Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Committee (2nd Day) (Continued)

20:20:00

Amendment 59

Moved by

59: Clause 16, page 10, line 18, after “care” insert “, humanitarian support” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is intended to probe whether provision of humanitarian support constitutes a “reasonable excuse” as a defence to the offence in this clause.

In moving this amendment, I will speak also to Amendment 60. This clause, again, is about collecting information and reasonable excuses. Clause 16(8) provides a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses. Our amendment is probing. We would like to see as many good reasons as are likely—I emphasise good reasons—in the legislation, rather than on each occasion being assessed by, in the first instance, someone fairly junior. In Clause 16(8), there is provision for an action or possession being for the purpose of “providing, or preparing for the provision of, medical care or emergency shelter or supplies”. Our amendment would insert “humanitarian support”. It seems that there is no difference between us as to the importance of promoting human welfare, so referring to it in the Bill follows from that. I have been prompted having heard of so many refugees—I do not know whether this is a good example of a humanitarian matter or not—being keen to progress their education, or to work in a profession or another activity for which they have qualifications, but not when they get here being able to prove what qualifications they have. Bringing a document showing those qualifications would not be for the purposes of a “relevant journey”, but it is not irrelevant either to an asylum seeker for his or her future life. As I say, this is a probing amendment. Amendment 60 concerns a matter raised by the organisation Justice and would except from the offences a person carrying out a legal activity, as defined—in other words, providing legal services. Perhaps I should declare—there have been a lot of declarations this afternoon and evening—that I was a solicitor, but that feels like a million years ago, so it is not personal. Everyone involved in the Bill will be aware of the shortage of good lawyers working in this field and available to undertake work on a legal aid basis or through a charity. The Bill is drafted widely, so it does not necessarily preclude the defence that it is for legal services, but I do not think that would be a huge encouragement to lawyers who might be worried about exposing themselves to a charge. Lawyers, as a breed, are not always popular and are not always, in this field, trusted by the Government of the day, because the work almost inevitably means challenging the Government. If we are not further to risk access to justice, which is already an issue, we should not add further deterrents to legal practice in the asylum and refugee field. So the amendment proposes a specific exemption from prosecution.

My Lords, there are only two amendments in this group, both of which are from my colleague and noble friend Lady Hamwee. They both probe whether providing humanitarian support and legal services is a reasonable excuse in the offence in Clause 16: “Collecting information for use in immigration crime”. While we welcome the inclusion of the defence of “reasonable excuse” in Clause 16 and the inclusion of those examples already contained in the Bill, we consider there to be a notable and concerning omission, namely an exception for those providing legitimate legal advice and preparing legitimate legal claims. Given that I have just received an email from those representing lawyers stating that the Ministry of Justice has increased the amount of pay that it is giving for immigration lawyers—it is not sufficient, I am told by the lawyers’ association, but there is nothing surprising about that—it would be very strange indeed if they were to be subject to any danger from providing that legitimate advice. Because those who represent asylum seekers in the UK provide legal advice about their rights and publicise their work, they should be confident that they will not be caught by one of the offences, given the wide drafting of the Bill. Although the Bill does not necessarily preclude a defence for such individuals, in our view, they should be specifically exempt from prosecution, otherwise those providing legal services to vulnerable individuals will be left in an uncertain position, which, in turn, will create an unjustified risk to access to justice and the rule of law.

My Lords, I am afraid that I will again speak against the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I recognise that both these amendments are probing amendments, but I suggest they are unnecessary. Clause 16 already provides a robust and comprehensive defence of reasonable excuse for those charged with the offence and collecting information for use in immigration crime. Subsection 8(b)(v) explicitly references those preparing to provide medical care or emergency shelter or supplies. In plain terms, that is humanitarian assistance. Indeed, subsection 8(c) goes further by protecting those acting on behalf of bona fide organisations assisting asylum seekers. So it is our view that humanitarian activity is not only covered but it is expressly protected in the text. Therefore, to insert an additional, open-ended reference to humanitarian support simply risks introducing ambiguity to a legal provision, which already strikes a careful balance between protecting genuine humanitarian actors while still enabling the prosecution of those who aid illegal immigration. It is vital that the law is clear and enforceable and it is our view that the clause already offers wide and meaningful protection to doctors, volunteers, NGOs and others engaged in humanitarian work. On Amendment 60, again in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I completely understand the desire to ensure that legal professionals are not inadvertently caught up in Clause 16, but I disagree with the amendment as it stands. It seeks to add a new limb to the reasonable excuse defence, namely that a person was carrying out a legal activity as defined by the Legal Services Act. It is arguable that that protection already exists in the clause as drafted; it is a flexible and general defence in terms of reasonable excuse, and subsection (8) sets out several examples of what that defence might include: journalism, academic research, rescue efforts et cetera, but crucially also those acting on behalf of legitimate asylum support organisations. I respectfully say that this is a deliberately broad and protective provision. It gives courts ample discretion to protect those acting lawfully, including legal professionals who are working to assist asylum seekers. As I said, I understand that these are probing amendments, so I am sure it would be of benefit to the whole Committee to hear the Minister’s response, although, as it stands, our perspective on this matter is that the clause as drafted provides adequate protections for those acting in good faith.

20:30:00

My Lords, I am tempted to just say “I agree”, but it is important that we put some points on the record. I thank the noble Baroness for her amendments. Amendment 59 seeks to include an explicit carve-out in the clause to list humanitarian support as a reasonable excuse. The list of reasonable excuses is already quite wide and includes specific exemptions for those undertaking or preparing to undertake the rescue of individuals from danger or serious harm, as well as for those acting on behalf of organisations that provide assistance to asylum seekers and do not charge for their services. I put to the noble Baroness that the list of reasonable excuses in this clause is non-exhaustive, and the provisions ensure that legitimate humanitarian activity is not captured by the offence. I hope that with that assurance, she will withdraw Amendment 59 accordingly. Amendment 60, again to Clause 16, also provides a list of very reasonable excuses where a person acts for a purpose that is reasonable in the circumstances. That list is non-exhaustive and the wording is intentionally broad to allow courts to assess on the facts of each case whether an individual’s conduct falls within the scope of legitimate activity, including carrying out legal work. In practice, as previously mentioned, law enforcement agencies exercise investigatory discretion when assessing the circumstances of any case, and the prosecution will apply the public interest test when considering charges. That means that individuals acting within the scope of their legal role will not be targeted for prosecution. I hope that gives the noble Baroness some reassurance on the points that she has raised in the amendment. The clause as drafted provides robust protection for those acting lawfully while allowing law enforcement to focus its efforts—as I have said in every discussion we have had to date—on the groups facilitating illegal and dangerous crossings. I hope that is a reassurance to the noble Baroness and she will not press the amendment, but essentially these are areas where we think there is clarity. Therefore, I hope she will reflect on those points and withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, of course I recognise that the lists are not exhaustive. It seemed to me to be fairly helpful to use the term “humanitarian”—but there we are. I am puzzled by the opposition to the reference to lawyers acting in the field. I wonder whether anybody in this Chamber who provides professional services would like to be dependent on discretion, on the public interest test, particularly when the specific provision in subsection (8)(c)(ii) is that the organisation “does not charge for its services”. The legal aid lawyers and others acting for asylum seekers and refugees do not get paid very much, and sometimes they are employed by charities that do not get paid directly for their services, although they raise funds to enable them to carry out those services. This is not special pleading on the part of the legal profession. It is pleading on behalf of the recipients of legal services, in fact, because of the widespread concern that the relevant legal services are not easily accessed. There are far too many legal aid deserts and far too few people who are in a position to provide advice and representation in this field. I had better not say—I suppose I am about to—that it strikes me a little that “not invented here” is the response to this. That will not win me any friends, but I do not see a damage or a harm that would be caused by including an amendment on the lines of the second in this group. I am clearly not going to pursue the matter tonight, but it is a concern if this is not accepted and if individuals are told they should just be dependent on discretion and the CPS’s good sense. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 59 withdrawn.

