore applies equally to offenders of all ages and will create consistency across offenders on licence and those serving sentences in the community, overseen by probation services or youth offending teams. Probation and youth offending teams will have discretion about whether an offender is returned to court if they fail to comply with this requirement. It is right that the enforcement provisions for this clause are robust and reflect the seriousness of non-compliance. It is right that probation officers and youth offending teams have the same powers to deal with non-compliance with this duty as they have for any other case of non-compliance with a sentence requirement. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 105 requires certain offenders, including those under referral orders, youth rehabilitation orders, community orders and suspended sentence orders, to provide up-to-date contact information to relevant authorities. Offenders must notify their responsible officer or panel member of any changes in names, phone numbers or email addresses as soon as reasonably practicable after the relevant order is made or after they begin using new contact details. For youth offenders under referral orders, the clause adds a new section to the sentencing code, mandating them to inform a youth offending team member of any aliases and their current contact details as soon as reasonably practicable. Similar requirements apply to offenders under future and existing orders. The overarching aim of the clause is to close a monitoring gap by ensuring that responsible authorities are kept fully informed of how to reach the offender. That is particularly important for managing compliance with rehabilitative requirements and preventing individuals from circumventing supervision through undisclosed identities or means of communication. Will the Minister clarify what threshold is intended by the term “reasonably practicable” in this context? Given that it is open to interpretation, will statutory guidance be issued to ensure consistent application by youth offender panels and responsible officers?

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. We will of course ensure that guidance is available for this new measure. We will provide the responsible officers with all the tools they need to protect public safety, and ensure that they have all the relevant information available to manage offenders on licence in the community. Question put and agreed to. Clause 105 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 106 Accelerated investigation procedure in respect of criminal conduct Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Clauses 107 to 109 stand part. New clause 23—Previous conduct as factor in deciding whether to investigate a complaint— “(1) The Police Reform Act 2002 is amended as follows. (2) In Schedule 3, paragraph 1(6B)(d), at end insert ‘or (e) the complaint is made about a person serving with the police who has previous convictions or has had previous complaints made against them.’” This new clause would make previous complaints or convictions a factor in determining how to handle a new complaint against a police officer. New clause 31—Automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting— “(1) The Police Act 1996 is amended in accordance with subsection (2). (2) In section 39A (Codes of practice for chief officers), after subsection (1) insert— ‘(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) and subject to subsection (1B), a code of practice may provide for an officer to be dismissed without notice where— (a) the officer fails vetting, and (b) it is not reasonable to expect that the officer will be capable of being deployed to full duties within a reasonable timeframe. (1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply where a chief officer concludes that— (a) the officer, notwithstanding his vetting failure, is capable of being deployed to a substantial majority of duties appropriate for an officer of his rank; and (b) it would be disproportionate to the operational effectiveness of the force for the officer to be dismissed without notice.’” This new clause would ensure police officers who failed their vetting can be dismissed.

Part 13 of the Bill pertains to matters relating to the police. Before I talk in detail about clauses 106 to 108, it may assist the Committee if I first provide some context for these provisions. Following the shooting of Chris Kaba, and the subsequent trial and acquittal of Sergeant Martyn Blake in October 2024, the Home Secretary made a series of commitments in response to the issues raised under the previous Government’s accountability review. The measures announced by the Home Secretary will rebuild confidence in police accountability systems for both the public and the police. As the Home Secretary said when making her announcement, the case happened against a backdrop of wider and long-standing concerns about accountability, standards and confidence in policing. The British model of policing relies on mutual bonds of trust between the public and the police. For our model of policing to work, it is essential that the police have the confidence of the communities they serve, and that officers have the confidence they need to do the vital and often extremely difficult job of keeping us all safe. Too often in recent times, both elements of that confidence have become frayed. Clauses 106 to 108 give effect to certain findings of the accountability review. Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the system by allowing the Independent Office for Police Conduct to make referrals to the Crown Prosecution Service prior to completing its final report. Clause 107 will amend the threshold for the IOPC to make referrals to the CPS, and clause 108 places the IOPC’s victims’ right to review scheme on a statutory footing, further improving the robustness of the IOPC’s investigative process. Clause 106 will improve timeliness in the misconduct system. At present, a number of factors cause delay in the misconduct system, one of which relates to the fact that in order for the IOPC to make a referral to the CPS, it is legally required to complete its final report, concluding its investigation, which causes delays in making referrals. The final report has to include misconduct findings and lessons learned for the IOPC. Such elements are not required for referrals to be made to the CPS, so the change that we are making will enable the IOPC to make a referral prior to completing its final report, allowing for an improvement in pace in the accountability system. Currently, the law states that the IOPC may refer a police officer to the CPS where there is an indication that a criminal offence may have been committed. This is a relatively low bar for making referrals to the CPS. Clause 107 changes this to bring the system in line with the threshold that the police apply when making referrals of members of the public to the CPS, which requires there to be a realistic prospect of conviction. It is right and fair that, as a result of this change, officers and members of the public will be referred to the CPS at the same threshold. The CPS will continue to make charging decisions at the same threshold, which is the full code test. This change will improve overall fairness in the system. Finally, the IOPC’s victims’ right to review currently allows for victims and their families to challenge the IOPC when it decides not to refer matters to the CPS. This right is currently available to victims and their families through guidance. Clause 108 places this right on the statute book to protect victims and demonstrate our clear commitment to victims’ rights. Taken together, these clauses are a balanced package of measures that will help to speed up IOPC investigations while strengthening the rights of those who may be aggrieved by the outcome of an investigation. Clause 109 amends the powers of the Secretary of State to make provisions on appeals to the police appeals tribunals. It will enable chief constables to appeal the findings or outcome of police misconduct proceedings, with a similar right for police and crime commissioners to appeal where the officer subject to proceedings is a chief constable. It will also enable a right of appeal to be conferred on the director general of the IOPC where the IOPC has presented the case at the misconduct proceedings. This Government are committed to restoring public trust and confidence in policing, which is something fundamental to our model of policing by consent. While the majority of our police officers act with bravery and integrity, where things go wrong the public rightly expect that there is a system to robustly hold the police to account. In the context of recent high-profile cases that have damaged that vital trust and confidence, chief constables must be empowered to drive up standards. While chief constables are themselves rightly held to account for standards in their forces, they are not afforded the same ability to challenge disciplinary decisions as the officers in their force. The only route for chief constables to challenge decisions that they consider to be unreasonable is through judicial review. That is a lengthier and more complex process than the existing specialist police appeals tribunals. Clause 109 will allow the Secretary of State to make amendments to existing rules. First, it will provide for a right of appeal for chief constables to challenge the findings or outcomes of misconduct proceedings in relation to officers within their force, and an equivalent right of appeal for police and crime commissioners where the officer concerned is a chief constable. This is designed to ensure parity within the system, supporting the wider responsibilities of police and crime commissioners in respect of chief constables. Furthermore, the clause will provide an equivalent right of appeal for the director general of the IOPC, limited to circumstances in which the IOPC has presented at the misconduct proceedings. This again supports public trust and confidence by ensuring vital independence in the system in the most serious and sensitive cases. Amendments to secondary legislation will be developed in consultation with the sector, including the Police Advisory Board for England and Wales. I will speak to new clauses 23 and 31, which are also in this group, once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

On 5 September 2022, an armed police officer shot and killed Chris Kaba during a vehicle stop in south London. The police referred the case to the IOPC, as required when someone dies or is seriously injured in police custody or contact. The IOPC investigated and referred the case to the Crown Prosecution Service, which authorised a murder charge in September 2023. Concerns over accountability systems led the Home Office to launch a review in September 2023. In March 2024, the officer was identified and the Home Secretary announced three immediate changes to improve accountability: raising the threshold for CPS referrals; relaxing restrictions on criminal proceedings; and formalising victims’ rights under the IOPC’s victims’ right to review policy. Clauses 106 to 108 implement these proposals, which had previously been tabled as amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. Clause 106 introduces significant procedural reform to allow certain criminal investigations into police misconduct to be expedited. It is clear that the clause will help to significantly speed up accountability, especially in cases involving clear and serious misconduct by police officers. By allowing criminal proceedings to be brought sooner, it reduces the delay in holding individuals accountable for their actions, ensuring that justice is not unduly postponed. In situations where there is clear evidence of misconduct, that allows for quicker action. A quicker response can help to reassure the public that, where there are serious allegations, the authority is acting swiftly and decisively. It demonstrates that law enforcement and oversight bodies are committed to transparency and integrity. What safeguards are in place to prevent inappropriate or premature referrals to the Director of Public Prosecutions under this accelerated procedure? How will the IOPC or other appropriate authority be held accountable for determinations made? Currently, chief officers have no right of appeal against panel decisions and may only challenge outcomes via judicial review. In October 2022, the Government launched a review of the dismissal process, with findings published in September 2023. Recommendations included a presumption of dismissal for gross misconduct; automatic gross misconduct designation for certain convictions; streamlined performance and vetting-based dismissal processes; and a new appeal right for chief officers. Met commissioner Sir Mark Rowley welcomed the reforms, citing the need for greater control to uphold standards. However, the Police Federation criticised the changes, warning they could undermine fair hearings and lead to excessive influence by chief officers, risking biased outcomes.

