House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Committee (2nd Day)

15:37:00

Amendment 11

Moved by

11: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause— “Duty to take forward proposals for democratic mandate for House of Lords(1) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to take forward proposals to secure a democratic mandate for the House of Lords.(2) In pursuance of the duty under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must carry out the steps set out in subsections (3), (4), (5) and (6).(3) Within 12 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a consultation paper on methods for introducing directly elected members in the House of Lords.(4) After laying the consultation paper under subsection (3), the Secretary of State must seek the views on the matters covered by that paper of—(a) each party and group in the House of Lords,(b) each political party represented in the House of Commons,(c) the Scottish Government,(d) the Welsh Government,(e) the Northern Ireland Executive,(f) local authorities in the United Kingdom,(g) representative organisations for local authorities in the United Kingdom, and(h) such other persons and bodies as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(5) Within 16 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a report on responses to the consultation. (6) Within 18 months of the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay before each House of Parliament a draft Bill containing legislative proposals on the matter mentioned in subsection (3).”Member’s explanatory statement This new Clause imposes a duty on Ministers to take forward proposals to secure a democratic mandate for the House of Lords through introduction of directly elected members.

My Lords, Amendment 11, standing in my name and those of other noble Lords, seeks to take forward proposals for a democratic mandate for the House of Lords. When we debated Lords reform last November, I set out the reasons why I thought the Lords should be elected. I said then that it should be elected on the basis that in a democracy, laws should be passed by people chosen by the people to act on their behalf. It should be elected because the unelected Lords leads to a geographical imbalance in membership in which London and the south-east are greatly overrepresented and the north, Scotland and Wales are underrepresented. It should be elected because it would almost certainly be more representative of the ethnic diversity of the United Kingdom, and it should be elected because it would be more politically representative. It would contain members of the SNP and almost certainly more members of the smaller parties. By doing all these things, it would help restore the trust that the people have of Parliament—currently at a low level. We realise that this Bill is not the place to introduce detailed proposals for an elected second Chamber. Instead, the amendment requires the Government to start a process that would lead to the House having a democratic mandate. It requires the Government to produce a consultation paper on methods for electing the Lords. It suggests who should be consulted—including the nations and regions of the United Kingdom—and it sets out a timetable for undertaking the consultation and then for the production of a draft Bill containing legislative proposals for reform. I do not intend to dwell on the imperfections of the current system of appointing people to your Lordships’ House. Suffice it to say that if we had elections, we would not be worrying about many of the issues that will concern us later today and on further consideration of the Bill. We would not be worrying about the Prime Minister overriding the Appointments Commission to appoint cronies. We would not be worrying about whether Peers did their jobs properly or about the balance between different groups or types of people. In short, it would cut through the Gordian knot of problems that bedevil the current system. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for supporting this amendment. I remind the Committee that in 2012 the proposals for an elected House of Lords were approved in the Commons by a majority of 338 at Second Reading, with the support of both the Conservative and Labour Front Benches and with only 46 Labour opponents and 89 Tories. On the other amendments in this group, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, that consideration would need to be given to the powers and conventions of a reformed House of Lords, but we have to be rather careful that this exercise does not become a pretext for delaying the whole process. I do not see the necessity for the noble Lord’s proposal of a referendum. No referendum was envisaged in 2012, and public opinion has for a very long time been strongly in favour of this House being elected. Again, such a move could be a pretext for delay. We obviously agree with the sentiments behind the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, but we wanted to put a timetable in our amendment to ensure that, if it is passed, momentum towards reform will not be unnecessarily delayed. The noble Lord, Lord Brady, would reduce the size of the Lords to 200 and elect people using the first past the post system. I do not believe that the Lords could do its job of detailed scrutiny and a comprehensive range of Select Committees with such a small number of people. The Clegg reforms envisaged a House of 450 and, to do the work we expect of it, that is probably about right. Noble Lords will not be surprised to know that we also prefer a system of proportional representation for the Lords, as for the Commons, for reasons with which the House will be only too familiar. In sum, we see Amendment 11 and the consequential Amendment 115 as helping the Government to fulfil their manifesto and bring about the long-term future of the Lords on a largely elected, or elected, basis. I commend it to the Committee. Amendment 11A (to Amendment 11)

Moved by

11A: After subsection (3) insert— “(3A) The consultation paper under subsection (3) must assess the implications of securing a democratic mandate for the House of Lords for its powers and conventions, which may include—(a) the powers of the Lords in relation to money bills;(b) the powers of the Lords in relation to statutory instruments;(c) the Salisbury Convention;(d) the Prime Minister being drawn from the House of Commons;(e) the limitations in the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 on the powers of the House of Lords;(f) the role of the Lord Speaker and their relationship with the Speaker in the House of Commons.”

My Lords, Amendments 11A and 11B would amend the Lib Dem Amendment 11 to say that we should first consult on the role of the Lords, if it were elected, and have a referendum to see whether the public actually wanted an elected Lords. Let me reassure my noble friends that I am completely opposed to having a consultation paper on this, and to having a referendum. My amendments are a response to the usual deliberate attempts to advance the case for an elected House without first working out how the whole balance of powers between the Lords and the Commons would change if this House were composed of elected Members. My Amendment 11A seeks to deliver what the Government Chief Whip, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said to the House magazine on 13 July 2021. He said: “We have to be very clear, what are the powers of the Lords, what do you want the Lords to actually do, and why is it there? Answer those issues, and then we can decide”. Those were very wise words from the noble Lord. Even the commission chaired by my noble friend Lord Wakeham avoided this by suggesting just 150 elected Peers, so that their membership was so small in comparison to appointed Peers or hereditaries that the supremacy of the Commons would not be challenged. Then we had the ludicrous Gordon Brown proposals suggesting an assembly of just 200 elected Members from the regions, with our current powers reduced and the Lords just a regional talking shop. I can do no better than quote the words of our new noble ambassador to Washington, who described the Brown proposals as “a sort of multi-layered cake with an assortment of very diverse ingredients in it with a thin layer of icing at the top, which is called a new second chamber of the regions and nations, which has barely been put in the oven yet, let alone fully baked”. Thank you, Mandy. So it is raw, not even half-baked—but that is Lib Dem policy for you. There was one report which suggested 450 elected Members, but most suggest just 300 elected Lords senators. Thus, we would have an elected Lords with about half the number of Lords senators as MPs. Before looking at the new roles of the two elected Chambers, we need to consider who those new senators would be. First, they will all be party-political people—Conservative, Labour, Lib Dem, SNP, Northern Ireland Members—exactly the same as the House of Commons. Just look round this Chamber and see how many here would be selected as candidates. Will the Cross-Benchers form a party? Possibly, but highly unlikely, so we would lose all that expertise. What about the older hands here, those who have had 30 or 40 years’ experience in their various professions, business or industry? Will they apply or be selected as political candidates? Even we older politicians, who have the scars and experience of doing things in government in the past—we will be out too.

15:45:00

I have always predicted that in 10 to 15 years’ time, a bunch of new MPs with no institutional memory will say, “Let’s invade Afghanistan and sort out the Taliban. What could possibly go wrong?” The greatest error in politics is no institutional memory.

Those likely to offer themselves for election and be selected by political parties will be the same sort of young political animals some of us may have been in the past. Some will be using it as a stepping stone to the Commons, and others will have failed to get into the Commons. Those 300 full-time political animals will, more than anything else, change what this House does and how it interacts with the Commons.

How many of us, as new Members of the Commons, had a clue about the Lords’ powers and conventions? Newly elected Lords senators will not know, nor have any regard for, the conventions I have listed in my Amendment 11A. Let us imagine that we are one of these new male or female young Turk senators with an electorate and a majority twice the size of MPs’, and therefore with twice the moral authority to legislate. If our constituents write to us asking us to vote against the national insurance increase, we say, “We agree entirely, but we can’t vote on that because there’s a convention that we don’t vote on money Bills”. If they want us to amend or vote down a statutory instrument, again we say, “While we are not permitted to amend it, we could vote it down, but the Commons will not like it”. The last time that happened, my noble friend Lord Strathclyde was called in to write a report on the constitutional crisis that that created. That is another convention up with which elected senators will not put.

How long will our self-imposed restrictions last when our constituents say that a newly elected Lord is just a waste of space if we will not vote on the things that matter to them? Why would democratically elected Lords senators accept the 1911 and 1949 limitations on stopping legislation for just one year? They would demand equal powers to the Commons to vote down a Bill, and could and would hold up legislation until they got that power.

Then we have the Salisbury convention, which both parties, sometimes reluctantly, adhere to. If the elections to both Houses were on the same day, there might be a possibility that the majority party forming a Government in the Commons might also have a majority in the Lords. But if elections were at different times, as Gordon Brown proposed, there could be a majority of elected politicians in the Lords opposed to those in the Commons. If there were a regional PR system, it is highly likely that the governing party in the Commons would never have a majority in the Lords. As we know, that does not matter as long as the Lords adheres to the Salisbury convention, as we currently do, but I suggest that a highly politically elected Lords Chamber would never endorse the Salisbury convention and we would have a US-style Senate/Congress deadlock.

If we are democratically elected Lords senators, why should the Prime Minister come from the Commons? It is only 60 years ago that Sir Alec Douglas-Home—Lord Home of the Hirsel—was Prime Minister. In the United States, 17 Presidents have come from the Senate and 19 from Congress—not that I am holding up the United States as a fine example of democracy in action at the moment. The Conservatives and Labour may make a party rule that the leader can come from only the MPs, but they would soon ditch that if polling suggested that some charismatic young Turk from this place was an election winner.

Of course, our Lord Speaker gives precedence to Mr Speaker, but that would have to change. The speaker of an elected upper House would inevitably have superior status to the Speaker of an elected lower House. The names are res ipsa loquitur. All the items in my amendment are things that fanatical advocates of an elected House deliberately do not talk about because if they are properly considered the public will reject them, as the Commons would.

My Amendment 11B calls for a referendum on whether the public want an elected House. I love the hypocrisy of the Lib Dems’ Amendment 11. It is to introduce a democratic mandate and give the public a say in who is sent to a new House of Lords. They propose consulting all political parties in both Houses, all territorial Governments, 400 local authorities and goodness knows how many organisations that are supposed to be representative of local authorities in the UK. Everyone is to be consulted, except a little group of people—48,200,000 of them—who are the electorate of the UK. They will have no say whatever on whether they want an elected House of Lords foisted on them by the great and the good, who know what is best for the plebeian herd, and we know why: because once the public get the facts, this Lib Dem proposal will face the same fate as their PR plan—soundly rejected in a referendum.

That proposal will be rejected not only for the reasons I have advanced but on cost grounds. Last year, according to the figures produced by IPSA, MPs’ salaries cost over £64 million, staff costs were over £133 million and other costs were over £34 million. The total cost for 650 Members of Parliament was £233,138,000. We can assume that elected Lords senators will have the same salaries, staffing and accommodation allowance, so at just £300 instead of £650, that will be a cost of £100 million for an elected Lords.

There is a rather nasty petition by the Electoral Reform Society, which says inter alia:

“It seems the only time the public is allowed into the House of Lords is to pay the bill. The House of Lords isn’t just an affront to voters, it’s an unacceptable burden on the public purse. Peers are able to claim £361 a day tax-free each day they attend, plus some travel costs … A smaller, fairly elected second chamber would be better for tax-payers”.

Really? That is the greatest lie from those who want to foist their unworkable ideas on us. The total cost for Peers in the House of Lords last year was a mere £22.1 million, so we are cheap at the price. Our current system is five times cheaper than any proposed new elected Lords Chamber. When the public are told that, as well as the consequences of what an elected Chamber would be—another bunch of party politicians, no different from the Commons—they would overwhelmingly vote down an elected Lords, as we should Amendment 11. I beg to move Amendment 11A.

My Lords, I have signed the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, but I really enjoyed listening to my noble friend Lord Blencathra, who raised many sensible points. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, did not quite give the case for a democratic House as much justice as it deserved. I am sorry to see that most of his Benches seem to be relatively deserted. On the whole, his party has not turned out to support him as ably as I will now try to do. It is interesting that today we very much turn to a new phase of discussion of the Bill. Last week, we discussed the issue of heredity and whether to fling out certain Peers. I think the Committee broadly agreed, overwhelmingly, that heredity was no longer an acceptable way of choosing a House of Parliament, but there was substantial disagreement about transitionary arrangements, grandfather rights and creating life Peers. No doubt we will return to those at length when we meet again and discuss those amendments on Report. When discussing a democratic mandate for this House, it is always worth having a look at history—what my noble friend called the institutional memory. I do not think that any of us can go back to 1911, which may not have been the first time that democracy was discussed for this House, but it is a key point because it led to a statute of Parliament which fundamentally reassessed the relationship between the two Houses. What is important about the 1911 Act is its preamble. I will not quote it exactly, but it said that we should substitute the House of Lords for a Chamber constituted on a popular, instead of a hereditary, basis. That was in 1911 and here we are in 2025, and we are no further to getting that. In the 1920s, after the First World War and the devastation it produced, several commissions looked at the case for an elected House, which came to nothing. In the 1930s, there were other matters. In the 1940s, there was of course the Second World War. The extraordinary Parliament in 1945, with all those radical Labour policies under Attlee, did so much. Of course, with only a few handfuls of Labour Peers, that Labour Government managed to pass everything they wanted to through this House, which goes to the nub of my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s argument that convention plays an important part in the relationship between these two Houses of Parliament. However, I am not entirely sure that my noble friend was quite so keen on those kinds of conventions existing. They were very powerful in the 1940s, and they are still powerful now. In the 1950s, there was the introduction of the Life Peerages Act which, at a stroke, fundamentally changed how this House was viewed and injected a good deal of new blood into it. That is what has kept us going ever since. But the dream of democracy did not quite die. Lord Longford introduced a Bill in 1968. That Bill was talked out in the House of Commons by two MPs: Enoch Powell and Michael Foot. They decided that the reason there could not be a democratic mandate for the House of Lords is that it would compete with the House of Lords, and that level of competition was completely unacceptable. The noble Baroness is trying to intervene.

I only wanted to correct the noble Lord. He said that they could not have an elected second Chamber as it would compete with the House of Lords; I think he meant the House of Commons. He just misspoke—that was all.

I thank the noble Baroness for putting me right.

I just proved I was listening.

Anyway, that took us to 1998-99 and the promise in the 1997 Blairite manifesto that there would be a democratic reform. Here we are, 28 years after that, and there is no further movement at all. At the beginning of the century, there were various royal commissions and White Papers, which came up in favour of a more democratic House, but none was pushed forward. I think Prime Minister Gordon Brown had an attempt in 2009-10 at a democratic House. But it was not until the Government of my noble friend Lord Cameron that we saw the introduction into Parliament of a Bill for real democratic mandate—an 80:20 elected House—and the noble Lord, Lord Newby, explained very well what happened to that. It is worth pointing out in this debate about the democratic mandate that the amendment I have signed is not for an 80:20 elected House; it is for a 100% elected House. That would mean that the House would lose the benefit of the Cross Benches. I think having 20% unelected is extremely important. The Cross-Benchers bring something to this House which no democratic mandate would be able to do. You just have to look at the Cross Benches for an example: former judges, trade unionists, businesspeople, churchmen, archbishops, and so on. They would never dream of standing for an election, but they bring their knowledge and experience to bear to the workings of this House and legislation, which is extremely effective. I am in favour of an 80% elected House, not a 100% elected House. Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, made the case for a directly elected House. I wonder whether it is worth considering, and whether the noble Lord has considered, that, given the enormous changes in devolution over the last 25 years in our major cities and, of course, in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, there may be a case for looking at the capacity of this House to accept some form of indirectly elected Members, which would perhaps go to stopping what my noble friend Lord Blencathra regarded as too strong a democratic mandate that would challenge the House of Commons.

16:00:00

My noble friend Lord Blencathra, in his Amendment 11A, poses some genuinely important questions about how the relationship between the two Houses would work. In 2012, when we looked at this in detail before the Bill was published, we rather imagined that the powers of the House of Lords and the House of Commons would remain the same. My noble friend was kind enough to refer to a study and a report that I published and presented to the Government about secondary legislation. I have to say that, from that moment to this, it has hardly been mentioned again and has sunk without trace. That does not mean that it is not still relevant and important, and I hope that it will be taken up again.

On the question of a referendum, there was no need for a referendum in the Bill that was published in 2012. I think that, for a change of the enormity that is proposed in these amendments, and indeed by my noble friends, you probably would need to seek some sort of popular mandate—whether that is a referendum or something else, I am not sure. I think we would have to wait until then. Since the amendment suggests that the Government should come forward with some proposals over the course of the next couple of years, perhaps we will not have too long to wait.

Finally, my noble friend Lord Brady wants to reduce the House to the very small number of 200. That would fundamentally change the role of the House of Lords. It is clear that we would be unable to continue to do the kind of scrutiny work that is currently required, but I can see which way my noble friend is thinking, I think it should be taken seriously and I hope that it will be debated to an extent over the next short while.

My Lords, I have also signed the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and I am surprised and delighted to say that I agreed with every word that he said. I think that there are some real problems with the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I always enjoy his speeches, but he made an awful lot of assumptions in that speech. While it was very entertaining, I am not sure that it would hold up to close examination. Does the noble Lord want to say anything? No. I am not against getting rid of hereditaries: I think it is a long overdue move. I am extremely fond of some of them—not all of them, but some—and they play the most incredible role in this House. Once they are gone, we will see some really big gaps in all our processes, so we will miss them. However, it is time. It is something that is way past its sell-by date. Quite honestly, my main objection to the Bill is that it is so timid. Why not be braver and think seriously about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby? Why not do something that has really forward-thinking, constructive ideas, rather than just the rather mean-minded blunt instrument of kicking out the hereditaries? I am not defending privilege; I do not like it at all, but in this case, it just seems so petty. On the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Brady—he has not even introduced his amendment yet, but we all have views on it—I agree that 200 is too small. If I could give my own short history lesson, back in 2013 my noble friend Lady Bennett and I tabled a Bill to redraw the whole House of Lords under PR, and I think that the figure we used was 350, essentially at least reducing this House by half, because we are a bloated, undemocratic, archaic, ridiculously old-fashioned House and it is time to move on. I am trying not to make a Second Reading speech, but I am not sure I am succeeding. The Labour Government told us they were going to modernise the House, which is fair enough. If I could see that this was the first of many alterations and many different Bills, it would sit easier with me. We have heard that everyone over 80 is going to be kicked out; I personally do not mind that, but the Government have been bringing in new Peers who are over 80; they will not have a very long shelf life. I am curious about that. I argue that this amendment is a very good one because it covers the crucial aspect of the House being more representative. Certainly, if we had it under PR there would be a lot more Greens, which I know would be very welcome to your Lordships’ House. Finally, in the Bill I tabled, there was an element of Cross-Benchers—I forget exactly how many, but it might have been about 100—and we can do that under a different form of election. We all agree that Cross-Benchers, hereditary or not, are extremely valuable, and so to lose their skills and expertise would be a mistake. However, I think that one of the first things this Labour Government should do is to stop the ridiculous appointment system by the Prime Minister which brings in people who love having a title but really do not love the work.

My Lords, in the interests of institutional memory, I will add a footnote to that. I was very surprised to see the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, as I know his passion for democracy in this House and the way he has pursued it in the Delegated Powers Committee. His explanation was more than welcome. It occurs to me that in the historical palimpsest that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, offered, the one thing he omitted was the report from the Joint Committee of both Houses in 2011-12 on the coalition Bill. Had the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, served on that Joint Committee, it would have taken two weeks rather than 18 months to write our report. We would have had infinitely more fun and would have come to conclusions that were infinitely crisper and more persuasive. In that report, we took exhaustive evidence from the authors of the Bill, from Ministers, from all the usual suspects and beyond, and—I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, takes some comfort from this—we came to exactly the same conclusions as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has about the dysfunctional relationship that would be set up automatically with the House of Commons. As we worked through our list of Ministers giving evidence, it became perfectly clear that none of them had asked themselves those questions about the implications it would have for the House of Commons, its legitimacy, its effectiveness and its relationship with the House of Lords. They had not considered whether there would be constituents who had competing notions of what was right or what would happen if we had different parties in command in the two Houses. It was an exhaustive review and there were differences of opinion—the chair was Lord Richard—but it was conclusive in its recommendations: the House of Commons must think again about the Bill it had been presented. It was the last time that either House looked at this issue in depth with any sophistication. My point is simply—just as the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Strathclyde, have said—that this is a constitutional issue of massive significance. It can hardly be dealt with through an amendment to such a narrow Bill on such a narrow point and where, frankly, these amendments have no place anyway. We should be addressing the substance of the Bill. Since the issue has been raised, however, we are right to remember that we had worked out our proper views on the implications of this subject separately in 2012. I wonder what happened to that Bill: why was it ever withdrawn? Unfortunately, the Prime Minister at the time is not in his place; otherwise, we might have been able to get an answer after all these years.

