Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill (Twenty-sixth sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Peter Dowd, Clive Efford, Sir Roger Gale, Carolyn Harris, † Esther McVey

† Abbott, Jack (Ipswich) (Lab/Co-op)

† Atkinson, Lewis (Sunderland Central) (Lab)

Campbell, Juliet (Broxtowe) (Lab)

† Charalambous, Bambos (Southgate and Wood Green) (Lab)

† Francis, Daniel (Bexleyheath and Crayford) (Lab)

† Gordon, Tom (Harrogate and Knaresborough) (LD)

Green, Sarah (Chesham and Amersham) (LD)

† Hopkins, Rachel (Luton South and South Bedfordshire) (Lab)

† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)

† Kinnock, Stephen (Minister for Care)

† Kruger, Danny (East Wiltshire) (Con)

† Leadbeater, Kim (Spen Valley) (Lab)

† Malthouse, Kit (North West Hampshire) (Con)

Olney, Sarah (Richmond Park) (LD)

† Opher, Dr Simon (Stroud) (Lab)

† Paul, Rebecca (Reigate) (Con)

† Richards, Jake (Rother Valley) (Lab)

† Sackman, Sarah (Minister of State, Ministry of Justice)

† Saville Roberts, Liz (Dwyfor Meirionnydd) (PC)

† Shah, Naz (Bradford West) (Lab)

† Shastri-Hurst, Dr Neil (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)

† Tidball, Dr Marie (Penistone and Stocksbridge) (Lab)

† Woodcock, Sean (Banbury) (Lab)

Lynn Gardner, Lucinda Maer, Jonathan Whiffing, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

(Morning)

[Esther McVey in the Chair]

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

10:00:00

Would everyone ensure that all electronic devices are turned off or switched to silent mode? Tea and coffee are not allowed in the Committee Room. We will now continue line-by-line consideration of the Bill. I remind Members that interventions should be short and should raise points of clarification or questions; they should not be speeches in and of themselves. Members who wish to give a speech should bob and should continue to do so at the appropriate points throughout the debate until they are called. When Members say “you”, they are referring to the Chair. They should not use “you” to refer to one another; debate should be through the Chair. Clause 23 No obligation to provide assistance etc Amendment proposed (18 March): 480, in clause 23, page 15, line 3, leave out subsection (1) and insert— “(1) No individual is under any duty (whether arising from any contract, statute or otherwise) to be involved, directly or indirectly, in the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act. (1A) In particular, no individual is under any duty (whether arising from any contract, statute or otherwise) to— (a) provide information about assisted dying; (b) participate in an initial discussion; (c) participate in the request and assessment process; (d) supply, prescribe or administer an approved substance; (e) be present at the time of administration of an approved substance; or (f) dispense a prescription of an approved substance. (1B) Nothing in subsections (1) or (1A) of this section shall affect any duty to— (a) signpost someone to where they can obtain information about assisted dying (under section 4(5) or otherwise); (b) perform acts of a clerical, secretarial, or ancillary nature; or (c) perform any acts necessary to save the life of or to prevent grave injury to a person.”—(Danny Kruger.) This amendment would expand the provision of Clause 23(1) to all individuals and clarify the activities in which they are not obliged to participate. Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following: Amendment 483, in clause 23, page 15, line 5, after “assistance” insert “, or in any activity closely related to the provision of assistance,”. This amendment would widen the range of activities which medical practitioners and other healthcare providers are not under an obligation to provide to include activities closely related to the provision of assistance under the Act. Amendment 484, in clause 23, page 15, line 8, after “Act” insert “, or in any activity closely related to the provision of assistance under this Act,”. Amendment 441, in clause 23, page 15, line 9, at end insert— “(3) There is no obligation on any care home or hospice regulated by the Care Quality Commission or the Care Inspectorate Wales to permit the provision of assistance under this Act on their premises.” This amendment prevents there being any obligation on a care home or hospice which is regulated in England or Wales to permit the provision of assistance under the Act on their premises. Amendment 481, in clause 23, page 15, line 9, at end insert— “(3) Nothing in subsection (2)— (a) prevents an employer who has chosen not to participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act from prohibiting their employees from providing such assistance in the course of their employment with that employer, or (b) prevents an employer from specifying occupational requirements in relation to the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act in accordance with Schedule 9 of the Equality Act when hiring employees.” This amendment ensures that employees cannot provide assisted dying against the wishes of their employers and that employers can still rely, in appropriate cases, on the occupational requirements of the Equality Act to either require employees to provide or not to provide assisted dying. New clause 22—No obligation for occupiers and operators of premises— “(1) Any individual, business, organisation, or association who occupies or operates premises has the right to refuse to permit the self-administration of an approved substance on their premises. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) confers any right on anyone with an interest in the land but who is not occupying or operating those premises.” This new clause would mean that the owners or occupiers of premises—but not landlords not currently in occupation—are not obliged to permit the self-administration of approved substances on their premises. New clause 23—No detriment for care home or hospice not providing assistance— “(1) No regulated care home or hospice shall be subject to any detriment by a public authority as a result of not— (a) providing assistance in accordance with this Act, or (b) permitting such assistance to take place on their premises. (2) No funding given by a public authority to a regulated care home or hospice can be conditional on that care home or hospice— (a) providing assistance in accordance with this Act, or (b) permitting such assistance to take place on their premises.” This new clause would mean that regulated care homes and hospices cannot be subject to any detriment for not providing or permitting assistance in accordance with this Act, and that their funding cannot be conditional on them providing or permitting such assistance. Clause stand part.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey, fortified as I am now with a touch of breakfast. I wish to open my comments on this set of amendments by reiterating the importance of respecting people’s beliefs in healthcare and the contribution that people of different faiths, beliefs and positions make, no matter where they come from, in the context of the activities under the Bill. I accept and recognise that amendment 480, in the name of the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, would do an important job in strengthening the Bill’s provisions. I obviously want to hear what the Minister says, and I note the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley, but I would want to see this sort of expansion in the final Bill when it goes back to the House. If they may not be the exact right words today, I repeat the offer that my hon. Friend has made to work across the divide, as it were, to ensure that such provisions are included in the Bill. With the benefit of an overnight reflection, I feel that last night we got somewhat muddled around some of the objections on conscience, particularly when we go beyond the individual. Amendment 480 and equivalent amendments deal very clearly with individuals not having an obligation to carry out acts that would offend their conscience in the provision of these services. I think we can broadly agree on that. The remainder of the debate got rather muddled between organisations providing assistance under the Bill and the locations at which the final act of an assisted death may take place. I think those are importantly different. On organisations providing assistance, I want to reset things with a common-sense approach to how it will work in practice. The hon. Member for Reigate made the point that hospices should be under no obligation as organisations to provide specific services. I agree. The powers set out under clause 32 for the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the provision of these services, which we will come on to debate at some point, will operate as they do elsewhere across the health service. An NHS organisation or another organisation will say, “This is the set of services that we provide as an organisation.” I see nothing in this Bill that will compel them to do anything other than that. Healthcare organisations up and down the land now make decisions about what is appropriate for them to deliver, based on skills, expertise and demand and whether they think they are well placed to provide care. I agree with the hon. Member for Reigate, but it does not follow that the amendments are required to enforce that principle. As I understand it, because it is permissible, every organisation and every individual practising healthcare professional will be able to say, “On my own bat, I’m not going to participate in this, regardless of what my employer believes,” not least because of clinical governance and regulation. There is already a strong body of healthcare regulation around the acts and services that are provided. It is currently overseen by the Care Quality Commission. We do not need to reinvent that regime. I reassure Members that I think it entirely appropriate for hospices or other providers of palliative care to consider whether they want to participate, should the Bill become law. I imagine we will get to a situation in which some will and some will not, which is absolutely appropriate. Particularly in end-of-life cases, a patient will make a choice on the back of that. I am aware that some end-of-life care providers in my area are actively considering whether this is something that they will do; I am equally aware that there are others that think it is not for them. We heard in evidence that in Australia some providers of palliative care provide integrated, holistic care in which it is one of a number of options, whereas other providers do not. Amendment 481 would insert a new subsection (3)(a) into clause 23, which suggests that an employer has the power to veto an employee doing an act on their time. That is moot: it is not necessary. In the healthcare environments in which I have worked, a doctor may practise elsewhere, doing their own thing, but while they are employed in a certain NHS trust to do an NHS service, they cannot suddenly decide to do something else.

