Victims and Courts Bill (Third sitting)

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Dr Andrew Murrison, † Graham Stringer

† Blundell, Mrs Elsie (Heywood and Middleton North) (Lab)

† Brash, Mr Jonathan (Hartlepool) (Lab)

† Brewer, Alex (North East Hampshire) (LD)

† Davies-Jones, Alex (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice)

† Dixon, Samantha (Vice-Chamberlain of His Majesty's Household)

† Fleet, Natalie (Bolsover) (Lab)

† Jameson, Sally (Doncaster Central) (Lab/Co-op)

† Jones, Ruth (Newport West and Islwyn) (Lab)

† McIntyre, Alex (Gloucester) (Lab)

† Midgley, Anneliese (Knowsley) (Lab)

† Mullan, Dr Kieran (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)

† Osborne, Tristan (Chatham and Aylesford) (Lab)

Rankin, Jack (Windsor) (Con)

† Thomas, Bradley (Bromsgrove) (Con)

† Thompson, Adam (Erewash) (Lab)

† Voaden, Caroline (South Devon) (LD)

† Wood, Mike (Kingswinford and South Staffordshire) (Con)

Kevin Candy, Rob Cope, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

(Morning)

[Graham Stringer in the Chair]

Victims and Courts Bill

11:30:00

Before we begin, I have a few preliminary remarks and reminders for the Committee. I have had requests to allow jackets to be taken off; Members have the Chair’s permission if they wish to do so. All electronic devices should be switched to silent, and no food or drinks are permitted during Committee sittings, except for the water provided. Hansard colleagues would be grateful if Members could email their speaking notes to hansardnotes@parliament.uk, or alternatively pass on written speaking notes to colleagues in the room. I remind Members to bob if they wish to speak in any debate. We now begin line-by-line consideration of the Bill. The selection list for today’s sitting is available in the room and shows how the selected amendments have been grouped for debate. Amendments grouped together are generally on the same, or similar, issues. The selection and grouping list shows the order of debates. Decisions on each amendment are taken when we come to the clause to which the amendment relates. Decisions on new clauses will be taken once we have completed consideration of the Bill’s existing clauses. Before I call the Opposition spokesperson, I should say that he has asked to talk more generally in his opening remarks; unusually, because it is the first speech, I will say yes. This is a narrowly drawn Bill with narrowly drawn clauses but, as it is the start of the debate, I will allow discussion to go a little wider. Clause 1 Power to compel attendance at sentencing hearing

I beg to move amendment 13 in clause 1, page 1, line 17, at end insert— “(3A) If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim or their family if a victim is deceased.”

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 14, in clause 2, page 4, line 11, at end insert— “(3A) If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim and their family if they are deceased.”

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer, and to open the first debate on the Bill in Committee as we begin line-by-line consideration. As you explained, Mr Stringer, I thought it might be useful to list the Bill’s measures to provide a wider context for the amendments as we consider them one by one. First, the Bill will make provisions relating to victims’ experiences in the administration of justice. Secondly, it will create a statutory power for judges to order offenders to attend their sentencing hearings and, if they do not, to give out sanctions that take place in prison. Thirdly, it will restrict parental responsibility for child sex offenders who are sentenced for four years or more for an offence against a child for whom they hold parental responsibility. Fourthly, it will expand eligibility for the victim contact scheme, meaning more victims will be able to access it. Fifthly, the Bill will strengthen the Victims’ Commissioner’s powers so that they can investigate individual cases in certain circumstances, request information from local authorities and social housing providers, and publish an annual report on compliance with the victims’ code. Sixthly, it will increase flexibility for the Director of Public Prosecutions in appointing Crown prosecutors, and set the rates at which prosecutor costs in private prosecutions can be recovered from central funds. Seventhly, it will amend the time limit within which the Attorney General can refer a sentence to the Court of Appeal on the grounds that it is unduly lenient. Finally, the Bill will amend magistrates court sentencing powers for six either-way offences, bringing them in line with other offences. The Opposition have not sought to amend, and will not seek to oppose, a number of the Bill’s measures, and I am sure there will be cross-party support for many of them, but we wish to push the Government to go further in other areas. The first group of amendments relates to the provisions that are meant to ensure that offenders attend their sentencing hearings. It is important to lay out the value of offenders attending such a hearing. Open and transparent justice is a cornerstone of our legal system. It is often said that it is important not just that justice should be done, but that it is seen to be done. There is something tangible and direct about an offender being present in court to hear all the elements of the sentencing hearing at first hand, in front of victims and their friends and family, the offender’s own friends and family, and potentially the wider public and the press, who help to share what happens more widely. In particular, victims and their friends and family may want to see it happening. This will often be true of the sentence itself, and the remarks that reflect back some of the impact of a crime, but it will be particularly true for the parts of the sentencing hearing when we hear directly from those affected by a crime. Victim personal statements, commonly known as victim impact statements, are a crucial reform of our justice system that tries to give a voice to victims and their friends and family. As we will consider later in proceedings, they might not be working as well as they could be, but they remain incredibly important. Many people want to see the offender hearing those statements, and want to know that the offender cannot escape the consequences of their actions or from hearing directly from the people they have impacted. The statements may be read out by the victim themselves or by their friends and family. The authors may or may not be present. We heard evidence from Paula Hudgell from Justice for Victims about the positive impact of victim personal statements in her experience of the judicial system. I am sure we have all read and heard about recent examples of offenders having derailed the process, escaped accountability and robbed victims and their families of its healing power. In the evidence session the hon. Member for Knowsley spoke about the case of her constituent Olivia Pratt-Korbel, whose killer refused to attend the sentencing, and whose mother Cheryl has campaigned hard to right that wrong for others. I have met and spoken with Ayse Hussein, another member of Justice for Victims, who campaigned for something to be done in memory of her cousin Jan Mustafa. The Minister and I have met and spoken with other campaigners. Kyle Clifford raped his former partner, Louise Hunt, who was 25, and used a crossbow to shoot both her and her sister Hannah, who was 28, having already fatally stabbed their mother, 61-year-old Carol, at the family home in Bushey. He was given a whole-life order—which I will return to—and refused to attend his sentencing. As MPs, we know that behind every case reported in the media will be cases that are not. But the experiences of those people are no less important, which is why the previous Government committed to introducing powers to try to ensure that offenders attend their sentencing hearing. I am pleased that this Government have agreed with that in principle. Although I welcome the aim, the shadow Justice team have looked afresh at how best to achieve the right outcome and tabled good-faith amendments to make it more likely that we achieve it. The shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick), and I are both committed to never being shackled by historical thinking and approaches when it comes to ensuring that we deliver for victims and their families, and we are doing that in two vital ways. Amendments 13 and 14 would introduce a duty to consult the victim or their family as part of the enaction of the powers in clauses 1 and 2. I talked earlier about the different people and groups that derive a benefit from the offender attending the sentencing hearing, but of all those with an interest in seeing that happen, victims and their families can be considered the most important. Although the evidence we heard was clear that not every victim would want an offender to be there, and not every victim would want to see force used and risk the disruption of proceedings to make it happen, some would. The representations we heard from victims groups almost universally supported the idea that the process should involve consultation with victims and their families. All agreed that it would be a welcome reform. Consultation is part and parcel of what the Government do day in, day out; I am sure the Minister has spent many hours reviewing and reading consultation results. The law often requires meaningful consultation before the Government or many arm’s length bodies make significant decisions. As MPs, we all undertake our own consultations, in which we give constituents the chance to let us know their views on something that affects them. Surely a Bill about victims—named as it is—should reflect its commitment to delivering for victims and would want wherever possible to orientate its measures to victims. A measure on consultation would do just that. Specifically, the amendments would require consultation on occasions when a judge is minded to make a decision to deny victims and family members the opportunity to see the offender at the sentencing hearing. In that scenario, it is important that victims and family members can at least know for certain that the judge was not ignorant of how important it was to them and how they would feel should the judge decide not to compel the offender’s attendance. They would be able to explain their views to the judge directly. Victim personal statements were introduced to give a voice to victims when determining sentences; we are saying victims should also be given a voice on another important matter. The proposed change is modest but important. Just like victim personal statements, it would not dictate the outcome—a right to be consulted does not constitute a right to decide—and it would not encroach on judicial independence, as the decision rests with the judge. The pain that can be caused when an offender refuses to attend sentencing is profound. Families can feel indirectly silenced, robbed of their moment to see justice done. We should at least ensure that victims are afforded the right to know that decisions about them are not taken without them. The amendments are about respect, participation and dignity. No decision that can have a profound impact on a victim should be taken without first simply speaking to them. I ask Members of all parties to support our amendments, knowing that doing so will demonstrate a commitment to victims and their families, and ensure that their voices are heard as part of the process, as we seek to ensure that attendance at the sentencing hearing becomes as close to mandatory as we can possibly make it. I know that will be a commitment everybody shares.