My Lords, there is one assumption in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that needs to be questioned, and that is the total identification of democracy with direct elections. There are other forms of democracy that include indirect elections. I was particularly glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, bring this up. The debate has moved on since the time of a great standoff between those in favour of a totally elected House and those in favour of a totally appointed House. Ideas were floated by the former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, for example, about a House that truly represents the nations and the regions. You can imagine a House that was indirectly elected by the Scottish Parliament, the Senedd, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the English regions. I am not arguing for or against it at the moment; I am just questioning the assumption that the only form of democracy is direct elections. You could have a form of democracy with the indirect elections by the nations and the regions. I have just one other small point in relation to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He mentioned the royal commission chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, which I had the great privilege to be a member of. The noble Lord suggested that we had recommended that the elected element would be only a third—150, I think. But, in fact, that commission recommended a series of stages in which the elected element would grow. I think on the commission’s recommendations, it would eventually grow to a majority. It is only a small point but that is what it envisaged.

My Lords, in speaking to the amendment that stands in my name, I reassure your Lordships that I neither seek nor anticipate achieving consensus on this point but rather hope to stimulate the kind of debate and discussion that we are already starting to hear in the Chamber this afternoon. To the noble Lord, Lord Newby, I say that my proposal of geographical constituencies would ensure the kind of geographical spread that he would like to see, possibly more effectively than a PR system would. I am not wedded to a membership of 200, although I think it is reasonable for the House to be smaller, and I suspect it could be a lot smaller. Unsurprisingly, I agree with a great deal of what my noble friend Lord Blencathra had to say. Perhaps my concern comes down to his central point, which I think we usually fail to address and tackle sufficiently in this discussion: this House does a very limited and specific job and does it very well. The point I made at Second Reading is that the hereditaries are actually at the forefront of that and, on average, contribute more than life Peers do. But given that the Government are determined to change the composition of a House that works so well in that limited and specific function, should we not take a moment to reflect on wider questions, not just how the House should be composed but whether our function should be so tightly confined? We might also pause to reflect for a moment on what the public think of this House. I note from a YouGov poll just a few months ago that 42% of the public have a negative view of the House of Lords and 49% think it is not useful. By a margin of 62% to 16%, there is support for having no hereditaries. But, also, interestingly, 50% of the public, compared with 22%, say that they oppose a wholly appointed Chamber. We are moving the composition of the House—I have no doubt that the Bill will become an Act—but we are moving to something that is already disliked and disapproved of by the wider public, and to something that possibly has even less legitimacy than a House of Lords comprising jointly life Peers and elected hereditaries. The justification for the current composition, or indeed for moving to a wholly appointed House, is circular and, in many ways, peculiar. It is deemed essential that the House should lack legitimacy and that its composition should be hard to defend, precisely and deliberately to ensure the primacy of a House of Commons that does have legitimacy, derived from elections.

16:15:00

Having spent 27 years in the elected House—which I found to be very largely controlled by the Executive, and in which the majority of Members are either Ministers or shadow Ministers or are seeking, often very hard, to become Ministers or shadow Ministers—I saw that patronage exerts huge control. My amendment seeks to probe the question of whether the Commons should and could benefit from more challenge, and whether Governments could benefit from a greater capacity for Parliament to hold them to account. Crucially, it would avoid the danger of moving to an elected House chosen in a way that increases the power of Prime Ministers, such as PR systems using a party list, which might lead to even more power of patronage in our Parliament. My purpose, fundamentally, is simply to ask noble Lords to reflect on the question of whether the House of Commons does its job well enough to have earned the absolute assumption that it should have primacy in our Parliament.

I close with a quote from Tom Paine’s book Common Sense. He said that

“a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right”.

I fear that in this matter, with the assumption—always unchallenged—that the other House should have primacy, we are falling into Tom Paine’s trap.

My Lords, I support Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, my noble friend Lord Strathclyde and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. As I have said in earlier debates, the 1999 agreement always envisaged that the House would, as stage 2 of that agreement, adopt proposals for introducing elected Members to the House of Lords. However, I am not sure that all were firmly agreed that the elected Members should be directly elected. I believe that some kind of indirect election system—perhaps one representing the new estates of the realm, such as the CBI, the TUC, the BMA, the Bar Association, et cetera—should also be considered as an alternative way to introduce a more democratic and representative element of the House’s composition. The difficulty would be in agreeing which organisations should be entitled to select or elect representatives, but the possibility should certainly be explored. An alternative way to select indirectly elected Members of your Lordships’ House might be by granting election or selection powers to devolved legislatures and principal councils. After the Second World War, and under pressure from the American occupation forces, the Japanese Government introduced constitutional changes that replaced the House of Peers with the directly elected House of Councillors, to which elections from large multimember constituencies are held. This introduced an element of proportional representation. Japan has two elected houses and, while they sometimes clash, the new upper house’s powers are restricted in a similar fashion to those of its predecessor House of Peers, and so it more or less works most of the time. I am not supporting moving directly to an all-elected, alternative second Chamber, but the Japanese example should be closely looked at. Although I support the outcome that could flow from this amendment, it is wrong to make changes to the membership of the House before shaking the sand out of the shoe. To let the Bill go through with this amendment alone will not guarantee that it would definitely lead to any enactment of a Bill laid before your Lordships’ House and another place. It is clear that the 1999 agreement was that the 92 hereditary Peers would remain until the enactment of proposals incorporating a democratic element. Nevertheless, I will support this amendment, but I believe the House should also adopt something similar to Amendment 6, as previously debated. I will support my noble friend Lord Lucas if he brings back on Report an amendment that would retain an elected and independent element within your Lordships’ House, which would keep the sand in the shoe. A combination of Amendment 6 and this amendment could well be developed to a level where a programme of change would enjoy a broad level of support across your Lordships’ House. I also support Amendments 11A and 11B in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra, both of which seek to ensure that referenda will be held to make certain that proposals for an elected House really would be enacted with popular support. As my noble friend Lord Strathclyde said, some sort of popular support should be sought in making a constitutional change of this nature. I cannot support Amendment 70 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, because a review would most probably conclude that a House composed of only appointed Peers and Bishops would lack appropriateness—that is an understatement. Such a review would just be kicked into the long grass. I like Amendment 72, but I think that the 92—or 88—should remain until the end of the Session prior to the new House being convened, following an election under a new electoral model. I am not sure about Amendment 90D in the name of my noble friend Lord Brady, although I agree with much of what he said in his most thought-provoking speech. Clearly, a House comprising only 200 Members would have no room for people retaining activities outside the House and would lack the capacity to scrutinise legislation as it does at present, or to operate the number of Select Committees it does today. It would be a very different kind of House. However, I am certainly attracted by my noble friend’s proposal that elections should be held one year later than general elections. That should be considered as a part of any move to a partly elected House. Lastly, Amendment 115 makes sense. The Bill should not be enacted without the adoption of at least a partial democratic mandate at the same time.

My Lords, I thoroughly support Amendment 11. People have tried picking holes in it, but it does not say that all have to be elected. It says: “introducing directly elected members in the House of Lords”. The proposals, which would be thought through and brought with a Bill within 18 months, could contain all sorts of different proposals, which I know everyone wants to debate in a moment. I will leave that to everybody else because there are some very good ideas in there. The whole point about Amendment 11 is that it gives voice to that promise of Privy Council oath, given from the two Front Benches, that there would be further democratic reform of the House of Lords. That is what Amendment 11 states, and it puts a time limit on it. Therefore, the Secretary of State has to do something about it, not just kick it into the long grass. We will not be here, but those who follow us will be here to see proper further reform of the Lords, introducing a democratic bit to it. As I said before, without that democratic element, it will eventually have all its powers removed because it will have no democratic legitimacy.

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Brady spoke very eloquently, but he did not refer to his Amendment 90C: “A person can only be a member of the House of Lords if they are not a Minister of the Crown”. I do not know why he did not refer to that, but it is a very bad idea. One of the most striking features of politics in the more than 50 years since I was elected to the House of Commons is that as the diversity in gender and ethnicity has widened—which is a good thing—the diversity of life experience has narrowed considerably. When I was first elected to the House of Commons, there were people who had a lot of business experience, people who had been active in trade unions—

My Lords, the amendment that the noble Lord is speaking to is actually in group 18, whereas we are starting with group 1. We will debate Amendment 90C later.

Then I will move to the other amendment which I wish to speak to and take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Newby. Democracy is the central feature of our governing system, and the House of Commons must always be the superior House. However, precisely because MPs’ experience has narrowed to the extent that it has, we have seen that the House of Commons has given up on its scrutiny function over time. When I was first elected, guillotines were very rare. They are now very common. Bills come up to this House that have barely been scrutinised. My question to the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and those who support his amendment, is: would an elected House be interested in the scrutiny function? The House of Commons has its representative functions. It does a great deal of useful work in different areas, but in terms of scrutiny it has rather given up the ghost. That has been left increasingly to the House of Lords. That is not a desirable situation, but it is the situation that exists. Would an elected House have the interest in scrutiny that we need? If we did not have scrutiny in the second Chamber, we would not have enough scrutiny at all. It would be wise to consider that a democratically elected second Chamber is not the only way forward. It may well be better to look at some alternatives and at the function first rather than the form. At the moment, we are all talking about the composition and the form of the House but not its function. If one looks at the function of the House, what system of election, selection, appointment—whatever—would be most appropriate?

My Lords, no doubt there are two different ways of furthering a democratic mandate for the House of Lords. One is, as we have heard, through a directly elected House, maybe following a referendum on that principle, as advocated by my noble friend Lord Blencathra in Amendment 11B, and perhaps including a partially or fully directly elected House of 200 Peers with constituencies, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham in his Amendment 90D. The other solution is advocated in a later amendment, Amendment 75, to which the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and my noble friend Lord Trenchard have already referred. This is through an electoral college, representative of all parts of the United Kingdom and responsible for indirectly electing two-thirds, or 400, political and temporal Members of a reformed House of 600, where one-third, or 200, Members are non-political Cross-Benchers directly appointed by a statutory appointments commission. It can be strongly argued that this is a much better formula for three reasons. First, it avoids conflict with another place, which direct elections to a reformed House of Lords would lead to, as my noble friend Lord Blencathra eloquently pointed out. Secondly, it is far more likely to preserve our current high standard of legislative and government scrutiny. Thus, thirdly, through this quality function, to which my noble friend Lord Tugendhat has just referred, it would thereby be better in preserving and improving democracy itself in the United Kingdom.

16:30:00

My Lords, my Amendments 70 and 72 are included in this group. On recent comments relating to the function of the House, I tried to table some amendments about the function of the House but it is out of the scope of this Bill, so it is not part of what we can debate. Amendment 70 calls on His Majesty’s Government to review the appropriateness of an unelected Chamber. While I am a Member of this place, it is my mission to see this House abolished and replaced with an elected Chamber that better represents the needs, diversity, backgrounds and lived experiences of people across all four nations. As the late Earl of Sandwich pointed out in his valedictory speech, I will do my duty right up to abolition. My position on an unelected Chamber has been clear from my maiden speech in this place right up to today. An unelected Chamber is inappropriate, outdated and obviously undemocratic. Why is it that the UK promotes democracy at home and abroad, yet fails miserably in ensuring that our own nations are governed by a democratic mandate? With record low levels of trust in politics and a Government who have pledged to restore public confidence in the political system, surely now is the time to radically transform this place. A recent poll by the Electoral Reform Society found that just 2% of the British public have confidence in the House of Lords. We must ask ourselves why that is. I suggest that an element of distress stems from the fact that this Chamber could not be further removed from the lives of the people we make decisions on behalf of, given that the public have no influence over who gets to become a Member of this place. In fact, the Prime Minister’s hold over appointments to this House was even challenged by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who said on our first day in Committee on this Bill: “I simply will not be able to get a life peerage”.—[Official Report, 3/3/25; col. 80.] We have become a gated community of more than 800 Members, without the public having a say in who those Members are. Democracy is built on the principle that people get to choose; they have a say in how their lives are governed. It seems contradictory that a body with no direct mandate from the electorate should have influence over matters that deeply affect people’s day-to-day lives.

Will the noble Baroness give way?

As we are in Committee, we will all have the opportunity to contribute. An unelected Chamber is, at best, an assault on democracy. I ask your Lordships to reflect on whether an unelected Chamber is appropriate in 2025. Amendment 70 calls on His Majesty’s Government to do just that. The Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, has himself previously stated that it is indefensible. It is time for His Majesty’s Government to act. I now move to my second amendment in this group—

Before the noble Baroness moves to her second amendment—

As we are in Committee, if possible, I will complete my remarks. Amendment 72 fleshes out how we could have an elected Chamber. There are currently 78 bicameral parliaments globally, with 55 of those being largely or wholly elected. We are an exception to that rule. The UK has one of only two second Chambers without any elected element, the other being Lesotho. Another poll by the Electoral Reform Society found that an elected second Chamber was the most popular option, with 47% of the British public saying that they should have the power to choose through elections. Does this figure not clearly highlight the public’s desire to see a second Chamber that reflects their needs and values? We are not here to serve our own interests; we are here to represent the people across our nations. If we believe that, which I hope everyone here does, we have no problem in accepting and indeed promoting the abolition of an unelected Chamber in today’s world. It has been reassuring to see several Members of your Lordships’ House tabling amendments to probe the establishment of a democratic House. I will briefly speak to these amendments before moving on to my own proposal on how we might want to achieve this through Amendment 72. Amendments 11 and 115, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, function as good starting points for reforming the composition of this House, which I support. However, I do not believe that they go far enough in outlining the model that might bring about a Chamber that best represents the people of these nations. However, they have my support in progressing and securing a move to a democratic mandate for this House. Amendment 72 seeks to address these gaps and offers a further fleshed-out solution. Plaid Cymru believes that proportional representation should be the mechanism used to elect representatives. Specifically, we favour the single transferable vote electoral system. This system allows voters to have a real choice on who represents them by reducing the pressure to vote tactically. I believe this system would establish a second Chamber that is truly elected by the people, creating a balanced Chamber where everyone is represented. Adopting this system also results in a greater diversity of candidates, with multiple candidates selected by a party. That a second Chamber in the UK desperately needs more diversity if we are to see a more representative legislative body cannot be disputed. This is not wishful thinking; far from it. Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Malta and Scotland already use this system in some of their elections, and noble Lords noted other examples earlier. Australia’s second Chamber also adopts this system, and it works. This has ensured that the Government are much less likely to control the Senate, meaning that the Senate is not always swayed by changing political tides, and the Chamber more accurately reflects the first voting preference of the electorate. While I firmly believe that STV would be the preferable choice, there are multiple ways it could be implemented. Neither my own amendment nor the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, specify it being 100% elected; there could be space for a Cross-Bench group to be represented as part of that model. It is crucial to consult a broad range of stakeholders to ensure that such a constitutional change follows a fully democratic process. That is why, in new subsection (2) proposed by Amendment 72, I have specified that the Secretary of State must consult various bodies, including devolved Governments, political parties and representative organisations. If we are to establish a Chamber that generally serves the people of these nations, constitutional decisions must not be confined to the remit of Westminster alone. I call on His Majesty’s Government, as well as everyone in this place, to reconsider the appropriateness of an unelected Chamber in the 21st century and join me in my mission for abolition.

Before the noble Baroness sits down—

I apologise, my Lords. I think it might help everybody if I confirm the normal courtesies of the House. This is a debate and Members can take interventions, but they can also choose not to; that is in section 4.29 of the Companion.

The noble Baroness made a very passionate speech in favour of democratic accountability. Why then did she not stand for the House of Commons instead of coming here?

My Lords, I do not think the noble Baroness wishes to answer the noble Lord’s question, and she has every right to do that. I rise very briefly to support my noble friend Lord Newby. This is a very straightforward and simple amendment that seeks to place a duty on the Government to do something after this Bill has passed. Some of us have spent a great deal of time on Lords reform. I started in this place just under 30 years ago and had 27 years between the two places, and one of the things I have observed in that time is that chances to do something to reform this place do not come along too often, and legislation comes along very rarely. I greatly enjoyed the eloquence and oratory of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, although I have to say that he has once again convinced me that the more eloquent he is, the more incorrect his arguments are. I very much appreciated the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, with grace and gentleness, rebutted them. The key point in all that—I am desperately trying not to give a history lesson—is that, when we did the draft Joint Committee of both Houses in 2011-2012, so ably chaired by the late Lord Richards, we came to a compromise position that addressed every single one of the points the noble Lord put forward, and they went into the draft Bill that went before the Commons. That Bill had a Second Reading and, had it had not been for a slightly sneaky operation by Jesse Norman on the programme Motion, it would have gone through and been discussed by both Houses. So I support my noble friend simply because there needs to be reform. There needs to be reform because we need more legitimacy. In 1832, we were powerful and the Commons was not. From 1832 onwards, the power has moved to the Commons. We now need to regain some legitimacy so that we can again be a powerful part of a Parliament that holds the Executive to account. In asking for this amendment, my noble friend is simply saying, “Let’s hold our feet to the fire and get it done”.

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on the eloquence of her speech. But she put forward a point of view about this House that I think is mistaken when she said that it is supposed to be representative of the people. It absolutely is not and it never has been. It has other purposes, for better or for worse, and we all sit here as representatives of nobody but ourselves. That is particularly true of Cross Benchers and the non-affiliated, but actually it is true of all party Members as well, and there are important reasons for that. We are well placed to bring to bear on the proceedings of Parliament as a whole a disinterested point of view, in the proper sense of “disinterested”: in other words, not representing an interest but trying to think as hard as we can about what is right. The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, was very important here, because, if we think about the function of this House, we may come to realise that its current composition is not so idiotic. Its function is to scrutinise, and the type of people that want to scrutinise are not the type of people who want to get on in life. The people who want to get on in life are those in the other place who are, as was eloquently pointed out by the noble Lord and others, trying to get the next position, higher marks on social media, more likes and jobs. Most of us have gone beyond that stage of life. That is obviously not true of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, because she is very young, but she disinterestedly and kindly sits here in order to contribute her wisdom. The trouble with the Bill is that we are not thinking about function but droning on about composition. As long as we think that it is a good thing to have a powerful House of Commons that forms most of the Government of the day, it is perfectly reasonable to have a not-very-strong House of Lords that tries to scrutinise. If we think that that is perfectly reasonable, we might consider that perhaps we should not be mucking around with our composition.

My Lords, we have already spent more than an hour on this and I do not intend to prolong that for more than two or three minutes. However, I am getting a bit alarmed by the breadth of the discussion we are having. I remind the House—maybe the Procedure Committee needs to look at this—that the Bill is the House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill. From looking at the amendments, of which this is a particularly bad example, not in the quality of the argument but in the dangers it presents for anyone looking for Lords reform in the future, we can apparently have absolutely any amendment whatever so long as it conceivably, by some long-stretched argument, has some effect on the future composition of the Lords. A lot of people have been saying that we need to do more things once this Bill has become an Act, but, my word, I have been very much put off thinking that is a good idea having listened to today’s debate, because any one of the other issues—whether it is the age of retirement, the length of service, or the number of Bishops, for example— could apparently lead to precisely the same kind of debate that we have had today on amendments to this Bill. I have to say—and probably anyone could say it about me—that it is very unusual that you hear any new arguments in these debates, of which we have had many in the past.