The hon. Member is giving a powerful speech. My amendment is only to ensure that if the employee is working in an NHS clinic, they comply with the policy of that clinic. It would not restrict their doing other things in their own time. The wording of the amendment is clear, as I discussed with the hon. Member for Spen Valley yesterday, that it is just while the employee is performing services for the employer.

I agree that that is what the wording says, but my point is that it is moot. The hon. Lady herself states that the amendment is to prevent an employee from going against the policies of the employer. That power already exists. No healthcare professional says, “Even though I’m employed as a doctor today by such and such a trust, I’m going to do a set of procedures or practices that I want to do.” It is moot. I have no issue with subsection (3)(a) in amendment 481, although I think it is unnecessary. However, I think subsection (3)(b) is deeply problematic. It cuts across employment law protections by referring to selection when hiring employees. There is a reference to the Equality Act, but as others have noted, it is not clear what protected characteristics we are talking about. At a deeper level, if we accept that there is going to be mixed provision, I would argue—and I think this Committee, in a small way, has shown this—that there is some benefit to that. We should not get to a position where every medic of a certain viewpoint on assisted dying works for one organisation and every healthcare professional of a different viewpoint works for another. That is not to say, by any stretch, that organisations would be forced to offer assisted dying. Clearly they would not. If the Bill becomes law, however, I want a society that is relatively at peace with it in healthcare, recognising people’s ability to conscientiously object as individuals. Setting up a dichotomy from the start, in which where a medic decides to work is determined by their views on such and such a procedure, is not a road that we should go down. I also have serious concerns, in terms of employment law, about subsection (3)(b).

The amendment is simply to prevent a discrimination case. Let us take another example. A rape refuge may provide services to women who have suffered sexual abuse; it may be appropriate, in that instance, to hire only women to support those domestic abuse survivors. In order to prevent a discrimination claim when hiring, we have to rely on the Equality Act and the exemptions carved out. All my amendment says is that the same exemption would apply when a hospice or clinic is employing. It is just to avoid those issues down the road.

I am afraid I cannot agree. The situation that I set out, in which a hospice makes an organisational decision that it does not wish to provide assisted dying services, is entirely legitimate under the Bill, as drafted. I do not, however, think it should screen which applicants have a certain view, which would be legal under the amendment. The example that the hon. Lady gives is rather different, because it relates to a particular protected characteristic. I am not an expert in the area, so maybe colleagues can help me, but this relates to specific services.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

I will move on, because we have started slightly late and I am not sure that we are going to add anything on this point. There is a fundamental distinction between providing assistance and being the location in which people may self-administer an assisted death. In his speech on new clause 22, the hon. Member for East Wiltshire somewhat overlapped those two things, if I may say so. Having established that a hospice would be under no obligation to provide, an individual would clearly not be able to turn up and say, “Your staff must help me to do this.” However, that is different from a situation in which someone living in their own private home— that might include a room in a care home or sheltered accommodation—decides that they want their healthcare team to carry out entirely lawful and appropriate activities under the Bill. I therefore cannot agree with new clause 22. People are legally resident in these premises. They are registered to vote. In some cases, such as in warden-provided accommodation, they have a lease. It is not a landlord in absentia. I know that the hon. Gentleman has provided an opt-out for some situations, but what about warden and supported housing situations? We would not accept operators or owners policing what lawful activities should happen in someone’s own home within that environment. That is entirely different from the situation that the hon. Gentleman sketched out, in which everyone has to be involved. There would be no obligation whatever on any staff of that establishment to participate in an ancillary manner or otherwise, but in a private residence, such as someone’s room in a care home, we cannot allow that to be prohibited.

As always, the hon. Gentleman is making a helpful and intelligent speech, and I appreciate the distinction that he is trying to draw. There is a lot to say, and I will respond more when I wind up, but does he think that it would be an acceptable condition of a lease—or whatever the living arrangement is for residents of sheltered accommodation or shared places—for the operator to specify that no assisted dying shall be performed in those premises, and for that to be a condition of coming to live there?

10:15:00

My instinct is that it would not. If the Bill becomes law, it would be a lawful choice. The hon. Gentleman may not characterise it as healthcare, but it would be part of healthcare and end-of-life services. We would not accept such stipulations on other healthcare services. I can see a sketch that some may choose to draw; someone mentioned housing supported by a religious institution. The reality is that people do not go out of their way to offend, and they try to live in harmony with those around them. If people are clear that they might actively explore assisted dying as an option, they will not choose to spend their last days in a community where others are ideologically opposed to their choice; it would be uncomfortable for the individual. They would, however, have the legal right to do so.

Having also thought about this overnight, I think there is a freedom-of-association argument. If it were a Roman Catholic organisation designed just for Roman Catholics to live in, such as a home for retired priests, or if it were a Jewish organisation just for Jewish residents, I could see that, but that is not a service that is generally on offer to the public. My concern is whether we could see a situation in which the board of trustees of Hampshire hospitals foundation trust has a majority of people who have a strong religious conviction, and they vote that the service shall not be provided across the three hospitals that the trust manages. If the provision is drawn tightly and the freedom-of-association argument could be made, I could see it. Having said that, there is no institutional objection power in law for abortion: people just do not offer it because they do not have the staff to offer it. It feels to me as though that is what the hon. Gentleman is pointing to.