It is an honour to serve under your chairship today, Mr Stringer. I thank the shadow Justice Minister for introducing the amendments he tabled, and the Government appreciate his support of the Bill in principle. The amendments would place a statutory duty on judges to consult victims or their families before deciding whether to use their powers under the measures in clauses 1 and 2 to order an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. I want to stress that victims and their families have been at the forefront of this legislation, and clause 1 will help to ensure that their voices and the impact of the crimes they have suffered are heard and understood by the perpetrators. We anticipate that, in making decisions, judges will take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the wishes and views of the victims and their families. However, mandating a duty to consult victims risks undermining judicial discretion and the ability of judges to make decisions based on the facts in front of them. Judges will of course consider any representations put to them by the prosecution on behalf of victims and their families, but they must also take into account the safety of prison and court staff, the efficiency and fairness of proceedings and the risks that a disruptive or resistant offender may cause further distress to victims and delays to justice. Retaining judicial discretion in such cases is therefore crucial to ensure that courts can make decisions in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including those of victims and their families. I therefore urge the shadow Minister to withdraw the amendment.

I understand the Minister’s desire to ensure that all the things she listed remain the purview of the judge, which is why the amendment makes it clear that they will. Nothing about consultation removes the judge’s ability to decide the factors that they wish to consider, to hear representation from others and to take in mind the safety and wellbeing of court staff and other people in the court. A duty to consult is simply that: a duty to ensure that victims are taken into account. I draw the Minister’s attention back to victim personal statements. Prior to them being a statutory requirement, people would have made the same arguments. Of course, the judge would have provided an opportunity to consider what victims had to say, but we were clear that such an opportunity was too important, and that we needed to ensure, on a statutory basis, that the victims and their families had the opportunity to say what they wanted about the impact of the crime. I do not think this is any different. A consultation provision would guarantee that victims have a voice as part of the process, while retaining judicial independence to make the ultimate decision whether someone attends a sentencing hearing. The Opposition will not withdraw the amendment. We think this issue is important, and I cannot reasonably think that Members will be able to explain to their constituents why they did not want to guarantee that a judge would simply have a conversation with a victim or their family about whether someone should be compelled to attend a sentencing hearing. Question put, That the amendment be made.

1|0|5|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

11:45:00

I beg to move amendment 15, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, leave out from “force,” to end of line, and insert— “so long as it is not grossly disproportionate.”

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 16, in clause 2, page 4, line 24, leave out from “force,” to end of line and insert— “so long as it is not grossly disproportionate.” Amendment 23, in clause 1, page 3, line 33, at end insert— “41C Power to restrain and gag a disruptive offender (1) This section applies where during attendance at a sentencing hearing an offender is disruptive of court proceedings. (2) The Judge may order the offender to be restrained and gagged to reduce their disruption. (3) When a Judge is minded not to make an order under subsection (2) and instead remove the offender from the court room they must consult the victim or their family if the victim is deceased.”

It is a pleasure to open this further debate on clauses 1 and 2. In our debate on amendments 13 and 14, we considered how we could improve the way a decision is taken. It is disappointing that Labour MPs did not feel they wanted victims and their families to have a statutory right to be heard in relation to that decision. Amendments 15 and 16 relate to how the decision will be enacted. A decision, no matter how considered, is of little use if the tools to make it a reality are inadequate. In a further clear demonstration of our commitment to bringing renewed thinking to policy, the shadow Secretary of State and I will always seek to ensure that the balance between criminals and the victims and their families is always tipped in favour of the victims and their families, as far as is reasonable. Members will, I hope, know that legislation that provides legal protections for those who exercise force, as long as it is not grossly disproportionate, has been on our statute books for some time now, via section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.

Will the hon. Gentleman explain what “grossly disproportionate” means?

I direct the hon. Lady to the statute book and to the case law that has evolved around that phrase. If the courts, this Government or our previous Government did not think it was a meaningful distinction, I do not know why we would have it on the statute book. It was introduced to provide the greatest possible benefit to those using force, in terms of legal protection and understanding that they would not be unfairly or unduly judged as a result. As I said, it has been on the statute book for quite some time. It is a legally recognised phrase, as distinguished from “reasonable force”.

No.

The hon. Member for Gloucester is chuntering; would he like to intervene? Did I say something that was factually incorrect?

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the short answer for his response to the hon. Member for South Devon is no?

As I said, it is on the statute book as a legally defined term. I struggle to understand why Members think it is on the statute book without any meaning. I have not heard any plans from the Government since the election to remove it.

Does my hon. Friend agree that people wishing for further clarification of the phrase “grossly disproportionate force” might be advised to consider the guidance on the matter issued by the Crown Prosecution Service?

Absolutely. It surprises me that Members think it is a novel concept when it has been on the statute book for quite some time. We want to ensure that the individuals tasked with using force to bring offenders to court have the legal protections they need in order to act with confidence. We do not want offenders to think that all they must do is attempt to resist violently in order to escape the outcome sought by the families who have campaigned for a change in the law. Although the notions of additional time to serve and prison sanctions may change behaviour in some cases, we must reflect on the sort of people we are dealing with and the sentences they serve. We should expect a willingness to offer violence from the sort of person who will barge into a family home and shoot into it without any thought to the family in it, as the perpetrator who killed Olivia Pratt-Korbel did. Do we really think that a man who is willing to violently murder three people with a crossbow, and who is never getting out of prison, would be particularly perturbed by not being able to go to the gym or watch TV? These are the sorts of people we are dealing with, and if we do not make physically forcing attendance our main goal, the Bill risks failing in its aims. Some victims and families might prefer that someone gets punished if they do not attend, but what many of them will really want is attendance. Our amendment would make it more likely that we achieve that. I urge Members who do not want to look back on a missed opportunity, which will lead to offenders again and again not attending hearings, irrespective of the measures in the Bill, to support the amendment. It is one thing to bring an offender to court, but we have to consider how they will behave. Amendment 23 would give judges the power to restrain or gag disruptive offenders in the courtroom rather than remove them entirely. Crucially, if a judge is minded not to issue such an order but instead to remove the offender, the amendment provides that they must consult the victim or their family. If offenders learn that all they need to do if they are dragged into court is scream and shout and disrupt proceedings, what do Members think is really going to happen? Is the sort of man who brutally murders two women and stores them in the freezer, as the killer of Jan Mustafa and Henriett Szucs did, and knows that a long sentence awaits him really going to be impacted by a short addition to his custody time?

Does the hon. Member believe that people capable of such violence would be equally violent with a probation officer or a police officer taking them to court?

I absolutely believe that people will be violent, which is why we tabled amendment 15 to ensure that officers are able to use the level of force necessary to compel offenders to attend. If we do not do that, what are we going to achieve? The kinds of offenders who have brought this issue to our attention will be more than happy to resist physically. Are we really saying that the purpose of these measures is just to punish people? I do not think it is. I think their purpose is to get people into court for their sentencing hearings. In combination, our amendments would ensure that that happens, or at least make it significant more likely.

