Football Governance Bill [HL]

Committee (6th Day)

15:57:00

Clause 22: Scope of powers to attach or vary discretionary licence conditions

Amendment 172

Moved by

172: Clause 22, page 15, line 3, leave out paragraph (c) Member's explanatory statement This amendment removes the ability of the IFR to restrict a club’s overall expenditure.

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 173A in the name of my noble friend Lord Moynihan and Amendment 173B in the name of my noble friend Lord Hayward. The amendments in this first group carry on from our discussion on the licensing regime on the previous day of Committee. The amendments rightly deserve their own group since they relate to the specific financial conditions that clubs will be required to abide by as part of their licensing conditions. My Amendment 172, which is in the name also of my noble friend Lord Parkinson, would remove Clause 22(3)(c). That provision permits the regulator to restrict the overall expenditure of a regulated club. We do not believe the regulator should be able to attach a discretionary licence condition which places an overarching restriction on a club’s expenditure. This is surely an overreach of the regulator’s financial powers. The point has been made on many occasions, not least by the Minister, that the aim of this Bill is to ensure the financial sustainability and resilience of football clubs. How would telling a club how much money it may spend aid it in achieving that goal? The key thing here is not expenditure but profit. Spending £50 million on a player might sound like a lot, but if that player is worth £60 million, I think we would all call that good business. An expenditure cap could stop that happening. If the goal is financial sustainability, surely the focus needs to be on profit or cash, not on expenditure. It is almost like a manager of a football club saying, “Look, it’s not just good enough that you go out and win today. We want you to score in the first half, then the other team can equalise and then we need you to score the winner in the last couple of minutes of the game”. It is trying to micromanage and overengineer. No one can ever do that.

16:00:00

In a similar way, we are trying to make sure that we are looking at cash and profit and not expenditure. By trying to restrict expenditure, we are trying to achieve a degree of control which is overbearing, hyper-restrictive and not necessary or workable—and actually it could be detrimental to the sound finances of a club.

This power to restrict overall expenditure—I am happy to be corrected by the Minister—is almost unique among regulators. As far as I am aware, the FCA does not have a blanket power to restrict expenditure. It can do so only if a firm is under investigation or has been found to have seriously breached FCA rules and is deemed a risk to the financial stability of a market.

This Bill does not contain any safeguards or guidance over how, when or under what circumstances the regulator may impose such expenditure limits. It could, if it wanted to, impose them at any time. This is a very specific concern that I hope the Minister will address. Even the possibility of the regulator imposing such expenditure limits would unnecessarily encroach on the ability of clubs to effectively manage their financial sustainability and resilience.

I will leave my noble friend Lord Moynihan to speak to his Amendment 173A, and may come back to that, but I will speak some more to Amendment 173B, because my noble friend Lord Hayward is unfortunately ill and not able to join us today. This is regarding the issue of capital buffers. I must start by thanking the Minister for a good discussion on this with the team. I think we all understand what we are trying to do here and there are good intentions behind it. At the same time, often noble Lords have a misunderstanding of this area.

I have heard noble Lords mention on a few occasions how bad it was that, for example, a club only had £25,000-worth of cash. That is not looking at the whole picture, because it does not matter how much cash there is; it is whether the club has assets to cover it. Most companies—nearly every company in the FTSE—will have net debt rather than cash. That is called an efficient use of your balance sheet. Anyone with a mortgage—which, let us face it, is a lot of people—will have net debt rather than overall cash. Again, I think most people would say that buying a home is a responsible thing to do. What matters is that you have the overall assets to cover your liabilities, and your overall balance sheet. This amendment seeks to require the regulator to look at the overall financial health of a club and look at all the assets—the players on their books, the stadium and all of them. I hope that noble Lords would agree that is very sensible.

That brings me to my final point. There is also a clause stand part notice in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Parkinson, looking to remove Clause 22 in its entirety. A concern has been brought to me by many clubs. When I say clubs, I mean the Brightons and Brentfords of the world, which I think we would all agree are model clubs and exactly the sorts of clubs we want to support so that they thrive. There is a stage in their life when they are like any start-up business; you are investing and your costs will be higher than your revenue. That is exactly what those clubs did. They invested in players and had a good plan behind it. You could say, at that stage, that they were unsustainable.

At that stage, they were totally dependent on their owners to bankroll them—in this case, Tony Bloom. A reasonable regulator could then say, “Ah, well, you’re dependent on your owner; what if they change their mind? How sustainable is that?” Or we could have unintended consequences. Matthew Harding, I think we would all agree, was a very reputable owner of Chelsea; he tragically died in a helicopter crash. Chelsea then were in severe financial difficulties. Again, I do not think any of us could have catered for that. Roman Abramovich, until the invasion of Ukraine, was seen as a pretty reputable owner. I do not think anyone could have predicted that, either.

The consequence in all those situations is that the regulator is likely to take into account those risks and say “Well, okay, we need a buffer, we need some sort of cash, some sort of liquidity ratio”, as in the case of the FCA—I have heard the shadow regulator mention this—which often deals with banks. This is exactly the concern of the Brentfords of the world. I was written to by their chairman, who said:

“This could create in effect a ‘closed shop’—where only a handful of clubs can genuinely compete for success and European qualification, more akin to other, less successful European leagues. This would be much less exciting for fans and would undermine the Premier League’s global appeal. For Brentford FC, a club that has risen against the odds to the Premier League, such restrictions risk stifling our ability to grow and compete with larger, established clubs. This could unintentionally entrench the dominance of the ‘big clubs’, reducing opportunities for ambitious teams and diminishing the league’s competitive integrity. Preserving a system that supports success stories like Brentford is vital to maintaining the Premier League’s unique excitement and global appeal.

I had the opportunity to meet with Paul Barber, the Brighton CEO, the other day, and he said very similar things as well. Those are precisely the sorts of clubs that had the plan, that invested early on, where their expenditure was higher than their cash, which would be restricted by these types of moves. That is the whole concern about Clause 22.

I do appreciate, as I mentioned before, the Minister and her team, and their good intentions in doing this, but I really fear that Clause 22 could have a massively damaging effect to aspiring clubs from the Premier league and the lower divisions. Remember that Brighton and Brentford came out of lower divisions; often, they were down in League One before they started their ascent. That will affect the overall attractiveness of not just the Premier League but of all the English Football League teams as well. That is why we are concerned and calling for the removal of the whole clause. I beg to move.

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 173A standing in my name on the Order Paper. Here, we are referring to Clause 32, and it is the Secretary of State who will be taking a power beyond this Bill, not even by positive resolution but by using a much lighter negative resolution procedure, to determine the time period for the approval of new owners and offices. I quote from the Government’s memorandum to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which states that “the contents of the IFR’s suitability tests may likely change, compared to when the Bill is introduced … Once the contents of the IFR’s tests are set in statute, the Government will be better placed to set the time window in regulations”. This is, after all, an important clause which addresses the scope of powers to attach or vary discretionary licence conditions. I would have thought that the consultation period should be very specific and placed on the face of the Bill. There is a risk here that the regulator may not consult the clubs in the leagues and just hurry the process through, which I am sure is not the intention, but why on earth not put it on the face of the Bill—not only which clubs and leagues are affected—which is not part of the Bill, as we have previously debated? The very least the Government can do on this occasion is amend this clause, given the scale of these powers, and change the scope of the manifold discretionary licence conditions that the Government, not the regulators, are imposing on football clubs here. They must consult them. It seems eminently sensible that they should consult them, and I would have thought that the Minister would be the first to say that they will consult them. If they will, I cannot understand why we would not put that in the Bill. My amendment says simply that, before submitting a request under subsection (6), the regulator must consult, first, the clubs; secondly, “each specified competition organiser”; and, thirdly, such other persons as the regulator considers appropriate. The consultation, as it stands, is not specific enough and risks the regulator not consulting the clubs and leagues on this issue. I really do believe that there would be every intention for the regulator to do so, so let us just clarify that in the Bill so that there is no danger that the regulator would avoid that possibility. I hope my amendment gains the approval of the Minister when she comes to wind up.

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 173B, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hayward, who I hope feels better soon. It introduces a number of key principles for the governance of capital buffer requirements that the IFR could potentially impose. This amendment fills an important gap in the Bill. I am also supportive of other amendments encouraging the IFR to adopt an outcome-focused approach, allowing the leagues to develop detailed financial rules within the overall statutory framework, as this will help to preserve the competitive balance with the design of common rules for all clubs. I am sure that the Minister will agree that this approach reflects the light-touch model that she has been describing. As we heard in our debate on Monday, the Bill allows for a more interventionist approach for the IFR with individual clubs, through its discretionary licence conditions. In these cases, it is important that some clear parameters are set out in the Bill to ensure that any capital buffer requirements that may be developed are workable, proportionate and reflective of football’s realities. Football clubs operate in vastly different financial contexts, even within the same pyramid. At one end, a relatively modest capital buffer of, say, enough to cover six months of operating costs might have saved a club such as Bury, for instance. But, at the other end, the challenges faced by Premier League clubs are of an entirely different scale. For a Premier League club relegated to the Championship, or indeed a club expecting but then failing to qualify for the Champions League, I understand that the financial shock can amount to as much as £90 million to £100 million. Crucially, the way these clubs manage such risks is fundamentally different from clubs in lower leagues. At this level, as we have heard, clubs do not rely on cash reserves alone. Instead, they utilise a range of financial tools, including player trading, which is a core part of football’s economic model, as well as secured credit facilities—often backed by guaranteed revenues—and parachute payments, which I know we will discuss later and which help with the transition on relegation. Without explicit reference in the Bill, there is a danger that the IFR might impose overly rigid liquidity requirements that would privilege clubs with access to unlimited working capital—I am thinking, for instance, of those backed by sovereign wealth funds—while unfairly disadvantaging others. This amendment would ensure that capital buffers reflect the real-world financial tools that clubs use to manage risk, including non-cash assets, as I have just described. The single most important liquid asset for football clubs towards the top of the pyramid is their players. As I am sure my noble friend Lady Brady can tell us, player trading is often one of the first mechanisms that they turn to when managing financial shocks—yet the Bill provides no clarity on how the IFR will treat these assets. Even when player liquidity is recognised, valuation of these assets is critical. Under current UEFA financial fair play rules, players developed through academies are often valued at zero, for instance, based on book value, rather than their actual market worth. The purpose of UEFA’s rules is different, but, if copied by the IFR for the purposes of capital buffers, for instance, this could penalise clubs such as Crystal Palace, Southampton, West Ham or Arsenal, which have brought through many talents into their first teams in recent years. This amendment therefore seeks to ensure that the IFR adopts sophisticated valuation methodology, including proper independent valuation of players and, in particular, a proper recognition of the value of academy players. Without these safeguards, the IFR risks undervaluing clubs’ most significant assets, forcing them to meet capital buffer requirements that are, in practice, unnecessary. We have heard many times in this Committee that the competitive balance is the lifeblood of football, but poorly designed capital buffer requirements could easily and accidentally disrupt this balance. We must avoid this outcome, so I hope that even if the Minister is unable to accept the level of specificity in Amendment 173B, she will recognise that this area of the Bill is a source of anxiety for clubs. I hope she will agree that the principles within this amendment are important and that it is the Government’s intention that the IFR pursues a tailored approach, informed by guidance, that will protect the competitive balance and investability of the English game.

16:15:00

My Lords, I declare again my interest as counsel for Manchester City Football Club in recent disciplinary proceedings brought by the Premier League. I offer my support to Amendment 173A from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. We discussed the principle of consultation on Monday evening. I repeat that, in my view, consultation with clubs and specified competition organisers is vital to ensure that they have confidence in the operations of the regulator. It is also vital to ensure that the regulator is operating, as he or she would want to do, in a fair manner. I very much hope that the Minister will give consideration to that and bring an amendment back on Report, in relation to Amendment 173A and earlier provisions of the Bill. I am far less keen, I regret to say, on Amendment 172 from the noble Lord, Lord Markham, which seeks, as I understand it, to remove from the Bill the discretionary licence condition relating to restricting the clubs’ overall expenditure. I suggest that it is important to see the limits of that power of the regulator, because Clause 22(4) provides that this discretionary licence condition “may not impose restrictions on expenditure of a particular kind or a particular transaction”. As I understand it—the Minister will say whether or not this is correct—the regulator would therefore not have the power, using the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Markham, to say, “You can’t buy a particular player for £50 million”, as that would be outside the scope of Clause 22. It is not difficult to see that there may be circumstances —one hopes that they would be very rare indeed—where the regulator takes the view that its objective under Clause 6 “to protect and promote the financial soundness of regulated clubs”, which is what it is there for, would be damaged if it did not have a power to restrict in exceptional circumstances a club’s overall expenditure.

My Lords, I am beginning to wish I had jumped up before the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, because I have come to a similar conclusion. For every success story in football, if you look you will find a failure. It is often the case when people come forward and buy themselves the dream team, then something goes wrong. You will find that especially in the lower levels. There are stories of those clubs, with Bury et cetera copping out, that have more expenditure going out on wages than they have coming in from revenue. If the regulator does not have the power to stop that speculative spending in certain circumstances, it is being denied a basic power over one of the biggest problems that has led to instability, particularly in the lower parts of the game. After some of the discussions we had on this, I really cannot see how we can support the lead amendment here and still have the central thrust of the Bill. How will the regulator assess the slightly strange finances of investing in people who are always one trip away from being worth nothing? One accident on a training field and your principal asset is worth nothing. How is that taken into account and balanced, which would require a level of expertise? Does the Minister have examples of where information will be gathered to make a sensible assessment on this? On speculative purchases, we have heard about deals with agents, et cetera, on other parts of this Bill; it is important to bear in mind how these are done. If the Minister has information on how that information will be gathered and those assessments made, I would be very interested to hear it.

My Lords, I hope the Minister will bear in mind that the repeated statements “For every winner there is a loser”, “The Premier League is in terrible danger” or “Football is in terrible danger” just ignore the fact that football is tremendously successful in this country. If for every winner there is a loser, there would have been no progress in the last 20 years. There has been progress and enormous success. We now have the greatest football league in the world. The statement that “Your biggest asset is only one accident on a training ground away from being worth nothing” completely ignores the fact that all football assets—all players—are insured. If, God forbid, your best player was injured irrevocably on the training ground, you would receive an enormous insurance payment, so it is just not true. The actual commercial realities of what is going on in football in this country seem to be completely mis-stated so often in this Chamber. I hope that the Minister will take heed of the tremendous success that private enterprise, unfettered by an onerous regulator, has created in the world of football in our country.