That is entirely right. The response of public bodies such as NHS trusts is a slightly different issue. I would not want to speak for the Government or imagine what the Secretary of State might say, but it would be inconceivable to me for a quasi-independent public body to decide, on a vote on principle by some local governors, not to offer citizens choices that have been enshrined in law. That is a slightly different point, but I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. The hon. Member for East Wiltshire suggested yesterday that if someone chooses to have an assisted death, everyone in the care home or wherever would be part of it. That fundamentally misunderstands the point; I will go for “misunderstands” rather than doubting his intentions, but some would see it as scaremongering. No one is asking for the right to do it in a communal area, where staff or neighbours are forced to observe or participate in any way. Where people live in their own home, they should have rights and dignity at the end of life, whether that is in a care home or in a private residence. We cannot deny them the choice to access end-of-life options, as set out in the Bill. I therefore cannot support new clause 22.

Does my hon. Friend agree that, given patient confidentiality, it is highly unlikely that other residents of a care home would even be aware?

That is entirely possible. Clearly it is up to the individual concerned to discuss how far they wish to share with neighbours or friends, in the home or elsewhere, but we must not get to a situation in which, as a policy default, someone’s intentions at end of life are broadcast within a certain radius. My hon. Friend is entirely right and helpful in making that point.

I do not want to go over ground that we covered in the later hours of yesterday, but this is sort of the issue that my amendment 533 sought to resolve, albeit via regulations rather than in the Bill directly. I am sure that our colleagues on the Front Bench will be doing some thinking about it. As the hon. Member for East Wiltshire alluded to, in some situations the question of place—of where we will be able to carry out these procedures—is not black and white. I fully appreciate what my hon. Friend is saying, which is that if someone chooses to end their own life in their own home, they should be able to do so. In some cases, however, the Government will need to give further thought to the issue of place. I think that is really important.

In considering the offer of any health or care-related activity, the appropriateness and suitability of the place is always in people’s mind, and clearly that varies. As I mentioned yesterday, we already have a licensing regime under which the CQC specifically licenses places for particular activity. I think my hon. Friend is right, but this is a normal part of decision making in the provision of health services and I do not think we should try to constrain it in primary legislation. However, as I started by saying, I recognise that we must enshrine the rights of individual conscientious objectors, which I think the hon. Member for East Wiltshire is trying to do with amendment 480, and I hope that we can do that, through some route, with the Bill.

I rise to speak to amendments 441 and 484, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell), and in support of new clause 23, tabled by the hon. Member for Reigate. Amendment 441 would amend clause 23 so that there would be “no obligation on any care home or hospice regulated by the Care Quality Commission or the Care Inspectorate Wales to permit the provision of assistance under this Act on their premises.” I think it is clear that “assistance” in this context means the act of administering lethal drugs. That is the sense in which the word is used in clause 18, for example. Amendment 484 would tighten that restriction somewhat by providing that there is no obligation on any hospice to permit “any activity closely related to the provision of assistance under this Act”. New clause 23 would also apply to all regulated care homes and hospices in England and Wales. It would provide that none of those organisations can “be subject to any detriment by a public authority as a result of not— (a) providing assistance in accordance with this Act, or (b) permitting such assistance to take place on their premises.” The new clause would also provide that no public authority can make its funding for a regulated care home or hospice dependent on the care home or hospice agreeing to provide assisted dying or to allow assisted dying to take place on its premises. All the amendments have the same goal: to ensure that the Bill does not harm this country’s hospices. We have heard from many witnesses how much hospices do in providing palliative and end-of-life care. Caring for people who are close to the end of life is difficult and vital work. The people who do that on our behalf include some of the very best in our society. We should all hold ourselves responsible for not making the task of hospices more difficult. The idea that the Bill might do that has been raised with us by people working in this country’s hospices. Hospice UK takes a neutral position on whether assisted dying should be legal in England and Wales, but it has set out clear positions on how the Bill should and should not affect hospices. On funding, its written evidence TIAB 36 states: “If assisted dying is legalised and becomes part of the health service, steps should also be taken to ensure there is no financial detriment to any hospice, whatever their positioning on the practice.” I agree strongly with that argument, for several reasons. The hospice sector in this country receives a mixture of public funds and private or charitable money, including donations and the proceeds of charity shops and fundraising events. Like the rest of the population, the people who work in and run hospices have a mixture of views on assisted dying. Many have strong objections on various grounds. If public funds were made dependent on hospices agreeing to assisted dying taking place, we would see several things happen, all of them bad. In evidence to the Committee on 28 January, Dr Sarah Cox, a consultant in palliative care and president of the Association for Palliative Medicine, said: “I am also concerned about our palliative care workforce, which we know is already in crisis. Eighty-three per cent. of our members told the Royal College of Physicians in 2023 that they had staffing gaps, and more than 50% were unable to take leave because of those staffing gaps. Forty-three per cent. said that if assisted dying were implemented within their organisation, they would have to leave. This has a massive impact on palliative care, in terms of its potential to develop both our funding and our workforce, who are really concerned about this.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 28 January 2025; c. 70, Q83.] In evidence to the Committee on 29 January, Toby Porter, chief executive officer of Hospice UK, said: “If hospices were involved in assisted dying, there is a theoretical risk that that would just reinforce an inaccurate perception about hospice and palliative care: the myth that you are helped along your way by doctors in hospices and hospitals. That is one risk. More briefly, the second risk relates to the duty of care. What do you need for hospice and palliative care services? You need adequate resourcing, which means staff and finances. In terms of staff, the real fragility in the hospice and palliative care sector is a shortage of clinical staff—that is shared nationally with the NHS and other healthcare providers.” Mr Porter also mentioned the evidence of Dr Cox. He told us: “You will know from Sarah Cox’s evidence that the majority of palliative care consultants hold views against assisted dying, many of them very strongly. If the consultants felt, for example, that they could not keep their distance from assisted dying in a 12-bed hospice unit in the way they could in an 800-bed hospital, you could very easily see that if this was not done properly and the consultants deserted the hospice sector, you could no longer offer the specialist care that is so important to the Minister, the NHS and every health and social care provider.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 196, Q256.] Many people would be entirely willing to enter a care home or hospice if they thought they might receive assisted dying there, but others already fear that they might be pressured into taking assisted dying if they enter palliative care. They may be wrong to fear that, but they do. We heard evidence on that point from Dr Jamilla Hussain, who gave evidence to the Committee on 29 January: “I work predominantly with an ethnically diverse population. I have gone into those communities and I have spoken to them about this Bill. What they say overwhelmingly to me is, ‘We’re scared. We’re really fearful that this is going to result in a disproportionate impact on our community. We have seen that through covid and we’re so scared. We already don’t access your services. We’re really worried that we won’t want to access them any more, and we won’t want to access the hospitals.’”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 187, Q245.] That fear will only grow if we use public funds to oblige hospices to permit assisted dying on their premises. Hospices should be able to say clearly to their patients that they do not allow assisted dying to take place on their premises. The dedicated professionals who work in hospices and who deeply object to people being helped to die with lethal drugs must also be protected. They should be free from having to work on premises where something they might disagree with happens. I anticipate that some hon. Members may argue that amendment 484 draws its restrictions too tightly. They might argue that it would mean that a doctor working on a hospice’s premises or making a visit to a patient in a hospice could not have the preliminary discussion about assisted death with that person. However, I want to be clear that these measures relate to the provision of assistance under this Bill. “Provision of assistance” is the phrase used throughout the Bill to refer not to the preliminary discussion, nor to the interviews with doctors, nor to the panel process, but to that part of the process at which the person takes lethal drugs with a doctor present.