We absolutely agree that it is preferable to have the perpetrator in court to face justice and hear their sentence. However, I listened carefully to the evidence of Baroness Newlove, who said that we want to avoid this becoming a spectacle and all about the offender. The sentencing hearing is the moment when the victim hears what sentence the offender will get for the crime that they have been subjected to. It is about the victim, and justice for them; it should not become some circus sideshow for the offender to create havoc in the courtroom. Does the hon. Member agree that there is a point at which it is not beneficial to bring the offender into court to create such a sideshow?

Order. I remind hon. Members that interventions should be short and to the point. If Members wish to catch my eye, I do not think they will have any difficulty, but we cannot have interventions turning into speeches.

The hon. Member raises an important point. That is why amendment 23 specifically includes a duty to consult victims and their family members on the use of the power. We heard evidence, which I had anticipated, that some victims and their families will not want to see the offender. That is why the judge should consult them and, if that is their clear and settled view, take that into account when making the decision. The point is well made, and that is why our amendment takes that issue into account. I have spoken directly to several people involved in these types of cases. I mentioned Ayse Hussein from Justice for Victims. She was absolutely clear that even if exercising the power in the amendment meant someone disrupting proceedings and creating a spectacle, as the hon. Member for South Devon described, she would want to see it happen, and there will be many other people who feel the same way. For those who do not, there is no pressure for it to happen. That is why we have said that the judge should speak to people about the power before using it, for the important reasons that the hon. Member gave. I return to the point that I fear that we will end up worse off because we will have told the public, “We can get these people into court,” but actually the worst offenders will just not come or resist. That is why we need to increase the level of force and ensure that they cannot just make a noise to get out of the whole process. The people on whole-life orders, for example, are some of the worst offenders, who we most want to see in court. They are the ones who would be least bothered by the sanctions, and they would just make a noise in order to not have to be in court. If we overcome that first hurdle, as a result of our amendments on the use of force, and get offenders into the dock, we also need the power to ensure that they cannot just scream or shout their way out of it. I have to say that I was genuinely shocked by Labour Members’ questioning on this measure during the evidence sessions. Restraint of people through force is practised in a wide variety of settings by a wide variety of people on a regular basis. I have no doubt whatsoever that the practice can be extended to our courts. As much as I respect the training and expertise of aeroplane crews, I do not consider them to be uniquely qualified in the ability to restrain people in a chair. I urge Members to reflect on any initial resistance that they may have to this measure. Do they sincerely think that what aeroplane crews can achieve up in the air is not achievable in a courtroom? Common sense tells us that this measure is eminently achievable. I was pleased to hear evidence from a senior police officer and a senior staff member of His Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service—and, indeed, to hear the Minister herself accept—that it is possible in principle. I am confident that the majority of the British public will agree with us, and I wonder how Members who choose to vote against the measure will explain that action to their constituents. I will deal briefly with how someone might be gagged —that is to say, silenced—by giving a simple example. I only need to do so briefly, because it really is a very simple matter. In August 2018, a US judge, John Russo, asked for a robber, Frank Williams, to be silenced after he refused to be silent and continued to disrupt the court’s proceedings despite being issued with 12 warnings. Based on their questioning during our evidence sessions, I know that Members struggle to conceive of how that might be done, so I will alleviate their concerns and tell them how it was done: they just placed some tape over his mouth. The US legal system is quite clear about the legal right for an offender to be restrained and gagged. Members can, should they wish, look up the relevant rulings in the US judicial system.

I am struggling to see how a piece of tape can silence somebody. Somebody with respiratory conditions, or whatever, might even suffocate as a result. Has the hon. Gentleman considered the medical reasons for not gagging somebody?

Absolutely, and it would be for the judge to decide in all circumstances whether it is appropriate. I will be happy after this sitting to send the footage from that case, and the evidence of someone successfully being gagged by having tape placed over their mouth. This is really simple stuff that is being done in other parts of the world and I do not understand why Members find it so difficult to understand.

The hon. Member is clearly suggesting using physical restraining techniques in a court setting. Does he agree that those techniques could be used in any other part of court proceedings, including, perhaps, during the trial itself? We would be setting a precedent for our system here. It would not just be about sentencing; you are arguing that we can use physical restraint, including gagging, within the court setting, which is not currently what we do in our courts.

Order. Let me lay down some ground rules. Can we try to stick to parliamentary language? In this case, “you” means me, and I am not arguing anything.

If the hon. Member wants to suggest where else such restraint might benefit victims and their families, I will absolutely support his case if I think it is legitimate. As I have said, my focus and the balance I want to strike is, as far as possible, in favour of victims and their families, and it is not about overly concerning ourselves, outside of clear medical reasons, with the rights and wellbeing of the criminal, who at this point has been convicted. This is not rocket science. Putting a bit of tape over someone’s mouth is effective. It is done in other countries. I really do not see why Members find it so difficult to understand. Earlier, I touched on the matter of victims’ and their families’ views about this measure. I have heard directly from family members of victims who accept that this sort of approach could be disruptive but still support it. I mentioned Ayse Hussein from Justice for Victims. Another member of Justice for Victims, Katie Brett, suffered the loss of her sister Sasha, who was raped, stabbed more than 100 times and had her body set on fire by her killer. Katie would have wanted him to be restrained and gagged, if that was what it took. I could go on, but I think that the point is made. I am, of course, mindful that not everyone will feel that the way that we have included in our amendment the requirement to consult victims and their families is appropriate, given earlier votes against that approach. However, I think that our amendments, in combination, will provide an effective measure that balances what some victims will want against what other victims may not want. Members will have to decide who they want to get behind: the kind of people who seem to feel uncomfortable about restraining and putting tape over the mouths of rapists, child abusers and murderers; or victims and their families who want to see that done. The choice is clear, and we on the Opposition Benches are clear what measure we will support.

00:00:00

Amendments 15 and 16 would change the circumstances in which force may be used to bring an offender to court. They would effectively extend those circumstances to situations in which disproportionate—but not grossly disproportionate—force is required to secure attendance. Based on the debate we have had, it might be beneficial if I explain how the system currently works. The use of force by prison officers is currently justified, and therefore lawful, only if it is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. We are quite deliberately legislating to permit the use of lawful force, which is a test that is well understood and used throughout the criminal justice system. I remind hon. Members that the previous Government used the same test in their attempt to get this measure passed. Prison and prisoner escort staff are trained to employ the lawful use of force and are experienced in making judgments about the circumstances in which the use of force is necessary, reasonable and proportionate. They are also trained in the use of existing approved techniques for moving reluctant or resistant prisoners safely around the prison and court estate. In recent cases, such as that of Nicholas Prosper, we have seen how they effectively employ the same techniques to restrain offenders and bring them to court to hear justice being done. Clearly defined boundaries for the use of force, which are well understood by custody officers, ensure that escorting staff are not subject to unreasonable or unmitigated risks when bringing offenders to court. Where it is deemed unsafe or unreasonable to use force, prisons will discuss with courts how best to proceed. Where attendance is considered necessary, the court can consider making a direction for the offender to appear via live video link. That option is more manageable for the prison to enforce and minimises the potential for impactful disruption to proceedings, which can, as we have heard, lead to a spectacle in the court. An offender who is deemed too violent or disruptive to attend court in person or by live link would, under these measures, be found in contempt of court and subject to a further prison sentence or other punishment. We are going further than the previous Government and ensuring that, where offenders do not take responsibility and face victims’ families, they are punished. Offenders should not be forced to attend court if it would risk the safety of custody officers or court users, or disrupt proceedings, causing undue distress and further delay to victims and their families. Our measures strike the right balance in requiring that the use of force must be proportionate, reasonable and necessary, ensuring the safety of all court users and minimum disruption to court proceedings. Amendment 23 would give judges the power to order a disruptive offender to be restrained and gagged in court during their sentencing hearing. It would also introduce a duty on the court to consult victims or their families before making a decision to have the offender removed from the hearing instead. The Government appreciate that an offender’s refusal to attend their sentencing hearing, or their disruptive behaviour during that hearing, can cause anger and upset for victims and their families, and we heard that during the evidence sessions. That is why the measures in the Bill reinforce the expectation that offenders should attend their sentencing hearings and behave appropriately in court. They give judges the powers they need to do what is right in each individual case. Decisions on the use of restraints to manage offender behaviour are a matter for prison officers and prison escort staff. They will make decisions about the use of force depending on the circumstances of each individual case. The use of force must be reasonable, necessary and proportionate, and restrained prisoners must be brought to court using approved techniques in our prison system for moving individuals safely. Gagging prisoners is not an approved technique in our prison system and is unlikely to be considered a lawful use of force in these circumstances. Its use may in fact increase the risk of violence or disruption to the point where officers would have no choice but to remove the offender from court. Amendment 23 is therefore unlikely to achieve its intended outcomes. We will not allow offenders to achieve the outcomes they intend of continuing to traumatise victims and families or disrupting proceedings, by not attending court or causing a circus or spectacle. Should a judge deem it necessary, the offender will be removed and the judge can add an additional sanction to punish them properly. Forcing disruptive prisoners to remain in court at any cost would jeopardise officer safety and delay proceedings and could cause unnecessary distress for victims and their families. Is that what the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle intends with his amendments? They are unlikely to achieve the intended objective of the Bill, which is to ensure that offenders face up to their crimes and hear the impact of their actions on victims and their families. A more productive and realistic approach would be to punish the offender for disobeying the order to attend their hearing and failing to show any respect for victims and their families or the court. The measures in the Bill were produced in consultation with families; they asked for them and we listened. Our measures give judges the option to punish any adult offender who, following an attendance order, becomes disruptive in court and is removed from the hearing, by ordering up to two additional years in prison, an unlimited fine and/or the imposition of numerous potential prison sanctions. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle to withdraw his amendment because of the risk of unintended consequences and the prevention of justice for victims and their families.