14:30:00

Under the proposals set out in clause 109, chief constables will be granted the right to appeal both the findings of misconduct hearings, such as whether misconduct or gross misconduct is proven, and the sanctions imposed, for example a written warning. Given the Police Federation has raised concerns about the potential for biased outcomes due to chief officers having a right to appeal, what safeguards are in place to maintain the independence and objectivity of misconduct hearings, especially in cases where the chief officer is personally involved?

Opposition new clause 23 seeks to amend the Police Reform Act 2002 so that a police officer’s previous conduct must be considered when deciding whether to investigate a new complaint against them. It allows for some discretion in handling complaints that may be trivial, repetitive or otherwise not requiring formal investigation. The new clause would prevent officers with a concerning history of conduct from escaping scrutiny simply because each complaint is viewed in isolation. It would introduce a cumulative view of conduct, which can help to identify patterns of behaviour that might otherwise go unnoticed.

This is especially relevant in the light of high-profile cases where officers remained in service despite multiple complaints. The new clause is a preventive mechanism, ensuring that repeat allegations are not dismissed as isolated incidents. The new clause seeks to close a potential loophole in the police complaints process by requiring that past misconduct be considered when assessing new allegations. It reflects a growing demand for greater transparency, accountability and rigour in dealing with officer behaviour, especially where there is a history of concern.

New clause 31 seeks to strengthen the legal framework around police vetting by introducing a mechanism for the automatic dismissal of officers who fail vetting, unless exceptional circumstances apply. The new clause proposes that where an officer fails vetting and it is not reasonable to expect that they will be deployable to full duties within a reasonable timeframe, they may be dismissed. This aims to ensure that individuals who no longer meet the basic standards of integrity and trustworthiness required for policing cannot remain in the force indefinitely in limited or administrative roles.

Importantly, the new clause includes a safeguard to prevent unfair or disproportionate outcomes. If a chief officer believes that, despite the vetting failure, the officer is still capable of performing a substantial majority of duties appropriate for their rank, and that dismissal would undermine the operational effectiveness of the force, they can decide not to proceed with a dismissal. This ensures that the decision remains proportionate, and sensitive to operational realities. The new clause builds on recommendations made in the Government’s 2023 review of police officer dismissals, which advocated for a clarified and consistent route for removing officers who fail vetting. By embedding this power in legislation, the new clause would give chief officers clearer authority to act in the interest of police professionalism and public trust.

I welcome what the shadow Minister has said. There have been no changes to the clauses that were introduced in the Criminal Justice Bill and that are now in the Crime and Policing Bill, so I think we are on the same page in terms of these being the appropriate measures to take forward. I am grateful that he set out in detail the case for introducing the new clauses, which seek to ensure that the provisions work in policing and are fit for purpose, and that everyone who is in policing is fit to be a police officer. I reassure the Committee that the Government take police integrity very seriously. It is essential, as I said in my earlier remarks, that we have public confidence in policing and that the highest standards are upheld and maintained. I think we all agree that individuals who fall below the standards the public expect should not be police officers. New clause 23 seeks to ensure that previous complaints or convictions are considered a factor in determining when a complaint against an officer should be handled formally under schedule 3 to the Police Reform Act 2002. I recognise the shadow Minister’s desire to strengthen the legislation to that effect but, in reality, these elements are already established practice. Under existing statutory guidance issued by the IOPC, previous complaints against an officer should be taken into account when considering whether to handle a complaint under schedule 3. All those working in policing must have regard to that statutory guidance. Compelling forces to record complaints under schedule 3, where a historical complaint exists on an officer’s record, would limit their ability to handle those complaints in the most proportionate manner and in the interests of the complainant. Similarly, information on historical convictions is available to forces on the police national computer and is relevant in determining the most appropriate way to handle a complaint. The Government have committed to ensuring that vetting rules are strengthened with regard to historical convictions. We intend to put mandatory vetting standards into law this year, so that those who have committed certain offences cannot hold vetting clearance and serve as police officers. New clause 31 would amend the Police Act 1996 to ensure that a code of practice may provide that a police officer who fails their vetting will be dismissed without notice. It may help the Committee to understand that the Government have acted rapidly to develop new regulations in this area, which will enable forces to dismiss officers who cannot maintain vetting clearance. The regulations have taken into account the relevant legal proceedings, such as the Di Maria judicial review, which considered the adequacy of the Metropolitan Police Service’s processes to remove those officers without vetting clearance. The Police (Vetting) Regulations 2025, which were laid just last week on 23 April, introduced a duty on police officers to hold and maintain vetting clearance, and provide a bespoke regulatory mechanism by which they can be dismissed should they fail to do so. The Government also strongly believe that there should be no circumstances in which an officer who is unable to hold vetting clearance should remain in policing, so I cannot support the qualification in new clause 31, which suggests that an officer may be capable of deployment to other duties despite failing to maintain their vetting clearance. I hope that, having had the opportunity to consider the existing framework for complaints, the new regulations that I just referred to and the ongoing work to strengthen the vetting rules, the shadow Minister will be content not to move his new clauses later in our proceedings. I want to mention how the IOPC will keep an eye on the changes that are being introduced. It is clear that there will be scrutiny of what happens following the changes. If there are emerging patterns of cases where, for instance, the CPS declines to charge an officer, despite the IOPC referral, I would expect the IOPC to consider whether there are lessons to be learned and a further review to be undertaken. Question put and agreed to. Clause 106 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 107 to 109 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 110 Power to make youth diversion orders

I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 110, page 128, line 31, leave out “an” and insert “a relevant”. See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments 54 and 55. Clause stand part. Clause 111 stand part. Government new clause 61—Notification requirements.

Part 14 of the Bill is about counter-terrorism and national security. Protecting the public is the first duty of any Government, which is why national security is a key pillar of the Government’s plan for change. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world, but we cannot stand by while threats evolve. As the Home Secretary has set out in her statements to the House, the Security Service, Counter Terrorism Policing and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation have all consistently raised concerns related to the increasing number of young people being investigated for terrorism offences. While there must always be the potential to pursue prosecutions in the most serious cases, it is important to ensure that there are alternative risk management measures that do not automatically result in a young person receiving a terrorism conviction, which can have a hugely destructive impact on their life prospects. We have listened to operational partners about the need for alternative and earlier interventions, and we are taking the opportunity to build on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC. Chapter 1 of part 14 therefore introduces new youth diversion orders or YDOs. YDOs will be a new civil order designed to better manage terrorist risk from young people, while reducing the need for their further involvement in the criminal justice system. They demonstrate this Government’s commitment to ensuring that operational partners have the tools they need to reduce terrorism risk and support rehabilitation. Clause 110 introduces a new power for the police to apply to a youth or magistrates court for a YDO. To impose a YDO, the court will need to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has either committed a terrorism offence, committed a non-terrorism offence with a terrorism connection, or engaged in conduct likely to facilitate the commission of a terrorism offence. The court will also need to consider that it is necessary and proportionate to make the order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism or serious harm, as defined in clause 111. This ensures that the new orders will be imposed only where there is a serious risk to the public. The technical Government amendments 53 to 55 adjust the definition of “offence with a terrorist connection” to avoid the need to refer to legislation relating to sentencing. Sentencing will not take place in YDO applications, but the judge considering a YDO application will be able to consider whether the individual has committed an offence with a terrorist connection, in the same way as a judge would consider this on sentencing. Finally, new clause 61 requires individuals to provide their personal details to the police where a YDO includes notification requirements. The relevant details are the respondent’s name, including any aliases, and their home address. This requirement will not be automatic or mandatory for every YDO, but will need to be agreed by the court on a case-by-case basis. The notification requirement will also include a requirement to provide information about the individual’s school or other educational establishment if relevant. This information would be helpful, for example, in a scenario where someone moved school and there was no other trigger for the local authority to inform the police of the move. The new clause is supported by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and operational partners have confirmed that it is necessary to support the effective day-to-day management of YDOs. I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee.