10:30:00

There are clear moral and practical arguments for saying that hospices and care homes should be able not to allow people to take lethal drugs on their premises. There are equal arguments for why they should not face losing public funding for refusing to allow assisted death on their premises.

One thing that strikes me from last night’s debate and this morning’s is about whether people would be discriminating. My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central has just spoken about the provision of staffing. My experience is that when we employ people in refuges, for example, occupational qualifications are generally required because of the nature of the business, so we use that legislation to recruit those people.

I think there is a further debate to be had, and I do not have all the answers, but I am concerned about those hospices that have charitable functions, or charitable aims, under the Charity Commission, that relate to a set of beliefs. To give an example in which the principle is the same, we do not say that vegan restaurants are discriminating against meat eaters because they are not providing steak. That is a service that they decide to offer.

Our conversations throughout this debate have been very much about “autonomy, autonomy, autonomy”, but what about those people who want autonomy over how to run their businesses, whether that is from a religious perspective, from an ethical perspective or, for a charity, from a fundraising perspective? It is the month of Ramadan, and one of the obligations on me as a Muslim—one of my five pillars—is giving zakat, which is charity. There is a very clear outline of where zakat can go and what needs it meets, such as educational or other purposes. There are different kinds of charity that I can give for other purposes, but they are specified.

This is obviously a difficult and sensitive area, but does the hon. Lady think, for example, that a women’s refuge run by a Catholic foundation should be allowed to evict a woman who wants or has an abortion?

I absolutely do not think that, because her abortion rights are set out in law. However, I also think that when that woman is going into a refuge, that refuge will make it clear that she may choose not to. It is about empowering both sides. I am grateful for the right hon. Member’s intervention, but let us follow that argument. Let us say that somebody wants to pursue assisted death, and they want to go into a place, but they are informed that that organisation does not want to provide or has not signed up to providing an assisted death. It comes back to the issue that my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central rightly raised, which is that people do not deliberately go out looking to offend people. If we were in that space—I cannot imagine being there, but I am trying to understand it—would we want to access that service, because its religious belief differs from assisted dying as a principle?

Just so I am clear, if a young woman is escaping domestic abuse and goes to a domestic violence space close to her home so that her children can carry on going to school, but finds out once she is there that she is pregnant by the abuser, does my hon. Friend think that that is acceptable?

Sorry, do I think which bit is acceptable?

That the domestic violence protection centre or home can refuse to let that lady stay there because she has latterly discovered that she is pregnant as a result of the abuse and wants to seek an abortion.

Absolutely not. I would be horrified if that were the case. I know we have had cutbacks and we do not have the access, but I cannot imagine any refuge of any religious belief in this country turning away a woman in the situation that my hon. Friend describes.

I am glad to hear my hon. Friend’s answer. I ask that question because I can imagine an analogous situation of a woman suffering from breast cancer who is allergic to opioids but does not know that when she enters the care home. If her cancer reaches a stage of terminality but she cannot pursue palliative options because of her allergy to opioids, assisted dying would be the only option for her to die with dignity and not in great discomfort. Under my hon. Friend’s scenario, that woman would not be able to pursue an assisted death in that care home.

My hon. Friend makes a really important point, and I absolutely hear what she is saying. If the woman were going into that hospice or care home when she was pursuing an assisted death, I am not sure how that would work.

To clarify, in my very clear example—it is a real-life example that reflects the experiences of someone who attended this Committee yesterday—the person has a terminal condition and enters a care home that makes her comfortable and is near her family, but discovers while the hospice or care home is trying to find methods to palliate that she is allergic to opioids and therefore her condition cannot be palliated. In the hon. Lady’s scenario, she would not be able to choose assisted death because that care home has a blanket policy against it. That would discriminate against that young woman, who has an allergy to opioids that means that she cannot be palliated.

I thank my hon. Friend for her intervention, which gives me a lot to think about. That is why I said that I genuinely do not have the answers. I want to have this discussion so that I can make the choice whether to support the amendments. I want to explore this issue further, because it is really important.

The conversation has moved on a little, but I was just going to make the point that the amendments that I tabled focus very much on the rights of the employer with respect to what they expect from their staff. I wonder whether it would be helpful to explore that a bit more.

If we are talking about employers and employees, not people who are accessing the service as service users, I hope the scenario to which my hon. Friend the Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge referred would not happen.

There is much to get into, and I will try to respond a bit more when I speak again. I do not want to revisit the whole question of palliative care but, on the scenario set out by the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge, the strong advice that I have received from palliative care professionals is that it is not accurate to say that somebody’s pain cannot be palliated. It might well be that there is a difficulty with particular opioids, but there are other palliative care options available to everybody. No palliative care doctor ever says that there is nothing they can do.

She said exactly that.

Well, we have been over the whole question of palliative care and alternatives to assisted suicide; nevertheless, I wanted to challenge that scenario. On the suggestion that there is a comparison with an abortion service no one is suggesting that a woman who goes into a refuge, discovers she is pregnant and wants to have a termination is somehow obliged to have it on the premises of the refuge, which does not believe in abortion. That is not a scenario that could happen, because that is not how abortion operates. What we are suggesting is that somebody who arrives in a care home or hospice that does not want to facilitate assisted suicide would not be able to receive such assistance there. There is no objection to their believing in or desiring an assisted suicide; the point is to protect the institution. I recognise the difficulty with the specific case the hon. Member for Penistone and Stocksbridge raised. Nevertheless, the alternative is to have blanket permission for any resident of any care home or hospice to insist that they can receive an assisted death in that home or hospice, despite what the rest of that community and the management might want. Indeed, the patient might have signed a contract specifying that they will not seek an assisted death in that home or hospice. There is much more to discuss, but I hope that that is helpful for the hon. Lady.

I thank the hon. Member. What he said is really helpful. I want to come back to the issue of opioids. As someone who suffers from chronic pain, my understanding is that I have a choice over whether I take opioids or other medication. So when people are allergic to opioids, they can potentially access other medication for pain relief.

A lot of the focus in the last few minutes has been about a care home having already made it clear that it does not support the process of assisted dying and the fact that anyone entering it would therefore know that. However, there is a clear scenario where some care homes might change their position over time. Someone may be in a care home for many years, but then the care home might change its position and say, “Actually, now we do not support assisted dying.” In that scenario, people would actually have gone into that setting thinking that it supported assisted dying. Although I am sympathetic to the issue of place being made clear, it has real ramifications. Again, I do not think it is as black and white as saying, “This care home already had a set position.” Some care homes or other settings might change their position over time, even when residents are in situ for a long time. That is the big problem with this particular clause: the situation is not as straightforward as some Members have perhaps suggested today.