Amendments 60 to 62 not moved.

Clause 16 agreed.

Clause 17 agreed.

Clause 18: Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom

Amendment 63

Moved by

63: Clause 18, page 11, line 23, leave out “France, Belgium or the Netherlands” and insert “any other country”

My Lords, Amendment 63 seeks to future-proof the offence in Clause 18 of endangering another during a sea crossing. As currently drafted, the clause risks failing in its central purpose: to deter and prosecute those whose actions endanger lives at sea, regardless of where they are travelling from. Perhaps we should remind ourselves of what Clause 18 is intended to do. It is designed to create an offence for conduct that places others at serious risk of harm during unauthorised maritime crossings to the United Kingdom. That is a vital and necessary objective, especially given the number of people who choose to make this crossing—the number has breached 20,000 this year so far, a record high—and the very real risks of injury and loss of life for those involved. However, as it stands, Clause 18 applies only to those travelling from France, Belgium or the Netherlands. I understand completely that those three countries are where the small boats are currently leaving from, but it is not necessarily true that this will always be the case. While this territorial limitation is not entirely arbitrary, it is illogical—it is predicated on a snapshot of today’s dominant routes, but we know all too well that the modus operandi of smuggling gangs is constantly evolving. Routes shift; departure points change. Those intent on profiting from human desperation will exploit any gap in enforcement or jurisdiction that we leave behind. What happens when a boat departs from Denmark, Germany or further afield? What if a criminal network re-routes its operations through new maritime channels not explicitly listed in the Bill? Are we to say that the same dangerous conduct, the same reckless disregard for life, somehow falls outside the scope of the offence? That is not a credible position, and neither is it a safe one. This amendment would ensure that the law is not constrained by geography. It would ensure that we legislate for principle, not convenience; that we criminalise the act of endangerment itself, wherever it occurs, not merely based on where the journey begins. Our Amendment 64 in this group speaks to another critical shortcoming. The Bill as drafted appears to require a discrete, identifiable act that causes or risks serious harm, but in the case of these maritime crossings, the danger is not always the result of a single act. It is inherent in the crossing itself. It lies in the overcrowding, the use of flimsy dinghies and the absence of life jackets, navigation tools or any basic safety standard. The act of stepping aboard such a vessel with others, knowing that it is patently unsafe, is itself the creation of danger and the act which places lives at risk. This very principle was, at the end of last week, endorsed by the Home Secretary, when she said that: “Everybody who is arriving on a boat where a child’s life has been lost, frankly, should be facing prosecution … If you get on to a boat which is so crowded that a child is crushed to death in the middle of that boat … you should face some responsibility and accountability for that”. We wholeheartedly agree, and our amendment seeks to incorporate this principle of collective responsibility into the Bill. Our amendment differs from the principle set out by the Home Secretary in one important way. It recognises this risk pre-emptively. It does not require tragedy to occur before the law is broken. If we are serious about saving lives, we cannot wait for them to be lost before we act. We need to intervene to ensure that actions taken to endanger life are themselves illegal. The Government already recognise that the act of getting into a boat is dangerous and that everyone who gets into that boat is thereby creating a risk for other people. We therefore hope that they will agree that this principle should be applied proactively to save life, not just reactively once it has already been lost, and adopt this amendment to the Bill. The amendment is about targeting those who act with recklessness or self-interest in ways that expose others to mortal peril. We all recognise that the act of getting into a boat is creating that risk. This is our opportunity to combat those who, regardless, choose to do so. The House has a duty not only to scrutinise the law but to ensure that it aligns with lived realities. Our amendments would make it clearer, more enforceable and more consistent with the Government’s stated goals. On the other amendments in the group, Amendment 65, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would insert a requirement that for an offence to be committed under Clause 18, the individual must have acted “intentionally or recklessly”. The stated aim is to ensure that the offence targets people smugglers rather than those seeking asylum. However, this entirely misunderstands the purpose of the clause and the reality of these dangerous sea crossings. The threshold for this offence is already clear. It requires that a person commits an act that causes or creates a risk of death or serious injury during an illegal maritime journey. As we have rightly recognised in our own amendment, the very act of boarding a dangerously overcrowded and ill-equipped vessel to cross the channel is reckless. It is done not in ignorance but knowingly, with an awareness of the risks not just to oneself but to others on board. This therefore automatically meets the “intentionally or recklessly” threshold that the noble Baroness talks about. To insert this new mental element, “intentionally or recklessly”, is not a clarification but an unnecessary restriction. It risks introducing a legal loophole that could allow individuals to escape prosecution, even where their actions had demonstrably endangered lives. We must not forget that the endangerment to life is a collective responsibility. The people whom we are talking about have knowingly made the decision to endanger themselves and, crucially, others. This offence is not designed to criminalise those merely seeking safety; it is designed to ensure that anyone, whether a smuggler, pilot or fellow traveller, who engages in conduct that places lives in jeopardy can be held accountable. We cannot allow the law to be softened to the point where it fails to deter the reckless behaviour that is putting people, including children, at risk. This is not an academic concern. People have died making this crossing. People will continue to die making it unless we take robust action now which recognises the danger that this collective action creates. Amendment 66, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, addresses a similar point and falls to the same problem in assuming that endangerment to life is an act that can be limited to a small number of people who are likely not on the boat at all. We must ensure that we prosecute people for the actions that they take, the risks that they run and the danger that they pose to others. Whether this is done for personal or financial gain is an unnecessary additional clarification which misses the point that the people whom we are talking about have endangered lives and well-being simply by choosing to get into the boat in the first place. Finally, Amendment 67, in the name of my noble friend Lady May, serves as an important reminder in this debate that we need to consider the plight of those acting under duress of slavery, but I have to say to her that we have the same concerns about this amendment as those which I raised earlier. I am conscious of what my noble friend Lord Cameron said on an earlier amendment, which is that it risked creating a loophole which could be exploited by bad actors looking for a way to get out of being held to account for the crimes they will be committing. That said, I welcome the amendment from my noble friend, again on the grounds that it raises important issues which I hope the Minister will fully address in his response. I beg to move.

20:45:00

My Lords, I remind your Lordships of my chairmanship of the Global Commission on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking. I want to address Amendment 67, which my noble friend Lord Davies has just referred to. I tabled this with a very specific issue in mind—I hope the Minister will be able to address it in his closing remarks—which is those circumstances where somebody who is in slavery is put on to a boat but is forced as part of their slavery to take charge of a child and therefore is potentially endangering that child, but they are doing so because their slave driver has required them to do it. It is a very specific point, and I hope that the Minister can address it. The Minister will recognise that there is a theme in all the amendments I have tabled, which is recognising that there are circumstances in which people are forced to take these actions as a result of their being in slavery, as opposed to it being a decision that they have taken for their own economic reasons. There is a small group of people to whom this might refer, so this is a probing amendment to see where the Government might stand on the issue and how they will want to address this very specific case of somebody who is forced by their traffickers or slave drivers to look after somebody else on a boat.