The new youth diversion orders are designed as a counterterrorism risk management tool for individuals under the age of 21. The purpose of the YDOs is to divert young people from engaging in terrorist activities, and to allow police to intervene at an earlier stage. Clause 110 grants the police the authority to apply to the courts for a YDO. Clause 110 clarifies that a YDO can be applied for by a chief officer of police when the respondent meets certain criteria based on their age and involvement in terrorist-related offences. In England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the respondent must be between the ages of 10 and 21, and in Scotland, between 12 and 21. The aim of the order is diversion, rather than punishment. The YDO is intended to help prevent further involvement in terrorism or related activities. The order may give rehabilitation, counselling or other interventions designed to steer the individual away from terrorism-related conduct. Clause 111 defines serious harm in the context of YDOs. New clause 61 introduces notification requirements for a youth diversion order, where the respondent must notify the police within three days of being served with the order. The notification includes personal details such as the respondent’s name, any additional names, home address, and the name and address of any educational establishment the respondent normally attends. It is intended to help ensure the youth’s compliance with the order, as well as assist in tracking their progress or risk of non-compliance. This approach strengthens the monitoring aspect of YDOs by tying in an educational component. It ensures that authorities have up-to-date information regarding the young person’s school involvement, which can be a crucial element in their rehabilitation. How will the Government ensure that the notification requirements, particularly educational details, do not inadvertently stigmatise the young person, or disrupt their education experience, especially in cases where the individual might already be vulnerable or at risk of exclusion from school?

14:45:00

I am grateful for the shadow Minister’s comments. On his point about information on schools and stigmatising children, am I right in thinking he believes that information will be made available to the public? I was not clear.

In educational settings, if people are given the details and the contact, might that be reflected?

I do not wish to try your patience, Mrs Lewell, but my understanding is that this would not be public information that was shared. It would remain within the youth court or the magistrates court. I am looking to my officials, and they are nodding at me, so this is not information that would be in the public domain. I hope that that deals with the point around any stigmatisation of a young person who was subject to a YDO. Amendment 53 agreed to. Amendments made: 54, in clause 110, page 129, leave out lines 8 and 9 and insert— “‘relevant offence’ means an offence which— (a) was committed on or after 29 June 2021, (b) is punishable on indictment with imprisonment for more than 2 years, and (c) is not specified in— (i) Schedule 1A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, or (ii) Schedule A1 to the Sentencing Code;”. This amendment, Amendment 53 and Amendment 55 replace the concept of an “offence with a terrorist connection” with the concept of a “relevant offence with a terrorist connection” so as to enable the court dealing with an application for a youth diversion order to makes its own determination as to whether an offence has a terrorist connection. Amendment 55, in clause 110, page 129, line 14, at end insert— “(3A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a)(ii), a relevant offence has a terrorist connection if the offence— (a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or (b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism.” —(Dame Diana Johnson.) See the explanatory statement for Amendment 54. Clause 110, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 111 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 112 Content of youth diversion orders

I beg to move amendment 56, in clause 112, page 130, line 11, leave out “subsection (2) or (3)” and insert “subsections (2) to (3A)”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 59.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments 57 to 59. Amendment 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert— “(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months. (7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat. (8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism. (9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent. (10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months. (11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.” This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist. Government amendment 60. Clause stand part. Government new clause 62—Electronic monitoring of compliance with order: England and Wales. Government new clause 63—Conditions for imposing electronic monitoring requirement: England and Wales. Government amendment 79.

Clause 112 sets out a non-exhaustive list of prohibitions or requirements that may be included in a YDO and the safeguards that the police and courts must consider. The police must have the ability to mitigate risk to the public from young people being drawn into terrorism—a growing problem, as we all appreciate. The YDO will enable the police to impose necessary restrictions on an individual, subject to a court order. These may include limits on accessing certain websites or apps, or restrictions on engaging with specific individuals or groups. For example, this could include engagement with other children who have been assessed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. A YDO may also include positive requirements that the respondent must comply with. These may be rehabilitative in nature, including, for example, mandatory attendance at intervention sessions that seek to support the respondent in moving away from extremist ideologies. Although it is critical that the police are able to impose necessary risk management and rehabilitative measures, the legislation ensures that there are safeguards to limit the extent of such measures. First, each measure must be necessary and proportionate for the purpose of mitigating a risk of terrorism or serious harm. Secondly, any measure included as part of a YDO must not unnecessarily interfere with a respondent’s educational or work commitments, or their religious beliefs. Thirdly, any measure may not exceed a total duration of two years. The aim is to ensure that YDOs have enough time to make a positive impact on a young person’s life while remaining proportionate to the scale of risk they pose to the public by being drawn into terrorism. The Government amendments to clause 112 provide further examples of the measures that may be imposed through a YDO. This increases transparency and provides a clear statutory basis for the most intrusive measures that will be available. The expanded list of prohibitions and requirements represents the measures that we expect the police will most commonly apply to the court to include in a YDO. Amendment 57 allows for potential restrictions on entering a specific area, including travel restrictions inside or outside the UK. Amendment 58 outlines potential requirements for the respondent to answer questions, provide information, or produce documents. Amendment 59 provides that, if included in a YDO, the individual may be required to comply with notification requirements, as detailed in new clause 61, and may be subject to restrictions on the possession of weapons and explosives. Amendments 56 and 60 are consequential on these other amendments. New clauses 62 and 63 and Government amendment 79 enable a YDO to include an electronic monitoring requirement. This will enable the effective monitoring of and compliance with measures such as curfew requirements and exclusion measures. Operational partners have been explicit that having this capability will maximise the utility and effectiveness of YDOs. Finally, amendment 40, tabled by the shadow Minister, seeks to give the police the ability to apply for a YDO in cases where a young person exhibits extremist views; it would also prevent an order from expiring unless there is an independent expert assessment that concludes the individual no longer poses a terrorist risk or holds extremist views. YDOs are designed for terrorism-related cases only. A YDO is a tool to be used only when young people pose a public safety risk. There are no plans to use YDOs for cases that do not meet terrorism thresholds, as this would interfere with the rights of young people. This Government take extremism very seriously, and we are committed to ensuring that we have the tools and powers needed to address this issue. Efforts to counter extremism span a broad range of Government and law enforcement activity, and we must persist in our efforts to challenge extremist narratives, to disrupt the activity of radicalising groups, and to directly tackle the causes of radicalisation. The Home Office leads work on countering extremism, and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government will lead work with local councils on strengthening community cohesion. It is vital that the two programmes on cohesion and extremism work in parallel. Clause 116(4), which we will debate in a later group, permits the police to apply for the extension of a YDO. There may be two extension applications, and each will be for a maximum of six months, so the maximum duration of an order is two years in total. I assure the hon. Member for Stockton West that counter-terrorism police will regularly assess the risk posed by the individual while the order is in force. Although decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis, the police may decide to apply to the court to extend an order. Where the police assess that the risk posed by the respondent remains despite the order having been in place, they may consider, in consultation with the relevant prosecutorial authority, whether the relevant test for prosecution for terrorist offending is met. Should the risk posed by the individual persist for longer than 24 months, other tools may be considered. I hope the shadow Minister will agree not to press amendment 40 given the clear operational need for the Government’s amendments, which I commend to the Committee.

Amendment 40 primarily focuses on the duration, assessment and possible extension of YDOs, and it would ensure that the orders are subject to review and that further intervention is applied when necessary. Under the amendment, YDOs must specify a period of up to 12 months in which the young person is monitored and guided through the diversion programme. This would ensure there is a clear time limit with a defined end point for the intervention. Additionally, before the order concludes, an assessment must be carried out to evaluate whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or poses a terrorism threat. This would add an important safeguard to the process, ensuring that young people who may still be a risk are identified before the order ends. A critical element of the amendment is the requirement that qualified experts carry out the assessment. The evaluation of whether the individual continues to hold extremist views or to present a terrorism risk must be conducted by an expert in extremism and counter-terrorism. This would ensure the assessment is informed by a high level of expertise and understanding of the complexities of radicalisation. Assessments made by the youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert who has no pre-existing relationship with the respondent. This independent review would guarantee objectivity and minimise any potential bias in the evaluation process. If the individual was assessed to be still holding extremist views or continuing to pose a terrorism risk, the youth offending team or a chief officer of the police would have the power to apply to the court for an extension of the youth diversion order. This extension could be granted for an additional 12 months, allowing continued intervention and monitoring of the individual. Importantly, the extension would ensure that the order remained in place for as long as the individual was considered to pose a risk to public safety. Finally, the amendment specifies that all provisions, prohibitions and requirements set by the YDO will remain in effect until the individual has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing no terrorism threat. This would ensure that the protective measures stipulated in the order were maintained throughout the duration of the individual’s involvement in the diversion programme, offering ongoing protection to the public while allowing continued monitoring of the individual’s risk level. The amendment would ensure that the diversion process is both effective and responsive to the changing nature of extremist behaviour, and that any decision to conclude or extend the order is based on robust and independent expert evaluations, thus improving the overall effectiveness of the youth intervention measures in countering extremism and terrorism. Clause 112 outlines the content and conditions of a youth diversion order, providing the framework for how the order can be structured and what it can include. How will the Government ensure that YDOs do not interfere with religious or cultural practices of respondents, as the clause provides, especially when it comes to limitations on association or communication?