I will sum up on a couple of new points. I always welcome comments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, because his forensic brain is really helpful in making sure we get to the bottom of what we are talking about. I have only just had a chance to look up Clause 22(4); this is about the regulator’s ability to restrict expenditure. It says that the regulator “may not impose restrictions on expenditure of a particular kind or a particular transaction”. That can be open-ended, unless the particular kind or particular transactions are defined somewhere; they could refer to anything. I do not know if the Lord, Lord Pannick, is aware of what they refer to, but perhaps the Minister could follow up on that, either now or in writing.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Markham, Lord Moynihan and Lord Hayward, for tabling these amendments, and the noble Lords, Lord Markham and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for giving notice of their intention to oppose the question that Clause 22 stand part of the Bill. Like other noble Lords, I wish the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, a swift recovery and hope to see him back for the next day of consideration by this Committee. I will start with Amendment 172 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Markham. It is vital that the regulator has the appropriate tools to address systemic financial risks that might arise. Indeed, in recent years clubs have faced a number of systemic risks, such as during the Covid-19 pandemic, when many clubs faced financial difficulties, some of which are still felt by clubs today. The ability to restrict clubs’ overall expenditure may be the most appropriate and effective tool in certain circumstances. The noble Lord, Lord Markham, asked about limiting expenditure, which is already used within football. Some leagues already have rules limiting expenditure on wages and limits on permissive losses. I reassure him that the regulator is further constrained when taking action here. First, we have made it absolutely clear that the regulator has the ability only to restrict overall expenditure. It cannot place restrictions around specific transactions or types of transactions, to micromanage spending in that way. Furthermore, the regulatory principles enshrined in the Bill in Clause 8 include the principle that the regulator should act proportionately. We would expect this to be reflected in any discretionary licence condition that the regulator sets. Restricting overall expenditure might be the most proportionate and least interventionist or burdensome response to these risks. Without this tool, it might have to apply a different response that may be more restrictive or less effective. I turn to Amendment 173A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, to which the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Addington, also spoke. While we appreciate the intent, we are confident that clubs and competition organisers would already be captured under the current wording in the Bill, of persons the regulator “considers appropriate”. As I have outlined in previous debates, the Government do not believe it is necessary or appropriate to put an exhaustive list of stakeholders in the Bill. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, has a different view, but we feel that the regulator will be best placed to determine which persons are appropriate to consult depending on the decision in question. However, I look forward to further discussions with him on this point. The regulator is required to consult anyone it considers appropriate. Failing to do so would be a breach of its statutory obligations and could result in legal challenge—

I was not for a minute suggesting that there should be an exhaustive list that should be consulted; I was simply highlighting three very specific groups of people who should be consulted, which I think the Minister agrees with. There should be no doubt in the minds of the Committee that if you simply list clubs and competition organisers and then say “such other persons as the regulator considers appropriate”, you capture everything she has just said and make it very clear that the regulator will approach and consult clubs and competition organisers—which is the whole purpose behind this clause and surely one that has her full support. Why not simply clarify it in a very simple additional nine words?

I hear what the noble Lord says and look forward to further discussions with him on that point, but we feel that the regulator will be best placed to determine which persons are appropriate to consult.

I am sorry to keep on at the Minister about this, but can she really think of any circumstances in which it would be appropriate for the regulator not to consult the competition organisers and the clubs in this context? If the answer to that is “Of course not”, let us put it in the Bill and make it clear.

I recognise the strength of feeling on this point and look forward to discussing this further as we proceed through the Bill’s progress in this House. Amendment 173B is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, and the noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, spoke to it in his absence. Its intention is to place procedural requirements around the regulator’s use of capital buffers as part of a liquidity requirement. First, I reassure noble Lords that the model of financial regulation is about making clubs more financially resilient. The noble Lord, Lord Markham, raised an issue that has been discussed previously in this Committee, where owners tragically die and the issues this can cause clubs, which is that clubs will have to submit detailed financial plans, including contingency plans. This could include what the club would do in the event of a financial shock such as the sudden loss of an owner. If the regulator has concerns about the level of financial risk exhibited in a range of scenarios, it can place discretionary licence conditions on clubs in limited areas. That does not necessarily mean that owners will have to put funding in up front. If the regulator does reach for liquidity requirements, there are already safeguards. Indeed, the amendment seeks to require the regulator to have regard to a number of considerations, but in each case the Bill already requires this. When assessing whether to attach the discretionary licence conditions needed to meet the appropriate financial resources threshold condition, the regulator will already be fully informed of the club’s financial position because clubs have to submit a financial plan, which would already include detail of any existing liquidity buffers. Consideration of proportionality and existing financial rules is covered by the regulatory principles in Clause 8(c) and (d). Again, consideration of the impact on competitiveness and investment is covered by the regulator’s duties in Clause 7(2). Therefore, this is all already accounted for.

16:30:00

However, this amendment goes further, in a way that the Government do not feel is appropriate. It would also require further detail about what constitutes “liquidity” in the Bill. However, it must be for the regulator, with an in-depth understanding of clubs’ finances, to determine what tools are suitable. Remember, the purpose of liquidity buffers is not to be punitive but to ensure that clubs are resilient. We expect that the regulator will determine that liquidity buffers can take a range of forms, not just cash buffers. The Bill as drafted already allows for this.

The regulator may determine that player value constitutes liquidity, but we must caution against always mandating this in legislation. Players are not liquid assets. They require willing buyers, can be sold only within certain windows and, as the noble Lord, Lord Addington, made clear, can get injured and lose their entire value overnight. While I appreciate the view of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan of Chelsea, that insurance would cover this, it remains the case that the regulator is best placed to determine what may constitute a suitable buffer and when. If player valuations contribute to liquidity, as they already can within the Bill, the regulator will of course need to determine their value. However, it would be wholly inappropriate to mandate that clubs and competition organisers determine the methodology for working out players’ fair market value. This would need to be objective.

On the intention of the Noble Lords, Lord Parkinson and Lord Markham, to oppose Clause 22 standing part of the Bill, Clause 21 outlines the use of discretionary licence conditions. These can be used to bring clubs up to the threshold requirements for a full operating licence, if necessary. They can also be applied to clubs with a full licence if there is a risk that they might drop below the threshold requirements.

Clause 22 sets out the scope of the powers that the regulator will have to attach or vary a discretionary licence condition. Under the financial resources threshold requirement, discretionary conditions may address only four areas: debt management, liquidity requirements, restricting a club’s overall expenditure and restricting a club’s ability to receive illicit finance. This fourth area, enabling the regulator to restrict the club’s ability to access funding that it has reasonable grounds to suspect is connected to serious criminal conduct, is integral. It will empower the regulator to limit illicit finance, which is inherently unsustainable for a club.

Under the non-financial resources threshold requirement, conditions may relate to only one of three areas: internal controls, risk management and financial reporting. As outlined in the previous clause, the regulator can also attach discretionary licence conditions to advance its systemic financial resilience objective, which is specifically to address systemic risks or structural issues by applying conditions to multiple clubs, or even to all licensed clubs. This clause limits the scope of that to only conditions that relate to debt management and liquidity requirements, and those restricting the club’s overall expenditure.

In order to future-proof the regulator’s regime, the Secretary of State will have the power to amend the areas that discretionary licence conditions may relate to. However, this can be done only if the regulator makes a request in writing to the Secretary of State explaining why an amendment is needed. Before doing this, the regulator must have carried out a consultation. This means that the Secretary of State cannot amend the regulator’s powers to attach discretionary conditions unilaterally, against the wishes of the regulator. This will limit the risk of unwanted, politically motivated scope creep in the future.

For those reasons, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments or their intention to oppose Clause 22 standing part of the Bill.

I thank the Minister for her response and thank noble Lords for all the contributions to the debate on this amendment. On Amendment 172 and the expenditure cap, the Minister referred to league rules on permitted losses, and that is exactly the point I am trying to make: permitted losses are different from expenditure. I completely get why you might have rules trying to prevent permitted losses, but with permitted expenditure you can spend a lot and still make a profit, and that is a good thing. Maybe we can explore further whether Clause 22(4) allows clubs, despite everything, to still spend money on players. As per the example I gave earlier, I am not quite sure that it does, but again, it would be good to consult or work on that later. On Amendment 173A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan, as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I do not think any of us could envisage the regulator not consulting the clubs and the competitions, so it seems sensible to have that in the Bill. Again, I hope the Minister will be able to look at that. On Amendment 173B and my noble friend Lord Hayward’s point about capital buffers, this really is an area of huge concern. The Minister said, “Well, if you’re reliant on an owner, maybe they need to provide more examples of how they could cater for that financial shock if they were to die”. The trouble is, as with so many clubs at that stage, that was exactly the Brighton and Brentford model—they were reliant at that stage on the owners bankrolling them behind what was a very sensible plan. But if, God forbid, something had happened to them during that stage, clearly, they would have gone, and if they had been asked to put aside some money as a buffer against that, that would have made their plan much harder to achieve. I know it is the view of both clubs that they may well never have embarked on those plans in the first place, because it was tough enough to begin with, and having to set some money aside makes the hurdle even higher. So again, I would appreciate it if we could return to that issue. The last point about this clause overall, which goes right to the point the noble Lord, Lord Addington, made, is that there is a fundamental difference here. He said that for every success there is a failure, and that we have to stop that speculative spending. With Brighton and Brentford, it absolutely was speculative spending. With any team that invests in players ahead of their revenue, that is speculative spending. That is the excitement of the league and of the game: there are no guarantees of success behind any of that. But if we seek to restrict that, we are seeking to restrict the whole competitive element of the game we love: football. The reality is that we cannot point to many failures; I think there have been two since the war. I do not want any failures, but are we really trying to prevent any club trying to embark on those success stories— I hope we are seeing it again now with Wrexham, who have come very far—because we want to protect against any failures whatsoever? That is the fundamental difference we are talking about here. We have seen examples of asset stripping, and I absolutely agree that we want to guard against it. But owners wanting to put in a lot of money in order to really get behind a club, invest in players and gain promotion—to me, that is the fundamental spirit of the game we all love. I therefore hope that we will be able to return to that issue, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 172 withdrawn.

Amendments 173 and 173A not moved.

Clause 22 agreed.

Amendment 173B not moved.

Clause 23: Procedure for attaching or varying financial discretionary licence conditions

Amendments 174 to 174B not moved.

Clause 23 agreed.

Clause 24: Commitments in lieu of financial discretionary licence conditions

Amendment 175 not moved.

Clause 24 agreed.

Schedule 6 agreed.

Clause 25: Procedure for attaching or varying other discretionary licence conditions

Amendment 176 not moved.

Clause 25 agreed.

Clause 26: Part 4: overview and interpretation

Amendment 177 not moved.

Amendment 178

Moved by

178: Clause 26, page 19, line 16, at end insert— (c) respects and promotes the protection of human rights and prevents modern slavery (as set out in section (Human rights and modern slavery considerations)).”Member's explanatory statement This amendment requires an individual to respect and promote the protection of human rights and prevent modern slavery in order to meet the individual ownership fitness criteria.

My Lords, our Benches at the back here have three amendments in this group. They cover modern slavery, human rights and slave ownership. The purpose behind the amendments is to flesh out from my noble friend the Minister how the independent football regulator may approach some of these issues. As we have heard on a number of occasions during debates on the Bill, football clubs are more than just businesses. They are community institutions; they have values, and they have provided some of the best examples of taking on social issues over the last few decades. We are trying to establish whether there should be a test that mandates having robust human rights due diligence and the ways in which owners can be held to account and prevent harm. State ownership and those two issues are inevitably bound up. We will recall from the ownership debates that circulated around Newcastle United when it was taken over some years ago the considerable concern expressed. In updating the individual ownership fitness criteria to include reference to human rights and modern slavery, we have taken account of Amnesty International’s proposed amendments to the previous Premier League test. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which the UK was the first country in the world officially to implement through a national action plan, requires all states and businesses to prevent, address and remedy human rights abuses where they occur. It is our contention in putting these amendments forward that we need to have a view on state ownership but also on the role that the IFR may play in trying to establish thresholds and principles around such issues as modern slavery and human rights, because these things are important. They are important to football fans; they are important to the moral and guiding principles behind our businesses, and, more generally, we should use the opportunity of having a regulator for football that has a view on these issues when it comes to judging the merits—or otherwise—of those who seek to own important institutions such as football clubs. I beg to move.

16:45:00

My Lords, there is no doubt that the amendment means well. It is laudable that we encourage football clubs and the football community to take seriously these important issues around human rights and modern slavery. My concern is about the wording, because I believe that the inclusion of such an amendment in the Bill in respect of the appropriateness of an owner will give rise to unnecessary litigation. Let us remember that the amendment does not distinguish between an individual and a football club. If it were to do so, it would be more sustainable in terms of developing policies around human rights and combating modern slavery. However, it does not do that. It is nebulous in its wording, and I think the drafting would cause grave difficulty because it references individuals—the owner, in essence—meaning that there will be problems down the line in how the amendment is interpreted. It is a value judgment as to whether an individual respects human rights. What does that actually mean in primary legislation? How do you measure it? What is its objectivity? What does success look like in terms of respect? The wording is very loose and would be very difficult—

Our wording mirrors the wording in Clause 28, which says: “A person may not become an owner of a particular regulated club unless”, so I do not think that the wording is the point here.

I understand the point that the noble Lord makes, but I am reading the amendment that he has tabled. The third word is “promotes”. What does that mean in terms of an objective criterion for how an individual would promote human rights, and for how he or she would protect the human rights of those involved in football and the club that they were involved with? The amendment is an example of potential regulatory overreach. Seeking to enforce it would be a straightforward prima facie case of ultra vires actions, because it would be unenforceable. Having said that, I have great sympathy with the noble Lord’s Amendment 200 on state ownership of football clubs. We will have a good debate on that. However, on Amendment 178, the noble Lord is gilding the lily. Although he has good intentions, it is not a workable amendment. It would damage the interests of football clubs and be difficult for the regulator properly to enforce.

My Lords, I support Amendment 178. Indeed, I have come in specifically to speak on the issue of modern slavery and I declare an interest as a co-chair of the modern slavery parliamentary group and vice-chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation. I profoundly disagree with what the previous noble Lord said about individual ownership fitness criteria in relation to modern slavery. Under the Modern Slavery Act 2015—Section 56, I think—it is wrong to have a supply chain that operates on the exploitation of those who provide the goods for a company. So, if you have an individual owning a company who makes his money on the exploitation of people in the supply chain, it should not be all that difficult to discover it. That is absolutely where the regulator should be promoting modern slavery issues when he looks at the individual fitness of a person who wants to take over a club. I see the point on human rights, although we have the Human Rights Act and it is fairly clear under that Act what the rights are of various people that might be impinged by an individual who did not have appropriate fitness criteria. I can see—

I thank the noble and learned Baroness for most generously giving way. If we have statutory sanctions already in place to deal with this behaviour, whether it is the Human Rights Act or the Modern Slavery Act, surely she is proving my case that this is regulatory overreach. My point is that we do not need further legislation when it is already covered by the existing legislation.

I do not want to deal with human rights. I have come here to deal with modern slavery. I disagree with the noble Lord. The problem is that Section 56 is voluntary and not mandatory. Consequently, companies are not obliged to follow what happens. In a 2019 review led by Lord Field of Birkenhead, of which I was a part, we picked up the fact that it was not mandatory. Consequently, if the regulator does not have to think about modern slavery, he would not have to look to see whether or not an individual taking over a club is making his money in a wholly inappropriate and extremely wicked way. Because it is not mandatory, it is important that someone else looks at it. If it were mandatory, I would entirely agree with the noble Lord.

Is it the case that the reason it is not mandatory is that Parliament did not think it should be? Therefore, the question is: why should it be imposed in this context and not generally?

Section 56 says that it is utterly wrong to have companies that make money by exploiting people down the chain—consequently, it is wrong. But, for reasons I do not know but can guess, the last Government, who put in place this very good bit of legislation, presumably did not want to offend businesses. I understand that there are problems in making it mandatory but, if somebody is making money that they are going to put into a football club by exploiting other people down the chain, that is something we should not want our clubs to be involved in.