16:45:00

If I were advising the Government, which I am not, and they were thinking of bringing in a narrow Bill—let us say about an age limit or the Bishops; I do not think they will, but if they did—I tell them not to, because it would lay itself open to a whole series of amendments just as we are seeing here today on a very narrow Bill. I am baffled as to why the House authorities here and in the Commons thought that it was absolutely in order to have this kind of huge debate on a very narrow proposition. At the very least—I know that the horse has bolted and that we are having these discussions now—I hope that the Procedure Committee will look at this, because it will be a massive deterrent to any future very narrow debate on a Bill relating to this House, let alone a Bill of the scope of that of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, which would take most of our lifetimes to discuss. That is my simple proposition: please let us get over all this stuff that is not directly related to the Bill. Perhaps the Procedure Committee should have a look at it.

My Lords, my first point in response to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, is that the Bill will pass—the noble Lord does not need to worry about that. Secondly, simple constitutional changes can have very serious consequences. We have only to think about a simple change that my noble friend Lord Cameron introduced, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which created a disaster. I think it would be helpful to the Committee if the noble Lord, Lord Newby, could tell us what he thinks the role of the House of Lords is now, and what he thinks it will be in the future. My noble friend Lord Blencathra touched on that. The noble Baroness said that there was mistrust from the public, and I think that arises largely from extremely misleading reporting in the media, which little is done to counter. I would ask the same question about the role of the House of Lords of the Leader of the House, but I expect she would be quite cautious, especially as regards the future. I remind the House that I intend to retire in the spring, so I am fairly neutral. Many noble Lords—and others inside and outside the House—fall into the trap of proposing to alter the composition of the House of Lords without first considering its role, both now and in the future. I thought that the Labour Government had already studied this matter carefully by means of the Wakeham commission, to which the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, and other noble Lords referred. There is a solution very carefully worked out by my noble friend Lord Wakeham and his commission. I have always believed that the role of the House of Lords is to revise legislation—and I mean revise, not just scrutinise. In the last Parliament, the House revised the Rwanda Bill: it did not merely scrutinise it. It should be an additional check on the Executive but not determine who the Prime Minister is or financial matters. Most importantly, it should be a source of expertise. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, pointed out that we have a difficulty in that we are hideously London-centric, but getting rid of the hereditary Peers who are chained to their castles and estates up and down the country will make the situation worse, and it is not clear to me how being elected, either in whole or in part, will make us any better at performing our role—a point touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Moore. Of course, it may make us much less willing to give way to the elected House. Many advocates of an elected House suggest that we would be more effective and legitimate if elected. I suggest that being elected can be a disadvantage. For instance, about two years ago, I was dealing with a problem with a high street bank debanking a business in the wider defence industry—noble Lords will recall that recently the Secretary of State for Defence was forcefully raising this issue in public. I needed to have a meeting with senior executives of the bank in circumstances where a Member of another place would be blanked by the bank; they would get nowhere. Why was I able to secure the meeting and then understand what the problem was? The answer is that the bank trusted me. It could be sure that I was not getting involved in order to burnish my local credentials, my media profile or anything else. I have a question for noble Lords proposing a change to the role of the House or introducing an elected element. In their proposed reformed House, would it be intended that the Government of the day could still easily be defeated? If it was, surely the House would claim democratic credentials and be far more challenging to the House of Commons, as noble Lords have already pointed out. However, if the new House could only very rarely defeat the Government, then in the case of something such as the Rwanda Bill, surely the courts would step in to fill the vacuum. Finally, can the Leader of the House say whether she agrees with my view of the current role of the House of Lords? I appreciate that she cannot comment about its future role, which is a much more difficult question. When in the 2010 Parliament the Conservative-led Government tried to reform the House, I gleefully went around my friends in the House of Commons saying that I was looking forward to being Senator Attlee of South Hampshire. They obviously got the message.

My Lords, when we debated the role of the House of Lords last November and on every occasion that we have debated the subject to which I have contributed, I have started by saying, as I say again today, that in a modern, 21st-century democracy there must be a case that the legislature should be elected. Although it puts me therefore to some extent at odds with friends of mine on different sides of the House, I have to say that I generally support, not necessarily every detail, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Newby. If that was all I had to say, I probably would not have bothered saying it, because I think the Lord Privy Seal must have grasped that there is support for the noble Lord’s amendment from different parts of the House, and all I would be doing is adding my name to that. However, I want to go a little further into the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and point out that it is really very clever and has a lot of lot in it that should attract noble Lords, because although it sets a clear destination, it is very non-specific about the details of how we should end up and what the new House of Lords would look like in its elected form. What he is doing in his amendment instead is putting in place a process. I think we all know what a process looks like. It has the sort of things that we find in this amendment: steps that need to be taken, in a certain order, and dates by which those steps should ideally be taken. The Lord Privy Seal seems to have some difficulty with the word “process”. She used it in Committee last week, when we talked about various matters to do with the future of this House beyond this Bill. She said that we were in a process, but the Lord Privy Seal is not actually in a process. She may think she is, but she is not, because if she were she would be able to tell us the steps, the milestones and the target dates that we find in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Newby. The only thing we know for certain about the process in which the Labour Government are engaged—the process that so is so important not only to this House, but to anyone who takes an interest in our constitutional balance—is that her door is always open. That is the process as far as the Labour Front Bench is concerned. There is no timetable, there are no milestones and there are no commitments as to what is going to happen, in what order or when. While it is perfectly legitimate for the Lord Privy Seal to say that she does not support the process proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, it now becomes almost impossible for her, given what she has said before, both to oppose the noble Lord and to fail to come forward with a process of her own—which is what so many noble Lords in this House would like to hear. Otherwise, she will show that she is not being wholly candid with us in the way that we would hope. The essential point about Labour’s sense of direction is that it came forward in its manifesto with a package of measures and obtained a mandate for a package of measures. Some of those measures were to be taken at an early stage—the Lord Privy Seal and I have had this argument about the weight of the full stop, and I am not going to go through that now—and at least one was going to be taken later. It was going to be a consultation involving the democratic character of the House and the representation of the nations and regions and so on. Clearly, anyone reading the Labour Party manifesto would say that that was something to be done in the latter half of the Parliament. It also explains to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, why these issues arise in what appears to be a very narrow Bill: it is because that very narrow Bill sits in a context of a manifesto commitment and a mandate which is very much broader. It cannot be separated out; those threads cannot be pulled apart without having an effect on the rest of the fabric. I will come to a close very quickly. If I tremble to find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Newby, I tremble even more to find myself in disagreement with my noble friend Lord Blencathra. While any new system or composition of the Lords is absolutely bound to require a crunching of gears as the two Chambers find a way of working together, the notion that this is impossible—that two democratic chambers cannot work together—is, as I have said before, simply belied when one looks round the rest of the democratic world, where it does work, with crunching of gears and not always ideally, and sometimes with surprises and unexpected turns of events—but of course it is possible to have two democratic chambers. I agree with my noble friend Lord Blencathra that these matters are so weighty that there is a strong case for a referendum. I am rather more sympathetic to referendums than many people here and in the other place, and I find myself rather out on the extreme wing on this, but I certainly think there is a strong case for a referendum on the constitutional future of your Lordships’ House. Coming back to my original point, I very much hope that the Lord Privy Seal will stop hiding behind her open door—if that is not too much of a mixed metaphor—and come out into the West Front corridor and tell us, if not in this Chamber today, if she does not like the process proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, what process she has to offer us.

17:00:00

My Lords, I will focus on paragraph (3) of Amendment 11, suggesting what should be in the consultation paper on methods for introducing elected Members to the House. House of Lords reform has been unfinished business now for well over a century, as emphasised in the Parliament Act 1911. I believe the Bill provides an opportunity for looking at several different ways of reform for the House: elected or appointed, or a mixture of both. The Electoral Reform Society produced an interesting paper on an elected House in December 2023. I will first explore how other countries select members of their upper houses, to give comparison for an elected House of Lords here. The majority of second chambers choose their members by election, whether direct or indirect. The Inter-Parliamentary Union—the IPU—categorises 55 second chambers as predominantly chosen by either direct or indirect election, and only 22 as predominantly chosen by appointment. Many chambers do, however, combine a direct and/or indirect election with a small element of appointment. For instance, while the Italian Senate is nearly wholly directly elected, a handful of life seats are held by ex-officio members, formerly presidents, and up to five citizens are appointed by the President for outstanding service. In Ireland, of the 60 members of the Senate, 43 are elected by panels representing different vocations, six are chosen by graduates of the two major universities, and 11 are nominated by the Taoiseach, creating a mix of direct and indirect election for some appointments. In Spain, the Senate combines direct and indirect election based on different territories. The majority of senators are directly elected in multi-member constituencies based on the 50 provinces. Around a fifth are appointed by the legislatures of the autonomous communities, which are themselves elected by closed-list proportional representation—PR. Concerns are often raised about the potential conflict arising from having two directly elected chambers. Wholly directly elected second chambers can be found in Australia, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Switzerland and the USA. Within this group are significant differences in the electoral system used, which in turn affects their composition. It is generally agreed that one party should not have a majority in both chambers. Because of this, few parliaments with direct elections for both chambers choose similar electoral systems for both chambers. Two notable exceptions are Italy and the United States. Italy employs a similar mixed system for both the upper and the lower house, with both chambers also electing on the same day. Because of this, while there may be some differences, the party balance tends to be the same in both chambers. The United States is the only country to use a majoritarian system for both chambers. While using the same system, the two USA chambers have different compositions because of the difference in size of their constituencies and the length of term. However, with party competition forcing a two-party shape due to the nature of the electoral system, the opportunity for gridlock is high. In both Italy and the USA, similar electoral systems are also matched by similar powers. The majority of parliaments with wholly directly elected upper chambers use different electoral systems in the lower chamber. Brazil, the Czech Republic, Poland and Switzerland have PR-elected primary chambers and use majoritarian systems for their second chambers. Australia has a majoritarian-elected lower house and a PR-elected upper house. Japan and Mexico use mixed systems for both chambers. Using different electoral systems for both chambers tends to produce different electoral outcomes, which are also supported by arrangements such as different term lengths and staggered elections. For a wholly or partly elected second chamber, the question remains as to which system of election to use. If direct election is chosen, there are many options for the type of electoral system that could be used. Previous suggestions for Lords reform have put forward different options, including versions of party lists and single transferable vote, STV. The STV option was recommended in the cross-party Breaking the Deadlock proposals in 2007 and the House of Lords reform draft Bill in 2011. As Liberal Democrats will know, STV is a proportional and preferential election system in which voters get to choose their choice of candidate. Constituencies are multimember, returning usually around three to five candidates per district, although constituencies can be larger, and voters can put a number to as many or as few candidates as they like. Candidates who reach the quota are elected, and any votes over and above what they need are redistributed to vote as second preferences, and so on until the places are filled. The 2011 draft Bill selected STV to ensure that those elected have “a personal mandate from the electorate, distinct from that of their party”. STV is a candidate-based system, which means that independents are placed on an equal footing with party-political candidates. In addition, because it is a candidate system, voters are able to choose between candidates of the same party, putting an emphasis on which party candidate they think will be most suitable. Candidates such as community leaders, who have a party leaning but would rather stand as independents, are able to do so without harming their party’s chances by splitting the votes. According to the Electoral Reform Society: “In the Scottish local elections of 2017, between a third and a fifth of voters gave their second preference to a candidate of a different party to their first choice. And, whilst many voters are loyal to their party, when no more candidates are available for their first choice party … the majority go on to give lower preferences to candidates of other parties. This opportunity for voters to make more nuanced choices would likely result in a chamber that has a different political character to the Commons. STV could also help elect a more diverse chamber. Because STV is a multi-member constituency system, it encourages parties to put forward candidates who differ from each other in order to maximise their vote. District magnitude, the number of people being elected in an electoral district, has an impact on the diversity of those elected, so larger STV districts are … more likely to create a more representative chamber without needing additional measures … STV would likely go furthest to fulfilling the goals of a more politically diverse and independently minded chamber where voters would be able to select candidates according to their expertise and experience, as well as ensuring representation from across the regions and nations of the UK”, which I believe the Labour Party wished for the Lords in its manifesto. Another form of rank ordering preference is the AV system. While STV is considered a form of proportional representation using multimember constituencies, AV would operate in single-member constituencies and is not. There are of course other forms of PR, namely list PR, which was recommended by the Wakeham commission and the subsequent White Paper in 2001. In 2010-11 the House of Lords reform draft Bill put forward semi-open regional lists. List PR systems can be open, closed or semi-open. With apologies to the Lib Dems, I will briefly go into the three main types of list. First, there is the closed list PR; secondly, the open list PR; and, thirdly, the semi-open list. There is a range of these types of list PR. Finally, we must not forget the first past the post system. The 2008 White Paper modelled the options for election to the House of Lords on the basis of an 80% and 100% elected Chamber of between 420 and 450 seats. Using the four different systems I have outlined, while the first past the post and AV options produced results close to those in the Commons, the list modelling showed a greater proportion of seats for other parties, with no single party gaining an overall majority, but highlighted the problem for independents to get a place under this system.

My Lords, with all due respect to my noble friend who has just spoken, there is no point in going into all those details about methods of election, interesting as they are. Amendment 11 is wrong, and I oppose it because it would undermine the very basis of our democracy, which actually works very well. The noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, referred to the Joint Committee report published in 2012. I had the duty—I almost said pleasure—to sit on that committee, along with the noble Baroness and others, for eight months while we went into these matters in very great detail. I recommend that report to noble Lords. The report itself was critical of the then Government’s plan to introduce a directly elected second Chamber. The minority report, which was signed by 12 of the 25 members of that committee, was even more critical of the Government; I especially recommend that to noble Lords. If we had direct election to this upper House, it would not only upset the delicate balance of our constitutional settlement. It would also totally undermine the delicate relationship between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I seem to recall that in speaking on this matter back then in 2012, I said something like, “Mr Speaker, I don’t care about the House of Lords; I care about the House of Commons”. If I may correct myself, I do now care passionately about the House of Lords. It is for that very reason that I hope Amendment 11 does not have support here. The great value of your Lordships is that the majority are not politicians, as the noble Lord, Lord Moore, most articulately said a few moments ago, whereas if we had direct election, the moment anybody stands for election and puts their head above the parapet, they become a politician. I can be critical of politicians because I am one to my fingertips; I have been a full-time one for more than 30 years. As a new Member of this House, I appreciate just how valuable noble Lords who are not politicians are in the work that they do and the scrutiny that this House brings to holding the Government to account. My second point is that if the upper House is elected, that undermines the position of the House of Commons. It undermines the authority and accountability of the House of Commons. The electorate have to know where the buck stops. There is a direct relationship between the voter and the elected person, which is embodied in our House of Commons, one of the best democratic institutions anywhere in the world. If the upper House were to have democratic accountability and authority, that would challenge the House of Commons—and then the electorate would not know where the buck stops. As Tony Benn used to say, “If you don’t know how to get rid of the people you elect, then you don’t have accountability and you don’t have true democracy”. It is very strange to find myself agreeing yet again with Tony Benn. My third point is simply that a well-functioning democracy is not just about elections. Our democracy works because of the checks and balances of civic society. That includes the work of your Lordships’ House as a revising Chamber, not as a representative Chamber. I beg your Lordships not to support Amendment 11.

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend, for two reasons. First, I served with her on the Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill. Secondly, I intend to follow her in actually referring to the text of Amendment 11, which makes me somewhat exceptional in this debate, because it has been about an elected second Chamber. The amendment does not actually stipulate that. Let me begin with one or two quick points. First, it is not self-evidently the case that an appointed second Chamber is undemocratic. I have developed this case before; there is a democratic argument for an appointed second Chamber. Secondly, it is not self-evidently the case that elected second chambers fulfil functions that benefit the political system, certainly not in terms of facilitating good law. Following what the noble Lord, Lord Moore, said, this Chamber is defined by its relationship to the other place. This is a complementary second Chamber. It adds value by fulfilling functions the other place does not have the time or political will to carry out. That renders it distinct, it adds value and I would argue that good law is a public good that deserves to be preserved.

17:15:00

I turn to the amendment before us. It does not stipulate that the second Chamber should be elected. It refers to a “democratic mandate”. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, made no reference to this. A mandate is an authority to carry out a particular policy. If one looks at the precise wording, one sees that you can use it against the argument for an elected second Chamber, because a mandate is something normally conferred on a party seeking election. If this Chamber had a mandate, that presumably would distinguish it from the other Chamber, which would have a mandate of its own. There would not necessarily be symmetry between the two. That could invite conflict.

The problem is, when you have two elected Chambers, who determines the outcome of public policy? Quite often it is the result of deals done between the Chambers—a process that is opaque and has results that are not accountable to the electors. Under our system, by having one elected Chamber through which a Government are chosen, that Government will remain accountable to electors for the policy they pursue. Having an appointed second Chamber does not challenge that core accountability. We add value, but we work within what the Commons can stipulate as the ends of public policy. We focus on the means. We improve them, but we do not challenge that fundamental accountability. That is the value of this system. That is why it is worth preserving.