My Lords, I speak to the amendment in my name and that in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We have probably exhausted the use of recklessness—we have had it, virtually, in every other group—but, in essence, I also have a very specific issue to raise in respect of the amendment in my name, which, again, is about ensuring that the right people are criminalised. It is about those who are coerced into steering the dinghies which have been made available. Paragraph 57 of the JCHR report refers to research by the associate director of border criminology at Oxford University, who said that “the most common reasons for driving the dinghy were being under duress from smugglers in Northern France; needing a discount on the crossing; or having previous experience driving boats, either from previous employment or irregular journeys”. There are differences between those groups, and it is the group of people who are under duress that are of interest in this amendment. First, I want to be clear that the actions of criminals who run the boats in northern France are appalling. They have total disregard for human life. They are not a benevolent facilitator of asylum seekers but criminals who see this trade as a source of great profit. I was able to see a number of those dinghies in the last two weeks, and I heard from the French authorities about some of the actions and tactics that the smugglers adopted towards migrants to evade law enforcement and maximise profit by cramming as many people as they can on to those flimsy boats. I want to explain something to people who often ask me, “Why don’t you just cut and slash the boat?” There was an example of that last week when the French authorities went into the water but slashed only one cylinder. The reason for that is that those boats have no solid base inside between the floating parts. If you slash them, the boat folds in half and drowns all the people already in the middle of the boat. Therefore, the French authorities are most concerned about taking that sort of action and are much more concerned about going for the motors, which is what I hope they will be doing in the coming weeks. It is right that those forcing people on to these boats should face the full force of the law. Having seen the flimsiness of them, I am absolutely convinced that it is all about making huge amounts of money. The problem is that this offence is drawn more widely than the Government have set out as their intention. If we are looking solely at people who are coerced or compelled to steer the boat under duress from the smugglers, that is not very much different from the coercion of victims of trafficking, as highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady May, in this and previous amendments. As the clause is currently drafted, it is not focused sufficiently on those who the Government wish to target and would also catch those asylum seekers who are victims of coercion. I am told that you can identify the people who have been steering these boats: the heat from the very cheap engines means that people get burns on their hands as a result of doing it. I know that the British and the French authorities can easily identify who has been steering a boat; the difficulty is whether that person has been coerced into it. That is why this amendment is in place—simply to give an opportunity to understand what the Government would do in those circumstances. I appreciate that, in Committee in the House of Commons, the Minister stated that: “In practice, the focus will be intelligence-led and targeted at those who law enforcement believe to be working in connection with organised criminal networks”.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/3/25; col. 128.] It was also stated that “the CPS will exercise … discretion, and the courts will be able to consider all the circumstances when deciding the appropriate sentence”. While prosecutorial discretion is an important safeguard, maybe it is not a substitute for clarity within the Bill itself. On that very specific matter, I ask the Minister to give his consideration. I must also say, in respect of the earlier amendments that we have just heard, that it seems to me that the Conservative Party wants to treat everyone in the boat as a criminal. If that is the case, does the Minister agrees or disagree with that? If he agrees, what is the consequence of treating asylum seekers as criminals when they arrive in our country?

I am grateful to noble Lords for tabling these amendments. I think there is a common aim in the Committee to ensure that we take action to prevent illegal migration, dangerous crossings and fatalities at sea. While we may have different views on some of the issues, this is a common aim that we all share. The endangerment offence, which we will talk about now, is a tangible measure to address dangerous acts during crossings and introduces consequences for such behaviour that risks or causes serious injury or death. A number of amendments have been brought forward by noble Lords. I start, if I may, with Amendments 63 and 64, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron of Lochiel. Amendment 64 seeks to apply the offence to any individual who enters the UK illegally using a vessel that they could not reasonably have thought was safe for the purposes of reaching the UK, and Amendment 63 seeks to remove reference to specific countries. I understand the intention of Amendment 63. The named countries in Clause 18 are appropriate to capture the focus on channel crossings, which is the Government’s main focus with this legislation, and provide clarity on which body of water is the focus. The reason we have looked at the particular three countries named in the Bill is that that is where the majority of the focus is today. I understand the points that the noble Lord has mentioned, but this has been done to focus the approach on channel crossings. Amendment 64 would fundamentally alter the focus of Clause 18. Instead of targeting specific acts, this amendment would criminalise any person for boarding an unsafe vessel. The reality is that none of the vessels can reasonably be considered safe, which means the amendment would capture all those making a journey. Is it in the public and taxpayer interest to put every small boat arrival through the criminal justice system? I sense agreement from the noble Lord, Lord German, on that point. The Government do not condone crossings, far from it. Noble Lords have heard during this debate that we are focused on taking action. However, the decision to board these flimsy boats is often made in chaotic circumstances, with the condition of the boat and the passage outside the individual’s control. We saw some of this in pictures at the weekend when the French took action. Setting out what is reasonable in that scenario is almost impossible, and what may be judged safe in one moment may quickly change. The weekend’s events showed that very clearly. Furthermore, adding the requirement of an unsafe vessel does not add to existing offences of illegal entry and arrival. I hope the noble Lord will reflect on that explanation. Amendment 65, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would require that the relevant act was done “intentionally or recklessly”. Amendment 66, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord German, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would require the act to be committed intentionally and/or for financial gain. I recognise the intention behind requiring that the person committed the act intentionally or recklessly. That mirrors the recommendation by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which I will respond to before Report. I thank the committee for its work and will consider its conclusions carefully. However, the amendment as currently proposed would undermine the effectiveness of the offence. Focusing on whether someone commits an act intentionally or recklessly pulls the focus of the offence away from the serious harm or risk of such harm caused to vulnerable people in these situations and, crucially, would make it easier for criminals to evade the offence. Adding a requirement for financial gain would undermine the intended effect. A person does not immediately need to financially gain for it to be appropriate for there to be consequences for dangerous acts that cause or risk serious injury or death of another. The amendment conflates measures in the Bill that tackle the facilitators behind small boat crossings and those, such as the endangerment offence, that are a response to the serious harms posed by individual actions. Those who cause risk or harm should face consequences. The endangerment offence rightly targets the most dangerous forms of behaviour and offers increased sentencing. Existing safeguards are in place. Prosecution services will, as I have said throughout the Bill, consider the particular facts of a case and whether it is in the public interest to prosecute. I hope I can reassure the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord German, that the offence has been designed to be proportionate and effective, and addresses the most dangerous behaviour in order to reduce harm. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady May, for Amendment 67. This may bring her a sense of déjà vu but I am going to say pretty much what I said in the last group of amendments. It is our assessment that Section 45 of the legislation that she facilitated in 2015 is a defence against prosecution where an individual commits the offence as a direct result of, or is compelled to commit an offence as a result of, their exploitation. The example the noble Baroness helpfully gave of a person entering a boat to save a child would be covered by Section 45 of that Act. It includes the catch-all defence of modern slavery for actions deemed to be criminal under this legislation. The national referral mechanism, which I know the noble Baroness is familiar with, is part of that defence, and I hope that those safeguards are in place. On top of that, we have the standard prosecutorial defence mechanism whereby the prosecution—the CPS in this case—would have to make a judgment. The example that the noble Baroness has given would, I think, give pause for thought for that discretion by the CPS. With the general criminal defence of duress, I hope those two issues together will reassure the noble Baroness on that point. The new endangerment offence addresses the current gap in legislation. We have specifically and carefully designed it to address dangerous acts that create further risk in what are already dangerous crossings. I hope that gives some comfort to the noble Lords who tabled the amendments. It is about focus on the channel. It is about making sure that we give proper protections where required and that we have clarity in the law. I hope that they will not move their amendments.