My Lords, I was unable to join your Lordships at Second Reading and have decided to add my name, and speak, only to amendments on areas where I have relevant knowledge. I speak as somebody who has for a number of years been a co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Democracy and Human Rights in the Gulf, and also led the first ever debate on sportswashing in your Lordships’ House in March of this year. Therefore, I will speak in favour of the amendments I have added my name to—Amendment 185 and in particular Amendment 193 from my noble friend Lord McNally, who cannot be here in his place today. I also strongly support Amendment 200 on state entities. It is interesting listening to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, and other noble Lords talk about human rights and the Human Rights Act. Let us be clear. What the regulator will be doing here is having a statutory responsibility for ensuring that a takeover of a club takes into consideration human rights issues. Under the Human Rights Act an individual can bring a case based on their feeling that their human rights have been undermined. If you are in Saudi Arabia, Qatar or the UAE, you cannot bring that case as an individual whose human rights have been undermined, particularly when it comes to a state entity potentially taking over a football club. That is what these amendments are about. Rather than just financial issues, when it comes to a takeover of a club, as a statutory point of principle human rights should be looked at by the regulator independently to decide whether a potential director is a fit and proper person to be able to take over and manage an English football club. That is what this debate is about. It is interesting that certain issues in the Bill are specific, such as money laundering, so the Government have accepted that the regulator can look at specific issues. These amendments ask that another area specified in the Bill should be human rights abuses carried out not just in the UK but elsewhere in the world, particularly when it is a state entity or an individual linked to a state entity. The reason why this is important is that the concept of sportswashing, where sports clubs are bought particularly to try to influence soft power, is really taking hold. The previous Government understood that when it came to taking over media in this country. There was an issue to do with how state-entity organisations, including their potential human rights abuses, actually stopped takeover of the media. I am sure that the Minister, when it comes to arguing the Government’s case if they are not minded to do this, will look at the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 as the cloak of respectability, where the powers already exist for this to be looked at. Well, let us be clear. These were introduced with the aim of holding individuals and entities accountable for human rights abuses. However, these regulations are not proving efficient in stopping foreign Government entities from owning Premier League clubs, or any league club. The Newcastle deal, where the Saudi Public Investment Fund took over Newcastle, happened 15 months after these regulations came into force. These regulations target individuals and specific entities, not entire Governments or sovereign wealth funds. This is a critical loophole which we can see in the case of Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, which now owns Newcastle United and operates a state-controlled entity that presents itself as independent of government. As a result, it evades direct scrutiny under the sanctions framework. There is also a lack of transparency with these regulations, because decisions about who we sanction are not clear and are at the whim of an individual Minister. That is why I believe there should be the provisions in the Bill laid down in Amendment 200 and the other amendments which I put my name to. The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations lack the reach and enforcement power to prevent foreign state entities linked to human rights abuses owning English Premier League clubs. That is why these amendments are required. Otherwise, I believe that our national game, football, will potentially remain a platform for authoritarian regimes or individuals who have committed human rights abuses and will be used as a sportswashing exercise that will tarnish their own reputations and image and not defend our national game.

17:00:00

My Lords, in speaking to Amendments 178, 185 and 199, I draw attention to my interests in the register. I thank my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss for her contribution to the debate this afternoon. Among the detail of what a regulator may or may not look like, we spent some time noting para football and how it can change and improve lives, and almost change the world. I would imagine that modern slavery is something that we would want to try to impact. Major games, such as the Olympics and the Paralympics, have made strong commitments in this area, as well as around trafficking. Their success is up for debate, but surely football and sport should try to leave the world a better place, and so I believe that these amendments are important. Briefly, Amendment 199 is about the ownership of clubs. We have debated Reading and Aston Villa at length. This amendment merely seeks to strengthen the owners’ and directors’ test.

My Lords, I think a very strong case has been made this afternoon by the noble Lords, Lord Bassam and Lord Scriven, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson to require the regulator to assess whether a prospective owner of a football club respects and promotes the protection of human rights and prevents modern slavery. I am very sympathetic to the principle. I am just concerned about the practicality. Is it really practical to expect that the regulator is going to have the expertise, time or ability to conduct a general assessment of whether a particular person—who may, for all I know, be based abroad—is generally respecting human rights and preventing modern slavery? This is going to take an enormous amount of time and money, and I fear that it would distract the regulator from the more day-to-day, prosaic functions that Parliament will be asking it to perform. I would be pleased to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, how this is going to work in practice, because I am very sceptical.

Does the noble Lord accept that it already takes place for certain individuals and entities with regard to the regulations that I pointed out, and that the Government already have a system in place to do this for takeovers? The issue is that there are gaps, which is why it needs to be in this Bill, particularly around football and state entities.

I entirely accept that there are detailed regulations, in particular in relation to money laundering, but that is a far more specific area, where there is a government system and a whole army of people with expertise to assess those matters. The question is whether we wish to make it a function of the independent football regulator to have a whole department that is concerned with this. I see the force of the principle, but I remain sceptical about it in practice.

My Lords, this is one of the best debates we have had in Committee to date. I am equally sympathetic to the points made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the interventions of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, and the concern about the practicality of this, but none of that is covered in Amendment 200, which is in this group. Let us just assume, hypothetically, that a state-owned entity acquiring a football club in England has an excellent human rights record and no problems with modern slavery. Under Amendment 200, it would be banned from owning a club in England because it is state-controlled. All the points that have been made are relevant and important, but Amendment 200, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is very specific and states that: “No state-controlled club may be granted an operating licence”. There is no reference to human rights abuses or to any of the important issues regarding the supply chain, which have been mentioned. It simply states that a foreign-owned, state-controlled company cannot own an English football club. If we pass this amendment, immediately we would then have to divest the Abu Dhabi United Group of its majority ownership of Manchester City and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund of its ownership of Newcastle United, to mention but two cases. How have the Premier League and UEFA addressed this to date? They have focused on the word “control”. When the Premier League addressed the Newcastle ownership test, it received “legally binding guarantees” that the state of Saudi Arabia would not have control over Newcastle United in the event of any deal. However, the Bill goes much further. It grants powers to the regulator that are not just about control. An individual has to be considered who has “a higher degree of influence” over the ownership of a club. The control test that UEFA and the Premier League currently use, which is a tough test that takes up a lot of time and energy, is overridden by a requirement in this legislation—for the first time in sport—to test whether an individual has a higher degree of influence. There can be no doubt that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, as chair of the PIF, has a very high degree of influence over that board —he appoints it. Indeed, a Minister from that board has been appointed to be chairman of Newcastle. If we go forward and accept Amendment 200 as it stands, what would we be saying to football, to Newcastle, to the Qataris—who might want to acquire a company, which there has been much speculation about, not least in this Committee—and to Abu Dhabi in relation to Man City? It would drive a coach and horses through the current ownership of the Premier League. It would be a very serious decision by the Government to take state control over who owns the football clubs in this country. I say that because it comes down to the degree of state influence that is behind the regulator. The Government have said: “Regarding the scope of the tests, we recognise the trade-offs involved, and are aware of the range of corporate structures behind clubs”, and they specifically mention here sovereign wealth funds. They go on to say: “We are designing the legal scope of the tests with these challenges in mind”. They call them challenges, to be faced down at the request of government. We would have an open back door in the Bill if we accepted the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, straying into foreign policy in a way that we do not currently do. We have plenty of legislation elsewhere on the statute book allowing the Government to intervene if they felt they needed to in a certain circumstance. The Government have therefore further confirmed the scope of the regulator. To me, it is incredibly important that the regulator is not given so many powers as to require it to have direct influence. I lost an amendment on Monday night, when I asked for that at least to be defined and for consultation to go out to find out what “significant influence” means in this context. I think that is extremely important. I have a question for the Minister. I cannot find an answer as a result of the debates we have had so far, but football needs an answer and probably needs it now. Is it the Government’s position that the Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, should be able to own Newcastle United under the definition of ownership in the Bill? It is a very simple question, with a yes or no answer. If yes, why have Ministers deliberately constructed a Bill that will quickly put him through the ownership test of significant influence, and why did the Minister confirm on Monday that she wanted incumbent Heads of State to be tested? If no then surely the Government should say so, and we should have that as part of an open debate. I hope that, if that question is answered this evening, there will be no doubt in future about what the Government intend, not least following the Prime Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia last week and his offer to go to a football match with the Crown Prince. It is only reasonable for Saudi Arabia and the Crown Prince to know whether he is expected to divest himself of the interest in Newcastle United or not.

My Lords, I welcome my noble friend Lord Scriven to this debate and congratulate him on making those points. When it comes to the modern slavery amendments—to take on the point from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—if other people are looking at this, surely the regulator should be able to take their opinion. Surely that would be a reasonable step. If the Bill does not allow that, I am sure we could do that quite easily. On state ownership, I put my name to Amendment 200 because I thought that at the very least we deserved an answer. The previous Government’s Back-Benchers did not like the Telegraph under control and, let us face it, more people have heard of Newcastle United than they have the Telegraph. This is an important point. Are we happy with a cultural asset being in the hands of a foreign power, regardless of the fact that we have a reasonably good relationship with it on most things? It is not all things, as we do not like certain things about it. That is a real question, and the Minister is being asked a series of real questions. I hope that at the end of this we will know whether these points are worth pursuing at other stages of the Bill. These questions really should be answered, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

My Lords, we have indeed touched on the matter of foreign ownership elsewhere in the Committee’s discussions. I am very glad we have had the opportunity to have a proper debate on it this afternoon, and I agree with my noble friend Lord Moynihan that it has been a very good one. Of course, there are, and have long been, a number of clubs in English football with some element of foreign ownership, whether through individuals or investment vehicles. Many of them have been very generous funders of the sport and in certain cases have turned clubs around for the better, with huge benefits to their communities. But there is a fine line to tread here between maintaining that inward investment and openness to the world, and preventing malign interference. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, has been able to join the Committee today. I enjoyed the debate he brought on sportswashing, to which I responded. We touched on some of these matters, and my view when speaking from the Dispatch Box opposite, which I still share, is that there is a distinction to be made between news organisations, which provide information to the populus, and sports organisations. As my noble friend Lord Moynihan has pointed out on previous groups, sport has always succeeded in rising above politics and has often been a forum in which people can raise complicated issues and foster dialogue between countries that may not be able to talk about things directly quite so easily. The amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, address modern slavery once again. I am conscious that we had Amendment 153 on modern slavery from the noble Lord, Lord Mann, in that rather strange miscellaneous group the other day, so I will not repeat what I said about the issue then. But I am interested in and broadly supportive of the issues they are raising and very glad to have heard the contribution of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who has done such important work in this area. I am glad we have been able to return to the issue of modern slavery and let other noble Lords add their voices to what we said when we were debating Amendment 153 on Monday. As someone from Tyneside, I must add my concern about the implications of Amendment 200 from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, which, among other things, would prevent clubs being owned by sovereign wealth funds. I think he accepts that if we were to accept his Amendment 200 the way he has worded it—he alluded to the Public Investment Fund of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s investment in Newcastle United—it would have the consequence that Newcastle might not be granted an operating licence and so would have to withdraw from the Premier League. I have to say that he would not be very popular on Tyneside if that were the case. It would be very helpful to have some clarity from the Minister about how the regulator will deal with clubs that currently have foreign owners or foreign sovereign wealth fund investment, and how it might approach prospective owners from abroad in the future. Like others, I would be very keen to hear her answer to the questions that my noble friend Lord Moynihan has raised and repeated so powerfully today. During the course of this Committee, the Prime Minister has visited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He was there just before it was announced as the host of the 2034 World Cup. He has invited the Crown Prince to come and watch a football match here in the UK when he next has the opportunity to visit. I would be interested to hear whether they discussed football and some of the issues we have discussed today, or indeed the thorny question of whether the Bill would bring the Crown Prince and the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia into scope in the way that my noble friend Lord Moynihan has suggested.

17:15:00

I thank my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton, as well as the noble Lords, Lord McNally and Lord Scriven, and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, for the amendments in this group. It has been a really thoughtful discussion around issues of note. I particularly welcomed the opportunity to hear from a number of noble Lords who have not spoken previously on the Bill but who have contributed their expertise, including the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven. Their expertise led to a thoughtful debate. A number of noble Lords had interesting alternative perspectives as well. That included the perspective of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is right that we discuss these significant issues as we discuss what the role of the regulator should be. On Amendments 178, 185 and 193, it is absolutely right that clubs have suitable owners. That is why the new statutory owners’ and directors’ test is a key focus of the regulatory regime. A core part of this is the fitness test, which these amendments seek to expand. The individual ownership fitness test criteria are based on precedents specifically relevant to whether somebody is suitable to be an owner of a football club. I would like to reassure my noble friend that much of what the amendments seek to achieve is already delivered within the current drafting. If an individual has had legal—whether civil or criminal—regulatory or disciplinary action of any kind brought against them, and that action has a bearing on their honesty or integrity, the regular must take that into account. This could then be used to find them unsuitable under the tests in this legislation. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, spoke specifically on modern slavery in relation to current legislation. I welcome the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, around keeping the regulator focused on issues that it can deal with effectively. Offences under the Modern Slavery Act are included in Schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act, so the regulator will have to consider them in particular when determining whether an owner meets the fitness criteria. If there are concerns about what is covered in the Modern Slavery Act, there are more appropriate places to discuss this, perhaps outside the Committee. I would be very happy to talk to noble Lords and the noble and learned Baroness outside the Committee to give them some reassurance on the points they have raised. Any human rights violations that have given rise to legal, regulatory or disciplinary action against the owner in any forum can be considered, and so are egregious actions committed outside the UK that would have been criminal if carried out here. I assure noble Lords that these are things the regulator would—

There is a specific issue with the Gulf states. If people are potentially put to death for being gay in a state, would that debar a state entity or an individual in that Government from owning an English club? It is a clear question.

I am going to come on to state ownership later in my speech, if the noble Lord would be happy to wait.

No, I would like an answer to this specific question, because the Minister gave a specific commitment with regard to what is in the Bill. I put a specific question based on what could happen, and on the laws of the land of a Gulf state. I wish to know: if that takes place, would someone who is related to that state through a state entity not be able to own a Premier League club in this country?

I would be grateful if the noble Lord allowed me to take away that specific example. I will write to him and to the Committee and place a letter in the Library, so that they have a detailed response on that point. These are all issues that the regulator will take very seriously. Where the amendments before us today go further than existing drafting, this introduces elements that we do not believe are necessarily relevant to an owner’s suitability. They would require the regulator to make a subjective and potentially speculative judgment on whether the individual has engaged in any activity that would risk bringing the game into disrepute. Where a potential dispute relates to things like criminal history, the regulator will already have to consider these things. But “disrepute” is a vague term; could it arise through an owner’s conduct in their personal life, or their political views? In the Government’s view, it would put the regulator in quite a difficult position, making a value judgment on what constitutes disrepute, which would undermine the principle of a reasoned, evidence-based test. Turning to Amendment 199 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, the test is supported by the regulator’s information-gathering powers to ensure its determination is evidence-based. These powers will help the regulator tackle unco-operative individuals or organisations that do not provide the information. However, let me be clear: if the regulator does not have enough evidence to make its determination, the individual will be found unsuitable. I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns about restrictions on an owner’s funds. I want to reassure her that the test requires an owner to submit financial plans and demonstrate sufficient financial resources to run the club. As part of this, we expect that the regulator will consider things such as the liquidity of those resources and their availability to actually be used to fund the club. The regulator will also need to be satisfied that the owner does not have wealth connected to illicit finance. To do this, it can conduct enhanced due diligence on the owner’s source of wealth. This would identify any links to criminality, corruption and money-laundering. We believe, therefore, that the intent of the noble Baroness’s amendment is delivered in the current drafting of the Bill. I hope she takes reassurance from this, but I am happy to meet her to discuss this if my explanation has not satisfied her. I turn to amendment 200 from my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton, which the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, also spoke to. This Government are not making a judgment on different forms of ownership. We recognise that good ownership can take many forms, and it is investment from responsible owners that has been a driving factor in the success of English football. Banning any one particular kind of ownership would not, in our view, be in keeping with the flexible and proportionate approach to regulation we are proposing. I believe that this approach has broad support across the Committee. Prospective owners with state backing will be assessed against the same set of criteria as any other prospective owner, on a case-by-case basis. I hope that answers the question about Newcastle from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson.