My sincere apologies to the Committee: before I called the shadow Minister, I should have proposed Government amendment 56. I call the Minister.

To answer the question that the shadow Minister just posed, I said in my earlier remarks that there would not be restrictions that interfered with educational and work commitments, or with religious observances. I think that deals with his question. On that basis, commend the Government amendment to the Committee. Amendment 56 agreed to. Amendments made: 57, in clause 112, page 130, line 18, at end insert— “(d) the respondent’s presence in, or access to, a specified area or place or an area or place of a specified description; (e) the respondent's travel (whether within the United Kingdom, between the United Kingdom and other places or otherwise).” This amendment provides that the prohibitions or requirements a youth diversion order may contain include ones relating to the respondent’s presence in or access to particular areas or places, or to the respondent’s travel. Amendment 58, in clause 112, page 130, line 22, leave out “provide information” and insert “answer questions, provide information or produce documents”. This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to answer questions, provide information or produce documents. Amendment 59, in clause 112, page 130, line 23, at end insert— “(d) require the respondent to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements). (3A) An order may contain any prohibition that is of a kind that could be imposed by the Secretary of State in relation to an individual by virtue of paragraph 6A of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (weapons and explosives measures).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.) This amendment provides that a youth diversion order may require the respondent to comply with notification requirements under NC61 and may contain prohibitions relating to weapons and explosives. Amendment proposed: 40, in clause 112, page 130, line 33, leave out subsection (6) and insert— “(6) A youth diversion order must specify the period for which it has effect, up to a maximum of 12 months. (7) An assessment must be taken of the respondent before the conclusion of a youth diversion order to determine if they continue to hold extremist views or pose a terror threat. (8) An assessment must be made by a qualified expert in extremism and counterterrorism. (9) Assessments taken by the respondent’s youth offending team must be reviewed by an external expert with no pre-existing relationship to the respondent. (10) If the respondent is assessed as holding extremist views or as a terror threat the youth offending team or a chief officer of police must apply to an appropriate court for the youth offending order to be extended up to a maximum of 12 months. (11) All provisions, prohibitions and requirements of a youth diversion order remain in effect until the respondent has been assessed as holding no extremist views or posing a terror threat.”—(Matt Vickers.) This amendment would give the police the ability to apply for youth diversion orders in cases of youth extremism and terror risks. The diversion orders would conclude automatically after a maximum of twelve months without an assessment as to whether the individual remained a terror risk or extremist. Question put, That the amendment be made.

19|0|3|7|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

15:00:00

Amendment made: 60, in clause 112, page 130, line 38, at end insert—

“‘document’ means anything in which information of any description is recorded (whether or not in legible form);

‘specified’ means specified in the youth diversion order.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

Clause 113

Duty to consult

I beg to move amendment 61, in clause 113, page 131, line 4, leave out from “order” to “consult” in line 5 and insert “, a chief officer of police must, if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made,”. This is a drafting change that ensures consistency between the drafting of subsection (1) of clause 113 and subsection (2) of that clause as amended by Amendment 62.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments 62, 64 and 63. Clause stand part. Government amendments 65 and 66. Clause 114 stand part. Government amendment 67. Clause 115 stand part.

Clauses 113 to 115 set out duties on the police to consult with relevant authorities, provide for applications to be made without notice in urgent circumstances, and provide for interim YDOs to be made. The Committee will recognise the importance of ensuring that the police take wider factors into consideration—for example, a person’s age, mental health, safeguarding and educational needs—before applying for a YDO. Clause 113 therefore introduces a duty to consult before applying for an order or applying for variation or discharge of an order. In England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, the police will be required to consult with youth offending teams and the Youth Justice Agency respectively for applications involving individuals under the age of 18. In Scotland, the police will be required to consult with the Lord Advocate for all applications. This is necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where consultation with the Lord Advocate is appropriate for all YDOs, including for 18 to 21-year-olds, and for without-notice YDO applications. That reflects the Lord Advocate’s specific functions in relation to their role as the head of the system for the investigation and prosecution of crime, which includes a specific working relationship with Police Scotland. Government amendments 62 and 65 make the additional requirement in respect of Scotland that the police consult with the local authority before making an application for a YDO, irrespective of the age of the respondent, and remove the requirement for consultation with the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration for YDOs for under-18s. Again, the amendments are necessary to give effect to the different position in Scotland, where there is no equivalent to youth offending teams. Government amendments 63, 64 and 66 are consequential on those amendments, while Government amendment 61 ensures consistency of drafting between the subsections of clauses 113, as amended. Consultation will be an important part of the YDO application process, ensuring that the police have thoroughly considered the necessity and proportionality of a YDO and taken into account the expertise of those who work closely with young people in the community. This statutory duty does not prevent the police from engaging with other authorities, such as the CPS or the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland, wider social services, or the respondent’s school or college, where appropriate. While it is likely to be rare in practice, there may be circumstances in which an urgent YDO application is required and providing notice to the respondent may increase risk. Therefore, clause 114 provides a route for police to apply for a YDO without notice to the respondent. The requirement to consult does not apply in such cases, although the police will still be required to consult relevant authorities before the full court hearing for a YDO. Where an application is made without notice, the court will be able to consider whether to impose an interim order, in line with the approach taken with other preventive orders, such as knife crime prevention orders. Due to the temporary nature of an interim order, clause 115 ensures that the only positive requirements that can be included in such an order are to provide information and to comply with notification requirements. For example, the Bill does not allow the police to impose a requirement to attend intervention sessions similar to Prevent in an interim order, but they will be able to impose risk-management measures where necessary and proportionate, subject to the court’s permission. Amendment 67 clarifies the measures that can and cannot be imposed in an interim YDO. I commend the amendments and the clauses to the Committee.

Clause 113 outlines the duty to consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or the variation or discharge of such an order, particularly when the individual involved is under 18. It ensures that key stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, so that the young person’s best interests are taken into account, and it ensures that the relevant agencies are informed and consulted before any formal application is made. How do the Government plan to ensure that the agencies that are consulted—in particular the youth offending teams—have the necessary expertise and resources to adequately assess the case before the application for a YDO is made? Clause 114 outlines the process for making an application for a youth diversion order without notice to the respondent. This provision is significant because it allows for situations in which immediate intervention is necessary and the respondent is not notified before the application is made. How will the Government ensure that respondents’ rights are protected in cases where an application is made without notice? What measures are in place to prevent misuse of this provision? Clause 115 makes provision for an interim youth diversion order to be made during the adjournment of a hearing for a full YDO. It ensures that even while a decision on the full application is pending, the court can take immediate temporary action to manage the respondent’s risk, particularly in cases involving potential extremism or terrorism. The clause allows the courts to impose interim measures to temporarily manage a respondent’s behaviour, safeguarding public safety, while the full process is ongoing.