21:00:00

My Lords, I am grateful to those who have spoken. Clause 18 seeks to address a very real threat to life, but none the less confines itself to an arbitrary, narrow set of departure points, as if dangerous crossings were the exclusive preserve of the channel route. This is plainly not the case, and it is naive to legislate as though it were. If we want to future-proof our border laws, they must reflect the realities of irregular migration as they evolve; we must not freeze them in the present moment and base them on the sort of activity we see now, rather than that which could emerge in the future. More than that, the amendments go to the heart of what it means to endanger life at sea. The danger does not begin when a trafficker pushes someone overboard. It begins the moment an individual, whether an organiser or a participant, boards an unseaworthy vessel, knowing it is not fit for the journey and puts lives at risk, often doing so for profit. I want to emphasise the point that we are not seeking to criminalise desperation. We are seeking to hold accountable those who, through their actions, their choices or their complicity endanger the lives of others. I will consider what the Minister has said but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 63 withdrawn.

Amendments 64 to 67 not moved.

Clause 18 agreed.

Clause 19: Meaning of key expressions

Amendment 68

Moved by

68: Clause 19, page 13, line 7, leave out “before or after” and insert “in the case of subsection (3)(b) before or after, or in any other case, after” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment is intended to remove the retrospective element of some, but not all, of the offences.

I also have Amendment 209 in this group. Clause 19 defines “relevant person” for the purposes of search and so on in relation to what these days are simply called “devices”. There are other terms in Clauses 20 to 23. The amendment particularly goes to the point of retrospectivity. The clause provides that a relevant person is someone who has entered or arrived, whether before or after the section comes into force. The amendment would leave in as a subject someone who has entered in breach of a deportation order. It seems to me that there is a rather different flavour to retrospectivity here, because the individual knows what he is doing. Having been on the receiving end of a deportation order, he can hardly ignore that that is going to be relevant. In the other cases, the wording puts it into the future: if the person “requires leave … requires entry clearance … is required … not to travel … without an electronic travel authorisation”. In parentheses, I wondered about the term “entered” compared with “arrived”, which I think might technically be the position, and the Explanatory Notes do not seem to help—but that is by the way. That first amendment would deal in all but one of the cases in this clause with the retrospective element. Amendment 209 would require the affirmative procedure for regulations under Clause 25, extending powers to persons designated by the Secretary of State. This is a point made by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. As we said in our report, the committee has “previously raised concerns about the extension to persons who are not recognised legal officials of powers which might be used to interfere with individual liberty”. The Government say that the requirements would not create any new powers; they would extend the cohort of people who can use the powers, and the Secretary of State can impose such safeguards as she considers appropriate. The Constitution Committee reminds the Committee not only that it has previously raised these concerns but that the safeguards about designation of other people should be set out on the face of the Bill, so that this is not left to the discretion of the Secretary of State. The affirmative procedure is of some assistance in scrutinising—but not really blocking—the provisions. It would, of course, enable parliamentarians to debate and scrutinise in public this power of the Secretary of State to designate whoever it might be. The Bar Council has raised another issue on the provision that the Bill will allow civil servants, if so designated, to access and keep information found on devices. A police constable exercising powers such as these needs authorisation from a superintendent; that is the usual level of authorisation. This Bill will allow junior Home Office civil servants and immigration officials to do so without oversight. The Bar Council has briefed on its concern about the potential for violating the rights of privacy and legal privilege of people who may have entered the UK years ago and are engaged in legal proceedings against the Home Office. So, that is a range of concerns, which I hope would be addressed by my amendment. I beg to move.

My Lords, it would be remiss of me if I did not begin my remarks on this group by mentioning the puzzling inclusion of Clauses 20 to 23 in the Bill, given that these powers already exist in statute. Section 15 of, and Schedule 2 to, the Illegal Migration Act 2023 already grant these exact same powers of search, seizure and access for electronic devices. Rather than retain the provisions that are already law, the Government are repealing those parts of the Illegal Migration Act and then re-enacting them through this Bill; I would submit that that does not really make much sense. In fact, the wording of the sections that the Government are repealing are virtually identical to the clauses in the Bill. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act says: “An immigration officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article, if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”, while Clause 20(1) of the Bill says: “An authorised officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”. The only difference is that the Bill grants the powers to an authorised officer rather than an immigration officer. I understand the purpose of the distinction, as Clause 19 states that under the Bill the powers will be able to be used by police officers as well as immigration officers. I have no issue with that, but why repeal the whole of paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act simply to replace one word? The similarities continue. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act authorises the search of vehicles and containers for electronic devices, and Clause 20(6) of the Bill does exact same thing. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 2 authorises the search of premises for an electronic device, while Clause 20(5) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 authorises the search the person’s property for an electronic device, while Clause 20(4) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 2 authorises the seizure of electronic devices, while Clause 21(1) of the Bill does the exact same thing and has precisely the same wording. I could go on, but I believe it should be blindingly obvious that there is no practical purpose to Clauses 20 to 23; they are simply regurgitated provisions of already existing statute that the Government are performatively repealing. I turn to one of the very few aspects of the powers relating to electronic devices that the Government have actually changed. My Amendment 69 is intended to probe the Government’s definition of “relevant articles” from which electronic information can be accessed and stored under Clauses 20 to 23. As drafted, the Bill essentially defines that as any electronic item that could contain information relating to an offence under Section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971. Consequently, the powers under Clauses 20 to 23 can currently be used only to garner information relating to the facilitation of unlawful entry or the illegal facilitation of the arrival of asylum seekers. However, those are not the only offences that immigration officers might need to access electronic devices to investigate. For example, what about the information on electronic devices pertaining to offences under Section 24 or Section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971? If the Bill is aimed at tackling illegal immigration and protecting our border security, should it not address that in its totality? Why should immigration officers and police officers not be able to utilise information they have gleaned from the electronic devices of illegal entrants as evidence of the commission of the offences of illegal entry or the use of deception to gain leave to enter or remain? Is the prevention of those offences not crucial to our border security? The previous Government recognised that these powers need to extend to information relating to a wider range of offences, which is why in the Illegal Migration Act we did not limit the definition of electronic devices in such a way. Rather, relevant articles were defined as anything containing information related to “any function of an immigration officer, or … of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality”. That offered a far wider-ranging power to investigate the whole plethora of immigration crimes, all of which would fall under the Government’s definition of border security in Clause 3 of the Bill. The Prime Minister has spoken on many occasions of giving the Border Security Commander counter- terrorism-like powers. I have to say to the Minister that the substance of what is contained in Clauses 19 to 23 is utterly consistent with the tough language that the Government have been throwing around, and if they are indeed serious about matching their rhetoric with their actions then they should accept Amendment 69 and expand the definition of relevant articles in Clause 19.

21:15:00

I look forward to hearing the response of the Minister to the cut-and-paste threat which has been put upon him. I hope that there is a satisfactory answer that will make me smile. If it does not, then maybe there is a point to be made somewhere. I echo the point the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made about Amendment 209. It has been a promise to this House from many reports—from legislation committees and from the Constitution Committee—that, where there is a matter of seriousness and public interest, the affirmative process should be used to bring these matters before the House. The current arrangement is for a police constable, authorised by a superintendent, but there is an openness for Ministers to extend these powers. You might say that it does not matter to whom they give the powers and, if anybody feels really upset about it, they could pray against the Motion, which is a very rare thing in this House and in the House of Commons. What it means is that the Government are not prepared to allow that public scrutiny to ensure that they have got the matter right. It would be a sensible approach to follow the pattern that the Lords committee responsible for these matters has laid before us and to change this from a negative to an affirmative procedure when regulations are brought forward to extend the list of people who will have these powers. I also take note of the interesting comment from my noble friend about who in the Home Office will supervise whom about what access anybody can have. I would like to know a little about the chiefs and the Indians if possible, please.