My hon. Friend makes a very valid point: it is not straightforward. That is why people are tabling amendments and having this discussion—to iron this issue out and make sure we nail it, to make the process as safe as possible. There are laws in our country that protect people’s religious views—for example, we have the Equality Act 2010—and those laws are there for a reason. Speaking to all the amendments, I would not want to see hospices not being funded because they take a certain position. Also, from an employer’s perspective—I appreciate the scenario that has been mentioned, and I will come back to it—they may be recruiting in accordance with their values. We are all in politics, and we all sign up to a particular view of politics. When we recruit our staff, we put on the application form, or other information, that we would like applicants to believe in our value system. That is not discriminating against somebody who has a different value system. That would be my response.

I just want to nail this point about employers and recruitment. We have said that no organisation will be obliged to provide these services, in exactly the same way as with abortion. The example I would give is this: a provider of women’s services says, “We are not providing abortion. But, in addition, we are going to ask staff members we are recruiting if they believe it is ever legal for abortion to take place.” That is exactly the same test of belief, although on a different medical procedure, that my hon. Friend is proposing in this instance.

That is not what I am saying. I am saying very clearly that when we recruit people to any job, we ask them to have the values that we have as an organisation. I appreciate my hon. Friend’s intervention, but what he says is certainly not the point I am trying to make, and I cannot imagine anybody—even for religious reasons, and even if they have changed their position—genuinely treating somebody in that way. We just do not do that.

10:45:00

I appreciate that, but as my hon. Friend has said a number of times over the last few weeks, some of these things unfortunately do happen. As I am sure we all do, I have had casework involving people with guide dogs saying that they have been refused certain services, including taxis, even though that is a civil offence because they have a guide dog with them. We have said a number of times that there are flaws in every single system. I appreciate that we want to adopt a good-will attitude, and I am sure the vast majority of settings across the country will operate on that basis, but we know that, in certain circumstances, that is not always the case. That is why, if we put anything in the Bill, it needs to have real clarity and not unintended consequences.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that we need to clarify this. To sum up, this comes back to some of the questions I have for the Minister, and I wonder whether he can answer some of them. I say that especially because the Committee has had lots of debates on amendments tabled by the Government via my hon. Friend the Member for Spen Valley giving the Secretary of State statutory duties. Perhaps the Secretary of State will be able to clarify this issue and make it watertight using regulations. Have we had an assessment of what the impact would be on the provision of healthcare if assisted death were permitted in either a hospice or care home, and is the Minister happy to share that assessment with the Committee? For example, if palliative care specialists are saying, “X amount of people would no longer want to be involved, so there is a real risk of an exodus of specialists from hospices,” we need to know whether there has been an assessment of that. Perhaps the Government can help us to understand that real concern from palliative care specialists. Given that the Minister mentioned his visit to a hospice this week, has he had any discussions with Care England care homes about allowing this process to happen in care homes themselves? How have the concerns of clinical staff about allowing an assisted death in their healthcare facility been assessed, and have those concerns been put to him? How many staff have indicated that they would need to leave the NHS, care providers or hospices if an assisted death were mandated on their premises? Coming back to beliefs, there is also the element of charitable bodies. Have we spoken to the Charity Commission about the impact on those bodies if they were pressured by the Bill into changing their charitable aims? Would they be protected from providing assisted death because of their charitable aims? For me, this debate has raised more questions than answers, and there is much more discussion to be had. I am happy to listen to the hon. Member for East Wiltshire, as I can then intervene and probe further.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship this morning, Ms McVey, even though it is a little later than originally planned. Amendment 480 is intended to extend the category of those protected from being obligated to participate in the provision of assisted dying under clause 23 from registered medical practitioners, registered nurses and registered pharmacists or pharmacy technicians to all individuals. The amendment also seeks to clarify what an individual can refuse to do under clause 23(1), by setting out a non-exhaustive list of activities under the Bill that an individual would not be obligated to participate in. The amendment also specifies that the ability not to participate in the provision of assisted dying does not override any duty to signpost someone to information about assisted dying; to perform clerical, secretarial or ancillary acts; or to perform life-saving acts or grave injury-saving acts. The amendment would introduce significant legal uncertainty and may mean that a person who had opted in to providing services under the Bill could refuse to continue to do so or could use clause 23 as a justification not to perform their duties as described in the Bill. For example, they may use the amendment as justification for not checking eligibility criteria, discussing prognosis or palliative care options, or performing other requirements under the Bill. Amendment 480 may also conflict with other provisions. It states: “no individual is under any duty…to be involved, directly or indirectly, in the provision of assistance”, in accordance with the Bill. That may, for example, mean that although doctors are required under the Bill to notify a cancellation, they would be allowed to refuse to do things under the Bill, even if they have opted in to providing assisted dying services. It is not clear which provision would take precedence, which could allow the doctor to decline to notify a cancellation, by arguing that they are relying on clause 23(1). Amendment 483 is intended to extend “the range of activities which medical practitioners and other healthcare providers are not under an obligation to provide to include activities closely related to the provision of assistance” under clause 23(1). Amendment 484 is intended to expand the protection from being subject to a detriment by an employer at clause 23(2), to include where a registered medical practitioner or health professional refuses to participate in activity closely related to the provision of assistance. The term, “activity closely related to the provision of assistance”, is not defined, and that could create uncertainty as to what types of activity it is intended to cover. The Bill does not, as currently drafted, specify where the provision of assistance may or may not take place. Amendment 441 would prevent there being any obligation on a care home or hospice regulated by the Care Quality Commission or Care Inspectorate Wales to permit the provision of assistance to be carried out on their premises. The effect of the amendment may be to limit the places where assistance could be provided. It may thereby reduce access to an assisted death for those residing within a care home or hospice, if a care home or hospice did not wish to allow an assisted death to be provided on its premises. The amendment could preclude some people from accessing services under the Bill if they were near the end of life and leaving their usual place of residence was therefore impeded. It may result in inconsistent treatment for patients when seeking to access an assisted death. That could potentially engage a person’s rights under article 8 of the ECHR—the right to respect for private and family life. Amendment 481 has two parts. The first aims to ensure that employees cannot participate in the assisted dying process in the course of their employment if their employer has chosen not to participate in assisted dying. The effect of the amendment could be to limit the places where assistance would be provided, and it may result in inconsistent treatment for patients when seeking to access an assisted death. That could engage a person’s rights under article 8 of the ECHR—the right to respect for private and family life. The explanatory notes suggest that the second part of the amendment seeks to ensure that employers require employees to provide or not provide assisted dying under schedule 9 of the Equality Act 2010. That schedule enables an employer to specify that having a protected characteristic is a requirement of a job when having that characteristic is crucial to the post and a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The ability to specify occupational requirements is conferred by schedule 9 of the Equality Act, and reference to it in this amendment would not have any additional effect. The purpose of new clause 22 is to provide that the owners or occupiers of a premises would not be obligated to permit the self-administration of an approved substance on their premises. This right to refuse would not extend to a person who has an interest in the land but who is not occupying or operating on those premises, such as a landlord. It is unclear if the term “premises” would apply to a residential property, care home or hospice. As a result, the amendment may mean that someone who is terminally ill and is residing in, for example, a care home or a hospice could be required to leave that care home or hospice in order to receive assistance under the Bill if the care home or hospice owner did not wish to allow assisted dying on their premises. That could engage a person’s rights under article 8 of the ECHR—the right to respect for private and family life.