The shadow Minister raised the issue of consultation with youth offending teams and their equivalent in the devolved nations. My understanding is that we are not talking about a large number of individuals being subject to these provisions. The reason we say that youth offending teams have to be consulted is that they have the expertise and the knowledge of working with young people, and it is likely that the individuals they will be consulted on will already be known to them. It is a good, positive measure to undertake that consultation with youth offending teams and recognise the skills and safeguards that they will bring. Their knowledge of the individual will perhaps include, as I spoke about earlier, issues in their background or safeguarding issues that need to be considered. That is really important. An interim YDO may be required if there is an immediate risk that has to be managed. That is why provision needs to be made for interim YDOs, but of course they are interim, and a full hearing will take place. Interim YDOs will be used only in urgent circumstances, and of course the court will have to agree; while an application can be made, if the court does not recognise the urgency, it will not be granted. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has agreed that the power to make interim measures is necessary in order for YDOs to be effective. I hope that, on the basis of those answers, the shadow Minister is satisfied that the clause should stand part of the Bill. Amendment 61 agreed to. Amendments made: 62, in clause 113, page 131, line 10, leave out from “Scotland” to end of line 15 and insert “must consult— (a) the Lord Advocate, (b) the relevant local authority, and (c) if the respondent will be under the age of 18 when the application is made, the Principal Reporter.” This amendment changes who the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland must consult before making an application for a youth diversion order or for the variation or discharge of such an order. Amendment 64, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, at end insert— “‘relevant local authority’ means— (a) the Scottish local authority in whose area it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives, or (b) if it appears to the chief constable that the respondent lives in more than one such area, whichever one or more of the relevant Scottish local authorities that the chief constable considers it appropriate to consult;”. This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62. Amendment 63, in clause 113, page 131, line 21, after “section” insert “— ‘Scottish local authority’ means a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994;”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 62. Clause 113, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 114 Applications without notice Amendments made: 65, in clause 114, page 131, line 27, leave out “Section 113(1) does” and insert “Subsections (1) and (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 do”. This amendment disapplies the requirement to consult the relevant local authority and (where the respondent is under 18) the Principal Reporter where an application for a youth diversion order is made without notice in Scotland. Amendment 66, in clause 114, page 131, line 35, leave out “section 113(1)” and insert “subsection (1) or (2)(b) and (c) of section 113 (as the case may be)”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.) This amendment is consequential on Amendment 65. Clause 114, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 115 Interim youth diversion orders Amendment made: 67, in clause 115, page 132, line 8, leave out subsection (3) and substitute— “(3) The only requirements that may be imposed by an interim youth diversion order on the respondent are— (a) a requirement of the kind mentioned in section 112(3)(b) (requirements to provide information etc); (b) a requirement to comply with section (Notification requirements) (notification requirements).”—(Dame Diana Johnson.) This amendment enables an interim youth diversion order to require the respondent answer questions, provide information or produce documents, or to comply with notification requirements under NC61. Clause 115, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 116 Variation and discharge of youth diversion orders

I beg to move amendment 68, in clause 116, page 132, line 33, at end insert— “(4A) The court may make provision of a kind mentioned in subsection (4) only if it considers that the provision is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism or other serious harm. (4B) Subsections (5) and (7) of section 112 apply to additional prohibitions or requirements included on a variation of an order.” This amendment provides that a court may only vary a youth diversion order to include an additional prohibition or requirement or to extend its duration if it considers it necessary; and that certain provision in clause 112 about the content of orders applies equally to such additional prohibitions or requirements.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Clause stand part. Government amendments 69 to 71. Clause 117 stand part.

Clause 116 ensures that the police or the subject of a YDO can apply to the relevant court to vary the order once it is in place to, for example, add or remove measures or to change the duration of existing measures. The clause also allows the police or the subject of a YDO to apply to end the order before it is due to expire, allowing the police to withdraw the order if it is no longer considered necessary. Clause 117 sets out the route for the police or a respondent to appeal against a court decision to impose a YDO, an interim YDO or any change made under clause 116. Appeals will be made to the Crown court in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and the Sheriff Appeal Court in Scotland. The court may then make changes on the basis of that appeal, as required. Government amendments 68 and 71 make changes to clarify and streamline the appeals process for YDOs, as do Government amendments 69 and 70, which provide that a second appeal in relation to a YDO may be made to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales. The Committee will recognise the importance of the clauses in ensuring that there is a process for varying or revoking the order as well as for both the police and YDO subjects to have a prescribed and proportionate route for appeals. Amendment 68 agreed to. Clause 116, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 117 Appeal against youth diversion order etc

15:15:00

Amendments made: 69, in clause 117, page 133, line 11, leave out “this section” and insert “subsection (1)”.

Amendment 70, in clause 117, page 133, line 13, at end insert—

“(2A) Where an appeal is made to the Crown Court in England and Wales under subsection (1) and on hearing the appeal the Crown Court makes a decision in relation to that matter, any person who was a party to the proceedings before the Crown Court may appeal against that decision to the Court of Appeal in England and Wales.

(2B) An appeal under subsection (2A) may be made only with the permission of the Court of Appeal.”.

Amendment 71, in clause 117, page 133, line 18, at end insert—

“(4) A youth diversion order made on an appeal under this section is to be treated for the purposes of this Chapter (other than this section) as having been made by the court that first made the decision appealed against.

(5) Rules of court may provide that an appeal from a decision—

(a) to dismiss an application for a youth diversion order made without notice being given to the respondent, or

(b) to refuse to make an interim youth diversion order when adjourning proceedings following such an application,

may be made without notice being given to the respondent.”.—(Dame Diana Johnson.)

Clause 118

Offence of breaching youth diversion order

I beg to move amendment 72, in clause 118, page 133, line 22, at end insert— “(1A) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to provide information or produce a document, it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that requirement, to provide any information or produce any document which the person knows to be false. (1B) Where a youth diversion order requires a person to comply with section (Notification requirements), it is an offence for the person, in purported compliance with that section, to notify to the police any information which the person knows to be false.” This amendment makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a youth diversion order.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments 73 to 75. Clause stand part. Government amendment 76. Clauses 119 and 120 stand part. Government amendments 77 and 78. Clause 121 stand part. Government new clause 64—Data from electronic monitoring in England and Wales: code of practice. Government new clause 65—Reviews of operation of this Chapter. New clause 42—Report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within three months of the passing of this Act, publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. (2) That report must include— (a) the organisations which will be responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders; (b) what level of counterterrorism and de-radicalisation training and expertise they have; and (c) what additional resources they will require to effectively administer the provisions, prohibitions and requirements of youth diversion orders. (3) Within one month of the publication of this report, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a plan assessing the— (a) training, (b) financing, and (c) guidance, available to the organisations identified in the report under subsection (1) to bring their training, expertise and funding to the requisite level identified in that report. (4) The Secretary of State must commission a report from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to assess whether the levels of funding, training and expertise proposed in the plan under subsection (3) are sufficient. This report will be laid before Parliament with the plan under subsection (3).” This new clause would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders and a plan and independent report on the funding, training and expertise they need.

I wonder whether it might be helpful for the Committee if I respond after the shadow Minister has spoken to his new clause 42.

Clauses 118 and 119 outline the offence of breaching a youth diversion order and subsequent processes for issuing and revising guidance on the exercise of functions related to youth diversion orders. Clause 118(4) provides that if a person is convicted of breaching a youth diversion order, the court cannot issue a conditional discharge requiring a substantive penalty instead. This provision prevents a lenient approach that might fail to deter non-compliance. The clause also establishes varying penalties based on age, with difference consequences for individuals under and over 18. How do these penalties balance deterrence with the goal of rehabilitating young offenders, particularly those under 18? Clause 119 grants the Secretary of State the authority to issue guidance for local police forces. How does the Minister plan to ensure that that guidance brings consistency in the application of YDOs across different regions? Further clauses outline wider procedures, including for applications for YDOs. New clause 42 would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within three months of the passage of the Act detailing the organisations responsible for implementing and enforcing youth diversion orders. The report must cover the organisations involved, the counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training they possess and any additional resources required to effectively manage the YDO provisions. Within one month of the report’s publication, the Secretary of State must present a plan to address training, financing and guidance to meet the required standards. Additionally, the Secretary of State must commission an independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to evaluate whether the proposed levels of funding, training and expertise are adequate, with that assessment being laid before Parliament alongside the plan. The new clause would ensure the effective implementation of youth diversion orders with the necessary expertise. The requirement for a report and plan would ensure that organisations are prepared to handle counter-terrorism and deradicalisation issues. It would set clear expectations for training and funding, holding the Government accountable for providing sufficient resources. The independent assessment by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation would add scrutiny, ensuring that the Government’s plans meet the required standards. Overall, the new clause would introduce a proactive and transparent approach, fostering confidence in the system’s ability to address terrorism and extremism. What steps are the Government taking to ensure that the organisations involved in implementing YDOs have the necessary counter-terrorism and deradicalisation training and expertise? Are the Government confident that those organisations are sufficiently prepared without the need for an independent assessment? Given the complexity of implementing YDOs, does the Minister agree that additional resources might be required to ensure that the orders are effectively enforced? If not, what plans are in place to guarantee that the organisations responsible are adequately resourced?