My Lords, I am grateful for the thoughtful contributions made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord German. Amendments 68, 69 and 209 raise important questions about the scope, application and oversight of the powers in the Bill. I will address the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, around Clauses 20 to 23 being lifted from the Illegal Migration Act. The noble Lord, Lord German, is smiling already; maybe he anticipates a cracking punchline—but there is not one. It is a simple fact that, clearly, one of the chief intentions of this legislation is to replace the Illegal Migration Act. It was deemed easier in drafting terms to do that and then include certain sections that were deemed worthy of keeping in this Bill, rather than simply have to go back and unpick the Illegal Migration Act in different parts of the Bill. It was felt that this was a cleaner way of doing it. I am not sure if that has made the noble Lord, Lord German, smile; it has not particularly raised a laugh with me, but there we go. While I recognise the intentions behind each proposal, I will respectfully set out why the Government do not support them. In each case, the current drafting of the Bill is deliberate and proportionate and designed to ensure operational effectiveness, legal clarity and appropriate safeguards. Amendment 68 seeks to limit Clause 19 by removing what is perceived to be a retrospective effect. I want to be clear that Clause 19(2)(a) does not operate retrospectively in the way suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The powers in the clause come into effect only after the Bill receives Royal Assent. The clause has been carefully drafted to ensure that powers apply regardless of when an individual entered or arrived in the UK before that date. This is not retrospective legislation. Individuals who entered the UK without leave did so in breach of immigration laws that were already in place at the time of their entry. The clause does not impose a new penalty for past conduct. Instead, it enables the powers to be used from the moment they come into force, provided that the individual still meets the relevant criteria at that time. This approach ensures that the law can respond effectively to ongoing encounters of individuals who have already arrived illegally in the UK and does not create loopholes that could be exploited by those who may look to take advantage of immigration controls. The amendment, while well intentioned, would narrow the scope of Clause 19(2)(a) and undermine its operational effectiveness. It would create a two-tier system, in effect, treating individuals differently based on the timing of their entry or whether they are subject to a deportation order, and result in missed opportunities to gain valuable information to stop organised immigration crime groups. In summary, the clause as drafted strikes the right balance: it is not retrospective in its legal effect, and it is forward-looking in its application. It ensures that the Government can act decisively to protect the integrity of UK borders and uphold the rule of law. I turn now to Amendment 69, which proposes to broaden the definition of a “relevant article” to include any article containing information on the commission of an offence under any of the immigration Acts, as defined in Section 61(2) of the UK Borders Act 2007. While I understand the desire to ensure comprehensive coverage of immigration offences, I must respectfully oppose this amendment too. The current drafting of Clause 19 is deliberately narrow and targeted. It focuses on offences under Sections 25 and 25A of the Immigration Act 1971, offences that relate specifically to facilitating unlawful immigration and assisting illegal entry. These are the offences most relevant to the operational intent of this clause: to disrupt organised criminal networks and protect the integrity of our borders. Expanding the definition to include all offences under the immigration Acts risks capturing a wide range of minor or administrative breaches, such as overstaying or failing to comply with conditions, which are not the intended focus of this power. Our concern here is that such a broad approach could undermine the proportionality of the measure and expose it to legal challenge. Amendment 209 seeks to amend Clause 60 so that regulations made pursuant to Clause 25 are subject to the affirmative procedure, as pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord German, and recommended by the Lords Constitution Committee. While we fully respect the committee’s role in scrutinising delegated powers, we respectfully disagree with the necessity of this amendment and the affirmative procedure. Clause 25 does not create new powers; rather, it allows for the extension of existing powers to a broader cohort of authorised officers. The use of the negative procedure in this context is appropriate and proportionate. Moreover, Clause 25(3) provides an important safeguard that the Secretary of State is required to include such safeguards as they consider necessary. This ensures that any extension of powers is accompanied by appropriate checks and balances. The negative procedure is appropriate for this type of technical and operational regulation, which ensures agility without unduly compromising oversight. Regulations made under the negative procedure are still laid before Parliament and subject to annulment, providing a clear route for scrutiny while avoiding unnecessary delay in operational matters. Conversely, requiring the affirmative procedure in this case would introduce unnecessary delay and complexity into what is a targeted and operationally focused provision that must be able to respond agilely to any challenges. The negative procedure strikes the right balance between parliamentary oversight and practical implementation. For these reasons, I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

My Lords, seeing the back of the Illegal Migration Act will be a great pleasure. I am with the noble Lord on it being better to have an easy-to-read version of this Bill, including provisions, rather than having to refer back to another piece of legislation. I do not think that is entirely the case throughout the Bill, but there we are. On the retrospectivity amendment, I am not sure that I have followed the argument, since the wording of the clause is “whether before or after this section comes into force”. I thought the Minister was talking about a distinction being made because the clause would need to come into force before it had any effect, but I will have to read what he has to say. The Minister says that Amendment 209 is not necessary, but I think that depends on your point of view. The checks and balances are better scrutinised through the affirmative procedure than through the negative procedure. I have heard what he has to say and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 68 withdrawn.

Amendment 69 not moved.

Amendment 70

Moved by

70: Clause 19, page 13, line 32, at end insert— “(c) a constable of the Police Service of Scotland,(d) a constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, or(e) an NCA officer,”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment expands the definition of “authorised officer” for the purposes of the powers in clauses 20 to 23 to cover constables of the police services of Scotland and Northern Ireland and National Crime Agency officers.

I begin by reaffirming the policy position of the Government for the use of search and seizure powers, which is an approach grounded in the principles of proportionality, accountability and the rule of law. The amendments in my name before the Committee today have an underpinning policy objective, and that is to ensure that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has the necessary powers to search for, seize, retain and use information from electronic devices belonging to irregular entrants or arrivals where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an electronic device is likely to contain information relevant to the offences under Sections 25 and 25A of the Immigration Act 1971. These powers are vital to disrupt organised crime groups. We must ensure that authorised officers are fully equipped to use the powers effectively and we must have safeguards in place against misuse. Government Amendment 70 expands the definition of “authorised officer” to include “a constable of the Police Service of Scotland … Northern Ireland, or … an NCA officer”. This now ensures that constables from devolved police services and the National Crime Agency, who were already authorised, may exercise the full powers available to them under the legislation. The National Crime Agency-focused amendments that follow on from government Amendment 70—Amendments 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 92 and 94—collectively ensure that NCA officers have all the relevant safeguards and protections and legal clarity in using these powers. Government Amendments 75, 79 and 92 require that the NCA officers exercising powers under Clauses 20, 21 and 23 must be authorised by an officer of at least inspector equivalent grade with the requirement to inform a superintendent or equivalent officer, in line with safeguards applied to police constables. Government Amendments 77 and 81 provide protections under paragraphs 21 and 22 of Schedule 5 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013, ensuring that those who obstruct or assault an NCA officer during the exercise of their powers under Clauses 20 and 21 may face criminal prosecution. Government Amendment 80 enables NCA officers to use reasonable force where necessary in the execution of their powers under Clause 21. Government Amendments 82 and 83 provide for the lawful transfer of seized items to an immigration officer or the Secretary of State. I apologise for the number of amendments but I hope that they are all relatively straightforward. Government Amendment 94 provides legal clarity by defining “NCA officer” within Clause 26. These amendments are necessary and proportionate to enable officers to perform their duties effectively. The National Crime Agency, as noble Lords will know, is the central agency in combating serious and organised immigration crime, and previously the Bill sought to include NCA officers by enabling them to use their immigration powers. However, NCA officers are triple warranted, holding the powers of constable, immigration officer and customs officer. Through ongoing engagement with the NCA, it became clear that it would be more operationally effective for the Bill explicitly to enable them to exercise their police powers under this legislation. Government Amendment 70 extends these powers to the devolved police services in Scotland and Northern Ireland, so that we have consistency across the United Kingdom as a whole. Members will know that criminal organisations do not respect administrative boundaries and will operate wherever they can. Due to the inclusion now of devolved police services, government Amendment 89 ensures that appropriate legal procedures are in place for the disposal of relevant articles held by constables of Police Scotland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland. There are several consequential amendments—Amendments 85, 86, 87, 88 and 93—which are minor and technical in nature, but will, I hope, help to ensure the legal coherence of the Bill. In essence, the amendments extend powers to the NCA, police in Scotland and police in Northern Ireland, with appropriate safeguards. I commend them to the Committee.