I finish by accepting that we have a problem in terms of public perception. We have to work hard on that. At the same time, we need to be aware that the public can be persuaded. I remind your Lordships of a survey of the public carried out some years ago, in which several statements were put, and people were asked whether they agreed with them. One statement was: “At least half the Members of the House of Lords should be elected, so that the upper Chamber of Parliament has democratic legitimacy”. Some 72% agreed with that. Another statement was: “The House of Lords should remain a mainly appointed House, because that gives it a degree of independence from electoral politics and allows people with a broad range of experience and expertise to be involved in the law-making process”. My Lords, 75% agreed with that.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and I both grew up in the post-war era. When I sat in front of our coal fire as a little boy, I used to love pulling at the threads of my woolly jumper and holes appeared elsewhere. My mother, who had knitted it, was furious and pointed to those holes. So it is with this Bill that would create an all-appointed House; holes appear elsewhere, and it is perfectly reasonable for your Lordships’ House, which is uniquely affected, to address some of the consequences. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, in advocating work on a democratisation of the House—he is doing just this thing—follows a position long taken by his party. The preamble to the Parliament Act was referred to, which said that the House of Lords should be supplanted by a House constituted on a popular, instead of a hereditary, basis. It so happened that Asquith and Lloyd George, who believed in strong government, were not that keen on PR. In fact, Lloyd George, famously told CP Scott that PR was “a device for defeating democracy, the principle of which was that the majority should rule, and for bringing faddists of all kinds into parliament and establishing groups and disintegrating parties”. That was a wise man. Probably the father of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, did not know Lloyd George. Asquith’s Government did not take democratisation forward, although, as the noble Lord said, Sir Nick Clegg and my noble friend Lord Cameron did go for reform in 2010. At the time, the Liberal Democrats saw that as part of a programme to entrench a Lib Dem hold on future Governments, with a PR wedge in both Houses. That did not succeed, but that potential Lib Dem lock is probably why many here, on both sides, would regard a Lords elected by PR as a less than enticing prospect. However, beyond the principled arguments we have heard in this debate, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Newby—and it is a legitimate, principled argument—and by others, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, there are two reasons why calls for democratisation might intensify after this Bill. They may appear to be in contradistinction, but they could interlock. The first is potential overreach by an unelected Chamber. I remember that, when most hereditary Peers left in 1999, the then Leader of this House, the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, declared that the new House, stripped of most hereditary Peers, would be “more legitimate”. Will the new House created by this Bill, freed of the drag anchor of so-called illegitimate hereditary Peers, be more assertive? Will it view itself as the rather more expert House, one with more wisdom and authority than an inexperienced House of Commons, where 335 Members are new and only one in 10 was a Member more than 15 years ago? I sincerely hope not. Will the new House be more confident in pressing its arguments? In the absence of sensible working arrangements such as I have suggested, that is possible. Indeed, the current campaign in the Guardian shows what is already being said about the legitimacy of the unelected House, life Peers and hereditary Peers alike. Faced with challenge, an elected Government might see merit in pressing forward with reform. Which takes one to a second, very plausible scenario, where successive Governments, copying the precedent created by this Bill, simply tear groups of Peers out of your Lordships’ House to adjust numbers here to their party-political convenience. I have spoken about this before. When I did, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, challenged me to say what other groups might be taken out of the House. I cited an example of Peers who have served for over 15 years, term limits being a very popular proposal for Lords reform. I checked what the effects would be if term limits came in in 2029 without grandfather rights, as this Bill plans for hereditary Peers. Removing in 2029 all Peers who have served over 15 years and denying them grandfather rights would deliver the Conservatives a significant net gain of nearly 70 over the Opposition parties and some 190 against all groups in the House. It would remove 59 Liberal Democrat Peers, which is throwing out more than 75% of them. What about that as a prospect? Before anyone says “threat”, it is not threat but fact. There are really grave dangers and deep unfairnesses in this game of “remove a chunk of Peers here and there”, and they are redoubled if grandfather rights are denied. I do not think that any unelected House could long survive such manipulation. The calls to allow the public, rather than the Government, to choose political Members of the House would inevitably grow. So, like it or not, the debate about democratisation posed by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, will not be shooed away simply by removing hereditary Peers. After the 1999 Act and the challenge to us on a stage 2 House, my party, as my noble friend Lord Strathclyde reminded us, came forward in 2002 with an idea for an elected Senate of 300 members, with 60 seats reserved for unelected Cross Benchers to damp the electoral mandate. Our manifestos in 2005 and 2010 maintained that, and we sought to put it into action in the coalition Government. As we have heard, that attempt was frustrated, but what is the Labour position? It is the party in power. It is the party proposing, in its manifesto, replacing your Lordships’ House. The gracious Speech for the 1998-99 Session said that the 1999 Act would be “the first stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords more democratic and representative”. Labour’s 2001 manifesto pledged a “more representative and democratic” House. Sounds familiar: is that not the line that we keep hearing spun by the party opposite on this Bill and this package of reforms? I did not believe it then, I am sceptical now and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Newby, has every right to ask for the kind of work that he is proposing. So I must ask how the Minister will respond—I hope that she will. After succeeding Tony Blair, whose party had been publicly advocating for a democratic second House for years—and then voted against any element of election at all in 2003—Gordon Brown tried to revive Labour’s idea of a representative House. In Labour’s 2009 Bill, he looked to end the entry of new hereditary Peers, but he included grandfather rights: a provision that all existing Peers should stay. It was a different Labour Party then, perhaps. Instead of backing plans for election put forward by the coalition, however, Labour allied with rebels in the Commons to frustrate progress. Given the track record of the party opposite, I am a little sceptical as to the future. Will the Minister set out her plans in detail when she responds? If not, can she place a letter in the Library of the House? The absence of a stage 2 destination overshadows the whole debate on the Bill and provokes many of the questions being asked. When Sir Keir Starmer became leader in 2020, he pledged the abolition of this House in his first term in office and the creation of a new elected Chamber. He was ecstatic when Gordon Brown’s commission reported in December 2022, acclaiming the idea of a new assembly of the nations and regions and, as he put it, rebuilding trust by “replacing the unelected House of Lords with a new, smaller, democratically elected second chamber”. Yet Labour’s 2024 manifesto merely said that “Labour is committed to replacing the House of Lords with an alternative second chamber that is more representative of the regions and nations”. The word “democracy” was not there. Where in the long grass is it now? In conclusion, I will ask the Minister some specific questions. Can she confirm whether Labour’s alternative second Chamber will be wholly or partly elected by the people? The manifesto said there would be a public consultation on this Chamber, but you cannot have a meaningful consultation without a proposition on which to consult. When will consultation start? My noble friend Lord Blencathra asked for one form of consultation: a referendum on an elected House of Lords. Does the noble Baroness leave the door open to such a referendum? Can the Minister tell us whether the Government will publish a White Paper, or any other guidance, to inform your Lordships as we move towards Report? As my noble friend Lord Moylan said, what is the current timetable envisaged for replacing your Lordships, as the manifesto pledged? It is causing concern and confusion on all sides. Will the Minister, who is Leader of the whole House—a responsibility she carries out, in my judgment, with a high sense of responsibility—set out a clear direction as to the Chamber that will replace us before we come to Report?

My Lords, I am grateful for what has been a long and interesting discussion; I thank the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Blencathra, and others, for giving us the opportunity to have it. As with most debates we have had on the Bill, it has gone rather wider than the precise amendments in front of us. The noble Lord referred to some of the things he mentioned at Second Reading, the King’s Speech and other debates. I welcome that there is a focus on other issues beyond the Bill, but that is not what is before us now. However, they are all worthy of longer-term consideration. The amendments in this group raise the introduction a democratic element to the House. Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, Amendment 72, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, and Amendment 90D, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, all seek to impose a duty on the Government to take forward proposals to ensure a democratic element of your Lordships’ House once the Bill has passed. Amendments 11 and 72 would require the Government to consult specified persons and bodies, including from this House and the other place, on proposals for introducing elected Members, whereas Amendment 90D would not require consultation and focuses on legislative proposals for a far smaller House of Lords elected under a first past the post system. I am not sure, if we were elected under any system, that it would be a “House of Lords”; I cannot remember which noble Lord said that they were tempted by the title “senator”, but it certainly would not be a House of Lords if that was the proposal. Amendment 90D also asks the Government to bring forward a draft Bill. A very similar amendment was placed in the other place, which was resoundingly rejected by a majority of 262.

17:30:00

I will comment on some of the comments that were made about Amendment 90D. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that his party’s dedication and commitment to an elected second Chamber has been known for many years. He may well be right that it would create more diversity. It certainly would give more geographical balance. I do not really accept that castles, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said, make for the best geographical balance the House of Lords could have. I am sure he did not mean for that to be taken seriously.

I dispute the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that an elected second Chamber would have greater public support. A number of noble Lords, such as the noble Lord, Lord Brady, mentioned this, and the noble Lord, Lord Norton, touched on opinion polls. I remember discussing opinion polls about how the House of Lords is perceived with my party colleagues. A number of Members said that we are very low down in the opinion polls, but the elected House does not do too well in the opinion polls either. The public do not like politicians terribly much full stop, so I am not sure whether being elected gains greater support. But it certainly is the case that there are more attacks on Members for being unelected.

That comes back to my wider comments: as I said, his party’s support for this has been well known, as has that of the party of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, Plaid Cymru. I am interested to see that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, and other noble Lords are enthusiastic supporters and transferred their allegiance to an elected second Chamber. It may put them at odds with their party, but I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Newby, welcomes their support.

My Lords—

No, I will not take an intervention. I have listened to everybody with great courtesy throughout the whole debate. Would the noble Lord mind letting me answer the questions?

My Lords—

I shall take one short intervention. I am sure the noble Lord would not want to detain the Committee any longer than necessary.

My Lords, I intervene simply to say that I have long been a supporter of an elected House, as many noble Lords are aware—certainly since 1997. I am on the public record. I supported the Bill in 2012.

I am happy to be corrected on that, and I am sure noble Lords will welcome his support. I found Amendments 11A and 11B from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, really interesting. Amendment 11A seeks to impose a requirement on the Government to include in its consultation “the implications of securing a democratic mandate for the House of Lords for its powers and conventions”. The interesting thing about his amendments is that he was the first in the debate to talk about the functions of a second Chamber rather than the form. Other noble Lords then commented on that, but he was the first and he did so in some detail. My starting point on a second Chamber has always been: what does it do, how does it do it, why does it do it, and how do we best fulfil the role? I was pleased that some noble Lords mentioned the role of the Cross-Benchers, because we all welcome that role, and I think the public would too if they were asked. However, the noble Lord would also require a referendum on the principle of an elected second Chamber. If I understood him correctly, if that principle was endorsed it would have to be followed by a further referendum on the methods of election. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, spoke significantly more widely than her amendment, which seeks to place a duty on the Government to lay before Parliament a review of the implications of Act for the appropriateness of an unelected Chamber. She complained that she could not get the functions into her amendment, but the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, expressed surprise at how wide amendments could go on membership when the terms of the Bill are so narrow. But that is the ruling we have: anything to do with membership of the House is seen to be in order, which leads to quite a broad approach. Underlying all those amendments is the argument that further reform of this House is required. I welcome that, because although this Bill is narrow and noble Lords have commented on the next steps, the Labour Party’s manifesto was clear. I am surprised that noble Lords seem so surprised. The manifesto talks about the steps. It says—I think the noble Lord, Lord True, read this out—that we are committed to replacing the Chamber we have now with “an alternative second Chamber that is more representative of the nations and regions”, and that we “will consult on proposals seeking the input of the … public”. The noble Lord, Lord True, seems to expect me to have a ready-made proposal to bring forward. I do not; this is a longer-term proposal, and I would have thought noble Lords would welcome the opportunity to have an input into it, which, obviously, they will have. There is a range of proposals. We have already heard today that even those who support an elected second Chamber have a range of ways they would do it, so there is no ready-made blueprint: there are lots of thoughts and suggestions, and we have put forward suggestions in the past, but we want to consult more widely. That is a manifesto commitment. However, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Newby, said himself, this Bill is not the right vehicle for delivering that proposal and we would not accept those amendments. This is a focused Bill that seeks to deliver the manifesto commitment by removing the right of the remaining hereditary Peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords. I remind noble Lords that that principle was established 25 years ago. This is the final part of that principle. My noble friend Lord Grocott seemed surprised this has taken so long and asked why people had made interventions on a range of other issues. This is a focused Bill on immediate reform, following the principle established 25 years ago. We heard quite a lot about the history of different parts of legislation. The proposals that matter at the moment are those in our manifesto that we are delivering with this Bill, but the Government are committed to more fundamental reform, as I have said. More geographical representation is clearly part of that. I come back to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I also thought that the noble Lord, Lord Brady, made a thoughtful speech. I know the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, was not proposing an elected second Chamber, but the primacy of the first Chamber is about its elected status. It is accountable to the electorate. If I understood the noble Lord, Lord True, correctly, he thought this Chamber should have a more enhanced role because we have been here longer and have more expertise. You could also argue that an elected Chamber is more in touch with the electorate who have more recently elected them. That is a very important principle. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, raised a number of points to be considered during a consultation on the form an alternative second Chamber should take. One point, of course, is primacy. I am intrigued by the idea that we could have a Prime Minister in a second Chamber; I will not apply for any such role. The noble Lord made an important point about the conventions that apply to an unelected second Chamber. Those conventions have stood the test of time through many changes, and they remain. They serve this House, the primary Chamber and democracy well. I anticipate no change to those conventions; it would be a different kind of Chamber if we did not abide by them. The hereditary Peers leaving in 1999 did not alter the conventions, and it will not alter the conventions now either. It is those conventions that protect the primacy of the Commons, which is extremely important. These issues are not for your Lordships’ House today in this Bill. The Government are making an immediate start to reform this House with this Bill. Part of the reason why there has been no progress over the past 25 years is this argument that nothing can be done until everything is done. But nobody can agree, even in the debate we have had today, on what “everything” is and the result is that we do nothing. Completing this part of the reform shows good faith and good intentions. The noble Lord, Lord True, tempted me on a number of points, and I want to challenge him on one. He referred to the exit of some Peers—that is, losing our hereditary colleagues—as being some kind of political attack because it affects the numbers. I ask him: did he feel the same when his party racked up appointment after appointment, creating a much larger disparity between the two main parties than we have ever seen before or than would happen under this Bill? What he suggested is not our intention. I have been very clear in Committee, as well as in Select Committee and in the other place, that this House works well with roughly equal numbers between government and opposition parties—and that is not a party-political point at all. Because of the work we do, we should be a more deliberative and engaged Chamber. The noble Lord is laughing at me, and I am not quite sure why; I am making a serious point about how this House works best. It is important that we do our best work and that we figure out how we can do that.

The noble Baroness challenged me on one thing, and perhaps I can make it clear for the Hansard record that I was certainly not laughing at her, even if other noble Lords were. I think she acknowledges that from a sedentary position. The noble Baroness asked whether I was concerned about certain things. I did not particularly like it when Sir Tony Blair created the largest number of life Peers ever known, but that was his prerogative. The point I am trying to make—this is a House point, not a party-political point—is that a very dangerous precedent opens up when it is felt that a group can be dismissed from the House. That has never happened in this way, and the Conservative Party has never removed people from other parties. I will not repeat what I said in my remarks, but I believe that this is a profoundly dangerous precedent, and we should find ways to avoid setting it.

My Lords, it is a party-political point. I was trying to make the very non-party-political point that the House operates best with roughly equal numbers. It has taken 25 years to get here. The principle was established when the hereditary Peers left in 1999—I have to say that any trade union would have snapped up Viscount Cranborne in a moment—and, in effect, 92 of their number remained in perpetuity. Those were the arrangements then. This Bill will end those arrangements, so that the House can move forward. The noble Lord talked about a term limit, an issue on which some noble Lords have put down amendments later. That would have to be discussed and debated by this House. That is not one of the proposals we are putting forward, but if someone wants to propose that during the consultation we will have on an alternative second Chamber, they are at liberty to do so. I think there would probably be quite lengthy arguments about the duration of a term limit, but that is not included the proposals before us today. Although 25 years is perhaps quite a long time to take to move forward, it is right that we take time to consider these issues. I am grateful to noble Lords for the points they have made. Certainly, some useful points for the future have been made on how an alternative second Chamber may be constituted. That is not before us today, but in due course, when we are able to come forward with proposals, we will consult quite widely. At this stage, I respectfully ask that noble Lords and Baronesses take their amendments back and reconsider them, and I beg leave to ask that they not press them.

My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken, and I slightly apologise for initiating such a long debate. I am grateful to noble Lords who have supported our proposal, and doubly grateful to those who have supported me today who have never supported me before—I thank them very much. I obviously cannot deal with all the points made, and I will try to be brief. The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made the classic argument for not having an elected House of Lords, the nub of which relates to the primacy of the Commons. The only thing I would say is that, in 2012, the House of Commons voted by a majority of 338 to have an elected House of Lords, so presumably, it did not think its position was being fatally undermined at that point. The noble Lord was the first person to raise the possibility of Cross-Benchers being included under our proposals, and they absolutely would be. There was a provision for Cross-Benchers in the 2012 proposals, and having them would be perfectly possible under my amendment. On the question of looking at functions, as I said in my introductory remarks, there is no bar to that happening during the consultation period. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that, at worst, wherever one ends up, one is likely to get a crunching of gears rather than a car crash.

17:45:00

I am obviously extremely pleased to have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. I was grateful for his description of the history of this proposal. My only criticism is that he did not go back far enough: he forgot to refer to the cogent arguments made by the radicals in favour of an elected House of Lords in 1836; however, I will forgive him. He was the first noble Lord to raise the possibility of indirectly elected Members of a reformed House of Lords. My problem with that is, if they come via an intermediate elected body such as the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly or local councils, they are members of those bodies, in which case they will not have time to do this job as well; or they are appointed by those bodies, in which case we will be in the same position that we are in now—political patronage deciding the composition of your Lordships’ House, which is not a good idea.

The noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, asked why the 2012 Bill was withdrawn. I am afraid that it was not because people had seen the light; it was because of a bit of straightforward political skulduggery. I do not think that she gets anywhere by asking that question.

The noble Lord, Lord Brady, objected to the possibility of a party list on the basis that it would bring about more patronage. I am afraid that that is impossible, because we have 100% patronage now for the party-political Peers. Whatever system of PR you have, the degree of patronage would be reduced.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said that we should not be debating any of this, and I rather agree. I was amazed that the clerks in the Commons decided that the scope of the Bill could include anything to do with Lords reform, but, once they had, I felt it incumbent on me to set out what I would do.

The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, asked whether, under our proposals, the Government could be defeated in future in the House of Lords. It would depend on the elections that led to this Chamber being elected, but in all likelihood, yes, they could.

The noble Baroness, Lady Laing, said, as a demerit of elections, that the House would be composed principally of people who were politicians. Let us not fool ourselves about what we are: this is a House of politicians. She is no less of a politician now than when she was in the Commons. Politicians would arrive by a direct, rather than indirect, route. Frankly, the idea that we are not politicians is strange.

I am grateful to the honourable—

Noble!

I think I just proved the point there. I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. My point was not that I am not a politician, but that I am a lesser person for being a politician. The great thing about this Chamber is that it has a very large number, if not a majority, of Members who are not politicians, and that is what gives it its value.

My Lords, I am happy to debate the numbers, but I disagree that the majority of people who take a party Whip can legitimately not call themselves politicians. The Cross-Benchers are not politicians, although they are very political in many cases. Under my proposal, they are not being abolished anyway. On the noble Lord, Lord True, I was intrigued by his reference to Lloyd George. Lloyd George does not come with a totally unblemished record when it comes to matters relating to the House of Lords. As I said at the start, this amendment is to set up a process. It is not a blueprint. We on these Benches believe that this process should now be commenced. We believe that it is very long overdue, and we will return to this amendment on Report with that in view.

To the best of my knowledge, we are presently debating Amendment 11A, an amendment to Amendment 11.

My Lords, I did not intend to respond at length, or indeed to respond at all to the debate. It has been a thorough debate—two hours and 10 minutes. I raised the point about the problems we would have in this House if we concentrated only on form, rather than on function. That point has been eloquently made by all sides. I have no intention of summarising the debate any further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 11A (to Amendment 11) withdrawn.

Amendment 11B (to Amendment 11) not moved.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.

Amendment 12

Moved by

12: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause— “Life peerages not to be conferred against recommendation of the House of Lords Appointments Commission(1) The Life Peerages Act 1958 is amended as follows.(2) In section 1 (power to confer life peerages), after subsection (1) insert—“(1A) The power under subsection (1) may not be exercised in relation to a person if the House of Lords Appointments Commission has written to the Prime Minister to recommend that a peerage should not be conferred on that person.””Member’s explanatory statement This new Clause would prevent a life peerage being conferred on a person if the House of Lords Appointments Commission has recommended against the appointment.

My Lords, I hope and trust that this debate will be at least marginally shorter than the last. Amendment 12 and its consequential Amendment 116, in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, relate to the powers of the House of Lords Appointments Commission, HOLAC. Our amendment is very modest. It simply says that the Prime Minister should not be able to override a recommendation of HOLAC not to award a peerage to an individual on the basis that they were not a proper person to hold a peerage. One would have thought that this amendment would be unnecessary; surely no Prime Minister would ever wish to overrule HOLAC on a matter of propriety. Sadly, that is exactly what has happened in recent times. This amendment would prevent it happening again. I understand that, not least from the evidence she gave to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in another place, the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, as the chair of HOLAC, supports this amendment. The amendment in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Lord, Lord Colgrain, would prevent the Prime Minister overriding HOLAC by giving the commission sole power to make recommendations for peerages to the King. In reality, the difference between this and our amendment is one not of substance but of form. However, it would be odd, to put it mildly, if HOLAC had such a power without being already constituted on a statutory basis. It is a valid criticism of our amendment that it does not go far enough. The position of HOLAC should be placed on a statutory basis and it should be able to assess candidates for a peerage in terms of suitability as well as propriety. Other amendments in this group by the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, make provisions in these areas. We support these amendments in principle but believe that this limited Bill is not an appropriate vehicle for a more fundamental reform of HOLAC. The amendment by the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, for example, raises detailed issues of the composition of a statutory appointments commission, which clearly need more detailed discussion than is possible in the context of this Bill. Fortunately, the Government committed in their manifesto to move further on these issues. Our amendment is a stand-alone provision that can be done easily now, and I hope that between now and Report the Government will give further consideration to bringing forward the very limited and uncontentious change covered by this amendment. I beg to move. Amendment 12A (to Amendment 12)

Moved by

12A: In inserted subsection (1A), leave out second “not” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment seeks to render the House of Lords Appointment Commission ineffective.