I thank the Minister for her response. She says that judges will have the powers they need. As I think I clearly explained, those powers might be helpful in some circumstances, but for the very worst offenders—the kind that have been in the news and have caused us to think more clearly about this issue, in particular those on whole-life orders, for whom a sentence extension means nothing—

I implore the hon. Gentleman, in his efforts to ensure that offenders face families and justice, to explain why none of the additional measures that he proposes were in the previous Government’s Bill.

As I have said very clearly, I am a shadow Justice Minister now, and the new shadow Secretary of State and I make justice policy. I am not afraid to go further than previous Governments, and I will not be restrained by what they did. I did not make those previous policies; it was not my decision how they were enacted. I am confident that the public will respond positively to our attempts to go even further on these measures. As I was saying, the worst offenders, who are in our minds when we consider these offences—those on a whole-life order, for example—do not care about a custody extension because they cannot have one. They are never getting out of prison, so they are never paying a fine. The Minister listed examples of sanctions, which included not being able to watch TV or go to the gym. Do we really think those are the sorts of measures that will have hardened, violent criminals quaking in their boots? I do not think they are. The Minister said the measures in the Bill were developed in consultation with victims. I have absolutely no doubt that victims will welcome them—the sanctions, prison time extensions and fines. They are all welcome sanctions and will be appropriate for a whole range of victims, but some of the very same victims that she consulted—I spoke to two of them—would also welcome a further strengthening of the measures. If all a criminal has to do to get out of being in court is make noise—that is literally the test we are putting before ourselves today—there will be very many of them who are happy to do that in order to ensure that they do not have to face the accountability of the system. The Minister talked about what is legal now. We are legislating—we are making the law—so it is up to us what is legal. We can make the decision that something is legal. I have given a concrete example of another jurisdiction where the sort of restraint that we propose is used successfully—it has not been tried and found not to work; it is used successfully. There is absolutely no reason not to assume that we can make it a success in certain situations in this country. Our amendment 23 would not compel the judge to act—there is no compulsion. The judge would remain able to decide, but they would be given the clear power to act in this way if they think it is appropriate in all the circumstances. I am confident in the validity of the amendment and the positive impact it would have on victims and family members who were willing to see it used and felt that the potential disruption to the court proceedings was a price worth paying. As the HMPPS staff member and the police officer we heard evidence from attested to, such a change in policy would take training and resource. Of course, we would expect the Government to develop training in support of the enactment of the measure. A lack of such training right now is no reason not to make the power available to judges. I am conscious of the time, and the fact that we might wish to push this measure to a vote at a further stage, so I will not seek a Division today. However, we remain convinced of the legitimacy of this measure and will ensure that it is voted on at a later stage so that the public can understand which side Government Members are on. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 2 stand part.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I just want to say a few words about the provisions in this Bill on attending sentencing hearings and related prison sanctions, because this issue is incredibly personal to me. I do not think we would be sitting in this Committee today, with this Bill in our hands, without my constituents Cheryl Korbel and Antonia Elverson, who have fought hard to make this happen. Many of us will know Cheryl’s story: just quickly, for the record, her nine-year-old daughter, Olivia Pratt-Korbel, was tragically shot and killed in their own home in 2022. As if that was not horrific enough, the man who killed her, Thomas Cashman, did not turn up to court and did not attend that sentencing hearing, which meant that Cheryl did not get to read her victim impact statement out to him. There was confusion at the court; she did not know what was happening, and it came very late in the day. This has been a source of pain, because she felt out of control and that she had a lack of agency. In my first surgery, Antonia and Cheryl came in and told me about their case, and I have had the pleasure and the privilege of supporting them. I want to thank the Government and put on record today that I have been in every meeting with them, with the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor and this Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypridd. That was not just consultation; it was Antonia and Cheryl’s suggestion about sanctions and attending the sentencing hearing that put this measure in the Bill. I thank the Government for listening to and acting for people. I know that there were other families on the frontline who were listened to as well. This measure is because of those family members, and I pay tribute to them. This is what a Government can do when they really listen to people and act in that reality. That is why we have this Bill today.

I thank my hon. Friend for that powerful speech. I place on the record my thanks to her and her constituents for all of the brilliant work that they have done in ensuring this measure becomes law, and to ensure that no other families have to face what her constituents and, sadly, many other families have had to face. I will speak to both clauses 1 and 2 at the same time, as they are very much linked. In recent years, as we have heard, several murderers—most recently Lucy Letby and Kyle Clifford—have refused to attend their sentencing hearings. That causes victims’ families significant further distress. It can be seen as a final insult, denying the families the opportunity to see the full administration of justice for their loved ones and allowing offenders to avoid having to hear and confront the consequences of their horrific crimes. The provisions in clause 1 and 2 recognise the impact that such behaviour has on victims and their families in compounding their trauma. Clause 1 inserts proposed new sections 41A and 41B into a new chapter 2A within part 3 of the Sentencing Act 2020. Proposed new section 41A introduces an express statutory power for the Crown court to order an offender to attend their sentencing hearing. It makes clear that an offender who refuses to attend their hearing without reasonable excuse commits a contempt of court, meaning that adult offenders are liable for an additional two years’ custody and/or an unlimited fine, or, in the case of a child offender, a maximum penalty of £2,500. That also applies to offenders who, following an order to attend, commit contempt by misbehaving or disrupting the proceedings and are removed as a result. Proposed new section 41A makes it clear that, for adult offenders, reasonable force, where necessary and proportionate, can be used to give effect to the court’s order to deliver them for their sentencing hearing. The final decision on whether to use reasonable force will remain with the prison and escorting staff. Children will not be subject to reasonable force for this purpose, in line with existing policy. The second part of clause 1, proposed new section 41B, goes further than ever before by introducing a new power for Crown court judges also to impose prison sanctions on any adult offender who is subject to an attendance order and commits a contempt of court by refusing, without reasonable excuse, to attend their sentencing hearing, or who attends, but is removed from the hearing because of their conduct. That can be instead of or alongside any other punishment imposed by the court.

12:15:00

Section 41B allows for regulations to specify the sanctions that judges will be able to impose, which will be consistent with what is already available to a prison governor for punishments already given out in prison. That will ensure that they can be implemented in prison and in a way that maintains the safe functioning of the prison. It is intended that regulations will also provide for governor discretion to override a sanction where that is considered necessary because of health, safety and operational concerns.