To be absolutely clear, are there further amendments in this area to Clause 33 concerning trailers, or is that covered in this group? I will give the Minister time to think about that. The Minister sent us a letter on 17 June relating to these amendments. On Scottish and Northern Ireland Ministers, the letter said that an amendment had been tabled to Clause 33(9)—this is why I ask the question—which specifies the persons and bodies to be consulted before making regulations under Clause 33(8), which is about trailer data. It says that: “at present, this amendment is framed in such a way that the Northern Ireland and Scottish Ministers need be consulted only where the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to do so”. In what circumstances would the Secretary of State consider it appropriate so to do? If he wants to answer some time later, that would be fine.

21:30:00

I always hope to be helpful to the noble Lord. I suggest that we consider those matters in some detail when we reach Clause 33. These amendments relate to the additional powers for the National Crime Agency and bringing the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Police Service of Scotland into the remit of the legislation. They have all been done in consultation with the three responsible bodies—the Home Secretary and the two devolved Administrations. I am very happy to examine Clause 33, but I think it would be in order to do so just after Clause 32 and before Clause 34.

My Lords, we appreciate that, as the Government go through the Bill, they will make minor adjustments to the language or corrective amendments to tighten it up, but the amendments in this group incorporate substantial changes that could well have been included in the Bill before. The fact that we are now turning to 17 government amendments, with at least eight substantive ones, speaks to the fact that the Bill could have been more carefully drafted. I will not take too much time dwelling on this issue, but it is important to raise that we on this side have been clear throughout Committee that we need to develop legislation that is robust and unambiguous and that can tackle this serious problem. That the Government are only just realising at this late stage that they have missed out key provisions perhaps does not inspire confidence. Broadly speaking, we support the amendments in this group, in so far as they allow the more effective enforcement of some of the provisions in this Bill, in particular specifying that the NCA will have the capability to seize relevant articles and exercise reasonable force. However, we need to make sure that these powers are exercised with due care and proper procedure and process. I hope the Minister will set out how this will be ensured.

I have just double-checked all the amendments that have been laid, and there is none as was laid out in the letter. I will not ask the Minister to reply to this, but it is a lacuna. The letter says that an amendment has been tabled to Clause 33(9). According to the Marshalled List, it is not there. I do not expect a substantive reply, but I guess that an amendment will be laid, and the letter was slightly inaccurate.

I hope that I have been clear with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, about what these amendments are for. As ever, as Ministers we all know that things are organic and in development. If requests come in, loopholes are found or things need to be tightened up, amendments are part of the parliamentary process, as is reflection on amendments that colleagues table on Report in both Houses from the Opposition and other Benches. It is an organic process. I hope I was clear, and I do not think he objects to the principle behind why they have been tabled. I am grateful for his support. In reply to the noble Lord, I will just say that I do not write inaccurate letters. I try to be open and fair, which is why the letter was issued. We are not yet at Clause 33; I will give him chapter and verse on all the issues that he has raised when we get there, which is the appropriate part in our proceedings to discuss those matters.

Amendment 70 agreed.

Clause 19, as amended, agreed.

Amendment 71 not moved.

Clause 20: Powers of authorised officers to search for relevant articles

Amendment 72

Moved by

72: Clause 20, page 14, line 1, leave out subsection (2) Member’s explanatory statement This amendment would remove the requirement that a person can only be searched if they have not previously been searched.

My Lords, our amendments in this group speak to the important principle that, if we are going to do something serious about this issue, we need to make sure those who will be undertaking that vital work are given all the tools they need. Amendment 72 removes the restriction under Clause 20 that a person may be searched only once. That limitation is both arbitrary and impractical. In the real world, people arriving in the UK illegally may conceal items, documents, electronic devices and false identification, only to reveal or discard them later. Preventing further searches, even when officers have fresh grounds for suspicion, is not a safeguard; it is a gift to traffickers and smugglers. This amendment would correct that mistake and restore operational flexibility where there is lawful cause. Indeed, we need look no further than the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for precedent and recognition of this fact; it permits multiple searches of a person if there are reasonable grounds. This is a commonplace power and we must ensure that it is incorporated in the Bill if we are to effectively tackle this sort of criminality. Furthermore, Amendment 73 removes the requirement that a person must have been on the premises before a search can take place. Criminal organisations are constantly adapting their tactics, using safe houses, transferring items between locations and avoiding detection by not being physically present. By tying an officer’s hands to whether a suspect was on the premises at a precise moment, we risk losing vital evidence and allowing dangerous networks to evade accountability. This change would ensure that we are not outwitted by legal technicalities. Furthermore, Amendment 74 removes unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles that require prior authorisation from an inspector and notification to a superintendent for a constable to conduct a search. Amendment 78 applies this principle to the seizure of relevant articles. Of course, oversight is vital, but we must not confuse oversight with obstruction. Our officers already operate within a strict legal framework and we are of the view that adding yet another layer of sign-off, particularly in time-sensitive operations, risks slowing down action, delaying disruption and missing crucial opportunities to intercept criminal activity. Officers need to be able to respond quickly, flexibly and effectively if we are to stand up to those who violate our borders. Indeed, constables are not subject to this requirement to seek permission to conduct a search under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, and in Section 18 of that Act, police offers are only required to inform an officer of at least the rank of inspector as soon as is practicable after they have conducted a search, not before. This provision to seek permission is therefore unnecessary and not in line with the relevant existing legislation. These amendments are about restoring operational realism and strengthening our capacity to protect. If we are serious about securing our borders, cracking down on illegal entry and dismantling the networks that exploit vulnerable people for profit, we must give our officers the clear, workable powers they require. These amendments are sensible proposals that would cut back bureaucracy and allow us to get on and deal with this problem more effectively. Finally, Amendment 91 would remove the requirement that a constable must obtain authorisation from an inspector and that the inspector must notify a super- intendent before accessing, copying or using information from a relevant article seized under Clause 23. We need to be clear on this. Clause 23 deals with information that may relate to the commission of serious immigration offences. In such cases, time is not a luxury. It is often the difference between success and failure—between a dismantled network and a missed opportunity. Indeed, this issue runs through all the amendments that I have spoken to in this group. The current drafting imposes a two-tier authorisation system before any such information can even begin to be examined. The requirement to obtain inspector-level authorisation for each individual access, and then to escalate that to a superintendent, adds a bureaucratic burden that could hinder fast-moving investigations, especially when such information could reveal links to other suspects, routes and wider criminal infrastructure. Our amendment would ensure that our officers have the practical powers they need in a way that means they can be exercised with urgency and purpose. The constable will still be required to act lawfully, proportionately and within the scope of the clause, but removing these layers of procedural delay would ensure that our enforcement efforts are not undermined by red tape. We cannot, on the one hand, claim to be taking a tough stance on illegal immigration and organised criminality and, on the other, design a framework that ties the hands of those trying to enforce the law. Amendment 91 works alongside our other amendments in this group to correct that imbalance. It would strengthen our operational capability while retaining the legal and ethical standards we rightly demand. I urge the Committee to support these amendments, and I beg to move.