Another example raised by the hon. Member for East Wiltshire was about hospitals under certain trusts—because of the word “premises”. In the Government’s view, would hospitals and other such facilities beyond hospices and care homes also be included within this new clause?

As I was saying, the scope of the term “premises” is unclear. Is it residential property, care home, hospice or indeed hospital? That is one of the challenges with the drafting of the amendment: the scope and definition of the term is not clear.

We are going to get to the question of the NHS provision, but, surely, if it is the decision of Parliament and the Secretary of State that assisted suicide should be provided through the NHS, then that is what will happen. It might be that there are some trusts that will have some sort of autonomy—to the extent that they can decline to deliver certain services—but, if this is a healthcare treatment that is regulated in that way and if it is to be set out as something that shall be provided by the NHS, surely hospitals will not be in a position to decline to deliver, if they are indeed NHS hospitals. The purpose of these amendments is to protect private and charitable providers. Does the Minister agree?

I agree with the sentiment of the hon. Gentleman’s intervention. The challenge is that the way in which the amendment is drafted could well lead to unintended consequences, because the scope is not clear. If we are not clear what the scope is, it could potentially be exponential. New clause 23 would prevent regulated care homes and hospices from facing any detrimental consequences for not providing or permitting assistance in accordance with the Bill. This also means that their funding must not be conditional on them providing or permitting such assistance to take place on their premises. As a result, a person who is terminally ill and is residing in a care home or hospice could be asked or required to leave that care home or hospice in order to receive assistance under the Bill, if that care home or hospice provider does not wish to allow assisted dying on their premises. In such circumstances, the care home or hospice provider would not be able to be placed in any detriment as a result of any action or decision taken. This could engage a person’s right under article 8 of the ECHR. Further, public authorities would not be able to persuade care homes or hospices to provide or permit assistance to take place on their premises by offering additional funding if they agreed to do so. Equally, if a public authority gave funding to care homes or hospice providers in recognition of their agreement to provide or permit assisted dying on their premises, and that provider later decided not to provide or permit the assistance, and spent the funding on other matters, the public authority would not be able to recover the funding if it were given unconditionally. Clause 23 sets out that no registered medical practitioner or other health professional would be under any duty to participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill. It also sets out that employees cannot be subject to any detriment by their employer for exercising their right to either participate or not participate in the provision of assistance in accordance with the Bill. Further amendment to the clause will be required on Report to ensure that the opt-out in clause 23(1) and the employment protections in clause 23(2) work effectively alongside the duties imposed on health professionals in other provisions of the Bill as amended in Committee. I hope those observations were helpful.

Thank you for stepping into the breach this morning, Ms McVey. Clause 23 provides that there will be no obligation on medical practitioners and health professionals to provide assistance as set out in the assisted dying process. We know doctors and other health professionals hold a variety of views on assisted dying. A significant number are in support of what this Bill sets out to do, and the experience from other jurisdictions is that that number increases once it is seen to be working safely and effectively in practice. Others, of course, would object to being involved at any stage and I am very respectful of that. The Bill is about giving terminally ill people choice and autonomy, but it is absolutely right that the principle of autonomy is extended to registered medical practitioners, health professionals and others. As such, I turn to amendment 480. I agree with the intention behind the amendment—nobody should have a duty to be involved with the provision of assistance in accordance with the legislation—and I think there is consensus across the Committee on that. However, I am concerned about the drafting of the amendment, the lack of clarity around being directly or indirectly in the provision of assistance, and the framing of the selective list of activities. I fear that the amendment could have unintended consequences and an impact on continuity of care, and I take on board the Minister’s comments about the significant legal uncertainty that that would create. I therefore cannot support the amendment as drafted but, as I have said, I am happy to work with the hon. Member for East Wiltshire to consider an alternative amendment that would better achieve the aim of ensuring that no one has an obligation to take part in the assisted dying process.

11:00:00

We have had a good, powerful debate about institutional opt-outs. The hon. Gentleman said that he did not think an abortion could take place within a women’s refuge. My understanding is that women may be given drugs to have an abortion at their place of residence, so I think that is not strictly true. Amendments 441 and 481, as well as new clauses 22 and 23, amount to what is understood as an institutional opt-out. That sounds like a simple principle, but as our discussions have shown, it is not. International experience shows that different jurisdictions have different approaches to this matter, and we should take the opportunity to learn from their experience.

Research on the impact of institutional objections in the Australian state of Victoria shows that the ability of institutions to opt out can create considerable harms. Supportive staff and medical personnel have been prevented from discussing the assisted dying process, and in some cases denied access to their patients. The delivery of legally authorised substances has been blocked, and the taking of the substances has been banned. As a result, which institution a person was in changed their ability to exercise their legal right to an assisted death, and some were blocked from doing so. One relative of a person who had chosen an assisted death was quoted in the study as saying that institutional objections were a “significant challenge” that

“created a whole lot of stress on what was her last day…It will always be a great sadness for me that the last few precious hours on Mum’s last day were mostly filled with stress and distress, having to scurry around moving her out of her so-called ‘home’.”

We should not lose sight of the fact that the overwhelming majority of people who request an assisted death will already be receiving palliative and/or hospice care, although we know that many will choose to die at home. I am very sensitive to the fact that people who run institutions where the assisted dying process might be accessed may hold very sincere and deeply felt views, but it does not feel right that, were the law to change, people in charge of institutional policy could deny the choice of an assisted death to the terminally ill patients in their care because of those views.

I am particularly concerned about amendment 441, which relates to care homes. As I said yesterday, many terminally ill people want to spend their final days and weeks at home; that is where they choose to die. If a patient is living in a care home, that is their home, and they may have been living there for a number of years before becoming ill. Can it be right to ask them to leave their home if they choose to have an assisted death? Like others, I am also concerned around the concept of shared ownership and sheltered accommodation, as well as limited access in rural areas.

These are sensitive issues, and there is a range of views across the various professions involved in end of life care. Hospice UK recognises that, which is why, representing its members’ different views, its formal position is that it has no collective view. It recognises that staff, volunteers and hospice trustees will look at the Bill’s implications in a variety of ways, and we should give them the time and space to do so, rather than the Bill’s dictating what they should or should not do. We probably all have hospices in our constituencies and local areas, which we visit and have good relationships with, and we probably all have family and friends who have benefited from the care of those amazing places—I know I have. That local dialogue is important—almost as important as what goes into this legislation.