My Lords, this country is being slowly but inexorably paralysed by committees of all shapes and sizes—departmental public bodies, quangos, you name it. New ones are being created on a regular basis, and every single one of them—new and old—is doing its best to expand its remit, thereby increasing its power and, frequently, its budget. The result, more often than not, is that Ministers are unable to take decisions. They are obliged to seek advice from this committee or that. If something goes wrong, however, it is the Minister who is held responsible and has to take the blame, while these unelected bodies, populated by the people who know best, remain unaccountable. Even the Chancellor of the Exchequer has to consult the Office for Budget Responsibility, an organisation that gets things wrong more often than right. What is wrong with our own vast department, the Treasury—or even the Bank of England, which has been known to get things wrong? When it comes to misjudgments, it is but a rank amateur compared with the OBR. I draw your Lordships’ attention to one organisation that could be got rid of with no loss: the House of Lords Appointments Commission—HOLAC. It is a non-departmental public body. If His Majesty the King wishes, on the advice of the Prime Minister, to appoint someone to the House of Lords, what is the commission needed for, when exactly the same advice that the commission calls on to take its decision is available to the Prime Minister? Why does this advice need to be filtered through a separate body? What is the point of having an organisation to collate information from government departments to present it to the Prime Minister?

One reason is that we do not always trust the Prime Minister.

He can already get this information. I regret having to say this, but on more than one occasion HOLAC has taken a decision, or made a recommendation, that has been biased by a political view and not as an arm’s-length appraisal, resulting in the rejection of candidates of the highest calibre. That is not what the commission should be doing. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for whom I have the greatest respect and admiration, will stop HOLAC going beyond the bounds of what it should be doing. At this very time, this Chamber is coming under increasing scrutiny. We need to welcome into our ranks individuals of talent, vision and extraordinary achievement. I strongly believe that HOLAC is a hindrance to this process and is damaging the future health and viability of the House of Lords. I beg to move.

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 51, to which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, have kindly added their names. I look forward to their contributions and appreciate their support. This amendment, along with others in this group, focuses on the exemplary work of the House of Lords Appointments Commission, or HOLAC, whose appointees sit largely here on the Cross Benches. While I do not agree with ranking ourselves by method of entry to your Lordships’ House, I firmly believe that, once here, we are all equal. In my view, the angels of HOLAC have by far the worthiest routes to these red Benches. My amendment would increase the number of HOLAC appointments accordingly. Whereas the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Wallace, seek to ensure that the approval of HOLAC would be mandatory before any life peerages were conferred—a proposal I am minded to support given the excellent work of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, and others and the importance of probity to appointments to this House—Amendment 51 is more limited. It aims to encourage the use of HOLAC as a means by which a further 20 Cross-Bench Members of Your Lordships’ House are appointed during the five years after the passage of this Bill. Unlike the party-political Benches, which can organise themselves and lobby for their share of prime ministerial patronage to recharge their Benches following the removal of the hereditary Peers, the Cross Benches, as a determinedly independent body of individual Peers, are not in a position to push collectively for new membership. They will inevitably lose out due to this legislation and the House undoubtedly will be more political and thus less effective. This amendment has the benefit of diluting, if only a little, the relative increase in prime ministerial patronage that will result from the removal of the hereditary Peers. That must be a good thing.

18:00:00

As I have previously noted, I do not think that hereditary Peers, of which I am one, should be converted into life Peers en bloc in any number. The horse-trading towards such an outcome is regrettable. Consistent with my long-held ambition that the removal of the hereditaries should leave this House better and not worse as a legislative body, Amendment 51 would replenish the House with a more representative and varied membership. We should take the opportunity presented by this Bill to encourage greater diversity of experience and outlook in this House via HOLAC appointments, which will add to its wisdom and increase its standing in the eyes of the public whom we serve.

There will be 34 fewer Cross-Bench Members after the hereditary Peers depart your Lordships’ House—a full 18% of our membership, shrinking Cross-Bench numbers far more as a proportion of the whole House compared with Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Bishops in particular. Legislating now to encourage the addition of 20 new Cross-Bench Members over five years via HOLAC would allow us at least in part to maintain Cross-Bench numbers as a proportion of the House, which is important. It also would do so without risking an undue increase in the size of the House and therefore remain sensitive to those concerned about overall numbers.

I do not have the same reservations as some—including the noble Lord, Lord Burns—that the House is too large in its current format. This House benefits from the breadth of amateur expertise that it is able to call on. Although reasonable participation is to be encouraged and retirement at a certain age may be advisable, we should avoid our membership becoming too professionalised as full-time politicians and legislators. I add my voice to the opposition to Amendment 11 on those grounds.

The additional benefit of Amendment 51 would be to increase the beneficial impacts on your Lordships’ House of the HOLAC appointment process. I do not mean to embarrass my fellow Cross-Benchers, but many of the most able and committed of our number are angels of HOLAC. It is regrettable that the number of HOLAC appointments has tailed off dramatically over recent years. The achievements of HOLAC are many. If anyone wants a primer on its role and powers, I refer them to the excellent Library briefing, published in January 2025, which states that:

“The House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC) vets nominations to the House and recommends non-party political members. While its advice is usually followed, it is not a statutory body and the prime minister can choose to disregard its advice”.

Established in 2000 as part of Prime Minister Tony Blair’s major constitutional reforms, HOLAC has recommended a total of 76 individuals for appointment to your Lordships’ House since then and is highly selective in so doing. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, has noted that just over 1% of those who apply to HOLAC have become Members during those 25 years. However, it is concerning that HOLAC is drying up as a route to entry to this House; 57 Members were appointed between 2000 and 2010, but only 19 since then over nearly 15 years, with only six since 2018, or one per year. Despite having a non-partisan, highly qualified appointments commission about which we are all very proud, we are simply not making use of HOLAC as we should.

Amendment 51 seeks to ensure that, at least for the Cross Benches, HOLAC will have a consistent and lasting contribution to the non-political composition of your Lordships’ House. It would at least ensure that a fair number of new Members in the years ahead were free of patronage and would have endured the rigorous approval process of HOLAC.

My Lords, with the demise of the “good chaps” theory of government, articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and my noble friends Lord Dundee and Lord Hailsham, giving statutory powers in terms of probity, capability and experience to HOLAC, are essential. We should legislate for them at the first possible opportunity. Obviously, I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Howard on his amendment, but I understand some of his analysis. On the amendments tabled by the noble Earls, Lord Dundee and Lord Devon, the Cross Benches have a great selection of hereditary Peers which they have carefully selected and elected and who provide great expertise to Parliament. For instance, we want to get to net zero, so they have a senior civil nuclear engineer. We have problems with shipping, including the Russian shadow fleet and the need for certain ships to go around the Cape of Good Hope because of the activity of the Houthis, so we have a former chairman of the Baltic Exchange. International aid is always important, which is why the Cross Benches have one of the few people in Parliament with any operational experience of international aid, who is in his place today. I could go on. Why does anyone want to get rid of that experience on the Cross Benches? I have some concern about the selections that HOLAC makes. There is no doubt that noble Lords appointed by HOLAC are exceptionally good, as the noble Earl said, but there are too few of them. The problem is that—and I gently make this point—they tend to be public sector orientated, although there are obvious exceptions. Looking generally, I think that we have too many who are expert at spending other people’s money. Our debates are nearly always about spending more money and increasing resources, and never about spending less. Very shortly, we will have to make some very tough decisions about that. I am surprised that no noble Lord has sought to put a duty on HOLAC regarding where noble Lords are based. I am sorry to say that the House is hideously London-centric, a point touched on already today by the noble Lord, Lord Newby. This problem will get even worse with the demise of the hereditaries, who tend to come from far and wide. Overall, we need greater involvement from HOLAC in vetting but to limit its selection powers to the Cross Benches. We need some better informal mechanisms to work out what experience and regional expertise we lack. Perhaps HOLAC should have some mechanism to deal with or advise on London centricity.

My Lords, in this grouping, there are two connected proposals in my name. Amendment 43 would not prevent political patronage creating non-parliamentary peerages. Yet it would abolish the right of parliamentary political patronage to appoint Members to this House, replacing that practice, as advocated by Amendment 45, with a statutory appointments commission responsible for appointing 200 independent Cross-Benchers within a reformed House of 600 temporal Members, where the balance of 400 Members are political Members indirectly elected by an electoral college representative of the different parts of the United Kingdom. These amendments also indicate three background considerations. The first is how thereby, in appointing 200 non-political independent Members, the new statutory commission appoints the largest group within a reformed House of 600. The second is the purpose of doing that and, thirdly, how membership, within a total of 20 appointment commissioners, reflects the proportions of different Benches sitting in a reformed House. Among the 400 political and temporal Members, the Government and the Opposition would have exactly 150 each, while all other political parties, including the Liberal Democrats, would have 100. With 200, the independent Cross Benches, therefore, would have 50 more Members than either the Government or the Opposition. The purpose of this is not House of Lords composition; instead, it is continuity of House of Lords quality function. So many of your Lordships have eloquently stressed that point today, including the noble Lord, Lord Moore, and my noble friends Lord Tugendhat and Lady Laing. This quality function is not just our current high standard of legislative scrutiny. As my noble friend Lord Attlee pointed out, it includes our achievements in revisions, and thus also the quality of that evidence. This quality of function would be undermined if the party of any Government having a majority in another place also had one here. That is why the Government and the Opposition ought to have equal numbers in a reformed House, while the non-political Cross-Benchers should be in the majority. With a total of 20 commissioners appointing 200 non-political Members, subsection (5) of the new clause that would be inserted by Amendment 45 gives the ratios allocated to the different temporal Benches: five commissioners each for the Government and the Opposition; seven for the Cross-Benchers; and three for the Liberal Democrats as the third-largest temporal group. Amendment 46, referring to that subsection (5) in Amendment 45, proposes the additional words, “or from a party-political group in the House of Lords not otherwise identified in this table”, for which I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hailsham. I also thank my noble friend for the qualification in his Amendment 44A, referring to Amendment 43, that with appointments to this House the statutory Appointments Commission can only select people who are properly reliable and independent-minded. In addition, I am grateful to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Newby, for their proposed Amendments 47 and 12 respectively, envisaging that, in the period of time before a statutory Appointments Commission has replaced political patronage, life peerages can still not be conferred against the recommendations of HOLAC or the present non-statutory Appointments Commission. In Amendment 51, the strengthening of HOLAC is also urged by the noble Earl, Lord Devon, who has just spoken to that, supported by myself and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. As outlined, the aim should be for HOLAC to become statutory, replacing political patronage and appointing one-third or 200 non-political Members of a reformed House, temporal membership being 600 of which 400 are political Members. As a revising Chamber, this arrangement is best able to protect our present very high standard of legislative scrutiny to the advantage of the United Kingdom democracy here and, by example, to that of national democracies elsewhere.

My Lords, I very much endorse what my noble friend Lord Dundee has been saying, and what he has said has enabled me—your Lordships will be pleased to know—to abbreviate my remarks very significantly. I have put down four amendments, to which I want to say something briefly: namely, Amendments 43, 44A, 46 and 47. I shall also comment briefly on Amendment 45. So far as Amendment 43 is concerned, I agree very much, for the reasons advanced by my noble friend Lord Dundee, that HOLAC should be the sole source of recommendations for appointments. In substance, there is too great a risk that individuals will be appointed by a party or Prime Minister in circumstances that will offend the public sense as to what is appropriate. Unfettered discretion on the part of a Prime Minister raises serious questions as to suitability and propriety of additional appointments. That risk will be diminished by giving the right of nomination to HOLAC. In response to the point made by my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising, the truth is that the decisions of Prime Ministers cannot always be trusted, and we have seen some pretty rum events over the last few years which give force to that conclusion. I prefer the approach set out in the amendment which my noble friend Lord Dundee has moved to the negative approach suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Newby—I think he himself would accept that his amendment does not go far enough. That takes me to Amendment 45, which puts HOLAC on a statutory basis. I think that it is highly desirable that the existence, composition, role and powers of HOLAC should be enshrined in statute. I have come to this conclusion very much for the reasons advanced by the noble Earl and for the reasons that were advanced by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde in the debate of last Monday. It is very important that the powers and role of HOLAC should be statutory. There is a very good model for this. It is in a Bill which was introduced in the 2022-23 Session by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, and it may well be that he is going to repeat those points in the debate on Friday when he has a Bill before your Lordships’ House.

18:15:00

I now come to Amendment 44A. It is highly desirable that the criteria to be used by HOLAC should be expressed in statute. The phrase “fit and proper” is a phrase frequently used in law. All of the seven criteria presently used by HOLAC when determining the propriety of an appointment would fall within that phrase. Establishing a statutory rather than a non-statutory test means that both the public and HOLAC will have a clearer and properly expressed understanding of what HOLAC’s task is. The test expressed in statute would constitute a clearer and stronger barrier to undesirable nominations than do tests which are unsupported by statute and which could be changed at the direction of the Prime Minister.

I now come to the second element of Amendment 44A, which is an extension to the oath that I suggest Members should take at the commencement of Parliament and at the start of every new Session. I emphasise that what I am talking about is an extension to, not a substitution for, the oath of loyalty that Members presently take. The language in my amendment reflects the language of the oath taken by a privy councillor on appointment. I have to acknowledge that I took the Privy Council oath so many years ago that I cannot fully recall its text, so I have had to rely on published material, but I believe that the text is correctly set out in my amendment. In any event, however archaic they are, those words accurately reflect how Members of this House should conceive their duties. The oath reads:

“in all things to be moved, treated and debated … faithfully and truly declare your Mind and Opinion, according to your Heart and Conscience”.

The purpose of that oath is twofold. First, it is to remind Members of this House of what their primary obligation is and, to take a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moore, in the previous debate, we need disinterested not party-based contributions to this House.

I recognise of course that there are many subjects on which Members of your Lordships’ House cannot have a clear and decided opinion, and it is wholly understandable that in those circumstances they should seek guidance from the Front Bench. But when a Member has a clear and decided view, it is the duty of that Member to assert his or her conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that it may be contrary to the views of the Front Bench. This was a point touched on by the noble Lord and it is one to which I am passionately committed.

Let me give some examples. I acknowledge that I am and was wholly opposed to Brexit. I recall with deep dismay how Boris Johnson withdrew the whip from many on his own Benches—people who would not support some of his Brexit-related policies. Mr Johnson effectively ended their parliamentary career. He was wrong and they were right.

To take a less controversial example, there must be many Republican legislators in the American Congress who are appalled by the behaviour and words of Mr Trump. Should they speak out? Of course they should. Take another example, this time from Israel. There must be many members of Likud in the Knesset who are deeply opposed to Mr Netanyahu’s policy on the West Bank and Gaza. Should they speak out? Of course they should.

The additional oath that I suggest a Member should take would remind them of the fundamental duty that he or she has to this House. It has another advantage. There are Members of this House, as there were Members in the House of Commons, who are even more sensitive than I to the views of their Front-Bench colleagues. Should such Members come under unwelcome pressure—as a former Whip and Member of Parliament for 40 years, I know that happens frequently—the oath that I propose would enable Members to respond to such unwelcome pressure by asserting the primacy of the oath that they have taken. I therefore suggest that Amendment 44A has merit.

I have two brief points. Amendment 46 would extend the eligibility criteria for members of HOLAC to party-political groups not otherwise identified in the noble Earl’s table. I have in mind Members of this House affiliated to the DUP or, as may happen at some time in the future, Members affiliated to the SNP, Sinn Féin or Reform. They clearly should not be excluded from eligibility for HOLAC.

Finally, Amendment 47 is to avoid an injustice. If HOLAC recommends that an appointment should not be made, it is likely that that recommendation will leak. Such leaking will inevitably cause serious damage to the reputation of the person involved. Moreover, we can all agree that rejection per se is damaging. One has to concede that it is at least possible that HOLAC will come to a mistaken conclusion, especially if it relies on press reports. My suggestion to address that evil is that, before coming to a final recommendation, HOLAC should give to the person affected notice of the reasons and give them the opportunity to respond and, if appropriate, put the record straight. Those are my amendments.

HOLAC is 25 years old in May and, looking at its report card, one would say that it has been a success. Of its two jobs, the production of the 76 Members that the noble Earl, Lord Devon, referred to into the Cross Bench has been a great success. I can say, as I am not one of them, that they really are among our most regular attenders and most valuable contributors. On the other side, its vetting business has also been a success, otherwise we would have noticed standards slipping in the House all round. But HOLAC is a delicate child; it was born of a White Paper and it lacks the permanence that it deserves. It is now a non-departmental government body and an advisory body only. I suppose there are three things that one could do to HOLAC from here: first, give it the permanence that I think it deserves; secondly, broaden the scope of what it looks at; and thirdly, increase its powers—or, rather, give it powers, because it does not have any at all at the moment. In permanence terms, as I have already suggested, I feel that the time has come, after 25 years of success, to try to find a way to make HOLAC more permanent somewhere in statute, and not just have it as something which appeared in a White Paper. On broadening HOLAC’s scope, it is clear that the exercise it undertakes when it looks at new Members includes enough data, information and deliberation for it to make a determination on not just propriety but suitability. Given that it is an advisory body, this would be interesting to me, were I Prime Minister, and it should be asked to provide that guidance to the Prime Minister. I would have that element of broadening its scope. Where I do have a difficulty, though, is on increasing HOLAC’s powers. It would be hugely complex. We would have to sort out who is going to be a member. Today, it is quite a relaxed process—it is going on at the moment to fill two slots—but it would be extremely interesting to all sorts of people to become a member, or indeed a chair, of HOLAC. Its scrutiny, if it had real power, would be something we would have to sort out as well. That would take some time, and the timetable for this Bill would not allow that. I do not feel that this Bill could possibly be a vehicle for increasing HOLAC’s powers, but it could be a vehicle for making it permanent and giving it some breadth.

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 45 and the other amendments in this group that would make HOLAC a statutory body. I was a member of the commission for a number of years and, despite the fact that I hold the proposers of these amendments in very high regard, it would be a great mistake to put it on a statutory basis. I say so for the same reason as that given by the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, a distinguished former chairman of the commission, to your Lordships on 18 November 2022. In a nutshell, making HOLAC a statutory body would make it subject to judicial review. This would mean that someone who was unsuccessful in their application to become a Member of your Lordships’ House could challenge that decision in the courts. It would mean that an appointment that had been announced and, indeed, confirmed could be challenged in the courts. The courts would be drawn into deciding who should and should not be a Member of your Lordships’ House—a Member of this Chamber of Parliament—which is a flagrant breach of what we have always understood by the separation of powers. It may be suggested that the legislation contemplated by these amendments to make HOLAC statutory could in some way circumscribe the power of the courts to intervene. I am afraid that history demonstrates that in a contest of that kind between the parliamentary draftsman and the courts, the courts usually win.

My Lords, my noble friend is making a very serious point. Would he perhaps consider that the power of judicial review would be reduced if HOLAC was obliged, before making a public statement, to give the person affected the opportunity to respond?

On the contrary, if reasons were given, those reasons could be the basis of a challenge in the courts. I fear I entirely disagree with the last point my noble friend made in his speech, when he suggested that reasons should be given. If reasons are given, they can form a stronger or a particular basis for a challenge in the courts. I shall content myself with one example of the attitude of the courts to attempts to circumscribe their powers to intervene. When I was Home Secretary, a decision was made, though not by me, to refuse British nationality to someone whom I will not name. The relevant statute says that in such cases the Home Office is not obliged to give reasons for its decision. The High Court decided that these words meant what most people would think they meant, which was that the Home Office did not have to give any reasons. The Court of Appeal, however, decided that because the statute gave the Home Office discretion as to whether it could give reasons, it was wrong not to give the reasons. Your Lordship will see what I mean when I say that it is extremely difficult to circumscribe the determination of the courts to intervene. I do not think that the courts should have a role in determining the membership of your Lordships’ House. That would be a consequence of these amendments. I urge your Lordships to reject them.

18:30:00

My Lords, with regret, I cannot support any of the amendments in this group. I say “with regret” because there are aspects of them that I like very much. I like the proposal to extend the scope of HOLAC to consider competence as well as integrity. I am also tempted, like my noble friend the Convenor, by wishing to put HOLAC on a statutory basis. But the objections raised by the noble Lord, Lord Howard, are powerful. So, I would go as far in agreeing with my noble friend as to say that I would favour HOLAC being put on a more permanent basis if a way could be found for dealing with the objections raised by the noble Lord, Lord Howard. One thing that runs in common through these amendments is that HOLAC’s power being extended runs up against a fatal flaw—that in one case HOLAC is given a veto on nominations to your Lordships’ House and in another it is given the sole right to make recommendations. Those aspects are constitutionally wrong. The sovereign, the King, creates Members of your Lordships’ House. There must be somebody to advise him. It must be a democratically elected person and that has to be the Prime Minister. It cannot be the role of a body such as HOLAC, however admirable its work and however admirably it is composed, to give that advice. The advice to the sovereign must come from the Prime Minister. So HOLAC’s advisory role is very important but, although we may not like it, in the end the Prime Minister has to take the responsibility. That means the Prime Minister can, if he wishes, reject the advice of HOLAC. The right channel is that HOLAC advises, the Prime Minister advises the King and the King appoints.