I apologise for intervening on the Minister’s speech, but I did ask a very specific question, which I think she has answered but I would be grateful if she could make it clear to the Committee. Through the higher degree of influence test, which we have debated and understand, and which is unique to this regulatory framework, will the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia be subject to an ownership test—yes or no?

Any owner, with state backing or otherwise, will be assessed against the same set of criteria as any other prospective owner, on a case-by-case basis.

So the answer is yes.

Yes. Prospective owners with state backing will be assessed against the same set of criteria and, by requiring new owners to undergo the regulator’s test, we better mitigate against harm to clubs by preventing unsuitable custodians ever becoming owners. Giving the regulator the power to test incumbent owners where there are concerns about their suitability ensures that any unsuitable owners can be removed. The noble Lord, Lord Scriven, raised a comparison with the legal position on media organisations. Although football clubs up and down the country are vital community assets, they are not the cornerstone of our democracy that free media is. Investment from responsible owners has been a driving factor in the success of English football, which is why we are putting in place a stable regulatory environment that will continue to attract investors with a long-term prudent approach to growing football clubs as important community assets. What is important, in our view, is that owners are suitable, and the approach to testing owners set out in the Bill ensures just that. This has been a hugely useful debate and, although I will have to come back on a number of points, I hope my response has provided some reassurance. But, for the reasons I have given, I would be grateful if my noble friends and other noble Lords would not press their amendments.

My Lords, I will of course happily withdraw the amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Taylor and the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. I have a few points to make in response. Generally, this has been a useful and valuable debate. We have had reassuring clarity from the Minister on the issues of concern. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked a practical question about how this would work. There is already an issue, in a sense, for the regulator to deal with. Under Clause 28(2)(a)(iv), the regulator will have to look for—and will certainly want to know—the source of funding. I can only assume that that is because we do not want the funding of our football clubs to be in any way under suspicion and/or linked to criminal activity, particularly human rights abuses and modern slavery. In Clause 28(2)(b), there is a fairly wide power for the independent football regulator to require information. Clearly, there are practical questions in carrying out inquiries and investigations into the source of funding that owners will offer up, but this is just one of those issues that will undoubtedly be tested over time. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, that putting amendments forward like this is tantamount to regulatory overreach. If we were not concerned about issues such as modern slavery and human rights abuses, we would be selling the world of football short.

Surely the noble Lord will concede something. Proposed new paragraph (f) in Amendment 185, which he signed, mentions “whether A has been complicit in … non-crime hate incidents”. We are talking about the ownership of a football club. What does complicit in a non-crime hate incident even mean in the context of a strategy to deal with human rights and potentially preventing someone, via primary legislation, owning a football club?

I would hope that we would be concerned by things like hate incidents—those are important considerations. I certainly do not want my football club to be associated in any way with that, and I know the club itself does not. I am sure that goes for most clubs up and down the country. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady, Butler-Sloss, and the Lib Dem Front Bench for their support. I take most of the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, as being broadly positive, in terms of what we were trying to achieve with this little group. The issues are important, and I assure the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, that I have no great desire to become massively unpopular with Newcastle United fans. I am probably a bit unpopular because Brighton seem to beat them regularly anyway.

Oh!

But clearly, we should we look at these issues. State ownership is an issue we should keep under careful consideration. The Minister has said that all forms of ownership will be scrutinised in a similarly robust way, and we should be satisfied with that. So, having heard what was said, I am happy to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 178 withdrawn.

Amendment 179 not moved.

Clause 26 agreed.

17:30:00

Clause 27: Duties to notify IFR of prospective new owner or officer

Amendment 180

Moved by

180: Clause 27, page 20, line 18, leave out subsection (7)

My Lords, I hope that Amendment 180 will be much simpler, because is a bit niche and, dare I say it, anoraky in nature, for which I apologise. It would amend Clause 27 by removing subsection (7). This subsection states that where a prospective owner or officer does not inform the regulator of their intention to become an owner or an officer “as soon as reasonably practicable”, that person must inform the regulator as soon as it is reasonably practicable. We probably understand the issue there. Not to mince my words, it is a slight tongue- twister. It is a bit confusing and nonsensical. In essence, it says that if someone has not told the regulator in the period when they were meant to, they must do so later “as soon as reasonably practicable”. I hope that this provision is a fairly simple one to tidy up. Again, I think we all understand the good intentions here, but I would be grateful if the Minister could clear that up. I will leave it to my noble friend Lord Moynihan to raise his amendments.

My Lords, I will be equally brief in proposing my Amendments 187ZA and 187ZB. The drafting of the Bill states that if the regulator takes too long to determine applications for new owners and officers, then the applicants are treated as not suitable under Clause 32(5), through absolutely no fault of their own. This is not aligned with practice in other regulated sectors. It could have an impact on that person wider than purely their involvement in the club and be detrimental to clubs that have only one potential new owner, who is deemed unsuitable purely because the regulator ran out of time. The change that I propose to Clause 32(5) would reverse the consequence of excessive delay, addressing the inherent unfairness in the current drafting. This is aligned with how statutory time limits on mergers work, for example. If the CMA fails to make a decision within a specified timeline, the merger is automatically allowed. These are clarifying amendments; I very much hope that the Government will see benefit in improving the legislation by accepting them.

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests as detailed in the register. I support Amendments 187ZA and 187ZB, tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan, which propose a sensible and very necessary adjustment to the presumptions under- pinning the ownership test. These amendments address an important issue in the Bill, ensuring that the ownership process is fair, reasonable and aligned with best practices in other regulated sectors. As my noble friend has said, as it stands, Clause 32(5) means that if the independent football regulator fails to determine an application for a new owner or officer within a set timeframe, the applicant will be automatically treated as unsuitable. This is a really problematic approach. It assumes that any delay is the fault of the applicant or reflective of their unsuitability when, in reality, delays can occur for many good reasons. Quite often, they are entirely outside the applicant’s control or, indeed, the control of the selling club. Simple cases can, of course, be done quickly, but acquisitions of football clubs can be complex undertakings. Applications for ownership done well involve a detailed examination of financial records, governance structures and regulatory compliance. Imposing arbitrary deadlines does not speed things up; it just risks poor decisions being taken on very consequential issues without all the facts. Indeed, taking time to get it right is in the best interests of all involved: the club, the fans and the broader football ecosystem. To penalise an applicant simply because the IFR runs out of time is neither fair nor proportionate. The Premier League allocates significant resources to operate its own owners’ and directors’ tests. I have spoken to it about this issue and, of course, so has DCMS. It has told me that the league sees no benefit whatever in arbitrary deadlines and has explicitly told the Government that unless this is staffed and resourced intensively, the IFR will almost definitely hit the deadline in a range of cases. Of course, this will be compounded by the fact that the Premier League will be running its own process without a statutory deadline, meaning the IFR would be ruling people to be unsuitable for no good reason while the league would still be performing its test. This is a recipe for chaos and, I am afraid to say, litigation. This presumption of unfitness if a statutory deadline is not met could have significant unintended consequences. Let us imagine a scenario where a club is on the brink of critical ownership transfer—perhaps its survival depends on transferring the ownership—and the only prospective buyer is deemed unsuitable purely because the IFR failed to meet its deadline. In the last Committee debate, the Minister said: “Although the risk of clubs going into administration will be greatly reduced, it may still happen”.—[Official Report, 16/12/24; col. 54.] For a club to go into administration because the regulator has not met its deadline would be unfair, and catastrophic for its supporters. Even if it did not result in immediate administration, it could leave the club in limbo, unable to secure necessary investment and potentially sliding into financial difficulty or worse. This issue is not confined to the immediate impact on clubs. There are also wider reputational and practical implications for prospective owners and officers. Being deemed “unsuitable” by default could carry consequences far beyond football, affecting their credibility and standing in other sectors. That is not how a fair and just regulatory process should operate. The amendments before us propose a simple but important correction. By reversing the presumption, they would ensure that applicants were not unfairly penalised for delays that were outside their control. Instead, if the IFR fails to make a determination within the specified timeline, the applicant would be treated as suitable by default. As my noble friend Lord Moynihan said, that is much more aligned with practices in other regulated sectors. For example, in merger control, if the Competition and Markets Authority fails to make a decision within the statutory time limit, the merger is automatically allowed. That ensures that the time limits are meaningful but that regulatory delay does not create unnecessary barriers or unfair outcomes. It is important to emphasise that this amendment does not undermine the integrity of the ownership test. The IFR will still be able to make a determination based on the suitability of the applicant, but it will no longer have the ability, in effect, to penalise applicants or clubs because of its own delays. It would, in truth, be far better not have a timeframe at all, for the reasons I have outlined. However, if there is to be one, we must reverse the presumption and place incentives in the right place. I hope the Minister will recognise the value of these amendments, and the much greater fairness and reduced risk they would bring to the process. It is a small but crucial change that will help ensure the ownership process operates in way that is both reasonable and just. I urge the Government to give the amendments the consideration they warrant.

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, in this matter. It cannot possibly be fair to have a regulatory system in which, if the regulator does not perform and reach a decision within the specified time, for reasons that are not the responsibility of the applicant, the application fails. That is plainly unjust and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, says, it is contradictory to the approach adopted in competition law, where the regulator has short time limits and must comply with them. The alternative is to have a more open-ended system, whereby the regulator can take more time if it is necessary to do so in exceptional circumstances.

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lords, Lord Markham and Lord Moynihan, for tabling these amendments. I will start with Amendment 180, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Markham. The regulator needs to know who a club’s prospective new owners and officers are before they can buy or join the club, so they can be tested. Although clubs, owners and officers are required to pre-notify the regulator, there may be occasions where someone becomes an owner or officer of a club without having first notified the regulator. In these circumstances, it is vital that the regulator is notified after the event—precisely what this amendment would remove. That is because, if the regulator is not aware that someone has become an owner or officer, the regulator will not know to test them. This risks clubs having unsuitable owners or officers in place. I turn now to Amendments 187ZA and 187ZB, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. I will not deviate to talk about Leeds United at this point, although we always find reasons to do so in our general conversations. I am grateful for his comments and for those of the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Clearly, I think we come down to the issue of timely decision-making on the suitability of new owners and officers, and we recognise that this is important for clubs’ financial sustainability. It is a fact that, without deadlines, we have seen league determinations drag on, unable to reach a decision. That is why the regulator will be subject to a statutory deadline when it tests the suitability of prospective new owners and officers. We believe that Amendment 187ZA would undermine the regulator’s tests. It would require the regulator to deem an owner or officer suitable to take up a position at a club if the deadline had been met, and the regulator had otherwise been unable to make a determination. This means that it would have to approve an applicant it did not know was suitable. Amendment 187ZB would then allow that owner or officer to remain at the club until such point as the regulator found them unsuitable. This creates very concerning outcomes. If the end of the time limit resulted in an automatic pass, this could incentivise prospective applicants to stall and withhold information. More worryingly, as I set out, it would also mean that new entrants were approved even if the regulator was not confident that they were suitable—which is something that we simply cannot have. This risks owners and officers who should never have been allowed to take up positions at clubs in the first place to potentially do considerable harm to clubs, which is why the statutory deadline must result in an automatic negative determination if reached, because this is the only way to ensure that suitable owners and officers become custodians. If the end of the time limit resulted in an automatic affirmative determination, this would incentivise prospective applicants to stall, as I have already outlined. It would also mean that new entrants would be approved if the regulator was not confident, and I hope that noble Lords will understand that this is not an acceptable position to be in. That is why—

Does the Minister accept that the current wording of the clause means that the application fails even if the delay is due entirely to the incompetence of the regulator or the failure of the regulator to have an efficient system for dealing with applications? Surely that cannot be right.

I understand the noble Lord’s comment but I really believe we are covering our tracks in this. We are improving the situation where the regulator works to avoid the situations that he outlined. I will add that this also provides certainty to the industry and, most importantly, it will incentivise the prospective person to promptly provide information to the regulator to allow it to make its determination. With those comments, I hope that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

17:45:00

I thank noble Lords for this debate and the Minister for her response. While my amendment was anoraky by nature, I think we would all agree that the other amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan are quite serious. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, mentioned, this is something that happens in all other regulatory environments, and other regulators manage to cater for that in exactly the same situation. What my noble friend Lord Moynihan is suggesting is not, if the deadline has passed, that an owner is deemed suitable for ever. They will be deemed suitable only until the regulator is able to get round and opine. It would be a pretty silly thing to do for an owner to drag their feet and be awkward, for them to be allowed to do it only to be removed a few months later. That would be a big waste of money for them, and it would be completely illogical for an owner to try to game the system in that way. So I am afraid that do not quite understand, and I think other noble Lords share in this. I ask the Minister to go back and think more on that, because it has got to be the right case. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, in a situation where the regulator is not able to pass judgement through their own incompetence, it is the owner, who might be perfectly suitable, who loses out. So I would be grateful if we could consider that further—but at this point I am happy to withdraw.

Amendment 180 withdrawn.

Clause 27 agreed.

Clause 28: Determination of suitability required for new owner

Amendments 181 to 184 not moved.

Clause 28 agreed.

Amendment 185 not moved.

Clauses 29 to 31 agreed.

Clause 32: Determinations under sections 28 and 29: time limits

Amendments 186 to 187ZB not moved.

Clause 32 agreed.

Amendment 187ZC not moved.

Clause 33: Duties to notify IFR of change in circumstances relating to incumbent owner or officer

Amendments 187A and 187B not moved.

Clause 33 agreed.

Clause 34: Incumbent owners

Amendment 188 not moved.

Clause 34 agreed.

Clause 35: Incumbent officers

Amendment 189 not moved.

Clause 35 agreed.

Clause 36 agreed.

Clause 37: Matters relevant to determinations

Amendment 190

Moved by

190: Clause 37, page 28, line 9, at end insert— “(1A) In making a determination under section 28 or 34, the IFR must also have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.”