Clauses 118 to 121 will support the implementation of YDOs. Although the aim of a YDO is to divert a young person away from terrorist offending, it is critical that there is an effective deterrent against breaching the order, and that where a young person breaches the order, the police can take action. Clause 118 ensures that a separate criminal offence is available for breaching a YDO without a reasonable excuse. In practice, we propose that statutory guidance will set out that the police will be expected to consult youth offending teams where there is a suspected breach, and for less serious breaches the police may consider alternatives to prosecution, such as varying the measures in the order or issuing a formal warning to the individual. Prosecution for this offence will therefore be a last resort. Government amendment 72 makes it an offence for a person to knowingly provide false information, produce a false document or notify false information in purported compliance with notification requirements imposed under a YDO. Government amendments 73 and 74 make the offences under clause 18 triable either way irrespective of the defendant’s age, with a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment. The amendments ensure that there is a consistent maximum penalty for any breach of a YDO, regardless of the young person’s age, and that the legislation more accurately reflects the potential severity of breaching a YDO. For example, a serious breach may involve a breach of a weapons measure, such as by making plans to purchase knives or encouraging or assisting others to do so. We would expect a prosecution for that offence to be the last resort. Detail on other options to be considered beforehand will be included in the statutory guidance. The change is supported by operational partners and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Government amendment 75 enables a copy of a YDO to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order. Clause 119 introduces a new power for the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the police in relation to YDOs. In issuing such guidance, we recognise the importance of proper consultation with relevant authorities, including the police, the prosecution service in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland, and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. That is why clause 119 requires mandatory consultation with certain parties and permits the Secretary of State to consult with other stakeholders, where appropriate. Government amendment 76 expands the list of consultees to include youth justice agencies. Clause 120 ensures that rules of court can provide for anonymity for individuals going through civil proceedings for a YDO. That is important to ensure that reporting restrictions apply, and it is in line with the general policy aim of ensuring that young people do not feel stigmatised through engagement with the justice system—something that the shadow Minister has spoken about. Finally, clause 121 makes procedural provision in respect of applications for a YDO. Government amendment 77 disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a YDO from being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application. Amendment 78 enables proceedings in Scotland for, or in relation to, a YDO to be heard by a summary sheriff. I turn to the Government new clauses in this group. To safeguard effectively the data that is gathered under electronic monitoring requirements, new clause 64 will require the Secretary of State to issue a code of practice for the processing of such data. The processing of such data will be subject to the requirements in the UK general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. New clause 65 will enable the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to review and report on the use and operationalisation of the youth diversion order. The independent reviewer already has a number of statutory functions, and this new clause aligns his statutory functions, enabling him to report on the YDO. The independent reviewer has been consulted on the clause, and his view is that the power to review the operation of the youth diversion order is important. New clause 42, tabled by the shadow Minister, would require the Government to publish a report on the organisations that are responsible for implementing and enforcing YDOs, and a plan for delivering the relevant funding, training and guidance available for these organisations. It would also require the Government to commission a report from the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As Matt Jukes, the head of counter-terrorism policing, set out in his written evidence to this Committee, counter-terrorism policing is a collaboration of UK police forces with a network of exceptional investigators. It is the lead law enforcement agency for managing terrorist risk, so it is appropriate that it will lead the implementation and enforcement of YDOs. It will be supported in this role by youth justice partners who have substantial experience of working with young people who are subject to court-imposed orders. As I have already set out, Government new clause 65 already ensures that YDOs are added to the statutory remit of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As part of this role, the independent reviewer is required to review the operation of YDOs in practice and report to Parliament. I hope that the shadow Minister agrees that new clause 42 is therefore unnecessary. On the other issue that the shadow Minister referred to, regarding the consistent use of YDOs across the UK, one of the key objectives of the statutory guidance under clause 119, which chief officers must have regard to, is to ensure that there is consistency. To go back to the point about the youth offending teams, given the small size of the cohort of children who are likely to be given a YDO, we do not anticipate that the changes will add significant pressures to those youth offending teams. On that basis, I commend the Government’s amendments to the Committee. Amendment 72 agreed to. Amendments made: 73, in clause 118, page 133, line 23, leave out subsection (2). This amendment is consequential on Amendment 74. Amendment 74, in clause 118, page 133, line 33, leave out “aged 18 or over”. This amendment makes offences under clause 118 (breach of youth diversion order) triable either way whatever the age of the respondent. Amendment 75, in clause 118, page 134, line 8, at end insert— “(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section, a copy of the original youth diversion order, certified by the proper officer of the court that made it, is admissible as evidence of its having been made and of its contents to the same extent that oral evidence of those matters is admissible in those proceedings.”—(Dame Diana Johnson.) This amendment enables a copy of a youth diversion order to be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings for breach of the order. Clause 118, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 119 Guidance Amendment made: 76, in clause 119, page 134, line 16, at end insert— “(za) the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales; (zb) the Scottish Ministers; (zc) the Youth Justice Agency in Northern Ireland;”—(Dame Diana Johnson.) This amendment adds to the list of persons the Secretary of State must consult before issuing or revising guidance to chief officers of police about youth diversion orders. Clause 119, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.  Clause 120 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 121 Applications Amendments made: 77, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert— “(2) Section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (time limit for complaints etc) does not apply to a complaint under this Chapter.” This amendment disapplies the time limit that would otherwise prevent an application for a youth diversion order being made in relation to matters arising more than six months prior to the making of the application. Amendment 78, in clause 121, page 135, line 17, at end insert— “(3) In Schedule 1 to the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (asp 17) (civil proceedings etc in which summary sheriff has competence), after paragraph 12 insert— ‘Youth diversion orders 13 Proceedings for or in relation to a youth diversion order under section 110 of the Crime and Policing Act 2025.’” —(Dame Diana Johnson.) This amendment enables proceedings in Scotland for or in relation to a youth diversion order to be heard by a summary sheriff. Clause 121, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 122 Prevention of terrorism and state threats: weapons etc Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 122 amends the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 and the National Security Act 2023 to broaden the definition of weapons that are prohibited for individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures or state threat prevention and investigation measures. The clause gives the Secretary of State the power to prohibit individuals who are subject to terrorism prevention and investigation measures, or to state threat prevention and investigation measures, from possessing any items that she reasonably considers could be used to cause injury. The change builds on a recommendation by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, in his annual report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”.

15:30:00

Under our proposals, not only will the Home Secretary have the power to prohibit the possession of any knife or bladed article for which prior approval has not been sought, but she will have the power to prohibit possession of any item that she reasonably considers could be used to cause injury, even where it has other legitimate uses. As the independent reviewer said in his written submission to the Public Bill Committee, “the power is needed”.

The modern threats that we face, whether terrorism or state directed, are as complex and diverse as ever. It is vital that we ensure that our law enforcement and security partners have the tools they need to manage such threats. The amendment to the law under this clause will ensure that our toolkit keeps pace with the evolving threat and supports our vital efforts to keep the British public safe.

Clause 122 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 123

Offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of proscribed organisation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 43—Travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation— “(1) A person commits an offence if they travel outside of the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation. (2) For the purposes of this section, ‘support’ includes— (a) becoming a member of a proscribed organisation, or an affiliated group of a proscribed organisation; (b) working for any entity, either voluntarily or for financial gain, run by a proscribed organisation; (c) attending political, religious or social gatherings in support of a proscribed organisation; (d) meeting with members of a proscribed organisation; (e) creating content, both online and offline, to raise support for a proscribed organisation; or (f) travelling to territory controlled by a proscribed organisation without an exemption. (3) This section does not apply to— (a) accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations; (b) accredited media outlets and journalists; (c) diplomats and other governmental officials travelling in an official capacity; or (d) independent journalists and content creators reporting on a proscribed organisation, or in a territory with a proscribed organisation present. (4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, to a fine (or both), or (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment of a term not exceeding 6 months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both).” This new clause would make travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation an offence.

Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to wear or display an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that they are a member or supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. The offence is committed only if the person carries out such conduct in a public place. Clause 123 makes two key changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act. The first is to create a new offence where a person carries out the conduct in one of the relevant premises set out in the Bill, including prisons, young offender institutions and immigration removal centres. In 2022, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation undertook a review of terrorism in prisons. That was in the context of the UK suffering four terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020 committed by serving prisoners or terrorist offenders who had been released on licence. One of the reviewer’s recommendations was for the Government to consider amending section 13 to extend the offence to prison settings. This clause implements and builds on that recommendation. The new offence will act as a deterrent to such harmful conduct in the prison estate, and it will help to prevent exposure to articles that are linked to terrorist organisations. That, in turn, may reduce the risk of individuals being radicalised or otherwise encouraged to support such groups. The second change concerns the powers of seizure under section 13. In his report “The Terrorism Acts in 2022”, the independent reviewer highlighted that the existing seizure powers would not be available where the police could not connect an article, such as a flag or banner, to specific individuals for the purpose of further criminal investigation. He recommended that that gap should be rectified. The clause will therefore amend section 13 to ensure that the police can seize such articles even when there is no real prospect of prosecuting an individual for a section 13 offence. An article may therefore be seized to prevent its continuing display and to preserve it as evidence. Both changes to section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 implement the independent reviewer’s recommendations and are supported by the police. They will ensure that the offence and associated seizure powers can be used to full effect. I am happy to respond to new clause 43 once we have heard from the shadow Minister.