My Lords, I support the amendments that would put HOLAC into statute, for the reasons given by the Convenor of the Cross Benches, which I shall not weary your Lordships by repeating. To the noble Lord, Lord Howard, I would say that, if HOLAC’s procedures are fair and if the courts are wise, which I believe they are, they will steer well clear. Amendment 51, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Devon, and to which I have put my name, is an amendment that is not for the long term but for the here and now. Although the Cross Benches notoriously still lack a hairdresser, we owe to the People’s Peers scheme a decent share of the expertise that so distinguishes your Lordships’ House. Without it, we would not have the noble Baronesses, Lady Grey-Thompson, Lady Watkins and Lady Kidron, or the noble Lords, Lord Krebs, Lord Pannick and Lord Hennessy. None of them, incidentally, are what the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, described as “public sector experts”, although we have some of those, too. We would not have had Lord Ramsbotham, whose former desk in this place I proudly occupy and whose detailed knowledge of the prison system no current Back-Bencher in any part of this House can equal. None of those people—and they are only illustrative examples from a short but distinguished list—was active in politics or would have thought of standing for election. None qualified automatically by virtue of a previous job. None was proposed for membership by a political leader. But each has brought qualities of the very highest order to public life. Whether future political Peers arrive here by appointment or by some process of election, I hope they will continue to be joined by a modest stream of independent experts—ideally for a fixed term, as counselled by the noble Lord, Lord Burns—who owe nothing to party affiliation or prime ministerial patronage. How modest is the stream? The noble Earl has given some figures. Let me give some more. Between the start of the scheme in 2001 and the 2010 general election, HOLAC’s website records that 55 People’s Peers were appointed—around six a year. But, more recently, the stream has slowed to a trickle. In the past 15 years, only 21 People’s Peers have been appointed, balanced between 11 women and 10 men. I would be wary of any suggestion that might tend to increase either the numbers in this House or the proportion of peers who sit on the Cross Benches—but we do have a problem. The removal of 34 hereditaries will not only leave a large gap on the Cross Benches; it will leave gaps in the collective expertise of the House. How would we have navigated the cladding issue without the noble Earl, Lord Lytton? How could we provide a substitute for the remarkable energies of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden? Such gaps will not all be filled by the current trickle of People’s Peers. That is where Amendment 51 comes in. It would operate independently of any special arrangement for which there might be support, in favour of the Convenor of the Cross Benches and perhaps others. It would increase the flow of People’s Peers—at least for five years—but the increase would be modest and well within the bounds of precedent. Four a year is somewhere between the current rate and the rate as it was under the last Labour Government. The noble Earl, Lord Devon, has honourably made it clear that the purpose of his amendment is not to provide a route back to the House for hereditary Members who have been expelled—but, equally, there is no reason why such Members could not apply. I cannot speak for HOLAC, but surely a track record of superlative contribution to the work of the House could only be of assistance to Cross-Bench hereditaries who wish to try their luck again by a route that is open to all. That leads to my last point. We are right to focus in these debates on the qualities of those who are already here, including the hereditary Peers who contribute so greatly to our work. But let us not neglect the qualities and the potential contributions of those candidates who have already applied to HOLAC or might be encouraged to do so. Though the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, as chair of HOLAC, cannot speak on this issue, I suspect she would agree that among those applicants are some of our very brightest and best—their expertise valuable and current. Let us give them a real chance, however small, to join this House. The People’s Peers scheme has shown that the reputation and effectiveness of this place is capable of being enhanced by those who do not come from noble families, who do not benefit from political patronage and who are not members of a political party. I hope the Minister will agree that a modest but immediate revival of the People’s Peers, to which she could commit without accepting this amendment, could help to replace the Cross-Bench wisdom that will sadly be lost when the hereditary Peers leave us.

My Lords, the amendments in this group raise some very serious questions—perhaps the most obvious being the opaqueness of HOLAC and how it will work and conduct its business under these proposals. Why on earth would the public be happy for Peers who are their legislators to be appointed by a group of people most of whom they will never have heard of and who are, frankly, regarded just as members of the same elite club? This is a political Chamber where the Prime Minister of the day needs his ideas turned into law and the Opposition need champions to challenge them respectfully. The PM and the leader of the Opposition must be allowed to choose their own team. The team need not be political people or people with political experience, but they must be people who the PM and the leader of the Opposition will regard as being helpful to what they want to achieve. A while ago, the Labour Party, I think—forgive me if it was another party—went down the route of their Cabinet being selected by someone other than their leader. It was an absolute disaster, as indeed it would be here. As my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising said—I do not agree with him that HOLAC should be got rid of; I think it has a very useful role—one can see that, under these proposals, it could overreach itself and decide for itself who to appoint on grounds that might be a mystery to the rest of us but feel good to it. The very minimum is, of course, that such people who are appointed are fit and proper, but that is not enough by any stretch of the imagination. Under these proposals, we do not know on what grounds people would be selected in the future. In previous Bills that have tried to address this issue, there has been discussion of conspicuous merit. I think the Bill brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, with whom I agreed on everything he said this afternoon—talked about “conspicuous merit”. How does define one that? I am not sure that I could say I have any conspicuous merit. I would ask each of your Lordships to ask yourselves whether you really do have conspicuous merit. Is long service conspicuous merit? We see that some sports people are put in here on conspicuous merit. I do not think that has gone particularly well. As the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has quite rightly reminded us, what this Bill has got to focus on is hereditary Peers. I was taken by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Moore, about the point being that people should be in this House to contribute—to make it more effective, to deliver—which is not a function of what they have done in the past but a function of what they will do in the future. Personally, one reason why I was very keen on hereditary Peers is that they do not come here to get a title, as many people do; they come here knowing, with their eyes wide open, that there is a job of work to do, and, by and large, they do the job of work. An argument is also made that every person coming here must, in effect, be vetted by HOLAC, and that vetting is to be binding. I note that proposed new subsection (1B) in Amendment 47 would allow representations to be made, but, as ever, my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne addressed the problem of those representations leading to further judicial review. However, there is no right of appeal—as far as I can see in this legislation—so that cannot be right. Of course, if we go down the route of judicial review—which, as my noble friend Lord Howard pointed out and the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, suggested in the previous debate, would happen—I suggest that very few people would want to sit on a committee knowing that they were going to be subject to the awful process of a judicial review. If HOLAC were to be made all-powerful—much more powerful—that committee would need to be investigated very carefully. Is it going to be balanced in ethnicity, gender, age, geography, politics, religion or diversity? We can see a real mess developing. Why would that committee be given so much power when it seems to me that we appoint a PM as we trust his—or, hopefully soon, her—judgment and we must let them get on with it? We elect our MPs to select their leader and, like it or not—obviously I do not at the moment, but I have in the past and I respect the will of the people—we must allow them to get on with their job. If HOLAC is to be on a statutory basis, or if its recommendations are to be binding, surely we will need much greater access to its deliberations. Does HOLAC now work fully effectively? No, clearly it does not. In my case, I was told on 12 December that I was going to be elevated to the House, but it did not happen until the following December, so there was a huge gap, and I was told that part of the reason for that was HOLAC deliberations. Therefore, the idea of giving HOLAC more power, just when government has said that it wants to reduce the number of quangos, seems to me inappropriate.

My Lords, I shall speak briefly. While I can understand the logic behind the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, I believe that HOLAC, for which I have the greatest respect, is not totally infallible. I examined the issue of my noble friend Lord Cruddas’s rejection by the committee, and to summarise the matter, he was involved in a sting with Sunday Times journalists. He was then cleared by the Electoral Commission of any wrongdoing, sued the Sunday Times in a court and was given extensive damages. He is a respectable businessman, so I feel that, in that case, the Prime Minister was right to overrule HOLAC. There should be some sort of appeal mechanism in that case.

My Lords, before this debate concludes, I think this House owes a great debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who has confirmed for the Committee now what I feared in the past: that it is HOLAC’s duty to advise the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister’s duty to advise the King, and the King’s job to appoint. That is as it should be. What he does confirm, however, is that the sole power of appointment to the Second Chamber, from the passage of this Bill onwards, now rests in the hands of the Prime Minister, who has the majority in the House of Commons. If that is not an unbalanced and damaged constitution, I do not know what is.

My Lords, I will speak very briefly, mainly because I endorse the words of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and agree with virtually everything he said. I do not think it is appropriate for these amendments to be in this Bill for two reasons. First, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, about scope. This is in essence a one-clause Bill with a very specific purpose. Secondly, the amendments—though I agree with a number of them—are, in essence, disparate and discrete, so it is not appropriate to embody them in a Bill of this sort. They need to be drawn together. If there is going to be change, it needs to be in a clear, coherent Bill that addresses the concerns that we have heard today.

18:45:00

That leads me on to my key point, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hailsham for the trailer that he has already provided. I have my Private Member’s Bill being discussed on Friday that addresses these very points and responds to the criticisms that we have heard, such as that from my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne. It addresses those problems and will establish the appointments commission on a statutory basis but not extend its powers extensively in the way that some of these amendments suggest—ultimately, it is a matter for the Prime Minister to make the nominations to the Crown. There may be some restraints and limits, but there is a case for complying and fulfilling—the very points that the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, has made. For those who wish to pursue the arguments or to understand the arguments against the points made by my noble friend Lord Howard and others, turn up on Friday.

My Lords, I do not want to detain your Lordships long. I feel that I also have to swim rather against the current, as my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley was doing. Is there not something intrinsically wrong with a committee of the great and the good getting to appoint one of our two legislative Chambers? Why bother to get yourself elected to another place and be one among 651, when you can get yourself appointed to a committee which would then, in its turn, appoint a huge chunk of one of the two legislative Chambers? Is that not the very definition of oligarchy? I am conscious that what I am saying is going to be unpopular here, because we are all, I suppose, to a greater or lesser extent, beneficiaries of the existing system, and I am also conscious that it is going to be unpopular beyond this place. In my years as an elected politician, I found that the most popular thing you could say about any subject was: “This is too important to be a political football. Why don’t we just get all the elected politicians out of the way and let the experts get on?” If you wanted a round of applause on “Question Time” or “Any Questions”, all you had to do was say, “Trust the professionals”, because on some level, everybody loves the idea of an expert. Everybody loves the idea of a disinterested patriot who can raise his eyes above the partisan scrum and descry the true national interest. However, I have to tell your Lordships that no such person exists. We all have our prejudices and assumptions—the expert more than anybody if, by expert, we mean somebody who has spent their entire career in one particular field. The idea of having such people appointing jolly good chaps like themselves is the antithesis of representative government. I heard all the arguments that were made about what is wrong with concentrating this power solely in the hands of the Prime Minister, and I agree with that. If this were happening in Xi’s China or in Putin’s Russia, we would all say, “How terrible—imagine having the Executive filling one of the two legislative Chambers. What a travesty. What an affront to democracy”. I slightly fall back on saying that, if we are not happy having the Prime Minister doing it all, and we do not want a committee replicating itself like some Borg in “Star Trek”, we have to come up with an alternative. My own preference would be to keep something closer to what we have, where we would at least have some diversity, with some of our Members having been through some kind of election, albeit with a small enfranchised group.

My Lords, I think we can all agree that we want the same thing: a House that serves with integrity, a Second Chamber that commands public trust, and an appointments process that preserves the best of our traditions while adapting to the demands of modern democracy. The House of Lords Appointments Commission provides a non-statutory safeguard within the process for appointments to your Lordships’ House. It has a clear but limited role: to recommend non-party-political Members for the Cross Benches, ensuring that this House benefits, as many noble Lords have pointed out, from independent expertise; and to provide vetting advice on nominations for life peerages. Crucially, its recommendations are advisory and do not bind a Prime Minister. Many of the amendments in this group seek to place the power of nomination to this unelected Chamber in the hands of an unelected committee, as my noble friend Lord Hannan emphasised. This includes proposing significant changes to the powers and operation of HOLAC, including making its recommendations binding, rendering it statutory or altering its remit entirely. While I deeply respect noble Lords’ intentions in tabling these amendments, I must express my concerns, which were echoed by several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, about the direction of travel that most of these proposals suggest. I appreciate my noble friend Lord Dundee’s Amendment 45 and the clarification that my noble friend Lord Hailsham has suggested in Amendment 46. These amendments would establish HOLAC on a statutory basis and establish a cross-party board to oversee its work. They received support from my noble friends Lord Attlee and Lord Norton of Louth, the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Their aim—to secure greater legitimacy and transparency for HOLAC—is honourable. Their effect, however, would be disastrous: a great mistake, as my noble friend Lord Howard pointed out. Placing HOLAC on a statutory footing would not clarify its role; it would fundamentally alter it. Legislation would create a legal framework against which HOLAC’s decisions could be formally challenged in court, opening the door for the malicious and the litigious to claim it had failed to fulfil its legal duties. Candidates who were not recommended for appointment as Cross-Bench Peers could contest the basis on which they were excluded. Those who failed the propriety test, which is based on judgment rather than law, could argue it had been misapplied. Instead of providing independent advice to the Prime Minister, HOLAC would become a body subject to judicial review, forced to justify its reasoning in court, constrained by legal precedent and bound to operate based not on judgment, but within the narrow confines of justiciability. The Prime Minister’s discretion, exercised on HOLAC’s advice, would be second-guessed in not this House but the courts—a point made brilliantly by my noble friend Lord Howard. The process would become slower, more contested and more uncertain, exposing every appointment to challenge, delay and dysfunction. We should be under no illusion: making HOLAC statutory would not reinforce its authority but undermine it. It would not enhance trust but erode it, and it would not improve the system but entrench its weaknesses.

In the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill, now an Act, we included an ouster clause. Why could that not be included in this measure?

I defer to my Front-Bench colleague, my noble and learned friend Lord Keen: because of the way the ouster clause would be interpreted in court. Amendment 43 in the name of my noble friend Lord Dundee takes a step further by transferring the responsibility for proposing peerages to HOLAC and away from the Prime Minister. This amendment would strip the Prime Minister—the only person in this process with a democratic mandate—of the power to propose life peerages and hand it to an unelected body. That would be a well-intentioned mistake. The Prime Minister does not act alone. HOLAC already plays an important advisory role by scrutinising appointments and applying the propriety test; but, crucially, it is the Prime Minister who makes the final decision. That balance matters. If HOLAC gets it wrong, if it misjudges a candidate or applies the propriety test too narrowly or too loosely, the Prime Minister can correct it. If the Prime Minister gets it wrong, he or she faces scrutiny, challenge and, ultimately, the judgment of the electorate. This is a system that holds both in check. If the Prime Minister is stripped of that role, HOLAC’s decisions become final. There is no backstop, no political oversight, no democratic accountability. More than that—this point was made eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Butler—the amendment breaks a fundamental constitutional principle. The Prime Minister is the monarch’s chief adviser. It is not for an unelected commission to take on that role. Appointments to this House must be made by those who answer to the people, not by a body with no democratic mandate, no political accountability and no direct link to the people. We all want higher standards, but high standards must be upheld in a way that strengthens, not weakens, our democracy; in a way that builds trust, not erodes it; and in a way that reinforces the legitimacy of this House, not undermines it. Amendment 44A from my noble friend Lord Hailsham seeks to add an additional test: that nominees must be fit and proper and independent-minded. While I entirely understand the intention behind this, I struggle to see how one could determine legally whether a potential appointee is independent-minded. It is, by its nature, a subjective judgment, and in a democracy such judgments should ultimately rest with those who are accountable to the people, rather than with those who are accountable to no one. Amendment 12, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and Amendment 47, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham seek to prevent life peerages being conferred if HOLAC has recommended against the appointment. Amendment 12 establishes this power as absolute, but Amendment 47 concedes that HOLAC must give an explanation and allow representations before a decision is final. Amendment 116 merely amends the Short Title of the Bill in relation to Amendment 12. These amendments do not simply tweak the appointments process; they fundamentally recast the role of the House of Lords Appointments Commission. HOLAC was created as an advisory committee: to advise, not to command. To make its recommendations binding is to transform it from a source of counsel into the ultimate arbiter of membership of your Lordships’ House. It would no longer be a check, but a gatekeeper. This is not some dry technicality. It is a profound shift in constitutional authority. At present, the system balances expert scrutiny with democratic accountability. HOLAC advises; the Prime Minister decides. If a Prime Minister presses ahead against its recommendation, the commission ensures transparency by informing Parliament. The check is there, the scrutiny is real and, crucially, it is the Prime Minister, not an unelected committee, who must justify their judgment to the country. We do not strengthen the system by stripping discretion from those whom the people can ultimately hold to account. The power to recommend appointments to His Majesty should rest where it always has: with a democratically accountable Prime Minister, not an unelected tribunal with the right of veto. That is the system we have; it works. These amendments would replace it with something far more rigid, less democratic and more dangerous. This brings me to Amendment 12A in the name of my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising. This amendment proposes the opposite of the rest in this group, rendering HOLAC ineffective. While I am incredibly sympathetic to my noble friend’s position, especially on the untameable growth of committees and quangos, I accept that HOLAC has some role to fulfil, even if it should be limited. HOLAC plays an important role in safeguarding propriety and ensuring that this House retains, and is seen to retain, its reputation for expertise and integrity. I am sure that the Prime Minister, like his predecessors, will continue to place great weight on the commission’s careful and considered advice. The House of Lords Appointments Commission has an independent and important advisory role, but it is and must remain advisory. It also has a clear remit and that too must remain clear. There was a suggestion while I was serving in government that HOLAC might seek to dictate the timing or publication of a peerage list. That is clearly not part of its remit and illustrates a potential tendency of the commission, even in its non-statutory form, to succumb to the temptations of overreach. Finally, I turn to Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Devon, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and my noble friend Lord Dundee, which seeks to encourage HOLAC in its current form to confer life peerages on up to 20 Cross-Bench hereditary Peers. As my noble friend Lord True set out so eloquently last week, we firmly believe—

The amendment does not seek to apply 20 life peerages to hereditary Peers; it merely suggests life peerages to refill the Cross Benches.

I apologise to the noble Lord. His amendment seeks to confer life peerages for up to 20 Cross-Bench Peers. As my noble friend Lord True set out eloquently last week, we firmly believe that all hereditary Peers serving in our House should be permitted to stay as they are, albeit without being replaced or granted life peerages. No advisory body is truly neutral and objectivity is hard to achieve. HOLAC is no exception. It offers judgment, not infallibility, and expanding its powers risks creating a system neither accountable nor impartial. We must be wary of trading one form of discretion for another, especially when it moves further from democratic oversight. The balance we have is not perfect, but it preserves scrutiny and responsibility. To abandon that balance is not reform but retreat.

19:00:00

Before my noble friend sits down, will she join me in congratulating the Government Chief Whip on the brilliant management of business in the House this afternoon, whereby there is virtually nobody sitting on the Government Benches? Apart from the wonderful noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, and the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, representing the dinosaurs, I do not think a single Government Back-Bencher has spoken in support of the Government’s Bill today. They have now even brought in Ministers to sit behind the Front Bench so that everybody watching on screen thinks that the Government are being supported. This is not the sort of management of business that we expect to see in your Lordships’ House.