I rise to speak to the amendments tabled by noble Lords on the Opposition Front Bench. As we have heard, Amendment 72 proposes to remove the requirement for an authorised officer to ensure that a person has not previously been searched using these powers. I respectfully but robustly oppose this proposed change. These are intrusive powers that allow for the physical searching of individuals who are not under arrest and could be victims or witnesses. To apply such powers multiple times to the same person without any procedural check not only is disproportionate but risks undermining public confidence in the fairness and proportionality of our system. We must remember that this safeguard was introduced for good reason. It was informed by lessons learned from previous misuse that led to legal challenge. Its inclusion has helped to address legitimate concerns about the potential for abuse of power. Amendment 73 proposes removing the requirement that the relevant person must have been on the premises when, or immediately before, they were encountered by an authorised officer. We respectfully oppose this change. This safeguard is essential. It ensures that there is a clear and direct link between the individual suspected of possessing a relevant article and the premises being searched. Without it, the power becomes too broad, allowing searches of premises even when there is no reasonable basis to believe the person was ever present. The presence of the individual is often the only factual basis upon which an officer can form reasonable grounds to suspect that a device or article is located there. Removing this requirement risks turning suspicion into speculation. Amendments 74, 78 and 91 propose removing the requirement for police constables and National Crime Agency officers to obtain authorisation from an inspector or equivalent grade before exercising powers under Clauses 20, 21 and 23. Furthermore, the amendments would remove the requirement that an inspector notifies a superintendent or equivalent grade as soon as reasonably practicable. We strongly oppose these proposed changes. These are significant intrusive powers, and the current authorisation process is not an administrative burden. Rather, it is a vital safeguard to ensure the powers are applied with proportionality, due process and respect to the legal system. It ensures that decisions to use the powers where we are obtaining personal data and privacy are subject to senior oversight and scrutiny, helping to prevent misuse and maintaining public confidence and trust in those who use the powers and in the Government. Unlike immigration officers, who may use these powers more routinely, police and NCA officers may not exercise them as frequently. That makes the case for retaining oversight stronger, not weaker. Removing this safeguard risks inconsistent application of the powers and undermines the legal and ethical standards we have worked very hard to uphold. Again, we want the system that we are introducing to command confidence across all of society. That means that we have to balance powers given to the authorities with safeguards and proportionality. We must ensure that these powers are used lawfully, proportionately and effectively. Retaining the requirement for senior authorisation is an essential part of achieving that balance. For those reasons, I urge the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, to withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, at the heart of this group of amendments lies the proposition that, if we are to confront the scale and complexity of illegal entry into this country, and indeed the criminal networks that are facilitating it, we must empower those on the front line to act swiftly, decisively and within a framework that reflects operational reality, not burdensome bureaucracy. We on these Benches have listened carefully to what the Minister has said, but I am afraid that I have heard no compelling justification for why officers should be constrained to a single search, even in circumstances where new evidence arises, nor have we been given assurance that the narrow drafting of the premises clause will not impede investigations where criminal activity is thought to be located. I say to the Minister that those who orchestrate illegal crossings are not bound by procedure or protocol. Current legislation with regard to searches does not require such restrictions, so why should it apply here? Under the current drafting of Clauses 20 to 23, the Bill proposes the imposition of a procedural bottleneck on our officers, who are working under pressure, often with incomplete information and in fast-moving, high-risk environments. We expect these officers to deliver results. Indeed, the Minister and his Government have staked a huge amount of political capital on these officers delivering results. Therefore, we need to make sure that we take decisions in this place so that those officers are equipped and empowered to get the job done. These amendments would not lower standards; they would reduce delay and would not undermine safeguards. They would ensure that the law serves those it is meant to protect, not those who seek to exploit its gaps. If we are truly committed to securing our borders, upholding the rule of law and dismantling the infrastructure of exploitation that underpins these crossings, we must match the rhetoric with reality. These amendments certainly speak to our ambition, which is to give the officers the tools they need to do their jobs effectively.

Amendment 72 withdrawn.

Amendments 73 and 74 not moved.

Amendments 75 to 77

Moved by

75: Clause 20, page 14, line 36, at end insert— “(8A) An NCA officer may exercise a power to search under this section only if the search is authorised by an NCA officer at or above a grade that is equivalent to the rank of inspector.(8B) If an NCA officer gives an authorisation under subsection (8A), the NCA officer must, as soon as it is practicable to do so, cause an NCA officer at or above a grade that is equivalent to the rank of superintendent to be informed.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment provides for the authorisation by a senior National Crime Agency officer of a power to search under clause 20 exercised by a National Crime Agency officer.

76: Clause 20, page 14, line 37, after “constable” insert “or an NCA officer” Member's explanatory statement This amendment enables a National Crime Agency officer to use reasonable force in the exercise of a power under clause 20.

77: Clause 20, page 14, line 38, at end insert— “(10) Paragraphs 21 and 22 of Schedule 5 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (offences of resistance, wilful obstruction and assault) apply in relation to an NCA officer exercising a power under this section as they apply in relation to a designated officer acting in the exercise of an operational power within the meaning of that Schedule.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment applies the offences of resisting, wilfully obstructing and assaulting an NCA officer to an NCA officer exercising a power under clause 20.

Amendments 75 to 77 agreed.

Clause 20, as amended, agreed.

Clause 21: Powers to seize and retain relevant articles

Amendment 78 not moved.

Amendments 79 to 83

Moved by

79: Clause 21, page 15, line 8, at end insert— “(3A) An NCA officer may seize a relevant article under subsection (1) only if the seizure of the article is authorised by an NCA officer at or above a grade that is equivalent to the rank of inspector.(3B) If an NCA officer gives an authorisation under subsection (3A), the NCA officer must, as soon as it is practicable to do so, cause an NCA officer at or above a grade that is equivalent to the rank of superintendent to be informed.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment provides for the authorisation by a senior National Crime Agency officer of a power to seize an article under clause 21(1) exercised by a National Crime Agency officer.

80: Clause 21, page 15, line 9, after “constable” insert “or an NCA officer” Member’s explanatory statement This amendment enables a National Crime Agency officer to use reasonable force in seizing a relevant article under clause 21(1).

81: Clause 21, page 15, line 10, at end insert— “(4A) Paragraphs 21 and 22 of Schedule 5 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (offences of resistance, wilful obstruction and assault) apply in relation to an NCA officer exercising a power under subsection (1) as they apply in relation to a designated officer acting in the exercise of an operational power within the meaning of that Schedule.”Member’s explanatory statement This amendment applies the offences of resisting, wilfully obstructing and assaulting an NCA officer to an NCA officer exercising a power under clause 21(1).

82: Clause 21, page 15, line 11, after “constable” insert “or an NCA officer” Member's explanatory statement This amendment and my amendment to Clause 21, page 15, line 12 enable an NCA officer to give a relevant article seized by an NCA officer to an immigration officer or the Secretary of State.

83: Clause 21, page 15, line 12, after “constable” insert “or an NCA officer” Member's explanatory statement See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Clause 21, page 15, line 11.

Amendments 79 to 83 agreed.

Amendment 84

Moved by

84: Clause 21, page 15, line 21, at end insert— “(6A) A relevant article seized under subsection (1) or given under subsection (5) must be protected during the period it is retained so it can later be relied on by the owner of that article for evidence—(a) in court, or(b) as part of a National Referral Mechanism “Reasonable Grounds” determination.”Member’s explanatory statement The amendment seeks to make provisions to protect the belongings of people who have had them confiscated, especially for potential victims of modern slavery who often vitally rely upon their belongings as evidence during the determination of their status as a victim.