Clause 123 amends section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which concerns the offence of wearing or displaying articles in support of a proscribed organisation. The key amendment is the introduction of a new offence: “A person commits an offence if, on relevant premises, the person…wears…or displays an article, in such a way…as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.” What is the rationale for introducing the concept of reasonable suspicion in the offence of wearing or displaying articles, as opposed to requiring more direct evidence of support for a proscribed organisation? I would also be grateful for clarity on how the list of relevant premises is determined. Could that include other locations or contexts beyond those listed? New clause 43 introduces a criminal offence for individuals who travel outside the United Kingdom to support a proscribed organisation. The offence covers various forms of support, including joining or working for a proscribed organisation or its affiliated groups, attending events in support of such an organisation, meeting with its members, creating content to promote the organisation, or travelling to areas controlled by the organisation without a legal exemption. The new clause provides specific exemptions for accredited non-governmental organisations and humanitarian organisations, media outlets and journalists, and diplomats or Government officials travelling in an official capacity. A person who is found guilty under the provision could face a severe penalty of imprisonment for up to 14 years on conviction on indictment, or up to six months and a fine on summary conviction. The measure is a proactive step to curb the influence and spread of terrorism. By criminalising travel abroad to support a proscribed organisation, it would help to prevent individuals from engaging in activities that might contribute to terrorism and destabilisation abroad. The inclusion of various forms of support, ranging from membership and financial involvement to attending gatherings or creating content, provides clarity on what constitutes illegal activity. That would ensure that law enforcement could pursue a wide range of actions that support proscribed organisations. New clause 43 is designed to prevent individuals from becoming embedded with or supporting proscribed organisations. Why would the Government not support a preventive measure that helps to protect the UK from individuals travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activities?

As the shadow Minister has explained, new clause 43 seeks to introduce a new offence for travelling abroad to support a proscribed organisation. The UK has one of the strongest counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. That includes, under the Terrorism Act 2000, the ability to proscribe an organisation that the Home Secretary reasonably believes is concerned in terrorism. That means that it commits and participates in terrorism, prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. Some 80 terrorist organisations are currently proscribed. As part of the counter-terrorism framework, there are a wide range of powers and offences that can be used by the Government and operational partners to disrupt travel overseas for terrorist purposes and to prosecute individuals on their return. That includes, for example, an executive power to cancel a British citizen’s passport and the power to temporarily seize a passport when there is a reasonable suspicion that the person is traveling to engage in terrorism-related activity. There are also a wide range of terrorism offences that could be engaged in relation to an individual who travels to support a proscribed organisation. For example, it is an offence to be a member of a proscribed organisation, to invite support—the invited support can be intangible, and it is not limited to money, property or support that incites violence or encourages terrorism—for a proscribed organisation, to attend a place used for terrorist training or to provide or receive terrorist training, and to undertake preparatory acts with the intention of committing an act of terrorism or assisting another to commit an act of terrorism. The counter-terrorism framework also includes the designated area offence, which permits the Secretary of State to designate an area if she is satisfied that it is necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism to restrict British nationals and residents from entering or remaining in the area. It is an offence for UK nationals or UK residents to enter or remain in a designated area. I recognise that the power has not been used to date, but the Government’s view is that it remains a useful tool to disrupt terrorist travel in the right circumstances. As the shadow Minister may be aware, the Government are considering a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, on the topic raised by his new clause. The Government will not hesitate to address gaps in our toolkit and to ensure that it keeps pace with the modern terrorist threat. We have brought forward measures in the Bill to implement and build on recommendations the reviewer put forward under the last Government. In November 2024, the Home Secretary accepted his recommendation to consider introducing a new terrorist travel offence. Officials are currently considering it with operational partners, as well as the extent to which there is a gap. It is vital that any new offence extends the ability of operational partners and the CPS to disrupt and prosecute those involved in terrorism. In due course, the Government will respond fully to that recommendation on disrupting terrorist travel. Before I conclude, on the issue of reasonable suspicion and the requirement, this measure simply extends beyond private settings to designated settings. We are not changing the reasonable suspicion test; I hope that that is helpful to the shadow Minister. For the reasons set out, I hope he will be content not to press his new clause 43 when we reach it later in our proceedings. Question put and agreed to. Clause 123 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 124 Management of terrorist offenders Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Schedule 16. Government new clause 21—Terrorism offences excepted from defence for slavery or trafficking victims. Government amendment 23.

Clause 124 introduces schedule 16, which amends the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It gives powers to effectively manage a certain cohort of historical terrorism offenders. That cohort includes individuals who committed non-terrorism offences, such as conspiracy to murder, that would have been considered to have a terrorism connection had they not been committed before the relevant legislation came into effect. This is the same cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders as captured by clause 104, relating to the polygraph testing of those offenders, which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Justice spoke to earlier. The 2008 Act introduced a requirement for courts to consider whether there is a connection to terrorism when sentencing certain specified offences. In circumstances where a court determines that an offence has a terrorism connection, it must aggravate the sentence. Where a terrorist connection is determined, the sentence imposed will reflect the risk profile of the offender. In addition, the offender can be more appropriately managed on their release because certain counter-terrorism risk management tools become available to the police in respect of that offender. Since the passage of the 2008 Act, several further risk management tools have been introduced via various Acts of Parliament to manage terrorism and terrorist-connected offenders. The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021 also expanded the scope of the terrorist connection provisions to require a court to aggravate certain non-terrorism offences with a maximum penalty of more than two years. The clause and the associated schedule will extend the application of existing risk management measures. Those measures include powers of urgent arrest and personal search for those on licence, where it is suspected that they have breached a licence condition, as well as imposing terrorist notification requirements under the 2008 Act for this cohort of historical terrorism-connected offenders. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation noted that the schedule will allow the police to apply important counter-terrorism measures to serious offenders involved in terrorist plots backed by proscribed organisations, but who were convicted of non-terrorism offences. The amendments made in schedule 16 will also permit the police or the Secretary of State to apply to the courts for an order imposing the terrorist notification requirements on offenders whose historical offences have a terrorist connection. If such an order is made, the urgent arrest power and the power of personal search will also apply in respect of the offender. That measure is supported by the police and the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, who described it as a “sensible measure”. Government new clause 21 will add certain existing terrorism-related offences to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Government amendment 23 is consequential on new clause 21. As we have debated, schedule 4 to the 2015 Act contains a list of serious offences to which the section 45 defence of that Act does not apply. The list currently includes some terrorism offences, as well as serious violence and sexual offences. Section 45 provides a statutory defence against prosecution for victims of modern slavery, and is designed to give victims the confidence to come forward without fear of prosecution. Schedule 4 to the 2015 Act ensures that those who commit the most serious offences specified in the schedule do not have the option to rely on that defence. New clause 21 adds existing terrorism offences to schedule 4, building on a recommendation made by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. Currently, only a limited number of terrorism offences are listed in schedule 4, including those in sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006—preparation of terrorist acts and training for terrorism, respectively. Others, such as the offence in section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000—collection of information useful to terrorists—are in scope of the section 45 defence.

15:45:00

In his 2021 report, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation set out his concerns about the operation of the section 45 defence in the context of counter-terrorism investigations. The report suggested that all terrorism offences are sufficiently serious to warrant an exemption from the section 45 defence. It also stressed that the change would simplify cases where numerous terrorism offences are being prosecuted together, ensuring prosecutorial consistency.

We agree with the independent reviewer’s recommendation and have decided that schedule 4 should include all the terrorism offences within scope of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020. Those offences carry a minimum sentence of two years, with associated terrorist offender notification requirements. The amendments are supported by counter-terrorism policing and the Crown Prosecution Service. Given the clear operational need for the amendments in supporting public safety, I trust that the hon. Member for Stockton West will support new clause 21.

Clause 125

Sentences for offence of breaching foreign travel restriction order

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 17.

