I welcome the Armed Forces Act 2006 (Continuation) Order 2025 and place on record my wholehearted support for our armed forces and the role they play in providing national security and defence of this nation, both at home and deployed on operations across the globe.
As a new MP last year, the first Delegated Legislation Committee I sat on considered the previous continuation order. I was very proud to be able to do that. As a veteran and now the MP for a constituency in Huntingdon with British, US and wider NATO forces, I know first hand how vital political support for our military is today. Although we have moved past the period of kinetic operations that typified my generation of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world feels more dangerous today than it did at that time. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 precipitated a sea change in the nature of warfare. The manoeuvre warfare of old that we saw during the initial invasion, unchanged in a generation and familiar to those of my generation and several before that, has been replaced by cyber, drones, grey zones and subthreshold activity that feels like warfare but not so long ago would have been the preserve of science fiction or an episode of “Black Mirror”. That is the thread that must run through the strategic defence review and it is in such areas that we must ensure our armed forces are equipped to compete in across domains.
I do not doubt the Government’s sentiment in wishing to increase defence spending to ensure that we remain a credible and capable NATO ally, and that we continue to punch above our weight on the world stage. As an island nation in a notionally geographically safe part of the world, the legacy of our imperial past is one of world policing, post-colonial responsibility and expeditionary warfare. Our decentralised, persistent nuclear capability ensures that we are a nation that continues to be taken seriously, but my concern is that we are in danger of being benched, as those NATO allies closer to the fray, who feel the threat from Russia on the eastern flank and the High North most keenly, will, with their vastly increased defence budgets and whole-of-society approaches to defence, make us a second-tier nation.
The pledge to uplift defence spending to 5%, with the claim that we will achieve 4.1% by April 2027, is simply not credible. This smoke and mirrors approach reflects the fact that the sums do not add up. We saw only yesterday that the Government’s botched welfare reform has left a £4.5 billion gap in the spending plans, which is coupled with a further £1.25 billion from the winter fuel U-turn. Where will that money come from? Spending cuts or higher taxes are now inevitable, and growth projections look at best sluggish.
Meanwhile, the Government claim that they can reach 2.6% on defence plus security, but they refuse to break down the quantum of that spending. How much of that 2.6% is actually on hard defence, and how much is on the intelligence services? By our estimates, the number is somewhere in the region of 0.15%, which suggests that the real defence budget as a proportion of GDP is only 2.45%. If we bear in mind that a sizeable proportion of that figure is solely our continuous at-sea deterrent, the figure for our conventional forces drops to somewhere in the region of 1.7%—a long way from the numbers that the Government are putting forward.
The 4.1% figure that the Government are now puffing their chest out about includes 1.5% on national security and general resilience. This contains everything from UK arts spending to rural broadband. Under the chapter on pursuing asymmetric advantage, paragraph 25 details that the royal research ship Sir David Attenborough plays a part regarding understanding environmental changes in the Arctic ocean, which means that Boaty McBoatface is included in the Prime Minister’s defence spending figures. Do we honestly think that Russia and China will take that seriously?
The huge capability commitments that we see in the SDR and in the forthcoming equipment plan far outstrip our spending power. We are quite literally writing cheques that we may never be able to cash. Not only have we pledged to create an entirely new domain in cyber, but we are about to embark on an essential modernisation process which now simply does not look funded.
The global combat air programme—a project not due to be delivered until the back end of the next decade, but one that runs the risk of being outpaced by technological change—is exquisitely capable, but in 20 years’ time, will a sixth-generation fighter need to be crewed? It may be crewed in 2040, but GCAP’s out of service date is likely to be beyond 2070. Do we honestly believe that crewed aircraft will be relevant by then? Furthermore, how will we deliver the loyal wingmen in the system of systems that it forms part of?
Drones are clearly the future of warfare, and although we continue to use Ukraine as the proving grounds for a new capability against a near-peer adversary, the British Army should be on the front foot, rapidly equipping and training with drones, rather than using e-sports as the only drone warfare training of note. I see the Minister taking notes. While he is writing stuff down, let me suggest that a two-stage warhead a la Javelin on an FPV—first person view—drone is surely the next generation anti-armour capability that we need, thus consigning enfilade fire from a defilade position to a thing of the past, despite my own anti-tank roots.
Meanwhile, Project Grayburn means that we will replace 150,000 SA80A3 rifles by 2030—a significant logistical commitment, in terms not just of changing the weapon system, but of possibly changing the nature of the ammunition as well. Although that will increase stopping power, it will also remove the purpose of 5.56, which I am sure we do not need to go into in the Chamber today, and everything that goes with that, including rifle racks, ammunition pouches, magazines and mag chargers. This is the nitty-gritty of changing a weapons platform that really does take its toll on exactly how we would implement that. We also intend to replace nearly 6,000 Land Rovers by 2030, which is another significant logistical commitment in terms of training soldiers to drive them, putting those vehicles out, and making sure that we have the logistical trail in place to be able to service those vehicles. These smaller but still resource-intensive tasks place more and more strain on our personnel.
Only today, I understand that the Ministry of Defence police have cut 1,500 roles. With the Military Provost Guard Service under-resourced and unable to replace them, the burden has fallen on regular soldiers to augment their guarding tasks. Such additional tasks with weekend guards erodes goodwill and continues to contribute to retention problems.
Only a few weeks ago, I was in Poland visiting the RAF conducting the NATO air policing role, interdicting Russian penetration along NATO’s border. The personnel there were rightly extremely proud to serve, but at the same time the strain that the current operational tempo was placing on those in specialist roles was immense, requiring them repeatedly to spend long periods away from home. Incredibly, the additional penalty that they pay is a financial one, with all but those on the highest LSA bands finding that the pay they receive for being separated from their families is often, at best, negligible and, at worst, a financial hit. Second-order effects mean that an individual who may be being paid more to be on operations is not physically at home to help with the tasks there; that means having to pay for a babysitter rather than having their spouse look after the children. They have to pay for a dog walker rather than being able to leave the dog at home, for when the spouse returns. Those costs add up, and they simply are not factored into those extra payments that people receive for being on tour.
Meanwhile, we continue to see those who have already served their nation questioning whether they continue to enjoy the support of those they have risked their lives to serve. The concerns around the treatment of Northern Ireland veterans leave Operation Banner veterans rightly very concerned about their futures and about being held accountable for actions from over 50 years ago. Without clarity on whether protections will be guaranteed for those who serve their country, future recruitment could suffer hugely. People serving their country will lose confidence under this Government that they will not one day be treated as a criminal. It raises questions over my own service and that of my peers. The goalposts could one day move for us, and I know that that applies to former service people on both sides of the House. I see the Security Minister on the Front Bench who served so proudly in Afghanistan.
I welcome the Armed Forces Act 2006 (Continuation) Order 2025, and I was proud to play my small part in the history of one of our finest institutions. I recognise and acknowledge the sentiment and intent of Defence Ministers to deliver for our service personnel; I do not call that into question for one second. However, I wish to place on record my concerns that the limitations placed on them by Treasury accounting and the smoke and mirrors approach to hitting our NATO pledges will put the cross-party consensus on defence at risk, and the fiscal rules and botched legislation will reduce the Chancellor’s spending power in a dangerous new world. This Government must demonstrate their front-footed commitment with tangible results, not just pledges.