Obviously, the sentiment that we should work with hospices and let them set their own policy is absolutely right—that is the purpose of the amendment—but does the hon. Lady acknowledge that the Minister just said that if any hospice attempts to prevent assisted dying from taking place on their premises, there will be human rights claims? They can have all the consultations and conversations they want, but unless the Bill specifies that they are allowed to opt out, they will be forced to do it.

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, and I am aware of the Minister’s comments. This will be part of the discussion as we take it forward. That is why this debate is really powerful. In their written evidence, the trustees at Willow Burn hospice, based in the UK, told us: “Our Mission is to deliver hospice care of the highest standard to our patients and those important to them...We also believe that we should support and enable people to make the choices that matter to them.” They said they had not decided their position on assisted dying and remained “open minded about possible future actions. We believe this stance is in the best interests of patients and their families and reflects the wishes of our community.” I welcome that open-minded approach and their commitment “to put care, compassion and dignity at the heart of everything” they do. Contrary to what the hon. Member East Wiltshire has said, the picture is not black and white. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Ipswich in that regard. Colleagues may remember the evidence given to the Committee by the CEO of Hospice UK, Toby Porter. He clarified for us that institutions do not function in the same way as individuals when it comes to conscience-influencing decisions. He told us: “There is this idea that your individual opinion guides everything, but with a hospice charity the opposite is true. As many Members will know because of their own work as trustees, the trustees and leadership of a hospice team are required to put personal opinion and interest to one side and always act in the best interest of the charity’s beneficiaries, who are the population.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 195, Q255.] It is also important to remember that international experience shows that up to 30% to 40% of patients who sign up to the assisted dying process ultimately do not access it. Palliative care may meet their needs, or they may simply change their mind. However, we also know that the reassurance and comfort that the choice of an assisted death provides alongside other treatment and care is really important to them, and I do not believe that reassurance should be denied to some people because of the institution they happen to be in.

The hon. Lady is outlining the issues very effectively. No one, of course, is saying that anybody who works at the hospice that may object has to participate. It may say, “No one here will assist.” We have talked about the importance of place. To a certain extent, I have a right as a tenant in a place where I am resident. It seems that my hon. Friend the Member for East Wiltshire is proposing actively to prevent someone from being able to access this in a place that they choose. That feels to me the wrong balance. I wonder whether that is broadly where she is heading.

The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point. The word that we have used a lot—maybe not enough in some respects—is choice. That is important for individuals, but it is important for institutions as well. Putting an institutional opt-out in the Bill would risk creating confusion and distress for patients and their loved ones, and indeed for staff and volunteers.

Does the hon. Lady have any concerns about what this position would mean for the end of life workforce? I know we are here to make law, but we cannot ignore the practical consequences for end of life care. If we do not have this carve-out, we could lose a lot of wonderful and great people who work in end of life care and who feel that they are not able to participate, if the hospice cannot specify.

The hon. Lady is absolutely right to acknowledge the wonderful workforce working in end of life care, but there is a range of views within that workforce and there is the individual opt-out. No one has to be involved in this process if they do not want to be. That is clear in the Bill as it stands. I hope that, working together, we can make that even clearer if needed. Under the Bill, doctors and health professionals already have the ability to opt out for any reason, wherever they work.

Pharmacies have not been mentioned. Would they have the ability to opt out?

It is a good point. My understanding—the Minister might correct me—is that pharmacists currently are within the definition of health professionals, but if they are not, that is an important point, which would be covered by making the change to ensure that no one is under any duty. However, I will definitely check that. Mr Porter also said: “hospices evolved out of the community. They exist because communities wanted better deaths. In the end, it is the job of institutions to evolve to fit the values and laws of society as they evolve, rather than vice versa.”––[Official Report, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Public Bill Committee, 29 January 2025; c. 202, Q264.] The polling on assisted dying shows significant public support for a change in the law, which is one of the main reasons we are here discussing the issue today. The latest figures from the British social attitudes survey, published just this week by the National Centre for Social Research, show that support at 79%, which is unchanged or slightly up on a decade ago. Although I cannot support these amendments, this is an important debate. I think we have conducted ourselves extremely well over the past 24 hours. I think it is important that we continue the debate respectfully and sensitively.

I, too, am very grateful to you for rescuing us, Ms McVey; thank you. I also thank the hon. Member for Spen Valley: it is nice to be commended for our good conduct, so I am grateful for that. This has been a very interesting debate, and I thank all hon. Members for participating. I appreciate the fact that we have made some progress in understanding each other and potentially improving the Bill, although I regret the lack of support from the Government Front Bench for the amendments that I have tabled. Let me just refresh memories on the purpose of my amendments. The Bill promoter has tabled amendments to clauses 24 and 25, which we will come to and which keep the phrase “providing assistance to a person in accordance with this Act”, but add to it these two other phrases: “performing any other function under that Act” and “assisting a person seeking to end their own life in accordance with that Act”. Those amendments expand the protection from criminal and civil liability. They mean that performing any other function under the Act and assisting a person seeking to end their own life, in connection with the doing of anything under the Act, are both protected from criminal and civil liability. But the hon. Lady has not tabled a similar amendment to clause 23, and there is a real risk. The British Medical Association, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society and the Royal College of Nursing, as I mentioned yesterday, have all warned that the protection of conscience clause is limited solely to the final act, rather than applying to all functions under the Act. I appreciate that the hon. Lady expresses a commitment to trying to ensure that we do cover everybody and all appropriate actions and activities that take place, but I suggest that that is what my amendment would do. In response to the objections to the amendment, I appreciate the sudden interest in precision in drafting.

It is not sudden!

Well, every time that those on my side of the debate raise detailed, particular points we are told, “Oh, the spirit of the text is clear. We’ll sort that out later. It’ll come in guidance.” We are told that we should not be nitpicking, embroidering and so on. Anyway, I appreciate the attention to detail, and I want to respond to some of the points. With respect, the Minister made a pretty tendentious suggestion that a doctor could opt in to assisted dying and take part in some of the procedures but then suddenly decide to neglect performing others, and that that would not be negligent. I cannot conceive of any court or tribunal conceding that it would not be negligent not to fulfil the obligations under the Act once the procedure has begun—once the doctor has made commitments and already undertaken activities to progress an assisted dying case. The hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire objected on the grounds that the amendment might give a gardener or cleaner the right to opt out. Proposed new subsection (1B)(b) of clause 23 actually makes it clear that “ancillary” activities are not protected by the conscience clause, so the gardener would not be off the hook—under the amendment, the gardener would still have to mow the lawn. I recognise that the drafting might not be perfect, but I emphasise that the PBL “Guide to Making Legislation”—by the secretariat to the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Cabinet Committee—makes it clear that Government should not object to Back-Bench amendments on drafting grounds. If there are issues with particular phrasing that cause the Government or the promoter concern, that can be addressed subsequently, so I regret it if the Minister is using drafting issues to justify a refusal to support these amendments. On new clause 22 and the issue of premises, which we have discussed very interestingly, a couple of objections have been raised. The first relates to shared ownership schemes, which we are all familiar with, particularly for elderly people. The answer is simple. The corporate owner under a shared ownership scheme is not in occupation. Being in occupation has a particular meaning in land law, and it is not the case here that a tenant genuinely in occupation of their own premises could somehow be denied their right to have an assisted death in their own home because of the freehold arrangement of the premises they occupy. I am grateful for the indication given by Members, particularly my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire, that there may well be circumstances in which it is appropriate for particular premises to opt out of the obligation to facilitate assisted dying, so that a particular institution would have the right to deny permission for assisted death.