My Lords, what is so unfortunate is that I was about to welcome and celebrate the tone of the debate that we had just had. So I am going to move on with the tone of the debate and celebrate the contributions that noble Lords have made, which have been—in overwhelming number— thoughtful and considered. I am grateful for that. I think all noble Lords—as the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, highlighted—want the same thing for this House: colleagues who meet the highest standards of public service, who are dedicated to our country and who want to ensure that our legislation is fit for purpose. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, allow HOLAC to veto the Prime Minister’s and party leaders’ nominations to the House of Lords. The amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Dundee, also specifies HOLAC’s composition and purpose in statute. The Government are grateful for the discussion on these amendments today. We committed in our manifesto to reform the appointments process, but we cannot, unfortunately, accept these amendments, which fundamentally alter the roles and responsibilities in the appointments system. Constitutionally, it is on the advice of the Prime Minister that the sovereign appoints new Peers, but it is not just the Prime Minister who makes these nominations. The Prime Minister, by convention, invites nominations from other political parties. After all, as was pointed out earlier in Committee, I was appointed by the former Prime Minister Truss. It is the responsibility of party leaders to consider who is best placed to represent their party in the House of Lords. This is an important principle. The Prime Minister and other party leaders are democratically elected and accountable to Parliament, and ultimately to the electorate, for the political nominations they make to the House of Lords. The House of Lords Appointments Commission vets all nominations for life peerages to ensure the highest standards of propriety in this House. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, would seek to make HOLAC’s advice defunct. If HOLAC recommended a nominee, the Prime Minister would be unable to proceed with their appointment. I hope it is obvious to your Lordships’ House why we cannot accept this, not least given the conversation we had earlier about People’s Peers. HOLAC’s proprietary advice is important to the Prime Minister as he discharges his duty to advise the sovereign on life peerages, and he of course considers it carefully. The Government are very grateful for the work that HOLAC, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, does to provide this advice. This advice, however, forms part of a process that also ensures democratic accountability in the appointment process. Party leaders must accept responsibility for their appointment. We cannot and should not expect HOLAC to take on that responsibility. Handing HOLAC, an unelected body, the role of recommending new life peerages directly to the sovereign, or giving them the power to veto the Prime Minister’s recommendations, as in the amendment put forward today, would undermine that accountability. The Government believe that nominating parties should be properly held to account for their nominations to the House of Lords. As my noble friend the Leader of the House set out on the first day of Committee, we have already taken a straightforward but important step to introduce a requirement on all nominating parties to provide public citations that clearly set out why individuals were nominated. I was pleased to see the first set of citations published on GOV.UK following the recent peerage list in December of last year. The amendment from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, seeks to introduce a new oath for new Peers and requires HOLAC to be satisfied that new Peers will participate. This is a thoughtful suggestion, but, as a reminder, new Peers already sign our Code of Conduct when they take their seat. As we have said during the passage of the Bill, we are working on developing a participation requirement to ensure that we become a more active Chamber. It matters less what Peers say they will do than what they actually do when they come here. I am, however, grateful to noble Lords for their suggestions on how this could work and ways to take it forward. More widely, the Prime Minister has made clear that he is committed to restoring trust in Parliament and takes the advice of all ethics bodies seriously. The Government are committed to keeping our ethics bodies under review and, where necessary, delivering reforms to ensure the highest standards in public life. Indeed, the Government have already demonstrated their willingness to strengthen the independent protections provided by the standards landscape. The Prime Minister has, for example, significantly strengthened the remit of the Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards, ensuring they have the ability to initiate investigations into ministerial standards without requiring the Prime Minister’s consent. However, as I have made clear, the amendments proposed today would undermine the manifesto commitment to look at the current system and the democratic lines of accountability that currently exist in the appointments process. I now turn to the amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Devon, which would give HOLAC the power to recommend 20 individuals to the sovereign for non-party political life peerages over the next five years. The Cross-Benchers bring expertise and diverse perspectives to the House, which I welcome, and I thoroughly enjoy working with many of them. They make valuable contributions. Retirements and other departures mean that new Peers will always need to be appointed to ensure that the Lords has appropriate expertise, and I acknowledge that the Bill will have a particular impact on the number of Cross-Benchers. As my noble friend the Leader of the House said to the Committee last week, she has committed to discuss this with the relevant parties. As it stands, new Peers can be appointed to the Cross Benches through nominations by the House of Lords Appointments Commission. HOLAC runs an open-application assessment process to identify and select new Cross-Bench Peers, and the Prime Minister passes HOLAC’s nominations to the sovereign. Many excellent Peers have come to your Lordships’ House this way. The number of Peers that HOLAC is able to nominate is decided by the Prime Minister, and in doing so he of course takes into account the political balance of your Lordships’ House. Prime Ministers can also recommend a limited number of additional Cross-Bench appointments over the course of the Parliament for those with a record of public service. As with all new Peers, they are subject to propriety vetting by HOLAC. I note that the noble Lord’s amendment allows HOLAC, rather than the Prime Minister, the role of recommending 20 life Peers to the sovereign. As I addressed earlier, constitutionally it is for the Prime Minister, as principal adviser to the sovereign, to recommend new life Peers. I appreciate that the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the Cross-Benchers remain a significant presence in your Lordships’ House. To give HOLAC, an unelected body, the role of providing advice to the sovereign, even in this limited way, would, however, be a clear break from our constitutional arrangements—one that would require careful thought, as today’s debate has demonstrated, and one that the Government do not support or think necessary. As we have repeatedly stated, the Government committed in their manifesto to reform the process of appointments to this place, to ensure the quality of new appointments and to improve the representative balance of the second Chamber so that it better reflects the country that it serves. We have heard—and I am sure we will continue to hear—interesting proposals from across the House, and we welcome the discussion on appointments. However, it is right that we take time to properly consider how to take forward our manifesto commitment to reform in this area, as part of the wider standards landscape, in a way that reflects the importance of those lines of democratic accountability. It is also not a debate for this Bill. As has been stated, this is a focused Bill that delivers the Government’s manifesto commitment to bring about an immediate reform by removing the right of the remaining hereditary Peers to sit and vote in your Lordships’ House. It is not the vehicle to consider all reforms to the House of Lords. I therefore respectfully ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for a typically interesting debate. As I said at the outset, we were not seeking a fundamental reform of the way that HOLAC operates; we were seeking to do something uncontroversial that I thought nobody could possibly disagree with. I have been in your Lordships’ House for only 27 years, so what do I know? I say to the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that our amendment does not break the link between the Prime Minister and the monarch. The Prime Minister would still make the recommendations. I am sure there are many other areas in which the Prime Minister gives advice to the monarch where that advice is constrained by various outside bodies, so I am not persuaded by the noble Lord’s argument. In a way, the problem was set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, who said that the Prime Minister does not act alone. The truth is that he did act alone in this case. That is why we have the amendment. There was no constraint on the Prime Minister in making some proposals. HOLAC could not then do anything about it. I am not saying that it was a whim of the Prime Minister, or done without thought, but it was certainly his decision and his alone.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. As I read his amendment, the Prime Minister could not recommend somebody if HOLAC had said that he should not. Would that not give HOLAC a veto and constrain the Prime Minister’s powers?

Yes, it would constrain the Prime Minister’s powers; that is what I want to do. In my view, the Prime Minister has, on rare occasions in the past, acted in a manner that has allowed people who HOLAC thought improper to become Members of your Lordships’ House. That is what I want to stop.

My Lords, does it not strike the noble Lord as interesting that, in this amendment, he recommends the power of appointed people over elected people whereas in previous amendments he recommended the exact opposite?

It may be interesting to the noble Lord; I think it is totally irrelevant to this case. We are obviously done with this issue today. I will withdraw my amendment but I will come back to it on Report.

Before I deal with Amendment 12, the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising, moved his Amendment 12A; does he wish to withdraw it?

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 12A withdrawn.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

Amendment 13

Moved by

13: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause— “15 year terms for life peers(1) A member of the House of Lords who has sat in the House by virtue of a life peerage for 15 years or more ceases to be a member of the House of Lords at the end of that Session of Parliament, subject to subsection (2).(2) A member of the House of Lords who has sat in the House by virtue of a life peerage for 15 years or more may apply to the House of Lords Appointments Commission for reappointment for a further five or more years up to a maximum of 15 years, but no member may sit in the House of Lords by virtue of a life peerage for more than 30 years in total.”

My Lords, the first and most important point to make about this amendment is that it was not dreamed up by me. It is one of the key recommendations of the royal commission on House of Lords reform. This commission, which reported in 2000 and of which I was privileged to be a member, was chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham. It had representatives on it of all political parties and came to unanimous conclusions. The commission argued for a mixture of appointed and elected elements, and this proposal for a 15-year term was designed for both kinds of Member. The point was that Members of the House of Lords should not be driven by short-term considerations or looming elections but should be able to take the long view, and 15 years was considered appropriate. As proposed new subsection (2) of the amendment indicates, this term could be extended in the case of a particular Peer by the independent Appointments Commission. When a 15-year term came to an end, a Peer might find themselves a Minister, chair of a key committee, or deeply involved in an important piece of legislation or some other work that was deeply appreciated by the House. Their term could be renewed, in the first instance for a further five years, but such instances would, perhaps, become the exception. Most Peers would expect to serve 15 years. Like others of your Lordships, I am very disappointed that the Bill as set out deals only with hereditary Peers and not with the wider issue of Lords reform. I entirely accept the Government’s good faith that they want to bring forward some further reforms but I am deeply sceptical as to whether they will ever be able to get round to doing it. This is because, as the noble Lord, Lord Newby, stressed earlier, Parliament is still deeply divided as to what form major reform should take. Furthermore, other ideas about reform have come forward since the royal commission, notably from the former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, for a second Chamber representing the nations and regions. Building a consensus for that or for any major reform could take decades.

19:15:00

So we are back in the business of incremental reform, as we have been since 1911. For those who would like to see something more radical, it is frustrating, but that is where we are and where we are likely to be for some time, so it is incremental reform or nothing. My amendment is one element in this incremental reform that could be brought in without jeopardising more ambitious longer-term plans for reform.

We will debate age limits in another group but, just to give an example, the age limit of 80 has, as we know, been floated and then sunk with the realisation that it would hole “Good Ship Labour” below the waterline by culling them disproportionately. Besides, such an idea was always open to the charge of ageism, which my amendment for a 15-year term is not.

This amendment is one element in the continuing process of incremental reform. I believe that, in the long run, it would help to bring our numbers down and enhance the credibility of the Chamber. I beg to move.

Amendment 14 (to Amendment 13)

Moved by

14: In subsection (2), at beginning insert “Until the conclusion of the Parliament in which this Act is passed but not beyond,”

My Lords, my Amendments 14 and 15 would have very limited impact. The problem with Amendment 13 from the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, is that it flies in the face of the attempt—which I think is felt within your Lordships’ House—to get the numbers down and to refresh this House. I have nothing against the extension proposed by the noble and right reverend Lord provided that it is confined to this Parliament and limited to five years. Otherwise, we will run the risk of extending terms for substantial periods. That is not what I think this House wants.

My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment from the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, although, with apologies to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, it does not actually mention hereditary Peers. This debate has ranged much more widely. At some stage we will need to discuss the next steps for reform. I hope that we will not overlook the work of either the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, or the noble Lord, Lord Burns, who had some very sound proposals in his report that we somehow seem to have swept under the carpet. I have been here for nearly 18 years and I have no wish to retire, but it is possible that, if I still have my marbles in another 12 years, I would be grateful for an honourable way to go. Most of us are appointed because we have expertise in a particular field, but it is quite possible that, after 15 years, our expertise is not quite as lively as it was when we first came in, so having this sort of term seems to make quite a lot of sense. I cannot understand why noble Lords have not grouped more amendments in this debate. This seems an unnecessary waste of your Lordships’ time and, I fear, the sort of thing that brings this House into disrepute. I note that the ungrouped amendments all seem to come from the Conservative Benches. I wonder why.

My Lords, my Amendment 66 has been grouped with these amendments. I will briefly explain what the amendment does and then make a valiant, though likely unsuccessful, attempt to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that it would be worth accepting. My amendment seeks to address the fact that there is broad agreement across the House that in some way, shape or form the length of time that people sit in the House should not be indefinite. The concept of a seat for life has no more validity than a seat for life that has been inherited. The report from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, suggested 15 years, as referred to in Amendment 13. I have chosen a term of 20 years precisely because 15 years sounds like something I can imagine, whereas 20 years sounds somewhat more gentle. The number has been chosen so as not to frighten the horses. The amendment would amend the Life Peerages Act such that the right to receive a Writ of Summons would be limited to 20 years from the moment someone took their seat in the House. That would mean that if somebody happened to be just under the 20 years when an election was called, they would get a Writ of Summons and could get up to 24 years. If they were lucky—or unlucky, depending on your point of view—to have sat for 20 years when an election was called, that would be their lot. By referring to a Writ of Summons, the amendment has the merit of meaning that anyone who was limited would get to the end of the Parliament they were sitting in so that if they were chairing a committee or running a Bill, they would be able to complete their work. The amendment is deliberately designed to affect peerages granted after the passage of this Bill. There is quite a lot of feeling, one way or another, about the concept of changing the terms of employment, as it were, for people who are already here. Therefore, people given a peerage in the future would know precisely what they would be doing and the length of time they would serve. An alternative for terms of reference, which will be debated later, is a retirement age. I do not favour retirement ages because I have met people of considerable age with great faculties and abilities and some people of not very great age who do not have great faculties and abilities. I would rather have, as happens in the other place, a term limit based on moment of arrival and moment of departure, rather than an arbitrary one based on age. The key difference between this amendment and virtually any other that will be tabled is that it does not affect anybody who is currently sitting in the House. Why, therefore, have I brought it forward? I hope to persuade the Leader of the House that it may be worth considering and possibly accepting. As I mentioned in the debate on the last group, I have been around the houses on Lords reform for the best part of 30 years, across two Houses. Apart from the fact that anybody who engages in that requires a certain degree of stamina, I have noticed that progress has been remarkably small and often barely incremental. The amendment therefore seeks to put in a longstop. If it is accepted, it would change nothing at the moment. If the Government go ahead, as promised, and bring something forward in the remainder of this Parliament, nothing has changed; this is perfectly reversible and whatever changes might be thought appropriate by the Government can go ahead. It has no impact on anything that might be discussed. But if the circumstance arises—and the odds are probably in favour of this circumstance—that for one reason or another, such as international affairs or all sorts of different reasons, time is not found in this Parliament for any further reform, and the electoral maths changes so that the next term might be more difficult, we would be back to having another 10 or 15 years before something happens. If, therefore, we are really interested in the size of the House coming down—I think we all wish to see that—and if some form of limited term is appropriate, the amendment puts this out into the distance. It is exactly like crown green bowls, where you put one ball right at the back, just in case. If nothing happens, there would be a longstop that would start to see a reduction in the numbers. I would like to think that my amendment has been drafted in a way that has some elegance and grace and would solve a problem that I hope we will not have and therefore could be disregarded. But in case we do have the problem, it is a mechanism planted into the future that would have some control over the size of your Lordships’ House. For those reasons, I hope the Government might consider this amendment, or something very like it, as a workable proposition, and use the Bill for this tiny addition that would have no impact on the vast bulk of what they are seeking to achieve.

My Lords, instinctively, I like limited terms. It is like running a board: you know who is leaving, when they are leaving and what skills they have, and you recruit to replace them in an orderly way rather than relying on the grim reaper to do it for you. I often say about 15-year terms that it is five years to learn the job, five years to be effective and five years to go out of date. I fear that I may offend a few in the Chamber today by making that mathematical assertion. In practice, there is one point that we need to consider with regard to limited terms: what then? If people have spent their peak career earning years in this House and then leave at 50 or 60—with no pension from this employer, by the way—are we in danger of putting people off from joining us because they have nothing to look forward to as a support beyond the time they spend here? I worry that your Lordships’ House would become more attractive to people of independent means and less attractive to people who are not in that lucky position.

May I respond to the noble Lord briefly, as we are in Committee? If one looks at the average age at which people come into this House, it is at the end of their careers, just below or above 60. Therefore, 20 years takes most people who come into this House from mid-50s to mid-70s or early 60s to early 80s. Under the current arrangements, there are relatively few people who come into the House as a full-time occupation who are in their primary working years. I know that there are exceptions, and exceptions always prove the rule. However, if we wish to have some longstop, my amendment takes care of most of the points he has made. If people know in advance that they are being offered something for 20 years, they always have the choice of declining.

My Lords, I have many things to declare. One is that I came here not as a hereditary Peer but was appointed by John Major, who conspired with Neil Kinnock—the noble Lord, Lord Kinnock—to get me here. Secondly, I have been here for 34 years, so I obviously do not qualify to be a sane, sensible person, because I am too old. I am 85, and after 34 years I am clearly not qualified to be here at all—so I have to fight for my life, because I actually like this place. When I came here I did not swear an oath, not being a believer, but I affirmed one. I affirmed an oath to serve Her Majesty the Queen, her heirs and successors. I did not say “Till death do us part” but I definitely came on the promise that I was appointed for life. I was not appointed on whether I was qualified, whether I was sane, whether I was solvent, or anything like that. Okay—if I violate the rules of conduct, I may get thrown out. Apart from that, given the logic of your Lordships’ House, I do not see any reason whatever to have age limits and term limits retrospectively. Yes, have a Bill which is not to do with the hereditary Peers but with House of Lords reform. If you want to reform the House and reduce the number of people and so on, then say that normally at such and such an age you would qualify.

19:30:00

I do not know how many noble Lords remember Lord Mackay of Clashfern. For those of us who do, he was here, as I remember, until he was at least 94. Whenever he rose to speak, we all listened carefully, because he was a very sound and good constitutional expert. So, if the Government want to reduce the number of Peers in the House of Lords, they should go about it by, first, throwing out everybody who does not come more than, say, once a week or once a term, or whatever it is. There are a lot of people like that. People may be disqualified on other grounds, but I do think it is ageist to have people going out at 85 or whatever it is, and ageism will not do any more.

We really ought not to mix up this Bill with other problems just because some people do not like the hereditary Peers being thrown out. We can discuss that, but we really ought not to mix it up because the Government ought to be allowed to think of how to reduce numbers and come to us with a good Bill, and then we shall discuss it. Right now, this arbitrary 15-year term or an age limit of 80, 85 or 90 years will not do. We ought to think again.

My Lords—

My Lords, with apologies for interrupting the noble Earl, I want to draw noble Lords’ attention to the subjects coming up for debate in later groups and remind them to try to stick to the subjects of the groups.

My Lords, the noble Baroness is of course absolutely correct on her point and I strongly support her. The issue of fixed-term peerages or membership of the House is indeed closely related to the issue of age limits, so I have some sympathy with what the noble Baroness, Lady Garden, said. I think that the overall answer to both issues is a retirement age that is agreed or understood at the time of appointment for new Peers. I hope that gives some comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Desai. Once the hereditary Peers have gone, the remaining Peers who are over 70 now will come under considerable media pressure. It is no use avoiding this point. To an even greater extent than younger Peers, such older Peers are, rightly, not very responsive to what the media think or what the media want them to do. Rather, they do what they believe is in the public interest and in accordance with the Nolan principles. I am not sure that that is what the media want. I think that having 80 year-old Peers will be made to seem just as indefensible as hereditaries are incorrectly claimed to be today. I would not underestimate the value to the House of Lords of having some Peers whose experience goes back a very long way. For instance, I advised a noble Baroness on the Cross Benches who was faced with an assisted dying Bill. She erroneously believed that she could not try to kill the Bill at Second Reading; I advised her that she could and that I had seen it done some time before. Sure enough, she succeeded in her endeavours. Unfortunately, when drafting this speech, I could not avoid the words “kill”, “fatal” or “euthanise” or the phrase “put out of its misery” when talking about the procedure related to an assisted dying Bill. I am not opposed to term limits, provided that those who propose them are clear about what they want the House to do. However, the Wakeham report identified a danger, in that term limits could deter potential new Members—a point well made by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell.

My Lords, perhaps I could comment on one or two of the points being made. The Lord Speaker’s Committee, which I chaired, did indeed make the proposal that there should be either 15-year or 20-year term limits. We looked at both of them and came down in the end marginally in favour of 15-year term limits. That was against the background not of this Bill, of course, but of also promoting the idea of a ceiling on the size of the House of Lords. The great argument in favour of term limits is that it generates a predictable number and a predictable flow of levers, which can then work alongside a limit on the size of the House. It then provides the scope for both refreshment of the House and a change in the political balance over a period of time, which is also very important, and it all can be done in an orderly way. The proposal that we made was in this context of several other changes that were suggested, rather than something which was standing on its own. The proposal we made was also to be applied only to new Peers. We said that it should begin then and was a long-term proposal. It was the only real mechanism we could find whereby you could stabilise the numbers over time and have the capacity to make changes. After all, there are term limits for most people in most legislatures. Most of them are determined by the electorate and by what happens to people when they meet the voter. There is nothing new about this: it is a very useful mechanism, but not really a mechanism for this Bill. I accept that it is for another day, but in the argument about a more balanced and wider group of changes being made, I would be very supportive of this important mechanism at that time.