My Lords, in moving Amendment 190 I will speak to my further amendments in this group, Amendments 191, 195 and 198. I will also speak to Amendment 204, which is in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, to which I have added my name as well. The amendments in this group focus on the criteria that the regulator will take into consideration when determining the suitability of a potential owner of a regulated club. My Amendment 190 is intended as a probing amendment, to tease out the reasonings behind the Government’s removal of what was Clause 37(2) in the previous version of the Bill. While the wording of this amendment is exactly the same as that of the subsection that was taken out when the present Government introduced their version, I want to be clear that I am not necessarily arguing that I want to see it reinserted. My intention here is to use this opportunity to understand why the Government took it out, and to ask the Minister a few questions for the sake of the Committee to elaborate on the Government’s position. The Government have said that the previous requirement for the regulator to have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of the United Kingdom and its Government was one of the main concerns that UEFA had with the previous version of the Bill, and that removing the provision has pacified it. But has it fully pacified UEFA? We have not yet had sight of the letter from UEFA to the Secretary of State, which the Committee has heard about a number of times. My noble friend Lady Brady sent her own correspondence to the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, on 2 December, asking her to publish that letter and to place a copy in the Library so that the Committee can see it, but I do not believe my noble friend has yet received a response. It would be very helpful for the whole Committee to be able to see that letter, so we can be reassured about what exactly UEFA has said in that regard. At present, it is not clear whether this provision was the only part of the previous Bill with which UEFA was not content or whether there are further parts of the Bill currently before us with which it is still unhappy. It would be useful to know how strong UEFA’s opposition was to the old provision on trade policy and so on. Did the Government remove it because UEFA threatened to exclude England from European competitions if, and only if, it remained in the Bill, or was UEFA’s opposition weaker and focused on other aspects of the Bill? I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on that for the Committee, and I hope that my noble friend Lady Brady will receive a response before Report. My Amendment 191 would insert the word “relevant” to Clause 37(2)(c). This requires the regulator to consider whether a prospective owner or officer has been party to any civil proceedings in a court of law. The intent of including “relevant” here is to give a more precise wording, and indeed a bit of leeway. Our concern is that the current wording permits a wide range of court proceedings to be considered by the regulator—for example, divorce or child custody would surely be a civil proceeding. Making this simple change would focus the scope on civil proceedings which are directly related to somebody’s ability as an officer or owner of a regulated club. I seek through Amendment 195 to prevent the regulator amending the considerations relevant to owner and officer determinations. This follows the theme that we have carried through this Committee of ensuring maximum clarity for clubs which are going to be regulated, and ensuring that the powers granted to the regulator by Parliament are not expanded in future. To allow that would be to grant the regulator a blank cheque to demand more and more requirements as it wishes. The last amendment in my name in this group is Amendment 198, which would remove the provision stating that the regulator may not refuse ownership of a regulated club because of a prospective owner’s connection with the Government of a particular territory. I am sure we can all think of particular countries or territories at present which would indeed be grounds for immediate disqualification—this perhaps flows from the debate we had on group 2. For instance, at present, connection with the Government of the Russian Federation would surely be an open-and-shut case—would the Minister not agree? We want to ensure that the regulator is independent of our own Government, of course, but I do not see why the regulator should be prohibited in law from considering factors such as this in the determinations that it makes. Amendment 204, in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, prevents the regulator prohibiting multi-club ownership models. There are currently a large number of Premier League and English Football League clubs which are owned by individuals or consortia that own other clubs. There has been some controversy in this area, I gather, but we should be alive to the benefits of the model—one of which is a reduction in financial risk. It gives the ultimate owner of a club greater protection from one of their clubs being relegated or suffering a slump in revenue. Because there is a common owner, other clubs in the multi-club model can act as a buffer to absorb losses in one of the other clubs. There is, consequently, less risk of that owner facing difficulties and having to sell the club or, even worse, that club going into administration. Multi-club ownership models can absorb financial risk, thereby aiding the regulator to achieve the goals we want to see it achieve in regard to financial stability Surely the regulator should not prohibit this. I beg to move.

My Lords, I support Amendment 191, which seeks to add the word “relevant” to Clause 37(2)(c). This would be an important adjustment that would bring additional clarity and guidance to the IFR, as it develops its ownership test. The clause currently requires the independent football regulator to consider “whether the individual is or has been a party to proceedings (other than criminal proceedings) in any court or tribunal”. This is a strikingly broad provision. It would allow any civil proceedings, regardless of their nature or relevance, to count against someone in an ownership determination; it may even be that the individual in question seeking ownership has brought the civil action or tribunal that, as a result, is likely to disqualify them from owning a football club. It is a very concerning approach. Amendment 191 would provide a much-needed safeguard against unintended and disproportionate outcomes. Let me take this opportunity to ask the Minister again the question I asked earlier in Committee—it is quite a fundamental question. Is the ownership test provided for in this Bill going to be subjective or objective? That was not made clear by the Minister when I asked the question before, so I would really like clarity—surely it cannot be both. Without this clarity, we risk creating an ownership framework that is open to arbitrary and inconsistent application, which would undermine investor confidence and, ultimately, the credibility of the regulator. This concern is particularly acute when we consider the clause as it stands. Most successful businesspeople who have lived rich and varied commercial lives will have been involved in civil proceedings at some point, somewhere in the world. These could range from contractual disputes to regulatory disagreements or employment tribunals, and very often instances where they were not at fault whatever but had to defend their interests or bring such cases themselves. Are we seriously suggesting that such proceedings should disqualify them from passing an ownership test? This is not a hypothetical concern. Civil proceedings can be entirely routine and, in many industries, reflect the complexity of modern business rather than any moral or professional failing. The absence of the word “relevant” means that such cases could be treated as a disqualifying factor, even when they have no bearing whatever on the individual's ability to responsibly own or direct a football club. This is not aligned with practice in any other regulatory sectors and will create an entirely unnecessary barrier to investment. Clarity on the scope and purpose of the ownership test is essential for not just the regulator but the entire football ecosystem, including investors, leagues and clubs. Noble Lords have already highlighted serious issues with the current drafting, not least the lack of definition of “significant influence”. On the very unclear situation of Newcastle United, the Minister confirmed that the Crown Prince would be subject to the owners’ test, and the issue of significant influence would mean that this is the case. At least that situation was clarified and he knows where he stands. Amendment 191 provides an opportunity to address at least one aspect of this mixture of problems by narrowing the scope of Clause 37(2) to focus only on what is genuinely relevant. This small change would provide greater clarity, fairness and confidence for all stakeholders in football. I encourage the Minister to reflect on this issue and the broader issues around this element of the Bill. As we move towards Report, it would be helpful to hear how the Government intend to address the now quite numerous concerns about the scope and application of the ownership test in the Bill.

18:00:00

My Lords, I will say a few words about one of the amendments, but first want to follow up on what the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, was saying about multi-club ownership. He was suggesting that multi-club ownership could alleviate risk. I see the point that he was making, but we have to be clear that it can also generate risk. This is an ongoing conversation that many people in football are having. We have to consider its prevalence and the fact that it is increasing, but there are questions about how it could distort competition and lead to complications with loan deals or the sale of players. This is a big question that will loom over us in the future. It is not just a one-way issue, as perhaps the noble Lord was suggesting. I want to say a couple of words about Amendment 201. Clause 37 says very clearly that in determining whether it considers that an individual has the requisite honesty et cetera, the regulator should have regard to whether the individual has been convicted of a serious criminal offence. Amendment 201, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Bassam, goes somewhat further and says: “No individual with an unspent serious criminal conviction, whether or not in England and Wales, shall be permitted to own a controlling stake in, or serve as a director for, any regulated club”. That is a clear statement of intent about the serious nature of some of the issues that have arisen about specific clubs in recent times. I ask the Minister to tighten up on this, take the prospect of owners with serious convictions very seriously and say that it should be a bar to ownership and not simply something that has to be taken into account.

My Lords, I too will speak to Amendment 204 on multi-club ownership, as the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, has made some important points and it would be helpful for the Committee to understand the position of the Government. It can alleviate risk. It is also highly complex and can make it very difficult, in terms of due diligence, for the regulator to look at an English club under this legislation without taking into account the financial exposure that a multi-club owner could have in another country with other clubs. This is a growing trend; it is not new. A significant number of Premier League clubs and six EFL Championship clubs form part of a wider multi-club model, a structure first explored exclusively in Europe by ENIC, now the majority shareholder of Tottenham Hotspur. The rationale underpinning multi-club ownership aspirations, which underlines just how complex the situation can be, ranges from player recruitment and development efficiencies to knowledge sharing, resource synergies and brand penetration. Furthermore, accruing interest in clubs that compete in the continent’s top leagues—those that hold higher bands and therefore score more points in the governing body endorsement system—is seen as a means for Premier League and EFL clubs to access a more eligible foreign pool of players. Having interests in multiple clubs is not a phenomenon unique to the UK; it pervades the European game. UEFA reports that clubs with cross-ownership relations account for more than a third of the top division in each of Belgium, France and Italy, in addition to England. Integrity of competition, reconciling the model with football’s rulebook, has become a complex issue for UEFA. At the centre of sport is competition, so if the same person, either a natural or a legally based entity, was to have control or influence over two rivals, there would be a risk to the integrity of competition whenever those rivals competed. To mitigate that risk, football’s governing bodies have introduced rules to preserve the independence and integrity of competition between its clubs. At a domestic level, approximately two-thirds of European national football associations have rules directly limiting or restricting multi-club ownership. The famous article 5 of the regulations of the UEFA Champions League, on the integrity of the UEFA club competitions, stems from the governing body’s concern, which started back in the late 1990s. Article 5 regulates common ownership by prohibiting the same individual or legal entity having control or influence over more than one club playing in the same UEFA club competition. That notably includes the ability to exercise, by any means, a decisive influence on the decision-making of the club concerned. With that brief explanation on top of the important points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, I would be very grateful if the Minister could confirm that she is completely comfortable with article 5 and will instruct the regulators not to impose any conflicting regulations in this area.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, Lord Addington, Lord Markham and Lord McNally, who I am sorry to hear is not available today, and particularly my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, for the amendments in this group. Starting with Amendment 190 from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, I do not agree that the foreign and trade policy objectives of the Government have any bearing on suitability. Suitability should be based purely on an impartial assessment of the individual’s fitness, whether they have a source of wealth connected to serious criminal conduct, and their financial plans and resources.

I am sorry to intervene so early, but the noble Baroness has said something quite stark. The policy of the United Kingdom is very clear in relation to the Russian Federation at the moment. Roman Abramovich was sanctioned because of the UK’s very clear position and the ownership of Chelsea was changed for a brief period. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport owned it on behalf of the nation and oversaw the sale. I understand the Government’s stated reasons for taking this out of the Bill, but should the regulator not be able to take into account the foreign policy issues of the day on something as important as this?

The noble Lord has pre-empted the further comments that I was going on to make. I can address this here. Clearly, in the example that is given regarding Russia, anyone connected to a state that is subject to sanctions would not pass the test. That is a straightforward way of picking up some of the concerns that he has raised. The intention with all this is to ensure that the test can be applied consistently and remain fair, transparent, robust and focused on whether an individual is suitable to own a football club. Furthermore, the Government have been clear that the independence of the regulator is vital. That is the point I want to stress here and that is why the Government have removed the requirement for the regulator to have regard to His Majesty’s Government’s foreign and trade policy objectives when assessing an owner’s suitability, which is the precise requirement this amendment seeks to include. Turning to Amendment 191, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and assure him that the intent of his amendment is already achieved in the Bill as drafted. The Bill sets out a number of matters the regulator must take into account when considering an owner or officer’s fitness as part of the owners’ and directors’ test. One of these is whether the owner or officer has been party to civil proceedings. As with all public bodies, the regulator must take into account all relevant matters and must disregard irrelevant matters when it comes to making decisions. That means that the things listed in Clause 37(2) will affect the regulator’s decision only if they are relevant in a specific case. That picks up on the issue of relevance. In other words, the regulator must treat these things as potentially relevant to its decision, but it must consider the specific facts and context in every case. The noble Baroness, Lady Brady, also picked up on the issue of relevance. For example, the regulator will not be concerned with whether an owner or officer has contested a speeding ticket. However, it will be concerned if a civil court has found that an owner or officer has acted in a seriously dishonest way or if they have a track record of civil cases that cast significant doubt on their integrity. The test is designed to allow the regulator to make a holistic evidence-based assessment of suitability, taking the context into account, as I have mentioned previously. I turn to Amendment 192, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Addington, and Amendment 201 in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton. On the latter, I completely agree that an unspent serious criminal conviction is likely to affect whether an individual is suitable to be a club’s custodian. That is why the regulator is already required to take any criminal convictions into account when assessing an owner or officer’s suitability —it does not have a choice: it has to. I reassure my noble friend that we take her comments seriously and are grateful for the way in which she expressed them today. The Bill does not set out exhaustive details on every element of the fitness test as to what constitutes a pass or fail. Instead, it allows the regulator to make a holistic assessment, which, crucially, is able to take into account any context and relevance. We believe this approach is key. If someone’s criminal history makes them unsuitable, the regulator can fail them on that basis. By comparison, the binary nature of the league’s current tests leads to a less sophisticated assessment of suitability. That is why this test takes a different approach. I reassure noble Lords that the Bill as drafted already requires the regulator to consider any unspent serious criminal convictions, and we fully expect the regulator to treat these as very significant factors in its assessment. I turn now to Amendments 195 and 198 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson—

Can the Minister help me? She said she would comment on the amendments. What are her comments on Amendment 192, tabled by my noble friend Lord Addington, which would require the Bill’s propriety test to include equality, diversity and inclusion? We had a long and wide-ranging discussion on that the other night, and the Government made it clear that they supported including equality, diversity and inclusion in the Bill. I would like some clarity. The propriety test seems fixated on criminal charges and litigation.

18:15:00

I am sorry that we have not had a fuller discussion on that, but I thank the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for his amendment and I agree that equality, diversity and inclusion are significant factors which the regulator has a duty to highlight. Equality, diversity and inclusion are not named criteria in the fitness test, and I do not believe they should be. If an individual has behaved in a seriously discriminatory and harmful way that rises to the level of a criminal offence, and which results in a civil lawsuit or regulatory or disciplinary action, the existing test will capture this. We believe that this is the appropriate threshold. It would not be proportionate to require the regulator to assess individuals’ commitment to equality, diversity and inclusion. I will return to the point the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, made regarding a blank cheque, and pick up on his Amendments 195 and 198. The Bill sets out a list of matters the regulator must consider when assessing an owner or officer’s honesty and integrity as part of the fitness test. Those are the relevant matters when assessing an individual’s honesty and integrity, and they are based heavily on precedent—namely, the Financial Conduct Authority’s fit and proper person test. However, as we have discussed before, football is a changing industry and the regulator must be able to adapt to this. Matters may emerge in the future that are crucial to assessing an individual’s fitness. The purpose of the owners’ and directors’ test is to ensure that clubs have suitable custodians. That is why it is vital that the regulator be able to consider other matters. This sort of discretion is well precedented; indeed, the FCA has more discretion when conducting its fit and proper tests. However, we want to make it explicitly clear that it would not be appropriate for the regulator to add any matters which would allow it to determine an individual’s suitability solely based on their connection with a Government. That should not be what determines whether an individual is suitable or not. Turning to Amendment 204 from the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, nothing in the Bill prohibits an owner owning more than one club. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, for his comments on this issue. Concerns about multi-club ownership are to do with conflicts of interest and competition, which is why the leagues and UEFA have rules about multi-club ownership. Clubs competing in these competitions will be required to abide by any applicable rules. Turning finally to Amendment 202, from the noble Lord, Lord McNally, I agree that it is crucial that clubs be protected from unsuitable officers, which is why the Bill gives the regulator the powers to disqualify any unsuitable officer from being an officer at any regulated club, up to and including for life. That, I am sure noble Lords will agree, is a very strong tool that has powerful ramifications. It means that all clubs will be better protected from unsuitable officers, but it should be used carefully. There are scenarios where the regulator must find an officer unsuitable—for example, if an officer lacks the requisite qualification, experience or training to take up that specific officer role at the club—but it should not automatically follow that they are deemed unsuitable for any officer role at the club. Indeed, there may be other officer roles that they are suitable and qualified for, but this amendment would ban that. It would mean that the regulator would have to disqualify them from being an officer anywhere. This we cannot and should not accept. That is why it is important that the regulator has the power to disqualify unsuitable officers but is not always required to do so. For the reasons I have set out, I hope the noble Lord will be able to withdraw his amendment.