It will be a matter for judges to decide whether to order an individual to attend court, and we expect that they will use the new powers as they see fit to ensure that justice is done. That could include not ordering individuals to attend where they may cause significant disruption in court and further distress to victim, or where there are significant factors, including mental health and learning disabilities, that might prevent their attendance.

Clause 2 inserts equivalent provisions in proposed new section 259A of the Armed Forces Act 2006 in respect of offenders attending service courts, such as a court martial.

Does the Minister accept that, unamended, this measure will simply require an offender to make a lot of noise in order to get out of all the things that she is saying about them actually being at the hearing? Sanctions are there, but in terms of them actually being at the hearing, all they will have to do is make some noise.

I welcome that intervention, but I disagree with the hon. Member. We have seen most recently cases in which offenders have been brought to court despite their reluctance. The prison officers and court staff have been able to get them there with the use of reasonable force. Then they have started to disrupt proceedings, but once the judge has explained to them some of the measures that are available currently—not these sanctions, because we have not yet made this law, but those measures that are currently available—that has resulted in the sentencing hearing being allowed to go ahead. What the hon. Member says is not always the case.

I absolutely accept that it will not always be the case, but does the Minister accept that some people will not be bothered by those measures and will be able simply to use noise to escape accountability?

We need to be careful on what we deem as noise. If, as we have heard in the Committee’s evidence sessions, an offender is beginning to make the sentencing hearing a spectacle or a circus and that is causing more distress to the victims and their families and preventing the course of justice, the judge will have the power to remove the offender from the court. However, with our new measures, the judge will have the power to impose these sanctions on them in prison, issue the unlimited fine and impose more time in prison. That will still be a measure even if they attend, cause a spectacle and have to be removed. They will be punished, and that will be explained to them if they continue to carry on. I go back to the Armed Forces Act and the effect that these new measures will also have on service courts, because that is important. We need to remember that justice is done in a number of courts in our country and not just in the Crown court. Offenders before service courts who commit a contempt are liable for a fine or 28 days’ service custody—or, alternatively, the offence may be considered by a civilian court for the purposes of contempt of court proceedings. Where an offender is ordered to attend a service court from prison, but fails to do so or—as the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle said—attends, but is removed from the hearing because of their conduct, they may similarly receive a prison sanctions order. I recognise that these provisions may not guarantee that every offender will attend their sentencing hearing when so ordered or that they will not create a spectacle during the sentencing hearing. However, these measures reinforce the expectation that offenders should attend their sentencing hearing and behave appropriately. We need to ensure that justice is seen to be done by victims, their families and the wider public, to create trust in our justice system. The measures will ensure that offenders are appropriately punished for failing to do that. Judges will retain the discretion to make decisions based on the facts of the case in front of them. I therefore urge that clauses 1 and 2 stand part of the Bill. Question put and agreed to. Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 2 Power to compel attendance at sentencing hearing: armed forces Amendment proposed: 14, in clause 2, page 4, line 11, at end insert— “(3A) If the court is minded not to make an order under subsection (2), the court has a duty to consult the victim and their family if they are deceased.”—(Dr Mullan.) Question put, That the amendment be made.

2|0|5|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 3

Restricting parental responsibility of certain sex offenders

I beg to move amendment 24, in clause 3, page 6, leave out lines 1 and 2 and insert— “for a serious sexual offence committed against a child.” This amendment would extend the provision of restricting parental responsibility where a parent is sentenced for a serious sexual offence committed against a child, regardless of whether it is their child or on the length of sentence handed down.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 17, in clause 3, page 6, line 1, leave out “of 4 years or more” This amendment would ensure that where anyone is sent to prison because of a sexual offence the court would be under a duty to make a prohibited steps order. Amendment 18, in clause 3, page 6, line 2, leave out “for whom the offender has parental responsibility.” This amendment would ensure the court was under a duty to make a prohibited steps order where anyone is sent to prison because of a sexual offence against a child, whether or not that child was one for which they had parental responsibility. Amendment 8, in clause 3, page 6, line 43, at end insert— “10CA Duty to consider make prohibited steps order where serious sexual offence committed against any child (1) This section applies where the Crown Court sentences a person (‘the offender’) to a term of imprisonment or detention of less than 4 years, for a serious sexual offence committed against any child. (2) The Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order with respect to each child for whom the offender has parental responsibility. (3) A prohibited steps order must be made if the court is of the opinion that there is a significant risk to children of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further serious sexual offences. (4) In making that assessment, the court— (a) must take into account all the information that is available to it about the nature and circumstances of the offence, (b) may take into account all the information that is available to it about the nature and circumstances of any other offences of which the offender has been convicted by a court anywhere in the world, (c) may take into account any information which is before it about any pattern of behaviour of which any of the offences mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) forms part, and (d) may take into account any information about the offender which is before it. (5) The reference in subsection (4)(b) to a conviction by a court includes a reference to— (a) a conviction of an offence in— (i) any proceedings under the Army Act 1955, the Air Force Act 1955 or the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (whether before a court-martial or any other court or person authorised under any of those Acts to award a punishment in respect of any offence), or (ii) any proceedings before a Standing Civilian Court; where ‘conviction’ includes the recording of a finding that a charge in respect of the offence has been proved), and (b) a conviction of— (i) a service offence within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act 2006, or (ii) an SDA offence within the meaning of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (Transitional Provisions etc) Order 2009 (S.I. 2009/1059), where ‘conviction’ includes anything that under section 376(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 is to be treated as a conviction). (6) The order must be made to have effect until the order is varied or discharged by the High Court or the family court. (7) But the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if— (a) making the order is prohibited by section 29(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, (b) a prohibited steps order is already in force that meets the requirements in subsection (3), or (c) it appears to the Crown Court that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. (8) Further, the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if—in respect of any child in respect of whom the offender has parental responsibility—the Court is of the opinion that— (a) the removal of parental responsibility is not in the best interests of that child; and (b) there is no significant risk to that particular child of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further serious sexual offences. (9) For the purposes of subsection (8), each child in respect of whom the offender has parental responsibility must be considered separately. (10) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if— (a) the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal, or (b) the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more, but see section 10D. (11) Sections 1, 10 and 16 do not apply where the Crown Court proceeds under this section. (12) A prohibited steps order made under this section is to be treated for the purposes of section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (proceedings and decisions) as if it were made by the family court. (13) The Crown Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in connection with the enforcement of a prohibited steps order made under this section. (14) A reference in this Act to an order under this section includes, so far as the context permits, an order varying or discharging it. (15) In this section ‘serious sexual offence’ shall have the same meaning as that in s.10C. (16) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the list of offences in Schedule ZA1.” New clause 13—Restricting parental responsibility of certain offenders— “After section 10B of the Children Act 1989 insert— ‘10CA Duty to make prohibited steps order where serious sexual or violent offence committed (1) This section applies where the Crown Court sentences a person (“the offender”) to a life sentence, or a term of imprisonment or detention of 10 years or more, for a serious sexual offence or violent offence committed against someone with whom they share parental responsibility for a child. (2) The Crown Court must make a prohibited steps order with respect to each child for whom the offender has parental responsibility. (3) The order must— (a) specify that no step of any kind which could be taken by a parent in meeting their parental responsibility for a child may be taken by the offender with respect to the child without the consent of the High Court or the family court, and (b) be made to have effect until the order is varied or discharged by the High Court or the family court. (4) But the Crown Court must not make a prohibited steps order under this section if— (a) making the order is prohibited by section 29(3) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, (b) a prohibited steps order is already in force that meets the requirements in subsection (3), or (c) it appears to the Crown Court that it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. (5) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if— (a) the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal, or (b) the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more, but see section 10D. (6) Sections 1, 7 and 11 do not apply where the Crown Court proceeds under this section. (7) A prohibited steps order made under this section is to be treated for the purposes of section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (proceedings and decisions) as if it were made by the family court. (8) The Crown Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings in connection with the enforcement of a prohibited steps order made under this section. (9) A reference in this Act to an order under this section includes, so far as the context permits, an order varying or discharging it. (10) In this section— “life sentence” means a sentence of imprisonment, detention or custody for life, or during His Majesty’s pleasure; “serious sexual offence” means an offence listed in Schedule ZA1; “violent offence” means an offence of homicide, assault or robbery. (11) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend the list of offences in Schedule ZA1.’”