My Lords, my Amendment 73 is included in this group and supported by my noble friend Lord Wigley and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I thank them for their support. Most noble Lords will be aware by now that my goal is to see this place abolished and replaced with a democratic second Chamber. However, in the meantime, I am determined to push forward even small steps that can have a meaningful impact. Amendment 73 is a simple step towards achieving radical reform. I am asking His Majesty’s Government to implement a term limit for Members in this place, capped at no more than 10 years. While I commend the tabling of several other amendments by noble Lords proposing term limits, the shortest among them is 15 years. By international standards, 15 years is extremely long for an appointed Chamber. In fact, it is three times longer than the most common term length of five years, with the next most common being just four years. Based on this evidence, we can also see that 10 years is extremely abnormal. However, I wish to note that my amendment seeks to establish a ceiling and not a target. I have drafted Amendment 73 with a 10-year ceiling to allow His Majesty’s Government to investigate the various ranges of term limits before bringing forward a final proposal. I tabled the amendment because I firmly oppose the prospect that anyone should have a job for life. It is absurd in most settings, but completely inappropriate for an establishment that is supposed to be accountable to the people of these nations. We cannot honestly believe that someone can be forever representative of others. Others have tabled amendments that would set a retirement age, which we will cover in the next group. Although this could be a good practice to introduce, I fear that setting a retirement age without a term limit would fail to address the imbalanced composition of this Chamber. This approach would not solve the issues that the Bill and these amendments aim to address—namely, the number of Members and the diversity of this Chamber. Following my advocacy for term limits at Second Reading, I was asked by a Member of this House where I would get a job after my term was up. Would I not struggle with the loss of power and influence after being a Member of this place? I have reflected on this question, and I cannot escape the conclusion that it reveals a deeply flawed perception of what this institution should represent. It is precisely this kind of thinking that underscores the urgent need for term limits. No one in our position should see this role as a source of power. It is and must always be a responsibility, a duty to serve—not a privilege to cling to. If we ever lose sight of that, reform is not just desirable but essential. Therefore, I stand by my statement that term limits are the best way of addressing these issues. Implementing this amendment would guarantee that the Chamber undergoes regular renewal and revitalisation, with Members carrying out their duty with a strong sense of responsibility and commitment to their role, knowing that their time in office is limited and impactful. Some argue that regular and continuous changes to the second Chamber might be disruptive. However, this amendment does not propose changes that would result in Members being unable to stand for re-election. I propose that we counter the supposed issue of turbulence by following the example of the Australian Senate. There, term limits are six years, with half the Senate elected every three years. This provides a staggered approach that ensures that at least a proportion of the upper Chamber is elected less recently than the lower Chamber. It means that membership is less affected by changes in the political mood. Implementing a term limit can also prove an effective way to ensure that Members of this Chamber do not exceed a certain number, and that representatives better reflect the voices of the public. I would be grateful if the Minister could share with us some of her thinking about term limits. Does she see this as a possible reform that His Majesty’s Government would consider as part of this Bill or as a short new Bill? What is His Majesty’s Government’s view on life appointments?

My Lords, in view of the hour, I shall attempt to be brief, but I would like to speak in support of the thrust of the amendments proposed in this group. I do so in the context of the Government’s wider manifesto commitments. I do not want to trespass upon or pre-empt discussion of the next group of amendments, which cover retirement on account of age. But if the Government’s objectives are to reduce the size of this House and continually to refresh the skills and experience of Members, retirement based on term rather than age is a viable and, I argue, preferable alternative. Given that the manifesto commitment to a retirement age is missing from this Bill and that, within a year of this commitment being formally made, new Peers above the proposed mandatory retirement age have already been appointed, one might objectively conclude that the Government may be reconsidering the method by which retirement can best be achieved. Why do I favour the principle of term limits? Discrimination on the basis of age is illegal in many walks of life, including in the workplace. In the corporate world with which I am most familiar, law and best practice have moved away from age and towards terms. As far back as 2007, the Companies Act requirement setting the age limit for directors of public companies at 70 was repealed. This has effectively been replaced by the Corporate Governance Code, which stipulates that non-executive directors should be appointed for terms subject to re-election. This principle is generally considered to have served stakeholders well, and it is extremely rare that any company would seek to contravene it. So what should that term be? These amendments span a range of 10 to 30 years, with the upper limit being achieved only by a series of five-year reappointments. Again, I take as my starting point the Corporate Governance Code. It provides that any term for a non-executive director beyond six years should be subject to particularly rigorous review and should take into account the need for progressive refreshing of the board. In practice, all other things being equal, directors would be asked to serve at least six years and most up to nine years. That naturally leads me towards the lower end of the ranges proposed. I believe that there is merit in Members serving for at least two full parliamentary terms, 10 years, and that the flexibility of allowing a five-year extension is sensible. Beyond that, it may be that the balance of, on the one hand, continually refreshing the skills and experience of Members of the House and, on the other, retaining the wisdom and contribution of existing Members starts to become too skewed away from the former. Most unhelpfully, my views do not conform precisely with any one of the amendments, but they are best aligned in principle and in detail with Amendment 13 in the name of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, as amended by my noble friend Lord Hailsham in Amendment 15. However, I strongly believe that, given the significance of such a change, it must be right for transitional arrangements to be put in place for existing Peers. Amendment 66 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, distinguishes in this regard between existing peerages and peerages yet to be created, a proposal that has much merit.

19:45:00

My Lords, I support the principle behind terms, but I cannot support and would not vote for any of these amendments. The idea behind terms is a great one because it limits our contributions to while we are fresh. I do not agree with prejudice as expressed by age, which I think is irrelevant and hard to justify. Even murderers do not get life any longer, so I think “life” is an inappropriate term. Finally, as with many of the speeches on the amendments we have heard today, this is not the time nor the Bill to be debating these issues. They need to be referred to and considered in the round, but that is for another day. There are many issues about our constitution that deserve attention. Should we have an established Church? In what relation is the Supreme Court held to Parliament? Many things have yet to be remedied, but not in this Bill. For that reason, I would not vote for these amendments. These are worthy issues that should be debated in another place when we have the time, but not in the time we are taking to debate this Bill.

My Lords, this and the next three groups are about related issues, and we cannot avoid moving from one on to the other. They are about limiting the conditions under which one becomes a Member of this House. When I was appointed to this House 29 years ago, the majority of Members clearly saw this as a part-time job. It was explained to me that it was a part-time job. I managed to go on being a full-time professor at the LSE for another nine years. Now we have a more professional House. We are expected to commit ourselves to working hard while we are here. Life expectancy has risen and more of us have some expectation of living well into our 90s. I am told that my life expectancy, given my parents and my elder sisters, is around 98, so I can perhaps look for many years to come. Clearly, we need to take this on board and the Government need to give us some indication of how they are going to moderate the lifetime rights to sit in this House. As we have become a professional second Chamber, do we think that retirement, life terms, participation or attendance is the most useful way to do it? I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that term limits are the easiest way. The 2012 Bill proposed for the elected Members a single term of 15 years, elected in thirds, and a 15-year term for those who were appointed. That, at the time, commanded widespread support. I suggest that the Government look back to this; we have been around this circuit before. I will also say briefly that we have to remember the context in which we are discussing this. Popular disillusionment with politics in Britain is high; respect for both the Commons and the Lords is low. We have, outside Britain, much that we dislike in populist politics, anti-democratic tendencies, the belief that strong men make politics easier, and we see the problems of systems where checks and balances built into their constitutions are being ignored. We cannot entirely ignore that, as limited outside opinion looks at the way that we as a second Chamber behave. If the Government are going to push this limited Bill through, they must also respond to that for the longer term. The sort of second Chamber to which we might slowly shuffle is one in which term limits are perhaps one of the ways in which one limits the life cycle of Members.

I support this group of amendments and other groups that follow with regards to Lords reform. I take this opportunity to say again that, as an hereditary Peer, I am not opposed to Clause 1, but having the opportunity to be elected to the House of Lords is not an appropriate way of selecting people to sit in the House in the 21st century, for many reasons. This is a simple Bill with one purpose: to remove the right for hereditary Peers to continue to sit, contribute and vote. It is a great privilege to be a Member of this House, and I am fortunate enough to have experienced it for a short time. The Bill achieves some reform of an outdated process, possibly the easiest one, as it is a simple one. If this Bill is so simple, why have so many amendments been put down? That concerns me and others such as the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries. The fear is that there will be no further reform for many years after the Bill has received Royal Assent and the hereditary Peers have left. The noble Baroness the Lord Privy Seal has said on many occasions that further House of Lords reform is under consultation. Sadly, the track record of the House in making decisions on legislative reforms is not a good one, as proven by Bills from the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and many others, and the implementation of the recommendations of the noble Lord, Lord Burns, and his committee. This group of amendments makes suggestions for reform, one of which concerns the length of term a Peer can serve in the House. Having been in the House for only just over a year, I would say that the ways of the House are quite challenging at times, especially if you are not used to the way that government works. A bit of time is needed to understand the way that the House works, to gain experience and to be best able to contribute. I feel strongly that, in the majority of cases, a term of 15 or 20 years is appropriate for Peers to serve in the House. As Peers have many skills and experiences that they can bring during their term, they can contribute to the workings of the House. When they come to the end of a term, there are many outside this Chamber, as some Peers have already commented, who have similar skills and different experience to bring to the House: the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, stated this clearly on the previous group. Another feature of the 21st century is that there are not very many jobs for life with no formal review process, appraisal or performance review. That privilege and the privilege of the role can be maintained with just half a day’s work every year. I agree that a consultation on this matter is appropriate, and I agree with the amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso. That has great promise, and I agree that it should apply only to Peers who enter the House at this stage. I note what the noble Baroness the Leader of the House said regarding the consultation process that is ongoing. Can I ask when she might bring reform to the House on one or two of the areas that we are about to discuss in the next few minutes?

My Lords, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord de Clifford, that we are extremely unlikely to see any further opportunity of Lords reform in the lifetime of this Government. It would be the first Government that had ever managed to achieve that in my 35 years in this House, and I do not see why the rules should have changed again, so it is really important that we get the discussion done now and move things forward a bit. I like the amendment in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, very much. It has the virtue of creating a big change at the end of a Parliament, just when you need a big change so that you can alter the balance of the House a bit and bring in Ministers. In my experience of this place, I think that 20 years is the right time; 15 years feels too short. It takes a good long while to embed yourself, and then one does have a decent, useful life after that, so 20 years feels better to me. I agree with the noble Viscount that we should go for a proper way of remunerating Members of this House. The sooner that pensionable, taxable remuneration comes in, the better. There is no excuse for the current system. I can comfort the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes: if she ever feels powerful in this place, she will be immensely lucky. We are like waves breaking on the rocks of the seashore. Most of the time, we just bounce off. Occasionally, we manage to shift a grain of sand, and very occasionally, somehow, we all come together and shuffle a rock down the slope and into the deep, as with the unlamented Schools Bill in the last Parliament, or as my noble friend Lady Owen has achieved with her ambitions in this Parliament.

My Lords, the problem with any debate on House of Lords reform is that it very quickly descends into self-interest. As a relatively youthful Member of your Lordships’ House, who is already more than one-third of his way through what would be a 15-year term, it may not surprise your Lordships to hear that I am not especially attracted to this idea. By contrast, I am sure that some octogenarian colleagues on the Government Benches, some but not all of whom are in their places today, are perhaps keener on this potential reform than they would be about implementing that part of the Government’s manifesto which relates to a retirement age, but I think that it has been worthy of separate consideration. When my noble friend Lord Remnant was speaking, I was struck by the fact that age is of course a protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010, which the last Labour Government brought in, whereas length of tenure is a question of good governance. My noble friend spoke from his own experience in the private sector in making his points. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Garden of Frognal, that I have asked for one of my later amendments to be grouped with the others in the next group, so I am keen to make good progress. I note that both the Minister responding and I are in what I suppose would be called in the terms of the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, our primary working years—I am glad to see her in her place responding. I was struck by the question of the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, “What then?” not so much from the employment rights angle, although noble Lords have raised some pertinent points about the way that active Members of your Lordships’ House are remunerated, but more from the point that, if we were to be ushered out at the end of a term, those of us who have come in at a younger age would be thinking about what comes next in terms of our careers. In government, we have put in place a sensible mechanism, through the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, to make sure that Ministers are not abusing their position to line up their next gig. I would worry slightly that, if we were to have limited terms here, people who were looking to serve in your Lordships’ House and then leave and do something next, in the next chapter of their career, would be thinking about “What next?” and lining up some lucrative opportunities, whether in financial or political ways. My noble friend Lord Attlee rightly drew attention to the fact that we have less interest in media coverage or the clips that we might put on social media. I often say, when talking to friends outside the House about our work here, that we do not, unlike another place, play to the Gallery. That is mostly because there are very few people in the Gallery watching debates in your Lordships’ House, but I think that a lot of us are dispassionate, by virtue of the fact that we have taken an oath, as the noble Lord, Lord Desai, reminded us, to sit here and give our dispassionate views for the rest of our service here, and that is something that is worth holding on to. I am grateful to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, for bringing this amendment before us for consideration and for highlighting its origins in the royal commission chaired by my noble friend Lord Wakeham under the last Labour Government.

20:00:00

I think it is worth thinking in this debate, and in all those that follow, about whom we might lose under the proposal for slimming down the House. If we remove those who will have served 15 years or more by the end of this Parliament in July 2029, to assume a five-year term, we would lose 129 Labour Peers, 121 Conservative Peers and 120 Cross-Bench Peers—interestingly, a broadly comparable figure on those three Benches—along with 59 Liberal Democrat Peers and 23 non-affiliated Peers. We would also lose the Leader and Deputy Leader of your Lordships’ House, perhaps before they have even been able to move on to the second and third stages of reforms of your Lordships’ House that they set out in their manifesto. I am sure we would all be disappointed not to see them finish that job by the end of this Parliament.

We are a House of experience; we try to take the long view to give successive Governments the benefit of our collective experience and to warn them against repeating mistakes that have been made in the past. I have seen this in my relatively short time in your Lordships’ House; when I took the Online Safety Act through, I was glad to hear from the noble Lord, Lord McNally, who came here in 1995 and is a veteran of 30 years’ standing in this House. He spoke powerfully during the passage of what became that Act from his point of view of taking through the Communications Act 2003, and he had some very useful points of comparison. I benefited from listening to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara—whose 15 years would be coming up around now—who sat on the Joint Committee that debated that Bill and was extremely good in that committee. I enjoyed working with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, who at 13 years in your Lordships’ House is only just getting started.

Many of the objections we see based on tenure are the same that I am sure will be made when we debate the separate issue of an age limit. When the noble Lord, Lord Dubs—who has been here for 31 years—speaks about child refugees, we are all humbled to remember that he came to this country as a child himself on the Kindertransport. When the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, who has been here for 34 years, speaks on defence matters, he does so not just as a former marshal of the Royal Air Force of 40 years’ distinguished service in uniform, but as someone who is almost as old as the RAF itself—there are only 11 years in it. The noble Lord, Lord Desai, recalled my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, from whom we got 43 years of very distinguished and much-respected service in your Lordships’ House.

I am mindful that some of the most powerful speeches that have been uttered in this Chamber are those that have been grounded in the wisdom of long experience. They have come not just from people who are relics of a past age and who are stuck in their ways, but often those who surprise us—and sometimes themselves—by admitting they have changed their minds: those whose broad canvases pull us up by pointing out how much has changed in the world around us. Harold Macmillan was just beginning his service in your Lordships’ House when he used his maiden speech, as the first Earl of Stockton, to defend the miners then striking against the Thatcher Government. He was speaking with the benefit of a political career which had begun 60 years earlier as a Member of Parliament for Stockton-on-Tees. He represented that fine north-east town during the General Strike, he fought in the trenches alongside miners and other working men in the Great War, and that is why he knew that the striking miners were the best men in the world: they beat the Kaiser’s army, they beat Hitler’s army, they never gave in.

We should be seeking to encourage, not discourage, such a tradition of long public service and speaking candidly from the benefit of that experience. I think speeches such as those from the noble Earl, Lord Stockton, are worth waiting for, even if the price is listening to one or two others from those who may have gone slightly off the boil. That is why, despite many excellent speeches from noble Lords of varying vintages, I have not been convinced of the case made for these amendments.

I found myself struck by the comment from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that we could do with a few more professors and a few fewer professional politicians. The trend he has identified of us becoming more a House of professional politicians is one that we have not taken consciously, but he is right to point out that we are sleepwalking into it. I am, however, pleased to say that we are not currently a House of professional politicians and I hope we do not become one. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s view on these amendments.

My Lords, it has been an interesting debate to listen to. I was brought up properly and told that you are never to discuss a woman’s age, but, in the context of the debate today, it does feel slightly relevant given my own, and that of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson. I believe we are currently in the prime of our economic earning, in the phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. The current average service of your Lordships’ House is 13.74 years, and the average age on appointment in the last Parliament was 56. I will be 57 if we get to 15 years of service, so I would be leaving very quickly and would still be a very young member of your Lordships’ House. With regard to the substance of the debate today, these amendments concern the imposition of term limits, as we have discussed. It may be useful to summarise what the themes of the amendments in this group have been, not least because they demonstrate that there is not yet a consensus on next steps. Amendment 13, tabled by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, provides for a 15-year term limit for life Peers. His proposal includes the possibility of applying to HOLAC for reappointment while providing that no Member can sit for more than 30 years in total. The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, has sought to further amend this by proposing that Members can apply for reappointment only during the Parliament in which this Bill passes and not beyond. His amendments also seek to limit the length of reappointment to five years, therefore reducing the original total limit proposed by the noble and right reverend Lord from 30 to 20 years. Amendment 66, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso—in an excellent speech—goes for a term limit of 20 years, but also for life peerages granted after the end of this year. Amendment 73, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, would require the Secretary of State to lay before Parliament a draft Bill with proposals for a term limit of up to 10 years. The underlying intent of the majority of these amendments is to reduce the size of your Lordships’ House—an aspiration the Government share. Some noble Lords, including the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, made clear that they were motivated by the principle that no one should automatically be a Member of this place for life. Both he and I have experienced that at the other end, so making it happen here seems appropriate. The smattering of amendments in this group demonstrate a range of different ways that term limits could be introduced. It is clear there is not a settled view among your Lordships on the arrangements of introducing a term limit. More importantly, however, the Bill before this House today is not the legislative vehicle for implementing these issues. The Bill is focused solely on removing the right of hereditary Peers to sit and vote in this House. These amendments, while both thoughtful and considered, are not the central issue of this Bill. Furthermore, the Government’s view is that the introduction of retirement age, as promised in our manifesto, is a more effective way of reducing our numbers, rather than the introduction of a term limit. As your Lordships are aware, my noble friend the Leader of the House has been having an ongoing dialogue with the House on how the manifesto commitment of introducing a retirement age can best be implemented. The Leader has already had in excess of 60 meetings and she is keen for that dialogue to continue. With respect, these amendments would cut across those conversations. With this in mind, I respectfully ask noble Lords not to press their amendments.

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment standing in my name.

Amendment 14 (to Amendment 13) withdrawn.

Amendment 15 (to Amendment 13) not moved.

I thank everyone who has supported this amendment. Despite the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, to it in principle, there is quite a lot of support for it in the Committee, with different age limits proposed, from five years to 20 years. All I would say in favour of the 15-year limit is that it was proposed by the royal commission and in the report of the noble Lord, Lord Burns. The noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, referred to the huge loss of numbers from the House, but that ignores the second part of my amendment, which allows people to apply for another five, 10 or 15 years. One imagines there would be a great deal of sympathy in HOLAC if people wanted to stay on when their 15 years were up. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 13 withdrawn.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.50 pm.