Could the noble Baroness say something about the UEFA letter which expresses its views on the Bill? Will she assure the Committee that a copy of this letter will speedily be sent to the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and a copy put in the Library so that we know what it says?

My understanding is that we will not be sending it, but I am sure there will be further clarification on this point.

Can I ask why? This is a letter from the sports regulatory body that governs European football. Surely the Committee is entitled to know what its views are on the substance of the Bill we are debating.

We have already covered this point. We are talking about a private letter to the Government. That is my understanding of the situation. I do not feel qualified to comment further at this stage.

It is a private letter that has convinced the Government to change the Bill in the way that we are debating here, so I hope the noble Baroness will take that away and hear the repeated request from the Committee to see this letter. It has persuaded them to take out the provision that I am probing with my Amendment 190 and every time we return to this matter, the Committee gets a bit more confused about why the Government have done it and what may or may not be in that letter. I appreciate what she says but I would be grateful if she could let us see it. I apologise for intervening so early. What the noble Baroness said subsequently was very helpful. Also, the example I gave was not a helpful one because Roman Abramovich was sanctioned and if a person becomes sanctioned, as the noble Baroness went on to say, that individual would indeed be covered. To give her another, necessarily hypothetical example, if an unsanctioned citizen of the Russian Federation, connected to the Russian Government and supportive of their illegal war in Ukraine, wished to become an owner of a football club in this country, the combination of taking out this provision about allowing the regulator to have regard to the foreign policy objectives of the Government of the United Kingdom and the refusal to accept my Amendment 198, which covers links to foreign Governments, means that the regulator would not be able to prevent that person—a Russian citizen connected to the Government of the Russian Federation—becoming an owner of a club? Does she not think that is an unfortunate consequence of the changes the Government have made to the Bill because of this UEFA letter which we have not seen?

With regard to the UEFA letter, I refer noble Lords back to the comments that my noble friend Lady Twycross made previously. To clarify, we did not in fact say that the letter was the reason for changing the Bill; we said that UEFA’s views more generally were the reason for change. With that, I think I can leave that there. I also want to make the point again that anyone subject to sanctions would not pass the test.

But somebody who is not subject to sanctions but who is connected to a Government whom the UK is in dispute with would not be covered because of the removal of this provision from the Bill. I am happy if the noble Baroness wants to write on this, but this is an important matter because this is a change to the Bill. I understand the Government’s stated reasons for changing it—we do not want to see football teams in this country unable to take part in international tournaments and we want to make sure that the regulator is independent of government—but I worry that by making the change in the way that we have and by not adding in the additional safeguard such as the one I am proposing through my Amendment 198, we open ourselves to a situation where somebody connected with a foreign Government cannot be taken into account by the regulator. If she is happy to commit to write on that, we would be grateful.

We have gone through this several times. If there could at least be some private way in which those people involved in this could see this letter, it would be of assistance, because this is becoming a hardy perennial that is getting in the way of progress.

I think everybody is thinking about the previous examples we have been given, but would not the example that the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, just gave us of the non-sanctioned Russian individual be covered by the other considerations and the holistic attitude that my noble friend the Minister was telling us was the basis of the approach of the regulator?

I thank my noble friend for her helpful comments. I am not able to comment further at this moment. I think the detail is probably beyond this discussion and I recognise the comments about going round and over things again.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness but it would be helpful if we could have something in writing on this. As I say, I gave a poor example in the case of Roman Abramovich, but the hypothetical example is one that I would be grateful for an answer to. That would be appreciated. But I am grateful to her for what she said and the reassurances she gave on some of the other amendments that I have tabled in this group on civil offences and so on. I take on board the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, raised about multi-club ownership. I recognise that this is a live and lively debate in the sport. What we were trying to test with Amendment 204 was that the regulator should not be restricted on that basis alone. But with gratitude to the noble Baroness and eagerly awaiting the letter that will follow, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 190 withdrawn.

Amendments 191 to 199 not moved.

Clause 37 agreed.

Amendments 200 and 201 not moved.

Clause 38: Disqualification orders

Amendments 202 and 203 not moved.

Clause 38 agreed.

Clauses 39 to 44 agreed.

Amendment 204 not moved.

Clause 45: Duty not to operate a team in relation to a prohibited competition

Amendment 205 not moved.

Amendment 206

Moved by

206: Clause 45, page 37, line 10, at end insert “, unless it has ceased to be a regulated club by virtue of being relegated from competitions specified by the Secretary of State under section 2(3) of this Act.”

My Lords, I will speak only briefly to Amendment 206 as it is quite simple. It seeks to prevent clubs which are relegated to a competition which is not regulated by the new independent football regulator being subject to the prohibitions of Clause 45. Currently, any club that is relegated will have to continue to abide by these rules for a period of 10 years. Clause 45 has a similar provision applying the rules in that clause to relegated clubs for five years. It seems unfair that a club that is relegated to a league or competition below the scope of the new regulatory regime should have to abide by the rules set out in the Bill for such a long period. Surely a fairer approach would be either to shorten the period or, as my amendment suggests, to remove it altogether. Clubs that no longer operate a team in a regulated league will, by virtue of their relegation, receive lower incomes and potentially lose players. The financial situation they face will not be commensurate with the duties placed on them by the Bill, and retaining these long time periods seems to render the principle of specifying competitions, as the Bill does elsewhere, less meaningful. Why specify certain competitions if clubs playing in leagues that are not specified would still be subject to duties in the Bill? I beg to move.

18:30:00

My Lords, we need an answer about why these things are carried on for so long, because there are administrative burdens. If we want these clubs to survive and come back, we could probably make a case for two things. One would be an intermediate regulator, which I do not think would be terribly popular with certain sections of this Committee, and the other is deciding when you can come out of this, because there are duties that are probably an appropriate burden for a professional structure. A good few clubs have gone in and out of this structure, but there is a certain level at which you are not receiving income, you are not receiving support and you have become a part-time asset to the community. Surely there is some point at which there is a cut-off. A better definition of the Government’s thinking on this might be helpful.

My Lords, I just want to say a word about Amendment 207. It talks about a club that is not a regulated club but bears a very similar resemblance to one that is in things such as the name, the shirt colours and things of that type—almost an imitation of another club in order to get some support, finance or whatever. It may seem that this is highly unlikely, but I have a nightmare scenario where the super leagues that are being proposed do not take off, and therefore people try to create an artificial super league by, for example, having a team called “Manchester Blues” or “Liverpool Reds” getting into competitions with clubs abroad as an imitation of the super league that has been proposed and rejected. I want some assurance that should that nightmare scenario come about, there is some provision for being strict about what can and cannot happen.

My Lords, before I speak to this group, I want to be clear about who the regulator will test and clarify an earlier point I made. I will ensure that all noble Lords who participated in the second group have their attention drawn to this clarification and apologise if I caused any confusion. Schedule 1 to the Bill sets out details on who meets the definition of an owner. The Secretary of State will also set out guidance on one of the criteria for ownership, “significant influence or control”. An incumbent individual simply meeting the definition, including if they exert significant influence or control, does not mean that the regulator is required or obliged to test them. It may test an incumbent owner if there are grounds for concern about their suitability. The criteria for suitability are clearly set out in the Bill. This applies to any type of owner, be it a state owner or otherwise. The key point I must stress—it goes for Newcastle United or any other club, although as someone who lived for a number of years in Newcastle I am particularly keen to reassure Geordies—is that the regulator will be operationally independent of government. It is not for the Government to prejudge the regulator’s assessment of who meets the definition of owner, whether there is concern about a particular owner or the outcome if the regulator tests a particular owner. Finally, I want to reassure your Lordships’ Committee that this Government are unashamedly pro-investment, which will drive our growth mission. We want good, long-term investors into the UK, and foreign investment is key to this. I hope that noble Lords find this clarification helpful.

I thank the Minister for that. I think it is self-evident from her comments that once you remove the foreign and trade policy objective and put in place the significant influence test, you have a massive problem in the Bill. That massive problem is that it is self-evident, as has been discussed many times during the proceedings, that the Crown Prince—as chair of and in control of the PIF, with significant influence over it—would automatically come within the scope of significant influence as defined so far in debate on a number of occasions. I have no problem with that, and I do not think that the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, has any problem with that. If that is the case, so be it, and let us be honest about it. If it is not the case, “significant influence” is meaningless, and we should come back to it on Report and simply delete “significant influence”, which, incidentally, goes far further than any other regulator in Europe. We have control tests that are applied by UEFA, by the Premier League and across football. We do not have this significant influence test, and that is what is causing the problem. You remove the foreign and trade policy objectives and apply a significant influence test. The Minister was very clear in response to me on Monday that the Crown Prince would be absolutely full and central in any clear interpretation of that test. For the first time, she has put the definition of significant influence into the long grass as she said that it would come back in secondary legislation, that the Government do not actually know what it means and that she cannot give an answer to that in Committee or when we return on Report. But it is critical, because it comes to the very hub of political influence: what is the status of the Crown Prince? What is the status of Abu Dhabi? What would be the status of the Qataris if they wanted to buy a club in the Premier League, or indeed in any other league? My recommendation is that, given the uncertainty in the response that the Minister has just given and the absolute clarity on Monday evening and earlier this afternoon on the yes/no answer, we leave it for the time being and return on Report and analyse this in depth.

I felt I was clear, but I accept that the noble Lord has a different view. I look forward to ongoing discussions with him before and on Report. My comments related to a previous group, so I apologise to noble Lords who were not there to hear the context of my comments. I will now move on to my remarks on this group, which—

I shall just say this, as it is so central to our proceedings this evening. Just for the record, on Monday evening the Minister said: “Finally, on the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, the whole point of the owners’ and directors’ test, which has been carefully designed, is to ensure that club custodians are suitable for assessing an owner’s fitness—this is absolutely crucial. It is right that any owner passes the tests set out in the Bill, so it would not be fair, appropriate or responsible to exempt certain types of owners from testing … This amendment intends that owners with diplomatic status or who are Heads of State, Government Ministers or high-ranking officials of foreign Governments would not be tested”. That was in response to my probing amendment. She went on: “I do not need to tell noble Lords about some of the people this could exempt from testing. That means that the regulator could not consider any personal finances or criminal history, no matter how egregious. Instead, it would have to ignore these matters, so the regulator could be letting unsuitable owners in”.—[Official Report, 16/12/24; col. 140.] In other words, all those people I have just mentioned are subject to the tests set out in the Bill, and that would include anybody who was chair of a sovereign wealth fund that had invested in football in this country. That is what we will return to on Report. I do not think it is appropriate to lengthen the discussion this evening, as it has been well aired, but it is fundamental to removing that clause from the legislation in terms of opening up a can of worms now for the Government in identifying exactly what the suitable ownership test means.

Like other noble Lords, I want to move on, but I shall repeat two sentences that I referred to earlier. Simply because an incumbent individual meets the definition, including if they exert significant influence or control, does not mean that the regulator is required to test them. It may test an incumbent owner if there are grounds for concern about their suitability. Now I think we should move on. I do not feel that is a can of worms, but I appreciate that the noble Lord has an alternative view. Moving to the group under discussion, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, and my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton for speaking to the amendments. On Amendment 206, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, the aim of the clause, as he knows, is to stop the possibility of clubs leaving to join a closed-shop breakaway competition, as several clubs attempted with the European Super League in 2021. While I appreciate the aim of the noble Lord’s amendment, the clause has been carefully drafted to ensure that there is no possibility of circumvention. That is why the duty also captures formerly regulated clubs, so an owner cannot remove a club from the specified competitions in favour of joining a new break- away competition. It is unlikely that clubs in the sixth tier of English football or beyond will attempt to join a prohibited competition, so we do not think the risk that the amendment aims to cater for is a material one. What is more, if these clubs sought to join a competition that had been prohibited by the regulator, that would undermine the heritage and history of the club and should also be condemned—so it is no bad thing that the duty would capture them as well. On Amendment 207, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton, which my noble friend Lady Taylor spoke to, I acknowledge the intent to protect the clause from any risk of circumvention. However, we do not believe it is necessary to extend the scope of the clause to the new clubs or entities that are created to take on the identity and players of a formerly regulated club in order to participate in prohibited competitions. We believe this is a remote risk. Even if a club could convince its players to do this, convince its fan base to follow them and work through the legalities, the FA’s existing requirements around the registration of clubs and players would offer sufficient protection. For the reasons I have set out, I hope noble Lords will not press their amendments.

I am grateful to the Minister for her answers to the amendments in this group and for the clarification she gave on the comments on a previous group. I take what she says about breakaway clubs, but the point is for how long the provisions will still apply to clubs that drop out below the bottom level of this regulation through relegation, and why it lasts for so long. She has spoken before, rightly, about making sure that this is a proportionate regime. If you are a club that has been relegated to such a low tier and are unlikely to come back in, it feels like a very long time to have to continue to comply. That is the point that I was probing there. I might take that away and think about it further. If she has anything further to add on reflection, I would be very happy to receive that in a letter or pick it up in the discussions that we will have between now and Report—but that was part of the thinking there. The noble Lord, Lord Addington, is right: the suggestion of another or an intermediate regulator would not be popular in all parts of this Committee, so I will let that issue rest. My noble friend Lord Moynihan’s suggestion on the question of influence and foreign ownership is one that is perhaps better for us to talk about in our discussions between Committee and Report. I cannot be the only Geordie who is a bit confused and concerned about the implications for Newcastle United and I look forward to speaking to the Minister about that. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 206 withdrawn.

Amendments 207 to 218 not moved.

Clause 45 agreed.

Clause 46: Duty not to dispose etc of home ground without approval

18:45:00

Amendment 219

Moved by

219: Clause 46, page 38, line 26, leave out first “home ground” and insert “specified properties” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment expands the duty to notify the IFR of a potential disposal of a home ground to include a potential disposal of any specified properties.

My Lords, Amendment 219 relates to Clause 46 and the question of the disposal of home grounds, and the kinds of approvals that are going to be required. I have just three points to make. First, are the words “home ground” sufficient? We suggest that we should say “specified properties”. This relates very much to what I was saying the other night about assets of community value. I said that when my own club, Bolton Wanderers, made its ground an asset of community value, it covered not just the ground itself, the pitch and the stands but the concourse. We have to talk about whether it should cover a training ground and even advertising hoardings, car parks and the fan zone. If we simply say “home ground”, will that cover an item such as a fan zone? That is why the amendment I have tabled suggests that we should have specified properties. They may be different in the case of different clubs, but a home ground is more than just what is on the pitch or even within the boundaries of the stadium. That is something that I hope the Minister will consider. My second point is that this should relate to the assets of a club being used as security for a loan by the owner. There is clearly potential danger there if the loan is called in but the owner does not have the wherewithal to cough up the money that he has borrowed. Could that situation jeopardise the heritage of a club if it is vulnerable because it has been given as security? That is a valid consideration. The third point is the need to make sure that fans are fully consulted and engaged in any discussion about the disposal of the specified properties. Often, when we are talking about which properties might be involved, it is the fans themselves, especially if there is a fan zone, who have a clear vested interest. We have talked on the Bill about moving five miles. In any circumstances, the fans have to be involved and, therefore, I hope the Government will consider the amendments that we have tabled.