It is very clear that a child of a sex offender is at risk, regardless of whether the sex offender has committed that offence against their own child or another child. The amendment would seek to broaden the provisions for removing parental responsibility from children of sex offenders. I would like to share some of my professional experience. I used to work in a domestic abuse charity, where I ran a women’s refuge and had safeguarding responsibility for the families that have fled violent and often sexual abuse. There were numerous occasions when we had to facilitate parental contact by enabling a mother and her children to meet the perpetrator of that abuse, which was court mandated, even though they had fled that abuse, supposedly to a position of safety. As a person with safeguarding responsibility, that puts professionals in an impossible situation, but that is nothing compared with the position in which it places the parents, who have to take their child to a position that is desperately unsafe. We would seek to broaden the measures in clause 3 so that somebody who is convicted of a serious sexual offence, regardless of the length of the sentence and of who that sexual offence was committed against, would not have parental responsibility for their children. If they have been convicted of a serious sexual offence against any child, their own child is at risk. At the moment, the children of sex offenders are at more risk than other children in society. We believe this is a very important measure, and it needs appropriate resource allocated to it.

I rise to speak in support of our amendments 17 and 18. As has been said, the Bill currently requires prohibited steps orders, which remove parental responsibility, only for those receiving custodial sentences of four years or more, and only if they have parental responsibility for the victims of those offences. In the evidence session earlier this week, the witnesses were absolutely clear that this provision, as currently drafted, is too narrow. Amendment 17 seeks to widen the court’s duty to protect children from those convicted of serious sexual offences. It would move the threshold and ensure that anyone imprisoned for a sexual offence triggers the court’s duty to protect children by considering a prohibited steps order. We believe that is a more appropriate line to draw for this measure, which is essentially when an offence reaches a level of seriousness that hits the custodial threshold. Amendment 18 is of even more vital importance, and it was also strongly supported by the witnesses in their evidence. It would close a troubling loophole in clause 3—although I am not sure whether “loophole” accurately describes it; it is an enormous omission. At present, the duty to make a prohibited steps order applies only when the child victim is someone for whom the offender has parental responsibility. That is an unacceptable narrowing of protection, and the logic of this measure is indefensible. The Government believe that it is right to remove parental responsibility for someone who is convicted of a very serious sexual offence against a child, but only if it is against their own child or a child for whom they have parental responsibility. That makes no sense, and it is no surprise that the witnesses were universally against it. Amendment 18 would ensure that anyone convicted of a sexual offence against a child that is serious enough to warrant a custodial sentence is subject to a prohibited steps order, regardless. Again, I ask Members to think about how they might explain their position on this amendment to their constituents. Amendment 24, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, is essentially aiming for the same outcome, but perhaps we have a slightly different interpretation of where we place the threshold. Amendment 24 specifies “serious sexual offence”, while we have used the custodial limit as the trigger in attempting to achieve the same outcome. It is something that we could commit to looking at in future stages of the Bill, if we can secure a better understanding of how we distinguish between serious and non-serious offences. We are sympathetic to the Liberal Democrat aims, and I think we have a shared aim on not just the threshold, but particularly the fact that this measure will be enacted only when the child who has been the subject of the crime is one for whom the person has parental responsibility. I do not see the logic in drawing the line in the way that the Government have, separate to any questions about the level of severity.

It is a pleasure to speak to this group of amendments: amendment 8, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lowestoft (Jess Asato); amendments 17 and 18, tabled by the hon. Member for Bexhill and Battle; amendment 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Josh Babarinde); and new clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove. Amendments 17 and 24 seek to remove the four-year custodial threshold for the automatic restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility. The restriction of the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious and far-reaching measure. It must be applied with care and in a manner that is a legally robust, while also protecting the most vulnerable. The requirement for a four-year custodial sentence provides a defined marker of seriousness. This thresholds aligns with existing sentencing frameworks. Section 244ZA and schedule 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 specify a list of serious offences, including child sexual offences, that are considered serious enough to warrant that the offender must serve at least two thirds of their sentence in custody, rather than the standard half when they are sentenced. The amendment would lower this threshold and require the Crown court to make the prohibited steps order when the offender is sentenced for any period of imprisonment or detention. I want to be clear that any offence against a child is unacceptable and one of the most heinous crimes in society. Restricting the exercise of parental responsibility is a serious step and not a decision to be taken lightly. That predetermined marker of seriousness ensures that any order made by the Crown court happens automatically only where the offender has committed serious and grave offences against a child who they are supposed to look after.

The Minister has a wealth of colleagues around her who are covering these issues, including—as I understand it—the Home Office Minister responsible for safeguarding, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Birmingham Yardley (Jess Phillips). What does this Minister say to the Home Office Minister about her previous position that a provision of the kind that the Government have drafted was too narrow? Has this Minister spoken to her colleague about that, and does her colleague personally agree with the measure as currently drafted by the Government?

12:30:00

The hon. Gentleman will know, having been in Government before the election, how Government collective responsibility and consultation with other Government Departments work. The safeguarding Minister and I are responsible for the Government’s strategy on violence against women and girls, which commits to halving it within a decade. Of course, the family courts are playing an integral role in that, and we seek to build on it. I will talk more about that shortly. Where we need to go further, this Government will. We have used the statutory framework because it reflects the Government’s view that the offences are exceptionally serious. It is therefore appropriate that the same threshold be used to determine when an automatic restriction on the exercise of parental responsibility should apply. I understand and appreciate the rationale but, because there are existing processes to seek the restriction of parental responsibility, it is essential that there is a threshold and a clear marker for it to happen automatically.

There are mechanisms in place, but they put undue onus on the non-offending parent. Does the Minister agree that the onus should be shifted to the offending parent?

I agree that the current situation in the family courts is difficult, and it can be traumatic for parents who are seeking to have a parental order removed. That is why we have taken the measure in the Bill. It is a new approach, through which we seek to remove parental responsibility on automatic conviction in the Crown court. As I said in oral evidence, this is not something we do lightly, but we feel that it is necessary in order to protect offenders’ and perpetrators’ own children from the most serious offences. I am happy to work with the hon. Member for North East Hampshire to consider what further work we can do to reform the family courts. The Department is working closely on that, and we know we need to get it right in order to protect all children from these crimes, whether or not restrictions to parental responsibility are sought via the family courts or automatically, with this measure, in the Crown court. Amendments 18, 24 and 8 seek to expand the circumstances in which the Crown court should make a prohibited steps order to include cases in which the offences were committed against any child. Again, it is important to be clear that child sexual abuse is an abhorrent crime that leaves a lasting impact on victims and their families. Those affected have my deepest sympathies, and it is they who we must have in our minds when we debate the measure. The current provision is carefully targeted. It ensures that automatic restrictions on the exercise of parental responsibility apply only when there is a direct and recognised relationship between the offender and the child victims. Our focus on offenders who have committed a serious child sexual abuse offence against a child for whom they hold parental responsibility is based on a desire to tackle the cases involving child sexual abuse with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. This is, as I have already said, a novel and untested change to the law, and the response from perpetrators is unpredictable. We know that perpetrators often seek to use the family courts, as we have already heard, to further traumatise victims, and they could therefore seek to appeal the removal of responsibility.

Does the Minister agree that somebody who has been convicted of a serious child sexual offence against a child for whom they do not have parental responsibility still poses a danger to their own child?

I agree with that point. It is important that we recognise, as I have stated, that there are other measures to remove a person’s parental responsibility for their own child through the family courts. I stress that this is a novel approach. We need to look at the justice system as a whole; we cannot consider our various courts in isolation. The measure being carried out in the Crown court could make an impact on the delays that exist in the family courts, thanks to the backlog that we inherited from the previous Government. I do not wish to exacerbate that, or to traumatise any other children and families who are going through the family courts, by further increasing that backlog. For that reason, we wish to keep the measure quite small and novel, as it is untested at present; however, once we have seen how it works, there is the possibility perhaps to go further in the future.