11:15:00

To clarify my remarks, I was not necessarily saying that they should have the right to deny, but by default they would if they were, in effect, a closed community that was discriminating in favour of like-minded individuals—a home for retired Catholic priests, for example. By default it would be someone who was unlikely to offer those services. The other point to ask is: if I am in a hospice, in my bed at the last with visitors coming to see me, and one of those visitors is the doctor who is coming to administer to me, I am not quite sure how that would be prevented, unless people are willing for there to be a wrestling match at the door of my room.

Under the terms of amendment 441, the owners of the premises would be entitled to deny access to anyone who is seeking to deliver an assisted dying service on their premises. They would be entitled to prevent that from happening, yes. Obviously, that is an extremely unlikely scenario; nevertheless, it is one that I think we need to contemplate. I thank my right hon. Friend the Member for North West Hampshire for his clarification. I had understood that he had acknowledged that it would be appropriate for the management of a Catholic care home to specify that there shall be no assisted dying on the premises, but he is suggesting that it would be illegal or inappropriate for the management to make that stipulation; it just would not happen organically, because no one would want that in that place. I regret that, because I think it should be appropriate for the management of a place—not in some sort of vindictive mission to deny people a particular right or service—to convey to everyone else who lives there that this is, as it were, a safe space in which there will not be state-assisted suicide. I think that is a reasonable hope and expectation that many residents will want when they live in a certain place. Once this becomes normalised, once it becomes 5% or 10% of deaths, as happens in parts of Canada—if this becomes a normal and standard way to die—I think many people will not want to live in communities in which that practice takes place. I am afraid that we will find a demarcation, a bifurcation in society, for those who do not want to live in an assisted suicide community. It would be appropriate for them to have the option of going to live in a place where they know that will not be taking place. I concede, by the way, that for many of the institutions that we are imagining here, these shared communities, it would be perfectly appropriate and understandable for it to be an option for residents. Let us think about the different sorts of places we are talking about. The Duchess of Somerset almshouse in my constituency—the sort of place we have in Wiltshire—is a lovely place, beautiful. It has lots of Liberal Democrat voters in it, which I know because I knocked on all their doors—unfortunately, the wrong sort of Liberal Democrat. I can imagine many of them supporting the right in their home, behind their own front door—which they have there—to have an assisted death, and I am sure that the other residents of that place would concede that that is appropriate. In other places in my constituency, however, a hospice being the most obvious one, neither the management nor the other residents would be comfortable—in fact, they would be extremely uncomfortable—with the sense that assisted suicide might be practised in the next-door room. Whether it is performed, as it were, by the hospice staff, or merely facilitated by them—it would be extraordinary were it somehow to take place without the facilitation of the staff who managed the facility and look after the patients—for it to take place on some sort of parallel track would be an extreme imposition on that hospice and its management. It would be extremely disquieting for everyone else who lives and works in that place. I therefore think it is an appropriate consideration to give such places the right, at a management level, to opt out. I also want to express my deep concern about what we heard from the Minister—his suggestion that we should not give either individuals or institutions the absolute right to opt out of the facilitation of assisted suicide because we think the European convention on human rights might challenge that. He suggested that a court in this country or Strasbourg would overrule a decision or would negate this law, or challenge it, if we passed it with these amendments to protect hospices and individuals. We would then have a court citing international law in an attempt to overturn this law. I am very concerned about that in terms of both parliamentary sovereignty and the Government’s position. Surely, if the Government think this is the right thing to do, we should do it even if we fear an ECHR challenge. This is a craven submission to a lawmaking body that is not sovereign in our country and would be only advisory. I regret what the Minister for Care said and hope that the Justice Minister can clarify that the Government would not concede an ECHR challenge if Parliament decides to insist on individuals’ rights to decline to participate in assisted suicide. In response to my challenges on that point, the hon. Member for Spen Valley suggested that it would be an interesting topic for a future conversation. This is the moment to have that conversation. We are deciding on amendments now that will insist on people’s right to decline to take part in assisted death. There will be no further opportunity to insist that people have that right to opt out except on Report, which will be a limited opportunity. Yesterday, the hon. Member for Luton South and South Bedfordshire made an interesting point that had not occurred to me—whether a husband living with his wife in their own shared home could legitimately deny her the right to assisted suicide in their home. It is a very good challenge. It is certainly not the policy intention, as I am sure the hon. Lady appreciates, to enable one partner to deny the other the right to assisted suicide in their shared home. I ask her to accept that that is not the intention. The purpose of the amendment is to give an occupier the right to refuse assisted dying. With the hon. Lady’s permission, given that this clause will be voted on only next week, I propose tabling an amendment that would address her concern. I am happy to work with her or the Government to get to the point where we are satisfied that that concern has been addressed, because she is absolutely right: in someone’s own home, their partner or the person who shares the home with them should not be allowed to deny them. We have hashed out the question about protected beliefs in relation to amendment 481, so I will move on.

I am wondering about the difference between my own home with my partner, and my care home with lots of people that may or may not be strangers, and why I should have the right in one but not in the other.

I hope my right hon. Friend will understand that there is a difference between occupying one’s own home and living in a community under conditions set by somebody else, which is what happens if someone lives in a care home. There are terms and conditions. People have to comply with the rules of the place and have obligations to their fellow residents. In someone’s own home, whether they are living with a partner or not, they have absolute rights. That is the difference. If someone signs up to live in a care home, they have to follow the rules of the place, just like in a hotel. In someone’s own home, they can do what they like, as I am sure my right hon. Friend does.

We should acknowledge the reasons that people go into residential and nursing care homes. They go into them because they need day-to-day help to live. Would the hon. Gentleman reconsider what he has just said? It seems to fundamentally discriminate between people who are able to live at home, have families or carers around them and can operate in that way and people who need to go into residential, and particularly nursing, homes.

The right hon. Lady clarifies the point very well. I concede—that is right. When someone goes to live in a care home, they yield, by necessity, a whole set of freedoms that one has in one’s own home. That is the consequence of the stage of life they are at, the conditions they have, and indeed their own choice to live in that particular care home.

They might not have one.

I appreciate that—there might be very little choice or no alternative. I am speaking in terms of the reality of life. We can do everything we can through the law to obviate reality—to give people as much autonomy as possible, even though they are very dependent on other people. That is why it is so important to consider the autonomy of the elderly, the frail and people with disabilities or who are ill. They require other people to give them what fully healthy and able-bodied people are able to do for themselves. I recognise that I am suggesting that somebody who lives in a care home would not have the same freedom of action as somebody living in their own home.

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