I support the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, because I have walked this tightrope. When I was leader of Stockport Council, we had to financially advise and support Stockport County on several occasions. In the end, in 2013, we acquired the freehold and leased it back to the new owner of Stockport County, Mark Stott, for 250 years. That enabled him to get investment in and get the football club moving back into the league and climbing the divisions. That is where we start from: the position of the club and its value as a loan against something. If we can get local authorities and other people to get hold of the freeholds, that will save Toys-R-Us from being built on certain football grounds on the south coast and give the clubs real opportunities to move forward. So we should support the amendments. We should also probably be thinking about how we can strengthen that in future. There is more involvement in the community value and the asset to a town and area of a football club, so we could be a bit more imaginative about how we protect that, rather than just arguing over how we should cover a loan against the ground.

My Lords, I will say a few quick words about my amendment in this group. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and other noble Lords for their amendments in this group. My Amendment 236 would introduce a new duty encouraging clubs to consult the Office for Place before making any decisions regarding their home ground or the construction of a new one. I know that the Government have proposed to wind up the Office for Place, but I wanted to draw attention to its work, and in particular the excellent work of its interim chairman, Nicholas Boys Smith, and the board and staff who were working in Stoke-on-Trent. I think a lot of us share the disappointment, because we saw the Housing Minister after the election tell the BBC that the Office for Place would be kept. But, following the Budget, I understand that the Government are proposing not to keep it. I did think it could play an important role here, as it has in so many other areas of public policy. My amendment offers a clear benefit in terms of promoting meaningful engagement and ensuring that football clubs consider the broader social and cultural impacts of their decisions. That is a theme that noble Lords touched on when introducing their amendments in this group. I think we all want to see clubs take a more holistic and responsible approach when planning changes to their home grounds, helping to preserve the heritage of these much-loved sites while ensuring that development is in the best interests of both the club and the community in which it is rooted. In light of the need for more thoughtful and inclusive decision-making, my amendment tries to strike the right balance between promoting consultation with an expert body, fostering collaboration and ensuring that long-term planning for home grounds is done responsibly. I appreciate the points that noble Lords raised in their amendments and look forward to the noble Baroness’s response to them all.

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton. They sound very reasonable to me. We need to avoid the situation of groundless clubs. Coventry City come to mind. They had some very awkward years and some equally awkward ground sharing. We want to avoid groundless clubs and ground-sharing clubs. Avoiding stadiums being used as security for loans taken out by owners is incredibly helpful. I very much hope that the Minister will support that. I also support the amendment from my noble friend Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay. I declare that I am a member of Historic Houses and tend to bang the drum a little about heritage and aesthetics. To give a personal example, my local team are Shrewsbury Town. They had this amazing stadium, Gay Meadow, on the banks of the River Severn. They had a chap or chapette in a coracle who would go out into the river when the ball was kicked into it. Like many other clubs during the 1990s and 2000s, they moved to a sort of identikit shopping centre stadium. I guess it has some practical advantages, but it is pretty soulless and is like so many other stadiums. So I hope the Government can listen and take this into account. We have some amazing stadiums in this country. If we are going to get a club to move, let us move them to a better home, not a worse one.

My Lords, I would like to say a few words in support of my noble friends Lady Taylor and Lord Bassam, some of whose amendments I have signed. I also want to pick up on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, has just made. He mentioned Coventry, who moved to Northampton, which is about 35 miles away and obviously not at all convenient for fans. My noble friend Lord Bassam’s club, Brighton, moved to Gillingham, which is, what, 70 miles away?

Seventy-two.

Some 72 miles and a few chains, I am sure. Even a club such as Bristol Rovers, who were obliged to move to Bath, which is only about 15 miles away, had to play there for 10 years until their new stadium was built—and even then, I think they ended up sharing with a rugby club. Amendments 227 and 233 are really “the AFC Wimbledon amendments”, because they refer to that club in which I have an interest, which I have stated on a number of occasions in consideration of this Bill. On the figure of five miles, it may not surprise noble Lords to know that, when Wimbledon FC were obliged to move because their ground had been sold from underneath them, they went to Crystal Palace, which is about six and a half miles away. It still was not convenient for a lot of the fans. It has been said that, when Wimbledon moved to Crystal Palace, the crowds increased. Factually, that is correct—and I see the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, nodding—but they increased because there was a far greater ability for visiting fans to go to Crystal Palace. It was not at all unusual for Wimbledon FC to play home games where their own fans were very much in the minority. So that was not a benefit—okay, in financial terms for the club it was, but it is not a system that anybody would advocate. My final point is to reinforce Amendment 234, about taking reasonable steps to ensure that the club’s fans do not consider arrangements for any change to be unsatisfactory. That should be a very basic consideration. I think it is in the Bill, but it is helpful to have that stated quite clearly and I hope that my noble friend will take that on board and, if she is not able to accept it today, which I would not expect, that we might come back to this to get something more solid on Report.

I thank my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton and the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for tabling these amendments regarding home grounds. The noble Lords, Lord Harlech and Lord Goddard, gave powerful examples of why home grounds matter and what they mean to fans, as did my noble friend Lord Watson of Invergowrie, particularly in relation to relocation. As somebody who grew up within hearing distance of Oxford United’s Manor Ground, I can empathise with the feelings of fans when grounds move —although inevitably they do sometimes, and often successfully. I will talk first to Amendments 219 to 223, 227 to 230 and 233 and 234 in the names of my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton. Starting with Amendments 219 to 222 and Amendment 230, home grounds are clearly often the most important asset of a club and that is why this legislation has carved out specific protections to safeguard against risky financial decisions or sales of the ground. This does not mean that other assets such as training grounds or office space are not also important to the club, but there is a specific consideration necessary for the home ground. I reassure my noble friends that there are protections in the Bill to safeguard against owners stripping a club of its assets or making reckless mortgage decisions against clubs. They include the enhanced owners’ and directors’ test, which will look to ensure that owners are prepared to be appropriate custodians of their club and its assets. The regulator will also have oversight of the financial plans and balance sheets of the regulated clubs, ensuring that the club is not putting itself in a risky position unnecessarily. We would expect that this would include what assets remain in the club’s ownership and any plans to dispose of them. If it were to become evident that an owner was looking to asset strip the club or deliberately worsen its financial position, the licensing regime gives the regulator power to place licensing conditions on the club. The regulator could also take enforcement action if those conditions are breached or if the financial plan that the club has submitted has not been followed. I turn to Amendment 227. I will not repeat the same points made previously as they are both similar to other amendments in this group. However, on the second sub-paragraph proposed by this amendment, with changes to the ownership or use of the home ground as collateral, the potential adverse outcomes are entirely financial. They do not impact the heritage of the club, nor would they necessarily relate to a relocation. If there is reasonable prospect of a change leading to relocation, Clause 48 sets out the parameters for any home ground relocation. The regulator would need to be satisfied that the move does not undermine the financial sustainability of the club or significantly harm the heritage of the club. This means that the regulator will be able to look at things such as location. However, the Government have deliberately not set a fixed distance or considerations. This is to further allow for a bespoke approach to be taken at all clubs to make sure that the impact of a relocation can be mitigated if one is deemed necessary. Amendment 223 seeks to expand the scope of the duty to gain the regulator’s approval to include all substantial changes to specify properties or the club’s home ground. Given the addition of the specified properties, this amendment could include any significant changes to property, such as a hotel owned by the club. This is a significant expansion of scope and could be onerous and resource intensive on the regulator. In such a case as a hotel, the amendment could feasibly lead to a full consultation and approval process for substantial changes such as building an extension. This would not be an appropriate or efficient use of the regulator’s time or resources. Instead, such substantial changes to either the home ground or other assets can be addressed via other areas in the Bill. For example, we expect all clubs to consult and have regard to the views of fans on the specified relevant matters. This includes home grounds and business priorities, among other issues. We would also expect any substantial changes to the home ground or other assets to be captured by the club’s financial plans. The regulator will therefore be able to have oversight and react to any concerns.

19:00:00

Amendment 228 would, first, introduce a test for the regulator to apply when considering whether to approve a significant change to a club’s home ground and other specified properties owned by a club. The requirement for clubs to seek prior approval of these changes is not in the Bill but is proposed by related amendments. I have already explained in addressing those amendments why the Government do not support this change, so I will not go through those arguments again. Secondly, the amendment would require the regulator to take reasonable steps to establish that the majority of the club’s fans agree before approving a disposal or change to the home ground or, based on the amendments, other specified properties belonging to the club. As I have said, we expect all clubs to consult and have regard to the views of fans on the specified relevant matters, including home grounds and business priorities, among other issues.

Regarding changes to the ownership of the home ground, the potential adverse outcomes are entirely financial; they do not impact the heritage of the club. If the change of the financial arrangements relating to the home ground were to lead to a relocation then heritage would rightfully be considered and fan consultation would be required, as per Clause 48. However, this amendment is in large part about the regulator considering fan approval of a home ground sale. The Government do not believe that this is justifiable, not just because it relates to a purely financial matter but because we would already expect the club to be consulting with fans on such changes.

Amendment 229 is largely similar to Amendment 228. However, it would require the regulator to carry out a full consultation with supporters of the club, representatives of the local community and the relevant competition organisers prior to making a decision on the financial impact of a sale or use as collateral. This would be an extensive requirement on the regulator that is likely to be overly burdensome. Given that there are further requirements to engage with supporters on any changes to heritage assets, including the home ground, this use of resources for consultation does not seem justifiable.

I turn to Amendments 233 and 234. The safeguarding of football heritage will be a key priority of the regulator and there are a number of provisions in the Bill to uphold this key objective. That is why, in the case of a home ground relocation, the Bill requires clubs to consult their fans and have regard to those views on a proposed relocation. It is also why the regulator will determine whether there is significant harm to club heritage. However, this is not a binary decision and, in a lot of cases, will require a holistic approach and for the regulator to consider a number of factors, not just the views of current fans. We would expect the regulator to engage and consult the fans of the club, as it would be necessary to do so to ascertain the impact on club heritage.

The regulator will be able to look at things such as location. However, the Government have deliberately not set a fixed distance or other considerations. This is to further allow for a bespoke approach to be taken at all clubs, to make sure that the impact of a relocation can be mitigated if one is deemed necessary. These amendments would risk not allowing the regulator to take the multifaceted approach that the Government think is best suited to the nuanced issue of club heritage and home ground relocations.

I turn to Amendment 236, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson. As the noble Lord acknowledged, it has recently been announced that the Office for Place will be closed and absorbed by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government. I wish to reassure the noble Lord that all clubs will continue to be required to comply with local planning legislation and processes, including any asset of community value status or other protections.

Finally, I thank my eagle-eyed noble friend Lord Bassam for tabling Amendment 225, which seeks to align the drafting within Clause 46. I am sympathetic to the preference for language to be consistent where possible, but please be reassured that the intended policy is absolutely delivered within the current drafting. The Bill already ensures that any regulated or formerly regulated club will have to get the regulator’s approval before it can sell any part of the home ground or use it as security. The amendment would have no impact on this, but I recognise the intent to ensure consistency of drafting, so I will take this away to consider it further.

On that basis, and for the reasons I have set out, I would be grateful if the noble Baroness would withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, I have listened very carefully to what the Minister said. I am very grateful to her for saying that she will consider some aspects further, because I think there is an issue here, especially in how we define a home ground. We may want to return to this at a later stage. In the meantime, it proves why every club should have its grounds designated as an asset of community value; we then would have the protection that we are seeking in this amendment. I am grateful to the Minister for what she has said and for saying she will consider parts of this again. On that basis, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 219 withdrawn.

Amendments 220 to 230 not moved.

Clause 46 agreed.

Clause 47 agreed.

Clause 48: Duty not to relocate without approval

Amendments 231 to 234 not moved.

Amendment 235

Moved by

235: Leave out Clause 48 and insert the following new Clause— “48 Duty on competition organiser not to arrange matches away from home grounds(1) A specified competition organiser must notify the IFR where the organiser considers that there is a reasonable prospect of the organiser entering into arrangements whereby a match between two teams operated by regulated clubs might be played at a ground that is not the home ground of either team.(2) A notification under subsection (1) must be given as soon as reasonably practicable after the organiser considers the duty under that subsection to have arisen.(3) The organiser must obtain the approval of the IFR before it enters into the arrangements mentioned in subsection (1).(4) The IFR must grant approval for the organiser entering into those arrangements if the IFR is satisfied that the arrangements—(a) would not harm the financial sustainability of the competition or of English football,(b) would not cause significant harm to the heritage of the competition or of English football, and (c) have the approval of UK-based supporters including those of the clubs involved.(5) The IFR may not grant approval in any other circumstances.(6) The IFR must, as soon as reasonably practicable after the organiser has sought approval, decide whether to grant approval under subsection (4).(7) The IFR must notify the organiser of its decision to grant, or not to grant, that approval and give reasons for its decision.(8) In this section “home ground”, in relation to a regulated club, has the meaning given by section 46(10)(a).”

My Lords, I will be brief, partly because dinner is fast approaching and partly because this is an amendment to probe the Minister’s response to a good existing clause, Clause 48. This clause is about preventing home matches being relocated. The amendment is to probe whether the provision is sufficient to meet widespread fan concerns about possible exceptions. There is increasing discussion about domestic football games being moved overseas. We have seen statements from the chairman of my own team, Liverpool, and broadcasters such as NBC are talking about relocating Premier League games abroad. The FIFA working group is reviewing its policies to allow this. There are all sorts of stories, rumours and plans afoot to possibly allow Latin American domestic games to be played in the United States. There is historical evidence showing that the Premier League once proposed an additional 39th game to the season, which would not be played at the ground of a Premier League club. We also see countries such as Saudia Arabia that have intervened—let us put it that way—in sports properties, buying them and moving them around, for golf and boxing. There is reason to think that this is not a very remote possibility. The Bill sets out to prevent clubs relocating matches away from home stadia without the approval of the regulator. I hope that enjoys widespread support; it is welcome and important. The point of my amendment is to probe the idea that the clause is not quite as watertight as it should be. The concern is that the current wording is based on the relocation of matches which are already designated as home matches. What happens if the competition organiser allocates games directly, before the season’s fixtures are issued, to Riyadh, Los Angeles, Singapore, Paris or wherever? They could claim that no home game is being relocated and say, for example, that weeks 10 and 20 are weeks in which games are played elsewhere. What if the 39th game proposal, so widely reviled by fans, is revived? That is not about the relocation of a home game; it is an extra game. The new clause addresses this by placing a requirement on the regulated competition organisers to seek approval from the regulator before moving a domestic game overseas. That way, there is no longer a need to define what a home game is to bring it in scope, and it ensures that as part of the assessment of this request to relocate a game, the regulator must specifically consult UK-based fans of the clubs involved in the relocation. Importantly, this does not rule out the relocation of a game; it requires any additional fixture that is part of a competition to be subject to consultation in the way specified in the Bill. I would welcome the Minister’s observations on this amendment and her assessment of two questions. First, what happens if the competition organiser allocates games directly to an overseas location? How will the existing clause protect against that? Secondly, what happens if the competition organiser creates a new format, such as another 39th game that cannot easily be defined as a home game? The amendment tries to cover those extra, niche cases. With that in mind, I beg to move.