We all recognise that this is a novel measure. I do not think that anyone is suggesting introducing a blanket measure. For example, we have used the custodial threshold as a narrowing measure and the Liberal Democrats have used a serious sexual offence as a narrowing measure. The Minister is talking about the balance that needs to be struck, but surely the balance is not being struck correctly when the decision is that only a child for whom someone has parental responsibility brings this measure into scope. Surely that is not the right balance, despite the weighing exercise that I appreciate the Minister has to undertake.

It is important to note that a line does need to be drawn, as the hon. Member has recognised; there does have to be a balance. In the previous Government’s version of the Bill, there was a different threshold, which was child rape of any child. We have changed that.; in this version, the measure is any child sexual offence where there is four years or more in custody, but only of the offender’s own child. As a Government, we have determined that as the necessary threshold. That is different from the previous Government’s threshold, which was only child rape. I think that recognises the difficulty in drawing a balance here. We need to take a more limited approach for the time being, especially initially, to ensure that, as I have already said, the family court is not overwhelmed by endless appeals from perpetrators causing even more traumatisation to victims, and especially children. This is essential so that other victims and families with cases in the family court are not detrimentally impacted. Our intention with clause 3 is to tackle the cases with the highest direct harm to the perpetrator’s children. That is why we have chosen to focus the measure in the way that we have. It is important that we properly understand the impact any additional family court proceedings will have on the children and families involved. The cohort in scope of this measure is at the highest risk of immediate harm from the perpetrator, which is why we have chosen to focus on that cohort. This does not prevent an application being made to the family court for parental responsibility to be restricted in other circumstances, as is already available. Amendment 8 suggests using the Crown court to gather evidence on the best interests of the child and the level of risk the offender poses to the child. Doing so would place a significant new burden on the criminal court, meaning less capacity to hear criminal cases and even longer waiting times for those seeking justice. The proper forum for that consideration to happen is the family court, where the judge can hear from all relevant professionals and have access to any necessary reports before making a decision that will always be based on the best interests of the children involved. We are already going further than the previous Government did with their Criminal Justice Bill. Those proposals were limited to child rape; our measure includes not only child rape, but a broader range of child sexual offences. Most important of all, the previous Government talked of change, but failed to deliver. We will deliver this change to protect children. We all have a huge amount of sympathy for families in these circumstances, and I want to do all we can to support them in getting the right outcome for their children. New clause 13, tabled by the hon. Member for Bromsgrove, seeks to expand the instances where the Crown court will be under a duty to restrict the exercise of a perpetrator’s parental responsibility at the point they are sentenced to 10 years or more for a serious sexual offence or violent offence committed against someone with whom they share parental responsibility for the child. I reassure the hon. Member that there are already clear powers in the family court to restrict parental responsibility where it would be in the best interests of the children involved. If a parent or other interested party wishes to make an application, they can do so. Where relevant, the family court is able to and will remove parental responsibility or restrict it to the point that it cannot be exercised in any meaningful way. The existing law is clear that in every case, the court’s paramount consideration must be what will be in the best interests of the child. We cannot rule out that sometimes it may not be in the child’s best interests for parental responsibility to be removed or restricted, particularly where the child is not the direct victim of the offence. However, as the Lord Chancellor and I have said, we look forward to working constructively across the House on this measure. While we cannot support new clause 13, we remain committed to ensuring that the law robustly protects children. I reassure hon. Members that the Government will continue to work to strike the right balance on this issue. For the reasons I have outlined, I urge hon. Members to withdraw their amendments so that we can continue to develop this important legislation in a way that is principled and practical and gets the balance right for children.

I thank the Minister for her comments. While I understand that this is a novel approach and I welcome the measures in the Bill as a first step, we believe that they do not go far enough and still leave children at risk. Question put, That the amendment be made.

3|0|2|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Amendment proposed: 17, in clause 3, page 6, line 1, leave out

“of 4 years or more”.—(Dr Mullan.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

4|0|5|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Amendment proposed: 18, in clause 3, page 6, line 2, leave out

“for whom the offender has parental responsibility.”.—(Dr Mullan.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

5|0|5|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

12:45:00

I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 3, page 6, line 19, after “justice” insert— “or of a child and the non-offending parent”. This amendment would mean that a judge could have discretion to decide not to make a prohibited steps order when it was not deemed in the interest of a child and the non-offending parent. This is a small amendment that would continue to put children at the heart of this Bill. There are times when a court should not make a prohibited steps order in relation to a child. In the evidence session, we heard from many charities that children are not sufficiently heard as victims of crimes, and that their voices are not carried forward. We would like to include a small amendment that would put children and the non-offending parent at the heart of that decision making in the courts.

Amendment 25 was tabled by the hon. Member for Eastbourne, for whom I have much respect, and seeks to amend clause 3 to allow the Crown court discretion not to make a prohibited steps order in cases where it considers such an order not to be in the best interests of the child or the non-offending parent. Let me begin by acknowledging the intent behind this amendment. It is of course right that we consider the welfare of children and the rights of non-offending parents in all decisions made by the court. However, the Government cannot support this amendment for several reasons. The clause as drafted already strikes a careful and considered balance between protecting children and respecting judicial oversight. We have included a narrowly defined exemption to allow the Crown court the flexibility not to make a prohibited steps order, which is a section 8 order under the Children Act 1989, where it would not be in the interests of justice to do so. That provision is intended to cover exceptional circumstances where the Crown court does not consider it to be in the interests of justice, which may arise from unusual facts or a case that is particularly complex. It ensures a degree of flexibility without undermining the core safeguarding purpose of the provision in the Bill. The family court is the appropriate forum for determining what would be in the best interests of children and navigating the complexities of individual family circumstances. It is uniquely equipped to consider the full facts of each individual case, drawing on the expertise of all relevant professionals and supported by any necessary reports. That enables the judge to make a fully informed decision, one that is always guided by the paramount principle of the child’s best interests. The Crown court simply is not equipped to carry out that detailed consideration. Legislation already provides a route for family members to bring an application to the family court, so it can consider whether the order should be varied or discharged and whether a more tailored order or other family court orders are required, and ensure that any order is consistent with the best interests of the child or children involved in the individual circumstances. This avenue is still open for families where the Crown court has made an order under the provisions of clause 4. Alongside that existing route into the family court, we are also providing a clear new route in certain circumstances. If the offender is acquitted of the relevant offence, or their sentence is reduced to less than four years—I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify this point, because it was raised when I gave evidence to the Committee—the local authority is under a duty to bring the matter back before the family court. This ensures that decisions remain responsive to the best interests of the child, without compromising the initial safeguarding intent of the judge. The Government are committed to ensuring that the justice system protects children from further harm from such offenders. The provisions in clause 3 are a vital part of that commitment. I also place on record the Government’s commitment to consulting on a new victims’ code, specifically with the intention of addressing concerns, raised by the hon. Member for North East Hampshire, regarding how we can ensure that child victims are at the centre of the justice system. As she has said, for the first time ever, children are considered victims in their own right for crimes such as domestic abuse, in law; but, as we know, in practice that sadly is not the reality for many child victims. Therefore this Government are determined to go further. Under our new consultation on the victims’ code, which we are hoping to launch later this year, we will make it a key focus to ensure that the code works for all victims, with a particular focus on children in mind. I understand the reasons why the hon. Member for Eastbourne has tabled this amendment, but I hope that he and the hon. Member for North East Hampshire are reassured that there are already strong provisions in place to ensure that the family court can consider the interests of the children involved in these types of cases, and their families. As such, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw amendment 25.

I thank the Minister for her assurances. As with our previous amendment, I look forward to working with her on improving the family court. However, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner, women’s and children’s charities, and victims strongly urged us all to ensure that children and non-offending parents are at the heart of the criminal justice system, so I believe that this is an important amendment. Question put, That the amendment be made.