My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 84, I also wish to speak to Amendment 90. I do not wish to detain the Committee for long. The principle—sorry, I am looking at the wrong Minister—behind these two amendments is the same as that behind Amendment 49: namely, the circumstances addressed in Clause 21 concern the search of a person and the circumstances addressed in Clause 23 concern the retention of material information that has been copied as a result of that search. In both those circumstances, the material should be so protected on its retention that it is available to the individual should they wish to use it in a court or particularly in a case before the national referral mechanism, so that anybody who is potentially in slavery has access to the information they need to be able to support their case. The Minister, in responding to Amendment 49, referenced the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. I think he would accept that there have sometimes been incidents where the police’s retention of evidence has perhaps been less than perfect. Therefore, it would be helpful to put this requirement in relation to the retention of information, so that it can be used by potential victims of slavery in national referral mechanism cases, on the face of the Bill. I beg to move.

My Lords, having supported the noble Baroness on her previous amendments, from these Benches we do so on these, too.

My Lords, I will speak briefly on Amendments 84 and 90, tabled by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead. These amendments raise a serious and important concern that we believe merits the attention of the Committee. It seeks to ensure that, where personal belongings are retained by the authorities under Clause 23, particularly in the case of potential victims of modern slavery, those items and the information they contain are preserved in a manner that allows them to be relied on as part of a national referral mechanism determination. For many victims of trafficking, the evidence contained on a mobile phone or similar device may be the only proof they possess of their exploitation, whether that be messages, photographs or location data. To risk the loss, corruption or mishandling of that data would not only undermine the pursuit of justice but could place the individual concerned at even greater risk. We therefore support the principle behind this amendment. These protections are vital. That said, we also recognise that many of these safeguards may already be provided for under the existing statutory framework, particularly under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which governs how evidence is secured and handled. But I accept what my noble friend said earlier about retention by police in some cases. If the Minister can offer the Committee reassurance that those protections already apply in the context of Clause 23 and that the rights of potential victims are adequately safeguarded in practice, that will be most welcome. This amendment raises a proper, necessary point of clarification and we hope the Government will respond accordingly.

My Lords, in addressing Amendments 84 and 90 proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, I first take the opportunity to pay tribute to her work in this area, particularly as chair of the Global Commission on Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, and indeed I acknowledge and pay tribute to her continued dedication to protecting vulnerable individuals. However, having said that—there is always a “however”—we feel that the amendments that she has tabled are not entirely necessary. The amendments seek to introduce a statutory requirement to protect seized or surrendered items so they may later be used as evidence in court or in the national referral mechanism. Although obviously we agree with the intention behind them, we believe that they are unnecessary. The policy objective underpinning this measure is to ensure that the United Kingdom has the necessary powers to search for, seize, retain and use information from electronic devices belonging to irregular entrants or arrivals in relation to facilitation offences. These powers are vital to disrupting the operations of organised crime groups that exploit vulnerable individuals. It is essential that the focus of these powers is not changed and that authorised officers are fully equipped to use them effectively. First, the current legislative framework already provides robust safeguards for the handling of personal property—notwithstanding the exchange with the Minister, my noble friend Lord Hanson, which I am afraid I was not in the Chamber for, on the operation of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The Bill ensures that any electronic devices seized are treated appropriately and that any data they contain is preserved and processed in accordance with data protection laws, evidentiary standards and human rights obligations. Safeguards are particularly important in the context of modern slavery and human trafficking, where, as we have heard, victims may be in possession of devices that contain sensitive personal information, indeed evidence of exploitation, or communications with support services. The Bill ensures that such material is handled with care and integrity, protecting both the individual’s privacy and the integrity of any ongoing investigation. We recognise the importance of timely access to personal devices, particularly for victims of modern slavery, who may rely on them for communication, evidence or support. If we are able to successfully download relevant data from a device, we will return the phone to the individual at the earliest opportunity. If the device is still required for the purposes of investigation, we will retain it for only as long as is reasonably necessary. If the device must be retained, we can provide the victim with any downloaded material they may need to support a national referral mechanism application or to access support services. As I said, the Bill makes it clear that devices and other personal property will be retained only for as long as necessary. Once they are no longer required for the purpose for which they are seized. they must be returned to the individual as soon as is practicable. This approach, we feel, strikes the right balance between empowering law enforcement to act decisively against organised immigration crime and trafficking networks, while safeguarding the rights and dignity of individuals, particularly those who may be victims of modern slavery. Given that, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, I am not at all surprised by the response the Minister has given me. I continue to be concerned to make sure that people have access to this information and these articles for their national referral mechanism cases to be considered. I will reflect further on what the Minister has said, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 84 withdrawn.

Amendments 85 to 89

Moved by

85: Clause 21, page 15, line 28, leave out “or (10)” and insert “, (10), (11) or (13)” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on my amendment to Clause 21, page 15, line 40.

86: Clause 21, page 15, line 36, after “constable” insert “of a police force maintained by a local policing body, or of an NCA officer” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on my amendment to Clause 21, page 15, line 40 and on the extension of clause 21 to National Crime Agency officers.

87: Clause 21, page 15, line 38, leave out “section 2 of” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on the extension of clause 21 to National Crime Agency officers.

88: Clause 21, page 15, line 39, after “constable” insert “or NCA officer” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on the extension of clause 21 to National Crime Agency officers.

89: Clause 21, page 15, line 40, at end insert— “(11) If the relevant article is in the possession of a constable of the Police Service of Scotland, it must be disposed of in accordance with Part 6 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 as if—(a) it were property that has been delivered to a constable under section 67 of that Act, and(b) it were delivered to a constable on the date when subsection (6)(a) of this section ceased to apply to it.(12) In the application of Part 6 of that Act in relation to a relevant article by virtue of subsection (11), references in that Part to action which may or must be taken in relation to the finder of property are to be disregarded.(13) If the relevant article is in the possession of a constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, it must be disposed of in accordance with section 31 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, and any regulations under that section, as if it were property that has come into the possession of the constable in connection with the investigation of a suspected offence.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment makes provision about the disposal of a relevant article that is in the possession of a constable of the Police Service of Scotland or a constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Amendments 85 to 89 agreed.

Clause 21, as amended, agreed.

Clause 22 agreed.

Clause 23: Powers to access, copy and use information stored on relevant articles

Amendments 90 and 91 not moved.

Amendment 92

Moved by

92: Clause 23, page 18, line 10, at end insert— “(4) An NCA officer may access, examine, copy, retain or use information under subsection (1) only if the accessing, examination, copying, retention or use of the information is authorised by an NCA officer of a grade that is equivalent to the rank of inspector or above.(5) If an NCA officer gives an authorisation under subsection (4), the NCA officer must, as soon as it is practicable to do so, cause an NCA officer of a grade that is equivalent to the rank of superintendent or above to be informed.”Member's explanatory statement This amendment provides for the authorisation by a senior National Crime Agency officer of a power under clause 23(1) to access etc information on a relevant article exercised by a National Crime Agency officer.

Amendment 92 agreed.

Clause 23, as amended, agreed.

Clause 24: Amendment of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001

Amendment 93

Moved by

93: Clause 24, page 18, line 14, leave out “(10)” and insert “(13)” Member's explanatory statement This amendment is consequential on my amendment to Clause 21, page 15, line 40.

Amendment 93 agreed.

Clause 24, as amended, agreed.

Clause 25 agreed.

Clause 26: Meaning of other expressions

Amendment 94

Moved by

94: Clause 26, page 19, line 23, at end insert— ““NCA officer” means National Crime Agency officer;”Member's explanatory statement This amendment inserts a definition of “NCA officer” into clause 26 for the purposes of clauses 19 to 23.

Amendment 94 agreed.

Clause 26, as amended, agreed.

Clause 27 agreed.

House resumed.