My Lords, I am assuming that this is a probing amendment. Other sports—not British sports—do this, such as American football. Is it the Government’s intention that the regulator will make sure that such games are played at home? If the Minister can say that that is the intention, we are all comparatively happy; if not, we have a real problem.

My Lords, I rise in support of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wood of Anfield. If all football fans were surveyed—more than the 20,000 to 30,000 that responded to Dame Tracey Crouch’s report—this would be one of the issues they cared about most. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Mann, will not mind me putting words in his mouth, but if he were here, I think he would say in his Yorkshire tones, “Home should mean home.” The Government must do everything they can to ensure that.

I thank my noble friend Lord Wood of Anfield for tabling Amendment 235. Clause 48 has been designed to prevent clubs unilaterally moving their home ground with no regard for the vital role it plays in the club’s history and identity, as well as its financial position. In essence, it is intended to capture instances such as Wimbledon’s move to Milton Keynes and is a really important protection in the legislation. The Government believe that this protection must remain in the Bill to enable the regulator to deliver its key objectives and ensure that home grounds have the appropriate safeguards in place. This amendment, however, seeks to address a slightly different but related issue of competition organisers relocating matches elsewhere. Many of the current instances of this are, for example, play-off matches at Wembley, which have become a key part of English football heritage in and of themselves. However, I am aware that my noble friend wants this amendment to address situations in which a match could be moved outside England and Wales. Noble Lords will be aware that FIFA is currently reviewing its position on overseas league matches. I do recognise the point the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, made—although I would not presume to paraphrase my noble friend Lord Mann—and how significant this would be for supporters. FIFA has committed to looking at how it might impact supporters, as well as players and a number of other valuable considerations. While the industry is still considering its position on this matter, and many clubs have spoken against the proposals, we do not think the regulator should have a specific power to directly address this. However, the regulator will ensure that clubs consult fans on any changes to match days, including moving the location. The Government will remain in conversation with the relevant governing bodies on this developing issue. I am happy to continue conversations with noble Lords who have a specific interest in this issue before we get to Report. But for the reasons I have laid out, I must ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

I thank the Minister for that reply. I also thank her—I did not before—and her officials for the generous way she has spared time not just for me but for lots of other Members of this House over the last few weeks. It is really appreciated. I understand what the Minister says, and I also understand that FIFA is currently revising its proposals. We have spent a lot of time worrying about provoking FIFA, and I understand why there is sensitivity there. The requirement to consult fans on moving matches assumes that there is already a scheduled match that needs to be moved. My amendment is about two problems that there are in fact technical ways around. So, that issue is still a live one. There will be more discussion about this, and I know the Minister is going to be as generous with her time as she has been already, so with that in mind—

19:15:00

I urge the Minister to give this some more thought, because it is a pertinent and powerful core issue, and we should all be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wood of Anfield, for raising it. As the noble Lord, Lord Harlech, said, fans worry about these things; they do not want to see “home” meaning something completely different. That is why we should have something in the Bill on this topic.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, very much. My two teams are Liverpool and Tonbridge Angels of the National League South. One is an internationally competitive team—and the other is Tonbridge Angels; but place is crucial to both teams. If you are a fan of Liverpool from Los Angeles or Singapore, the place of Anfield and the locality and the community relationship are absolutely part of what it is you support. Home and away fixtures are a routine part of how the Premier League competition is conducted. That is why this is essential, not just to large clubs but to small clubs across the country.

This issue has arisen before. The FA Cup is the oldest cup competition in the world, yet one club that held the title did not enter it the following season in order to play a match in the world championships in South America. Does the Minister think the regulator would have the power to prevent that happening in future? It is the kind of thing regulators should be looking at.

I am grateful to the noble Lord. That is a very live issue as well, but I do not want to expand my amendment to that. I am conscious of the time, so with those caveats, and with thanks to colleagues who have intervened, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 235 withdrawn.

Clause 48 agreed.

Amendment 236 not moved.

Clause 49: Duty not to change crest, home shirt colours or name without approval

Amendments 237 to 241 not moved.

Clause 49 agreed.

Amendment 242 not moved.

Clause 50: Duty to notify of changes in circumstances relevant to the IFR’s functions

Amendment 242A not moved.

Clause 50 agreed.

Clause 51: Duty to keep fans informed of insolvency proceedings

Amendment 243 not moved.

Clause 51 agreed.

Amendments 244 to 248A not moved.

Clause 52 agreed.

Amendment 249 not moved.

Clause 53: Duty to pay a levy

Amendment 250

Moved by

250: Clause 53, page 42, line 22, at end insert— (f) the amount which the IFR estimates is necessary to fund appropriately for that period the Central Fund established pursuant to Section (Central Fund).”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment adds another factor which must be considered (namely the amount required to fund the Central Fund - see amendment 254) when determining the amount of the levy.

My Lords, we can probably dispose of this one relatively quickly. All that we seek is some reassurance, on the record, that the levy raised by the IFR will not overburden smaller clubs. We are trying to get some assurance that the levy will be relative to the income of the clubs and that any other levy that the IFR might want to raise for a central fund of any sort would also closely reflect the ability of the clubs concerned to fund that. It has to be relative to their income, strength and viability. That is the purpose of the amendments in this group, and I am keen to get that on the record.

My Lords, I have some concerns about what the noble Lord advocates in this amendment. He advocates setting up a central fund in one of his other amendments, and the purpose of that is not clear, unless it is to provide a mechanism, in effect, for redistributing the levy funding the operation of the regulator, presumably from bigger and better-off clubs to smaller clubs. That will dilute the incentive that should exist for the regulator to constrain its size, cost and degree of interventionism because of the effect on smaller clubs. This comes back to the sense that the rich, big or better-off clubs are somehow there to be plucked in terms of the redistribution of funds down through the pyramid—already, 16% of the revenues of the Premier League goes down into clubs through the pyramid. My concern throughout the consideration of the Bill has been that, if the regulator is set up in too large a manner and exercises its powers as regulators have an inbuilt tendency to do—they increase their scope and degree of intervention—that will have a cost. A primary aim of the Bill and of setting up the regulator is to “improve” the distribution of money down through the pyramid, but the more the regulator does, the larger it is and the greater the extent of its activity, the less there is to distribute. If it is not strictly controlled, it will become self-defeating. If the purpose of the central fund that the noble Lord advocates is, in effect, to increase that degree of redistribution from bigger clubs to smaller clubs, as it seems to be, the effect would be to exacerbate the concerns that a number of us will have about the direction of travel and the inevitable tendency for a regulator of this kind to increase its scope, size, interventionism and, inevitably, cost. I have given notice of my desire to oppose that Clause 53 stands part of the Bill, on the basis that the power to impose a levy will damage football. If the Government are so concerned to have this regulator, they should raise the money for it themselves and not have the regulator able, in a very uncontrolled way, to impose a levy—potentially very large amounts of money, as the impact assessment makes clear—on the very activity of the sport that we love, inflicting damage on it that would run counter to the intention of the Bill.

My Lords, I will try to put the noble Lord’s mind at rest. Most regulators are financed by the industries that they regulate, and the noble Lord knows that; he knows a lot about regulation. Given that there may be, from time to time, a need to strengthen the capacity of clubs lower down in the pyramid to operate, comply with regulations and all the rest of it, it is not unreasonable for the IFR to have the ability and capacity to exercise a levy. The Premier League is generating considerably large sums of money and, although the distribution down the pyramid looks extremely generous in raw number terms, it is worth being reminded that some 92% of the revenue generated ends up being maintained by the Premier League and those five clubs in the Championship that receive parachute payments and the rest. There is a lot of money here, and we need to make sure that the regulator has the capacity to intervene in a way that is entirely fair. Later amendments deal with some of this issue, but we should have that at the front of our minds when we consider this.

My Lords, we look forward to hearing what the Minister says about the amendments in this group, although I think, as my friend Lord Maude of Horsham pointed out, we are all listening with different hopes and expectations about what she may say. Briefly, my Amendment 256 in this group specifies that the regulator must consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer rather than His Majesty’s Treasury in the abstract. It seeks to ensure a clearer line of accountability and strengthen the governance structure for decisions relating to the levy. The Chancellor might well delegate this responsibility, but she should be accountable in law and the Bill ought to point to her as the Minister at the head of that department and not anyone else at the Treasury. I look forward to the noble Baroness’s responses to the amendments in this group.

My Lords, very briefly, it is probably important to remember that a lot of this is about making sure that we preserve our football league. If a different Government had not intervened, we would have a European Super League and the Premier League would not be there. That is what happened. We must remember that the preservation of those top five leagues is intrinsic to the Bill. If we want that to carry on, some money will occasionally have to be raised to support their structure so that it is more stable. The noble Lord’s amendment is reasonable. There may be a reasonable answer about why it does not have to go in, but I agree with the concept.

What the noble Lord says is simply not the case. When the European Super League was proposed, what stopped it from happening and what made the clubs drop it like a red-hot potato was the fact that the fans reacted with fury. Admittedly, the rather populist Prime Minister of the time responded to the fan fury by uttering threats, but it was not the politicians, the Government, your Lordships’ House, the other place or a fantasy regulator who stopped it; it was the fans who stopped it, and we should have absolutely no illusion about that.

My Lords, that might be the noble Lord’s interpretation, but, ultimately, it is government that makes law.

My Lords, just to be clear for the record, no law was passed in this instance. In a matter of days the clubs quickly withdrew from the competition because, as my noble friend mentioned, it went down like a lead balloon and fans were up in arms. The Government were nowhere near it. That was a perfect example of where the clubs and the fans regulated themselves.

My Lords, I have a very strong recollection of this because I wrote an article the day after the proposal came, which was published, like many articles at the time, and I remember that the very next day the proposal was withdrawn. It had nothing to do with the Government. By the way, I was not a politician at the time; some would say I am not one now, but it had nothing to do with Governments or Parliaments.

19:30:00

My Lords, this is the first time I have spoken in Committee. I am rather late to it but I spoke at Second Reading. On this matter of history, it is not usual that I come out in support of a previous Conservative Prime Minister, but the truth is that once the fans showed their feelings—I agree that they did—the then Prime Minister, within a short number of hours or certainly days, quickly came up and took over the issue, as it were, on behalf of his Government. That was well done and, along with the fans’ disagreement, it had a profound effect on the clubs, some more reluctantly than others, which withdrew from that mad scheme.

My Lords, I specifically remember this as it involved Manchester United. It is propitious that the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, has arrived as it was his brother, the then Prime Minister, who said “I would drop a legislative bomb on this proposal”. Do your Lordships remember the language? That is precisely what happened and it killed it dead.

We have interventions on interventions here and we should move on.

My Lords, before we have any further interventions, I thank my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for their amendments. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, for his contribution on this group, which sparked a lively debate, and for giving notice of his intention to oppose the Question that Clause 53 stand part of the Bill. It is useful to remember why we are here, but my comments will focus on the amendments in this group. It is imperative that the regulator can raise the funds necessary to deliver its regulatory functions, so I thank my noble friends and the noble Lords who have raised this important issue. Turning first to Amendments 250 and 254 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam, I want to reassure him that the existing drafting in Clause 53(3) is comprehensive, in the Government’s view, and provides the necessary mechanism for raising these funds. Clause 53(3) also acts as an important constraint on what the regulator can charge clubs for. We believe that the amendment would risk bypassing this safeguard. We also want to be clear that, under the existing drafting, any such central fund could not be used as a form of lifeboat fund to prop up clubs in distress. It is the Government’s opinion that a zero-failure regulator, as implied, would create moral hazard and encourage the very risk-taking that the regulator is trying to address. On Amendment 252 in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, the Government acknowledge the importance of any charges on clubs being transparent and proportionate, and offering value for money. These values should be at the heart of any public body. This must be achieved while maintaining the regulator’s operational independence and flexibility, which is why it would not be appropriate to prescribe an exact methodology in legislation for charging the levy. Doing so would remove the regulator’s ability to explore other, possibly more effective and proportionate, methods of charging. The Bill already requires the regulator to have regard to clubs’ financial resources and position in the pyramid. I am confident that this will be sufficient to ensure that the levy is fair and proportionate. I hope this will give my noble friends reassurance that these costs will not be burdensome to clubs. Amendment 256 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, would require the regulator to consult with the Chancellor of the Exchequer specifically, as opposed to the Treasury, when making, amending or replacing levy rules. Consulting with the Treasury on levy rules is standard practice for a regulator, and this approach has been agreed with the department. The Chancellor, as head of the Treasury, will have full oversight of the Treasury’s response to the consultation. The Chancellor is accountable for the decisions of the Treasury and any consultation with the Treasury is likely to have the approval of the Chancellor. Therefore, the Government’s view is that the existing requirement to consult with the Treasury is sufficient to ensure value for money. Finally, on whether Clause 53 should stand part of the Bill, this clause will allow the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running costs. This follows the precedent of other regulators such as the FCA, the CMA and Ofcom.

I thank the Minister for allowing an intervention. Has there been any further development on the cost of the regulator? I know that we have asked the question on numerous occasions, but we have not had a reply. It would be very good for clubs to know what the Government expect the regulator to cost. The Minister mentioned the FCA; that costs £762 million a year. I hope it will not be that much.

I was going to come on to that. I anticipated that if the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, was here, he would ask me that question. If I can carry on through my speech, with the noble Baroness’s permission, I will address that later in my remarks. We think it only fair that industry should cover the cost, as opposed to taxpayers. Football is a wealthy industry, and the cost of regulation would represent just a tiny fraction of its annual revenue of over £6 billion. However, this legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator. It will be limited to raising funds to meet a set of tightly defined costs that are necessary for regulatory activity only. The regulator will not have a blank cheque; it will be subject to numerous safeguards, including annual auditing by the National Audit Office, and its annual accounts will be laid before Parliament. This will provide the necessary transparency and scrutiny to deliver value for money. Clause 53 also requires the regulator to have regard to a club’s individual financial position and the league it plays in when setting the levy charges that a club must pay. This should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. As noble Lords are aware, the regulator will be the one that decides on the methodology and, ultimately, the cost of the levy. I understand, however, that there is a clear desire, as expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, and other Members of your Lordships’ Committee, to have a much better understanding of how the costs may be borne at different levels of the game. I will endeavour to provide more clarity on this issue. Therefore, after further discussions with the shadow regulator, I will write to noble Lords to provide further clarity on costs ahead of Report. I will also place a copy of this letter in the Libraries of both Houses and would be happy to meet noble Lords or take any questions. This is a complex issue and we cannot fetter the discretion of the regulator. The letter, when it comes, cannot therefore be considered a definite estimation of costs. It will merely be illustrative, in an attempt to be helpful to this Committee and provide your Lordships’ House—and the clubs that will be regulated—with some clarity and reassurance before we get to Report. For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments in this group. I therefore hope that noble Lords will not press them.

My Lords, I am more than happy to withdraw my amendment and grateful to the Minister for the assurances that she has given about the levy. I just say to colleagues on the Opposition Benches: it is worth reminding ourselves that we are talking about the regulation of only 116 different football entities. This is a small regulator, at the end of the day, so we should not be overly worried about its eventual costs. I think the costs will be, in relative terms, small—nothing at all by comparison with the FCA. Some of the clubs regulated, such as Gateshead, employ only three staff. If you are an Ebbsfleet staffer, you are one of just six, whereas Arsenal employs more than 500 full-time backroom staff. That is why we need to be certain that the levy raised is proportionate to the size of the club. Proportionality should be at the core of the regulator’s consideration when setting its levy. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 250 withdrawn.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.40 pm.