6|0|2|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

I beg to move amendment 19, in clause 3, page 6, line 20, leave out from “not” to end of line 25 and insert “ceases to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal. (5A) A prohibited steps order made under this section does not cease to have effect if the sentence is reduced, on appeal, so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of 4 years or more.” This amendment would ensure that a prohibited steps order would cease to have effect if the offender is acquitted of the offence on appeal. It would also require that a prohibited steps order remain in effect where a sentence is reduced on appeal so that it is no longer a life sentence or a term of imprisonment or detention of four years or more. I will keep my remarks brief. As we have said, these measures require balance and consideration for all parties concerned. We were surprised that the Government’s proposed measure would not cause a prohibited steps orders to automatically fall away if someone is acquitted of an offence. It might seem obvious to say this, but if someone is acquitted of an offence, they are innocent. They have not done anything in the eyes of the law, so I struggle to see why we would continue to insist that, if they are subject to a prohibited steps order, the onus is on them to get it removed. On the other side of things, if a prohibited steps order is in place and has not been challenged, and someone remains guilty but is on a lesser sentence, the balance falls in the other direction and it should remain in place. Although she may tell me that this was our position in government too, I am interested in hearing from the Minister why the Government do not feel that it is appropriate for such an order to be removed if someone is acquitted.

The amendment seeks to amend the process in clause 3 if an offender has been acquitted or had their sentence reduced on appeal. The Bill provides a clear route for considering a prohibited steps order following an appeal that has resulted in an acquittal or a reduction in the offender’s sentence. In such cases, the relevant local authority will be under a duty to bring an application to the family court to consider whether the original order should be upheld, varied or discharged. The drafting of the amendment is deficient and risks creating confusion. It would provide that any prohibited steps order made under proposed new section 10C of the Children Act 1989 would cease to have effect where a person is acquitted, effectively discharging the order. In practice, there would be no order in place to discharge the original prohibited steps order, and therefore no documentary evidence that the order had been discharged. Compounding that, the amendment would retain an obligation for the relevant local authority to make an application to the family court to consider the prohibited steps order, under proposed new section 10D(2), and yet there would be no order for the family court to consider, because it would have ceased to have effect. In short, the amendment would not make sense in practice and would risk creating confusion in a context where clarity is particularly important.

I thank the Minister for that feedback. Perhaps we need to consider how the amendment is drafted, but does she accept the principle? There is no other example I can think of where someone is acquitted of an offence, because they are innocent, but they remain subject to any provisions whatever that were related to the conviction. Perhaps the amendment needs to be redrafted, but surely the Minister agrees in principle that someone should not be subjected to a consequence of a conviction that has been overturned.

We need to remember that for a criminal case to have been brought, the child or another party will have made an allegation of serious sexual abuse committed against that child, and that will have been followed by criminal proceedings and an initial guilty verdict. The relationship between the child and the accused parent may have completely broken down during that process. When the family court reviews the case, the judge will undertake a holistic review of all the circumstances, including the acquittal, before deciding what is in the best interests of the child. We must also remember that the prohibited steps order does not form part of the sentence when it is made by the Crown court. The order is not part of the punishment, or an additional punishment, for an offender; it is a tool to protect children who have been the victims of a dreadful crime, and their families. Even where the individual is acquitted—I have huge sympathy for those who are found innocent and acquitted—it is likely that the case will have gone through lengthy proceedings, and complex family dynamics will be involved. We must keep in mind the overarching aim of protecting children and doing what is best for them. That is why the order will not be automatically discharged following a successful appeal. I think it is important that if there is a successful appeal, there is a clearly defined process during which the best interests of the children involved are considered, which is why we have put that measure in place. We understand that following a successful appeal, it is important that decisions about a prohibited steps order are made quickly. That is why the process already included in clause 3 requires the local authority to make the application within 30 days of the acquittal. By placing the duty to make the application on the local authority, we are reducing the burden on the families involved, at what will already be a difficult and potentially traumatic time. Moving the proceedings to the family court centres deliberations in the correct forum. The family court will consider whether varying, discharging or, indeed, upholding the order will be in the best interests of the children involved, which I am sure we can agree is what we all want.

I am struggling to understand either the legal or the ethical distinction that says that someone who is acquitted at trial should be in a fundamentally different position from someone who is acquitted following an appeal and has their conviction overturned. Surely the practical results should be the same. In every other part of the criminal justice process that I have encountered, they are.

That goes to the heart of why we have kept these measures as niche and tight as possible—because they are quite novel. We are restricting parental responsibility where an offender has been found guilty in a Crown court, with a jury and a judge, of any sexual offence against their own child for which they will be sentenced to four years or more in prison. That is incredibly traumatic for the child and family involved. The person will have already been found guilty. This is not similar to cases in which someone is acquitted and a prohibited steps order can be removed immediately. We have to consider the impact on the child. These are offences that the perpetrator will have been found guilty of, in a court of law, against their own child.

As the Minister will be aware, where the Court of Appeal overturns a criminal conviction for a serious offence such as this, it will generally be because there was a serious flaw in the original trial that has left it invalid. Even in those circumstances, the Court of Appeal may grant a retrial rather than overturning the conviction. I understand the point the Minister is making about the trauma to the family and child, but would that not apply equally to someone who is acquitted at the original trial, in which case should the court not also be considering it in the event of a not guilty verdict? I really am struggling to understand why a conviction being overturned on appeal is substantively different from a not guilty verdict.

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I will happily answer that point. We are not saying that we would not remove the prohibited steps order; of course there will be a route to remove it. If the offender or alleged perpetrator is then acquitted through the Court of Appeal, there should always be a route to do that, and there will be within 30 days. However, the correct route for doing that is the family court, which will have all the reports available to determine the best interests of that child’s welfare, given everything they have been through, rather than the Crown court, which is not equipped to make that assessment.

Can the Minister give me any other example in our legal system where someone who has suffered a consequence directly as a result of a conviction that is then overturned is required to take further steps to unpick a consequence that flows from that overturned conviction? I cannot think of any. If someone is exonerated, everything falls away. This measure is specifically linked to someone being found guilty; if they are then essentially found not guilty, they will have to take further steps. Nobody else who is essentially found innocent has to do other things to get things removed from them.

The shadow Minister cannot think of any and, off the top of my head, stood here right now, I cannot think of any either, but that goes to the heart of the reason why we need to keep these novel measures quite tight—it is because of their potential impact. Primarily, my interest, and the interest of the Government, is to protect children and child victims, and I put my faith in the family court system to do what is in the best interest of the child following an acquittal, given everything that that child—that victim—has been through. We must remember that if the perpetrator is acquitted in the Court of Appeal, there is still a child victim and a crime that has been committed against that child.

With respect, there is not a victim. The person has been acquitted, and there is not a child that has suffered anything, any more than if the person was found not guilty in the first place. I respect the Minister’s comments on how the amendment might be better drafted, but the Government have to accept that they are introducing an extremely unusual interpretation of what happens to someone when they are found not guilty, compared with every other bit of the justice system that I am aware of. Someone who is found not guilty is innocent; the court has decided that the accusation made did not transpire.

That is exactly why we have included a route to remove the prohibited steps order, and we feel the appropriate route for that is the family court. That is the measure in the Bill, and it still stands that that is the safest route to protect the welfare of the child in the circumstances, given what—I was going to say, “I can only imagine”, but I cannot even imagine it—will be an immensely traumatising and awful experience for everyone involved. For that reason, I urge the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment.

The Minister made heroic efforts to explain the logic and context of how we ordinarily deal with these matters. We think the prohibited steps orders are an important enhancement for the safeguarding of children, but I cannot imagine a scenario, even in circumstances in which the offence has not been found proven, in which the children the Minister talks about will not have had the involvement of social services and other steps taken to ensure their wellbeing more generally. This measure is specifically about parental responsibility, and I find it difficult to understand why the Government are setting a precedent that an innocent party should be required to take further steps to unpick a consequence that flows specifically from their conviction. I appreciate the feedback on the drafting of the amendment, and I will not press it to a vote, but the Government need to think very carefully about the precedent they are setting in relation to what happens to innocent people. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Samantha Dixon.)

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