The clause will bring the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order, under paragraph 15 of schedule 5 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, within scope of the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, known as TORER. TORER was emergency legislation passed in 2020 following the horrific terrorist attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, committed by terrorist offenders on licence. TORER restricts the eligibility of terrorist prisoners for release on licence. It ended the automatic early release—in other words, release without Parole Board approval—of individuals who have committed a terrorist offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment, and increased their release eligibility date from the halfway point of their sentence to the two-thirds point. The offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is not currently covered by TORER, despite having a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and being a terrorism-specific offence, and despite offences for breaching other terrorism-related orders being within scope of TORER. The clause will add breaching a foreign travel restriction order to TORER, ensuring greater consistency. Since the introduction of TORER in 2020, a number of other changes have been made to the counter-terrorism legislative framework to strengthen the risk management of individuals who commit a terrorism offence carrying a maximum penalty of more than two years. We are seeking to apply those changes to this offence too, in order to ensure that consistency remains. Specifically, we are ensuring that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order is capable of attracting a sentence for offenders of particular concern, and the equivalent sentence in Northern Ireland and Scotland. We are also making the offender eligible for certain specialist management on licence, including eligibility for personal search conditions, which will be UK-wide, and a polygraph condition, which will be for England and Wales only. We will also ensure that the offence is incapable of being found by the court at the point of sentencing to have been committed with a terrorist connection, on the basis that it is in fact a terrorist offence. Given that the offence of breaching a foreign travel restriction order applies UK-wide, the clause also makes the equivalent changes for Scotland and Northern Ireland. This change will ensure that sentencing and release arrangements are commensurate with the risk that the individual is considered to pose, and that eligibility for terrorism management conditions is consistent with other terrorist offences. I commend clause 125 and schedule 17 to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 125 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 126 Length of terrorism sentence with fixed licence period: Northern Ireland Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 126 makes a minor amendment to ensure that sentencing for terrorist offenders in Northern Ireland remains consistent with that in England and Wales. The sentencing and release regime for terrorists who commit offences attracting a maximum penalty of more than two years’ imprisonment is designed to be consistent throughout the United Kingdom. However, as currently drafted, the relevant legislation in Northern Ireland—the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008, and specifically article 15A—makes it possible for judges to hand down incommensurate sentences. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure consistency, so that where a sentencing court in Northern Ireland hands down such a sentence, known as the terrorism sentence with a fixed licence period, the length of the sentence is commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. That will then be comparable to the equivalent sentence in England and Wales, namely the sentence for offenders of particular concern. Action is necessary to ensure consistency and fairness across UK jurisdictions. I commend the clause to the Committee. Question put and agreed to. Clause 126 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Schedules 16 and 17 agreed to. Clause 127 Implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 128 and 129 stand part.

Clause 127 relates to the implementation of international law enforcement information-sharing agreements, clause 128 sets out the meaning of “appropriate national authority” and clause 129 relates to the consultation with devolved authorities about regulations under clause 127. International law enforcement information-sharing agreements are a vital tool that provides law enforcement officers with access to new intelligence to fight crime, increase public protection and reduce the threat of societal harm posed by international criminality. Clause 127 will provide the appropriate national authority with the power to make regulations to implement any new legally binding international law enforcement information-sharing agreements. Such regulations may, for example, make provision for the technical and, where appropriate, operational detail needed to facilitate the information sharing provided for in a particular agreement. Clause 127 also stipulates that regulations can be made in connection with implementing an international agreement only in so far as it relates to the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes, and that any data sharing must comply with data protection legislation. Clause 128 defines the appropriate national authority as the Secretary of State or, where a provision falls within devolved competence, Scottish Ministers, Welsh Ministers or the Northern Ireland Department of Justice. Clause 129 requires the Secretary of State, before making regulations, to consult devolved Governments about any provisions in the regulations that would be within the legislative competence of the relevant devolved legislature. These measures will enable the swift implementation of new international agreements that are designed to help keep the public safe from the threat posed by international criminality and cross-border crime, and help to protect vulnerable people. I commend them to the Committee.

Clause 127 gives the Government the power to make regulations to implement international agreements relating to the sharing of law enforcement information. The agreements may evolve over time, and the clause ensures that UK law can adapt accordingly. The clause allows regulations to override existing restrictions on information sharing, but with two key safeguards. A data protection safeguard means that regulations cannot require or allow the processing of personal data in a way that would breach UK data protection laws, unless the regulations themselves impose a legal duty or power. Regulations also cannot override the restrictions set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which covers the surveillance and interception of communications. The clause aims to ensure that the UK can meet its obligations under international law enforcement agreements, while still upholding important privacy and legal protections. Clause 128 defines who the appropriate national authority is for the purposes of making regulations under clause 127. Clause 129 places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the devolved Administrations before making any regulations under clause 127 that include provisions falling within the legislative competence of a devolved legislature, as set out in clause 128. That ensures proper engagement with, and respect for, the roles of the Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive when regulations touch on devolved matters. We welcome these measures, but could the Minister briefly comment on what format such consultation would take?

I am happy to comment. With matters such as this, the normal procedures are in place around consultation. There has been extensive consultation on getting these provisions into the Bill. That is just the normal way that we consult. I hope that that satisfies the shadow Minister. Question put and agreed to. Clause 127 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 128 and 129 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 130 Criminal liability of bodies corporate and partnerships where senior manager commits offence Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

As we know, crimes can be committed by corporate bodies, just as they can be committed by individuals. It is important that corporate bodies are held liable for committing criminality and face justice accordingly. That is achieved through what is called the identification doctrine. In the 1970s, the Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass case determined that a corporation can be held liable for a crime if it is committed by its “directing mind and will”, but there is a lack of clarity on what that constitutes. As companies have grown in size and complexity, there are often multiple controlling minds within different business functions who can exert control and cause harm through different functions of the business. Through clause 130 the Government are placing the case law test for attributing crimes to corporate bodies on a statutory footing, and clarifying and extending the circumstances under which a body corporate or partnership is liable for any criminal offence, if that offence has been committed by its senior management. The previous Government undertook the first stage of this reform in the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, placing the identification doctrine in legislation for economic crime offences. However, the identification doctrine was never intended as an economic crime-only regime. It has historically applied to any criminal offence in case law, and it is important that statute reflects that. Clause 130 therefore repeals the relevant sections of the 2023 Act and replaces them with an identification doctrine that applies to all relevant crime, not just economic crime. As a result of the clause, a body corporate or partnership in the UK can be held liable for any criminal offence and fined accordingly where a senior manager who has control over the whole or a substantial part of the business commits an offence while acting in the scope of their actual or apparent authority. The broadening of the principle to senior managers with control over any substantial part of the body corporate reflects the wide decision-making responsibilities of organisations and mitigates prior concerns that individuals committing crime could escape liability by changing or removing their title. That will ensure that businesses cannot continue to avoid liability where senior management have clearly used the business to facilitate or conduct crime.

Clause 130 holds organisations criminally liable when a senior manager commits an offence within their authority, expanding liability beyond economic crimes to all criminal offences. This reform addresses gaps in the previous identification doctrine and applies to both UK and non-UK entities. However, liability will not apply if the offences occur entirely outside the UK, unless it would be criminal at the corporate level in the UK. How will the Government ensure that the broader application of corporate liability strikes the right balance between holding organisations accountable and avoiding unfair penalisation for offences that occur in part outside the UK?

I am grateful for the question. It is clear that offences committed outside the UK would not be covered by the clause—I think that that answers the shadow Minster’s question. It is clearly something that we need to keep under review, because other legislation does have extraterritorial application. I am certainly willing to go away and look at that point, and to come back to the shadow Minister. Question put and agreed to. Clause 130 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That the Order of the Committee of Thursday 27 March be varied by leaving out paragraph 1(g).—(Keir Mather.) Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Keir Mather.)

16:01:00

Written evidence reported to the House

CPB 82 JUSTICE (further submission) (for parts 2 to 14 of the Bill)

CPB 83 A sex worker based in Bristol

CPB 84 Both Parents Matter

CPB 85 Victims’ Commissioner for England and Wales

CPB 86 British Retail Consortium

CPB 87 Domestic Abuse Commissioner

CPB 88 Letter to the Committee from Rt Hon Dame Diana Johnson DBE MP, Minister of State for Policing and Crime Prevention, relating to details of a final tranche of Government amendments which were tabled on 24 April

CPB 89 ESRC Vulnerability & Policing Futures Research Centre

CPB 90 A Way Out

CPB 91 A sex worker based in London

CPB 92 Amnesty International UK (further submission)

CPB 93 UK Finance

CPB 94 Board of Deputies of British Jews